ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.

HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents. [G.R. No.
142840. May 7, 2001
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue
in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that
"no

person

shall

be

Member

of

the

House

of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen." [1]

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April
27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost
his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,

among

others,

"rendering

service

to

or

accepting

commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said

provision of law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in,
the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and
the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not
divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or
offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at
the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said

commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident

thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his
service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That
any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph
(a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in
any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the
period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces
of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the
said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to
the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of
Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a
U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service
in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic
Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of

26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was

then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto
Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. [4]
On

March

2,

2000,

the

HRET

rendered

its

decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and

declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative
of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998
elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April
27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari
assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being

such in view of the loss and renunciation of such

citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire
his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of
Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the
petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.
[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a

natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still

be

considered

natural-born

Filipino

upon

his

reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be
considered

natural-born

Filipino

since

he

lost

his

Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the

United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by

repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he
reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was
repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV,
Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino
citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers,

who

elect

Philippine

reaching the age of majority, and

citizenship

upon

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

[8]

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth,

and

(2)

by

naturalization. These

ways

of

acquiring

citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the

natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person
who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born
citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who
have

become

Filipino

citizens

through

naturalization,

generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise

known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed
the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant has
to prove that he possesses all the qualifications [12] and
none of the disqualifications[13] provided by law to become
a

Filipino

citizen.

The

decision

granting

Philippine

citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years

from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that
during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left
the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling
or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation

of

Government

promulgated

rules;

or

(4)

committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation

or contrary to any Government announced policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On
the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who
wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess

certain qualifications[17] and none of the disqualifications

mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces; [19] (2) service in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; [20] (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;
[22]

and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]

As

distinguished

from

the

lengthy

process

of

naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of

an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA
Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his

residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.

[Italics in the original.][25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality.[26] This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship
when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United

States. However,

he

subsequently

reacquired

Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with
Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last

resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall

contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen,
a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of repatriation
allows

him

torecover,

or return to,

his

original

status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer
a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to
regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained
by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen"
was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered

as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth
and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two
categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered
natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those
born before January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who,
upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those

"naturalized

citizens"

were

not

considered natural-born obviously because they were not

Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not
considered natural-born because they also had to perform
an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those
born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining
who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a
sentence: "Those

who

elect

Philippine

citizenship

in

accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be

deemed

natural-born

naturalized

Filipinos

citizens."
are

Consequently,

considered

not

only

natural-born

citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are

citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and
(2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship,

necessarily

is

natural-born

Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of

a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be naturalborn or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss
of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent
Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of
the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the

Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is
merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. [30] In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to
substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for the
simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for
certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of
discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin
cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of
Sorsogon
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the
highest number of votes in three successive elections but
who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to
hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now
claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship
thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass,
but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo
should be considered void; that the electorate should be
deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots;
and that legally, he secured the most number of valid
votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who

obviously was not voted directly to the position of
governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence
should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the
ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the
contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on
repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing
jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the
superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the
Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to
review and annul a Resolution of the respondent
Commission on Elections (Comelec), First
Division,1 promulgated on December 19,19952 and another
Resolution of the Comelec en bane promulgated February
23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor

of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23,

1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a
petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or
holding any public office or position by reason of not yet
being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate
of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting
the petition with the following disposition:6
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition
and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for
the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is
NOT a citizen of thePhilippines. Accordingly, respondent's
certificate of candidacy is cancelled."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained
unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his
candidacy continued and he was voted for during the
elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the
Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution
of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass
of the election returns and a Certificate of [Link] May

27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained

by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero,
Jr.

51,060

Juan G.
Frivaldo

73,440

[Link]

3,304
Isagani P.
Ocampo

1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a

(supplemental) petition9 praying for his proclamation as the
duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated
according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of
proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on
June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at8:30 in the evening
of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new

petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and
for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995,
at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a
citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation
under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee
on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted."
As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the
Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no
more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as
governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that
pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the ViceGovernor not Lee should occupy said position of
governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division
promulgated the herein assailed Resolution13 holding that
Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes,"
was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest
number of votes, and xxx having reacquired his Filipino

citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the

provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified
to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division),
therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is
hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not
having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant
his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of
Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed
to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the
completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as
the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the
highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his
Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,1995 under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus,
qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is

directed to notify His Excellency the President of the

Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation thereof."
On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en
banc in its Resolution14 promulgated on February 23, 1996.
On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed.
Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this
Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter
alia directed the parties "to maintain the status
quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be
capsulized in the following propositions":15
"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient
in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and deciding said petition;

Second- The judicially declared disqualification of

respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him
ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office
of Governor;
Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither
valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his
ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor;
and
Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully
supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly
elected Governor of Sorsogon."
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the
respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at
issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May
1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that
he is not a citizen of thePhilippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated
on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also

on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among
others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in
G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the abovementioned resolutions on a different ground: that under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is
reproduced hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election." (Italics supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions
because they were not rendered "within the period allowed

by law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the

election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the
Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within
the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided
by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said
Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated
G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately
related in their factual environment and are identical in the
ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the
position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from
the parties and required them thereafter to file
simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues
may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did
it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him

to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not,

may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack
of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to
run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of
Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the
initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that : said
petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest
or a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election,
valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its
jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of
which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship
of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered
within ( the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the
elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is

the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the
other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires
Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local
officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must
be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and
able to read and write Filipino or any other local language
or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor
or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor,
vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23)
years of age on election day.

xxx

xxx

xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as
a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show
that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he
possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said
statute (R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his
citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill
allowing him to do so "failed to materialize,
notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of
the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to
the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case,
his attempt at naturalizationwas rejected by this Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural
defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was
overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of
Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988

elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the

same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared
a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and
discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a
third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon
and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections
to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully
passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring
citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less
than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime
opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time,
as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity
of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the
provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is
not disputed. Hence, he insists that henot Leeshould
have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of
Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at
8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes
in the elections and since at that time, he already
reacquired his citizenship.

En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is

tainted ; with serious defects, which we shall now discuss
in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively
repealed," asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino
exercising legislative powers under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of
citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances
as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of
policy which the present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution," adding that in her memorandum dated
March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee
on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential
Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease
and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within
your functional area of responsibility as defined under
Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as
amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any
stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law

sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws

are repealed only by subsequent ones25 and a repeal may
be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal
was made because then President Aquino in her
memorandum based on the copy furnished us by Lee
did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725
was being repealed or was being rendered without any
legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically
by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule
of statutory construction that repeals by implication are
not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it
is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the
two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent
that they cannot co-exist."26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be
regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every
pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor
should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making
powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy
addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance
and processing of applications for repatriation pending

whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987

Constitution" might make. In other words, the former
President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first
Congress once createdto deal with the matter. If she
had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to
Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential
issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of
"the present government, in the exercise of prudence and
sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new
Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential
Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court
by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital
irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings,"
asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed
on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was approved in just one day
or on June 30, 1995 x x x," which "prevented a judicious
review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo
counters that he filed his application for repatriation with
the Office of the President in Malacanang Palace on August

17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor

General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated
only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said
Committee started processing his application. On June 29,
1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the
Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could
not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the
processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the
Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely
for the personal interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor
General explained during the oral argument on March 19,
1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were
many others who applied and were considered for
repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this
Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced
that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted
by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded
up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such

proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the

requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not
difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and
cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of
an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special
Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike
in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry
into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a
former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to
reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo,
he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and
faithfully served his country and his province prior to his
naturalization in the United States a naturalization he
insists was made necessary only to escape the iron
clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in
conscience embrace and who, after the fall of the
dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space,
wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer
once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by
the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues

convincingly and conclusively against the existence of

favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate,
any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should
have been pursued before the Committee itself, and,
failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed
repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be
effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local
Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if
not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our
decision in G.R. 10465430which held that "both the Local
Government Code and the Constitution require that only
Philippine citizens can run and be elected to Public
office" Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the
only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's
naturalization was valid or not and NOT the effective
date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be
invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office
should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court.
Which question we shall now directly rule on.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n

elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province x x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language
or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election
day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not
specify any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one year's residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office,31 and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that

no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation,

shall govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and
on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995
the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other
elective officials) beganhe was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of
said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to
govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to
our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for
which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal
(as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be
noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code
speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of
candidates. Why then should such qualification be required
at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the
certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such
qualifications unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as
in the case of age and residence should thus be

possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins

to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing
this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap &
Sons,33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to
ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to
another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted
but instead achieved by construing the citizenship
qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the
elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised
during the oral argument34 to the effect that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate
(or for that matter the elected official) registered as a
voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official
to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under
the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less
a validly registered one if he was not a citizen at the
time of such registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the

purpose of the requirement. If the law intended
the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to
election consistent with the requirement of being a
registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a
SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It
therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a
VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.
It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was
included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"),
not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that
the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR
TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be
emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an
elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require
him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual
votingis the core of this "qualification." In other words,
the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure
that the prospective official is actually registered in the
area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized

and Lee has not disputed that he "was and is a
registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter
has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x In
fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly
maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered
voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then
he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was
questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a
voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all
the previous elections including on May 8,1995.37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the
province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of
citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date
of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code38 gives any voter, presumably
including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to
question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate.
This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a

remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an

incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the
qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be
availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the
winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the
issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the
Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's
proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo
was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his
oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day,
then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in
the immediately preceding elections and such oath had
already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage.
Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also
hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the
date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of
the Philippines,39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled

exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute

is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES
NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which
undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby
validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of
public officers, or private deeds and contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended consequences
by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply
with some technical requirement. They operate on
conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive
in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that
curative statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and
adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x
(and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities
in existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x By their very
nature, curative statutes are retroactive xxx (and) reach
back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to
render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which

do not create new or take away vested rights, but only

operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal
meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule
against the retrospective operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a
new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby
filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D.
725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino
women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing
law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until
"after the death of their husbands or the termination of
their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted
by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a
Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine
citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the new
Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had
married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus,
P.D. 725 granted a new right to these womenthe right to
re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital
coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the

other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a

new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had)
lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation
of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of
naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could
now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive,
(DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to
supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del
Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil.
119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA
1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in
the existing naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63
wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate
only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and
other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid

procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship

by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the
aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions
are considered essentially remedial and curative."
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording
of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent
was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A)
retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment
where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears
from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the
terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute
was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and
transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and
jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that
citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important
as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures and other
guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the
legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725
must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said
that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it

effect the evident purpose for -which it was enacted, so

that if the reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will
be so applied although the statute does not in terms so
direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or
violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more
true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or
delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the
retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that
said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his
Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and
applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the
time that Frivaldo became an American citizen,
nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is
tobe given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation
granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be
deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application
therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply
that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past events i.e.,

situations and transactions existing even before the law

came into being in order to benefit the greatest number
of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy
and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the
fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That
is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of
his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in
the law that would bar this or would show a contrary
intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there
is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or
anything unjust or injurious would result from giving
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that
there will result the impairment of any contractual
obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of
some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people
repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of

Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his

nationality should now be deemed mooted by his
repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is
that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725
were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special
Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing
of applications for any substantial length of time, then the
former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving
already renounced his American citizenship was, may be
prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not
be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body
intended right and justice to prevail.47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was
able to process, act upon and grant applications for
repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the
same were filed.48 The fact that such interregna were
relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice
to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to
repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct
prejudice to the government is possible only where a

person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability

of his to the government arising in connection with or as a
result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the
interregnum between application and approval, a situation
that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people,
already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the
circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in
treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective
as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994.
This being so, all questions about his possession of the
nationality qualification whether at the date of
proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May
8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March
20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's
status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled.
Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated
i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored as of August 17,
1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise
deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became

an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not
effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40
of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from
running for any elective local position?"49 We answer this
question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold
that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said
oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he
"had long renounced and had long abandoned his
American citizenshiplong beforeMay 8, 1995. At best,
Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned
and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution
dated December 19, 1995:51
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost
his American citizenship when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign

nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this
Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a
Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53 of the
Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in
toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995
"became final and executory after five (5) days or on May
17,1995, no restraining order having been issued by this
Honorable Court."54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as
the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a
final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee
adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now
concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien
have also become final and executory way before the 1995
elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his
political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all

time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any

public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193
disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the
1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was
disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be
changed. In the words of the respondent Commission
(Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55
"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had
decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus
disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992
elections. However, there is no record of any 'final
judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate
for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in
its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30,
1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that
Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by
the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not
a citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the

Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992

elections."
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any
of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in
Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again, as the occasion demands."
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction
to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the
only "possible types of proceedings that may be
entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case,
an election protest or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee

reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but

that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's)
proclamation only on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day
reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's
"recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo
warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has
given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x
provincial x x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length on
the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its
constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the
Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317
obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we
ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and
assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no
longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that
pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be

entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate

has been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187
SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513;
Casimiro [Link], 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however,
is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no
proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the
power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing
Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883;
Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a
proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following
the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed
only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no
question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction
over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We
uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the
fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the

sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a

second placer, xxx just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship
on the pronouncement of this Court in the
aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully
aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so
as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety,
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to
have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away
their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant
dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that
petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible
candidate, much less the electorate as having known of
such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even
allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution

dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of

the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying
due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had
not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of
this case."
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is
the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in
1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when
the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases
a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason
Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that
Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be
voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence
presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was
"fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged
disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety", in other words, that the voters
intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of
their voting for him, he was ineligible. IfLabo has any
relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and not Lee

should be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was,

to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the
people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot
be deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have
seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he
obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995
elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence,
Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now
be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code
Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed
Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1,
1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11,
1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be
annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen

(15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus

Election Code which reads as follows:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election" (italics supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these
resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent
ones issued by the Commission (First Division)
on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23,
1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is
obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide
petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the -winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong." (Italics supplied)
Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum
dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension
(not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it
decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic
distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that
can amend or abrogate an existing law. The existence and
subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo
case;64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired
by xxx repatriation" He also contends that by allowing

Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the

Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of
our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen.
We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity
of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured
whatever defects there may have been in his registration
as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such
retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988
and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous
rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not
the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate,
citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate
of candidacy on the ground of a false material
representation therein as required by Section 74.
Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our
holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have
no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his
claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions
promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were
invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen

days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In

dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because
"Section 6 of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and
decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite
of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section
78 "is merely directory," we note that just like us, Mr.
Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No.
120295." One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent,
teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section
78 must be filedwithin the 25-day period prescribed
therein. The present case however deals with the period
during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And
we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen
day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that
a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the
elections is valid but Loong held that a petitionfiled
beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no
inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding
that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo,
repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues

that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first

Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo)
decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of
acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no
question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of
determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992
elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation
has changed his political status not in 1988 or 1992, but
only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that
Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that
"informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to
lose American citizenship." Since our courts are charged
only with the duty of the determining who are Philippine
nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are
or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law
that a State determines ONLY those who are its own
citizens not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The
issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that
Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown
by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled
case law, such finding is binding and final.

The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by

chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections,
should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility
for being an American was publicly known." First, there is
absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public"
knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can
be true post factoonly of the last two previous elections.
Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the
1995 elections. How then can there be such "public"
knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code refers to the qualifications
of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and
not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification
[under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by
candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term,
but by election day at the latest. We see it differently.
Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official"
while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates." If the
qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to
"candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would

have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the

rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant
that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at
election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically
stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for
other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive
effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among
others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after
taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do
not question what the provision states. We hold however
that the provision should be understood thus: that after
taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition
(or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to
have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal
meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39
of the Local Government Code, as well as regarding Mr.
Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725

suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather

extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This
Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We
agree we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT
the issue here. The issue is how should the law be
interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed,
so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of
philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply
laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the
spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal
syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the
context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in
favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election
laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular
sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected
candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would
constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an
unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the

Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective
official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which
he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in
full force and effect up to the present, not having been
suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time,
and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been
properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by
reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law
granting him a new right to resume his political status and
the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique
situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship
and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime
he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive
effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up
his U. S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he
possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of
the start of the term of office of governor, and should have
been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994,
his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have

been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of

course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack
of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability
or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And
once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings
recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to
hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably
construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest
effect to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of
doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate
freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal
niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the
sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections (citations omitted)."67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible
protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular

will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the

importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to
ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular
electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to
resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the
will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to
cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the
choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning
candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has
miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to
find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to
grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold
him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship

at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995

elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of
the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of
repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship
as a disqualification "from running for any elective local
position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate
from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It
proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the
dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development
of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes
harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke
substantial justice in the larger social context consistent
with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability
in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American
citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship.
At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt
about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first
opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve
his people once more. The people of Sorsogon
overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath
of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his
certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization

bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity

and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of
birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in
spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his
consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his
native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years.
Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of
purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity.
Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all,
Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a
citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he
opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and
serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth.
He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the
law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final
analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable
people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed
by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED.
The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are
AFFIRMED.

(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for

being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.