Section 90 (Indian Evidence Act)

1. Parkash Chand And Ors. vs Hans Raj And Anr

Citation: AIR1994HP144, 1994(1)ShimLC114
11. There is no dispute that document Ex. D-4 was more than 30 years old and presumption
may be drawn in respect of its execution and attestation as provided under Section 90 of the
Indian Evidence Act. Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act is :-"90. Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any
custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that
the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting
of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document
executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it
purports to be executed and attested."
The scope and effect of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act is no longer in doubt as it has
been incorporated in number of judicial decisions. The purpose of enacting Section 90 of the
Indian Evidence Act is to do away with the strict rules of proof which are enforced in the case
of private documents, by giving rise to a presumption of genuineness with regard to
documents which are of thirty and more years of age. In fact, Section 90 of the Indian
Evidence Act dispenses with proof of document as required under Sections 67 and 68 of the
Indian Evidence Act. This section is designed to meet situations varying in character where
passage of time might have obliterated the proof of genuineness of a disputed document by
presuming that signature and other pan of the document which purports to be in handwriting
of any particular person is in that person's handwriting, that the document was executed by a
person for whom it purports to have been executed and that the document was attested by a
person by whom it purports to have been attested. The Legislature has used the words 'may
presume' in this Section, which have been defined under Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act
as follows :-4. "May Presume" -- Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it
may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of
it.
12. Whenever a document purporting or proved to be thirty years old is produced from a
proper custody, the Court may either to dispense with proof of the execution of the document
or call for further proof in favour of the document. The discretion is left to the Court to raise

or not to raise presumption in respect of a document depending upon the circumstances of

each case but this discretion must be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. The exercise of
discretion should not only be in consonance with law and justice but also with great caution
because wrong exercise of the discretion under this provision is likely to strengthen the hands
of forger. In many cases, it will be most dangerous to draw presumption that the document is
genuine merely because it is thirty years old according to the recitals in the document and
also is produced from proper custody. Whether a document is produced from proper custody
or not is a matter of judicial satisfaction and it ought to be founded on the evidence on record.
The factum of proper custody cannot itself be a subject matter of any presumption and it
should be satisfactorily proved.
13. From the analysis of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, the following propositions
are deducible :-1. That the presumption applies to documents proved to be thirty or more years old;
2. The document must come from proper custody;
3. The presumption is discretionary and in cases where a document is ex-facie suspicious the
Court may very well refuse to make the presumption and call upon the party to offer other
proof forthwith;
4. The presumption can only be applied to documents which bear the signatures of the writer
or of witnesses and the presumption cannot be drawn in case of unsigned or anonymous
papers;
5. The extent of the presumption relates only to the signatures, execution or attestation of a
document, that is to say, its genuineness. The drawing of the presumption does not connote
the idea that the contents of the documents are true or that they have been acted upon; and
6. The presumption applies only to original documents and not any copy thereof, certified or
otherwise.
(Please see : Ramaswami Goundan v. Subbaraya Goundan, AIR 1948 Mad 388, Ravjappa v.
Nilakanta Rao, AIR 1962 Mys 53; Chakicherla Audilakshmamma v. Atmkuru Ramarao, AIR
1973 Andh Pra 149 and Ghurahu v. Sheo Ratan, AIR 1981 All 3.)
14. Applying the above mentioned propositions to the present case, the document Ex. D-4 is
original document, it bears signatures of its executants and it does not look ex-facie
suspicious as it has been produced at the first instance when the respondents-plaintiffs

claimed exclusive ownership of the property in dispute, whereas, as per this documents it is
stated to be joint property of predecessors-in-interest of the parties. So far its production from
a proper custody is concerned, as per the explanation to Section 90 of the Indian Evidence
Act, a document is said to be in proper custody if it is in the place in which and under the care
of the person with whom, it would naturally be. Moreover, a document is proved to be
produced from proper custody, if it is brought from such a place as to offer reasonable
presumption that it was honestly and fairly obtained and preserved for use. So far a deed
relating to the affairs of family or arrangement of the family property is concerned, it is from
proper custody if produced by the sons of one of the brothers amongst whom the arrangement
was arrived at and who are in possession of the part of the property, as in the present case the
document Ex. D-4 is produced by the appellants-defendants who are sons of Ram Dass, one
of the executants of the document, who during his life time and after his death the appellantsdefendants have seen in possession of the property in dispute. The appellants-defendants
being proper re-pository of this document, even proof of its custody is not necessary. Having
satisfied that document Ex. D-4 has been produced from proper custody a presumption can
safely be drawn in respect of the signatures as well as execution by Ram Rattan, Ram Dass
and Durga Dass and it was not necessary for the appellants-defendants to prove their
signatures by producing descendants of Durga Dass or Ram Rattan as their witness, who was
alive at the time of recording the evidence of appellants-defendants. Therefore, both the
courts below have raised wrong presumption against the appellants-defendants for not
producing descendants of Durga Dass and Ram Rattan to prove their signatures on document
Ex. D-4. Rather, presumption was required to be drawn against the respondents-plaintiffs for
not producing Ram Rattan, their father, who had, admittedly, died in the year 1983, if they
were disputing that this document was not genuine and did not bear his signatures.
2. Sarangapani vs Kalidoss
Citation: (2011)6MLJ29
26. Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follows:
Section 90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.-Where any document, purporting
or proved to be thirty years old is produced from any custody which the Court in the
particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other
part of such document, which purports to be in the hand writing of any particular person, is in
that person's hand writing, and in the case of document executed or attested, that it was duly
executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested.
The principle and scope of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act is that this section does
away with the strict rules of proof which are enforced in the case of private documents, by

giving rise to a presumption of genuineness, with regard to documents reaching a certain age.
If private documents not less than thirty years old are produced from proper custody, and are
on their face free from suspicion, the court may presume that they have been signed or
written by the person whose signatures they bear or in whose handwriting they purport to be,
and that they have been duly attested and executed, if they purport so to be. In other words
documents thirty years old prove themselves. The age of the document, its unsuspicious
appearance, the production from proper custody and other circumstances are the foundation
for the presumption. It is immaterial that a witness to the document is alive or is present in
court.
27. In this connection, Section 107 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is also very much
relevant to be extracted:
Section 107. Burden of proving death of person known to have been alive within thirty
years.-When the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is shown that he was alive
within thirty years, the burden of proving that he is dead is on the person who affirms it.
28. On coming to the instant case on hand, the documents under Exs.A1, A2, A3 and A13 are
all ancient documents, aged about more than thirty years and the executor Gopalu Gounder
was not expected to be alive when the documents came to be admitted before the trial court.
Ex.A4 is the death certificate of Gopalu Gounder which shows that he died on 11.02.1992.
Hence, as contemplated under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it could be
presumed that the documents have been produced from proper custody and there is no
suspicion with regard to the genesis of these documents. This Court is of view that the above
specified documents are all free from suspicion and it could be presumed that they had been
signed or written by the person whose signatures they bear or in whose handwriting they
purport to be and that they have been duly attested and executed. Hence, there is no obstacle
in placing reliance upon these documents
3. Ketharaju Rajeshwari Vs. Kanthamraju Varalakshmamma and Anr.
Citation: AIR1964AP284
7. Before I deal with Ex. A.2 and the arguments advanced in regard to the same, it is necessary briefly
to refer to Ex. A.1 which is the gift deed executed by Venkayamma in favour of Lingiah. It was faintly
argued that although the original of Ex. A.1 is produced, but it was denied by the 1st defendant and as
there is no evidence in regard to the execution of the gift deed, Venkayamma could not be considered
to have gifted away the property to Lingiah. I do not see my way to accede to this argument.
Admittedly Ex. A. 1 is a document which is more than 30 years old. Under Section 90 of the
Evidence Act, there fore, when the document is admittedly of over thirty years old and has been
produced from proper custody, the trial Court, in my judgment, has not erred in exercising the

discretion for presuming that the gilt deed is properly executed and attested by the person
whose signature appeared on the deed. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that Ex.
A. 1 is proved. I do not see therefore any reason to interfere with that conclusion. Nothing
particular has been pointed out during the course of argument as to why the finding of fact in this
respect should be disturbed by this Court. When Ex. A. 1 is proved it follows that Venkayamma
conveyed the suit property through Ex. A. 1 to her brother, Lingiah. She ceased to have therefore any
interest in the suit property.
10. It is, however, true that on mere production of a certified copy of a document which is more than
30 years old, no presumption is permitted regarding its genuineness or execution under Section 90 of
the Evidence Act. Section 90 requires production in Court of the particular document in original in
regard to which the Court is asked to draw the statutory presumption of its execution. In Basant Singh
v. Brij Raj Saran SinghMANU/PR/0038/1935 their Lordships of the Privy Council observed:
Their Lordships approve of the decision in Shripuja v. Kanhayalal 15 Nag LR 192: AIR 1918 Nag 114
in which the Judicial Commissioner held that production of a copy was not sufficient to justify the
presumption of due execution of the original under Section 90, and they are unable to agree with the
subsequent overruling of that decision in Gopinath Maharaj Sansthan v. Moti MANU/NA/0021/1933.
This view has now been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Harihar Prasad v. Deonarain Prasad, (S)
AIR 1956 SC 305 at p. 310. Although' therefore a certified copy may be used to prove the contents of
a document, but no statutory presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act is available in a case
where the original is not produced but a certified copy alone is produced.

4. Khudawand Haiyal Qaiyoom, through Mushir Hasan Khan Vs Sabir

Citation: 2007 (68) ALR 210, 2007 6 AWC5830All
13. The object of Section 90 of the Act was spelt out by the Supreme Court in Lakhi Baruah (supra)
and it was observed:
Section 90 of the Evidence Act is founded on necessity and convenience because it is extremely
difficult and sometimes not possible to lead evidence to prove handwriting, signature or execution of
old documents after lapse of thirty years. In order to obviate such difficulties or improbabilities to
prove execution of an old document, Section 90 has been incorporated in the Evidence Act, which
does away with the strict rule of proof of private documents. Presumption of genuineness may be
raised if the documents in question is produced from proper custody. It is, however, the discretion of
the Court to accept the presumption flowing from Section 90. There is, however, no manner of doubt
that judicial discretion under Section 90 should not be exercised arbitrarily and not being informed by
reasons.
14. The question that arises for consideration in the present second appeal is whether the presumption
under Section 90 of the Act can be made only after the documents had been admitted as secondary
evidence under Section 65 of the Act and not otherwise. This issue was examined by the Supreme
Court in K. B. Subbaraju (supra) and it was observed:
As aforesaid, the Respondents did not produce the original Will but produced only its certified copy,
Ex. B-9, which they obtained from the record of Suit No. 21 of 1923 wherein. Surayamma had filed

the original Will alongwith her written statement............. The High Court appears to have relied upon
Section 90 of the Evidence Act and to have drawn the presumption that the Will being more than 30
years old it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purported to have been
executed and attested. Such a presumption, however, under that Section arises in respect of an original
document. (SeeMunnalal v. Mt. Kashibai AIR 1947 PC 15). Where a certified copy of a document is
produced the correct position is as stated in Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Saran Singh
MANU/PR/0038/1935 : 67 Ind App 180: AIR 1935 PC 132, where the Privy Council laid down that if
the document produced is a copy admitted under Section 65 as secondary evidence and it is produced
from proper custody and is over 30 years old only the signatures authenticating the copy can be
presumed to be genuine. The production of a copy therefore does not warrant the presumption of due
execution of the original document. The Privy Council repelled the argument that where a copy of a
Will has been admitted the Court is entitled to presume the genuineness of such Will which purports
to be 30 years old. Relying on the words "where any document purporting or proved to be 30 years
old" in Section 90, the Privy Council held that the production which entitles the Court to draw the
presumption as to execution and attestation is of the original and not its copy and that the decisions of
the High Courts of Calcutta and Allahabad on which the argument was based were not correctly
decided. This view has since then been approved of by this Court in Harihar Prasad v. Deo Narain
Prasad, MANU/SC/0092/1956 : 1956 SCR 1 : AIR 1956 SC 305 at 309. The High Court therefore
was not entitled to presume from the production of the copy either the execution or the attestation of
the said Will.
15. In Lakhi Baruah (supra), the original sale-deed was not produced by the Defendants and an
attempt was made to prove the execution of the sale-deed with the aid of Section 90 of the Act as the
alleged sale-deed was more than 30 years old. The trial court accepted the case of the execution of the
sale-deed on the basis of presumption arising from Section 90 of the Act but the learned Assistant
District Judge and the High Court did not allow the claim since the original sale-deed was not placed.
In this connection, the Supreme Court observed:
So far as applicability of presumption arising from Section 90 of the Evidence Act in respect of copy
of the old document is concerned, the earliest decision of the Indian Court was made in 1880 in
Khetter v. Khetter Paul ILR 5 Cal 886. Later on, in the decisions of various High Courts the
presumption under Section 90 was also made applicable to the certified copy. The Privy Council,
upon review of the authorities, however, did not accept the decision rendered in Khetter and other
decisions of the High Court, where the presumption was attached also to copies, as correct. It was
indicated that in view of the clear language of Section 90 the production of the particular document
would be necessary for applying the statutory presumption under Section 90. If the document
produced was a copy admitted under Section 65 as secondary evidence and it was produced from
proper custody and was over thirty years old, then the signature authenticating the copy might be
presumed to be genuine ; but production of the copy was not sufficient to justify the presumption of
due execution of the original under Section 90. In this connection, reference may be made to the
decisions in Seethayya v. Subramanya, 56 IA 146 : MANU/PR/0077/1929 : AIR 1929 PC 115 and
Basant v. Brijraj MANU/PR/0033/1935 : AIR 1935 PC 115. In view of these Privy Council decisions,
disproving the applicability of presumption under Section 90 to the copy or the certified copy of an
old document, in the subsequent decisions of the High Courts, it has been consistently held by
different High Courts that production of a Copy or a certified copy does not raise the presumption
under Section 90.

The position since the aforesaid Privy Council decision being followed by later decisions of different
High Courts is that presumption under Section 90 does not apply to a copy or a certified copy even
though thirty years old ; but if a foundation is laid for the admission of secondary evidence under
Section 65 of the Evidence Act by proof of loss or destruction of the original and the copy which is
thirty years old is produced from proper custody, then only the signature authenticating the copy may
under Section 90 be presumed to he genuine.
16. It is, therefore, more than apparent from the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court that before
raising the presumption under Section 90 of the Act, the foundation for admission of secondary
evidence under Section 65 of the Act has to be made. So far as the State of U.P. is concerned, under
Section 90(2) of the Act, the presumption is made applicable to a certified copy of a document
registered in accordance with law relating to registration of documents but still, in view of the
aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, the certified copy has to be first admitted under Section 65
of the Act as secondary evidence.
17. This issue was also considered by a learned Judge of this Court in Manjoor Ali and Anr. (supra)
and it was observed as follows:
Thus, it is clear that the mere production of a certified copy of the sale-deed is not sufficient to draw a
presumption under Section 90 of the Act. The Plaintiff has to lay the foundation for admission of the
secondary evidence by proof of loss or destruction of the original, etc. Only then, the presumption of
the genuineness of the document can be drawn under Section 90 of the Act.
5. G. Chikkapapanna alias G.C. Papanna Vs. Smt. Kenchamma (Deceased) by [Link] and
Others
Citation: ILR 1998 KARNATAKA 3450, 1998(5)KarLJ360
53. Section 90 of the Evidence Act, lays down the presumption regarding signature and every other
part of a thirty year old document to be in that person's handwriting by whom it purports to be signed
and executed and permits raising of presumption of its due execution and attestation provided the
document is produced from the custody which is proper in Court's view, in the circumstances of the
case. The presumption under Section 90 is available and can be raised if thirty years old original
document is produced. It does not apply where original is not produced. It does not apply to copy of
document even namely the certified copy thereof. Reference in this connection may be made to the
following decisions:
(a) Basant Singh v Brij Raj Saran;
(b) Sital Prasad v Sant Ram;
(c) Harihar Prasad Singh v Deonarain Prasad and Others;
(d) Shiv Lal v Chetram;
(e) Harihar Pal v Sudhir K. Pal.

54. This above contention of learned Counsel as such is rejected and it is to be held that no
presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act could be made about execution etc., as original
deed of which Exh. P-1 purports to be copy, from copy, issued under Section 57 of the Registration
Act happened to be.
55. A reference was made to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram
Jas v Sudendra Nath and it was urged that the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, as
regards signature and execution and attestation of deed of settlement of 1933, may be applied even if
original deed has not been filed but certified copy of registered deed has been filed as reason behind
enactment of Section 90 of the Evidence Act is possibly of non-availability of witness to transaction
due to natural causes of death during long span of time and likelihood of failure of justice on technical
grounds and so to get rid of failure of justice, Section 90 of the Evidence Act was enacted. The
learned Counsel as such urged that in the interest of justice, the presumption may be applied to such
cases where copies, of original document more than thirty years old or copies under Section 57 of
Registration Act, of such documents, are filed and expression document may be read as including
their copies. There is no doubt the concept of justice is important but justice is to be done according to
law. Expression 'document' has been defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It means the document
in its original and not the copy thereof. A reading of the definition of document and use of expression
'certified copies of document' in various sections of Evidence Act such as Sections 62, 63, 64 and 65,
as well as of document in Section 90 of the Evidence Act is indicative of legislative intent to clearly
express that the two mean differently and they do not mean the same. It is well settled when the
legislature uses distinct expressions, it is to be presumed the legislature ordinarily intends to convey
different meanings or ideas. Maxwell on interpretation of statute, page 282/283, and in "Interpretation
and Legislation", it has been observed by learned author Sri Jagdish Swaroop:
"The legislature must always be presumed to aim at precision and in so doing would naturally follow
the safe rule of always calling the same thing by same word, but if it has used two different
expressions though analogous in nature in different parts of same clause, it must be assumed that they
were intended to be used in different sense".
56. This is the view as expressed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Board of Revenue v A.P,
Benthall, Income Tax, Commissioner, New Delhi v East West Import and Export Private Limited.
That wherein Section 90 of Evidence Act, expression 'document' is used, it is to be taken as 'original
document' and it does not apply in case of copies of documents. It will not be out of place to mention
that the Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Ham Jas case, supra, has been concerned,
with and the law laid down therein is in the context of amendment introduced in Section 90 of the
Evidence Act by Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1954, introducing therein sub-section
(2) to Section 90 of the Act and by special provision made the presumption available to original
Section 90 (which was numbered as Section 90(1)), applicable to a case where even certified copy is
produced. This amendment was introduced after the decision in Sant Ram's case, supra. As regards
State of Karnataka, there is no such amendment made in Section 90 of the Evidence Act, as such
Allahabad High Court's decision in the case of Ram Jas, supra, is of no help to plaintiff-appellant and
Section 90 or presumption thereunder cannot be applied in this case with reference to Exh. P-1.

6. Managing Committee Vs. T. Sesha Reddy and Anr.

Citation: 2003(4)ALT383

48. Thus, considering the documents and the boundaries given therein, it is quite clear that the suit
schedule property did not form part of Wakf property, which is being claimed by the Wakf Board and
the Mosque Committee. The further question would arise as to whether the property sold under Ex.A1 was the property gifted to Syed Safdar Ali by Fatima Bee. It is to be seen that various documents
have been filed by the parties and it is necessary that the documents have to be scrutinised with
reference to the date of event. If the documents are more than 30 years old, the presumption has to be
drawn under Section 90 of the Evidence Act to the effect that the said document was duly executed, if
they are produced from the proper custody. Ex.B-1 is the document of 1344 Fasli which was executed
in favour of the Fatima Bee in respect of the 9,200 sq. yards of land at Panjagutta and ex.A-2 is the
document of 1961 under which the property acquired by Syed Safdar Ali by virtue of the gift from his
sister was sold away by his [Link]. in favour of the Smt. Khanam Janam Saheba. Ex.A-4 is a original
partition deed dated: 11.11.1950 while Ex.B-15 is the Certified Copy of the Sale Deed of the year
1344 Fasli. It has been held by the Privy Council in MAHADEV PRASAD'S CASE (1920 INDIAN
CASES 368) that the Court as a right to presume genuineness of the document which was not 30
years old either on the date of the suit or on the date of the production, but was 30 years old when the
arguments were heard.
49. In the instant case, Ex.A-1, Ex.A2, Ex.A-3, A-4 and A-11 and Ex.B-1 and B-15 would fall under
the category of the documents mentioned under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act and the
presumption goes in favour of the contents of the documents unless it is rebutted by adducing
satisfactory evidence. Most clinching and important evidence which is forthcoming is the premises
numbers which will decide the fate of the suit. So long as the premises numbers are different and they
could be correlated to the original documents, then denying the relief to the plaintiff on the ground
that it is Wakf property would not arise. Learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff, however, tried to
submit that the certified copies cannot be relied on inasmuch as no witnesses are examined and that is
the reason why the trial Court failed to give credence to the genuineness of the documents. But, this
contention cannot be accepted in the wake of the judgment of the Privy Council in BASANTH
SINGH Vs. BRIJ RAJ SARAN SINGH3 wherein it was held:
"Section 90, Evidence Act, clearly requires the production to the Court of the particular document in
regard to which the Court may make the statutory presumption. If the document produced is a copy,
admitted under Section 65, as secondary evidence, and it is produced from proper custody and is over
thirty years old, then the signatures authenticating the copy may be presumed to be genuine, but it is
not sufficient to justify the presumption of due execution of the original under Section 90."
50. In BAI SAKINABAI Vs. GULAM RASUL UMARBHAI SHAIKH4 Justice S.B. Majmudar as he
then was while dealing with the presumption of a document of 30 years age observed:
"It is true that merely because under Section 90 of the evidence Act, the documents are resumed to be
duly executed if they are more than 30 years old, there is no presumption about the contents of these
documents being true, but in the instant case once the execution of the document is presumed, it will
show that the Plaintiff's predecessors-in-title who was the signatory to the document had executed the
same. Once that is established by Section 90 of the Evidence Act, it would amount to an admission on
the part of the executant i.e. Plaintiff's predecessors-in-title about the truth of the statements
mentioned therein."

7. Mohmedbhai Rasulbhai Malek and Ors. Vs. Amirbhai Rahimbhai Malek

Citation: AIR2001Guj37, (2000)4GLR667

7. Now let us examine and analyse what is the nature of the document produced vide mark 17/1. On
having perusal of the document mark 17/1, it was a copy of the statements of leaders of Malek
Community recorded by some officer on September 15, 1909. Admittedly, this document was more
than 30 years old. On further perusal it could be assembled that statements of some members of
Malek Community were recorded but there was no mention whether those persons were the leaders of
Malek Community. There was also no evidence as to whether they had authority to make such
statement for and on behalf of Malek Community of village Anti. On further scrutiny of the said
statement it could also be gathered that the designation of the officer before whom the statements
were recorded was not mentioned. Moreover the said document was not shown to be a public
document. The contention that since the document was more than 30 years old and it came from
proper custody, a presumption would arise that the document was genuine and the contents thereof
were correct under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act ('Evidence Act' for short) has no substance
as Section 90 of the Evidence Act provides that the document of 30 years old coming from proper
custody prove themselves i.e., no evidence need in general be given. The presumption permissible
relates to the signature, execution or attestation of a document i.e., to its genuineness but it does not
involve any presumption of correctness of every statement in it which may contain narratives of past
events or that the contents of the document are true or that it has been acted upon. That must be
proved like any other fact. So far as the document marked 17/1 is concerned, the plaintiffs have
produced certified copy of the statement dated September 15, 1909 alleged to have been recorded by
some officer. It may also be appreciated that the plaintiffs have not pleaded or made any case of loss
or destruction of the original document and hence secondary evidence under Section 65 of the
Evidence Act is not admissible.
8. The Supreme Court in Harihar Prasad Singh v. Must. of Munshi Nath Prasad, AIR 1956 SC 305,
held that there could be no presumption of genuineness in favour of certified copies of documents
under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. The aforesaid view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in
Tilak Chand Kureel v. Bhim Raj MANU/SC/0409/1969 : (1969)3SCC367 in the following words :
"It was said that the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act was not applicable as copies
were produced and not the original documents. In our opinion this argument is well founded. In
Basant v. Brij. Raj MANU/PR/0038/1935 it was held by the Privy Council that the presumption
enacted in Section 90 of the Evidence Act can be applied only with regard to original documents and
not copies thereof. The same view was taken by this Court in Harihar Prasad Singh v. Must, of
Munshi Nath Prasad (AIR 1956 SC 305) (supra)."

Similar question had arisen before this Court in the case of Patel Manilal Chhaganlal v.
Municipal Corporation, Surat MANU/GJ/0090/1978 : AIR1978Guj193 . In the said judgment
this Court has observed that Section 90 of the Evidence Act cannot be pressed in service for
introducing the certified copies in evidence as the statutory presumption arising under Section
90 of the Act can be availed of only if the original documents are produced on record. The
words "any document" and "is produced" used in Section 90 of the Act indicate that reference
is to the original document and not to the certified copy of that document. In the said decision
this Court has further observed that once it is established that the original title deeds are lost
or destroyed or are being deliberately withheld by the party against whom they are sought to
be used, secondary evidence in respect of those title deeds can be tendered and if the

secondary evidence happens to be certified copies of registered documents entered in Book

No. 1, the contents thereof can be read in evidence by virtue of Sub-section (5) of Section 57
of the Registration Act.