28

Sovereignty"
HANS KELSEN

i. THE CONCEPT
Although the expression sovereignty denotes one of the most signicant mtiamental concepts of both the traditional theory of state law and

that of intemational law. it is fraught with an ambiguity of dire consequence in the controversy over its meaning. The generally accepted
meaning found most frequently in the newer literature is all that is given
when sovereignty is characterized as that property according to which

the state is the supreme power or the supreme system of humari behaviour, a meaning corresponding to the original sense of sovereignty as
derived from the Latin 'srrper.~:trrus'. Some authors who pronounce the
state to be essentially sovereign nevertheless quality their position in that

they consider even the sovereign state to be bound by the norms of

morality in general--or by a particular morality of religion, namely
Christianityand therefore to be subject to this morality as to a higher

order. At the same time, they attempt to preserve the concept of state
sovereignty as a highest authority. understood simply as the highest
authority in the eld of the law. that is, as a power or order not subject to
any higher legal order.

ll. THE PROBLEM

This sovereignty of the state becomes problematic when international

law is brought into the picture as a legal system imposing obligations and

conferring rights on the state. That international law imposes obligations

and confers rights on the state to behave in a certain way does not mean,
as sometimes assumed, that international law imposes obligations and
' Edits-if note: The Gcrrnan text of this paper mt appeared in Wtirterilttclr ties
Wlilkerrechts. 2nd edt|-. ed. Hans-Iiitgen Schlochauet. 3 vols. iiierlin: de Gruyter. IEIBD-2:.
vol. Ill fl HEEL 2'3"Bil5. The translation is by the editors. an earlier Eriglish-language version
appeared under the title overelgity and International Law {see n.5 below].

525

Harts Keiserr

confers rights on a being that is not human but a lrlntl of superman or

superhtunan organism. There is no such superman or superhuman
organism in society, whose sole reality is the individual human being.

What is characterized as a society or a community is eid-rer the actual

coettistence of individual human beings or a normative system of their
reciprocal behaviour. Only human beings can have obligations imposed
and tights conferred on them to behave in a certain way: only the behav-

iour of human beings can be the content of legal obligations and rights.
lf intemational law imposes obligations and confers rights on the state to
behave in a certain way, this means that it imposes obligations and confers rights on human beings. in their capacity as organs of the state. to

behave in this way. That these human beings as organs of the state full
the obligations imposed and exercise the rights conferred by international law, and that their behaviour is seen as the behaviour of the
state and is attributed to [l'lE state, means that intemational law applies

to a personied legal system in which the human beings are specied

who are to full the obligations imposed and to ettercise the rights conferred by international law. This is the legal systemin the familiar legal
terminology that differentiates between the state and its lawthat is

characterized as the law of the state. This law is a relatively centralised

coercive system whose validity is limited to a certain territory. And this is
the legal system, qua state legal system, that is distinguished from the relativeiy decentralized system of intemational law, whose territorial

sphere of validity is unlimited. That international law imposes obligations and confers rights on the state to behave in a certain way means
that intemational law leaves it to the state legal system to specify the
human beings who are to behave in such a way as to full these obliga-

tions and to exercise these rights; in other words. international law delegates powers to the state legal system to make this determination. The
state qua system is what one calls one's own law, a particular legal sys-

rem; and the state qua personthat is, as a subject of intemational lawis the personication of this legal system. The notion of the state as
superman or superhuman organism is the hypostatiaation of this personication. Sovereignty as a legal concept can only be the property ofa

legal system, and the problem ofthe sovereignty of the state is. therefore.
the problem of the sovereignty of the state legal system in its relation to
the system of international law.

Two theories about this relation are diamenically opposed: the dualistic theoryor. if one takes into account the multiplicity of states or state
legal systems, the pluralistic theoryand the monistic theory. According
to the dualistic theory, international law and state law lthe individual

state legal systems} are different systems of norms. systems that. in their
validity, are independent of one another but at the same time equal.

S-orreret:'gnty

527

Thus, according to the dualistic theory, particular human behaviour can

be judged from the standpoint of international law and at the same time

from the standpoint of state law, and not simply from one standpoint or
the other. According to the monistic theory, international law and state
law form a unity: Either intemational law is above state law, so that the
basis of the validity of state law is to be found in irttemational law [primacy of international law), or, conversely, state law is above inter-

national law, so that the basis of the validity of intemational law lies in
state law (primacy of state law}.
If one recogni:-r.es that the imposition of obligations and the confetl'a.l

of rights on the state by international law simply means that international law delegates powers to the state legal systems to specify the
human beings whose behaviour rnalres up the content of these obligations and rights, then the dualistic construction of tlte relation between
intemational law and state law collapses. The dualistic construction

would not be warranted unless there were, between the norms of international law and the nonns of state law, conicts that could only be
described in contradictory statements by a legal science having legal systems of equal validity as its subject-matter. For then a unity of the two

sysremswhich is simply an epistemic unitywould be out of the question. lt can be shown, however, that it is possible for legal science to
describe the relation between intemational law and state law without
such contradictions, that, in other words, there are no conicts between

international law and state law that render a dualistic construction necessary. It can also be shown that, in the principle of eectiveness, positive intemational law has a nonn that detenrtines the basis and sphere of
the validity of the state legal system, so that there is no doubt about an

epistemic unity of international law and state law.

lll. MDNISTIC THEURIES AND SDVEHEIGNTY
For the solution to the problems of sovereignty, then, there is only the
monistic construction of the relation between international law and

state law. that is to say. either the primacy of intemational law or the primacy of state law. The difference berween these two monistic constructions reaches only to the basis of the validity of international law and of

state law, and not to the content of these legal systems. The content of
international law is just the same in both cases. And from a juridico1 |Fcr lt'.elsen's understanding cl the principle of effet-rivem,-ss tE_'el:ripiti|E|'], see e,g, LT
Btllclidl tat pp- 61-3]. tltgl [al pp- ]2llll; Hans lielsen, Principles offntemrrnlrirtnl Low,
lst edn. [New Torlc llinehart. l952lt at 212-25. 253-Bl. -ll2l5: End edn., ed. Robert W.
Tuclrer (ft-lew lforlt: Holt, ltineltart and Winston, 195?]. at 312-1?, -lltit-ll-:, Still-2-]

52ft

Hons Kelsen

theoretical standpoint. both constructions are equally possible. Their

opposition to each other is simply the opposition of two different frames
of reference.
if one's point of departure is state law as a normative system having

the validity of ought, then the question arises of how. from this point of
departure, the validity of intemational law can be established. This can
be done solely by means of the asstunption that intemational law is valid
for a state only if it is recognized by that state as valid for that state, and.

indeed, is recognised as valid in its actual form at the moment of recognition. Since this recognition can also be tacit, in that the state in question complies with and applies, in practice, the norms of intemational
law. it is this theory of recognition, then. that also tutderlies the view of

intemational law as valid for all states. Prevalent in Anglo-Aroerican law.

this view is given expression in modern constitutions containing provisions that require law-applying organs to observe general international
law as well as the particular international law created by the treaties of

the state in question. Thus. international law is understood as a component of the state legal system. as eirtemal state law. and the basis of the
validity of international law is shifted to the state legal system that serves
as the point of departure for constructing the relation between the two

systems. This construction represents the primacy of state law over

intemational law. and it is this primacy of state law tltat is characterized.
within the framework of a legal theory, as dte sovereignty of the state.
Sovereignty in this sense does not represent a perceptible or otherwise

objectively identiable quality of a real object. Rather, it represents the

presupposition of a nonnative system qua highest system, not derivable
in its validity from any higher system. The question of whether the state

is sovereign cannot he answered by enquiring into natural or social

reality. The state sovereignty that is of interest from the standpoint of

legal cognition is not a particular magnitude of real power. States that
have no power comparable at all to that of the great rtations are no less

sovereign than these. The question of whether a state is sovereign is the

question of whether the state legal system is to be presupposetl as the
highest legal system. And this is the case where international law is con-

sidered to be valid for the state only if it is recognised by the state and its
basis of validity is seen as the
of the state.
If, however, one's point of departure is international law as a valid nor-

mative system, then the question arises of how, from this point of departure, the validity of the state legal system can be established. The basis of
the validity of the state legal system must, in this case, be found in international law. and this is feasible, since the principle of effectiveness, a

norm of positive international law, determines the basis as well as the

sphere of the validity of the state legal system. This nonn of international

Sovereignty

529

law, representing the basis of the validity of the state legal system. is
expanded upon to the effect that, according to general irtternational law.
the government of a community existing widtin a certain clearly circumscribed territory, independent of other governments of sirrtilar commu-

nities artd exercising effective control over the members of its

community. is the legitimate government; and the community under
this goventment is a state in terms of intemational law even if the effective control exercised by the government is based on a constitution rst
established by the government through revolution. This nteans that a

norm of general international law empowers an individual or a group oi

individuals to establish and to apply, on the basis of an efcacious constitution, a normative coercive system, thereby legitimizing this coercive
system as the valid legal system for the territorial and temporal sphere of

its actual efcacy, and legitimixing the system's community as a state in

terms of international law. If the eicacy of the state legal system is seen
as a condition for the system's validity, and if this condition is set by a
nonn of international law, then the basis of the validity of the state legal

system can be seen in this norm of intemational law. And intemational

law. therefore. can be interpreted as a universal legal system above the
state legal systems, encompassing them all as legal systems qua subsystems, and making possible their coexistence in space and succession in

time.
This construction of the relation between international law and state
law rules out the notion of state sovereignty in the original and proper
sense of the expression. Wltat is sovereign qua highest system is inter-

national law. not the state legal system. If one spealts of sovereign states
in the context of this construction, the concept taltes on a meaning that
is altogether different from the original and proper sense. Here, it
expresses simply the notion that the state legal system is subject to inter-

national law alone and to no other state legal system, and that thereforein the personifying terminology of the law-the state is legally
independent of other states. The so-called sovereignty of the state,

then, is nothing other than its immediate relation to internation al law. if

one's point of departure is the primacy of international law, then the
misleading expression state sovereignty ought to be replaced by the

expression of the state's immediate relation to international law. Cine

may not speak of a relative sovereignty ofthe states, for this expression
amounts to a corrrrrrrzlicrio in rrrljecto.
Only by assuming the primacy of the state legal system can one

speak of the sovereignty of the state in the original and proper sense of
the expression. lt seems more than questionable, however, that the
authors who prefer this construction of the relation between international law and state law are willing to accept the consequences of their

53!]

Harts liaison

construction. For, according to this construction, only the sovereignty of

a single state can be presupposed, which in tum precludes the sover-

eighty of all other states. but it is the sovereignty of all the statessocalled sovereign equality qua equal soveremty of all states, the notion
dtat, irt terms of their sovereignty, all states are equaltl1at is to be res-

cued by means of the constnrcrion representing the primacy of state law.

The point of departure for this construction can indeed be any state
whatever. but always just one single state. The relation of this state to the
other states is established by international law, which is a component of
the state legal system that serves as the poirtt of departure for the con-

struction. According to prevailing intemational law, a state considers

another community to be a state. and tlte system constituting this community to be a valid legal system, only if the rst state recognizes this
community as a state in terms of intemational law, that is to say, only if.

in the view of the authorized organs of the recognizing state, this commurtity fulls the conditions prescribed by intemational law.
Ifintemational law is a component of the legal system of the recognizing state, then for this state the basis of the legal existence of the other

statesthat is, the basis of the validity of the other legal systemslies in
the recognizing state's own legal system, or, guratively speaking, in its
own will. Thus, all other state legal systems must be seen as subordinate
to the recognizing state's legal system with its component, intentational

law; they cannot be presupposed as sovereign. as a component of the

state legal system that is the basis for recognizing the other states. international law, too, has its basis of validity in this state legal system. in the
will of the recognizing state. Thus, this state aloneand so, only the

state legal system that serves as the point of departure for the constnrction representing the primacy of state lawcan be regarded as sovereign, as the highest legal system, for above it dtere is no higher legal

system presupposed as valid.

Ifinternational law exists only as a component of a state legal system,
however, then a distinction must be made between the state legal system
in a narrower artd a broader sense. The state legal system in the narrower

sense comprises norms of the constitution and norms set in accordance

with the constitution by means of acts of custom, legislation, adjudication, and administration. The state legal system in the broader sense

includes, in addition, the state legal system in so far as it encompasses

international law [recognized on the basis of the state legal system in tlte
narrower sense], that is, in addition, nortns that are created by means of

the customs and treaties of the states. Talring into account the content of
intemational law, the relation of the two components that make up the
state legal system in the broader sense must be interpreted as a relation
of su perordination and subordination. This relation is figuratively

Sovereignty

531

expressed when one says tltat the state that recognizes intemational law

as valid for itselfis thereby subjecting itselfto intemational law. The state
legal system in the narrower sense, in its relation to international law {the
other component of the state legal system in the broader sense}, is just as

subordinate as the legal systems of the other states and therefore no

more sovereign than they, but simply enjoys a relation that is just as
immediate as theirs to international law. This state legal system in the
narrower sense, having recognized intemational law, has its basis of

validity in inter-national law just as all the other state legal systems do.
international law is not, however. the ultimate basis of validity for the
state legal system that renders international law valid as its component
and that serves as the point of departure for the construction represent-

ing the primacy of state law. For international law itself has its basis of
validity in the so-called will of this state, that is. in the state legal system
in the broader sense. The relation, between international law and state
law. that is characterized as the primacy of the state legal system exists
only between the state legal system in the broader sense and inter-

national law as its component. This legal system alone. not the state legal
system in the narrower sense, is sovereign. And sovereignty here means
simply that although international law is indeed assumed to be above the
state legal system in the narrower sense, it is not assumed to be above the

state legal system in the broader sense, whose component it is. Since
what must be meant when one spealts of a sovereignty of the states is
ordy {or at any rate primarily} the state legal system in the narrower sense

or the community constituted by it, sovereignty can only denote an

immediate relation to international law. Dnly the state legal system in
the broader sense, however, which renders intemational law, as its component, valid, could be characterized as sovereign in the sole admissi-

ble meaning of the word- Thus. if this construction of the relation

between intemational law and state law is chosen. it is well to speak of
the primacy of state law rather than to use the misleading expression

state sovereignty.
The choice of one or the other of the two constructions of the relation
between international law and state law, and, therefore, the presupposition or non-presupposition of the sovereignty of the state, has no inu-

ence on the content of international law.Tl1e content of state law. too,

remains untouched by the construction of the relation and, therefore, by
whether or not the state is presupposed as sovereign. lt is a misuse, then,

of either construction. or [what amounts to the same thing] a misuse of

the concept of sovereignty. when decisions that can only be taken on the
basis of the content of positive international or state law are drawn from
the concept of sovereigntywhich happens again and again. lhus, sup-

porters of the primacy of international law claim that since the state is

532

Hons ltieiretr

subject to intemational law and since international law is the higher legal

system in relation to state law, it follows that in case ofa conict between
international law and state law, intemational law has priority and so the
conflicting [nornr of] state law is null and void. A norm of state law can
only be invalldatable however, not null and void. Moreover, it can only

be invalidated, owing to its so-called contrarlety to international law, if

international law or state law provides for a procedure leading to its

invalidation. General international law, however, does not provide for
such a procedure, and the assumption that it is above the state cannot

make up for the absence of such a procedure." Positive international law

merely attaches a sanction to the issuance of the questionable nonn of
state law, a sanction directed against the state whose law includes this
norm. Thus, the norm of state law remains validindeed, valid from the

standpoint of not only state law, but also international law; the state
does, however, subject itself to a sanction imposed by international law.
This circumstance cart be described without any logical contradiction.
for the law prescribes particular behaviour only in that it imposes an

obligatory sanction in the event of the opposite behaviour. 'lwo norms,

one of which attaches a sanction to particular behaviour, and the other.
a sanction to the opposite behaviour, can botlt be valid and applied. This
remains true if one norm is a norm of intemational law, attaching to par-

ticular behaviour the specic sanction of international law tnarnely, war

or retaliation]. artd the other is a norm of state law, attaching to the opposite behaviour the specic sanction of state law {punishment or a seizure
of pro perry]. From the stand point of legal policy, such a situation is

undesirable, suggesting that a means be irtstitutio nalised either in international law or in state law for invalidating the state law norm that is
contrary to international law. Unless this is the case, both the norm of
state law and the norm of intemational law are valid. There is a teleolog-

ical conict here, but not a logical contradiction, neither between international law and state law, nor between the statements that describe
them. Neither the nullity nor the invalidatability of the nornt that is con-

trary to internatio nal law is necessary in order to maintain the epistemic

unity of state law and intemational law in terms of the primacy of international law.

From the fact that international law is above the states, the conclusion
is also drawn that the sovereignty of the state is fundamentally limited.
making possible an efcacious organization of world law. in the political
ideology of pacism, the primacy of international law, excluding state

sovereignty, plays a decisive role. The state sovereignty excluded by the

primacy of international law, however, is altogether different from the
1 in 'invalidatable' [t'errric.lrt.l:trrr], see LT 3| [h] lat p. T3 n.5E].|
3 [Reading procedure for the German iir'ortn'-|

Sovereignty

533

state sovereignty limited by intemational law. The fonner means the

highest legal authority, the latter means the state's freedom of action or
the state legal system's unlimited authority. The authority of the state

legal system is equally limited by international law understood either as

a legal system above the states or as a component of a state legal system.
n efcacious organization ofworld law is possible given the assumption
of either construction of the relation between international law and state
law.
Even more apt to be misused than the primacy of international law is
the primacy of state legal systems. a primacy based on the assumption of
the sovereignty ofthe state. To assume that international law is valid only

on the strength of its recognition by the state and therefore only as a

component of the state legal system is to assume that the state is soverelgtt. The conclusion drawn from this assumption is that the state is not
necessarily bound by the international treaties it has entered into, that its

nature is incompatible with its subjecting itselfeven in a treaty entered

into by the stateto an international court with obligatory jurisdiction
or with its being bound by the majority decision of a collegial organ, even
if this organ and its procedure have been created pursuant to a treaty
entered into by the state. lust as the primacy of international law plays a

decisive role in the ideology of pacism, so the primacy of state lawthe

sovereignty of the stateplays a decisive role in the ideology of imperialism. Here as there, what is lrey is the ambiguity of the concept of sover-

eigmy. If, however, international law has been recognized by the state
and is therefore valid for this state, then it is valid just as if it were valid as
a legal system above the states. Then the norm of international law to the
effect that states are bo und by ll'lE'.' treaties they enter into is valid, regard-

less of the content given to the norms created by treaty. according to

international law, no content of a norm created by treaty can be excluded
on the ground that it is incompatible with the nature of a state entering

into the treaty, in particular incompatible with the sovereignty of this

state. The fact that no intemational law above the state limits the sovereignty of the state is altogether compatible with the fact that a state. on

the strength of its sovereignty. recognizes international law and thereby

turns intemational law into a component of the state legal system, that it
linrits its own sovereigntyand so its own freedom of action or its own
autltorityby assuming the obligations imposed by general inter-

national law and the treaties entered into by the state. The answer to the
question of how far this sovereignty of the state is limitable by the international law recognized by the state can only be given on the basis of the

content of international law, not derived from the concept of sovereignty. Positive intemational law, however, sets no bounds on limiting
state sovereignty, that is, the freedom of action or the audtority of the

534

Hons Kelsen

state. Arr intemational treaty can create an intemational orga nization so

centralised that it has itself the character of a state, with the result that
the states entering into the treaty and incorporated into the organization
lose their character as states. How far a state government nray or ought

to limit by international treaty the freedom of action of the state is admittedly a question of politics. The answer cannot be drawn from either the
primacy ofintemational law or the prirnacy of state law.
The opposition of the two monistic constructions of the relation

between inrernatio nal law and state lawthat is, the two ways leading to
the epistemic unity of all valid lawis strikingly parallel to the opposition that exists between a subjectivistic and an objectivistic Weirnrrschnrrrrng. The subjectivistic view, in order to comprehend the exter-

nal world, takes as its point of departure on es own sovereign l, and can
therefore comprehend this world only as an intemal world, as the conception and will of the l', and not as an external world at all. So likewise,
the construction characterized as the primacy of the state legal system.

in order to comprehend the external world of the law, namely, international law and the other state legal systems, taltes as its point of departure one's own sovereign state, and can therefore understand this

exterttal law only as internal law, as a component of one's own state legal
system. A consequence of the primacy of one's own state legal system is
that only one's own state can be comprehended as sovereigrt, for the sovereigrtty of that state excludes the sovereignty of all other states. in this

sense. the primacy of one's own state legal system can be characterized
as state subjectlvism. indeed. as state solipsism. By contrast. the construction characterized as the primacy of the system of intemational law,
in order to comprehend the legal existence of the individual states. takes

as its point of departure the extemal world of the lawintemational

lawqua valid legal system, but can, therefore, confer validity on these
states only as legal systems qua subsystems incorporated into inter-

national law. and not as sovereign authorities. Scientic cognition of the

world is completely untouched by the opposition between subjectivism
and objectivism, and the world qua object of this cognition, as well as the

natural laws that describe the world. remain the same, whether this
world is thought of as the internal world of the I or the l is thought of
as within the world. So likewise, the opposition between the two legal
constnrctions has no inuence on the content of either international law

or state law, and the legal propositions that describe the content of the
law remain the sarrte, whether one thinlrs of intemational law as contained in state law or of state law as contained in international law.

The opposition between the two legal constructions can also be compared with the opposition that exists between the geocentric cosmic system of Ptolemy and the heliocentric cosmic system of Copernicus. lust

Sovereignty

sss

as, according to the rst of the legal constructions, one's own state is at

the center ofthe legal world, so likewise, in the Ptolernaic conception. the
eardt is at the center of the universe. with the sun revolving arormd the
earth- Find just as, according to the other legal construction, international law is at the center of the legal world, so likewise, in the
Copernican conception, the sun is at the center of the universe, with the

earth revolving around the sun. But this opposition of two astronomical
conceptions is simply art opposition of two different frames ofreference.
As Max Planck remarks:
lf, for example, one accepts a frame of reference that is rmly tied tn our earth,
then one must say that the sun moves in the heavens: but if one shifts the frame

of reference to a xed star, then the sun is at rest. In the opposition of these two
formulations, tltere is neither a conuadiction nor a lack of clarity: there is simply
the opposition of two different points of view. According to l'.l'lE' theory of relativity. which can surely be counted among the established assets of physics at
present, both frames of reference and the corresponding points of view are
equally correct and equally warranted; it is fundamentally impossible, without
being arbitrary, to choose between them on the basis of some kind of measurement or calculation.

The same is tnre of the two legal constructions of the relation b-etween
intemational law and state 1aw.'I'heir opposition is based on the distinc-

tion between two different frames of reference. Cine frame of reference is

rmly tied to one's own state legal system, the other to the system of
intemational law. Both frames of reference are equally correct and

equally warranted. it is impossible to choose between them on the basis

of legal science. Legal science can only present them both, and establish
that one or the other must be assumed if the relation between international law and state law is to be deterrrrined. The decision itself lies
outside legal science. It can only be taken on the basis of nonscientic

consideratio ns. in particular political considerations. He who values die

idea of the sovereignty of his own state because, in his heightened selfcondence, he identies with his state will prefer the primacy of the state

legal system over the primacy of the system of intematic nal law. He who
nds the idea of an organization of world law more congenial will prefer
the primacy of intematic nal law over the primacy of state law. This does

not mean that the ideal ofthe organization of world law would be served
less well by the theory of the primacy of the state legal system titan by the
theory of the primacy of Ll'lE' system of international law, The form er does
* lvlatt Planck, "liom Wesen der Willertsfrellreit' la lecture held under the auspices of the
tlerrnarr Philosophical Society on 2? November 1935]. in Planck, Vonrrige und
i:'rirrnerr.rngen (Stuttgart: 5- Hilxel. I915], 3tllli. at 3-l l. litortrrfige and Err'rrrr.err.rrr,gerr is the
5th edition of Planclt's papers, prepared with the advice of Planck's widow, lvlarga von
Hoeillin Planck, and published posthumously: earlier editions had appeared under the
title Wage arrr physilzslisciren Erlrenrrrrrr's.|

535

Harts K'el'.rert

seem to justify. however. a politics that rejects any far-reaching limitation on the state's freedom of action. Such a justication is based on a
fallacy. involving in a disastrous way the ambiguity of the concept of soy-

ereigntymeaning the highest legal authority and unlimited freedom of

action. This fallacy. however. ls a permanent part of the political ideology
of imperialism. witlt its operative dogma of state sovereignty. The same
is true. mntartr mutnndis. of the preference for the primacy oft.he system

of international law. it is no less propitious than the primacy of the individual state legal system for the ideal of the least possible limitation on
sovereignty in tenns of the state's freedom of action. it does seem to justify. however, a far- reaching limitation on the state's freedom of action

more readily than the primacy of the state legal system does. This. too, is
a fallacy. hut it plays a decisive role nevertheless within the political
ideology of pacism.
in eitposing these fallacies and stripping them of all pretence of logical

demonstration, which would he irrefutable, anti in reducing them to

political arguments that can he met with political counterarguments.
legal science opens tlte way to one political development or the other
without postulating or justifying either. Legal science qua science

regards them both with complete irtdiiference.*

5 lnt theconclusion of itieltt-en's essay. vdtich first appeared in a referenoe wort: on international law. various titles are listed that the reader might consult on monlsrn in international law and on sot-'ere'ignty.] Charles Edward lvlerriam. History of the Tlteotjv of
5ouet'et'grtty sfrtice Rousseau {New fork: Columbia UP. 1901]}; Wilttor Sultiertniclti. La
Souttemirt-etedmetrraren droitintenmtional rrtoderrte[Pa1'is:t't. Pedone. lil2t'i;Lttigi ltaggi. La
teortin delta sotrrartirrl ttlenoa: A. Donath. ltlitltli; Hugo itrahbe. Die Lela-e der
Hechusoutrertfnftift {i'lrtItt'tt':ngcitt: I.B. in-otters. lfllll [Die mucferne Stunts-fdee [The Hague:

l-'ia_rtlnt.tsl'~Ii_ihoff. 19l!'-.l] is. accorrllng toits preface. aclosely related worlt: its Ertglishtranslat1'on. byeorge H. Sabine an-d Walterl. Shepard. appeared under the title Tltetlfodem Idea of
the State {New Iorlc Appleton. l'll22ll: Leonard Nelson. Die Recltntarirsenscim oltne Reclrt
tl_.cipaig:"v'eit. I917] Irepr. ltt Nelson. tesommeite Scltrf|Il:en in rteun Bdn.d'en.ed. Paul Bcmays
el ttl. iHamht.trg: Frita Hefner. l3?D2]. vol. II [I972]. l2332-ll: Alfred ltlerdross. .l'Jt'e Efnheft

der rechtltichen Welthlldes rtufrtrrtdlogeder itlilltetvechtruerfossung tTi'ibingen: |.C.B. Mohr.

I923]: Harold]. Lttslci. Sntdier in rite Problem of Sovereignty lhlew Haven: Yale UP. l9l?i:
Kelsen. P5; Iohannes lvlattern. Concepts of Store. Sooeret'grtty and lnterrtorlonol Lrtw
[Baltimure: lohns Hopkins Press. 1928]; Dietrich W. Gunst. Der Begtffder ti-outs-.-rttn:'rrir fm
trtodemert lftilltierreclrr. Elms udsremwlmjllichenalyse ierlin: ll. Uppermann. 195;-ii: Ernst
Friedrich Sauer. Souvernit-t and Soliriotit-t. Ein Beitrog attr ttli-i'.l:etTeclttliclten Wertlehrr
ilittittgen: lvlusterschmidt Wissenschaftlicher Verlag. i954}: Maurice Bourquin. LEtnt er
lot-grmtmtlon tnrerrtrtrionoie [l"-lew York: lvlanhattan Publ. Co.. 1958}; Iiclsen. F"l"l'.;I~lt-rl:t-e1:-t
iitriiger. Tlouveriinitit und 5taater|gemeirtschaft'. in Bum Problem der Souuertf-'tt't-tilt.
Berichtedereulschen tlesellschaft .ir|-"t'sll:et'recht ii-iarlsruhe: fl.F. Miiller. l95'l']. vol. I. PP.
l-Ell: Georg Erier. 'Staatssooverll.nitiit und internationals 'Wirtschaflsverflechtung'. ibid29-ll; Hans iieisen. Die Einlteit von ttillterrecht und staatlichem flecht'. Zeltsehrijifr
ett-ddndtrrh onrllches Rerhr and lttitkenecht. Ill ilEt5-Bi. 234-I8 Irepr. W5 ll 22l3-29];
iielsen. iiovereigttty and international Law. tieorgetowrt Lawfoumal. -iii tl9'59Bil]. B2?--iii
[art earlier Ertglish-lattguage version of the essay translated here]; Gerhard Leittholz.
Sovereignty and European Integration. in Srtlertees humairtes er integration europeenne.
preface hy Robert Schttman tLeldtt-n:A.W. Sljtltofi. 15511]. I56-I-ti.

Normativity and Norms

Critical Perspectives on

Kelsenian Themes
Edited by
STANLEY L. PAULSON
BONNIE LITSCHEWSKI PAULSON
Translations by
BONNIE LITSCHEWSKI PAULSON
STANLEY L. PAULSON
MICHAEL SHEHBEHG
With an introduction by
STAN LEY L. PAULSON

CLARENDON PRESS - OXFORD

1998