I.

LEGAL PROFESSION
B. CONCEPT
1. Argosino Bar Matter No. 712 July 13, 1995
Facts - This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar
applicant. Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul
Camaligan but was sentenced with homicide through reckless imprudence after he
pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years imprisonment where he applied for a
probation thereafter which was granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the
bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allow him
to take the attorneys oath of office averring that his probation was already terminated.
The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was
terminated.
Issue - WON Argosino may take oath of office.
Held - The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar
members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general
public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of
legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify
that he has reformed and have become a responsible member of the community
through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify he is morally
fit to the admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the
proceeding be furnished to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.
2. PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.
July 30, 1979
Facts - Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died
on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their
firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local
custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partners name in a professional
firms name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater
Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the
individual members of the firm.

Issue - WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of
the partners who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO
Held - In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the
SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations
between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could
give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop
the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able
lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firms reputation established
by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property. 11 Thus, it has been stated that
the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of
practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication
as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.
3. Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)
Facts - Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case
pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was
appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He
commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as
counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel
de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed
to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which
could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So
Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue - Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the
petitioner is a grave abuse of discretion?
Held - No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty
rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is
burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and
is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the
performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered
without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or
other officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor
General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as
counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants
counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney
asked either by him or by the new counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs.
Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant,
a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The
right of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional
right of the highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law
unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy
them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a
counsel de officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the
accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31,
1930)

II. THE PRACTICE OF LAW

A. DEFINITION
4. RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.
Facts - Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The
Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection,
based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice.
Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section
1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
[Link], a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue 1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming Monsods appointment.
Held 1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and
other works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986
constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was
liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the
practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective
work. The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star,
that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers,
prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage
in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most corporation
lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who
passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then
worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and
also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have
been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyerentrepreneur, etc.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec
Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is
essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that
the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence,
there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
II. THE PRACTICE OF LAW
B. Supervision and Control
5. IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful
Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Facts - Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act,

in 1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations
from 1946 up to and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%

1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall
be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.
Issue - Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
Ruling - Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers
of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an
indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take
account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for
1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was
based under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from
1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close
to the end of World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who
may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power
to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by
Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute
the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes
to declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence,
it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an
petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
6. In the matter of the INTEGRATION OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES [49 SCRA 22, January 9, 1973]
Facts -The Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest
recommendation on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in
Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and consistently with the views and counsel
received from its [the Commissions] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar that (the) Honorable
(Supreme) Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible
through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. The petition in

Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine
Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing
provincial and other local Bar associations.
Issues (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
Held - YES. On all issues.
The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning x
x x the admission to the practice of law.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass
of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable, within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
The Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, ordained the integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16,
1973.
II. THE PRACTICE OF LAW
C. Citizenship
7. PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

Facts - Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law
until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free
medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen
in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General
in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice.
Issue - WON petitioner may still resume practice? YES
Held - Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court

satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage
in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied
to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen
of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because
all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]. Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost
his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the
authority to do so, conditioned on:
o the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
o the payment of professional tax;
o the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this
is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and
o the retaking of the lawyers oath.
DECISION: GRANTED.