NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS
MANHUNTING: A METHODOLOGY FOR FINDING
PERSONS OF NATIONAL INTEREST
by
Steven Marks
Thomas Meer
Matthew Nilson
June 2005
Thesis Advisor:
Thesis Advisor:

Gordon McCormick
Anna Simons

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Manhunting: A Methodology for Finding Persons of National Interest
6. AUTHOR(S) Steven Marks, Thomas Meer, Matthew Nilson
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

The asymmetrical threats that challenge U.S. national policies are not large standing armies, but rather
individuals who seek to usurp and coerce U.S. national interests. The nature of todays threats call for the U.S.
military to change from finding, fixing, and destroying the enemys forces to identifying, locating and capturing
rogue individuals in order to destroy networks. To counter such threats, the USG will have to quickly and
efficiently identify and find these targets globally.
Unfortunately, no military doctrine, framework or process currently exists for finding and apprehending
these Persons of National Interest (PONIs). Since military planners and intelligence analysts are neither educated
nor trained in the methods or procedures necessary to find and capture PONIs, this thesis will propose a
methodology to do so. This involves the development of an analytical process, and an organizational structure and
procedure to identify and locate PONIs. Consequently, the United States governments ability to prosecute the war
on terrorism today, and to find and apprehend PONIs in the future, depends on its ability to develop and
institutionalize a comprehensive manhunting strategy now.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Fugitives, Manhunting, Manhunts, Terrorism, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW),
Investigative process, Counter-leadership Operations (CLO), High Value Targets, Information
Collection, Deception and Denial, Personnel Targeting Operations (PTO)
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

MANHUNTING: A METHODOLOGY FOR FINDING PERSONS OF
NATIONAL INTEREST
Steve M. Marks
Major, United States Army
B.S., University of Missouri, 1992
Thomas M. Meer
Captain, United States Air Force
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1996
Matthew T. Nilson
Major, United States Army
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1993
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2005

Author:

Steven M. Marks
Thomas M. Meer
Matthew T. Nilson

Approved by:

Dr. Gordon McCormick

Thesis Advisor

Dr. Anna Simons

Thesis Advisor

Dr. Gordon McCormick

Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis
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iv

ABSTRACT
The asymmetrical threats that challenge U.S. national policies are not large
standing armies, but rather individuals who seek to usurp and coerce U.S. national
interests. The nature of todays threats call for the U.S. military to change from finding,
fixing, and destroying the enemys forces to identifying, locating and capturing rogue
individuals in order to destroy networks. To counter such threats, the USG will have to
quickly and efficiently identify and find these targets globally.
Unfortunately, no military doctrine, framework or process currently exists for
finding and apprehending these Persons of National Interest (PONIs). Since military
planners and intelligence analysts are neither educated nor trained in the methods or
procedures necessary to find and capture PONIs, this thesis will propose a methodology
to do so. This involves, the development of an analytical process, and an organizational
structure and procedure to identify and locate PONIs. Consequently, the United States
governments ability to prosecute the war on terrorism today, and to find and apprehend
PONIs in the future, depends on its ability to develop and institutionalize a
comprehensive manhunting strategy now.

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vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
A.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................2
1.
Primary Research Question ................................................................2
2.
Subsidiary Research Questions ..........................................................2
B.
METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................2
C.
ORGANIZATION ...........................................................................................3
D.
BENEFITS OF STUDY...................................................................................4

II.

MANHUNTING...........................................................................................................5
A.
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5
B.
FRAMEWORK................................................................................................6
1.
The U.S. Militarys Effectiveness in Manhunting.............................7
2.
The Role of Frameworks in Conceptualizing Problems.................10
3.
Two Forms of Manhunts ...................................................................13
4.
Categorizing Fugitives .......................................................................13

III.

MANHUNTING THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES.................................................19

A.
MANHUNTING STRATEGIC ELEMENTS .............................................19
B.
MANEUVER ..................................................................................................20
C.
DETECTABILITY. .......................................................................................24
1.
Visibility ..............................................................................................24
2.
Acuity ..................................................................................................25
D.
EXPOSURE....................................................................................................27
1.
Accessibility ........................................................................................29
2.
Vulnerability.......................................................................................29
E.
APPREHENSION AVOIDANCE STRATEGIES......................................30

IV.

INVESTIGATIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES ..........................................33

A.
WHAT DO FUGITIVES DO?......................................................................34
B.
THE BASICS..................................................................................................35
C.
MIR AMAL KASI CASE STUDY ...............................................................36
D.
CARLOS THE JACKAL CASE STUDY....................................................38
E
USAMA BIN LADEN: CRITICAL QUESTIONS .....................................39
F.
LOCATING THE FUGITIVE......................................................................40
G.
PURSUING THE FUGITIVE ......................................................................42
1.
Whos Who in the Zoo...................................................................42
2.
Mistakes are Made.............................................................................43

V.

DECEPTION AND THE FUGITIVE......................................................................45

A.
DECEPTION DEFINED...............................................................................45
B.
THE BASIC PARTS OF A DECEPTION OPERATION .........................46
1.
Objective .............................................................................................46
2.
Deceiver...............................................................................................46
3.
Deceivers Target ...............................................................................47
4.
Deception Story ..................................................................................47
vii

C.

5.
Means ..................................................................................................47
ORIENTATION.............................................................................................51
1.
Nature of the PONI and His Organization ......................................51
2.
PONIs Denial and Deception Resources.........................................51
3.
PONIs Denial and Deception History .............................................52
4.
PONIs Culture ..................................................................................52
5.
PONIs Knowledge of His Deception Target...................................53
a.
Biases.......................................................................................53
b.
Intelligence and the Decision Making Process......................54
c.
PONIs Strategies for Denial and Deception.........................55

VI.

A MANHUNTING METHOD..................................................................................57
A.
A MANHUNTING PROCESS......................................................................60

VII.

NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................63

A.
CURRENT FRAMEWORK .........................................................................63
B.
FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY SHORTCOMINGS ...............64
C.
NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY ..............................................................................66
1.
Relationship Development ................................................................67
2.
Diverse, Redundant, and Adaptive Relationships ..........................68
D.
AFFILIATION NETWORKS AND LONGITUDINALANALYSIS........68
E.
MAPPING THE NEXUS ..............................................................................69
1.
Familial ...............................................................................................69
2.
Educational.........................................................................................70
3.
Political................................................................................................70
4.
Religious..............................................................................................71
5.
Economic.............................................................................................72
6.
Criminal ..............................................................................................72
7.
Military ...............................................................................................72
8.
Ethno-linguistic / Cultural ................................................................73
F.
STRENGTHS OF NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY (NT) .....................................73

VIII. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE ..................................75

A.
A MANHUNTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.........................75
B.
AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURE...................................................78
IX

CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................83
A.
THE FOUNDATION.....................................................................................83
B.
THE ROAD AHEAD.....................................................................................84
1.
Doctrine...............................................................................................84
2.
Training ..............................................................................................85
3.
Operational Structure .......................................................................86
C.
CLOSING THOUGHTS ...............................................................................87

APPENDIX A.

ICTY INDICTEE STATISTCS........................................................89

APPENDIX B.

MANHUNTING CASE STUDY LIST.............................................95

APPENDIX C.

DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................99
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LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................101

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................107

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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Figure 6.
Figure 7.
Figure 8.

Fixity and Mobility Concept Chart ..................................................................22

Electromagnetic Spectrum (from Nave, 2005) ................................................25
Visibility Advantage Diagram .........................................................................26
Visibility and Acuity Overlay..........................................................................27
Mutually Exclusive and Apprehension Zones .................................................28
A Manhunting Process.....................................................................................60
Proposed Manhunting Organizational Structure..............................................77
Organizational Procedure.................................................................................80

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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.

Manhunting Characterization Table (Case Study Examples)..........................17

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank our thesis advisors Professor Gordon McCormick and
Professor Anna Simons, the Defense Analysis professors and staff, Professor David
Tucker and the Center for Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, LTG Dailey and
USSOCOM's Center for Special Operations, Mr. Thomas O'Connell, Mr. Jon Lellenberg,
Col John Pryor, Major Brian Sweeney, Detective Superintendent Richard Gething,
Detective Sergeant Stephen Lane, Detective John Anderson, Mr. Peter Dunnicliffe, LTC
David Hudson, Major Chris Job, Major Jiles Timms, US Marshal Chief Inspector John
Clark, FBI Supervisory Special Agent James McNamara, Ms. Katherine Wilson, Mr.
David Fechheimer, Mr. Dennis Renken, SGM (Ret) Billy Waugh, Mr. John Dodson, Dr
Frank Stech, Mr. Steven "Al" Human, Mr. Tom Carroll, Mr. Paul Morgan, Mr. Don
Schuler, and Detective Roger Kelly for their assistance with our thesis project. Also, the
following organizations were open to our research: the FBI, DIA, NGA, CIA, JWAC, US
Marshal Service, the San Francisco Police Gang Task Force, London Metropolitan Police
(New Scotland Yard), British National Criminal Intelligence Service, British Security
Service (MI-5), and British Defence Intelligence Staff. Their support, comments, and
experience helped shape this document.

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xvi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the September 11 attacks, the United States government has drastically
shifted its priorities to the Global War on Terror. Billions of dollars have been spent
setting up various counterterrorist centers. Academics and analysts alike have written on
the perplexing issues surrounding terrorism and terrorists. Most of this work focuses on
how to attack and dismantle networks, the root causes of terrorism, the psychology
behind suicide bombers, etc. However, the most important aspect in the war on terror
finding and apprehending Persons of National Interest (PONI)has received virtually no
attention. Little research has been conducted on the nature of manhunting, and this is
what the U.S. military, justice, and intelligence communities are currently engaged in.
One problem for the U.S. military is that its traditional rules for conducting
combat operations do not necessarily apply to the non-conventional threats posed by
terrorists. It is nonsensical to assume that the same methods, frameworks, and strategies
used by military planners to defeat a conventional enemys combat power apply to
finding a clandestine fugitive. Further, todays military has numerous new tasks that it
must perform in the Global War on Terror, and current U.S. military doctrine does not
address many, let alone all of them. This thesis offers a first step in defining the
problems specifically associated with manhunting.

In this thesis we develop a

framework, methodology, and process to assist military planners and intelligence analysts
in identifying, locating, and capturing Persons of National Interest (PONI).

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xviii

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 11 September 2001, the United States military has been actively pursuing
terrorists and disrupting the terrorist support infrastructure.

Although the U.S.

government (USG) saw initial successes in Afghanistan, the senior al-Qaeda leadership
namely Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahirihave avoided capture. With all the
technological resources available to the United States government and her allies, we are
still unable to locate and capture these elusive men. In fact, Usama bin Laden has been
on the FBIs Most Wanted terrorist list since the bombings of the United States embassies
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya in August 1998, and he has yet to be
brought to justice.
In October 2001, the United States Military sent Special Operations Forces into
the Northern territories of Afghanistan to assist the Northern Alliance with the overthrow
of the Taliban regime and the destruction of al-Qaeda. In December 2001, the hunt for
bin Laden and al-Qaeda led to numerous military operations in the Tora Bora mountain
region. Unfortunately, many senior al-Qaeda leaders, to include Usama bin Laden, were
thought to have escaped to the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan. Since
January of 2002, there has been little evidence to indicate where bin Laden might be.
Most analysts believe that he is either dead or being supported by various tribes in the
Northwest Frontier Province. Recent military operations conducted by the Pakistani
Army have further dispersed the remnants of al-Qaeda.
The clandestine and decentralized nature of terrorist cellular networks has made it
difficult for military units and intelligence agencies to identify and locate known
terrorists. The success of U.S. military operations in 2001 and 2002 disrupted much of
al-Qaedas infrastructure and forced al-Qaeda to conduct small-scale contingency
operations. Even infamous terrorists like Usama bin Laden are difficult to locate when
they are forced to go underground and rely on networks, which are hidden from spy
satellites, communication intercepts, and opaque human intelligence collection assets.

A.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.

Primary Research Question

How do military planners and intelligence analysts search, locate, and capture
fugitives who operate within networks that offer support, cover, and security?
2.

Subsidiary Research Questions

a)

What makes it difficult for the U.S. military to capture fugitives?

b)

What differences exist between the hiding characteristics of

fugitives who operate in a cellular network and those who dont have any
formalized organizational structure?
c)

What processes do other governmental agencies use to find

fugitives?
d)

How do social networks, behavior patterns, and environmental

factors impact the fugitives decision-making?

e)

How can search game theory be applied to manhunting?

f)

What deception and denial techniques do fugitives use to mask

their activities?
g)
B.

Is there a method to detect active deception by fugitives?

METHODOLOGY
In this thesis we define different types of manhunts, categorize fugitives, and

identify manhunting strategies using historical cases and analytical methods.

Our

research draws on interviews with law enforcement personnel, private investigators,

bounty hunters, military planners, and intelligence analysts as well as our own personal
experience in the field of special operations and intelligence analysis. Our collective
experience includes conducting operations in multiple geographical regions, to include
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans.

We have

conducted and supported operations at multiple organizational levels, from tactical

command to strategic operations at the theater combatant command level. We have also
supported manhunts for specific individuals in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, Iraq and Afghanistan.
In the course of our research, we have reviewed the manhunting doctrine of the
Department of Defense, FBI, U.S. Marshals, and CIA to include all methods, processes,
tactics and techniques used by these agencies to capture fugitives.

We then apply

analytical tools from various disciplinessocial network analysis, probability and

statistics, game theory, and linear algebrato develop our framework.
C.

ORGANIZATION
In Chapter II, we identify the problems military professionals face when hunting

individuals, the lack of a framework, and the U.S. militarys success rates in past
manhunting campaigns.

In Chapter III, we analyze the theoretical principles of

manhunting and discuss the strategies a Person of National Interest will use to evade
capture. In this chapter we also address the three elements that influence manhunts
detectability, exposure, and maneuverability.

Additionally, we define a set of

independent variables, and briefly discuss hunting strategies to include still-hunting,

stand hunting, drive hunting, stalking, trapping, and calling.
In Chapter IV we look at contextual and behavioral characteristics that influence
the fugitives course of action and describe various investigative techniques that military
professionals can use to locate fugitives. In Chapter V we examine individual deception
and denial, and show how it is fundamentally different from military deception. In this
chapter, we also consider other elements to be aware ofsuch as biaseswhich may
adversely impact the investigation. For instance, the proper analysis of anomalies can
help the hunter determine whether information is true or false, which may in turn prevent
the unnecessary investigation of false leads.
In Chapter VI we concentrate on the development of a manhunting method, to
include a framework and analytical process to better understand the complexities inherent
to successful manhunting. In this chapter we outline a process to help reduce the scope
and complexity of searching for individuals. Chapter VII provides a basic understanding
of social network theory and adapts many of these concepts to the practical application of
3

building social templates for revealing a fugitives likely comfort zones. Chapter VIII
proposes a manhunting organizational structure and develops an organizational process
for hunting PONIs. Finally, Chapter IX is our summary chapter, in which we also
identify areas for further research, and discuss the limitations of our methodology.
D.

BENEFITS OF STUDY
Manhunting is about identifying and locating known and unknown persons of

interest. However, this thesis will often refer to manhunting in terms of identifying and
locating terrorists. Readers should bear in mind that manhunting encompasses much
more than just hunting terrorists. For instance, the techniques we describe can be applied
to finding war criminals, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or finding deposed leaders such as
Saddam Hussein. For the purposes of this thesis, manhunting will be associated with
identifying and locating terrorists because finding terrorists is the most pressing concern
for the military today.
In addition, easy access to lethal technologies enables individuals and non-state
actors to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. The increasing threat from terrorists
requires the United States government to enhance its ability to identify and locate these
non-state actors. Yet, no doctrine or formalized process currently exits to enhance the
United States governments ability to apprehend these individuals. Although we possess
a counterterrorist capability to fix and neutralize the threat, we lack the information
gathering processes to identify and find the terrorists before they act. As a result, the
United States governments (USGs) ability to prosecute the war on terrorism, and to find
and apprehend high value targets in the future depends on the USGs ability to develop
and institutionalize a comprehensive strategy which includes developing a manhunting
organization, doctrine, and a training program.

II.
A.

MANHUNTING

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the United States military is to defend the constitution of the

United States by deterring war and, if necessary, by achieving victory in battle through
overwhelming combat power. However, the complex nature of the transnational terrorist
threat has created a new challenge for military planners and intelligence analysts. The
traditional rules used during the cold war to protect the United States and her allies have
changed. Many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by military units to
defeat the communist threat in Europe are ineffective in the war on terrorism. During the
cold war era, military commanders were rarely tasked to find, fix, and destroy specific
individuals. Although senior enemy leaders were targeted on various occasions, counterleadership operations (CLO) were characterized by conventional military-style attacks
against enemy headquarters or through the use of special operations forces to kill or
capture select prominent and visible individuals.
Generally speaking, the U.S. military does not conduct manhunts. There are,
however, a few historical cases when the U.S. military has conducted a manhunt to
apprehend a specific individual who was not a government agent. The 1916 expedition
into Mexico to capture Pancho Villa is a case in point. Pancho Villa, acting on his own
cognition, attacked the city of Columbus, New Mexico. Mexicos lack of government
control fostered internal instability, which enabled Pancho Villa to conduct a cross-border
raid. The Villistas posed a significant threat to U.S. citizens along the U.S.-Mexican
border. The United States government, at the time, had no other recourse available
except to use the military to conduct a massive search for Pancho Villa and his bandits.
The Pancho Villa expedition is a rare case and not a military norm.
Like Pancho Villa, todays non-state actors represent a significant threat to
regional security. In many cases, the host nations ability to maintain internal stability is
hindered by local popular support for the non-state actor. Some governments knowingly
allow non-state actors to operate from within their borders. In these cases, when a

government cannot or will not contain a transnational threat emanating from within its
borders, the U.S. government may have little choice but to conduct operations to protect
its citizens.
Yet, throughout history, finding and apprehending an individual from another
sovereign nation has rarely been considered a national security issue. Only recently has
the military increased its role in apprehending international war criminals, terrorists, and
drug traffickers. The U.S. militarys limited experience conducting manhunts has created
a doctrinal, legal, and procedural void. No established set of systems or procedures has
been formalized to specifically address manhunting within the confines of military
operations.

Consequently, the U.S. military approaches manhunting according to

established processes created for conventional battlefind, fix, and destroy. Yet, the
very nature of finding individuals differs considerably from finding a unit on the
battlefield.

Identifying and locating an individual requires significantly different

analytical methods and processes.

B.

FRAMEWORK
Although todays military may have some capabilities within its repertoire that

can be used for manhunting, it has not developed specialized systems or the
organizational capacity to find Persons of National Interest. The traditional rules for
conducting combat operations against a Soviet invasion of Europe do not apply to the
non-conventional threats posed by individual terrorists. For example, the principles of
war were developed to frame the strategies and tactics for victory. Exploring the nine
principles of warmass, objective, offensive, surprise, economy of force, maneuver,
simplicity, security, and unity of commandshould immediately suggest why the U.S.
military has difficulties conducting manhunting operations. For instance, combat units
that maneuver on the battlefield may use cover and concealment to protect and mask their
signature, but eventually these units must go on the offensive to gain the initiative to
obtain victory. To exploit the initiative, an enemy may use surprise to strike at a time,
place, or in a manner that is not expected. However, an individual who wants to avoid
capture will never go on the offensive. His goal is to constantly evade, avoid direct
contact, and thwart apprehension at a decisive place and time. Furthermore, in many
historical cases (as with the hunt for Pancho Villa), employing the principle of mass has
6

resulted in less than spectacular results. Since, the visible signature of large maneuver
units allows the fugitive to evade before being detected.
Further complicating the problems of finding fugitives are the doctrinal tasks
military commanders use to accomplish their mission.

Traditionally, military

commanders are often directed to find, fix, and destroy the enemy.

Intuitively, a

commander would assume that these tasks should also apply to finding individuals.
However, the tasks of identifying, locating, and apprehending means the hunter may need
to first identify the fugitives support infrastructure before a fugitive can be found.
Identifying the fugitives clandestine network of support may be very difficult because
relationships that develop within small world networks are not usually transparent to
outside observers. That is, relationships can date back several years or even decades and
there may not be any observable indicator of recent connectedness.
Not only are the tasks associated with apprehending fugitives different, but the
decision making process to capture fugitives may also be distinct from traditional military
operations. The military decision making process and the investigative process are very
similar in form, but vastly different contextually speaking. The military decision making
process (MDMP) is used to analyze the effects of terrain and weather, and the enemys
most likely and most dangerous courses of action (COA) based upon his capabilities.
These enemy situation templates (SITTEMPS) enable the commander to develop a
course of action suitable to accomplishing his mission and intent. On the other hand, the
investigative process is a step-by-step procedure that attempts to connect bits of
information together to solve a problem or prove a hypothesis. Comparatively speaking,
there is a predictive process based on operational norms, while the investigative process
is an approach used to connect pieces of a puzzle. While both processes have merit in
their particular fields, they are very hard to effectively combine when the military lacks
the investigative techniques necessary for conducting manhunts.
1.

The U.S. Militarys Effectiveness in Manhunting

The argument presented thus far is that the military framework established to win
battles may not be applicable for finding Persons of National Interest. We see this most
clearly when we examine cases like the Pancho Villa expedition, the pursuit of Persons
7

Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs), the hunt for Usama bin Laden and other members of
the al-Qaeda network, and the search for Saddam Hussein.
In 1916 the United States government launched a military expedition to bring
Pancho Villa to justice for his attack on Columbus, New Mexico. President Wilson
announced that an expedition will be sent at once in pursuit of Villa with the single
object of capturing him and putting a stop to his [Villas] forays (Boot, 2002, p. 189).
The Pancho Villa expedition was led by General John J. Pershing who initially had a
force of 4,800 men with which to search the Mexican state of Chihuahua. Later, Pershing
would add additional forcesapproximately 12,000 men. Yet, General Pershings forces
were only marginally successful. The search would span 94,000 square miles over rough
terrain (Boot, 2002, p. 192). The punitive expedition killed 135 Villistas, wounded 85,
captured 19 (Boot, 2002, p. 202). Interestingly enough, the most successful engagement
was not conducted by an infantry or cavalry regiment, but by ten men led by General
Pershings aide, 2nd Lieutenant George S. Patton Jr. This event came about in the
following manner: Patton was sent to buy supplies for the men. During this foray, he
visited San Miguelito Rancho, which was owned by one of Villas generals, Julio
Cardenas. Patton then deployed his 10 men and three vehicles to block all exits to the
ranch. Patton walked up and knocked on the front door, only for General Cardenas to
attempt to escape by horseback. Cardenas, unsuccessful in his attempt to leave the ranch,
was shot by Patton (Boot, 2002, pp. 197-198).
Under his own initiative, Patton, who was just a generals aide, accomplished a
taskto apprehend a person of national interestthat a large cavalry regiment had little
success in fulfilling. Although this small group of ten men was able to capture one of
Pancho Villas most trusted generals, Pancho Villa himself was never caught by General
Pershings forces. For the U.S. military, the experience in Mexico never contributed to
the development of any type of military procedure, doctrine, method, or organization
specially developed for manhunting.
Recent military manhunts for high value targets (HVTs) have continued this
tradition of only marginal success. For instance, the table in Appendix A, taken from the
International Criminal Tribunals (ICTY) website, depicts the current status of Personnel
8

Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs) from the Former Yugoslavia.

A total of 112

individuals have been indicted, with 27 individuals either cleared, charged, or killed
during an attempted arrest (one individuals indictment wasnt complete when he died,
which explains the statistical discrepancy). Altogether, 84 personnel have been indicted
for war crimes in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Of these 84, 25 indictees are still
at large, 9 were released pending trial, and 50 are in custody or serving a sentence. 22
indictees surrendered to the appropriate forces, with 6 PIFWCs surrendering as an
indirect result of the economic pressure placed on Serbia by the United States.
According to the ICTYs data (last updated in October 2002) the U.S. military was
responsible for the direct apprehension of 5 individuals over a six year period, which
means the US. Government caught fewer than 6% of the PIFWCs (ICTY, 2002).
Unfortunately, statistics are much more difficult to come by for OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and the hunt for bin Laden and the al-Qaeda Network
(AQN). At the 2004 Republican National Convention, President George W. Bush stated
that More than three quarters of the al-Qaedas key members and associates have been
detained or killed (Isikoff & Hosenball, 2004). This statistic probably refers to the
number of known al-Qaeda members prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October
of 2001. However, due to the lack of information on the composition of al-Qaedas core
leadership the exact numbers are questionable, and can not be corroborated because U.S.
intelligence officials have not provided any data to substantiate the 75% statistic.
Officials have also failed to explain the methodology behind calculating this percentage.
For various reasons, both the data and methodology have been classified, so it is hard to
evaluate the USGs measure of effectiveness in apprehending these terrorists (Isikoff &
Hosenball, 2004). What is known is that Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are
still at large, and they have been so for almost 10 years. This alone calls into question the
United States capabilities to apprehend rogue individuals.
However, there has been greater success in Iraq than in either BosniaHerzegovina or Afghanistan. Not only has OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)
successfully accomplished the mission of capturing Saddam Hussein, but this operation
has netted 44 of the 55 individuals, or 80%, of the persons of interest on the Combined
9

Joint Task Force Sevens (CJTF-7s) 55 Most Wanted list (Multi-National Corps Iraq,
2004).
We would argue that this is in large measure because finding the remnants of the
deposed government leadership in Iraq has been easier than finding transnational alQaeda members or, for that matter, PIFWCs in sovereign foreign territory. The freedom
of movement and the broad authority of a conquering army are greater than those of a
force deployed for peacekeeping or stability support operations. When a conquering
force is able to quickly secure a country and cut off points of exit, the invasion force has
a strategic advantage in the manhunting game (i.e. the Saddam Hussein case). Often the
deposed leadership tries to retain power well past the point where individuals can
successfully avoid capture. For example, Saddam Hussein and most of the senior Iraqi
leadership waited entirely too long before attempting to seek refuge in a neutral or
supportive country. Their avenues of escape, which where open during the initial stages
of the war, quickly closed as the invading force seized Baghdad. In comparison, some
reports indicate that al-Qaedas leaders and their families began repositioning themselves
well before the United States invaded Afghanistan. For instance, The London Sunday
Mirror reported that Abdullah bin Ladenthe son of Usama bin Ladenand Abdullahs
mother Sabiha, brother Malik, and sister Samina, jetted to the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) from Pakistan on 15 October 2001, just one week after the aerial bombing
campaign was launched against the Taliban and al-Qaeda (FBIS, 2001). Comparing and
contrasting these two cases, one could argue that the senior leadership of a government is
more concerned with maintaining power, whereas a terrorist organizations priority is
survival.
2.

The Role of Frameworks in Conceptualizing Problems

The U.S. militarys effectiveness in manhunting, described in the previous subsection, calls into question the U.S. militarys ability to conceptualize manhunting. The
apparent lack of a suitable framework may be one reason why the U.S. military only
achieves occasional successes in manhunting operations. That is, without a framework to
properly conceptualize the problem most of the pertinent information that impacts on
manhunting could be easily overlooked or mislabeled.

Further, the militarys

development of systems and tools which are thought to assist in solving the manhunting
10

problem could in fact exacerbate the situationleading to excessive costs, misleading

information, and false conclusions. Only with a proper framework can a problem be
properly identified. The following example serves to illustrate this point.
In Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Richard Heuer (Heuer, 1999) explains
how judgment is affected by the lack of a proper framework.

Heuer describes an

experiment in which experienced mechanics were given a diagram (fault tree in

psychology) that showed them all the reasons why a car would not start. The tree had
seven major branchesinsufficient battery charge, defective starting system, defective
ignition system, defective fuel system, other engine problems, mischievous acts or
vandalism, and all other problemsand a number of subcategories under each branch
(Heuer, 1999). The first group of mechanics was shown a complete tree and tasked to
identify 100 reasons for the car not starting. The mechanics were then asked to associate
each one of the 100 causes with one of the seven major branches of the fault tree. The
second group of mechanics, meanwhile, was shown a partial fault tree with only four
major branches (to include a branch labeled all other potential causes). The goal of the
experiment was to determine how sensitive the test subjects were to incomplete
information.
The theory behind the experiment was that if the mechanics were sensitive to the
missing information then the second group would choose the other problems category
for faults associated with the three missing branches. But, the results of the experiment
showed that the other problems category was chosen only half as often as predicted,
indicating that the mechanics who were shown the incomplete tree were unable to fully
recognize and incorporate into their judgments the fact that some of the causes for the car
not starting were missing. When the same experiment was run with non-mechanics, the
effect of the missing branches was even greater (Heuer, 1999).

This experiment

illustrates how the lack of a framework can prevent an accurate in-depth analysis of a
problem, suggesting that, the lack of a framework for finding fugitives may also prevent
military planners from adequately addressing the unique problems associated with
capturing fugitives.

11

For example, take the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) hunt for Abu
Sayyaf (ASG) leader Khadaffy Janjalani. On 5 July 2003, Khadaffy Janjalani and 30
Abu Sayyaf members on board two outrigger boats arrived in Barangay Libua,
Palimbang town, Sultan Kudarat in Southern Mindanao.

The AFP immediately

dispatched the 601st infantry brigade to the area to capture Janjalani. Yet, during the
601sts five-month deployment to the region, Janjalani was able to avoid capture while
operating in a very narrow and limited 10 km by 6 km zone. Even though the 601st
conducted MDMP and developed friendly courses of action to apprehend Janjalani, the
AFP still failed to apprehend him (Espejo, 2003).
The AFP framed the problem in conventional military terms, and too heavily
relied on technology based intelligence collection platforms provided by the United
States Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). Upon receiving U.S.
intelligence information, the AFP began its planning cycle, arrayed its units, determined
likely avenues of approach, and maneuvered its forces to engage the target. However, the
601st brigade and JSOTF-P never fully understood the fugitives strategies to avoid being
captured, and never looked to the Abu Sayyaf groups possible deception techniques.
These oversights were contributing factors in the AFPs failure to apprehend this rebel
group. Further, the absence of a manhunting framework led the 601st brigade to the
incorrect conclusion about why the AFP was unable to capture Khadaffy Janjalanithe
lack of timely actionable intelligence. Although U.S. and Philippine military planners
blamed their failures on slow intelligence, closer examination reveals that key planners
did not understand fugitive apprehension strategies. The 601st brigade was never able to
operate inside the fugitives decision cycle and predict Janjalanis next move.1
The lack of a framework or the wrong framework often leads planners, decision
makers, and analysts down avenues that fail to resolve the problem or accomplish the
mission. Our argument is that military planners cant develop an effective course of
action to capture a person of national interest when the fundamental principles behind

1 The co-author of this thesis, Matthew T. Nilson, was the JSOTF-Ps Liaison Officer with the 601st

Brigade from August to October 2003, and was responsible for coordinating all U.S. intelligence support at
the Brigade Level. The discussions addressing the 601st Brigades operations are based on the authors
personal observations.

12

manhunting are misunderstood. In the following sections we develop a framework based

on these principles.
3.

Two Forms of Manhunts

Two fundamentally different problems exist in hunting Persons of National

Interest: 1) finding and apprehending known persons of interest, and 2) identifying and
apprehending unknown criminals, terrorists, or their supporters.

Finding and

apprehending known individuals leads or amounts to a competition between hiders and

finders. However, in the case of unknown criminals or terrorist elements what becomes
essential is finding latent perpetrators and facilitators by squeezing the most out of
incomplete information. These individuals are generally in fixed locations, but strive to
conceal their relationships and activities. Clandestine networks may be difficult to track
and identify using technical collection means, primarily because these technical systems
are designed to detect observable signatures, yet they can be easily deceived by false
signals or overwhelmed by excessive signals.
Further, for these technical collection means to work they must be able to detect
patterns of behavior and interactions between individuals. Few technical systems are
designed to identify how relationships are formed between individuals, when these
relationships were formed, or how strong these relationships are or have been.
Meanwhile, if these relationships are unobservable using technical means, the network is
able to function below the surface, which offers it still greater freedom of movement.
Yet, through a thorough historical investigation of known facilitators, a deliberate
investigative campaign can help identify numerous nodes in a fugitives criminal support
network. Instead of following the signal, the investigator follows the story. He identifies
incongruities between the stories of different actors and forms theories based on these
incongruities. The investigator uses more art then science in his manhunting endeavor.
4.

Categorizing Fugitives

To gain a better understanding of the specific fugitive being sought, one needs a
system of categorization.

Through our analysis of numerous case studies we have

developed three preliminary categories: Type-Aindividual criminals; Type-Bpersons

who are members of an organization, and Type Cdeposed government leaders. For
instance, fugitives like Eric Rudolph the 1996 Olympic bomber or Mir Amal Kasi, the
13

individual who fired upon CIA headquarters, are characteristic Type-A fugitives. These
individuals are not part of any nefarious organization or government entity. Yet, they can
destroy infrastructure and disrupt governmental functions. They may or may not fall
under the responsibility of local police or federal authorities, but are generally a
responsibility of law enforcement. The interesting phenomenon behind Type-A fugitives
is that they can find sanctuary from prosecution in foreign countries. Type-A persons of
interest usually do not pose a direct threat to national security, but as technology evolves
these same individuals may become better positioned to challenge national security in the
near future. The key that separates Type-A from either Type-B or Type-C individuals is
that they dont have an organization or robust support structure supporting or guiding
their activities. Unless they are independently wealthy, their resources tend to be limited.
They are predominantly concerned with survival, and not with achieving any strategic
objective or maintaining power.
Type-B Persons of National Interest are individuals associated with a nefarious
non-state organization or network.

Type-B individuals include members of crime

syndicates or mafias, insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and drug cartels.

Individuals who operate in organizations or networks of this type can be further
subdivided into those who belong to the leadership core, operators, or supporters.
Hunting individuals who belong to criminal organizations, terrorist networks, or
insurgent groups may be considered as both a law enforcement activity and a mission to
protect national security. Manhunts for such individuals may fall within the scope of
different government agencies to include the Department of Justice, Department of
Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Pancho Villa expedition is one
example where the U.S. military conducted a manhunt for a terrorist/guerrilla group.
What truly separates the Type-B individuals from the Type-A lone actor is that
organizations have objectives and a robust support structure, whereas individuals have
limited support structures and the finite goal of survival. Group survival is important for
Type-B Persons of National Interest, but to be successful the group must recruit members
and it must have an objective besides pure survival.
Type-C individuals are government leaders, their cronies, and their supporters.
Saddam Hussein, Radovan Karadic, and Manuel Noriega are classic examples of Type-C
14

Persons of National Interest. What differentiates a Type-C from a Type-A or Type-B

individual is that the Type-C person is in power and controls or uses government
resources. Also, these individuals typically have armed forces and government assets at
their disposal to protect them and their regime. Although these individuals may be
indicted, law enforcement is usually unable to make an arrest without the help of larger
national assetslaw enforcement does not have the military might to bring these
individuals to justice. The Type-C person typically requires manhunts conducted by
military or paramilitary units and executive level approval must be secured before this
type of operation is conducted. The nature of the Type-C individual also differs in an
important regard from Type-A or Type-B Persons of National Interest (PONI) and is
exemplified by Saddam Hussein. That is, individuals in power do not want to lose
power. Leaders tend to hold on to their status well after their regime has fallen and,
fortunately for the manhunters, the leaders decision to evade is often made well after the
invading military has gained significant area control.
The comparison between these three different categories of Persons of National
Interest (PONI) accentuates another factor that affects the location and apprehension of
individualscontrol of the search space.

Type-A, B, and C individuals interact

differently with their environment. In some cases, the person of interest has sovereign
control; in others the hunter has control. The ability to control the search space is critical.
In Iraq, for instance, the environment went from not being controlled by coalition forces
to being semi-controlled. An environment can be considered either permissive, semipermissive, or non-permissive for the hunter. The same applies to the PONI. It is often
difficult to measure or quantify how permissive an environment is and for the purposes of
manhunting this may not be necessary. What is more important is to understand the
relationship between the hunter, the evader or PONI, and the environment. That is to say,
who controls the search space? If the hunter conducts a search that is external to his area
of responsibility then he may be at a disadvantage. On the other hand, if he controls the
area of search his chances of success increase.
In many of the most pressing cases, the United States does not have jurisdiction
over the area where these persons of interest are hiding, which means these individuals
live and operate in a country that may or may not assist the U.S. government with their
15

apprehension. Sometimes the U.S. government has an extradition treaty with the country
where the fugitive is, and extraditions serve as a useful means for law enforcement
agencies to apprehend individuals who flee. But, for extraditions to be successful the
individual must be caught, and this often assumes that the foreign government has the
resources, dedication, and political will to find and apprehend the fugitive. In some
situations, the political context is such that a foreign government may actually assist in a
rendition; a rendition is the informal transfer of a prisoner to another country.
In some cases, and especially in Type-C manhunts, the U.S. government chooses
a course of action that changes the rules of the game. For instance, the hunt for Saddam
Hussein would normally be characterized as a non-permissive manhunt, but after the U.S.
invasion and defeat of the Iraqi military, the United States gained military control of Iraq.
Hence, the U.S. military had internal control of the search space where Saddam was
hiding, which increased the likelihood of capture. In comparison, Radovan Karadic
former leader of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb
Army General wanted for war crimes, are believed to be living in southeastern Bosnia or
Serbia. According to a BBC report, The UNs chief war crimes prosecutor, Carla Del
Ponte, said in September 2001, however, that she thought he [Mladic] was in Serbia
(BBC, 2002). This was later confirmed by a high-ranking Serbian government official
who remains anonymous. If, in fact, these former Bosnian Serb leaders are in Serbia then
SFOR, the stabilization force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, can not be said to fully occupy the
search space and this search has to be considered a non-permissive search.
Table 1, on the following page, offers a graphic illustration of different types of
manhunts. The table shows the type of person being pursued, and the type of control the
U.S. government had in each case. Type-B individuals are further labeled as leaders,
operators, or supporters, since their operational characteristics impact the manhunt
differently.

16

Table 1.

Manhunting Characterization Table (Case Study Examples)

Manhunting Categories

Non-permissive
(not-controlled space)

Permissive
(controlled space)

Type-A: Individual

Mir Amal Kasi

Eric Rudolph

Type-B: Organizational
I. Core Leadership
II. Operators
III. Supporters

al-Qaeda
Usama bin Laden
Muhammad Atef
Yassin al-Qadi
(financier)

Symbionese Liberation Army

Donald DeFreeze
William Harris / Patty Hearst
Miki & Jack Scott, rented a
house to the SLA

Type C: Government Leaders

Radovan Karadic

Saddam Hussein

17

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

18

III.

MANHUNTING THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

As discussed in the previous section, military combat pits two adversaries against
each other on a linear battlefield so that they can defeat or demoralize each other by fire
and maneuver.

In such situations, both combatants are either actively or passively

engaged in battle to gain a tactical, operational, or strategic advantage.

In the

competition between two enemy combatants, the goal is to win the battle by defeating the
adversaryboth combatants must confront to win. However, a manhunt scenario differs
in that each players strategy is different. The fugitive always wants to avoid capture,
while the pursuer always wants to engage and capture the targetthe pursuer must
confront to win, whereas the fugitive must evade to win. In this competition between the
evader and pursuer, the evader has no requirement to win, just not to lose. Although, the
relationship between the evader and pursuer may appear similar to that of combatantsin
that there exists a competition between two adversariesthe underlying principles are
different.

The fugitive always wants to be obscure, unattainable, and ambiguous,

whereas a combatant wants to be obscure and unattainable only until he can engage his
adversary on favorable terrain.
Since the nature of the game is different, an exploration into the factors that
influence the competition is needed. Examining the variables that govern the relationship
between the hunter and the hunted will lead to a framework that should yield a logical
methodology for conceptually understanding the strategic, operational, and tactical
dilemmas associated with the search and capture of Persons of National Interest. This
analytical framework should also further our understanding of the three basic
apprehension-avoidance strategies used by Persons of National Interest, and assist in the
development of counter-strategies.
A.

MANHUNTING STRATEGIC ELEMENTS

Manhunting strategies are defined according to three elements: detection,

exposure, and maneuver. Each element addresses a component in the process of tracking,
locating, and capturing a fugitive.

These elements are composed of independent

variables that frame the relationship between the fugitive and hunter, and can be used in
19

various models to help develop measures of effectiveness and identify systems that may
not be producing the desired results.
The lack of any clear statistical data hinders much of the research in this area.
However, an investigation into the basic components of a manhunt should point us to in
the right direction. In this chapter we analyze the two basic functions of manhunts
detection and apprehension.

We begin with the final operational phase of any

apprehensionthe maneuver phase.

detection.

Next, we address the governing principles of

We do not address many of the more humanistic methods of capturing

individuals here (i.e. use of informants, trust, and betrayal).

Those issues will be

discussed in Chapter IV (Investigative Methods and Techniques).

For now, we

concentrate on the science and not the art behind manhunting.

B.

MANEUVER
The end-state of any manhunting scenario is the apprehension of the individual.

The fugitives capture occurs in either a stationary or dynamic state.

That is, the

hider/evader is either caught in a fixed location, such as a compound, or he is moving to

avoid capture by some means of transportation. Similarly, the hunter can be either
stationary in an ambush position waiting for the PONI to move into the kill zone or the
hunter can actively track him. In either case, both the hunter and PONI are in a dynamic
or static state. We can describe individuals in this spatial relationship as being fixed or
mobile. If the PONI is fixed, he must either reduce his signature to avoid detection or
increase his protection to avoid capture. The criteria fixed and mobile help describe
the positional relationships between the two actors.
These criteria are particularly useful to consider when going after a Type-B
individual. This is because Type-B individuals belong to pre-existing organizations. If
the PONI must maintain physical contact with at least one component element, and if the
element or elements are dispersed over a vast area, the PONIs inability to move will
directly hinder his operations or activities. The operational requirements for a Type-B
individual influence whether he has to move to maintain control. Even if he does not
have to move, he must have some method of communication to relay directions or
information to other members.
20

When searching for a PONI the issues of fixed versus mobile are very
important.

The hunter must understand both his and the fugitives constraints and

limitations in terms of fixity and mobility. In many cases, the hunter, especially in a
hostile or semi-permissive environment, is limited in his methods of movement and is
forced to remain in a quasi-fixed position. Similarly, the PONI can also be stuck in a
fixed position depending on his capabilities, organizational structure, visible signature,
and available resources. Additionally, an immobile PONI is much more difficult to
detect than a highly mobile individual because the hunters eyeespecially when
enhanced by technical meanscan detect motion.

Mobility generally increases the

visibility of the target, thus improving the hunters ability to detect the PONI.
(Detectability will be addressed in greater detail later in this chapter.)
We can also express this mathematically. At any given time (t) the PONI and
Hunter are located at a defined location (L). If the PONI is stationary at L1(t1) and the
Hunter is stationary at L2(t1) than the PONI can not be caught at time (t1).

An

apprehension is only feasible when the target and hunter are at the same location at the
same time. If, on the other hand, the target remains fixed at L2 for a duration of (t2-t1),
and the Hunter moves to L2 over that same duration (t2-t1), then the Hunter should
apprehend the target at L2(t2).

In other words, two fixed subjects at two different

locations will never meet. Although this concept is rather basic, the derivations when
either one or both actors are mobile have significant implications in manhunting
operations. These concepts of mobility and fixity, and their relationship are depicted in
Figure 1 below.

21

(L)
L3

PONI
Hunter

L2

Interdiction pt.
L1

t1

Figure 1.

t2

t3

(t)

Fixity and Mobility Concept Chart

The concepts underlying mobility are paramount in the apprehension of a target,

and the analysis of mobility can provide exceptional insights into the identification,
location, and course of action pursued by a PONI. Questions related to the PONIs
mobility are as follows: can he move, how fast can the he move, how far can he move,
what is his method of movement, when can (or does) he move? The answers to these
questions help create a template for developing a course of action to assist in his
apprehension.
Coincidentally, basic deer hunting strategies incorporate similar concepts. For
instance, deer hunters employ stand hunting, still hunting, stalking, calling, driving and
trapping to increase the probability of shooting a deer. In stand hunting, deer hunters
analyze the terrain and the normative behavior patterns of the deer to determine the deers
likely avenue of approach. Next, the deer hunter places a deer stand or hide in a location
that provides excellent observation over the deer path. With luck the deer will walk
down the path and the hunter hill shoot his prey. In this scenario the hunter remains fixed
while the deer is mobile. This technique works best when the target is active in a given
area, and the hunter has enough time and patience to wait. (Hunting Methods, 2005)
Stand hunting offers many advantages and disadvantages in comparison to other hunting
strategies.
As the name implies, still hunting is walking stealthily through an animal's
habitat, stopping frequentlysometimes for long periodsto scan and listen for game
22

(Hunting Strategies, 2005). Still hunting allows the deer hunter to actively pursue and
kill the deer. In this scenario, the hunter not only has to understand the terrain and the
deers normative behavior patterns, but also the deers adaptive behavior patterns. This
strategy allows both the deer and the hunter to operate in a mobile state. A variation of
still hunting is stalking. The difference between still hunting and stalking is that when
stalking, you follow signs leading to a particular type of game or group of animals, or
close the distance to game already spotted (Hunting Strategies, 2005). There is also
drive hunting. In drive hunting, or flushing, the drivers push the deer to a point where the
posters or hunters are positioned. This is an excellent strategy to use when deer are
hiding in thick brush.
Two other methods to catch prey are calling and trapping. Calling is the opposite
of drive hunting in that calling lures the prey out of a concealed or secure location by
incorporating different signals. Here false signals are used by the hunter to trick the prey
into revealing itself, whereas trapping is when the hunter baits or sets a trap and waits for
the target to fall for the ruse. The fundamental difference between calling and trapping is
that calling requires active participation & presence by the hunter, whereas trapping does
not.
Direction and velocity are two variables that are important in stalking and still
hunting because both the deer and the hunter are moving. For the hunter to shoot a deer,
he must be on a trajectory that interdicts the deers direction of travel, and he must have a
velocity that will allow him to overtake his prey. If both the deer and hunter follow a
similar path, then the hunter must possess a greater velocity than the deer. For the deer to
successfully avoid being shot at, the deer must have either a higher rate of speed or
change its direction of travel away from the hunters. This will lengthen the distance
between the deer and the hunter, and the greater the distance between the two the safer
the prey will be. We would argue that these same principles apply to manhunting.
In the case of a mobile PONI targeted by a stationary hunter, the hunter must be
able to predict the PONIs avenue of approach. The hunter must be very patient and
confident in his abilities to predict the PONIs movement patterns. When the hunter is
fixed, he can only capture the PONI when the PONI is at his location. In this situation,
23

time is a relevant, but not a dependent variable. In other words, for the hunter to catch
the PONI he must know that at some time the PONI will be located in his space. The
time frame could be a few days, weeks, or years, but eventually the target will approach.
How does the hunter know where the PONI will go? For some hunters this determination
is intuitive, but for most such a judgment is based on years of experience and intimate
knowledge of the game being pursued. As for targeting PONIs, this depends on the
hunters ability to understand the effects of social and not just physical terrain and the
PONIs normative and adaptive behavior patterns.
In cases where the PONI is hiding in a fixed position, the hunter must know
where the PONI is and successfully move to that location without being detected. Here,
the key to success depends on locating the target. In Hunting Down Saddam: the Inside
Story of the Search and Capture, Robin Moore describes an individual referred to as the
source, who gave U.S. military planners the type of detailed information necessary to
locate Saddam Hussein (2004, pp 245-250). Finding individuals in fixed bunkers or
underground tunnels can be difficult by technical intelligence collection means. In many
cases, like that of finding Saddam, the key to successfully locating a fixed PONI is by
gathering information from individuals close to the target.
C.

DETECTABILITY.
Essentially, before a target can be caught the hunter must first be able to find him.

The ability to find a PONI is directly related to the hunters ability to detect him.
Detectability is comprised of two independent variables: visibility and acuity.
Visibility is the size or strength of a signature left by the PONI, whereas acuity is the
hunters ability to detect the PONIs signature. A signature can be visible, audible,
electronic, or take on any other form so long as it is perceivable.
1.

Visibility

Visibility is a very important component for both the hunter and the Person of
National Interest. If the hunter is very visible then the PONI will be able to maneuver to
avoid the hunter by watching his activities. If, on the other hand, the PONI is very visible
then the hunters ability to identify, track, and locate the individual will be much easier.
However, just because there is no visible signature does not necessarily mean that the
fugitive is not present. The PONI may be emitting a signature that is out of sync with the
24

hunters collection systems. A useful analogy is the light spectrum, pictured below in
Figure 3.

Figure 2.

Electromagnetic Spectrum (from Nave, 2005)

The human eye can only see a narrow band of the electromagnetic spectrumthe
visible light spectrum. The human eye cannot detect infrared or ultraviolet light, but that
does not mean they do not existthey are just not perceived by the human optical
system. Similarly, the intelligence spectrum only detects certain kinds of intelligence.
For example, SIGINT detects signals intelligence; HUMINT detects human intelligence,
and so on. However, just because the SIGINT has not identified any signal to confirm or
deny the presence of a PONI does not mean the PONI is not present. It just means that
the method of collection is out of phase with the PONIs visible signature.
2.

Acuity

Acuity is another important factor in the ability to detect and observe the target.
The key for the hunter to detect the PONI is to increase resolution on his signature. That
is, the hunter must collect intelligence in the venue where the PONI operates, thus putting
the hunter in phase with the PONI. Type-B PONIs, for example, can send signals within
their organization in a manner or at a time that is unobservable by the hunter. Acuity is
especially useful in conjunction with social network analysis. Assuming that a PONI
uses his social network to help him hide, the hunter can gain clarity on the network by
identifying secondary and tertiary sources who know where the PONI is hiding.
Analysis of visibility and acuity reveal certain relationships that impact how well
the target can avoid being detected. In many cases, the hunters have a sensory advantage
25

over the PONIs, but in others the hunter may in fact be at an intelligence collection
disadvantage. Figure 3 illustrates a case where the PONI has an intelligence collection
advantage. The PONI gives off a visible signature, which is represented by dark red.
That represents how he is, while the hunters acuity is represented as light blue. At no
time does the light blue oval overlap the dark red ellipsethe hunter cannot see the
PONI before the PONI sees the hunter.

This illustration applies to all types of

intelligence collection.

Figure 3.

Visibility Advantage Diagram

More to the point, if the PONIs intelligence collection systems use human
sources to report information on the hunters movements, then the PONI can move before
the hunter reaches his objective. Further, if the hunters visibility to acuity ratio (V/A) is
small then the hunter has a better chance of detecting the PONI, whereas a large (V/A)
ratio means that the hunter has a better chance of being spotted first.
Returning to the light spectrum example can help us further conceptualize some
of the theoretical pitfalls of intelligence collection. Every different type of intelligence
collection meansHUMINT, MASINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and OSINT,can be
represented by a simple equation: Visibility times Acuity equals Detectability or (va)=d .

A detectability equation for signal intelligence collection is (vsig asig)=dsig , where vsig
represents the visible signal of the PONI and asig represents the acuity of the signal
26

collection system. If either asig or vsig is equal to zero then the PONI will not be detected
with that type of collection system. That means, if the PONI is not emitting the type of
signal that the collection platform is attuned to detect, than the PONI will not be seen by
the hunter.
This concept can further be graphically depicted by using overlays. A visibilityacuity overlay represents what the hunter can and cannot detect along various intelligence
collection spectrums, and an example is shown in Figure 4. For instance, the red squares
represent different HUMINT sources that have access in a given area; the blue represent
specific imagery of that grid square; the black squares represent intelligence collection
dead zones. Intelligence collection dead zones are areas where intelligence collection
assets are unable to detect information. Using such overlays would be extremely helpful
for identifying shortcomings or holes in the intelligence collection plan. Additional
collection assets can then be directed toward these intelligence voids.

Figure 4.
D.

Visibility and Acuity Overlay

EXPOSURE

Thus far we have discussed the theoretical variables behind finding and catching
individuals, but in many manhunts a third variable seems to describe the behavior of
successful hiders. In a competition between two individualshider and findera set of
constraints shape the rules of the game. These rules themselves restrict the players to
certain allowable activities.

For instance, political and legal restrictions shape the

individuals activities, especially when legal constraints are present in the form of
27

jurisdictional boundaries. Sovereign borders are among the greatest allies a PONI can
have. By understanding constraints and limitations associated with sovereignty, both
hunter and PONI can identify countries and locations that can help them each achieve
their specific objectives.
The ability for the hunter to capture the PONI is only possible when both occupy
the same bounded region. Figure 5 below contains three regionsRegions A, B, and C.
In this example, the hunter operates in Regions B and C, and the PONI operates in
Regions A and C. As long as both PONI and hunter operate outside the intersected
Region C, then it is physically impossible for the hunter to catch the PONI. If Region B
and Region A do not intersect, then the two operational areas are mutually exclusive and
an apprehension cannot occur. Consequently, the goal of the hunter is to have as much
access to the PONI as possibleideally the hunter wants the PONI to flee to Region C at
the same time the hunter should shrink the space in Region A.

Figure 5.

Mutually Exclusive and Apprehension Zones

Constraints and limitations expand beyond physical space to include time,

resources, and capabilities. Limited communications equipment or limited means of
transportation can constrain the PONIs avoidance plan, especially if the PONI is a TypeB individual with operational objectives. Other sets of limitations, which are difficult to
measure or represent on a map, include religion, and ethnic or cultural constraints. For
instance, an Arab who operates in either Southeast Asia or Central Asia may have to
adapt some of his behaviors to better integrate with the local populace. These social
28

effects can constrain activities to certain geographic spaces just as legal or political
constraints do.
Lack of exposure helps to explain why many fugitives are not caught. For
example, Usama bin Laden either explicitly or implicitly understands the effects of
exposure on his survival. Bin Laden has a solid history of fleeing to countries that
provide the sovereign protection he needs to avoid apprehension by the U.S. or Saudi
Arabia. Bin Laden has also maximized his survival in the past by manipulating the
political environment to support his activities, and one of his greatest attributes is his
ability to develop bonds of trust based on a shared cultural and/or religious identity.
Currently, bin Laden is believed to be in the Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan, an
area that is controlled by tribes supportive of Usama bin Ladens cause. This social
protection helps limit his exposure to Pakistani and U.S. forces. To further address the
variable of exposure, the following section will discuss exposures two independent
variables: accessibility and vulnerability.
1.

Accessibility

Many successful fugitives are able to avoid capture by minimizing their exposure.
The fugitive achieves this objective by finding a location to which he has access, but the
hunter does not. Historically, the Underground Railroad served as a conduit to help
slaves escape into Canada. Todays fugitives also flee to foreign countries where the
political and legal constraints prevent their extradition. Critical to our framework is
determining accessibility in terms of the terrains effect on the hunters ability to gain
access to the PONI. If we return to Figure 4, only in Region C does the hunter have
access to the PONI. Therefore, only Region C provides the hunter with the opportunity
to capture the PONI; this is the only location where the fugitive is vulnerable. Therefore,
we would argue that the hunters accessibility has to be considered a critical component
in the fugitives vulnerability.
2.

Vulnerability

Vulnerability refers to how susceptible the fugitive is to being captured. If the

hunter has no access to the PONIs location, the PONI is not very vulnerable. Referring
back to Figure 4, we see that the fugitive is only vulnerable in Region C. Additionally, if
29

a group or organization protects the fugitive then the fugitive is not as vulnerable to
capture. The extent of vulnerability can depend on many factorspolitical, economic,
informational, and legal. These factors define the relationship between the hunter and
PONI and can be geospatial, and represented by operational zones. These zones can help
identify the optimal locations for the PONI to hide based on objective criteria.
Constraints also create opportunities for both the fugitive and hunter. Given the
potentially dynamic nature of the game, the PONI may be vulnerable for only a limited
time. Thinking in terms of exposure is useful because it provides an analytical means to
identifying optimal hiding and apprehension locations. By measuring vulnerability and
accessibility, the hunter can identify where the PONI can be caught, and identify the
location(s) that maximize the PONIs safety. These theoretical principles allow hunters
to systematically think through the strategies the PONI will likely try to use to survive.
E.

APPREHENSION AVOIDANCE STRATEGIES

The PONI typically uses one of three general strategies: masking, maneuver, and
disengagement. The hunter, on the other hand, has five basic hunting strategies he can
use: still hunting and stalking, stand hunting, drive hunting, trapping, and calling. The
masking strategy is probably the easiest for military personnel to understand because it
incorporates the concepts of concealment and cover. The PONI is using a masking
strategy whenever he incorporates deception and denial into his operations. The PONI is
hiding or concealing his true identity, location, or support network, and uses denial by
preventing the hunter from gathering information on the target.
Masking is a strategy used by the PONI to reduce his visible signature. Many
different techniques can be used to mask a signal, such as noise and concealment. With
noise, the hunter can not effectively identify the PONI because too much information
overloads the hunter with data. Concealment, on the other hand, is when the fugitive
hides his true self. For instance, international fugitives often create aliases and false
documents to hide who they truly are.
Deception involves many different techniques to prevent intelligence collection
assets from gaining resolution on the fugitive. The art of denial also plays a role in
masking. Unlike deception, denial involves the deliberate attempt by the fugitive to
30

prevent access to information. That is, the fugitive prevents intelligence collection assets
from penetrating his zone(s) of influence. The key for the fugitive is to hide the truth
while simultaneously showing a false positive. Sir Francis Bacon, an English philosopher
and intelligence officer, first introduced these ideas in 1625 when he wrote Essay No. 6,
which outlined the concepts of simulation and dissimulation. Dissimulation is when a
man lets fall signs and arguments that he is not that he is (Bacon, 2001). Simulation is
when a man industriously and expressly feigns and pretends to be that he is not (Bacon,
2001).
The second, and arguably most effective, strategy used by PONIs to avoid capture
is disengagement. This is the safest strategy because it allows the PONI to operate in an
environment that prevents him from being captured. That is, he operates in an area that is
not accessible to the pursuer. The pursuer cannot gain access to this zone because of
certain constraints and limitations, whether political, economic, legal, military, or
geographic. For example, the 601st infantry brigade from the Armed Forces of the
Philippinespreviously described in Chapter IIwas limited in its search of the local
Barangays. In the Philippines, as in the United States, law enforcement officials have
certain laws that govern their activities.

These laws are established to guarantee

individual rights, and one of these involves the need for probable cause. Before the AFP
could search a suspected sympathizers residence, the AFP had to first show probable
cause. Unfortunately, these legal constraints enabled Janjalani to remain outside the
realm of legal jurisdiction, while the Philippine military had to operate inside certain
legal boundaries. In this case, the 601st brigade was unable to capture Janjalani because
legal limitations created a certain physical spacea sympathizers residenceto which
the unit had no legal access.
Here too, mobility helps the PONI to move at a time, to a place, or in a manner
that is not expected by the hunter, which optimizes his ability to avoid being captured.
For instance, the 601st brigade rarely conducted night operations, thereby allowing
Janjalani and his supporters to operate freely from dusk till dawn. Although imagery
may have identified named areas of interest (NAIs) at 2200 hrs, by the time a unit from
the 601st brigade arrived at that NAI the target had moved to another location. The
31

effects of time enabled Janjalani and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to remain one step
ahead of their pursuers.

32

IV.

INVESTIGATIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

In April 2005, the largest national fugitive dragnet ever, code named Operation
FALCON, arrested nearly 10,500 fugitives in the space of just a week, the result of a
massive push by the US Marshals service, the oldest of the federal law enforcement
agencies. Although the U.S. Marshals average over one hundred fugitive arrests each
week, it wanted to see how much further it could go. By joining with police from all 50
states, involving more than 3,000 law enforcement officials with much of the muscle
coming from 206 state law enforcement agencies, 302 county sheriffs departments, and
366 city police departments, the US Marshal service increased its apprehension rate by
nearly eight times its usual weekly record. Officials said fugitives were tracked in every
state, including Puerto Rico and Guam (Dragnet nabs, 2005).
In 2004, US Marshals apprehended over 36,000 felons and worked alongside state
and local law enforcement to capture an additional 31,600 felons (Dragnet nabs, 2005).
Several factors explain the success of the US Marshals. First, the ability to coordinate a
massive manhunt of this size requires thorough planning and exceptional intra-agency
coordination across local, state, and federal levels because fugitives can be dangerous.
Second, of those apprehended during Operation FALCON, 70 percent had prior arrests
for violent crimes, meaning the Marshals already had a booking sheet filled out on each
felon, detailing the arrestees name, address, bio-metrics, aliases, etc. Furthermore, the
standard operating procedure for first time felons prior to entering a detention facility is
to have them fill out a questionnaire to determine which prison cells should be off-limits,
given certain ethnic, gang, and religious affiliations. The questionnaire is quite specific
and probes about information on ethnicity, gang affiliation, languages, relatives, business
acquaintances, girlfriends, wives, and children. All the answers include a last known
address. First time offenders consider this questionnaire necessary to their survival
because it is suppose to guarantee that they do not share a cell or floor with revival gang
members. But no less critical to the US Marshals success was the fact that their
dedicated hunter teams are granted the authority to pursue a fugitive across jurisdictional
boundaries. The team is thus able to build intimate knowledge of the fugitives behavior
at levels not possible in the past because of discrepancies that occur in case file hand-off.
33

These three significant factors provide the US Marshals the capability to apprehend
fugitives at the local, state, and federal levels.

The US Marshals best practices,

therefore, are worth our attention. So, too, are those of the FBI, bounty hunters, and
private investigators. By studying an array of tactics, techniques, and procedures used by
the most successful manhunters we should be able to develop an overall manhunting
methodology.

Such an investigative process includes identifying possible hiding

locations or pinpointing individuals in the fugitives support structure who can help
locate wanted felons. As Americas leading and most feared bounty hunter, Bob Burton,
says, ultimately, your search will lead you to the two stars of this trade: the fugitive and
the Judas who betrays him (Burton, 1990, p.30).

There is no reason to believe that

some of these processes couldnt also be applied to hunting down international terrorists.
A.

WHAT DO FUGITIVES DO?

Commonalities exist among all types of manhunting, whether the hunter is

pursuing a common criminal, international fugitive, or a terrorist. Fugitives tend to
choose one of three types of places to avoid capture. A fugitives first choice is to
typically ask friends or family to hide him and provide him money and support. Second,
he might gravitate to rural locations that are culturally familiar and where he feels
comfortable blending in. Third, fugitives sometimes settle down in a dense urban area
where they can hide in plain sight. Likewise, there are three patterns associated with
avoiding capture and each fugitive typically will choose one of these. Planned flight is
used by a fugitive who has taken the time to recognize that he is a fugitive; either he
committed a crime, jumped bail, or planned an escape. Usually, this type of fugitive has
coordinated for support and has access to identification cards, drivers licenses, and
passports. In contrast, a sudden opportunity fugitive realizes he has the ability to flee and
jumps at the chance without establishing a support mechanism to facilitate his escape. A
fugitive who has committed a crime of passion or is reacting to an event represents the
third type. The second and third type of fugitive does not have much time to consciously
plan an escape or put support mechanisms into motion. For this reason it is imperative
the investigative response begin immediately. Putting pressure on the fugitive causes
stress, allows the hunter team to capitalize on the fugitives mistakes, and increases his
risk of capture.
34

Typically a fugitive will try to eliminate, minimize, or conceal contact with his
family, friends, and associates to increase his chances of success. Initially, he will try to
minimize his predictable and personal habits.

But, according to FBI psychological

profilers at Quantico, every person has a public, a private, and a secret life. Public
refers to how he presents himself in public, while private is how he acts around friends
and family. More difficult to assess is an individuals secret life, which is comprised of
those things he does not want even his family to know about.
The fugitive will try to minimize his level of risk by relocating to suitable areas
with access to food and water, or at least areas that are favorable for his survival. He will
try to assimilate into the community by either blending in or making himself invisible.
Often, fugitives engage in risk management strategies, trying to reduce the risk of
being captured. Several case studies reveal fugitives who have avoided contact with
friends, relatives, and associates, thereby changing their behavioral patterns and
decreasing their predictability. Often fugitives who are successful will be financially
prepared to move at a moments notice, often keeping $10,000 in every blazer or jacket so
that no matter which coat they grab they can be gone in an instant. Of the fugitives that
do get captured, most are usually caught because they have a bad habit that can be
exploited, or they leave an easy-to-follow signature. Based on our interviews with law
enforcement, most fugitives are captured thanks to their fondness for women, booze, or
phones.
B.

THE BASICS

Understanding the basics of investigative work allows the investigator to ask the
right questions of an intelligence analyst and of potential sources. Coordinating and
conducting investigations through detecting and collecting physical evidence, and
identifying, locating, and interviewing witnesses, victims, targets, and other third party
sources of information to compile facts, evidence, and opinions pertinent to the
investigation sounds like a lot of work, but this ultimately leads to locating the fugitive.
However, even the first step, understanding what is in a name, can help narrow the scope
of the search.

For instance, the Asian Gang Task Force Commander for the San

Francisco police department must have the proper spelling of the fugitives name and the

35

way the full name is arranged (first and last name) prior to beginning his investigation in
order to accurately search both US and Chinese databases for possible leads.
Collecting information to build the fugitives profile, to include names and
aliases, date of birth, a physical description, pictures or sketches, and documentation
(passports, social security numbers, birth certificates, drivers licenses, voter registration
card, etc.) points the investigator in the right direction. An investigator will start with the
fugitives last known location and work backwards, interviewing friends, relatives, and
neighbors, making sure to ask questions about the fugitives personal preferences,
especially relating to women and favorite hang-outs. By asking questions about the
fugitives personal habits, routines, and preferred locations (home, office, and bars) the
investigator is determining comfort zones. Fugitives tend to return to these comfort
zones or places of familiarity because they feel at ease and safe. If the fugitive rides a
Harley Davidson, frequents biker bars, and is covered in tattoos, then there is a
reasonable chance he will not be found in an upper middle class section of town or
playing golf at the local country club. For a fugitive from the Middle East or Southwest
Asia, understanding the tribe, clan, and village where the fugitive is from helps the hunter
narrow the search. Therefore, fugitive recovery can be thought of as an information
profession. (OConnor & Copeland, 2003, p. 94)
C.

MIR AMAL KASI CASE STUDY

In 1993, Mir Amal Kasi, a Baluchi migrant, shot and killed two people and
wounded three at the entrance to the CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The CIA
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) asked the Islamabad station for help in recruiting agents to
find Kasi. A family-based group of Afghan tribal fighters, whose training began back
with the CIA during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was hired to help in the search.
The CTC Kasi cell secured budgetary approval and shipped cash, weapons, and
communications equipment to Islamabad. If Kasi was found in Pakistan, the Afghanis
were to contact the CIA Station-Islamabad and case officers would then attempt to work
with Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and police to make an arrest without
revealing the existence of their paid Afghan agents.
Initially, Kasi could not be located, but was rumored to be moving throughout
Taliban- controlled Baluch province.

However, due to a deteriorating relationship

36

between ISI and the CIA, the CIA received little intelligence or access to Pakistani police
resources in the Northwest Frontier Province. Even if the CIA could locate Kasi through
their own sources, they would probably not be able to apprehend him because of an even
greater problem: the several centuries old clan and tribal protection code available to any
Baluch in danger. Although the CIA offered an enormous reward, under traditional
honor and revenge codes; no one could turn Kasi over to the Pakistani police or even
provide information of his whereabouts because of possible retaliation and tribal
disgrace. Nearly five years after the ambush of CIA headquarters, the CIA received a tip
that Kasi was in a compound close to the Afghan border near his hometown, but the ISI
would not attempt to arrest him.
In the end, it was a Baluch man who walked into the US consulate in Karachi and
announced he had information about Kasis whereabouts. The source claimed that Kasi
was under the protection of a Baluch tribal leader, but Kasi had fallen out of favor with
the tribal leader so the tribal leader now sought the reward money. An arrest plan was
formulated between the FBI and the Baluch tribal leader. While Kasi lay asleep in his
hotel room the FBI kicked in the door and slapped handcuffs on the wanted felon (Coll,
2004).
With manhunting there are many heartbreaks and letdowns; it is always darkest
before the dawn. But being patient and persistent, with the ability to remain flexible and
adaptable regardless of the situation, will always work in the investigators favor. It is
best to think creatively or outside the box and be imaginative, while still maintaining
attention to detail. The investigator must have the ability to develop, retain, and crossreference information from many sources and use all this information to maximum
advantage. For instance, being familiar with the level of military or survival training the
fugitive might have is essential when trying to determine his ability to avoid capture
when pressure is applied. Keeping a list of telephone numbers, including those for his
home, office, cell phones, wives, and girlfriends allows the investigator to track the
fugitive through surveillance tagging devices when technology is available. It is also
important to know how many languages the fugitive speaks. This helps in recognizing
potential collaborators and comfort zones. Cataloging special medical problems can
likewise point investigators toward specific treatment requirements.
37

D.

CARLOS THE JACKAL CASE STUDY

In his book, Hunting the Jackal, former Special Forces Sergeant Major and CIA
operative Billy Waugh shares his 55 years of experience hunting international fugitives,
including Carlos the Jackal (aka Illich Rameriz-Sanchez). Key lessons Waugh conveys
are: know the environment better than your prey; and know your fugitive, his operational
profile, and behavioral patterns. Pinpoint areas that are suitable for the fugitive, while
establishing surveillance points to detect activity. Establish positive identification of the
fugitive, and detect and observe enabler activities and patterns. After observing the
fugitives activity patterns, determine where the fugitive has established safe houses and
hide sites. Begin surveillance on the fugitives safe houses, hide sites, and his enablers
activities and homes. Recognizing what habits and addictions the fugitive may have
helps identify how and where he is vulnerable.
It was, in fact, Carlos the Jackals excessive drinking that helped Billy Waugh and
his team to find Carlos. During a drinking binge, Carlos waved a pistol at a shopkeeper,
and Sudanese authorities were forced to detain Carlos for disorderly conduct. After
Hassan al-Turabi agreed to Carloss release, Carlos made a phone call to his bodyguard,
Tarek. Tarek was then directed to come to Khartoum to protect/prevent Carlos from
getting into any more trouble. This event was the initial lead that started the search.
When Carloss bodyguard arrived at the Khartoum airport, he was whisked away by the
governments secret police. Unfortunately, the CIA team surveilling the airport was
unable to follow the bodyguard. The team then began searching places where foreigners
were known to stay and, as luck would have it, the CIA team located Tarek in a hotel.
The team immediately began surveillance on Tarek and identified the car that he drove.
The other major break in the search occurred when Tareks car was spotted near a
hospital. The team immediately began surveillance on the hospital, which is where
Carlos was finally spotted. Unknown to the CIA team at the time, Carlos had genital
warts, which required frequent treatments (Waugh, 2002, pp 156-177). In this case, it
was a string of events brought about by the fugitives addictive behavior which enabled
the team to successfully locate the fugitive.
Essential in finding Carlos was identifying his means of transportation,
determining certain modes of travel available to the fugitive and which ones the fugitive
38

prefers allows the investigator to identify possible locations and patterns of movement.
Technology can assist by providing a physical description of the fugitive even five, ten,
and fifteen years after he has been sighted. Often fugitives lose or gain weight based on
their comfort level. Carlos, for instance, gained 30 to 40 pounds in Khartoum and grew a
thick moustache.
E

USAMA BIN LADEN: CRITICAL QUESTIONS

In the case of Usama bin Laden, an investigator must analyze certain habits
specific to his culture and ethnic background. What does he prefer to eat and drink that is
specific to an Arab from a wealthy family, and who might deliver those types of comfort
items? What are his sleeping habits? Is he a family man or more nomadic, always
needing to move? How does he make or get money to support his lifestyle? Does he
tend to operate within his inner circle of friends, and does he only do business with those
of the same ideological beliefs? Is he known to operate on his own, or does he need all
four wives and children near him? Does he only feel comfortable in places he owns, or
will he put trust and safety in other peoples hands? Does he maintain ties with political
and religious leaders? These and many more questions help build the behavioral profile
the investigator must have in order to narrow his search.
After all information is collected, it is helpful to develop a graphic overlay,
depicting countries that might offer this type of support. Based on past tendencies and
behaviors, Usama bin Laden is likely to be in a country with a weak regime, and where
there is also ethnic and religious discrimination. In the past he has based his operations
in countries that have experienced recent political upheaval and are adjacent to one or
more countries with ongoing strife. Everywhere Usama bin Laden has lived, except
Saudi Arabia, has had a poor quality of life and sub-standard infrastructure. Templates
that yield information about social factors like these can narrow the search and allow for
further investigation.
A very important step in the investigative process is to develop a base-line
analysis for potential safe havens. What are the social norms and day-to-day events in
the targeted areas? One way to think about this is to imagine Usama bin Laden as a big
rock; the safe haven is a body of water. Depending on how bin Laden entered that body
of water would determine whether US government collection assets would see ripples or
39

waves. What would make ripples and what would make waves? Usama bin Laden often
gravitates toward businesses or industries with which he is familiar. During the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, bin Laden was nicknamed the Engineer because of his ability
to contract construction companies to build roads, schools, and hospitals. He is drawn
toward public service and to assisting regimes to improve their infrastructure. Many high
profile fugitives are successors to the family business, or have heirs, and locating these
can help investigators find the fugitive, or at the very least reveal not just enablers, but
also business rivals who can also be critical sources of information.
It seems paramount to build the behavioral profile of the fugitive before deciding
to spend millions of dollars moving personnel to investigate, and before shifting
collection assets to increase spying capability. Figuring out what terrifies or worries the
fugitive, and what his normative vs. adaptive behavior is, will also assist when the time
comes to apply some external pressure to influence his decision-making.
F.

LOCATING THE FUGITIVE

Databases like Choice Point or AutoTrack are an inexpensive way to begin the
process of locating a person of interest inside the United States, but the same kind of
information can be found overseas. What makes these two systems unique is their ability
to search public records nationwide and link together their many scattered bits and pieces
of information into an electronic dossier, or profile, of an individual. Just by searching
for a name, the investigator can obtain current and past addresses, telephone numbers,
social security number, date of birth and, more importantly, information regarding friends
and neighbors.

Local law enforcement officers will usually not only conduct an

investigation on a suspected criminal, but also run background checks on his neighbors.
Most likely, the neighbors are aware of his criminal activity and may even be affiliated
with this criminal behavior.

These databases cross-reference a massive amount of

publicly available data, including addresses, drivers licenses, property deed transfers,
and corporate information (About AutoTrackXP, n.d.). Most private investigators and
bounty hunters use databases like these as a starting point for most searches because they
are short term solutions given limited amounts of time and money.
Both AutoTrack Plus and Choice Point contain over 4,000,000,000 records,
collected and purchased from over 1,000 public and private sources.
40

These two

databases can provide real time searches by dialing into the databases of other computers
to perform an extended search and provide instant up-to-date change of address
information or directory information. Public record databases require some training to
use, but within an hour a search can provide an address and phone number for the
fugitive and display a list of where and with whom he has been transacting business over
the past several years. One can refine the search to just a first or last name and an
advanced search can even yield aliases or nicknames. AutoTrack and similar databases
deliver comprehensive information and allow the private investigator to browse through
billions of current and historical records to locate wanted felons or witnesses.
In high profile court cases, defense attorneys retain experienced private
investigators to locate witnesses who are enrolled in the Federal Witness Protection
Program. The first place most private investigators begin their search is by accessing
databases like Check Point, AutoTrack, and CDB Infotek.

Additionally, drawing

together information from a fugitives prior arrest reports and prison records can provide
leads which require further investigation. Focusing on who visited the fugitive in prison,
or who he called while in jail, aids in identifying potential enablers. Another method is to
track a fugitives children through a states Department of Education enrollment database
to discover where they are living and which school they attend. Putting the children
under surveillance and observing who drops and picks up the kids at school can yield yet
more leads. In many cases, fugitives can be found living close to their children, or
working at a job close by, in order to keep a watch on them and their mother.
Before online public record databases became available to the public, private
investigators routinely spent days in county courthouses researching and uncovering
information that could pinpoint the fugitives location. Collecting information from
public, civil, and criminal records along with searching marriage and divorce records
often uncovers critical information not found on a felons Failure To Appear (FTA)
worksheet or the jails booking and property records.

The same goes for property

records; if the fugitive has ever purchased real estate or personal property then there
should be a record of sale and last known address. Many of these same steps can be
applied to international fugitives.
41

In most cases, especially in countries ruled by authoritarian governments, there

are court houses or places where important documents and records are kept. In remote
areas, the village chief will often maintain these records in order to settle land disputes or
family feuds. Likewise, if the international fugitive ever attended a university, there
should be a record of his attendance, along with rosters of his fellow classmates. Getting
to this information is a lot easier than expected because most universities have faculty
from other countries who might provide this information for a small fee.

Finally, the

FBIs National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which is a database that collects and
discloses information from other law enforcement agencies about crimes and criminals, is
a popular source of information for those in law enforcement. The data contained in
NCIC is supplied by the FBI, local, state, federal and foreign criminal justice departments
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2003). Every application, database, or piece of paper
ever touched may hold a critical missing piece to the puzzle.
G.

PURSUING THE FUGITIVE

Persistence, patience, resilience, adaptability, and creativity are the keys to

successfully pursuing a fugitive. Quickly recognizing the fugitives avoidance strategies
and capitalizing on mistakes made by him or his associates can help in closing in on his
location. Maintaining a level of awareness, keying in on patterns, and changes to patterns
allows the investigator to be more aggressive in his search. Effectively using traditional
investigative techniques, and manipulating witnesses and informants, while also
understanding and using technology to your advantage can only increase the level of
success for the investigator. Taking a proactive approach to pursuing a fugitive and
applying intense pressure will often force the fugitive into the open.

The best

investigators anticipate the fugitives mistakesthe pursuer may make many mistakes,
but the fugitive need only make one mistake to be caught. Therefore, the pursuer must
always be ready to pounce.
1.

Whos Who in the Zoo

According to Los Angeles US Marshals Task Force Commander, Chief Inspector

John Clark, it is all about knowing whos who in the zoo. The most important aspect in
investigative work is identifying anybody and everybody who may be a potential source,
analyzing the nature and depth of their relationships and their relationships with other
42

family members and business associates. Key tasks include locating and interviewing a
spouse, children, significant others (current and past), parents and siblings, friends,
business and criminal associates, neighbors, vendors and, most important, the fugitives
enemies.

Capitalizing on weaknesses or character flaws of those in the zoo, the

investigator can pit one against another. Many times the spouse has no idea she is not the
fugitives only love. She may have much to disclose once she is told she is not the only
one he slept with. The same can be said about business partners or criminal associates;
often they are unaware the fugitive has fled or even committed a crime.
It is also important to adapt investigative techniques and approaches to
circumstances, based on who is being interviewed or put under surveillance. Prior to
interviewing a witness or informant, the questions need to be prepared and likely
responses anticipated. Along with this it is critical to have counter-responses that can be
supported with facts. Because it is possible to give more than they will get, investigators
must be mindful to direct the questions and stay focused and on track. It helps to know
the answers to as many questions as possible before they are asked. Once the interview
is over, it is then vital to conduct surveillance on financial transactions, voice intercepts,
and review physical tracking to identify responses to contact, and changes in patterns.
Questioning witnesses and informants may require some aggressive behavior from the
investigator. Investigators must be prepared to dirtyem up if necessary to get the
information needed to further the investigation. This includes checking to see whether
there is an existing warrant for the fugitives arrest which can lead to parole and
probation searches and, if enough probable cause exists, then this could yield a search
warrant which would enable the investigator to gather still more personal information.
2.

Mistakes are Made

Both the pursuer and fugitive make mistakes.

A common error for the

investigator is to allow a pre-conceived theory about a case to dictate the direction of the
investigation. Everyone has a tendency to allow cognitive biases creep into the way a
problem is perceived instead of analyzing all the information and discounting none. For
instance, because everyone has been saying for years that Usama bin Laden is in the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, we ignore all other evidence
suggesting anything different.

Another mistake is to allow external actors like

43

informants, media, and other law enforcement agencies to dictate the direction of the
investigation. Relying too much on intelligence that has been over-diluted or overfiltered by other investigators and analysts tends to lead the pursuer down the wrong path.
It is imperative for the lead investigator to know all the details and behaviors of the
fugitive, and to understand whos potentially involved in hiding and abetting the
fugitivewho they are, and what they do in order to look for patterns and changes in
their behavior. The investigator should never discount or overlook the obvious. An

informant with the correct answer could be staring you in the face, even though he may
not look the part, speak the language, or meet the criteria normally associated with
knowing important things. Individuals like this represent the golden nuggets that can
change the entire direction of the pursuit.
Meanwhile, a persistent debilitating problem that exists in law enforcement at the
federal and international levels is the lack of interagency coordination and limited sharing
of information with investigators and enforcement personnel at the local and state levels.
It is not always best to have a large force hunting one fugitive, but it is absolutely critical
to have everyone aware that a fugitive is being pursued. For instance, if everyone knows
who is being pursued then when the fugitive tries to rob a bank in South Africa, that fact
should be transmitted to the investigator, which will hopefully lead to the fugitives
apprehension. Fugitives become cocky and over-confident, perhaps contacting someone
they know, sharing their secret, or just becoming too comfortable or complacent.
Fugitives will often commit another crime or get arrested, and once they are booked and
their information is entered into the database and the prints match, then bingo, the cavalry
can be called.
Being able to react immediately is essential to apprehending fugitives, because all
too often these individuals are not prepared to move in short order, or someone may
suddenly and unexpectedly blow their cover. Manhunting is a very time consuming,
database-intensive, but simple process once someone is familiar with the steps. To do
manhunting effectively requires dedicated individuals who are willing to sacrifice career
progression and stick to the same job, year after year. Investigators must be able to work
each investigation from cradle to grave, and if information and intelligence is mishandled
be willing to restart the process.
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V.

DECEPTION AND THE FUGITIVE

Greek playwright Sophocles once stated, Profit is sweet, even if it comes from
deception (as cited in Bartebly).

Sophocles statement is quite applicable to the

fugitives situation since the fugitive will seek to enrich himself by using deception as
much as possible to avoid capture. Given this point, how does the United States military
counter or at least minimize the effects of a fugitives deceptions, which he uses to stay
hidden? The answer to this deception challenge is not easily found. In fact, leading
intelligence analysts still struggle to solve conventional military deceptions that involve
large numbers of troops, hard-to-hide platforms, and established governments. Bearing
this in mind, in this chapter we seek to simply orient analysts to a PONIs possible
deception operation in order to point out how this can complicate finding and
apprehending such individuals.
A.

DECEPTION DEFINED

A variety of meanings come to mind when someone mentions the word

deceptionranging from extramarital affairs to poker gamesbut the area of interest
for the military intelligence professional today is the use of deception by non-state actors.
To gain a workable definition, one can start with the U.S. definition of military deception.
U.S. Joint Publication 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception defines it as: Those
actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly
military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take
specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly
mission (Joint Doctrine, 1996, p I-1).
Although this definition is a good starting point, it needs to be further expanded
since it does not take into account non-state actors such as fugitives and their targets of
operations. With this in mind, a better definition would also refer to those actions
conducted by non-state actors that not only mislead their adversarys military decision
makers but also any component of the adversarys government that might be responsible
for developing and executing policies against the non-state actors group. Expanding the
definition in this way would also capture the unique characteristics of dealing with
transnational PONIs.
45

B.

THE BASIC PARTS OF A DECEPTION OPERATION

Having settled on a working definition of deception that can be applied to

international fugitives, let us now review the main parts of a deception operation and
their importance.

In our view, a fugitives deception operation has five main

components: objective, deceiver, target, story, and means (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000, p.
28). One should approach these parts in the order they are listed since the order also
amounts to a general roadmap for how deception operations are formed and carried out.
The objective is the end goal, while the other four components determine whether or not
the objective will be achieved.

At the same time, it is critical to approach these

components from the point of view that the fugitive is an international PONI. This means
that conventional definitions, such as those found in U.S. military publications, can serve
as starting points, but will require further elaboration and refinement on a case by case
basis.
1.

Objective

U.S. Joint Publication 3-58 defines the objective of deception as, The desired
result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to
do at the critical time and/or location (Joint Doctrine, 1996, p A-1). The key here is to
remember that the PONIs deception objective is designed to get the hunter to act in a
certain way to support a greater mission objective. In the case of al-Qaeda, the overall
mission objective is the eradication of infidels in order to return Muslim lands to their
true Islamic roots, as intended by Mohammed.

al-Qaeda operatives change their

appearance, mask their activities, and camouflage their operational bases in order to
deceive the United States and non-Muslim countries so that they can achieve their goals.
Additionally, their deception objective sets the stage for planning and executing the rest
of their deception operation.
2.

Deceiver

A fugitive deceiver is someone who alters or directs the altering of information

received by the hunter so that the hunter makes decisions that favor the fugitive.
Specifically, the fugitive deceiver conducts actions via means which allow him to tell the
story to the hunter. Ultimately, this helps him achieve his deception objective. On the
larger scale, deception acts as a force enhancer allowing the fugitive deceiver to gain an
46

advantage over the hunter. Taken a step further, fugitives and their networks can deceive
from the tactical to the strategic level. Therefore, deceivers can be found anywhere and,
since they are non-state actors, they are not constrained to military venues when
conducting their deception operation (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000, p 22). This requires that
intelligence analysts take into consideration other religious, political, economic or tribal
figures and organizations which lie beyond the military realm that may be supporting
non-state actors.
3.

Deceivers Target

U.S. Joint Publication 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception defines the
deception target as, The adversary decision maker with the authority to make the
decision that will achieve the deception objective (Joint Doctrine, 1996, p A-1). This
definition, too, needs to be expanded beyond the military, to include other government
entities such as the Departments of State and Treasury which play important roles in
policy formulation. Non-state actors such as al-Qaeda target individual and multiple
government entities simultaneously to create an overall veil of deception for both
operational and support activities.

Furthermore, analysts need to understand that

collection assets and analytic organizations are not the targets per se, but rather are
among the means by which the deception operations are executed against decision
makers.
4.

Deception Story

U.S. Joint Publication 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception defines the
deception story as, A scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to
cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception (Joint Doctrine, 1996, p A-2).
Specifically, the deception story is the plan which the fugitive deceiver uses to
manipulate the hunter to his advantage.

Moreover, the story must be believable,

verifiable, consistent, and executable. To meet these criteria, deceivers in general, and
fugitives in particular, will prey upon the hunters inherent perceptions and knowledge
about them. These biases will be covered in greater depth below.
5.

Means

U.S. military doctrine defines the means of deception as, The methods,
resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target
47

(Joint Doctrine, 1996, p A-2). These methods can be viewed using two different lenses:
form and function. In terms of form, means can be separated into physical, technical, and
administrative categories. In the fugitives case, the same person or an ambiguous group
of loosely connected people can orchestrate the means. Resources ranging from media
outlets and websites to religious institutions and non-governmental agencies can serve as
conduits to transmit the fugitives deception story.
The functional lens is a better way to describe the means of deception used by
fugitive PONIs. In The Art of Darkness, Gerwehr and Glenn offer seven categories of
functional deception, to include: camouflage and concealment, demonstration, decoy,
mimicry, dazzling, disinformation, and conditioning (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000, p. 28).
These terms were originally applied to means of deception used in urban warfare;
however, they can be modified to serve as a starting point for discussing PONIs means
of deception.
Camouflage and concealment refers to how a fugitive attempts to disappear using
different types of objects. In the case of camouflage, the fugitive uses natural or manmade materials to blend into his surroundings. If evading in the forest, an individual may
darken his face with mud or cover his body with pine boughs to blend in. These actions
would correspond to the traditional sense of camouflage.

Another approach to

camouflage involves assuming the appearance of the local people. For instance, the
PONI could camouflage himself by dressing as a Bedouin if he was in the Saudi desert or
he could attempt to blend in at Singapores international port by appearing as a
longshoreman.
The idea of concealment involves the use of terrain to hide from observation
(Gerwehr et al., 2000, p. 30). The fugitive could use traditional concepts of concealment,
which involve physical terrain, and could thus hide in caves, mountains, or swamps.
However, PONI concealment should also be expanded to include the social terrain.
Areas and groups that contain similar political, ethnic, religious, or occupational activities
could be used to shield the fugitive.

For instance, the fugitive could hide in a

neighborhood full of co-ethnics. Additionally, he could take cover by using religious

institutions or non-governmental agencies to prevent hunters from seeing him.
48

The second means of fugitive deception involves demonstrations. This concept

centers on activities designed to draw the attention of the hunter away from areas that are
important to the fugitive. Specifically, demonstrations could come in the form of an
attack in a neighboring province within the same country or announcement of the
formation of a new terrorist organization in a nearby state. The aim would be to cause
the hunter to shift focus at least temporarily to the new event, thereby costing him
precious time and providing the fugitive greater liberty.
The third means of deception involves decoys or dummies.

According to

Gerwehr and Glenn, decoying is, The placement of a natural or artificial construct away
from a deceiver to portray an entity or object of significance to the target (Gerwehr et
al., 2000, p. 30). How would decoying work in the case of PONIs? State leaders, for
instance, routinely use body doubles or ringers. False trails can be created through the
use of imposters. Decoys can also engage in scripted cell phone or email conservations
designed to give the hunter the impression that the PONI is in one place when he really is
not. The fugitives network might also create a mock hide-out. A safe house with fresh
food, new clothes, and recent newspapers which fit the fugitives profile would be
established so that when the hunter gains access to it, he thinks that the fugitive is nearby.
The fourth means of functional deception involves mimicry: the fugitive uses an
existing entity or creates one which is of significant interest to the hunter. For example,
the traditional military application of mimicry involves the use of heat and noise
generators to create the illusion that a large formation of tanks is approaching. This gains
the hunters attention, and he either avoids the tanks or requests additional resources to
investigate and/or attack them. A PONI could create an image that implies he is more
powerful than originally thought. He could create the impression that he has the full
support of a countrys government, or that the entire population backs him, and thus any
attempt to capture him may not be worth the resources spent or the political backlash. On
the other hand, the fugitive could make himself appear to be a much smaller target than
he is. He could do this by portraying himself as being low on the totem pole or
possessing a clean record in comparison to other members of his network or group.
The hunter may then be led to believe that the fugitive isnt worth pursuing, especially
when other, higher profile PONIs remain at large.
49

The fifth means of deception involves dazzling or sensory saturation: the hunter is
so overwhelmed by so much noise that the PONI becomes lost in the clutter (Gerwehr
et al., 2000, p. 31). The PONI, for instance, could create and release multiple false
sightings and reports of sightings, and thus overwhelm the hunters ability to track
everything at once. This could be done in a couple of ways. First, the fugitive could
create multiple, viable indicators that indicate he is located on several different continents
simultaneously.

Another approach could center on ensuring that multiple leads of

equivalent importance coming from a wide variety of reliable sources all appear at once.
Some might involve the fugitive himself while others might represent new and higher
priority targets. This would put the hunter in the position of trying to decide what is most
important while precious resources are consumed validating the intelligence reports.
The sixth means of deception involves disinformation.

As in the case of

conventional state-on-state deception, the fugitive has multiple ways to convey altered
information about himself via the media. Newspapers, televisions news reports, and
radio broadcasts, as well as websites, emails, and web-logs could be used to shape the
hunters response. Reports and updates concerning the fugitives current location, health,
or popular support could affect the hunters strategy. Again, this would force the hunter
to vet his sources, consuming valuable resources in the process.
The seventh means of deception centers on the act of conditioning. Gerwher and
Glenn point out that conditioning involves generating and then exploiting a bias, belief,
or habit (Gerwehr et al., 2000, p. 31). How does a PONI manage this? If, for instance,
the hunter relies on sophisticated technology and large organizations to conduct
surveillance and track the PONIs movements, the PONI can conduct routine activities
that are easily collected against. Over time, the surveillance operators will become
accustomed to seeing the PONI, but they will not realize that the PONI is actually
exploiting their technological biases. Thus, the hunter will feel comfortable with the
intelligence he is gathering even though the PONI is actually conducting operations
elsewhere. This is yet another reason the hunter will need to be self-reflective, so as to
carefully determine which of his biases and habits are readily available for exploitation
by the fugitive.
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C.

ORIENTATION

Orientation requires that the hunter understand the enemy and himself in order to
begin to identify and possibly overcome the PONIs deception. The hunter must not only
try to understand as much as possible about the PONI, but also how that PONI sees the
organization that is hunting him. This is where framing the problem is essential since this
will establish boundaries that guide the hunters efforts. This also is directly in line with
Paul Rosas reasoning that, Among the most useful types of characterizations of data is
information pertaining to the potential perpetrator of a D&D operation. The motives,
proclivities, objectives, knowledge (including feedback mechanisms), and D&D tools, for
example, of a potential D&D perpetrator may be consistent or inconsistent with
manipulation of a specific item of information or source (Rosa, 2002). In other words,
only with a good understanding of the particular fugitive can the analyst or hunter focus
his time and resources effectively.
1.

Nature of the PONI and His Organization

Analysts and hunters should identify the type of PONI they are hunting by asking
a variety of questions. For instance, is the PONI acting as an individual or is he a
member of a group? If he belongs to a group, is this group sponsored by a state or a nonstate entity?

Additionally, what best describes the nature of the group: is it local,

national, or transnational in scope? Each one of these questions will enable hunters and
analysts to better appreciate the type of PONI they are pursuing. They can then explore
past cases for information about how similar PONIs conducted deception operations, and
the strengths and weaknesses of those efforts.
2.

PONIs Denial and Deception Resources

Hunters and analysts must obtain as much knowledge as possible concerning the
resources a PONI has at his disposal for creating and conducting denial and deception
operations since these means will directly influence the complexity of his operations. By
being aware of the level of complexity a PONI may achieve, the hunter can better
allocate his collection resources.

Attention should be focused on several areas, to

include: logistics, personnel, finances, skill sets, and external assistance/connections.

51

When looking at these sectors, each should be considered independently, and then in
concert since how these capabilities are combined can create new synergies for the
fugitive.
3.

PONIs Denial and Deception History

By analyzing a PONIs historical uses of deception, hunters and analysts can

recognize and explore possible patterns. These patterns should suggest to the hunter
possible areas to be exploited to help reveal the PONIs position. Specifically, if the
PONI relied on certain resources such as key personnel or large amounts of money to
conduct previous deceptions, then these factors can serve as starting points for collection.
Remembering that all denial and deception activities are unnatural in nature, there should
always be some residual evidence that can be examined. Specifically, the analyst should
focus on support details, strategies, and cross-cultural knowledge the PONI may have
used to advantage in the past. If the operation failed, the analyst should pay particular
attention to the failure points and the conditions that created them. If a PONI has no
history of deception activities, his background and motives can be compared to known
deception cases to see how PONIs in similar situations, hailing from similar backgrounds,
behaved, and thus suggesting clues.
4.

PONIs Culture

The PONIs culture plays an important role since it will influence how he
interacts with his hunter. Certain cultures may increase or reduce the constraints faced by
the PONI and how those constraints can be handled. Analysts must be aware of the
cultural factor as they develop the portrait of the PONI. In The Minds Eye, Daniel
Druckman and Robert Bjork highlight this by pointing out that, By properly refining and
adapting their methods, information can be gathered on how individuals from various
cultures and subcultures conceive of deception and lying. In turn, this information might
lead to determining what sorts of stories or actions constitute socially unacceptable
behaviors. (1991)
Furthermore, the concept of culture should not be limited to just racial, religious,
or social groupings; rather, it should be expanded to include corporate, governmental, and
familial groups as well. Questions concerning who the PONI works for, what family he
comes from, where he grew up, and the nature of his government should be raised. Then,
52

the answers to these questions should be examined in the context of how these external
players view denial and deception.

Also, by better understanding the PONIs

background, analysts should have greater insight into the PONIs likely intent.
Specifically, the analyst should explore the concept of whether or not, to what extent, and
in what areas denial and deception aligns with the PONIs cultural morals, mores, and
values. Finally, it should be noted that although culture is an important factor, it should
not become the only factor considered when constructing the background of the PONI.
5.

PONIs Knowledge of His Deception Target

Another key area that must be examined involves how the PONI and his fellowdeceivers view the hunter. Hunters and analysts must look at themselves as much as they
look at the PONI. This is critical since the enemy has a choice to make about how he
conducts his denial and deception operations.

In particular, he can control the

observables the hunter sees or he can control the hunters focus. Since the PONI has a
limited amount of resources he can devote to fooling the target, it is to his advantage to
control the hunters focus rather than to control all of the observables. In the end, the
PONI will most likely use a mix of the two strategies. Thus, the best way to reduce the
success rate of a PONIs denial and deception operation is for the hunter to understand
his own biases, intelligence system, and decision-making process, and how the PONI is
likely to try to manipulate these to his advantage.
a.

Biases

Self-induced biases cloud peoples judgment by preventing them from

viewing an adversarys intentions and actions for what they are rather than what they
expect them to be. In some cases, the hunter wants to see the fugitive as a lesser person
or coward who lacks the skill and ability to deceive. Such a perspective automatically
creates the false impression that the enemy is not worthy or capable of executing
sophisticated operations in general, and deception in particular. Ephraim Kam, the author
of Surprise Attack, drives home this point by stating, The belief in military superiority
has an especially distorting effect when it relies on the concept that the other side has
deep-rooted, permanent deficiencies (1988, p. 80).

When the analyst believes

something similar, he opens himself to deception operations by his adversary.

53

At the same time, ones values can induce a form of self-bias. Each
culture is distinct in the way its members view the world and in what they place value.
Certain principles are accepted at face value while others are considered to be mutable
rather than hard and fast rules. For instance, Americans tend to take the word of others at
face value whereas elsewhere (e.g. in Arab societies) what is said is not necessarily what
is meant, and everyone realizes this. Additionally, things like pride, greed, fear, or
curiosity can be exploited by the PONI to create a sense of comfort for the hunter,
particularly when these are known to be things that motivate the hunter. The more the
PONI knows about the hunter and the less the hunter recognizes about him, the more the
PONI can take advantage of cross-cultural differences to further his deception.
Cognitive biases create problems for intelligence analysts by hampering
their ability to accurately comprehend incoming information. What are these biases
exactly? According to Heuer, cognitive biases are:
Mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies.
It is important to distinguish cognitive biases from other forms of bias,
such as cultural bias, organizational bias, or bias that results from one's
own self-interest. In other words, a cognitive bias does not result from
any emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment, but
rather from subconscious mental procedures for processing information.
A cognitive bias is a mental error that is consistent and predictable (Heuer,
1999, Chp 9).
There are a variety of contributing factors that feed cognitive biases, such
as relying on word of mouth over statistical data or willingness to believe discredited
evidence. These impact experts and novices alike and are not limited by ones profession
or experience level (Heuer, 1999). Given this reality, a PONI engaged in deception will
look to take advantage of these weaknesses, and thus will try to create an image that the
hunters mind by itself cannot distinguish from reality. While this bias is difficult to
overcome, even when recognized by the hunter, the first step in minimizing its effects is
to recognize that it exists.
b.

Intelligence and the Decision Making Process

Another area that needs addressing involves how the targets of denial and
deception acquire and then make decisions based upon the information they receive.
Hunters and analysts should develop a working knowledge of the systems and procedures
54

used to collect intelligence against the PONI and his associated organization. Efforts
should focus on the collection patterns of platforms, ranging from spies in the field to
orbiting satellites. Special care should be taken not to forget open sources such as foreign
newspapers, diplomats, and television reports.

These sources of information are of

particular importance since they provide the PONI with means for conveying the
deception story and monitoring the hunters reactions. Roy Godson and James Wirtz
drive home this point when they say, Deception requires information channels to reach
the adversary Deception planners require the authority and imagination to exploit
traditional channels and develop new ones on an adhoc basis. (Godson and Wirtz, 2002)
Not only does the PONI engaging in deception look for ways to inject and
receive information, he is also interested in how analysis and decision-making is
conducted by his hunter. Specifically, he wants to understand how the hunter assesses
received information and then how the hunter decides to act. Hunters should consider
how their organization collects, validates, sorts, analyzes, and then presents information
to the action arm of the government. Based upon this information, hunters should ask
how and at what level decisions are made,, and how these decisions become publicly
known.
c.

PONIs Strategies for Denial and Deception

Hunters should examine the possible denial and deception strategies that a
PONI can pursue to keep himself hidden. Strategies result from the interaction of factors,
such as the PONIs nature, culture, resources, activities, and history, with the capabilities
and nature of the deception target. Although there are a variety of ways to categorize a
PONIs deception strategies, our approach is based on the deception sophistication levels
described by Gerwehr and Glenn in Unweaving the Web.

These levels are: static,

dynamic, adaptive, and premeditative (Gerwehr and Glenn, 2002, pp. 33-34).
A static strategy would be the simplest deception scheme: a PONIs
operations would remain the same even though other factors, such as the hunters,
resources, or outside stimuli have changed. With a dynamic strategy, one would expect
to see a deception plan that would be triggered only under certain conditions. Although a
trigger would be required, the actual activities once initiated would always remain the
same. An adaptive strategy would build on the dynamic strategy by accounting for
55

changes in both the stimuli and the activities carried out in response to them. Finally, the
premeditative approach is the most advanced since it would take into account multiple
factors ranging from the hunters nature and capabilities to the PONIs own history and
capabilities. This strategy would be aimed specifically at one particular hunter.
By examining the strategies available to PONIs, one can begin to define
the time and space restrictions on his deception operations.

In turn, identifying

parameters should help the analyst to restrict the amount of information that he will have
to review.

56

VI.

A MANHUNTING METHOD

Understanding the fugitives strategy to avoid capture creates the foundation for
understanding his decision-making process. The fugitives decisions are based on four
apprehension avoidance criteria: familiarity, survivability, safety, and vulnerability.
When the fugitive asks, Where do I go to hide? these four criteria help to frame his
choices. Familiarity, the first criterion, refers to the level of comfort or intimacy a
fugitive feels when he is in a particular geographical area. This familiarity can be based
on prior visits to a location, close associates who live in an area, or a shared ethnolinguistic identity. The premise here is that every individual has a cognitive bias toward
comfort zones. For instance, a person who has spent his entire life in an urban area
may find it difficult to live in a jungle because he has not developed the necessary skills
to operate effectively in that environment. This cognitive bias may or may not be
cultural; a cultural bias is one by which an individual interprets information according to
his cultural orientation.
We believe fugitives may well suffer from what we call location familiarity
effect. Location familiarity effect is similar in concept to another popular cognitive
bias, mere exposure effect. Mere exposure effect is a psychological artifact well known
to advertisers: people express undue liking for things merely because they are familiar
with them (wikipedia, 2005). Therefore, location familiarity effect would predict that
fugitives will prefer to hide in locations with which they are familiar. When a PONI
makes a decision about where to go, his decision is limited by his experiences, to include
the sum of the locations he has visited.
Yet, how does a PONI know whether he will be safe or have the necessary life
support to survive? Again, the location familiarity effect likely plays an important role.
Generally speaking, the fugitive should choose locations where he already knows or feels
he can survive and be safe. When a fugitive goes to a location where he has limited to no
knowledge, then his level of uncertainty is bound to be high. As the fugitives level of
uncertainty increases so, too, does the level of risk that he must be willing to accept. If
he goes to a location about which he has limited knowledge, his level of uncertainty is
57

higher, and hence his level of risk will also be higher. Although different individuals
have varying degrees of risk tolerance, a fugitive should always try to minimize his
uncertainty ergo the location familiarity effect.
Essentially, a PONIs mental map constrains his potential hiding locations. These
constraints or cognitive biases are greatly influenced by the number and varying types of
places he has previously visited.

On rare occasions, certain fugitives are able to

disassociate themselves from their previous life. However, this takes a tremendous
psychological toll on the fugitive. Few fugitives are able to break all contacts from their
previous life because of the immense psychological strain. For example, when Eric
Rudolph was finally apprehended after five years on the run, Rudolph was very
cooperative with local law enforcementnot something you would expect from such a
notorious fugitive. According to Kathleen Walls, the author of Man Hunt: The Eric
Rudolph Story, The jail administrator, Joe Morris, was surprised at the prisoners good

manners (Walls, 2003, p 77). A possible reason why Rudolph was so well behaved
could have to do with his psychological state and the impact severing his social ties had;
this may well have weakened his resolve. It is important to note that severing social ties
is difficult for most fugitives. Even if only limited, most fugitives tend to maintain some
type of contact with members of their social network. So long as fugitives are unwilling
to depart from their previous relationships and normative behaviors their cognitive biases
will help delimit their decisions.
In addition, a fugitives decisions are also restricted by a survivability criterion.
Survivability is the ability of a fugitive to operate and live in a certain geographical
space. For instance, a fugitive must have food, water, medical supplies, and shelter to
survive. Without these basic necessities, a fugitive will be forced to move to another
location to fulfill these basic survival requirements. However, survivability expands past
simple life support when we consider fugitives who belong to organizationsmembers
of terrorist groups, drug cartels, gangs, and mafias who attempt to avoid capture and
prosecution while maintaining a link to the organization.

Organizational fugitives

require, and can acquire, other types of support. For instance, organizational fugitives
need a means to communicate and coordinate activities, transportation to conduct
business, personnel and equipment to support operations, and a financial infrastructure
58

for requisitions. In other words, both Type-A and Type-B PONIs tend to access support
networks to receive different types and degrees of support. Consequently, Type A and B
PONIs will not choose locations where they cannot live and operate.
Support networks not only provide physical goods, but can also provide early
warning and physical security. Security is another term used to describe safety, which is
the condition of being free from danger or risk. For the fugitive, safety includes the
degree or likelihood of apprehension avoidance. What helps to mitigate high levels of
risk is the support of a trusted network that provides the PONI with protection. The trust
network is comprised of individuals who reside inside the individuals larger support
network. A trust network is composed of those individuals who have intimate knowledge
of the PONIs exact location and provide him with the necessary safety to avoid being
captured. Generally speaking, a fugitive is more likely to trust an individual with whom
he has long-standing ties, which have been tested in moments of danger, and/or ties with
a considerable moral component. If the fugitives trust network is neutralized then the
fugitives ability to evade decreases significantly. For instance, as Saddam Husseins
trusted associates were apprehended, Saddams trust network began to dissolve, which
forced Saddam to rent protection (Moore, 2004, pp 237-257). By identifying a PONIs
trust network the investigator or intelligence analyst can potentially correlate individuals
to locations, which can potentially reveal the fugitives hiding location.
The final criterion is vulnerability. Vulnerability is slightly different from safety
in that safety is a condition provided by a trust network, whereas vulnerability is more a
measure of the hunters accessa subject discussed in a previous chapter.

Some

fugitives gravitate toward areas where they dont feel vulnerable to capture. They may
not have a robust support or trust network, but the lack of accessibility by the hunter
ensures their freedom. Vulnerability, basically, is dictated by where the hunter operates.
Certain legal and political constraints limit the physical space where the hunter can look
for the fugitive. These constraints limit the time, location, and manner of a search.
Furthermore, vulnerability can be geographically represented on a map.

While

vulnerability may seem easy for a hunter to map because the hunter has perfect
knowledge of where and how he operates, the hunter must try to map the fugitives
assumptions about the hunters locations and methods. That is, the hunter must make
59

estimations based on the level of information he believes the fugitive has on his (the
hunters) capabilities and accessibility.
A.

A MANHUNTING PROCESS

The four criteria mentioned above are the product of a five step manhunting
process, which is represented in the input-output model in Figure 6 below. The five steps
of the manhunting process are: 1) conduct an initial background investigation via
research; 2) build a social profile; 3) identify the support network; 4) analyze the hunters
constraints and limitations; 5) and conduct analysis of competing hypotheses. This
manhunting process is iterative and structures the problem so as to remove certain biases
from the search operation. This analytical process provides better resolution as to the
fugitives possible locations by limiting pre-established beliefs about the fugitives
behavior or hiding location.
A Man-hunting Process
Apply Nexus Template

Step 1.

Develop Initial
Historical Timeline

Conduct Initial
Background
Investigation /
research

Build initial Social

Network

Familiarity (Place or Person)

Identify
Communities of Identity
Communities of Locality

Profile Distribution Overlay

Comfort Zones

Step 2.
Build Social Profile
(Nexus Topography)

Information &
Intelligence
Requests

Identify
Potential Trust Network
Information &
Intelligence Requests

Types of Support

Step 3.
Network Support Overlay

Type A
ID Support Network
ID Type of Fugitive

Type B
(I, II, III)

ID Support
Requirements

Who can provide

this support and
Where

Type C

Identify
Support Network
Information &
Intelligence Requests

Familiarity
Safety

Step 4.
ID Composition &
Disposition of assets

Accessibility Overlay

Step 5.
Analysis Of Competing
Hypothesis

Survivability
Vulnerability

Identify Hunters
Constraints & Limitations

ID Asset Capabilities

Detectability Index

Figure 6.

A Manhunting Process

Step One, the initial background investigation, enables the analyst or investigator
to identify facts and assumptions about the fugitive. During the initial investigation, the
analyst develops a historical time-line listing dates and locations where the fugitive has
been. During this step, the analyst also builds an initial social network to include a
family tree of the fugitive, and a list of classmates. Certain assumptions can be made
60

about the fugitive, but these assumptions will need to be verified. Step One concludes
with developing an information request list to solicit information missing from the initial
investigation.
Step Two then develops the fugitives identity by asking the question: who is he?
What are his communities of interest and communities of locality? Communities of
interest include affiliations based on hobbies, skills, and interests, while communities of
locality define the fugitive according to where he is from or where he has lived. These
communities can be represented on a map as a social profile distribution overlay.
Mapping these communities can also suggest other areas to search for more information
about a fugitives potential social network(s).
Identifying the support network is the third step in the manhunting process. Step
Three considers the different types of PONIse.g. Type-A (individual), Type-B
(organizational), or Type-C (deposed state leaders).

Each PONI type will require

different forms of support to survive, conduct operations, and avoid capture. After
identifying the various support requirements, the analyst can identify specific individuals
from the fugitives social network who are likely to fulfill the fugitives support
requirements.
The fourth step in the process requires the hunter to analyze his own capabilities
and leads to the development of an accessibility overlay and detection index. The
accessibility overlay graphically represents the hunters area of operations, and the
detection index identifies what the hunter can observe. The detection index examines
different types of intelligence collection platforms and identifies what the hunter can or
cannot detect with those collection assets. This analysis provides a better framework for
understanding how a fugitive could operate in a given region without being detected. By
analyzing both the accessibility and the hunters ability to detect fugitive-related
activities, the analyst can determine where the fugitive is most vulnerable to capture and,
conversely, the PONIs optimal hiding location.
The final step is to take the objective analysis and apply a subjective set of
metrics to identify the most likely areas where the fugitive will hide.

By using a

technique called the analysis of competing hypotheses, described in Richard Heuers

61

book, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999), the intelligence analyst can greatly
reduce certain cognitive biases that he may have when trying to determine the fugitives
potential hiding location. Once given a list of these locations, the commander can then
direct assets to search for the PONI and collect critical information.

Once the

information collection is complete, we have cycled through the first iteration of the fivestep process. If the individual is located then the necessary apprehension operation can
be initiated. If not, additional iterations should be conducted until the individual is found.
However, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge two fundamental
problems associated with this five-step process. First, this manhunting process has never
been validated against a case study or real world scenario.

Unfortunately, limited

academic research currently exists, and any information that is available only draws from
bounty hunting and skip tracing. Most of the pertinent details behind successful and
unsuccessful U.S. government efforts remain classified. Due to the lack of information
available on the subject, validating this process may prove difficult until it has actually
been tested in the field.
Second, there is no standardized metric to measure or compare processes. The
current manhunting metric compares numbers of apprehensions to numbers of
outstanding warrants. The USGs success rate in finding and apprehending fugitives is
sporadic, to say the least. For every fugitive who has been arrested, there is an example
of an individual who has avoided captureUsama bin Ladens elusiveness is a case in
point. Since no formalized manhunting process exits in the U.S. military, the process we
propose can at least serve as starting point. It will certainly help standardize practices if
nothing else.

62

VII. NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY

For the last 10 years, the U.S. intelligence agencies have conducted covert
operations to capture Usama bin Laden (UBL). Intelligence analysts carefully review
incoming intelligence messages for clues that could reveal the location of the worlds
most infamous fugitive. These analysts conduct detailed Social Network Analysis (SNA)
based on available classified information and closely analyze messages to determine who
is talking to whom, the time of the conversation, and what is discussed. This information
is used to gain additional insights into the al-Qaeda terrorist networks structure. The
hope is that analysis of known or suspected terrorist links will reveal an informal
hierarchy, enabling the targeting of key personnel in the network, which could disrupt
current and future al-Qaeda operations. Unfortunately, this approach has not led to
Usama bin Ladens capture.
With that in mind, this chapter will first examine the intelligence communitys
current framework and identify any shortcomings in the intelligence analysts
methodology. Second, taking into account the reality of incomplete information, this
chapter will attempt to improve on current methods by presenting an alternative
methodology, which integrates a model and an investigative process for mapping a
fugitives network. We call this Nexus Topography (NT). Finally, this chapter will
describe the benefits Nexus Topography offers the intelligence community when hunting
fugitives.
A.

CURRENT FRAMEWORK

The first step in understanding why a new methodology is needed involves an

understanding of how the US counter-terrorism community currently maps fugitive
networks and the problems with that method. Since the September 11th attacks, the US
intelligence counter-terrorism community has shown a great deal of interest in the
applications of Social Network Analysis for tracking and targeting terrorists. Managers
within the intelligence community have aggressively sought out experts and developed
software tools to conduct Social Network Analysis, while at the same time instructing
their subordinates to build large databases of information to analyze.
63

Since the effort to capture terrorists became such an urgent task post-9/11, it
appears that either the general concept of how to build the framework was not sufficiently
developed or the concept was not communicated to those analysts at the lower levels who
are responsible for doing the actual work. Regardless, this approach has created a de
facto system for reconstructing a terrorists network based on the supposition of
conventional, hierarchically structured force designed to fight in post-World War II
Europe. That is, this approach creates an organizational chart based on a pre-determined
template.

Given this outdated approach, analysts construct and implement message

filters that seek out specific information from intelligence messages to create a picture of
the enemy and his organization. This system usually involves taking incoming classified
message traffic and filtering out clues as to which individuals are subordinate to whom
and how the organization interacts operationally.
B.

FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY SHORTCOMINGS

Although intelligence analysts are attempting to capture all the information about
a fugitive, they are coming up short for four reasons.

First, the system used by

intelligence analysts is rooted in a cold war mentality, which lacks the flexibility for
dealing with the current asymmetric and dynamic nature of terrorists (Fellman & Wright,
p. 5). Terrorists generally operate in cellular networks, which are more likely to be flat
horizontal rather then vertical organizations (Baraba`si, 2003, p. 223).

Horizontal

structures negate the value of looking for specific chains of command, which are either
not present or ambiguous in nature. Also, horizontal structures grant the fugitive a
greater degree of flexibility in interacting with other collaborators. Specifically, the
fugitive will interact with those individuals who can help him with a particular problem.
Therefore, the fugitives decisions are contextually based upon his needs at a given time,
place, and under circumstances which prevent him from following traditional hierarchal
patterns like those used by standard military commands.

Since these patterns are

irregular, they are not likely to be captured by a hierarchical construct.

Second, analysts often ignore open source information.

The bias towards

classified information likely stems from the days when the little information known about
the Soviet Union was collected through official government assets. As a result, analysts
depended on classified intelligence collection assets to fulfill almost all information
64

requirements. However, analysts can now access a great deal of information about
PONIs from on-line sources such as websites, blogs, and chat rooms. Furthermore,
journalists can provide useful information because journalists have greater access to a
broad rand of different individuals, groups, and organizations, man of whom use the
media to spread propaganda. Unfortunately, most analysts continue to ignore open
sources for information on fugitives.
Third, the current fugitive framework only concentrates on the operational
network and does not capture the fugitives entire social network, built over the course of
his lifetime. In particular, the system considers those elements critical to the fugitives
operational involvement within the organization. Given this situation, a large amount of
information is typically missing on the fugitives religious, educational, political,
military, criminal, and economic associations.

In Dark Networks: The Structure,

Operation, and Performance of International Drug, Terror, and Arms Trafficking

Networks, Brinton Milward and Joerg Raab highlight this point for al-Qaeda, stating

Unlike the drug smuggling networks, the membership of al-Qaeda seems to be quite
diverse in terms of ethnic, national, and social background. Operatives are from a variety
of countries, born Muslims and converts, highly educated men from middle class or
upper class families to petty criminals with only limited education (Milward & Raab, p.
10).

Given these wide-ranging differences, the current system fails to capture the

complex nature of these relationships.

Additionally, the current framework primarily concentrates on operational ties
between fugitives and fails to provide any historical context for these relationships. In
Uncloaking Terrorist Networks, Valdis Krebs, drives home the importance of earlier

relationships stating, Conspirators don't form many ties outside of their immediate
cluster and often minimize the activation of existing ties inside the network. Strong ties
between prior contacts, which were frequently formed years ago in school and training
camps, keep the cells linked. Yet, unlike normal social networks, these strong ties remain
mostly dormant and therefore hidden to outsiders (Krebs, 2002). Therefore, analysts
have no way of knowing if the fugitive has developed strong relationships through his
past activities since these bonds do not appear in recent intelligence reports.

As

mentioned before, the horizontal structure of terrorist networks allows fugitives to

65

activate latent relationships, which baffles intelligence analysts and prevents collection
assets from identifying additional associates.
Fourth, Social Network Analysis (SNA) suffers from an inherent flaw due to a
reliance on complete information. Specifically, traditional SNA relies on an a priori
knowledge of relationships, but without complete information Social Network Analysis is
limited in its effectiveness.

Additionally, most fugitives who are members of

transnational criminal groupslike terrorist organizations, drug traffickers, and illegal

arms dealersoperate in an opaque environment. Their clandestine networks cellular
structure is developed to prevent information from being gathered on the organization.
As a result, any type of useful analysis must be conducted with incomplete information.
Consequently, intelligence analysts need a map to identify areas of missing
information, which will enable US intelligence analysts to construct a more complete
picture of the fugitives support network. The key to developing such a map requires an
integrated framework, process, and methodology specifically designed to identify missing
information, something we label Nexus Topography.
C.

NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY

While Social Network Analysis documents the connections or links in a social

group, Nexus Topography describes the universe of potential relationships in different
social environments and cultures.

The word nexus comes from the Latin word

nectere, which means to bind.

So, Nexus Topography maps social forums or

environments that bind people together. The advantage of Nexus Topography is that it
facilitates identification of missing information, which further allows intelligence analysts
to redirect collection assets.
In developing a picture of a PONIs clandestine social network one must move
from the known to the unknown. In the development of a social network there are two
constants: all social interactions occur at a specified place and at a specified time. If two
individuals never occupy the same time and space, they are not likely to develop a direct
link. Conversely, the likelihood of an interaction occurring increases if two individuals do
occupy the same time and space, referred to from here on as spatial coincidence. The
exception to spatial coincidence involves the ability to create virtual relationships over
66

the Internet in places such as chat rooms (something beyond the scope of this thesis).
Therefore, the primary focus of NT is to show when, where, why, and how relationships
are formed. NTs aim is to understand the intricacies of relationship development to
forecast the PONIs complete social network.
1.

Relationship Development

A short discussion about where relationships are developed is necessary before

we can fully flush out Nexus Topography.

The initial social environment where

relationships are formed is in the family unit. The first bonds are those formed between
parents and children, brothers and sisters, grandparents and grandchildren, cousins, and
aunts and uncles. These family ties are often considered the strongest social bonds
developed between people.

In many cultures, generations of family members live

together in the same household and maintain close ties. The next most common set of
social interactions occurs between teachers, students, and classmates. These bonds can
last for generations, but the social interaction itself occurs at specific schools and
universities. Upon completion of academic study, most people transition straight into the
market place, which is another common location where social interactions occur. Yet,
another area where social interactions take place includes religion (i.e. churches,
mosques, and temples). For instance, religious congregations normally have a set time
and location where members meet to worship.
The social interactions mentioned above all occur within what we earlier referred
to as communities of identity. There are two types of communities of identity important
to the development of relationships: communities of locality and communities of interest.
The community of locality is the district or geographic region in which people live,
interact, or under which they are governed. An example of a community of locality is a
neighborhood, village, city, town or province. Communities of interest, on the other
hand, are communities formed around a common interest or shared experience. For
example, prisoners or inmates, members of the military, scientists, sports enthusiasts, and
hobbyists comprise of communities of interest.

The underlying assertion is that

relationships are always developed within communities, whether these are communities
of locality or communities of interest. By examining a fugitives communities of locality

67

and interest, an analyst can create the PONIs social profile. This profile can aide in
mapping the PONIs affiliation network.
2.

Diverse, Redundant, and Adaptive Relationships

At this time, it is important to introduce the concepts of diversity, redundancy,

and adaptability. Diversity of identity refers to the fact that individuals often have
multiple identities: a familial identity, an employment identity, a religious identity, and
an academic identity. Each identity is different and helps define the individuals social
network(s). Redundancy refers to individuals sharing multiple identities across networks.
For instance, two individuals could attend the same church, graduate from the same
university, and work in the same office building. In this case, these two individuals have
a redundant relationship based upon multiple shared identities (location, religion,
education, and employment). The byproduct of redundancy is that some links between
sets of individuals may be disproportionately strong. Finally, relationships have the
characteristic of changing over time. That is, a fugitives social network may alter as the
fugitives interests change, he moves to another community, or his position within that
community shifts. These changes directly influence the nature of his relationships, which
will further affect his informal network. Diversity, redundancy, and adaptability are what
make informal social networks, and especially clandestine terrorist networks, so
powerful, and why military commanders have a hard time disabling these networks.
D.

AFFILIATION NETWORKS AND LONGITUDINALANALYSIS

After reviewing the concepts of redundancy, diversity, and adaptability, it is now

time to discuss affiliation networks and time analysis. In Social Network Analysis:
Methods and Applications, Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust describe affiliation

networks as two-mode networks, consisting of a set of actors and a set of events (1994,
pp 291-298). Affiliation networks illustrate or map ties developed at events or activities.
Such events could include sporting events, clubs, or religious meetings. These events
may serve as a catalyst to unite two or more individuals into a group or clique.
Unfortunately, affiliation networks are currently modeled according to traditional node
and link diagrams. That is, the event serves as the central node and each individual is
linked together through attendance at such an event. This type of static analysis has very
limited uses in the analysis of clandestine networks.
68

One of the major problems with traditional network analysis is measuring and
depicting time or longitudinal data.

Unfortunately, most longitudinal analysis

concentrates on how networks change and adapt over time, but rarely focuses on how
networks are created. This type of analysis is also depicted in only two dimensions. As
Wasserman and Faust state, network analysis and network models have often been
criticized for being static. Although much work has been done on longitudinal models,
applications of this methodology are sorely lacking (1994, p 730). However, timeand
the timing of relationshipsis extremely important in unraveling small world terrorist
networks.
More useful is strand analysis. Traditional SNA graphically depicts nodes and
links, but strands represent the life span of individuals. Strands are linked together by
ties formed through various affiliations. Strand analysis is three dimensional analysis
with individuals, time, and events each representing a different dimension in 3-D space.
The advantage to strand analysis is that it depicts where potential social links can
develop. Using both strand analysis and the NT template can effectively build a picture of
the PONIs potential associates that were previously unobservable.
E.

MAPPING THE NEXUS

Relationships develop inside specific regions or communities based on the

concepts of identity and locality. These specific regions can be categorized and used to
template a range of bonds, which should help analysts investigate key areas of possible
interaction.

These regions of nexus are religious, political, educational, criminal,

military, familial, cultural, and economic. It is important to note that many of these
overlap. For instance, Islamic fundamentalist groups use religion as a source of political
power, economic exchange, and cultural identity.
1.

Familial

To determine familial relationships, the analyst must identify paternal and

maternal genealogy. This is especially important in tribal societies, where family lineage
is extremely important, and analysts need to look for bonds or alliances created at the
tribe, clan, lineage, and family levels. Social affiliations have so far received the most
attention in network analyses. These affiliations include not only ties of friendship, but
even more importantly, familial relations. The investigator must not only ask, Who are
69

the fugitives closest friends now, and who were his closest friends when he lived or
worked in such-and-such a place? but also, What is the fugitives family tree: is his
matrilineal side more dominant than the patrilineal side? Do both sides of his family
accept him? What about his wifes family (or wives families)? What about siblings
who might be married to people who show up as political or military associates? While
records about this may be difficult to construct, birth, marriage, divorce, and death
records are usually available in the public domain or can be obtained by persuading or
coercing local administrators or even village elders. HUMINT collection, by the CIA,
Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), or third country intelligence sharing can provide
additional information in this arena.
2.

Educational

Educational bonds are relationships developed during the sharing or exchange of

knowledge. For instance, a PONI who attended a specific university at a certain time
should have developed a social network at that university. Therefore, an intelligence
analyst can develop a target list based on all the students and teachers who attended that
university during that time. This does not mean that all individuals who attended that
university are terrorists, but it does expand the fugitives potential social network and
may reveal important information on the networks infrastructure. Also, it is important to
remember that education and how it is imparted to a person varies according to culture
and socio-economic status. For instance, people who live in third world Islamic countries
and who come from poor families are unlikely to attend government sponsored schools.
In contrast, families are more likely to send their sons to madrassas to gain a rudimentary
education. With this in mind, the analysts must understand and focus on the specific
characteristics of the PONIs background so that they can gather relevant educational
data for analysis.
3.

Political

Political bonds are bonds based on the manifestation of social power in a society.
Non-clandestine groups, organizations, and parties are formed to create power through
numbers. This power is based on the ability to mobilize group members in support of an
idea, belief, or cause. Political affiliations may often link a fugitive to a government
official or to individuals who can mobilize popular support. To begin analysis of the
70

political nexus, an intelligence analyst must identify those direct and indirect
relationships between the PONI and individuals who hold government positions, such as
town or village council members.

These associations can transcend the local level

government and manifest themselves at the national level. The analyst should develop a
list of political parties and politicians who hold ideological beliefs similar to those of the
PONI and who may be indirectly linked to him through others.
Often, the line between politics and religion is blurred. This is particularly true
when discussing Islamic fugitives since Islam recognizes no distinction between the two
(Islamism is often described as political Islam) (Sick, 1993). The fugitives affiliations
can be found, again, in open sources such as propaganda pieces, party registration
records, newspaper columns, and the records of political proceedings. It is vital to
understand what organizations the fugitive has belonged to. For example, Usama bin
Ladens affiliations with members of the Muslim Brotherhood, certain Salafi groups, and
Wahabbi clerics all helped him expand his popular support base and lent him a certain
level of political power within the Islamic world. Who a fugitive associated with,
campaigned with, or sponsored legislation with can also be telling. Equally important is
to pay attention to those persons whom the fugitive opposed or had caustic relations with.
4.

Religious

Religious bonds are relationships developed inside a religion. Usually these

relationships begin at the local church, mosque, or temple. Yet, religious bonds and
affiliations can transcend national boundaries. Since religion is so frequently a source of
identification (among those of like religion) and friction (among those of different
religions), this category merits careful attention. For instance, knowing whether a PONI
professes to be Muslim, Christian, Hindu, etc., is very important since he is less likely to
find refuge among people of a different religion.

Within the major religions it is

important to distinguish whether the fugitive is loyal to a particular denomination such as

being a Sunni, Shiite, or Sufi Islam. Within that denomination, knowing whether the
PONI belongs to a sect, sub-sect, or splinter group with a particular ideology can be
extremely helpful to an analyst.

71

5.

Economic

Economic affiliations are the relationships created through economic exchange,

such as business ventures or charitable organizations.

One should build a list of

businesses that are either funded by the fugitive or where the fugitive may find work. For
example, if the fugitive is a carpenter, he will probably try to find work as a carpenter.
Similarly, if a fugitive is a philanthropist and enjoys doing charity work for people, he
will probably be affiliated with other individuals who does similar charity work. This
makes it important to ask questions like: who has the fugitive been in partnership with, or
been employed by, or has made significant or numerous transactions with?
Another critical component involves tracking the flow of money. In the case of
al-Qaeda, the Golden Chain has become a common term to describe the networks
financial supporters in the Middle East (Eurolegal, 2004). Again, open source reporting
offers a tremendous amount. HUMINT can also yield valuable information, whether
from interrogations of captured members of the fugitives network or intelligence sharing
among countries that have cooperative agreements in place.

If the fugitives network

does business, or is associated with charitable organizations within the United States, tax
records and legal documents can provide valuable information about a fugitives
connections.
6.

Criminal

Criminal bonds are relationships formed within the prison system. When men
serve time together in prison extremely close relationships may develop. Sometimes
these bonds can be tighter than those in a family or tribe. With this in mind, analysts
should ask questions, such as: was the fugitive incarcerated, where was he incarcerated,
and when was he incarcerated?

Additionally, are there any countries that have

outstanding warrants for the fugitives arrest? By developing a picture of the fugitives
criminal ties and history, one can map a network of people who the fugitive relies on or
that he may feel indebted to, or vice versa.
7.

Military

Military bonds are built through shared combat experiences or military training.
It is easy to locate those who served in combat together, because there is usually a list of
veterans that can be retrieved through databases or records. A tightly knit group is
72

developed through different military experiences with varying levels of commitment to

each other based on those experiences.

Past military affiliations, such as training

received, special skills studied, or unit membership, can be used to suggest a fugitives
current relationships

Discovering what campaigns a fugitive fought in (such as

Afghanistan in the 1980s), and alongside whom, is useful information. This information
is most likely to be found on propaganda websites, during interrogations, or perhaps in
U.S. military or CIA archives that maintain databases on political and military leaders.
This type of data can also be extracted from foreign government records or local
knowledge.
8.

Ethno-linguistic / Cultural

Ethno-linguistic and cultural bonds form because individuals share a common

language or ethnic and cultural background. For example, if a fugitive only speaks
Arabic then it would be difficult for him to have close ties to anyone who does not speak
his native tongue. Not all ethno-linguistic and cultural ties are strong, but some are
crucial to a persons cultural identity.

In Afghanistan where tribal loyalties are

fundamental, a Pashtun is far more likely to find refuge in Pashtun-dominated parts of the
country rather than areas populated by Turkomen or Azeris. Similarly, if propaganda
websites retelling the exploits of a PONI indicate that he, as a foreigner, established a
lasting alliance with a warlord of a certain ethnicity, this information could prove critical
in narrowing the field of investigation. The investigator must seek to understand the
relative strength of such bonds.

Books, reports by investigative journalists, and

propaganda are useful open sources for such information.

F.

STRENGTHS OF NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY (NT)

Although NT is a simple and straightforward concept, its strengths are multiplex.

First, Nexus Topography identifies key social terraindefined as social elements that tie
individuals togetherthat can be used to narrow areas of investigation. Developing as
complete a template as possible for a PONIs potential network should be invaluable
given the high turnover rate in analysts and the constant effort of maintaining continuity
in analysis. Additionally, NT can be used against a variety of PONIs, thereby providing
analysts with a very flexible tool. It does not matter if a PONI is a member of a drug
cartel, terrorist organization, or weapons smuggling outfit since the model provides a
73

standard approach that can be tailored to a specific individual or group simply by

identifying how individuals are connected. A by-product of this model is the increased
efficiency in collection, especially when collection resources are scarce. As mentioned
before, the current framework tends to focus mostly on classified information since it
deals with operational connections. But, Nexus regions can be researched in the open
source realm even before classified collection begins. This, too, can serve to better focus
limited collection assets or free up resources from other intelligence taskings.

74

VIII. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE

Any type of analytical process needs systems and an organization to ensure that
the inputs yield appropriate outputs. Without an organization that integrates systems, the
best analytical processes will not achieve their desired outcome. Therefore, in this
section we analyze and present a possible organizational structure to support the proposed
manhunting process.
The fundamental question concerning manhunting is whether the United States
government (USG) is properly organized to conduct manhunts? Currently, the USG has
no central organization that oversees manhunting. Apprehending fugitives has never
been a core competency of either the DOD or any of the intelligence agencies.
Traditionally, apprehending individuals has been considered a law enforcement function.
However, criminal cases are man-power intensive, so most criminal investigations focus
on collecting evidence to issue arrest warrants.

Furthermore, the suspects in most

criminal cases are concerned not with running from justice, but with concealing their
connection to the alleged crime.

This dynamic has prevented the law enforcement

community from developing a centralized organization responsible for all fugitive

manhunts. Currently, the U.S. Marshals are tasked by the Attorney General to be the lead
agency for conducting many of the USGs fugitive investigations, but not all. Due to the
lack of a centralized oversight body, the United States government (USG) has not clearly
defined the duties and responsibilities between various governmental agencies. Since
manhunting is an important aspect in the war on terror, the USG has multiple agencies
expanding their jurisdictions past traditional organizational roles. Meanwhile, what role
should the Department of Defense play in hunting terrorists?
A.

A MANHUNTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Rumsfelds War (Scarborough, 2004) contains a 1 July 2002 snowflake from

Donald Rumsfeld to Doug Feith that addresses the issue of manhunting. In the snowflake
Rumsfeld asks, How do we organize the Department of Defense for manhunts? We are
obviously not well organized at the present time (Scarborough, 2004, p183). One
difficulty DOD faces in conducting manhunts is that the large bureaucracy does not allow
sufficient flexibility for such time-sensitive and time-intensive operations.
75

The

Department of Defense is very efficient at waging war, but the organizational structure
that makes DOD efficient in war also makes it politically inflexible during peace. The
U.S. military has made waging war a science, with precise calculations as to how to
disrupt and destroy the enemy. Yet, finding a PONI is more an art then science. To find
and apprehend a PONI takes creativity and thought. Some of the most unimportantseeming facts are often essential in unraveling where and how fugitives hide. This is why
many of the most successful manhunts have been conducted by small flexible units of
between 3-10 men, the hunt for the Black September Organization (BSO) being a case in
point.
In his Masters thesis, The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic
Massacre, Alexander B. Calahan compares two Israeli operations, the attempted

assassination of Ali Hassan Salameh by Mossad in Lillehammer, and the use of the
Avner Team. The Lillehammer operation was deemed a failure because it resulted in the
exposure of seven Israeli officers and the death of two innocent civilians. The Avner
team, in contrast, was more successful. During the two year deployment of the Avner
team, eight of the eleven targets were killed, and the collateral damage included one KGB
officer, four PLO security personnel, one freelance assassin, and two team members.
What separated these two cases was that the Avner team operated outside the
governments traditional organizational structure. This team had the freedom to develop
the necessary intelligence and conduct the necessary operations beyond the confines of a
large political bureaucracy. Due to too much compartmentalization, the Lillehammer
incident was doomed from the start. Information that was vital for the mission success
was rarely shared between individuals.
Although not all manhunts conducted by large bureaucratic structures are failures,
cases we have studied show that most successful manhunts involve small flexible teams.
With this in mind, Figure 7 outlines a potential manhunting organization with operating
units of 5-7 man teams. The organization itself would be comprised of a commander or
director, a deputy director, a staff, an operational research group, a technical support
group, and the manhunting teams.

76

Director/Commander
Deputy Director/Commander
Center Staff

Man-hunting
Team

Figure 7.

Operational
Research Group

Technical Support
Group

Proposed Manhunting Organizational Structure

The manhunting teams need to have the authority to directly access various
United States government agencies. A DOD manhunting team must be able to work
directly with personnel for the U.S. Marshals office, FBI, CIA, and the Treasury
Department.

Each entity would bring different experiences, knowledge, and

organizational perspectives to manhunting. The combined effort would ensure that the
whole would be stronger than the sum of its parts.
Manhunting requires small flexible units, which can work around various
limitations placed on a larger centralized organization. Centralized hierarchies do not
allow enough flexibility to collect the type of information necessary. Although large
bureaucratic organizations are efficient in conducting specified tasks, they often do not
have the flexibility to adjust to a changing environment. We would argue that for
manhunting, an organizations adaptability is more important than its efficiency. From
the cases weve studied, adaptability may contribute more to operational success than
efficiency.
Individuals who conduct manhunts need to also have a variety of skills in
interviewing, interrogating, information analysis, and surveillance. To develop these
skills sufficiently, officers should not be rotating through assignments every two years or
so. By rotating individuals, different hunters acquire different information at different
times, but the continual rotations cause the loss of some information collected during the
early phases of the manhunt. This should be mitigated. In many ways, the case officer
model used by law enforcement is optimal since it leads to the development of subject
77

matter expertise. The lack of law enforcement investigative skills in the military restricts
the type of information that can be collected on known fugitives, which further limits the
units ability to locate the fugitive and identify support nodes.
The manhunting team size may vary depending on the importance and difficulty
in collecting information on the PONI. Based on past historical examples, a manhunting
team should consist of approximately seven personnel, to include operators, intelligence
analysts, surveillance technicians, and communications specialists, and should have
enough depth to follow multiple leads. Specifically, the team should consist of a team
leader and three pairs of investigators and technicians. The investigators would be
operators and intelligence analysts, while the technicians could provide surveillance and
be responsible for communications. This set-up would provide flexibility and speed
since the team leader could pursue multiple leads by deploying his sub-units as he saw
best. Also, the team members would gain specialized manhunting skills by attending the
proposed manhunting training course. This focused, small team effort would also allow
for the development of subject matter expertise on specific PONIs.
As depicted in Figure 7, the centralized control unit would consist of the director,
deputy director, and staff. This control element would serve to coordinate and integrate
information collected by the manhunting teams, as well as assigning them their targets.
Beneath the command element would be the organizational research group, and the
technical support group. The organizational research group would collate data into a
central data bank and would also do high end analysis, to include such activities as link,
social, and information analysis to support the manhunting teams. The technical support
group would then provide the necessary technical support to conduct surveillance and
communication. The technical support group would also be responsible for developing
technologies to be used to target specific PONIs.
B.

AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURE

Thus far, we have described an analytical process and an organization. Yet, there
needs to be some type of procedure that integrates the two. The diagram in Figure 8
outlines the organizational procedure or scheme of maneuver for conducting manhunts.
This procedure starts with the organizational research group (ORG) developing a list of
Persons of National Interest (PONI). This list may fall under a tier system, where Tier 1
78

includes the PONIs who are to be either killed or captured. Tier 2 are those PONIs who
are to be located and tracked for intelligence collection purposes, and Tier 3 PONIs are
individuals whose status is currently unknown and about whom further research is
needed.
This list is then given to the director or commander for approval. The commander
designates a manhunting team to conduct the manhunt, and provides them with his
guidance.

The manhunting team begins the manhunting process and generates

information requirements, leads, and a method of collection. During this phase, the
manhunting team coordinates with the operational research group (ORG) and the
technical support group (TSG). The manhunting team briefs the commander on the
information it needs, leads to be followed, and its proposed methods of collection.
Ideally, the commander will subsequently approve the proposal and authorize the team to
conduct actions against the information requirements and/or PONI.
The manhunting team must then begin the investigation.

During this

investigation, the manhunting team should produce: 1) additional leads that will be
placed into the queue for further investigation, 2) points of exploitation to gain additional
information that is not forthcoming by direct interaction with known or past associates, 3)
the location of the PONI, 4) the identification of additional targets or PONIs. In some
cases, the investigation may lead to a dead end, and when this happens, the manhunting
team will have to reassess its assumptions and information. The manhunting team will
then create a new course of action to find the target.
As shown in Figure 8, the method of investigation or collection is either covered,
non-covered, or contracted. In a covered investigation the hunter assumes a false identity
or uses a cover story to elicit information, which under normal circumstances would not
be given by the PONIs friends or family members. In a non-covered investigation the
manhunting team represents itself without any false pretext. In a contracted investigation
a private organization or company is hired to obtain crucial information.
For example, the manhunting team can use a cover story to exploit a PONIs
parents. The manhunting team can call the parent and explain that his or her son has a
refund check pending his signature. The team can send a small check to the parents
79

residence and wait until the PONI cashes the check. In this case, the manhunting team
has verified that at least one parent is in contact with the PONI. The manhunting team
may also produce a source who has knowledge of the PONIs location. This would allow
the manhunting team to place active surveillance on the PONI and send the necessary
information to the director. The director could then initiate a joint planning group to
conduct a follow-on operation to either track or apprehend the PONI. The apprehension
of the PONI can be either covert, clandestine, or overt. These actions include the use of
direct action units to neutralize him.

Organizational Procedure
Director
Approves
Designates
Guides
ORG

Director

JPG

Approves
Method

COA

Man-Hunting Tm

Man-hunting Tm

Nominates
Man-hunting
Process

Investigation

PONI
Tier 1

Clandestine
PIR/Leads

Tier 2
Tier 3

Covert

Method of
Investigation

1. Additional Leads

Overt

2. Points of Exploitation
3. Locate PONI

Covered
Non-covered
Contracted

Figure 8.

4. ID Potential Targets
5. Dead End

Organizational Procedure

This organizational procedure allows for maximum flexibility for the manhunting
team while maintaining centralized control. Additionally, this procedure will also yield a
set of metrics. Given the fact that this method is structured around an inputoutput
model, it should be possible to measure outcomes. Studying these outcomes should
enable the organization to measure its effectiveness in finding and apprehending elusive
individuals. For example, Measures of effectiveness (MOE) include the number of leads
generated, points of exploitation identified, confirmed locations of the target, and the
80

identification of additional persons of interest. These MOE can then be compared to the
number of offensive operations that resulted in the successful apprehension of the PONI.
Correct analysis should identify why certain individuals have evaded capture, and
determine what types of measures need to be taken to improve apprehension success
rates.

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82

IX
A.

CONCLUSIONS

THE FOUNDATION

The purpose of this thesis has been to explore manhunting, and to develop a
formal process that can be used by law enforcement, intelligence analysts, and military
planners to capture Persons of National Interest (PONI) wanted by the United States
government. In particular, we have proposed a systematic, future-oriented approach to
locate and target PONIs.

This involves the development of an analytical process,

organizational structure and procedures, and the identification of manhunting strategies to

identify and locate PONIs.
This thesis represents the first attempt to formalize a process that has traditionally
developed through years of on the job training (OJT) in the law enforcement community.
The manhunting process we describe can assist the analyst by providing a systematic
method for identifying potential hiding locations and see through denial and deception.
This iterative process will also help the analyst identify key individuals in the PONIs
network. These individuals, once identified, can lead the hunter to the PONIs location.
The advantage to this process is that it will yield information that can be graphically
displayed on a map, thus providing increased clarity.
One of the key tools we introduce is Nexus Topography (NT) The intelligence
communitys current framework to identify a PONIs network has various shortcomings
that hinder the analysts abilities to find PONIs like Usama bin Laden. However, using
NT, intelligence analysts can create a better picture of the PONIs overall social universe
by accounting for relationships in terms of time, space, and affiliation. NT provides the
intelligence community with a logical, adaptable, and constantly updatable model that
provides a comprehensive and dynamic map of a PONIs potential network(s).
Ultimately, mapping these networks will allow analysts to conduct better targeting of the
PONI and the subsequent dismantling of his organization
This thesis also offers an organizational structure and procedure for conducting
manhunts. We envision small, decentralized five to seven manhunting teams that report
to a centralized information collection unit. A flattened hierarchy of this type is more
83

flexible than current structures within the Department of Defense, but also offers a
method to monitor the manhunting team, which allows for effective control.
B.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Although we believe we offer a sound process, much work remains in terms of

developing a comprehensive manhunting strategy for the United States government. This
strategy is necessary if we ever hope to have a robust, coordinated effort at local,
national, and international levels when it comes to identifying and locating PONIs. At
the moment, no one government agency has taken the lead. No one focuses on bringing
together what we regard as three key components of an interagency manhunting strategy:
doctrine, training, and operational structure. These three pillars need to be researched in
depth, developed, and then implemented by one lead entity to ensure that a seamless and
proactive manhunting system is available for American decision makers. What might
these three pillars look like? Although there are a variety of possible answers, the
following should serve as springboard for further consideration.
1.

Doctrine

No U.S. governmental agency has yet developed any doctrine on manhunting.

Although one would expect the Department of Justice to have written rules, procedures,
or principles on manhunting, so far no such documents have been identified. Nor has the
Department of Defense developed any doctrine on how to locate and capture individual
PONIs. The apparent lack of doctrine or standardized manhunting procedure calls into
question the ability of the United States government to target and capture known PONIs.
Unfortunately, manhunting has also failed to capture the attention of academia. The
research that has been done is that undertaken on the job by skip tracers and bounty
hunters, and the majority of this concerns the licensing and legal aspects of bountyhunting. Consequently, no substantial body of knowledge or collated set of best practices
exists anywhere.
The USG needs to develop a basic doctrine before it can begin to enact even an
initial manhunting strategy. It would be unwise to devote substantial time, money, and
personnel unless there was at least some basic understanding of how PONIs hide and
what tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) truly work against them. Since these two
subjects can be researched, an official study needs to be undertaken.
84

Given time

constraints, limited resources, and the organizational culture within the Department of
Defense, it may make sense to contract out such a study. Not only should this research
yield an across-the-board study on how PONIs hide based upon the category of PONI and
who he is trying to evadelocal, national, or international level manhunters but,
researchers would need unprecedented access and honest feedback from all agencies
involved in manhunting in order to gauge current USG abilities. This could well require
a Presidential directive. Regardless, the goal should be to evaluate and draw from the
raw data a number of working themes that would be consolidated into key principles. In
turn, these principles should serve as the starting point for developing a USG manhunting
doctrine.
2.

Training

Currently, DOD personnel receive very limited training in the skills necessary to
be effective manhunters.

The Department of Justice, in contrast, fields the U.S.

Marshals, who not only have unique skill sets not currently developed or trained by the
military, but offer a model for organizational structure and procedures. Skills that law
enforcement personnel have worth drawing on include being able to conduct interviews,
detect ambiguities in a story, conduct surveillance, and prosecute investigations to solve
complex problems. However, law enforcement in general and the U.S. Marshals in
particular, do not have much experience operating overseas in diverse and, what are in
many cases, dramatically different cultural environments. What may work in the U.S.
may not be successful in another culture. In DOD, meanwhile, the holistic sets law
enforcement possesses are not found in any one person or group. To the detriment of
manhunting, DOD separates the intelligence analyst and the operator, and never
integrates either skill with those of the interrogator and interviewer.
Given these points, a comprehensive international manhunting training program
should be established to ensure that the USG has the properly trained personnel to carry
out its strategy. The TTPs should be rooted in the doctrinal principles laid down through
the research described above.

Among those subjects taught should be various

investigative methods, interviewing skills, surveillance techniques, analytical abilities,

understanding of the interagency process, and grounding in the legal and ethical issues
involved in locating and tracking individuals globally. The training should be hands-on
85

with a focus on using each skill set in a synergistic manner that would be tested in a field
training exercise (FTX). The objective should be to produce military personnel who
could serve as investigators on operational manhunting teams. Ideally, the military
manhunter would possess the skills to be able to act as an interviewer, analyst, and
operator so that he can effectively find his targets without having to rely totally on
separate independent agencies. As operational teams provide after action feedback based
upon their operational missions, this training should be revised and further refined. So,
too, should the doctrine.
3.

Operational Structure

With doctrine and training in place, operational structurethe third pillar of the
strategycan be addressed. The current JTF structure does not address the complexities
inherent in manhunting. JTFs are often a collection of independent entities that do not
communicate effectively outside of their constituent organizations. Additionally, those at
the worker level lack an understanding of the strategic goal for their activities due to the
many layers of mid-level management within the structure. When individuals lack clear
guidance, they revert to familiar practices and activities since these fulfill the mission of
their immediate organization even if they fail the adhoc entitys overall objectives. Also,
existing organizational cultures do not grant sufficient flexibility to collect the type of
information necessary since they create their own self-inhibiting biases. Finally, the
practice of rotating officers over short periods of time through various organizations
adversely affects the manhunting campaign by removing the subject matter experts from
the case just as they begin to understand the PONI and his environment. In contrast, the
most successful manhunts are historically conducted by small five to seven man units.
These units have the ability to move quickly and focus on only one issuefinding their
PONI. Additionally, they will report to only one boss who understands the necessity of
allowing the team to dedicate itself over the long term to that single objective.
With this in mind, a new type of structure is required in order to effectively
manhunt.

This structure would be two-fold in nature, with one part devoted to a

centralized command and control entity, while the second part involves small,
decentralized hunter teams for execution. As described in this thesis, such a structure
would not have to be created from scratch. Rather it could be developed from an existing
86

military organization such as the DIA or USSOCOM. It should be the one place where
information from other government entities, such the FBI, CIA, and Treasury, as well as
traditional intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, and OSINT), is brought
together and analyzed. The reporting chain for the hunter teams would be from team
leader to action group commander to head of the central command and control entity to a
national level policy maker. Ideally, the policy maker would be the President of the
United States; however, if this was not possible then the Secretary of Defense or the NSC
should be the minimum level guiding their efforts.
C.

CLOSING THOUGHTS

Manhunting is about identifying and locating known and unknown persons of

interest. Although current events involving the War on Terrorism have much of the
public relating to manhunting in terms of identifying and locating terrorists, it is
important to bear in mind that manhunting encompasses much more then just hunting
terrorists. It can range from finding war criminals, as in BosniaHerzegovina, to finding
deposed leaders such as Saddam Hussein. Taken a step further, some of the greatest
threats to U.S. security in the future will come from small groups of non-state actors or
even individuals who will move quickly and act independently of governments or largescale organizations. To counter such threats, the USG will need to have the capability to
quickly and efficiently identify and find these targets globally. As a result, the United
States governments ability to prosecute the war on terrorism today and to find and
apprehend high value targets in the future depends on the its ability to develop and
institutionalize a comprehensive manhunting strategy now. We like to believe this thesis
offers a foundation on which to build.

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88

APPENDIX A.

ICTY INDICTEE STATISTCS

Data provided by the Coalition for International Justice.

Indictees - ICTY
The 25 known suspects still at-large or otherwise not in the Tribunal's custody
include Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb army commander
General Ratko Mladic, all four co-defendants in the Kosovo indictment against Slobodan
Milosevic, Bosnian Serb General Pandurevic, the Vukovar Three and many others
accused of genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the
customs of war, and crimes against humanity.
Updated: 21 October 2002
Overview
Total number of people known to have been indicted at any time
1121
Dead and/or indictments formally dropped
27
- of these, number killed during SFOR arrest attempts
032
Total number of people now publicly indicted
84
Total number of known indictees at large
25
In the custody of the ICTY or serving ICTY sentence
503
Awaiting transfer to the Tribunal
0
Currently serving sentence
05
Temporarily released by the Tribunal pending trial
09
Released after trial
08
Released after completion of sentence
03
Number of Arrests
By SFOR
By UNTAES forces (w/ICTY Staff) in then Serb-held Croatia
By Bosnian Federation police
By police in Republika Srpska
By police in Germany and Austria
By Serbia
By Croatia
By Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SFOR Arrests by Sector
British sector
Dutch sector
German/French sector
U.S. sector
U.S./UK sector
NUMBER OF SURRENDERS
Known Whereabouts of Publicly Indicted Persons Still at Large
89

45
264
015
06
00
04
06
03
00
24
12
02
06
05
01
22

Bosnia: French Sector

Location
Pale area (RS) (Visegrad and Trebenje)

Name
KARADZIC, Radovan

Bosnia: UK Sector
Location
Prijedor (RS)
Busovaca (Fed./Cro.)
Bosnia: Unknown Sector
Location
(RS)

Name
BOROVNICA, Goran
MARINIC, Zoran
Name
EUPLJANIN, Stojan

Croatia:
Location
Croatia
Croatia

Name
GOTOVINA, Ante
BOBETKO, Janko

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Location
Belgrade, January 2002
Kragujevac, December 2001
near Belgrade, June 2001
Serbia, June 2000
Belgrade, numerous sightings
Serbia, June 2000
Belgrade, December 2001
near Belgrade, June 2001
Serbia, October 2001
Belgrade, July 2002
Belgrade
Serbia, October 2001
Serbia, November 2001
Serbia, June 2001
Serbia, September 2002
Unknown Whereabouts
BEARLA, Ljubisa
NIKOLIC, Drago
POPOVIC, Vujadin
RAJIC, Ivica

Name
RADIC, Miroslav
RASEVIC, Mitar
LUKIC, Sredoje
MEAKIC, Zeljko
MILUTINOVIC, Milan
JANKOVIC, Gojko
TODOVIC, Savo
LUKIC, Milan
ZEC, Milan
SLJIVANCANIN, Veselin
PANDUREVIC, Vinko
KOVACEVIC, Vladimir
MILOSEVIC, Dragomir
ZELENOVIC, Dragan
BOROVCANIN, Ljubomir

90

DETAILS OF ARRESTS
Name
Date/Place of Arrest
Arresting Force
ALAGIC, Mehmed
08/02/01 Sarajevo
Bosnian Gov. (provisionally
(Bosniak)
Bosnia
released)
ALEKSOVSKI, Zlatko
04/28/97
Croatian Government
(ethnic Maced./CR citizen)
Serbian Government
BANOVIC, Nenad
11/08/01
(released, indictment
withdrawn)
BANOVIC, Predrag
11/08/01
Serbian Government
BLAGOJEVIC, Vidoje
10/08/01
SFOR (UK)
07/06/99 Banja Luka, RS
BRDJANIN, Radoslav (BS)
SFOR (UK)
Bosnia
CESIC, Ranko (BS)
05/26/02 Serbia
Serbian Government
German Police, acquitted
DELALIC, Zenjil (Bosniak) 03/--/95 Munich, Germany
and released by ICTY
Bosnian Federation
DELIC, Hazim (Bosniak)
05/02/96 Federation, Bosnia
Government.
07/0702 Bratunac, RS,
DERONJIC, Miroslav (BS)
SFOR (US)
Bosnia
Bosnian Federation
DJUKIC, Dorde
01/30/96
Government
DOKMANOVIC, Slavko
06/27/97 Erdut, Croatia (E.
ICTY/UNTAES, deceased
(BS)
Slavonia)
10/25/99 Prijedor, RS,
DOSEN, Damir (BS)
SFOR (UK)
Bosnia
ERDEMOVIC, Drazen (BC) 03/30/96
Yugoslav Government
FURUNDZIJA, Anto (BC) 12/18/97 Vitez, Bosnia
SFOR (Dutch, UK Sector)
12/20/99 Banja Luka, RS,
GALIC, Stanislav (BS)
SFOR (UK)
Bosnia
HADZIHASANOVIC,
Bosnian Federation
08/02/01, Sarjaevo, Bosnia
Enver (Bosniak)
Gov.(provisionally released)
01/22/98 Bijeljina, RS,
JELISIC, Goran (BS)
SFOR (US)
Bosnia
06/07/99 Prijedor, RS,
KOLUNDZJA, Dragan (BS)
SFOR (UK)
Bosnia
05/25/98 Banja Luka, RS,
KOS, Milojica (BS)
SFOR (UK)
Bosnia
SFOR (German and French,
KOVAC, Radomir (BS)
08/02/99 Foca, RS, Bosnia
French Sector)
KOVACEVIC, Milan (BS) 07/10/97 Prijedor, RS,
SFOR (UK), deceased

91

Bosnia
KRAJISNIK, Momcilo (BS) 04/03/00 Pale, RS, Bosnia
KRNOJELAC, Milorad (BS) 06/15/98 Foca, RS, Bosnia
KRSTIC, Radislav (BS)

12/02/98 Bijeljina, RS,

Bosnia

KUBURA, Amir (Bosniak) 08/02/01 Sarjevo, Bosnia

KUPRESKIC, Vlatko (BC) 12/18/97 Vitez, Bosnia
04/08/98 Prijedor, RS,
KVOCKA, Miroslav (BS)
Bosnia

SFOR (French, German and

others, French Sector)
SFOR (French and German,
French Sector)
SFOR (US)
Bosnian Federation
Government (provisionally
released)
SFOR (Dutch, UK Sector)
SFOR (UK)

LANDZO, Esad (Bosniak)

05/02/96 Federation, Bosnia

Bosnian Federation
Government

MARTINOVIC ,
Vinko(BC/C)

08/09/99

Croatian Government

MILOSEVIC, Slobodan (S)

MRDJA, Darko (BS)
MUCIC, Zdravko (BC)
NALETILIC, MLaden
(BC/C)

04/28/01 Belgrade,
Yugoslavia
06/12/02 Prijedor, RS,
Bosnia
03/08/96 Vienna, Austria
03/21/00

Serbia Government
SFOR (UK)
Austria
Croatian Government

04/21/00 Vlasenica, RS,

Bosnia
04/15/01 Zvornik, RS,
OBRENOVIC, Dragan (BS)
Bosnia
PRCAC, Dragoljub (BS)
03/06/00 Jelicka, RS, Bosnia
04/08/98 Prijedor, RS,
RADIC, MLaden (BS)
Bosnia
06/25/00 Prijedor, RS,
SIKIRICA, Dusko
Bosnia
03/23/01 Belgrade,
STAKIC, Milomir (BS)
Yugoslavia
STANKOVIC, Radovan
07/09/02 Foca, RS, Bosnia
(BS)
TADIC, Dusko (BS)
02/13/94 Munich, Germany
TALIC, Momir (BS)
08/25/99 Vienna, Austria
NIKOLIC, Dragan (BS)

TODOROVIC, Stevan (BS) 09/27/98 RS, Bosnia

92

SFOR (US)
SFOR (US)
SFOR (UK)
SFOR (UK)
SFOR (UK)
Serbia Government
SFOR (German and French,
French Sector)
German Government
Austrian Police
SFOR (US) - after capture in
Serbia by British special

VASILJEVIC, Mitar (BS)

01/25/00 Visegrad, RS,

Bosnia

VUKOVIC, Zoran

12/23/99 Foca, RS, Bosnia

DETAILS OF SURRENDERS
Name
Date of Surrender
ADEMI, Rahim
07/25/01
(ethnic Albanian/CR Citizen
BLASKIC, Tihomir (BC)
04/01/96
CERKEZ, Mario (BC)
10/06/97
FUSTAR, Dragan
1/31/02
HALILOVIC, Sefer
9/25/01
GRUBAN, Momcilo (S)
05/02/02
JOKIC, Miodrag
11/12/01

JOKIC, Dragan

08/15/01

JOSIPOVIC, Drago (BC)

KNEZEVIC, Dusan
KORDIC, Dario (BC)
KUNARAC, Dragoljub (BS)
KUPRESKIC, Mirjan (BC)
KUPRESKIC, Zoran (BC)
LJUBICIC, Pasko
OJDANIC, Dragoljub (S)
MARTIC, Milan
MRKSIC, Mile
PAPIC, Dragan (BC)

10/06/97
05/18/02
10/06/97
03/04/98
10/06/97
10/06/97
11/12/01
04/25/02
05/15/02
05/15/02
10/06/97

PLAVSIC, Biljana (BS)

1/9/01

SAINOVIC, Nikola
SANTIC, Vladimir (BC)
SIMIC, Blagoje (BS)
SIMIC, Milan (BS)

05/02/02
10/06/97
03/11/01
02/14/98

STRUGAR, Pavle

10/21/02

TADIC, Miroslav (BS)

ZARIC, Simo (BS)
ZIGIC, Zoran (BS)

02/14/98
02/24/98
04/16/98
93

forces
SFOR (French and German,
French Sector)
SFOR (German (and
French?), French Sector)
Surrendered to ICTY by:

Self
Self 6
Self *
Self
Self
Self
Self
Self (provisionally released
pending trial)
Self *
Self
Self
Self
Self *
Self *
Self
Self
Self
Self
Self *
Self (provisionally released
pending trial)
Self
Self *
Self
Self
Self (provisionally released
pending trial)
Self
Self
Self

1 Not including Slavko DOKMANOVIC and Milan KOVACEVIC, who both died while
proceedings against them were continuing and not including Slobodan MILJKOVIC who
was reported killed in Serbia on August 8, 1998.
2 Simo DRLJACA (BS), died resisting arrest by British SFOR forces in Prijedor, RS,
Bosnia on July 10, 1997; Dragan GAGOVIC (BS), reported by French SFOR to have
been killed during an arrest attempt on January 9, 1999 in Foca; Janko JANJIC (BS) blew
himself up with a hand grenade as German SFOR troops tried to arrest him on October
12, 2000 in Foca.
3 Not including temporarily released suspects
4 Including Milan KOVACEVIC, who has since died. Does not include three indictee
deaths during arrest attempts.
5 Slavko DOKMANOVIC committed suicide while in detention.
6 Surrendered after negotiations between US Secretary of Defense William Perry and
Croatian Minister of Defense Gojko Susak.
* Surrendered with assistance of the Croatian government, after the US government and
allies threatened to vote against funding by international financial institutions for Croatia.
Two other Bosnian Croats, Marinko KATAVA and Ivan SANTIC, also surrendered in
this group but they were later released after their indictments were dropped due to
insufficient evidence.
Sources: Elections results from OSCE; whereabouts from USG map 475416 (R00855)
2/98; information on arrests and surrenders from ICTY press releases and established
news sources, including AP, Reuters, and The Guardian.

94

APPENDIX B.

MANHUNTING CASE STUDY LIST

Individual

Pablo Escobar

Summary

Famous Columbian Drug lord who turned himself in

to Columbian Authorities in 1991 to avoid extradition
to the U.S. On 22 July 1992, he escaped from prison
and remained on the run until he was killed by
Columbian government in a shoot out in December
1993.

In 1992, the Columbians created a special

organization called the search block.

Escobar was

found hiding in a middle class barrio in Medellin

Columbia.
Usama bin Laden

Leader of al-Qaeda terrorist network who has been

on the run from U.S. authorities since 1998. Current
whereabouts are unknown, but he is suspected of
being in the Northwest Frontier Province. Bin Laden
has evaded numerous assassination attempts on his
life.

Mir Amal Kasi

Attacked CIA headquarters in 1993 and was

apprehended in Pakistan in 1997. He was convicted
of shooting 5 people outside CIA headquarters, and
later put to death by lethal injection in the Virginia
State prison. Kasi was found in Baluchistan.

Eric Rudolph

In 1998 Eric Rudolph was wanted as a suspect for the

Olympic Park bombings in 1996. The FBI conducted
an extensive manhunt in the mountains of North
Carolina without success. After a five-year period,
Rudolph was picking through trash at a local Sav-ALot, when he was apprehended by a rookie police
95

officer. Rudolph was sentence to four consecutive

life terms.
Pancho Villa

Pancho Villa was the first foreign guerrilla/terrorist to

attack the United States. In 1916, Villa led 1,500
Villistas into Columbus, New Mexico and killed 17
residents. President Wilson sent General Pershing
into Mexico to capture Villa.

Unfortunately, the

Pancho Villa expedition was a failure. In 1923, Villa

was assassinated in Parral Chihuahua.
Black September Organization

The BSO was a Palestinian paramilitary organization

responsible for the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes during
the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, Germany. By
1979, 8 of the 11 members responsible for the attack
were killed by Avner team created from the Mossad.

Theodore John Kaczynski

Kaczynski was the target of the FBIs most expensive

manhunt ever.

Over 18 years, Kaczynski evaded

identification. It wasnt until Kaczynskis younger

brother David recognized the handwriting of Teds
manifestos that the FBI was finally able to identify
the Unabomber. Ted Kaczynski was arrested in April
of 1996.
Abimael Guzmn

Abimael Guzmn was the leader of the shining

patha Maoist insurgency in Peru. The Peruvian
National Directorate Against Terrorism received
various leads that members of the shining path had
safe houses in Lima. The directorate began casing
various residences, and found empty tubes of cream
for the treatment of Psoriasis, a skin disease Guzman
was known to have. Guzman was arrested in 1992
and sentenced to life imprisonment.
96

John Dillinger

John Dillinger was a famous bank robber in the

1930s. Dillinger was arrested on 22 July 1934 after a
brothel owner, Anna Sage, turned over Dillingers
location. Anna Sage gave up Dillingers location to
avoid being deported to Romania.

Ilich Ramrez Snchez

Better known as Carlos the Jackal was responsible

for the attack on the OPEC headquarters in Vienna.
In 1994, the Sudanese government turned over
Sanchez to French authorities. The CIA played a
pivotalrole in finding Sanchez in Khartoum, Sudan.
A small 4-man element identified Sanchezs body
guard near a hospital.

The CIA team confirmed

Sanchezs presence in Khartoum, which enabled the

French to put political pressure on the Sudanese.
Saddam Hussein

On 13 December 2003, the U.S. military captured

Saddam Hussein in an underground hide site near his
home in Tikrit. U.S. forces were able to identify key
individuals in his support network, which allowed the
U.S. to quickly close in on his location.

Ratko Mladic

Mladic was the leader of the Bosnian Serb Army and

is wanted for war crimes by the International
Criminal Tribunal. Mladic has evaded capture since
December of 1995, and is currently suspected of
hiding in Serbia.

Radovan Karadic

Karadic is the former leader of the Serb Democratic

Party in Bosnia. He is currently indicted for war
crimes by the ICTY. Karadic has evaded capture
since the beginning of 1996. He is currently believed
to be hiding in the southeast portion of Bosnia
97

Herzegovina.
Khadaffy Janjalani

Khadaffy Janjalani is the leader of the Abu Sayyaf

Group responsible for capturing three U.S. citizens.
Janajalani has evaded capture by the Philippine
government since his escape from prison in 1995.
Janjalani is believed to be operating in Southern
Mindanao.

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

KSM is a member of the al-Qaeda network and is

believed to be the mastermind behind the 9-11
attacks.

On 1 March 2003, the Pakistani ISI

reportedly captured KSM in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

He was then transferred to U.S. custody.
Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali) Hambali was the leader of the Jemaah Islamiyaha
terrorist network with strong ties to al-Qaeda. Thai
police found Hambali in Auytthaya, Thailand just 75
km north of Bangkok. The manhunt for Hambali last
just 20-months, and he is currently detained by the
United States government.

98

APPENDIX C.

DEFINITIONS

counter-leadership operations
The employment of strategic forces in an effort to destroy, or render impotent,
selected enemy military, government, or group leadership under any circumstances by
which hostilities may be initiated.
investigation
A research process used to collect detailed information on a specific individual,
group, or organization with the intent to use the acquired information in a follow on
operation. An investigation may include traditional intelligence collection functions to
gather data, but slightly differs in the ability and methods used to question and interview
selected individuals.
manhunt
An organized, extensive search for a person of national interest conducted as a
special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments that employ
specialized military capabilities to identify, locate, neutralize or capture designated
individuals. Manhunts differ from typical surveillance, reconnaissance and direct action
missions by the degree and methods used to search for, investigate and apprehend the
targeted individual(s).
man-hunting method
A specific tactic, technique or procedure used by special operators to identify, and
locate individuals of national interest. A man-hunting method may or may not include
traditional intelligence collection methodologies.
man-hunting team
An element or unit specially selected, trained and organized to identify and locate
a person of national interest. The man-hunting team may or may not be responsible for
the apprehension of said individual.
Persons of National Interest (PONI)

Any individual designated by the President of the United States (POTUS) or the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as an individual that poses a direct threat to national
interest. Persons of National Interest include, but are not limited to persons indicted for
war crimes, terrorists, enemy combatant leadership, and insurgents.

99

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100

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106

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1.

Defense Technical Information Center

Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2.

Dudley Knox Library

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

3.

Center for Special Operations

USSOCOM
MacDill AFB, Florida

4.

John Clark
US Marshals Service
Los Angles Regional Fugitive Task Force

5.

Joint Intelligence Task Force-Counter Terrorism

Defense Intelligence Agency
Bolling AFB, Washignton, D.C.

6.

Regional Intelligence Center

Washington, D.C.

7.

David King
US Marshals Service Training Academy
Glynco, Georiga

8.

National Criminal Investigative Service

London, England

9.

British Special Forces Headquarters

London, England

10.

British Defence Intelligence Service

London, England

11.

Metropolitan Police
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London, England

12.

British Defence Staff

British Embassy
Washington, D.C.
107