In the case of Director of Lands vs.

Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by "private rights" means

that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that the property in question
was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means for the
acquisition of public lands xxx" (underscoring supplied).
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
11
The Spaniards first introduced
the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias
12
which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."
13
Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and
possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
14
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
27
the Court had
occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the
parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural Resources had
assessed to be a watershed area is exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law ("CARL" for brevity).
28
The Court defined
watershed as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary
or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds." However, the Court also
recognized that:
"The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most
important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human
necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for
future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also
cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an "intergenerational" responsibility that
needs to be answered now

Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the
Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because
of the failure to complete the required period of possession, whether under the original
Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA
1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired
ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the
State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only
been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of
land in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of
imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance
of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became
non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application
on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years
prior to the filing of petitioners application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be
counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of
occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as
amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land.
Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the
possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private
ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals,
32
the Court
declared that inalienable public lands -
"x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and
extinctive, does not run against the State.

In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141,
as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive
as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law requires
at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
possession of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The
rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains
to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by
virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession."
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,
44
which involved the registration of public lands,
specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel
to silence the Republics claim over public lands. The Court said:
"It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when
the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel
or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata is to
be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality."
The Court further held that "the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the
public properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private
acquisition does not prescribe."