Private Property

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE

vs.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
G.R. No. L-24440
March 28, 1968
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial
capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the
Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and
some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens
certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of
the President, issued a ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner
pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof,
payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying all the
said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of
the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog. However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was
approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39. Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961,
ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and
to return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of
Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11 of the
P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaintin the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for
depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff's rights and
obligations under said law be declared; (c) The Secretary of Finance and the Internal Revenue Commissioner be
enjoined from reimbursing the sum of P57,373.46 to defendant City; and (d) The latter be ordered to continue
paying the balance of P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.
Issue: Is the contested lands part of public domain or patrimonial property?
Held: The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which provide:1wph1.t

ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property.
ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service
paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to
the provisions of special laws. (Stressed for emphasis).

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site,
the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use.
They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem
generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding
enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations State vs.
Province than along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held
and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As
ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse
possession all these to the detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of properties other than
those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code is "... without prejudice
to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal
Corporations can be considered as "special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for
distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.

Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734

Facts: On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a land registration
court, rendered judgment declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No.
1, Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Mani1a, containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or
less. On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requesting His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City property bounded by Florida, San
Andres, and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 22547, containing a total area of
7,450 square meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the
actual occupants thereof.
With the presentation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547, which had been yielded as above stated by the, City
authorities to the Land Authority, Transfer Certificate of Title was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila and
in lieu thereof another Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Land Tenure Administration (now
Land Authority) pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118.

But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the City of Manila made a complete turn-about Antonio J.
Villegas brought an action to restrain, prohibit and enjoin from further implementing Republic Act No. 4118
Issue: Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila?
Held: There is one outstanding factor that should be borne in mind in resolving the character of the land involved,
and it is that the City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by
any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property.
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land in the
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary
purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it
owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a
subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration.

Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481

Facts: The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City. on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City
Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. 2 Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner
being the highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of
absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00. By virtue of the aforesaid deed of
absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the land
registered. On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion on the ground that the property
sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and
therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual.
Issue: is the land a public dominion or patrimonial?
Held: Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the
object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms,
states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs.

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133250
July 9, 2002
Facts: PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation, to
develop the Freedom Islands. On April 27, 1998, petitioner filed the instant Petition. Petitioner prays that
PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and
Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to
private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in
properties of the State that are of public dominion.
Issue: Is the land patrimonial or public domain?
Held: Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to
property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted
property of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the
national wealth.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares
which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act
classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition.
These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that
these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside
the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution,
"waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only
when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands,
which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no
longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.

Moveable Property
U.S. v. Tambunting, 41 Phil 364
Facts: The accused and his wife became occupants of the upper floor of the house situated at No.
443, Calle Evangelista, in the city of Manila. When the occupants at whose request this installation had
been made vacated the premises, the gas company disconnected the gas pipe and removed the meter, thus
cutting off the supply of gas from said premises. Upon June 2, 1919, one of the inspectors of the gas
company visited the house in question and found that gas was being used, without the knowledge and
consent of the gas company, for cooking in the quarters occupied by the defendant and his wife: to effect
which a short piece of iron pipe had been inserted in the gap where the gas meter had formerly been placed,
and piece of rubber tubing had been used to connect the gas pipe of rubber tubing had been used to connect
the gas pipe in kitchen with the gas stove, or plate, used for cooking.
Issue: Can gas be the object of larceny?
Held: Yes. There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it
incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and
sold like other personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being
transported from place to place. Likewise water which is confined in pipes and electricity which is
conveyed by wires are subjects of larceny.
Berkenkotter v. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil 663
Facts: The Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc obtained from the defendants, Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a loan
secured by a first mortgage constituted on two parcels and land "with all its buildings, improvements,
sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part or is necessary
complement of said sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, now existing or that may in the future
exist is said lots." Shortly after said mortgage had been constituted, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., decided
to increase the capacity of its sugar central by buying additional machinery and equipment, so that instead
of milling 150 tons daily, it could produce 250. On June 10, 1927, B.A. Green, president of the Mabalacat
Sugar Co., Inc., applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional loan of P75,000 offering as security the
additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B.A. Green and installed in the sugar central after the
execution of the original mortgage deed, on April 27, 1927, together with whatever additional equipment
acquired with said loan. B.A. Green failed to obtain said loan.
Issue: Does the machinery constitute immoveable property?
Held: Yes. If the installation of the machinery and equipment in question in the central of the
Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., in lieu of the other of less capacity existing therein, for its sugar industry,
converted them into real property by reason of their purpose, it cannot be said that their incorporation
therewith was not permanent in character because, as essential and principal elements of a sugar central,
without them the sugar central would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it
was established. Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character, the necessary machinery and equipment
installed for carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessarily be permanent.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the installation of a
machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar central, in lieu of another of less capacity, for the purpose
of carrying out the industrial functions of the latter and increasing production, constitutes a permanent
improvement on said sugar central and subjects said machinery and equipment to the mortgage constituted
thereon (article 1877, Civil Code); (2) that the fact that the purchaser of the new machinery and equipment

has bound himself to the person supplying him the purchase money to hold them as security for the
payment of the latter's credit, and to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering them does not alter
the permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery and equipment with the central.
Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor, 6 SCRA 197
Facts: Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner's abovementioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the
ground that the same are not realty.
Issue: Does the machinery an immovable property?
Held: No. In the case at bar the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the
transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as
demanded by the law. Said equipments may not, therefore, be deemed real property.
Rationale: So that movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first
be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would
be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." We may here
distinguish, therefore, those movable which become immobilized by destination because they are essential
and principal elements in the industry for those which may not be so considered immobilized because they
are merely incidental, not essential and principal. Thus, cash registers, typewriters, etc., usually found and
used in hotels, restaurants, theaters, etc. are merely incidentals and are not and should not be considered
immobilized by destination, for these businesses can continue or carry on their functions without these
equity comments. Airline companies use forklifts, jeep-wagons, pressure pumps, IBM machines, etc. which
are incidentals, not essentials, and thus retain their movable nature. On the other hand, machineries of
breweries used in the manufacture of liquor and soft drinks, though movable in nature, are immobilized
because they are essential to said industries; but the delivery trucks and adding machines which they
usually own and use and are found within their industrial compounds are merely incidental and retain their
movable nature.
Similarly, the tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not
essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes
by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals acquired as movables and used only for expediency to
facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried
on, as petitioner has carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business could
be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another
shop belonging to another.

Davao Sawmill v. Castillo

Facts: The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government
of the Philippine Islands. However, the land upon which the business was conducted belonged to another
person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. Some
of the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the conflict concerning machines which were
placed and mounted on foundations of cement.
Issue:
Held: In the first place, it must again be pointed out that the appellant should have registered its
protest before or at the time of the sale of this property. It must further be pointed out that while not
conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels by the appellant is indicative of intention and
impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties.
Prudential Bank v. Panis, 153 SCRA 390
Facts: Plaintiffs-spouses secured a loan in the sum of P70,000.00 from the defendant Prudential
Bank. To secure payment of this loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of defendant on the aforesaid date a deed
of Real Estate Mortgage. For failure of plaintiffs to pay their obligation to defendant Bank after it became
due, and upon application of said defendant, the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage were extrajudicially
foreclosed. Consequent to the foreclosure was the sale of the properties therein mortgaged to defendant as
the highest bidder in a public auction sale conducted by the defendant City Sheriff. The auction sale
aforesaid was held despite written request from plaintiffs through counsel for the defendant City Sheriff to
desist from going with the scheduled public auction sale. Held: While it is true that a mortgage of land
necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building
by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a
real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable property even if dealt with
separately and apart from the land
Benguet Corp. v. CBAA, 218 SCRA 271
Facts: Provincial Assessor of Zambales assessed the said properties as taxable improvements. The
assessment was appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province of Zambales. The petitioner
does not dispute that the tailings dam may be considered realty within the meaning of Article 415. It insists,
however, that the dam cannot be subjected to realty tax as a separate and independent property because it
does not constitute an "assessable improvement" on the mine although a considerable sum may have been
spent in constructing and maintaining it. On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the dam is an
assessable improvement because it enhances the value and utility of the mine. The primary function of the
dam is to receive, retain and hold the water coming from the operations of the mine, and it also enables the
petitioner to impound water, which is then recycled for use in the plant. Held: From the definitions and the
cases cited above, it would appear that whether a structure constitutes an improvement so as to partake of
the status of realty would depend upon the degree of permanence intended in its construction and use. The
expression "permanent" as applied to an improvement does not imply that the improvement must be used
perpetually but only until the purpose to which the principal realty is devoted has been accomplished. It is
sufficient that the improvement is intended to remain as long as the land to which it is annexed is still used
for the said purpose. The Court is convinced that the subject dam falls within the definition of an
"improvement" because it is permanent in character and it enhances both the value and utility of petitioner's
mine. Moreover, the immovable nature of the dam defines its character as real property under Article 415
of the Civil Code and thus makes it taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.

Caltex v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 114 SCRA 273

Facts: Caltex installed machinery and equipment in its gas stations located on leased land. The
said machines and equipment are loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under an appropriate lease
agreement or receipt. It is stipulated in the lease contract that the operators, upon demand, shall return to
Caltex the machines and equipment in good condition as when received, ordinary wear and tear excepted.
The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as
taxable realty. The Board held in its decision of June 3, 1977 that the said machines and equipment are real
property within the meaning of sections 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential
Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, and that the definitions of real property and personal
property in articles 415 and 416 of the Civil Code are not applicable to this case. Held: We hold that the
said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to
which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for
without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the
gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the
Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. Xxx That ruling is an interpretation of paragraph 5 of
article 415 of the Civil Code regarding machinery that becomes real property by destination. In the Davao
Saw Mills case the question was whether the machinery mounted on foundations of cement and installed by
the lessee on leased land should be regarded as real property for purposes of execution of a judgment
against the lessee. The sheriff treated the machinery as personal property.
Sergs products v. PCI Leasing, 338 SCRA 499
Facts: PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for [a] sum of money,
with an application for a writ. In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized
were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third
parties. They further stated that PCI Leasing was estopped from treating these machineries as personal
because the contracts in which the alleged agreement were embodied were totally sham and farcical. Held:
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in
the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their
chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all
of them have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the
industry. In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal,
property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code. Xxx The Court has held that contracting parties may
validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.

Action in personam/in rem/ Quasi in rem.

Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil 421
Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing the
plaintiff's action upon motion of the defendant on the ground that it is barred by prior judgment. The
pertinent facts alleged in the complaint to which a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by a prior judgment is filed, are those relating to the cause of action and the parties, because if
they are the same as the cause of action and the parties in the prior judgment, or though the parties are
different they represent the same interest, and the court rendering the prior judgment had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties, the subsequent action is barred by the prior judgment and should be
dismissed. Held: If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person,
with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or
objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam,
although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to
bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strength of alleging facts which, if
true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem.
Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9
Facts: In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original
Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
covering a parcel of land. In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to
Francisco, Regina, Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente. On October 19, 1965, Ching
Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's
death, a suit against him was commenced on December 27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title
is in personam and the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his
estate by means of service of summons. On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for
cancellation of title is quasi in rem, for while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a
judgment in in rem, it fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of
the nature of the judgment in rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching
Leng who on the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines. Held: An action to redeem, or
to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole
world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so
that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. Xxxx Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being
in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's
death.

Hernandez v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 71 SCRA 290

Facts: Petitioner was an employee of private respondent Development Bank of the Philippines in
its Legal Department for twenty-one (21) years until his retirement on February 28, 1966 due to illness. On
August 12, 1964, in due recognition of his unqualified service as Assistant Attorney in its Legal
Department, the private respondent awarded to the petitioner a lot in the private respondent's Housing
Project. Psent to the said Committee a Cashier's Check No. 77089 CC, dated -October 21, 1968, issued by
the Philippine Banking Corporation in the name of his wife in the sum of P21,500.00 to cover the cash and
full payment of the purchase price of the lot and house awarded to him. However, the Chief Accountant
and Comptroller of the private respondent returned to the petitioner ,the aforementioned check, informing
him that the private respondent, through its Committee on Organization, Personnel and Facilities, had
cancelled the award of the lot and house previously awarded to him on the following grounds: (1) that he
has already retired; (2) that he has only an option to purchase said house and lot; (3) that there are a big
number of employees who have no houses or lots; (4) that he has been given his retirement gratuity; and (5)
that the awarding of the aforementioned house and lot to an employee of the private respondent would
better subserve the objective of its Housing Project. Petitioner protested against the cancellation of the
award of the house and lot in his favor and demanded from private respondent the restoration of all his
rights to said award. However, private respondent refused. Petitioner filed a complaint, arguing that the
cancellation of said award was unwarranted and illegal for he has already become the owner of said house
and lot by virtue of said award on August 12, 1964 and has acquired a vested right thereto, which cannot be
unilaterally cancelled without his consent; that he. had requested the private respondent to restore to him all
his rights to said award but the latter refused and failed and still refuses and fails to comply with said
request. Private respondent, on the contrary, contended that since the petitioner's action affects the title to a
house and lot situated in Quezon City, the same should have been commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City where the real property is located and not in the Court of First Instance of Batangas where
petitioner resides. Held: The Court agrees that petitioner's action is not a real but a personal action.
As correctly insisted by petitioner, his action is one to declare null and void the cancellation of the lot
and house in his favor which does not involve title and ownership over said properties but seeks to
compel respondent to recognize that the award is a valid and subsisting one which it cannot
arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept the proffered payment in full which it
had rejected and returned to petitioner. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, "actions affecting
title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition, or condemnation of , or foreclosure of mortgage in
real property, shall be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff". Such an action
is a personal action which may be properly brought by petitioner in his residence.

Domagas v. Jensen, 448 SCRA 663

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent
Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged
in her complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land. On
August 16, 2000, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner
before the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC
in Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve
the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the
MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. The respondent further
alleged that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 because the petitioner, the plaintiff therein,
failed to show prior possession of the property. She further claimed that the
alleged forcible entry was simply based on the result of the survey conducted
by Geodetic Engineer Leonardo de Vera showing that the property of the
respondent encroached on that of the petitioner. The petitioner assails the
decision of the CA, alleging that the appellate court erred in holding that the
respondents complaint for ejectment is an action quasi in rem. The petitioner
insists that the complaint for forcible entry is an action in personam;
therefore, substituted service of the summons and complaint on the
respondent, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, is
valid. The petitioner, likewise, asserts that Oscar Layno is a resident and a
registered voter of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan; hence, the
service of the complaint and summons on the respondent through him is
valid. The respondent, on the other hand, asserts that the action for forcible
entry filed against her was an action quasi in rem, and that the applicable
provision of the Rules of Court is Section 15 of Rule 14, which calls for
extraterritorial service of summons. Held: As gleaned from the said return,
there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff
found Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of the respondent herein.
Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the
residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the
occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno
was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the
summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to
have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another
place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return. In sum,
then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint
in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the
decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.

Specific rights to protection & enforcement

Heirs of Olviga v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 330
Facts: In 1950, when Eutiquio Pureza, then only twelve years old, he
and his father cleared and cultivated it. Since then, the land has been known
as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Godofredo
Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga then living with the latter, protested the survey
but without respect to a one-half-hectare portion "sa dakong panulukan ng
Amihanan-Silanganan." This protest or "tutol" of Godofredo Olviga, brother of
petitioners Virgilio Olviga and Lolita Olviga Olila, is of public record in the
Bureau of Lands. In said document, Godofredo Olviga expressly admitted that
the lot belonged to Eutiquio Pureza, except the 1/2 hectare portion claimed
by him (Godofredo) which was included in the survey of Pureza's Lot 13.
Held: No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of
possession of the land sold had consummated, the sale and transferred title
to the purchaser, registration of the contract not being indispensable as
between the parties. Actually the action for conveyance was one to quiet
title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership by the refusal
of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. This
action accrued only when appellants initiated their suit to recover the land in
1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made
applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to
quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
Pingol v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 118
Facts: Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral
Survey of Caloocan. He executed a "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF
OF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND" in favor of
Francisco N. Donasco which was acknowledged before a notary
[Link] immediately took possession of the subject lot and
constructed a house thereon. On 19 October 1988, the heirs of Francisco
Donasco filed an action for "Specific Performance and Damages, with Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against the spouses Vicente and Lourdes
Pingol (petitioners herein). Held: That a cloud has been cast on the title of
the private respondents is indubitable. Despite the fact that the title had
been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the
delivery of the object of the contract, the petitioners adamantly refused to
accept the tender of payment by the private respondents and steadfastly

insisted that their obligation to transfer title had been rendered ineffective. A
vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment
thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements
thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had
refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee has an
absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality
to bring an action to quiet title.

Sps. Portic v. Cristobal,

Facts: Petitioners bought the land in question from the spouses
Alcantara and Edrosalam with a condition that the latter shall assume the
mortgage executed over the subject property by spouses Clodualdo Alcantara
and Candelaria Edrosalam in favor of the Social Security System. When the
petitioners defaulted payment and the SSS auctioned the property in
question, petitioners sold in installments the property in favor of the
defendants. Petitioners demanded payment, but the defendants refused to
pay. Hence, petitioner filed a case to remove the cloud to the property.
Petitioner conteded that they sold the subject property to [respondent] on the
condition that [respondent] shall pay the balance on or before May 22, 1985;
that in case of failure to pay, the sale shall be considered void and
[petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent] of the amounts already paid.
Respondent on her part claimed that her title over the subject property is
already indefeasible; that the true agreement of the parties is that embodied
in the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage; that [respondent]
had fully paid the purchase price; that [respondent] is the true owner of the
subject property; that [petitioners] claim is already barred by laches. Held:
Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to
acquire a new title. Good faith must concur. Clearly, respondent has not yet
fully paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid, she cannot
feign good faith. She is also precluded from asserting ownership against
petitioners. The appellate courts finding that she had a valid title to the
property must, therefore, be set aside.
Damages
De la Paz v. Panis, 245 SCRA 242
FACTS: The petitioners alleged that sometime in 1970 or 1971 the
private respondents illegally entered portions of the said property,
established possession thereof, and introduced illegal improvements. In their
answer, the private respondents admitted that they indeed entered into the

said property, but averred that they did so in the honest belief that it was
part of the public domain; that they introduced the improvements without
objection from any party; and that they have been in peaceful, open, and
uninterrupted material possession thereof for more than ten years. Held: We
must rule out forcible entry; there is no allegation in the complaint that
petitioners were denied possession of the land in question through any of the
methods stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, although private
respondents prior possession was clearly alleged. Neither is the action one for
unlawful detainer; it was noted earlier that there is no lease contract between
the parties, and the demand to vacate made upon the private respondents
did not make them tenants of the petitioners. In order to gain possession of
the land occupied by the private respondents, the proper remedy adopted by
the petitioners was the plenary action of recovery of possession before the
then Court of First Instance. Respondent judge, therefore, had jurisdiction
over the case and should not have dismissed it on the ground of lack thereof.

Vda. de Aviles v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 473

Facts: PLAINTIFFS averred that the actual possessors of a parcel of
land situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan, more particularly described
as fishpond, cogonal, unirrigated rice and residential land, bounded on the N
by Camilo Aviles. ON March 23,1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a
color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area of
approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence
(thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing
the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion. Dissatisfied with
the trial courts decision, petitioners appealed to the respondent appellate
Court. In its now-assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the
decision of the trial court, reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of
title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that
petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. Held: There is
no allegation or evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written
contract, or paper showing any color of title in the defendant, which could
cast a shadow on the title of complainants to any part of the land; there is no
overlapping of description in the muniments held by either. The land of
complainants and defendant join. The line which separates them is in dispute
and is to be determined by evidence aliunde. Each admits that the other has
title up to his line wherever it may be, and the title papers of neither fix its
precise location. So that there is no paper the existence of which clouds the
title of either party, and nothing could be delivered up and cancelled under
the decree of the court undertaking to remove a cloud.
Occupation

Carino v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935

Facts: Mateo Cario filed his petition in the Court of Land Registration
praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40
hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio. By order
of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo
and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the
reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion of land included in the
parcel set out in the former petition. The Insular Government opposed the
granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of land is public
property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any
manner or through any title of egresion from the State. Held: In accordance
with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cario, if it be
certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right
of average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within
the period of five years immediately following for example, if the
denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other
person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case.

Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriquez, 66 Phil 259

Facts: Petitioner owns the Nob Fraction mineral claim, situated in the
barrio of Gomok, municipality of Itogon, sub-province of Benguet, Mountain
Province, and located on public lands by C. L. O'Dowd in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by the Act of
Congress of February 6, 1905, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine
Commission, relative to the location of mining claims. Petitioner has
requested the respondents, as Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and as
director of the Bureau of Mines, respectively, to approve its application for
patent, and to prepare the necessary papers relative to the issuance thereof
and to submit such papers for the signatures of the President of the
Philippines, but the respondents have failed and refused, and still fail and
refuse, to do so. Petitioner claims that it is entitled, as a matter of right, to
the patent applied for, having complied with all the requisites of the law for
the issuance of such patent. Respondents, in their answer, admit some
allegations of the petition and deny others, and, by way of special defense,
allege that "petitioner was not and is not entitled as a matter of right to a
patent to the 'Nob Fraction' claim because the Constitution provides that
'natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall not be
alienated. Held: Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under
consideration no longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions

of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within the
prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has
the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions
prescribed by law.