IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

SPECIAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

W.P. NO. _____ OF 2011

Shamnad Basheer,
Ministry of HRD Chair Professor in
Intellectual Property Rights,
West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences,
NUJS Bhavan, 12 LB BLOCK,
Salt Lake City, Sector III,
Kolkata - 700098, India.

Petitioner

Versus
1. Union of India,
Represented by its Secretary,
Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion,
Ministry of Industry & Commerce,
Government of India,
Udyog Bhavan,
New Delhi 110011.
2. Intellectual Property Appellate Board,
Represented by its Registrar,
Annex-I, Guna Complex, II Floor,
443 Anna Salai, Teynampet,
Chennai 600 018.
.... Respondents

AFFIDAVIT OF SHAMNAD BASHEER

I, Shamnad Basheer, aged about 34 years, son of Mr. M.M.

Basheer, having my office at West Bengal National University of
Juridical Sciences, NUJS Bhavan, 12 LB BLOCK, Salt Lake City,
Sector III, Kolkata - 700098, do hereby solemnly affirm and
sincerely state as follows:-

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1. I am a professor of law and hold the Intellectual Property

Rights

Chair

instituted

by

the

Ministry

of

Human

Resources and Development (HRD), Government of India

(GoI), at the West Bengal, National University of Juridical
Sciences (WBNUJS), Kolkata. I am filing this writ petition
as a public interest litigation.
2. Before my current teaching assignment I was the Frank H.
Marks Visiting Associate Professor of Intellectual Property
Law at the George Washington University law school
located at Washington D.C. and a research associate with
the Oxford Intellectual Property Research Center (OIPRC).
I am also the founder of SpicyIP, a blog that aims to
improve Indian intellectual property institutions and
policies through a dispassionate analysis of current cases,
policies and the workings of IP institutions. I graduated
from

the

National

Law

School

of

India

University,

Bangalore and after some years in practice, went on to

finish my Masters in law (BCL) and MPhil from the
University of Oxford as a Wellcome Trust Scholar. I have
been researching and writing on intellectual property
issues for more than 10 years now and have published in
various international law journals.
3. The present writ petition has been filed seeking a Writ of
Declaration declaring Chapter XI of the Trade Marks Act,
1999, and Chapter XIX of the Patents Act, 1970, as ultra
vires Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21, 50, 245, of the Constitution

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of India and violative of the basic structure of the

Constitution and hence void ab initio, in so far as it
establishes the Intellectual Property Appellate Board
(IPAB) and vests important judicial functions on this
Board.
4. As a law teacher at a leading Indian law University, I am
committed to the growth and development of sustainable
intellectual property policies for India. I am therefore duty
bound to challenge those provisions of Indian intellectual
property law which are being administered in a manner
contrary to the basic tenets of the Indian Constitution. In
the case of D.C Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC
579, a professor of political science who had done
substantial

research

and

was

deeply

interested

in

ensuring proper implementation of the constitutional

provisions, challenged the practice followed by the state
of Bihar in repromulgating a number of ordinances
without getting the approval of the legislature. The court
held that the petitioner as a member of public had
sufficient interest to maintain a petition under Article 32.
Therefore being a teacher of intellectual property law at
the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences,
Kolkata, I have a substantial and direct interest in filing
this petition with a view to curing the infirmities of the
IPAB;

infirmities

which

adversely

impact

the

administration of justice in matters pertaining to patents,

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trademarks and geographical indications. This petition

therefore seeks to protect the larger public interest of
Indian

citizens

by

seeking

fair,

just

and

most

importantly, a constitutionally compliant legal regime for

the adjudication of disputes pertaining to intellectual
property rights.
5. The IPAB was originally constituted under the Trade Marks
Act, 1999 to primarily deal with appeals against orders of
the Registrar of Trade Marks as also original rectification
petitions against registered trademarks. Subsequently the
Geographical Indications Act, 1999 (GI Act) also vested
the IPAB with the power to hear appeals against the
Registrar of GIs as also the power to rectify the Register of
GIs. Although both the Trade Marks Act & the GI Act were
passed by Parliament in the year 1999, the IPAB was
notified by the Central Government, vide Government of
India

Gazette

Notification

No.

S.O.1049(E),

only

in

September of 2003. Subsequently in the year 2007 the

Central Government also issued Government of India
Notification No.12/15/2006-IPR-III authorizing the IPAB to
hear appeals against orders of the Controller of Patents as
also

original

revocation

petitions

against

registered

patents under the Patents Act. Though the IPAB is

headquartered at Chennai where it has a permanent
office, the IPAB has circuit benches at Kolkata, Delhi,
Ahmedabad and Mumbai.

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6. The precise rationale for the creation of the IPAB is not

known at this stage. It is not known as to whether the
Government of India recommended to Parliament the
creation of the IPAB after having actually carried out a
proper study of the situation. It is most likely that given
the general process of tribunalization in India at that time,
the Government decided to replicate the process for
adjudication of intellectual property rights disputes.
7. Before delving into the constitutional challenge against
the establishment of the IPAB, it is first necessary to study
the legal framework prior to the establishment of the
IPAB. For this purpose it is necessary to discuss the
forums to hear appeals and rectifications under the Trade
Marks Act, 1958, which is now repealed as also the
forums to hear appeals and revocation under the Patents
Act, 1970, before it was amended in the years 2002 and
2005. This discussion will help in explaining the extent of
the powers which have been shifted from the High Courts
to the IPAB.

A. APPEALS & RECTIFICATIONS UNDER THE TRADE

MARKS ACT, 1958
8. Appeals against the Registrar of Trademarks: Under
the Trade Marks Act, 1958 (hereinafter Act of 1958), as
is the case with the present Act, the Registrar is the

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main

administrative

authority

to

whom

trademark

applications are made. The Registrar is then responsible

for processing the trademark application and granting the
trademark

registration

after

deciding

any

possible

opposition against the trademark application. As per

Section 109 of the Act of 1958 all orders of the Registrar
of Trademarks could be appealed to a Single Judge of a
High Court with the provision for a further appeal to a
Division Bench of the same High Court. Section 3 of the
Act of 1958 prescribed the jurisdiction rules for such
appeals to the High Court. As per this provision, only High
Courts with jurisdiction over the appropriate Trade Marks
Registry could entertain appeals against the orders of that
particular Registry. This meant that that there were a total
of 5 High Courts in the entire country which had
jurisdiction to entertain appeals against the orders of the
Registrars situated in the Trade Marks Registries located
at Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Delhi & Ahmedabad. These
5 High Courts were the Bombay High Court, the Madras
High Court, the Calcutta High Court, the Delhi High Court
and the Gujarat High Court.
9. Rectifications: As per the Act of 1958, there were two
kinds of rectification petitions that could be filed in order
to cancel registered trademarks from the Register of
Trademarks. The first kind of rectification petition, as per
Section 56 of the Act of 1958 could be filed at any point

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of time with either the Registrar of Trademarks or the

High Court with the appropriate jurisdiction. The second
kind of rectification petition is that which is filed during
the

course

of

pending

trademark

infringement

proceeding where the defendant pleads invalidity of the

plaintiffs registered trademark as a defence or where the
defendant

contends

that

trademark

and

plaintiff

the

his

is
in

also
turn

registered

counters

such

registration of the defendants mark as being invalid. As

per Section 107 of the Act of 1958 such rectification
petitions could be filed only with a Single Judge of the
High Court and not with the Registrar of Trademarks. This
provision also provided for a further appeal to a Division
Bench of the same High Court. As per the Section 3
jurisdictional rules for the High Courts, already been
discussed above, only five High Courts in the country had
the jurisdiction to hear such rectification petitions filed
during the course of a trademark infringement suit. These
5 High Courts were the Bombay High Court, the Madras
High Court, the Calcutta High Court, the Delhi High Court
and the Gujarat High Court.
B. APPEALS & RECTIFICATIONS UNDER THE TRADE
MARKS ACT, 1999
10.

Appeals against the Registrar of Trademarks:

As per Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act 1999, any

person aggrieved with the orders of the Registrar of

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Trademarks may prefer an appeal to the IPAB within three

months from the date on which such order has been
passed. Therefore the power which earlier vested with
five High Courts across the country is now vested in only
one tribunal.
11.

Rectifications under the Trade Marks Act,

1958: As per Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 any

person so aggrieved may file an application before the
Registrar or the IPAB to rectify or cancel a registered
trademark from the Register. As explained earlier this
power under the Act of 1958 was vested only with
Registrar or the High Court. Similarly, under Section 125,
in

similar

circumstances

as

before

the

1999

Act,

rectification proceedings can be initiated before the Board

when infringement proceedings are pending. Therefore
the power which was earlier vested with five High Courts
across the country is now vested in only one tribunal.
12.

Transfer of powers from the High Court to the

IPAB under the Trade Mark Act:

Sl.

Remedy

1958-2003

2003 2010

No.

under

(Act of

(Present

Trade

1958)

Act)

1.

Marks Act
Appeals
against
Orders

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To

the Courts.
of

High To

only

IPAB.

the

the Registrar
of
2.

Trade

Marks.
Rectification

To

petitions

Courts.

High To

only

the

IPAB.

against
trademarks.
There is no provision for a statutory appeal against the
orders of the IPAB passed in its jurisdiction stated
above, making it all the more necessary that the
adjudication by the IPAB has to be performed by
members with prior judicial experience.

C. APPEALS & REVOCATIONS UNDER THE PATENTS

ACT, 1970
13.

Appeals against the Orders of the Controller

of Patents: Under the Patents Act, 1970 (hereinafter Act

of 1970), as amended upto the present date, the
Controller of Patents is the main administrative authority
to

whom

patent

applications

are

made.

Since

its

inception, the Act has vested the Controller with the

authority to either grant or reject a patent application
after adjudicating upon any possible pre-grant patent
opposition against the patent application. Under Section
116 of the Act of 1970 all Orders of the Controller could
be appealed to a Single Judge of the High Court. Given

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that there were only four Patent Offices in the country

located at Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata & Chennai, only the
Delhi High Court, the Bombay High Court, the Calcutta
High Court and the Madras High Court could hear appeals
against orders of the Patent Offices.
14.

Revocation of granted patents: As per Section

64 of the Act of 1970 a patent could be revoked only by

a High Court, either during the course of a counter-claim
filed in a patent infringement suit or by a revocation
petition independent of any suit for infringement. Such a
revocation petition could have been filed before all 21
High Courts in India.
D. APPEALS & REVOCATIONS UNDER THE PATENTS
ACT,

1970

AS

(AMENDMENT)

AMENDED
ACT,

BY

2002

THE

PATENT

&

PATENT

(AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005

15.

Appeals against the Orders of the Controller

of Patents: As per Section 117 of the Patents Act, 1970,

as amended by the Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002 &
Patent (Amendment) Act, 2005 (hereinafter Amended
Patent Act) a specified set of Orders of the Controller of
Patents and the Central Government can be appealed to
the IPAB within a span of three months. As explained
above, before the establishment of the IPAB, these
appeals could be heard by four High Courts across the
country. With the establishment of the IPAB, this entire

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workload has been shifted to only one tribunal. It is

pertinent to note that since its inception, the IPAB has
never had more than one bench to decide such matters.
The various matters, to which the appellate jurisdiction of
the IPAB extends, involve deep appreciation of law and
facts and specifically require judicial experience and
expertise. Some such orders passed by the Controller that
may be taken up on appeal to the IPAB are:
a) Order refusing the patent application itself, either for
non-compliance with the requirements of the Act (s.15)
or on the ground of anticipation of the claims in the
patent by any prior publication (s.18);
b) Order allowing any post-grant objections to an already
conferred patent, resulting in invalidation of the patent
[s.25(4)];
c) Order mandating division of the patent application into
two or more separate applications (s.16);
d) Order mandating reference to any other patent in the
claims as filed on the ground that the former patent
may be potentially infringed by the claims in the fresh
patent application (s.19);
e) Order of the Central Government revoking a patent on
the ground that the mode in which it is exercised is
mischievous to the State or generally prejudicial to the
public (s.66);
f) Order directing the patentee to compulsorily license
the patent technology to an applicant after considering
fulfilment of the pre-conditions as listed out in Sections
84 / 91 / 92;

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g) Order revoking a patent in respect of which a

compulsory license has already been granted, on the
ground that the patent is still not being worked or
being made available to the public at reasonably
affordable prices (s.86);
h) Order directing the patentee to compulsorily license
the patent technology to the customers of an applicant
after considering fulfilment of the pre-conditions as
listed out in Section 88;
i) Order terminating the grant of a compulsory license on
the ground that the circumstances that gave rise to the
grant of the license in the first place, no longer exist
(s.94)
16.

From the above, it is clear that the nature of

appellate jurisdiction exercised by the IPAB involves

serious determination of mixed issues of law and fact
such

as

patentability,

public

interest,

potential

infringement, etc. This in turn can only be done by

persons with judicial experience and expertise as it
requires deep knowledge of law and legal principles, the
acute ability to weigh evidence by identifying the relevant
factors that go towards such determination and ignoring
the irrelevant ones, and the skill of ascertaining facts
applying well established principles of evidence.
17.

Revocations of granted patents: As per Section

64 of the Amended Patent Act a granted patent can be

revoked on a petition to the IPAB by any person

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interested. The provision however allows a High Court to

revoke a patent on a counter-claim in a suit for
infringement of that patent. Therefore, although High
Courts do retain their powers to revoke in the case of
counter-claims being filed in the suit, their powers to
decide original revocation petitions have been transferred
to the IPAB. In addition to the IPAB, the Amended Patent
Act for the first time, vests the power of revocation even
with

the

opposition

Controller

of

mechanism

Patents
under

via

the

Section

post-grant

25(2)

of

the

Amended Patent Act. However, in order to avail of the

post grant opposition machinery, the said opposition has
to be filed within one year of the granted patent being
published in the official gazette of the Patent Office.

18.

The grounds for revocation a patent are again

extensively listed out in Section 64. From a bare perusal

of these grounds, which the petitioner does not wish to
reproduce here, it is clear that revocation again involves
determination of a lis inter partes after appreciation of the
law and the facts of the case.
19.

Transfer of powers from the High Court to the

IPAB in matters under the Patents Act:

Sr.

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Remedy under

1970-2007

2007 2010

No.
1.

Patents Act

(Act of 1970)

Appeals against To
the

Orders

(Amended

Patent Act)
High To the IPAB

of Courts.

only.

the Controller of
2.

Patents
Original

To

revocation

Court

any
in

High To

the

IPAB

the only.

petitions against country.

patents.
20.

Although the IPAB has been constituted to take over

the functions of the High Courts in key areas pertaining
to the adjudication/resolution of trademark and patent
disputes, the independence of the IPAB from executive
influence is under serious question. The norms for
appointment of IPAB members, its current constitution
and its mode of functioning are all in blatant violation of
sacrosanct principles of an independent judiciary and
separation of powers as enshrined in the Constitution.
Before

discussing

the

grounds

for

constitutional

challenge it is first necessary to describe the statutory

qualification criteria, the appointment and removal
process for members of the IPAB.
21.

The

statutory

qualification

criteria

for

members of the IPAB as laid down in Section 85

of the Trade Marks Act, 1999: As per Section 84(1)

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of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 the IPAB is required by law

to consist of a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson and
other members, as the Central Government may deem
fit to appoint. The other members are Judicial
Members & Technical Members. As per Section 84(2)
of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 every matter of the IPAB
has to be heard by a Bench consisting of at least one
Judicial

Member

and

Technical

Member.

The

Chairperson may appoint the same judicial member or

technical member to different Benches of the IPAB.
22.

The qualification criteria for a Judicial Member as

per Section 85 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is as
follows:
(i) Any member of the Indian Legal Service who has
held a Grade I post for at least three years; or
(ii) Any person who has held a civil judicial office for a
period of at least ten years.

23.

The qualification criteria for a Technical Member in

trademark matters as per Section 85 of the Trade Marks

Act, 1999 of the Trade Marks Act is as follows:

(i)
Any person who has ten years of experience as a
Registrar or held the post of Joint Registrar for at
(ii)

least five years; or

Any person who for at least ten years has been an
advocate of a proven specialized experience in
trade mark law.

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24. The qualification criteria for a Technical Member in

patent matters as per Section 116(2) of the Amended
Patents Act is as follows:
(i)
Any person who has held the post of Controller of
(ii)

Patents for a period of at least five years; or

Any person who has functioned as a Registered
Patent Agent for at least ten years and also
possesses a degree in engineering or technology or
a masters degree in science from any University
established under law.

25. The qualification criteria for a Vice-Chairperson as per

Section 85 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is as follows:
(i)
Any person who has for at least two years held the
office of a Judicial Member or a Technical Member;
(ii)

or
Any person who has been a member of the Indian
Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I of that
Service or any higher post for atleast 5 years

26.

The qualification criteria for a Chairperson as per Section

85 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is as follows:
(i)
Any person who is or has been a Judge of a High
(ii)

Court; or
Has, for at least two years, held the office of a ViceChairperson

27. It must be noted that the qualification criteria for the

positions of Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and Judicial
Members of the IPAB make no reference to advocates who
have at least ten years of practice. Therefore while an
advocate with 10 years of experience cannot become a

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Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson, a member of the Indian

Legal Service who has not practiced before the High Court
and also has no prior judicial experience can qualify to
become either a Judicial Member or the Vice-Chairperson
of the IPAB and subsequently the Chairperson of the IPAB.
28. The Appointment Procedure for members of the
IPAB: Section 85(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 states
that the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and every other
Member of the Board shall be appointed by the President
of India. Section 85(6) adds that the Chairperson shall be
appointed only after consultation with the Chief Justice of
India. There is however no judicial oversight over the
appointment of other members, and, as of now it is not
exactly clear as to who are the members of the Selection
Committee appointing the Vice-Chairperson and other
members of the IPAB. It must be noted that this is in
distinct contrast to the procedure for appointment of High
Court judges. Even for appointing district judges, Article
235 of the Constitution requires such appointments to be
made only after consulting the High Court that exercises
supervisory jurisdiction over the subordinate courts in
that State.
29.

The removal procedure for members of the

IPAB: As per Section 89(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 a

member of the IPAB can be removed from his office by
the President of India, on the grounds of proved

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misbehaviour or incapacity after an inquiry made by a

Judge of the Supreme Court. The rules to regulate the
procedure for the investigation are required to be
formulated by the Central Government. To the best of the
Petitioners knowledge, no such rules have been notified
till date. On the other hand, High Court judges, though
appointed

in

the

name

of

the

President,

can

be

impeached only by a vote of Parliament.

30.

Salaries, allowances and other terms and

conditions of service of the Members of the IPAB:

As per Section 88 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 it is left to
the

Central

Government

to

prescribe

the

salary,

allowances and other terms and conditions of service of

the IPAB members. It must be noted that the salary of the
Judges of the Union Judiciary is fixed by the Parliament
and may thus be altered only by an Act of Parliament.
Further Article 112 of the Constitution states that the
salary of Supreme Court and High Court judges shall be
charged to the Consolidated Fund of India.
31.

Term of Office: As per Section 86 of the Trade

Marks Act, 1999 members of the IPAB shall have only a

five year term with no provision for an extension of the
same. While the retirement age for the Chairperson and
the Vice-Chairperson is sixty five years, the retirement
age for other members is sixty two years. It must be
noted that with the Constitution (114th) Amendment Bill

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seeking to increase the retirement age of all High Court

Judges to 65 years it is highly unlikely that the IPAB shall
be headed by a retired High Court Judge ever again.
32.

Staff of Appellate Board: The number of officers,

their salaries and service conditions and their functions

with respect to supporting the IPAB are all left to the
Central Government. As of now the Department of
Industry Policy & Promotion (DIPP) is responsible for all
such appointments.

33.

General

observations

as

regards

the

qualifications of IPAB Members:

(i)

The manner in which the entire promotion scheme

is structured allows even technical members to
eventually become Chairperson of the IPAB i.e. after
two years of service as a Technical Member the
person qualifies to the position of Vice-Chairperson.
After another two years of service as a ViceChairperson the same person qualifies to become
Chairperson of the IPAB. Therefore a technical
member who does not even have a degree in
law is qualified to become the Chairperson of the
IPAB which is a position equivalent to that of a High
Court judge.

(ii)

The definition of Judicial Member as per Section

2(k) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 includes the

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Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson. This would

mean that once a Technical Member qualifies to
become

Vice-Chairperson,

then

that

Vice-

Chairperson can sit as a Judicial Member with

another Technical Member to function as a fullfledged bench of the IPAB. Therefore in reality,
under the current setup, two persons without law
degrees can decide trademark and patent matters
which were formerly being heard by Judges of the
High Courts. This would also mean that once a
former Registrar of Trade Marks qualifies as a
Technical Member and subsequently qualifies to
become a Vice-Chairperson, he or she may sit as a
Judicial Member on a Bench, along with a Technical
Member appointed under the Patents Act and
decide patent matters despite the fact that the
person in question does not have a law degree or an
expertise in science and technology.
(iii)

The above description is not strictly a hypothetical

situation as will be observed by viewing the current
Roster of the IPAB. The annexed cause-lists of the
IPAB on the 8th of November, 2010 & 2nd of
November, 2010, respectively, details the coram of
present benches as follows:

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(i)

Trademark

Bench

Chairperson),

Mr.

Ms.

Syed

S.

Usha

Obaidur

(Vice-

Rahaman

(Technical Member Trademarks)

(ii) Patents Bench Ms. S. Usha (Vice-Chairperson),
Mr. Chandrashekharan (Technical Member
Patents)
From the previous Orders of the IPAB, annexed
herewith, it is but apparent that Ms. S. Usha was
originally appointed as the Technical Member for
trademarks matters. However after serving two
years as Technical Member she qualified as the ViceChairperson and has started sitting as the Judicial
Member on both trademark and patents benches.
Therefore in reality a person originally appointed as
technical member for trademark matters is now
sitting as a Judicial Member for both Trademark
and Patent matters.
(iv)

Since its inception, the IPAB has had only two

former High Court judges as its Chairpersons. The
third Chairperson of the IPAB, a position equivalent
to that of a High Court Judge, was Mr. [Link], a
bureaucrat from the Indian Legal Service who was
elevated after serving as Vice-Chairperson for a
period of two years. Prior to his appointment to the
IPAB,

Mr.

[Link]

was

Secretary

to

the

Government of India and was working with the

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Ministry of Law and Justice. Currently the IPAB is

without a Chairperson as Mr. [Link] has retired.
With the retirement of Mr. [Link], the IPAB is
currently without a judicial member as defined in
Section 85(3).
(v)

Further, the qualifications of Mr. Syed Obaidur

Rahaman, Technical Member, IPAB are under serious
doubt. An RTI application filed by one Shri Papinder
Pal Singh Kalra on the 14th of December, 2009,
annexed

herewith,

illustrates

several

false

assertions made by Mr. Syed Obaidur Rahaman to

qualify for the post of Technical Member, IPAB. The
answers provided by the Central Public Information
Officer of the DIPP indicates that Mr. Rahaman has
allegedly stated on his application form, for the
position of Technical Member, IPAB that he was
involved in atleast one English case which was
decided in the year 1935. If this were to be true,
that would mean that Mr. Rahaman is more than 90
years old as of now and was qualified before the
English bar to have appeared in that case. The
Petitioner has also perused all the other cases cited
by Mr. Rahaman and can state, as a matter of fact,
that Mr. Rahamans name does not appear in a
single one of those cases. The reply to the RTI
Application also provides details on the Selection

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Committee which appointed Mr. Rahaman to the

post of Technical Member of the IPAB. The Selection
Committee

consisted

of

the

Secretary,

DIPP;

Secretary, Department of Personnel and Training &

Secretary D/Legal Affairs. The Selection Committee
therefore did not have any representation from the
Judiciary.
34.

General

observations

as

regards

the

functioning and independence of the IPAB over the

period 2003-2007:
(i)

The IPAB as an arm of the DIPP, Ministry of

Commerce: As already explained above the IPAB was
setup as a specialized tribunal to take over the
functions of the High Courts under the Trade Marks
and Patents Act. It would therefore be expected that
the

IPAB

function

with

the

same

degree

of

independence as the High Courts. However it is but

apparent that the DIPP, Ministry of Commerce &
Industry appears to be treating the IPAB as an
extension of itself. For example the Annual Report of
the DIPP for the years 2009-2010 reviews the IPAB
under the heading Attached and Other Subordinate
Offices and Other Organizations. It must be noted
that

Annual

Ministries

and

Reports

of

Departments

Central
cover

Government
only

those

organizations which are under their complete control,

Page No :
No of Corrns:

both administratively and financially. Moreover in this

Report, the DIPP describes the IPAB, a body which has
taken over the functions of the High Court, as a
quasi-judicial body. It is clear from a reading of the
Annual

Report

of

the

DIPP

that

the

Central

Government considers the IPAB as nothing but an

extension of the DIPP. The relevant pages of the DIPP
Annual Report are annexed herewith.
(ii) The implementation of the RTI Act, 2005 with respect
to the IPAB: As per the Right to Information Act, 2005
every public authority is required to formulate and
publish rules to implement the RTI Act, with respect
to itself. Although the IPAB falls within the definition
of public authority, as defined in the RTI Act, 2005, it
does not have its own RTI rules. The reason for this is
the fact that the DIPP is administering the RTI Act
with respect to even the IPAB. The DIPPs RTI Policy
which clarifies the Boards, Councils, Committees and
other bodies constituted as in the Department of
Industrial Policy and Promotion clearly lists the IPAB
as one of the bodies functioning under the DIPP
thereby giving the DIPP the right to implement the
RTI Act, 2005 with respect to the IPAB. This is akin to
having the Law Ministry administering the RTI Act
with respect to all 21 High Courts and the Supreme
Court.

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(iii) The IPAB was allegedly set up as a substitute for the

High Courts with a view to decrease pendency at the
High Courts and to provide more specialist expertise
in IP matters. On both counts, it has failed. This
appears to have been an exercise in futility, with the
High courts being stripped of jurisdiction which they
initially

possessed

and

the

adjudicatory

results

turning out worse than earlier. The Annual Report of

the DIPP for the years 2009-2010 provides statistics
which indicate that the IPAB has a remarkably low
disposal rate. Photocopies of the relevant pages from
the Annual Report are annexed herewith. A summary
of these figures are provided below.
IPAB Statistics as per DIPP Annual Report
2009-2010
Bench

Total patent

Total patent

cases

cases

filed/received

disposed

65

16

Delhi

45

Mumb

34

11

Chenn
ai

ai
Kolkat

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No of Corrns:

a
Total

155

21

IPAB Statistics as per DIPP Annual Report

2009-2010
Bench

Total

Total

trademark

trademark

cases

cases

filed/receive

disposed

d
Chennai

552

331

Delhi

923

353

Mumbai

310

58

Ahmedab

222

112

Kolkata

238

47

Total

2245

901

ad

(iv) One of the reasons for this abysmally low rate of

disposal could be the fact that the IPAB does not
function on a daily basis and also because only 2 of
its benches have been able to function fully in the
last few years. In fact as of December 16 th, 2010 the
IPAB is functioning with only 2 members. One
member is Ms S. Usha, the Vice-Chairperson and the
other is Mr. Syed Obaidur Rahman, Technical Member

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for Trademarks. All other members of the IPAB have

retired. On the basis of the cause-lists available on
the website of the IPAB, the Petitioner has been able
to compute the number of sittings the IPAB has had
per month in the year 2010. The same has been
reproduced in the following table:
[Link].
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Month
January, 2010
February, 2010
March, 2010
April, 2010
May, 2010
June, 2010
July, 2010
August, 2010
September, 2010
October, 2010
November, 2010
December, 2010
Total

No of Sittings
2
11
11
10
5
9
10
7
8
13
15
2
103

(v) The resource crunch being faced by the IPAB: In a

news report in the Hindu on the 12th of February,
2010 titled Seven years and still no facilities for IPAB
Circuit Benches, the correspondent describes in vivid
detail how the Vice-Chairperson of the IPAB, Ms. S.
Usha had complained to the Secretary of the DIPP
over the lack of facilities for three of the Circuit
Benches. While the IPAB does have a building,
although inadequate, in Chennai, the four Circuit
Benches in Kolkata, Delhi, Ahmedabad and Mumbai
are wholly without facilities. Most shockingly the IPAB

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is conducting its hearings at the premises of the

Patents and Trademarks Offices in Kolkata, Delhi and
Mumbai, despite the fact that it is sitting in appeal
over orders passed by these very offices. As detailed
by the Vice-Chairperson Ms. S. Usha in her letter to
the DIPP the IPAB is literally hostage to the Patents
and Trademarks Offices consent to use the premises
for its hearings. The Vice-Chairperson also details an
instance of how the Controller General of Patents
declines to grant the IPAB even a small room in the
Mumbai Patent Office to conduct its hearing post April
2010. As a result the IPAB has not conducted any
hearings in Mumbai. The fact that the circuit benches
do not have their own offices is further corroborated
by the annexed printouts of the cause-lists from the
IPABs websites. As per these cause-lists the venues
for the hearings in the various circuit benches are as
follows:
Sr.
1.

Date
24.11.20

Circuit Bench
Ahmedabad

Venue of Hearing
Gujarat State Legal

2.

10
8.11.201

New Delhi

Services Authority
Conference
Hall,

3.

0
21.6.201

Kolkata

Patent Office
Conference

0
35.

Hall,

Patent Office

Level of adjudication before the IPAB: It must

be pointed out that patent and trademark revocation

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matters are more often than not mixed questions of law

and fact. As a rule of thumb, in most common law
jurisdictions around the world, these matters are subject
to the rigours of a trial whereby extensive documents are
filed, witnesses are led and subject to intense crossexaminations.

While

such

cross-examinations

are

common features in infringement actions before district

courts and High Courts, for some reason, there is almost
no cross-examination of witnesses before the IPAB,
despite the fact that the IPAB possesses the power to
permit cross-examinations. This no doubt impacts the
quality of justice being meted out by the IPAB and raises
questions about the decisions rendered so far.
36.

The most alarming constitutional defect of the IPAB,

a tribunal that effectively took over the functions of the

High

Court,

is

the

fact

that

the

statutory

norms

prescribing qualification criteria for judicial members has

been drafted with a view to favour officers of the Indian
Legal Service (ILS). Such officers come with no judicial or
adjudicatory experience whatsoever and cannot, by any
stretch of imagination be placed on par with those who
are qualified to be appointed as High Court judges under
the Constitution of India.

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37.

Even more egregious is the history behind some of

these statutory provisions that were craftily formulated to

perpetrate executive influence on the working of the IPAB.
The Trade Marks Act, 1999 which created the IPAB was
drafted by the Ministry of Law and Justice which in itself is
staffed by officers of the Indian Legal Service. The
primary motive of these officers while drafting these
legislations appears to lie in creating retirement havens
for themselves. For example the Trade Marks Act, 1999
which is the parent statute of the IPAB, although currently
administered by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
was initially drafted and introduced into Parliament by the
Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, as it was
known then. Coincidently the first Vice-Chairperson of the
IPAB, Dr. Raghbir Singh, a former officer of the Indian
Legal Service, was the Secretary, Legislative Department,
Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, at the time
when the Trade Marks Act, 1999 was introduced into
Parliament.

Since

the

retirement

age

of

the

Vice-

Chairperson of the IPAB was fixed at 65 years and only ILS

officers, and not advocates, were qualified to become the
Vice-Chairpersons,

both

Dr.

Raghbir

Singh

and

his

successor Mr. [Link], also a former ILS officer, became

the Vice-Chairpersons, in succession, soon after their
retirement from the Indian Legal Service at the age of 62
years. After retiring from the IPAB as Vice-Chairperson and

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Chairperson, respectively, both officers are permitted by

Section 88 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to draw pension,
gratuity etc. as per their rank in the IPAB. Therefore for
three years of service at the IPAB, ILS officers end up
getting an IPAB pension in addition to their pension as ILS
Officers of the Central Government.
38.

The manner in which the IPAB has been set up,

appointment of its members have been carried out, and

has been functioning so far, is in stark contrast with the
system for patent law adjudication in the United Kingdom.
The adjudication of infringement and validity disputes in
patent law are well integrated with the judicial system, in
the United Kingdom. Broadly, every litigant has two
options: One, to go before the Patents Court, and two, to
approach the Patents County Court. The former is a Bench
of the High Court that is specialised in the adjudication of
patent law disputes and manned by those High Court
judges who have had specific training and exposure to
patent law litigation in their career at the bar. The latter is
a county court designated specifically for the resolution of
patent law disputes involving small and medium size
enterprises that cannot bear the costs associated with the
Patents Court proceedings. Even this court is headed by a
barrister specialised in patent law practise. The picture
that emerges is that no one who is untrained in the law,

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and without any legal qualifications, can adjudicate on

patent

law

disputes

in

the

U.K.

The

specialised

knowledge, if any, required to assist the adjudication

process

is brought in through the appointment of

scientific advisers by the Court when the Court is of the

opinion that it requires such assistance.
39.

In India, on the other hand, the Parliament has

taken the requirement of such assistance to a new and

unprecedented level by using this pretext to appoint
technical members who can now technically head the
IPAB. Such technical members may come with no prior
knowledge of the law, and in many cases, with no
significant prior expertise in IP matters as well, as is the
case with Syed Obaidur Rahman. Technical knowledge is
something that should ideally be left to the discretion of a
judicial body that adjudicates that particular dispute, in
the same manner as discretion is placed on the Executive
to appoint a fact finding Commission headed by a retired
Judge when circumstances demand judicial expertise for
carrying on such exercise. Ignoring this salutary principle
of separation of powers and using the pretext of
specialised knowledge to interfere with the functioning of
the judiciary is a wholly unconstitutional exercise, and the
impugned provisions suffer from this constitutional vice.
The requirement of the Technical Member is even more

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curious in the context of Section 115 of the Patents Act

which allows the Court to appoint a Scientific Advisor to
assist it in any patent matter.
40.

The Petitioner submits that the impugned provisions

of the Trade Marks and Patents Act, dealing with the

establishment and staffing of the IPAB and conferring
jurisdiction over matters requiring judicial experience and
expertise, seriously dilute the independence of the IPAB
and flagrantly violate the Separation of Powers doctrine
enshrined in the Constitution, as well as deny the citizens
of India their fundamental right to free, fair and impartial
administration of justice by qualified judges and should
therefore be declared ultra vires the Constitution of India,
on the following among other grounds:
Grounds:
A.

Over the last few decades, there has been a

conscious move on the part of the 1st respondent
Union

to

tribunalize

administration

of

justice.

Several of these laws have been challenged. While

the Honble Supreme Court did initially permit
limited tribunalisation, especially in adjudication of
service disputes,

consumer

disputes

and debt

recovery matters, in order to ensure speedier

justice, it has recently clamped down on the rapid
dilution of judicial standards in these Tribunals. On

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11th May, 2010, the Constitution Bench of the

Supreme Court delivered a landmark verdict in the
case of Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President of
Madras Bar Association (Hereinafter the NCLT
judgment)

[2010]

156

[Link].

392.

The

Supreme Court in this case clarified for the first

time, in the context of the proposed National
Company Law Tribunal, norms relating to the actual
composition and qualifications of tribunals taking
over the functions of the High Court. These norms
were carefully spelt out by the Apex Court with a
view to ensure that firstly these tribunals are
independent from the influence of the Executive and
secondly to ensure that these tribunals are staffed
with

persons

who

possess

adequate

judicial

experience and are capable of administering justice

in a fair and impartial manner. The impugned
provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the
Patents Act, 1970, are contrary to the norms
prescribed by the Constitution Bench of the Apex
Court in the NCLT judgment.
B.

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the

NCLT judgment held that the fundamental right to
equality before law and equal protection of law
guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution clearly
includes a right to have the person's rights,

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adjudicated by a forum which exercises judicial

power in an impartial and independent manner,
consistent

with

the

recognized

principles

of

adjudication. The Court further held that wherever

access to courts to enforce such rights is sought to
be altered by directing a litigant to approach an
alternative forum, then in such case the legislative
act in question could be challenged before a Court
of Law on the grounds that it is ultra vires the
Constitution of India. The Trade Marks Act, 1999 &
the Patents Act, 1970 which transfer intrinsic judicial
functions from the High Court to the IPAB, a body
manned by persons lacking any prior judicial
experience

before

assuming

their

tenure

as

members of the IPAB, is hence violative of Article 14

of the Constitution of India.
C.

Qualification criteria for judicial members of

the IPAB: The Supreme Court in the NCLT judgment
has very clearly held that in order to qualify as a
judicial member on a tribunal which is taking over
the erstwhile functions of the High Court, it is
necessary for the qualification criteria for that
tribunal member to be as close as possible to that of
a High Court Judge. One of the key qualifications of
such a person is that he or she must possess
adequate judicial experience. To this extent, the

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Supreme Court held that only persons with actual

experience in a Court of Law as either judges or
advocates can be termed as possessing adequate
judicial

experience.

The

Supreme

Court

had

therefore held that only Judges or Advocates can be

considered for appointment as Judicial Members on
tribunals. The Supreme Court further stated in no
uncertain terms that members of the Indian Legal
Service, even those from Grade I, could not be
considered for appointment as judicial members. As
per the NCLT judgment, the only persons who can
be appointed to the position of Judicial Members
are

High Court Judges, District Court judges who

have atleast 5 years of service or advocates with

ten years of practice. Therefore Section 85(3)(a) of
the

Trade

Marks

Act,

1999

which

allows

for

members of the Indian Legal Service (Grade I with

three years experience) to be appointed as judicial
members is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. The fact that persons appointed from the
Indian Legal Service, have in fact, risen through the
ranks to become the Chairman and Vice Chairman
of the IPAB is even more problematic.
D.

Appointment procedure: In the NCLT judgment,

the Supreme Court clearly stated that the Selection
Committee for members of the Tribunal should

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consist of adequate number of judges, so as to act

as a check against Executive abuse in the process of
appointments. In the case of the NCLT, the Supreme
Court held that the Selection Committee would
require to consist of (i) Chief Justice or his nominee
(with a casting vote) (ii) A senior Judge of the
Supreme Court or the Chief Justice of a High Court &
three

Secretary

level

officers

of

the

Central

Government (including one from the Ministry of

Company Affairs). Section 85(5) & 85(6) of the Trade
Marks Act, 1999 do not contain such safeguards and
are

therefore

ultra

vires

Article

14

of

the

Constitution of India.
E.

Term of Office: In the NCLT judgment, the Supreme

Court held that a term of 3 years is too short and
that the term should extend to atleast 5 years or 7
years with a provision for automatic re-appointment
to another term. Conditional re-appointment would
compromise judicial independence. The reason for
this recommendation was that specialized areas
require specialized expertise which can be built up
only over a period of time and in order to attract
younger blood to such Tribunals, it would be
necessary

to

provide

for

longer

terms

of

appointment, especially since such person cannot

appear before the tribunal after having sat on it. As

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per Section 86 of the Trade Mark Act, 1999 a

member may hold office for a term of only 5 years
without any provision for reappointment.

What

makes the present case more egregious on this

count is the fact that almost all of the judicial
members

appointed

to

the

IPAB

have

been

members of the Indian Legal Service without any

prior

experience

in adjudication

of

intellectual

property disputes. By the time they sit in on enough

matters to gain the relevant experience, they are
shown the door. As explained above, this is ultra
vires Article 14 of the Constitution.
F.

Removal Procedure: In the NCLT judgment, the

Supreme Court held that the highest ranking officer
of the Tribunal i.e. the President can be suspended
only with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of
India. Section 89(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999
states that no officer of the IPAB may be removed,
except by an Order of the President of India on the
grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after
an inquiry made by a Judge of the Supreme Court.
This provision does not state whether the President
is bound by the recommendations of the Supreme
Court judge. Moreover, while a High Court Judge is
appointed by the President on the advice of the
Union Judiciary, he or she can be impeached only by

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the Parliament. There are no such safeguards in the

case of IPAB members. Therefore S. 89(2) is ultra
vires Article 14 in so much as it violates the
Separation of powers doctrine.
G.

Salaries and Allowances of the IPAB members:

As of now, Section 88 vests the entire power to
regulate Salaries and Allowances of the IPAB with
the Central Government. In the cases of some
tribunals

such

as

the

Copyright

Board,

the

Chairperson of the tribunal who has the rank of a

High Court Judge is getting paid a measly Rs. 8000
and in order to obtain a hike in salary, he is required
to approach the bureaucracy in the Ministry of
Human Resources and Development. Similarly, in
the present case, the bureaucracy in the DIPP has
the power to regulate the salary of the IPAB
members and it is possible that they will be tempted
to manipulate their salary in order to control the
functioning of the IPAB. Since the salary and
allowances of the IPAB members are bound to affect
the functioning of the IPAB, the same can be held to
be one of the fundamental pillars of judicial
independence. Fixation of the salaries and other
emoluments and allowances of members of a
judicial tribunal is an essential legislative function
which cannot be delegated to the Executive. For

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example, the salaries of Supreme and High Court

Judges are decided by submitting the same to a
vote of Parliament. Even the salary of the Chief
Information Commissioner is pegged to that of the
Chief

Election

determined

by

Commissioner
Parliament.

whose

For

these

salary

is

reasons,

Section 88 of Trade Marks Act, 1999 is ultra vires

Article 14 of the Constitution as it compromises the
judicial independence of the IPAB.
H.

Support staff of the IPAB: As per the Supreme

Court in the NCLT case, the sponsoring ministry of
the Tribunal cannot be responsible for providing
support to the tribunal which it has created. Instead
the Supreme Court held that a different Ministry
being the Ministry of Law and Justice should be
responsible for administering the same. As of now
the

DIPP

functioning

under

the

Ministry

of

Commerce and Industry is the arm of the Executive

responsible for providing administrative support to
the IPAB. As noted earlier, the hold of the DIPP over
the IPAB is more than substantial. The DIPP lists the
IPAB as one of its own wings and even lists itself as
the

concerned

RTI

authority

for

all

matters

pertaining to the IPAB. As of now, Section 90 of the

Trade Marks Act, 1999 merely states that the
Central Government shall provide administrative

Page No :
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support to the IPAB. The final determination of the

Ministry under the Central Government is made
under

the Government

of

India

(Allocation of

Business) Rules 1961. Given the pathetic state of

the

IPAB

circuit

infrastructure

as

benches

and

disclosed

in

their
the

woeful
annexed

newspaper clipping, the Honourable Court may pass

appropriate declarations to ensure that the Ministry
of Law and Justice is the ministry responsible for
providing support to the IPAB.
I.

Further employment with parent cadre after

term on IPAB Bench: In the NCLT judgment, the
Supreme Court held that any person appointed to a
Tribunal on deputation from the Central Government
cannot hold a lien over his original job in his parent
service for a period of more than one year. The logic
behind this ruling was that a person who was
looking to go back to his parent service in the
Executive would definitely compromise his judicial
independence while on the Bench. By the same
logic, the rule of law should also require that a
retired member be barred from accepting any
further appointments from the Central Government.
The

Honourable

Court

may

therefore

pass

declaration to the same effect barring members of

the IPAB from maintaining a lien over their parent

Page No :
No of Corrns:

service for more than a year and of being offered

the possibility of future government appointments.

J.

The IPAB has extensive powers to decide on

complicated issues and disputes in the field of
intellectual property rights. Today, IPRs are a
valuable business asset for any organisation and
effective protection of IPR is part of the fundamental
right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of
India to carry on trade and business and the
constitutional guarantee under Article 300-A. In
these circumstances, a body that lacks judicial
expertise and experience cannot be mandated with
the task of adjudicating on the scope and protection
of these IPRs. The exercise of powers of revocation,
rectification, appeals over compulsory licensing and
post-grant opposition orders etc. by the IPAB will
result in a violation of the rights guaranteed to the
registrant or owner of the IPR under Articles 19(1)
(g) and 300-A of the Constitution.

K.

It is a well-established principle that the question of

determining the validity of a patent is in the
exclusive domain of a Court of Law since it involves
a mixed question of fact and law. The Supreme

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Court in the case of Bishwanath Prasad Radhey

Sharma v. Hindustan Metal Industries (AIR 1982 S.C.
1444) categorically stated that determination of
novelty and inventive step of an invention was a
mixed question of law and fact, depending largely
on the circumstances of the case. Emphasising the
complexity

in

determining

the

tests

for

patentability, the Supreme Court held the same to

be one of the most difficult aspects of patent law,
and has led to considerable conflict of judicial
opinions. This dicta of the Supreme Court has been
approvingly cited by the Honble Madras High Court
in the case of Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. TVS Motor Company
Ltd. MIPR 2008 (1) 217 while it was determining the
validity of a patent at an interim stage. The U.S.
Supreme Court has reiterated the very same
proposition in the case of Graham v. John Deere Co.
383 U.S. 1 (1966) when it held that the ultimate
question of patent validity is one of law. It is
therefore

established

position

that

the

determination of patent validity is a question of law

decided by Courts of Law. In the light of this
fundamental principle, the impugned provisions
which permit persons without any formal training in
the law to adjudicate on disputes that primarily
involve the construction of patents, are violative of

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Article 14 of the Constitution. There is no reasonable

nexus between the object of these provisions, being
the fair and impartial adjudication of disputes
pertaining to IPRs, and the manner in which they
seek to achieve such object by way of creation of
the IPAB.

L.

The mindless appointment of technical members

without considering the possibility of less intrusive
measures, such as leaving it to the discretion of the
judges to appoint a scientific advisor, as allowed by
Section 115 of the Patents Act, 1970, is violative of
the doctrine of proportionality. While specialised
knowledge is no doubt a relevant factor to be taken
into

account

expertise

in

when

creating

adjudication

bodies

of

certain

that have
kinds

of

disputes, the measure adopted to bring in such

specialised knowledge should also be one that is
proportionate to the requirement of specialised
knowledge.

M.

At present, the IPAB functions in a manner no better

than any other Government Department with the
same

level

of

independence

and

functional

autonomy. This is violative of the basic structure of

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the Constitution, which enshrines the principles of

separation of powers and independence of the
judiciary.

N.

The right to a fair and impartial system for the

administration of justice is also an integral part of
the right to life conferred under Article 21. The
improper constitution of the IPAB disregards this
fundamental right and derogates from it.

41. The petitioner craves leave of this Honble Court to raise

additional grounds at the time of hearing.
42.

The petitioner has not filed any other writ petition or

any other legal proceedings seeking the reliefs claimed

in the present writ petition.

43.
The petitioner has no alternative or efficacious
remedy except to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this
Honble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
44.

The territorial jurisdiction for this PIL arises within

the jurisdiction of this Honble Court where the principal

bench of the IPAB is located.
45. The IPAB currently has no judicial member. Ms. S. Usha
who is the present Vice-Chairperson of the Tribunal was
originally appointed as technical member for trademark
matters and was subsequently elevated to the position of
Vice-Chairperson. However after the retirement of the

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former Chairperson Mr. [Link], Ms. S. Usha is also

sitting as the Judicial Member on benches along with
Technical Members to hear and decide both Trade Mark
and Patent matters. This is likely to lead to a severe
subversion of justice, as the NCLT judgment has clearly
pointed to the need to have judicial members who have
qualifications that are as good as those that are
appointed as High Court judges. A technical member
donning the robes of a judicial member raises significant
issues of competence and fair administration of justice.
The continuation of such a state of affairs at the IPAB will
result in a mockery of Justice, the Rule of Law and
Parliaments authority thereby leading to irreparable
injury to the members of the public.
46. The petitioner therefore prays that this Honourable Court
may be pleased to grant an interim injunction restraining
the 2nd respondent from adjudicating any cases pending
the disposal of the above writ petition and pass such
further or other orders as this Honble Court may deem fit
and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case.
47.

For the reasons mentioned above, it is prayed that

this Honourable Court may pass a Writ of Declaration

declaring Chapter XI of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and
Chapter XIX of the Patents Act, 1970, as ultra vires
Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21, 50, 245, of the Constitution of
India

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and

violative

of

the

basic

structure

of

the

Constitution and hence void ab initio, in so far as it

establishes the Intellectual Property Appellate Board
(IPAB) and vests important judicial functions on this
Board.
Solemnly affirmed at Kolkata
BEFORE ME
this the ____ day of January,
2011 and signed his name
in
NOTARY PUBLIC

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my

presence.