Telecom, Media & Entertainment
Spectrum Valuation
A Holistic Approach
Telecom & Media Insights
Issue 55
the way we see it
Contents
Abstract
Introduction
Evolution of Spectrum Auctions
Current Market Opportunity
Challenges in Spectrum Pricing
Risk of Over-bidding
Risk of Under-bidding and Losing
Limitations of Using Range-bound Assumptions
Holistic Approach for Spectrum Pricing
Estimate the Intrinsic Value of Spectrum for the Bidder
Assess Competitive Context
Define the Right Price
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1 Abstract
The mechanism for spectrum allocation1 has evolved over the years from beauty
contests, to lotteries, onto the present market driven auctioning process. In the
coming years, we are going to witness a significant amount of spectrum being put
up for auction. A variety of factors including technological advancements,
increased efficiency of broadcasting technologies, and the tendering of remaining
3G frequencies to meet increasing data demand are combining to create a market
for spectrum. The single biggest challenge for operators in constructing winning
bids for the spectrum is to reconcile the gap between internal valuation and
market perception of the price of the spectrum. Consequently, operators run the
risk of either over-bidding or under-bidding for the assets and losing out in a
competitive auction. It is also pertinent to note that peer market comparisons
serve only a limited purpose while arriving at spectrum pricing. The wide
variation in auction prices around the world makes sole reliance on any such
benchmarking exercises fraught with risk.
In this paper, Capgemini proposes a four-step approach for arriving at the right
price for the spectrum. The first stage involves a comprehensive understanding of
auction specificities and the key success factors for a winning bid. Subsequently,
operators need to quantify the economic value of the license that they can realize.
This is followed by the evaluation of the competitive context wherein they look at
the competitor business case and financial strengths to gauge the expected market
value of spectrum. Finally, the inputs from the earlier stages are aggregated to
define the bid price for the spectrum which maximizes the chances of a successful
bid while being aligned to the operator objectives.
Spectrum Valuation A Holistic Approach
Spectrum allocation refers to the issuance process for usage rights of radio frequency bands of the electronic
spectrum, by the government or the regulator. Currently, the process in most developed markets involves auctions to
arrive at a market determined price for these assets.
2 Introduction
The coming years are
going to witness a
significant amount of
spectrum being put up for
auction
Evolution of Spectrum Auctions
Historically, spectrum allocation has evolved significantly in terms of the
methodologies adopted by governments the world over. In the US, for instance,
the evolution of the spectrum distribution has moved from a
command-and-control structure towards a market-driven process. In the initial
years, the US communications regulator, FCC2, used comparative hearings to
determine spectrum allocation. In this process, applicants set out their cases for
being awarded a license and the licensing authority then determined the best
applicant based on a combination of objective and subjective criteria. As an
evolution from comparative hearings, the FCC tried lotteries in the mid-1980s.
The lottery system was designed to be fair and more transparent than comparative
hearings. However, this system saw the FCC receive thousands of applications.
Spectrum allocations finally moved to a market-driven process through auctions,
which were inherently transparent and encouraged only the serious participants to
take part.
For regulators, auctions offer a potent mechanism for ensuring that the owner of
the spectrumthe governmentreceives a fair value. Moreover, since market
forces are involved in discovering the price for the spectrum, the process is
perceived to be fair.
Current Market Opportunity
Across Europe and most of the developed world, regulators are looking at
spectrum auctions driven by the explicit need to address distinct market
opportunities for next generation services and to raise funds. A combination of
factors is contributing to spectrum release, chief amongst which is the advent of
new technologies and associated spectrum dynamics. Technological developments
have given rise to the usage of the 2.6 GHz spectrum band for LTE3. Similarly,
improvements in broadcasting technologies (such as the advent of DTT4) have led
the industry towards a path of spectrum optimization thereby enabling usage of
existing spectrum for other purposes. This spectrum is part of what has been
considered the digital dividend for the telecom industry. In many European
countries, regulators are eventually looking at tendering the remaining 3G
frequencies as data demand continues to grow driven by the advent of
high-powered smartphones such as the Apple iPhone. Spectrum release is also
tied to local market consolidation. In markets that see mergers and acquisitions
among operators, a portion of spectrum could also be potentially released back
into the open market.
Keeping in mind these market opportunities, a number of European countries
have initiated the process to auction spectrum for next-generation services over
the coming years (see Figure 1).
2
3
4
Federal Communications Commission.
Long Term Evolution.
Digital Terrestrial Television.
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In this paper, we look at key challenges associated with pricing spectrum for a
bidder. We also present the case for a holistic approach that strives to work
beyond the challenges and adopts a highly structured approach towards pricing
spectrum.
Figure 1: Spectrum Auction Calendar
2010
2011
2012
2013
Germany
Italy
Belgium
Singapore
Czech
Europe's first 4G Auction for five 15 MHz
Republic
2.6 GHz and
The regulator
spectrum auction blocks of 2.6 GHz
900 MHz
is expected to 2.6 GHz
of 800 MHz, 1.8
spectrum
auction would
spectrum will start in
release 4G
GHz, 2 GHz and September 2010
likely to be
take place
spectrum in
2.6 GHz took
made
after 2012
2012
France
place in
available in
April 2010
Allocation of 2.6 GHz
2010-11
spectrum is expected in
H2 2010
Denmark
France
Allocation of
The regulator
Spain
800
MHz
completed the
Planned 2.6 and 3.5 GHz
spectrum is
auction for 2.5
auctions in 2010
expected in
GHz in May
2011
2010
Austria
The regulator plans to
UK
Netherlands
auction 2.6 GHz in
Auction of 800
September 2010
MHz and 2.6
Auction of the
GHz proposed
2.6 GHz
3.5 GHz spectrum had
for mid-2010
frequency
been allocated in
completed in Q1
January 2009
2010
2014
Ireland
2.6 GHz
auction is
expected in
2014
Latvia
2.6 GHz
spectrum
allocation
expected after
2014
Legend
Completed
Pending
Source: Various regulator websites; Fitch Ratings, European TelecomsSpectrum Issues for the Fore, November 2009 Note:
The auction dates for certain geographies are Capgemini estimations based on industry interactions
Spectrum Valuation A Holistic Approach
3 Challenges in Spectrum
Pricing
The key challenge for
spectrum acquisition is
less about valuation and
more about pricing
Telcos need to arrive at an optimum price for spectrum based on a combination of
the business-case driven value and the market-perceived value to a contender.
Here, the key challenge is less about valuation and more about pricing. Examples
from recent spectrum auctions are proof of this challenge. For instance, the recent
auctions of remaining 3G blocks in Italy and France led to very different spectrum
prices reflecting contrasting competitive bid situations rather than fundamentally
different economic spectrum value for the bidders. In Italy, three out of the four
Italian operators each bought a block of 5 MHz for 88.8 - 90.2 million (slightly
above the reserve price of 88.7 million) whereas French auctions led to 582
million for two blocks (far above reserve price of 120 million per block).
While operators can have a better understanding of how they value spectrum
based on their own projections (intrinsic value), the market perceptions strongly
vary from market to market and with every round of the auction (market value).
Consequently, telcos face significant challenges in arriving at an optimum price
that will see them win a spectrum bid. The biggest challenge for telcos is to arrive
at a price that will see them neither over-bid nor under-bid. The optimum price is
usually a function of bidders objectives including profitability, need-to-win, brand
image, and other external factors including financing capacity, impact on share
price consequent to winning or losing a bid, or other potential indirect impacts
on future auctions (see Figure 2). Telcos should also exercise caution in using
peer-market comparison techniques such as benchmarking in arriving at an
optimal price.
Figure 2: The Spectrum Pricing Challenge
Optimum Price
Combination of Intrinsic
and Market Values
Intrinsic Value
Price arrived at through
internal business case
To be maximized to ensure
profitable returns from
spectrum
Source: Capgemini TME Strategy Lab Analysis
Market Value
Lowest market-driven price
that can win a bid
To be kept down to the
minimum required to win
the auction
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Risk of Over-bidding
One of the biggest challenges facing mobile operators across the world is to
accurately estimate the perceived importance of spectrum to competitors and the
perceived attraction of newer services to consumers, along with their inclination
to pay. The fluid nature of these assumptions almost always results in mobile
operators ending up bidding significantly higher than what can be called a fair
market price, considering the incremental revenues which would accrue due to
the spectrum assets. A classic example of such a situation was witnessed in the 3G
spectrum auctions in the early part of this decade. While operators over-bid one
another, the bigger challenge proved to be in coming up with applications at price
points that would encourage mass uptake.
The intangible factors involved in valuing spectrum also sometimes play a much
larger role than was intended. A case-in-point is that of Vodafone UK. In 2001,
the operator believed that their market leadership would be under threat if they
did not acquire 3G spectrum at the first auction. Consequently, the company took
a strategic bet on the importance of the spectrum and raised their bid, factoring in
a premium for this strategic potential. When the results were out, it was revealed
that Vodafone paid 6 billion for spectrum for which the other operators O2,
T-Mobile, and Orange paid 4 billion each. This over-bidding accompanied by a
large debt hastened Vodafones decline to a number two position in the market.
Risk of Under-bidding and Losing
While operators face a significant risk of over-bidding in their enthusiasm to
ensure that their bids are accepted, there also exists a real challenge of operators
potentially under-bidding in comparison to their market peers, especially in
single-round auctions. At its core, the key issue around under-bidding lies in
estimating the extent to which competitors can and will stretch themselves in a
bidding war.
Limitations of using Range-bound Assumptions
While the discovery process of optimal spectrum price from a combination of
intrinsic and market price is a popular approach, many telcos also use
peer-market comparison too as a guide for spectrum pricing.
Figure 3: Spectrum Price Paid in Select European 3G Auctions and Worldwide 4G
Auctions in US$/MHz/Pop, in Relation with GDP per Capita
6
UK
5
US $/MHz/Pop
Germany
4
2
Italy
Canada
Denmark
Georgia
Bulgaria
0
0
10,000
Austria
Czech Republic Belgium
Sweden
US
Denmark
Switzerland
20,000
40,000
30,000
50,000
Norway
60,000
70,000
GDP per Capita
Source: Capgemini TME Strategy Lab Analysis; Telecom ParisTech, Spectrum ValuationPrinciples and Methodology,
October 2008; Fitch Ratings, European TelecomsSpectrum Issues to the Fore, November 2009. Note: 3G auction prices
adjusted with 2007 exchange rates.
Spectrum Valuation A Holistic Approach
Spectrum price is affected
by a host of local factors,
resulting in wide variations
across geographies
A key drawback of using comparisons from other geographies as a reliable
approach towards valuing spectrum lies in the fact that the price paid for
spectrum in each market is closely tied to a host of local factors, resulting in wide
variations in these values between geographies (see Figure 3). While broader
metrics around price of spectrum per capita can be derived from other markets
and used as pointers, in reality, a combination of macro and micro factors impact
spectrum valuation. An indicative set of such factors include the market
saturation, threat of new entrants, number of licenses on offer, round of spectrum
licensing, financial strength of incumbents, population density, and economic
spending power of potential consumers in that region. Under these circumstances,
it is prudent that operators use such benchmarking approaches as only one of the
input methods towards spectrum valuation rather than as a full-fledged
methodology that drives their auction strategy, given its simplistic approach to the
complex issue.
Telecom, Media & Entertainment
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4 Holistic Approach for
Spectrum Pricing
Based on projects conducted for operators in different geographical settings,
Capgemini has built a robust methodology for a successful spectrum bid process,
which captures the key lessons from various engagements (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Capgemini Consulting Approach to Successful Bidding
Analyze
auction
specificities
and critical
success
factors
4
Quantify economic value of license for
the bidder (intrinsic value):
Estimate net present value (NPV)
with and without new spectrum
Regulators
call for
license bid
Assess competitive context (rational
part of market value):
Estimate NPV with and without new
spectrum
Definition of bidding tactics
(right price):
Leveraging auction rules
Assessing expected
competitor behavior
Benchmarking and
estimation of
'psychological price
points'
License
Bid
Build up the bid book
Manage external communication with the regulator and the market
Covered in the Study
Out of Scope for the Study
Source: Capgemini TME Strategy Lab Analysis
Analyze Auction Specificities
The details of the spectrum allocation directive, as defined by the regulator,
should be analyzed in-depth as the first step of the spectrum valuation process.
The specificities of the allocation process help in the identification of the critical
success factors for a successful spectrum bid. The various clauses for the spectrum
allocation process also give a sense of the attractiveness of participating in the
process, by detailing parameters such as amount of spectrum on offer, coverage
obligations, and the bid process. The eligibility criteria laid down by the regulator
also gives a sense of the likely competitors during the spectrum auctioning
process.
The details of the auction specifics help in establishing the various analyses that
would need to be carried out. For example, if there are multiple blocks of
spectrum available, a detailed analysis is required to understand whether all of
them are identical in terms of the allocation process and fit with the bidders
requirements. This step is crucial in establishing the timelines for the various
steps subsequent to this stage.
Estimate the Intrinsic Value of Spectrum for the Bidder
Successful acquisition of spectrum assets results in potential revenue uplift,
through provisioning of new services, ability to accommodate a greater number of
customers on the network, cost savings, and by preventing competitors from
taking certain positioning in the market. The intrinsic value of spectrum captures
this potential revenue uplift by assessing the difference between the operator net
Spectrum Valuation A Holistic Approach
present value (NPV) with and without new spectrum (see Figure 5). However, the
analysis of benefits accruing from new spectrum must also factor in the cost of
licence and coverage obligations.
Figure 5: Estimation of Spectrum Value by Calculating the Deviation from Base Case
NPV
NPV
NPV without new spectrum, where
the assets are acquired by
competitors
Value might be dependent on
spectrum acquisition by
competitors
Spectrum Value
NPV with new spectrum
The value will be dependent on
spectrum acquisition by
competitors
Current estimate of NPV
(without accounting for
new spectrum)
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
NPV Net Present Value
Source: Capgemini TME Strategy Lab Analysis
The NPV from the scenario where the operator is unable to secure new spectrum
might be drastically different from the base case NPV. Strategic plans rarely
capture the base case scenario, which estimates the NPV in the absence of fresh
spectrum allocation in the market. Alternative strategies to compensate for the
absence of additional spectrum such as investments in other technologies and
densification of existing network need to be captured in this analysis. The
possibility of other players in the market establishing a strong competitive
advantage through the acquisition of new spectrum and the resultant negative
impact must also be factored into the business case.
The business case and hence the intrinsic value is specific for each operator. It is a
function of its positioning in the market, its long term strategy for utilizing the
spectrum, and its existing assets such as the network infrastructure. Consequently,
the business case for the market leader will vary significantly from that of the
third or fourth placed player in the market for the same spectrum asset.
The intrinsic value for markets with a scarcity of spectrum has an additional
component to reflect the value of obtaining spectrum to prevent the access to this
asset for competitors. In these cases, pre-emption revenues need to be considered
and the intrinsic value of spectrum should be adjusted accordingly to a higher
figure (see Figure 6).
Assess Competitive Context
In order to arrive at a winning bid, telecom operators also need to consider the
other crucial piece of the puzzle, the market price. The market price is the
minimum amount an operator would need to pay to ensure a successful bid for
spectrum. The market price is a function of the willingness of operators to pay for
spectrum assets, which also reflects the spectrum scarcity in the geography in
which it is being auctioned. If there is enough spectrum for each potentially
interested player, asset value will come close to the reserve price defined by the
9
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Figure 6: Intrinsic Value from Spectrum Acquisition Reflecting Pre-emption Revenues
NPV
Benefits from new spectrum
Benefits from
preventing competitors
from obtaining new
spectrum
Pre-emption
revenues
Incremental
revenues
Cost
savings
Source: Capgemini TME Strategy Lab Analysis
regulator. On the contrary, if there is perceived scarcity, operators are likely to
increase price to their limit (either maximum intrinsic value or perceived value for
competitors).
A holistic approach is
required to arrive at the
right spectrum price
For instance, European 2.6 GHz LTE auctions are currently characterised by
availability of significant amount of spectrum (2*70MHz) in comparison to the
800 MHz LTE spectrum. This led to very low price levels for the 2.6 GHz
spectrum as compared to 800 MHz LTE auctions where spectrum is more
constrained and characterised by better propagation features. In Germany where
both spectrum blocks were allocated in the same process, price per MHz for 800
MHz band went 32 times higher the price for 2.6 GHz band.
The spectrum allocation process may also be designed to influence market prices,
as regulators may try and meet their governments quest for new budget
contributions. The tendering process may artificially boost spectrum value by
granting asymmetrical features to the various auctioned spectrum blocks. Bidders
might be tempted to bid higher for blocks that are offered without coverage,
national roaming, or wholesale obligations. Similarly, some regulators tend to
adapt the auctioning process to the level of expected competition. When the
degree of competitiveness is unclear, regulators may favor low visibility auctions
(sealed auctions) whereas clear demand for spectrum may lead to simultaneous
multi-round auctions. The reserve price of the spectrum also plays a significant
role in impacting the market value. If positioned too high, they will deter
contenders from bidding or drive a wait and see situation as in Italy in 2009
when the 3G reserve price was set at close to 460 million. On the contrary, when
positioned low in poor economic situation, they tend to polarize bids.
To estimate the market value of the spectrum, it is necessary for a bidder to
assess the probable bid for each of its competitors. The assessment will have
several elements such as quantifying the intrinsic value for each competitor
through a business case, evaluating their ability to invest capital, stock exchange
and shareholder sentiments, and assessing the character traits of likely
competitors to ascertain their desire to emerge as the winner of the auction.
Building the business case for competitors is a complex but insightful task which
helps to establish the amount competitors are likely to bid if they behave
rationally. The NPV analysis will be conducted similarly in many respects to the
one for the bidder, although less detailed. It provides a fairly reliable indication of
Spectrum Valuation A Holistic Approach
10
operator intent as most of these players are presently under fairly strict cost
management scrutiny, therefore exhibiting less unpredictable behaviors. Specific
customer dynamics profiles need to be built for each competitor within an overall
consistent acquisition and churn market model. Similarly, specific network
profiles have to be built for each provider.
Bidders will exhibit different bidding behaviors, based on the style of their
management, their risk appetite, their willingness to get a good bargain, and their
estimates of what a winning price would be. An aggressive bidder will use its
maximum NPV (or the competitors maximum NPV if required) whereas a
cautious player will just try and position slightly above the first loser, keeping
room for maneuver within its own NPV range. Such behavioral patterns will help
weigh the various NPV calculations made according to possible alternative market
and technology scenarios. Hence, psychological levels should not be neglected
when fine-tuning competitive price expectations.
Define the Right Price
In the end, defining the right price will be about designing bidding tactics and
price levels that maximize winning chances vis--vis planned competitive bids,
while being compliant with the bidders objectives and external constraints. It is
imperative that the right price captures the operators motivations for acquiring
spectrum while in some cases profitability will be the operative criterion for the
interest in spectrum and in other cases the bidder might want to win the auction
at any price, because of other factors.
Complex auction processes, which combine various criteria create opportunities
for several approaches that need to be considered both for the bidder and their
competitors.
In order to assess the probability of winning for each potential bid, we identify
competitors possible behavioral response and probabilities for various scenarios
in a bid. These behaviors depend on the competitors business case but also on
non-rational elements such as psychological price points. Potential psychological
price-points can be gathered through benchmarking references from spectrum
allocations in international markets as well as by studying the local context. For
example, previous allocation process in the home country, prior announcements
around spectrum value, and analyst projections all contribute to setting these
check-points for the bidders.
In the case of the intrinsic value being far above the estimated competitor
willingness to pay, the right price will be defined by market value. In the case that
the intrinsic value is lower than market value two types of behaviors are possible.
If there is strategic value in winning the spectrum (e.g. brand benefit, better
alignment with strategic goals, improvement in customer experience) that is not
reflected in NPV calculation, an operator can bid above intrinsic value to
maximize its chances to win. In other cases, some operators adopt a rational
behavior and bid around their most probable intrinsic value.
In conclusion, arriving at the right price for spectrum is a complicated exercise. It
requires appraisal of both the bidders business case as well as that of other
competitors that are participating in the exercise. A holistic approach that factors
in all the variables in the process is required to arrive at the right price. The bid
price for spectrum should maximize the probability of winning the bid, while
being compliant with the bidders objectives and external considerations.
11
About the Authors
Philippe Blanc is a vice president within the Telecom, Media & Entertainment
practice of Capgemini Consulting. He is a specialist in strategy & market-oriented
topics, including bid strategy. Philippe has successfully led many European license
and spectrum acquisition projects, in the mobile context (3G auction, 3G beauty
contest), fixed (wireless local loop), media (radio, m-TV licenses) as well as
content (football rights auctions). He is based in Paris.
Nathalie Bes is a principal within Capgeminis Telecom, Media & Entertainment
Consulting practice. She is a specialist in marketing and technology strategy as
well as in business modelling. She has successfully led several spectrum
acquisition projects including auctions, for new entrants as well as for existing
players. She is based in Paris.
Subrahmanyam KVJ is a senior consultant in the TME Strategy Lab. His recent
work focused on the convergence of the telecom and media markets, and the
mobile industry. Prior to joining the Lab, he worked with a leading electronics
manufacturing services firm in a project management role. He is based in
Mumbai.
About Capgemini and the
Collaborative Business Experience
Capgemini, one of the
world's foremost providers
of consulting, technology and
outsourcing services, enables its clients to
transform and perform through
technologies. Capgemini provides its
clients with insights and capabilities that
boost their freedom to achieve superior
results through a unique way of working,
the Collaborative Business ExperienceTM.
The Group relies on its global delivery
model called Rightshore, which aims to
For more information contact:
Jerome Buvat
Head of Strategic Research
Telecom, Media & Entertainment
[Link]@[Link]
+44 (0) 870 905 3186
Copyright 2010 Capgemini. All rights reserved.
get the right balance of the best talent
from multiple locations, working as one
team to create and deliver the optimum
solution for clients. Present in more than
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