SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131457. November 17, 1998.]

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL, GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,
HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON.
RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO
D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
respondents.

O P I N I O N

MARTINEZ, J p:
This pertains to the two (2) separate motions for reconsideration filed by
herein respondents and the applicants for intervention, seeking a reversal of our April 24,
1998 Decision nullifying the so-called "win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997,
issued by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, and denying the
applicants' Motion For Leave To Intervene.
Respondents' motion is based on the following grounds:
"I.
THE SO-CALLED WIN-WIN RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1997 IS
NOT A VOID RESOLUTION AS IT SEEKS TO CORRECT AN ERRONEOUS
RULING. THE MARCH 29, 1996 DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT COULD NOT AS YET BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS
TO BE BEYOND MODIFICATION.
"II.
THE PROPER REMEDY OF PETITIONERS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW
UNDER RULE 43 AND NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE
65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
"III.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A CONDITION
SINE QUA NON BEFORE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI MAY BE FILED
BECAUSE THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION IS NOT PATENTLY ILLEGAL.
"IV.
PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING BECAUSE
ULTIMATELY PETITIONERS SEEK THE SAME RELIEF, WHICH IS TO
RESTRAIN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM FROM PLACING
THE SUBJECT 144-HECTARE PROPERTY UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW (CARL)."
1

For their part, the grounds relied upon by the applicants for intervention are as
follows:
"I.
THE INTERVENORS POSSESS A RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THESE
PROCEEDINGS.
"II.
THE MODIFICATION BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (OP) OF ITS 29
MARCH 1996 DECISION, THROUGH THE 7 NOVEMBER 1997 'WIN-WIN'
RESOLUTION, WAS NOT ERRONEOUS BUT WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF
ITS POWERS AND PREROGATIVES.
"III.
THE 'WIN-WIN' RESOLUTION PROPERLY ADDRESSES THE
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES RELATIVE TO THIS CASE."
2

Both movants also ask that their respective motions be resolved by this Court
en banc since the issues they raise are, as described by the respondents, "novel,"
3
or, as
characterized by the applicants for intervention, of "transcendental significance."
4
Most
specifically, movants are presenting the issue of whether or not the power of the local
government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The instant motions are being opposed vehemently by herein petitioners.
The grounds raised here were extensively covered and resolved in our
challenged Decision. A minute resolution denying the instant motions with finality would
have been sufficient, considering that the same follows as a matter of course if warranted
under the circumstances as in other equally important cases. However, in view of the
wide publicity and media coverage that this case has generated, in addition to the
demonstrations staged at the perimeter of this Court, as well as the many letters coming
from different sectors of society (the religious and the NGOs) and even letters from
abroad, we deem it necessary to write an extended resolution to again reiterate the basis
for our April 24, 1998 Decision, and hopefully write finis to this controversy.
To support their request that their motions be referred to the Court en banc,
the movant cited the Resolution of this Court dated February 9, 1993, in Bar Matter No.
209, which enumerates the cases that may be resolved, en banc, among which are the
following:
"xxx xxx xxx
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
xxx xxx xxx
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3)
members thereof merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable
to a majority of the actual membership of the Court en banc; and
xxx xxx xxx"
Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no
extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. Specifically, the issue of
whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the
approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided by this Court in the
case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals
5
wherein we held that
local government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The dispositive portion of the Decision in
the aforecited case states:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private
respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a
unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division of this Court. Stated
otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by movants are
nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the
participation of the full Court in the resolution of movants' motions for reconsideration
would be inappropriate.
We shall now resolve the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
In our Decision in question, we struck down as void the act of the Office of
the President (OP) in reopening the case in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424 through the
issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution which substantially modified its
March 29, 1996 Decision that had long become final and executory, being in gross
disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations. It will be recalled that the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by
the same office as final and executory in its Order dated June 23, 1997 after the
respondent DAR's motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied in the same
order for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
In their instant motion, the respondents contend that the "win-win" Resolution
of November 7, 1997 "is not a void resolution as it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling,"
hence, "(t)he March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President could not as yet
become final and executory as to be beyond modification."
6

The respondents explained that the DAR's failure to file on time the motion for
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was "excusable:"
"The manner of service of the copy of the March 29, 1996 decision also made
it impossible for DAR to file its motion for reconsideration on time. The copy
was received by the Records Section of the DAR, then referred to the Office
of the Secretary and then to the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance. By the
time it was forwarded to the litigation office of the DAR, the period to file the
motion for reconsideration had already lapsed. Instead of resolving the motion
for reconsideration on the merits in the interest of substantial justice, the
Office of the President denied the same for having been filed late."
7
(Emphasis
supplied)
We cannot agree with the respondents' contention that the June 23, 1997 OP
Order which denied the DAR's motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision for having been filed late was "an erroneous ruling" which had to be corrected
by the November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution. The said denial of the DAR's motion for
reconsideration was in accordance with Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated
February 12, 1987, which mandates that "decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof . . ., unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period."
8

Contrary to the respondents' submission, the late filing by the DAR of its
motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is not excusable. The
respondents' explanation that the DAR's office procedure after receiving the copy of the
March 29, 1996 OP Decision "made it impossible for DAR to file its motion for
reconsideration on time" since the said decision had to be referred to the different
departments of the DAR, cannot be considered a valid justification. There is nothing
wrong with referring the decision to the departments concerned for the preparation of the
motion for reconsideration, but in doing so, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary
period fixed by law, rule or regulation. In other words, the DAR must develop a system
of procedure that would enable it to comply with the reglementary period for filing the
said motion. For, the rules relating to reglementary period should not be made
subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body. Otherwise, the
noble purpose of the rules prescribing a definite period for filing a motion for
reconsideration of a decision can easily be circumvented by the mere expediency of
claiming a long and arduous process of preparing the said motion involving several
departments of the administrative agency.
The respondents then faulted the Office of the President when they further
stressed that it should have resolved "the (DAR's) motion for reconsideration on the
merits in the interest of substantial justice," instead of simply denying the same for
having been filed late,
9
adding that "technicalities and procedural lapses" should be
"subordinated to the established merits of the case."
10
Respondents thus plead for a
relaxation in the application of the rules by overlooking procedural lapses committed by
the DAR.
We are not persuaded.
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and
due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution
which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies."
11
The adjudicatory
bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.
12
While it
is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.
13
There have been some instances wherein this Court
allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity."
14
A
liberal interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
In the instant case, we cannot grant respondents the relief prayed for since they
have not shown a justifiable reason for a relaxation of the rules. As we have discussed
earlier, the DAR's late filing of its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision was not justified. Hence, the final and executory character of the said OP
Decision can no longer be disturbed, much less substantially modified. Res judicata has
set in and the adjudicated thing or affair should forever be put to rest. It is in this sense
that we, in our decision under reconsideration, declared as void and of no binding effect
the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997 which substantially modified the March
29, 1996 Decision, the said resolution having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and in
arrant violation of the fundamental and time-honored principle of finality to
administrative determinations.
The movants, however, complain that the case was decided by us on the basis
of a "technicality," and, this has been the rallying cry of some newspaper columnists who
insists that we resolve this case not on mere "technical" grounds.
We do not think so.
It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative
body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is by no means a
mere technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary that jurisdiction of a body, court
or tribunal is an essential and mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or
controversy. And even if said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has
acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act is still
invalid. The decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the merits.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of the law were committed, namely:
(1) the DAR filed its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision way
beyond the reglementary period; (2) after the said motion for reconsideration was denied
for having been filed late, the March 29, 1996 Decision was declared final and executory,
but the DAR still filed a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited by the
rules;
15
(3) despite this, the second motion for reconsideration was entertained by herein
respondent, then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, and on the basis thereof,
issued the "win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, substantially modifying the
March 29, 1996 Decision which had long become final and executory; and (4) the
reopening of the same case through the issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-win"
Resolution was in flagrant infringement of the doctrine of res judicata. These grave
breaches of the law, rules and settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of
technical nature.
It should be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared
final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the herein petitioners, namely, the
province of Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR
Management and Development Corporation, and all others who should be benefited by
the said decision. Thus, we repeat, the issue here is not a question of technicality but that
of substance and merit. In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in the
case of Videogram Regulatory Board vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
16
(j)ust as a losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case."
Another matter which the movants bring to our attention is that when the
DAR's Order denying petitioners', application for conversion was first brought by
petitioner Carlos O. Fortich to the Office of the President, the appropriate administrative
rules were not complied with. We wish to point out that, apparently, movants had the
opportunity to question this alleged lapse in procedure but chose not to avail of the same.
For the "win-win" Resolution itself never mentioned this supposed procedural lapse as an
issue. Here, the issue which has been brought to the fore is the validity of the "win-win"
Resolution of November 7, 1997, not that of any other previous proceedings. The movants
cannot now question the supposed procedural lapse for the first time before us. It should
have been raised and resolved at the first opportunity, that is, at the administrative level.
The other grounds raised by respondents in their instant motion for
reconsideration concerning the propriety of petitioners' remedy, the absence of a motion
for reconsideration of the "win-win" Resolution before resorting to the present petition
for certiorari, and forum shopping have already been extensively dealt with in our
challenged decision. We need not further elaborate on these grounds except to state that
the same lacks merit.
With respect to the motion for reconsideration filed by the applications for
intervention, we likewise find the same unmeritorious. The issue of the applicants' right
to intervene in this proceedings should be laid to rest. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a
party who wishes to intervene must have a "certain right" or "legal interest" in the subject
matter of the litigation.
17
Such interest must be "actual, substantial, material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."
18

Here, the applicants for intervention categorically admitted that they were not
tenants of petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation, but were merely
seasonal, farmworkers in a pineapple plantation on the subject land which was under
lease for ten (10) years to the Philippine Packing Corporation.
19
Respondent, the DAR
Secretary Ernesto Garilao, also admitted in his Order of June 7, 1995 that "the subject
land is neither tenanted nor validly covered for compulsory acquisition . . . "
20

Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the right to own
directly or collectively the land they till belongs to the farmers and regular farmworkers
who are landless, and in the case of other farmworkers, the latter are entitled "to receive a
just share of the fruits" of the land. The pertinent portion of the aforecited constitutional
provision mandates:
"Sec. 4. The State shall by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied)
Commenting on the above-quoted provision, the eminent constitutionalist, Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, declares that under
the agrarian reform program the equitable distribution of the land is a right given to
landless farmers and regular farmworkers to own the land they till, while the other or
seasonal farmworkers are only entitled to a just share of the fruits of the land.
21
Being
merely seasonal farmworkers without a right to own, the applicants' motion for
intervention must necessarily fail as they have no legal or actual and substantial interest
over the subject land.
It is noteworthy the even the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997
which the herein respondents and the applicants for intervention seek to uphold, did not
recognize the latter as proper parties to intervene in the case simply because the qualified
farmer-beneficiaries have yet to be meticulously determined as ordered in the said
resolution. The dispositive portion of the "win-win" Resolution reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the
President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996,
is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"(3) The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified beneficiaries.
xxx xxx xxx
"We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on
October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is
unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.
"SO ORDERED."
22
(Emphasis supplied)
These are all that are necessary to dispose of the instant separate motions for
reconsideration considering that the crucial issue in the present petition for certiorari is
simply the validity of the "win-win" resolution.
But even if we tackle the other issues which the movants describe as
"substantial," namely: (1) whether the subject land is considered a prime agricultural land
with irrigation facility; (2) whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of
Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (3) whether the land is tenanted, and if not, whether the
applicants for intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries thereof; and (4) whether
the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into
industrial/institutional use, to our mind, the March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly
and properly disposed of the aforementioned issues. We quote the pertinent portions of
the said Decision:
"After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon which the
denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant
application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is
impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from
agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment
and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic
growth of the municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be
beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not
guarantee such benefits.
"Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural
land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by
petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area,
the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water
to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of
the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted
with pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.
"On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas
covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was
declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC,
the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the
subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until
after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-
National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office
and the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to desist from
pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioner's land.
"On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family
has already contributed substantially to the land reform program of the
government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija In the 70's
and another 100 hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong,
Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received 'just
compensation' up to this time.
"Neither can the assertion that 'there is no clear and tangible compensation
package arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water as, in the first place,
there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as
already stated.
"Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the
subject property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very
purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the
management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other
interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units
autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition
to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
"WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate
and in view of the favorable recommendations of the various government
agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of
the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE
and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED."
23

(Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies which have
acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court,
24
considering
that the Office of the President is presumed to be most competent in matters falling
within its domain.
The interest of justice is invoked by movants. We are aware of that famous
adage of the late President Ramon Magsaysay that "those who have less in life should
have more in law." Our affirmation of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is
precisely pro-poor considering that more of the impoverished members of society will be
benefited by the agro-economic development of the disputed land which the province of
Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake. To our mind,
the OP Decision of March 29, 1996 was for the eventual benefit of the many, not just of
the few. This is clearly shown from the development plan on the subject land as
conceived by the petitioners. The said plan is supposed to have the following components
as indicated in the OP Decision of March 29, 1996:
"1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the
following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education; Institute for
Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for
Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and
Mindanao Sports Development Complex which covers an area of 24
hectares;
"2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing
for corn oil, corn starch, various corn products; rice processing for wine,
rice-based snacks, exportable: rice; cassava processing for starch,
alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products
such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared
for market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial
stores; public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for
recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover
33 hectares; and
"4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room
hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project covering an area of
20 hectares."
25

Expressing full support for the proposed project, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-
classifying the subject 144-hectare land from agricultural to industrial/institutional use
with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic
vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people. The said project was also
supported by the Bukidnon Provincial Board which, on the basis of a Joint Committee
Report submitted by its Committee on Law, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-
Economic Committee, approved the said ordinance on February 1, 1994, now docketed
as Resolution No. 94-95.
Impressed with the proposed project, several government agencies and a
private cooperative, including the people of the affected barangay, recommended the
same. Again, we quote the pertinent portion of the OP Decision of March 29, 1996:
"The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995,
adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office,
as one of its flagship projects. The same was likewise favorably
recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the
municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office
(Region X) of the DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance
Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director, signing 'By Authority of
PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ,' Office of the President Mindanao; the Secretary of
DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.
"In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation
Office, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief,
Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed
conversion . . . Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose
Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the
proposed conversion of the land in question 'as it will provide more economic
benefits to the community in terms of outside investments that will come and
employment opportunities that will be generated by the projects to be put up .
. ..'
"On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held
at the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose
Macalindong of DAR Central Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the
people of the affected barangay rallied behind their respective officials in
endorsing the project."
26
(Emphasis supplied)
In this regard, the petitioners gave this assurance: "The proposed project is
petitioners' way of helping insure food, shelter and lifetime security of the greater
majority of Sumilao's 22,000 people. It is capable of employing thousands of residents,
enabling them to earn good income ranging about P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each."
27

We express our grave concern with the manner some sectors of society have
been trying to influence this Court into resolving this case on the basis of considerations
other than the applicable law, rules and settled jurisprudence and the evidence on record.
We wish to emphasize that notwithstanding the previous adverse comments by some
columnists in the print media, the assailed Decision was arrived at in the pursuit of justice
and the rule of law.
Finally, for those who refuse to understand, no explanation is possible, but for
those who understand, no explanation is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998
Decision of this Court, filed by the respondents and the applicants for intervention, are
hereby DENIED with FINALITY .
SO ORDERED.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J ., dissenting:
The salient facts are well established. The instant controversy originated from
an application for land use conversion filed on December 11, 1993 before the DAR by
Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development
Association (BAIDA) and petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation
concerning its 144-hectare land in San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon. In an Order
1
dated
November 14, 1994, DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao denied the application for
conversion of the land from agricultural to agro-industrial use and ordered its distribution
to qualified landless farmers. BAIDA and NQSR Management and Development
Corporation filed a motion for reconsideration
2
dated January 9, 1995, which was,
however, denied in an Order
3
dated June 7, 1995. Thereafter, Bukidnon Governor Carlos
O. Fortich sent a letter
4
to President Fidel V. Ramos requesting him to suspend the
Garilao Order and to confirm the ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao converting the subject land from agricultural to industrial/institutional land.
Acting on the letter, then Executive Secretary Torres reversed the Garilao Order and
upheld the power of local government units to convert portions of their agricultural lands
into industrial areas.
5
Respondent DAR Secretary Garilao filed a motion for
reconsideration, admittedly tardy, which was denied by then Executive Secretary Torres
on the ground that his March 29, 1996 decision had already become final and executory
in view of the lapse of the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration. A
second motion for reconsideration was filed during the pendency of which President
Ramos constituted the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force. On November 7, 1997,
Deputy Executive Secretary Corona issued that herein-assailed "win-win" resolution
which, pursuant to the recommendations of the task force, substantially modified the
Torres decision by awarding one hundred (100) hectares of the Sumilao property to the
qualified farmer beneficiaries and allocating only forty four (44) hectares for the
establishment of an industrial and commercial zone.
In our decision promulgated in Baguio City on April 24, 1998, we annulled
the "win-win" resolution on the ground that public respondent Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of decision in modifying an already
final and executory decision of then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres. It is
undisputed that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) failed to comply with the
fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration.
6
It received the Torres decision
on April 10, 1996 but transmitted its motion for reconsideration to the DAR Records
Management Division for mailing to the Office of the President only on May 23, 1996.
7
The Office of the President received the motion on July 14, 1997. Forthwith, we applied
the rule on finality of administrative determinations and upheld the policy of setting an
end to litigation as an indispensable aspect of orderly administration of justice. In their
motions for reconsideration, respondents and intervenors protest the technical basis of our
decision.
I vote to grant their motions for reconsideration and remand the case to the
Court of Appeals.
First. It is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
8
Procedure, however, is only a
means to an end,
9
and they may be suspended when they subvert the interests of justice.
It is self-evident that the prerogative to suspend procedural rules or to grant an exception
in a particular case lies in the authority that promulgated the rules.
10

Rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts are
promulgated by this Court.
11
On the other hand, it is the President as administrative head
who is vested by the Administrative Code of 1987 to promulgate rules relating to
governmental operations, including administrative procedure. These rules take the form
of administrative orders.
12
This power is necessary for the President to discharge his
constitutional duty of faithfully executing our laws.
13
Under exceptional circumstances,
this Court has suspended its rules to prevent miscarriage of justice. In the same breath,
we should hold that the President has the power to suspend the effectivity of
administrative rules of procedure when they hamper, defeat or in any way undermine the
effective enforcement of the laws of the land. Indeed, we already recognize that Congress
can suspend its own rules if doing so will enable it to facilitate its task of lawmaking. The
three great branches of our government are co-equal and within their own sphere they
have the same responsibility to promote the good of our people. There is no reason to
withhold the power to suspend rules from the President and grant it alone to the two other
branches of government.
A closer scrutiny of the records in the instant case reveals that the fifteen-day
rule for filing a motion for reconsideration under Section 7 of Administrative Order No.
18 was suspended by the President when he constituted, on October 15, 1997 or some six
(6) months after the promulgation of the Torres decision, the Presidential Fact-Finding
Task Force to conduct a comprehensive review of the proper land use of the 144-hectare
Sumilao property. At that time, then Executive Secretary Torres had already denied the
first motion for reconsideration of the DAR on the ground that his March 29, 1997
decision had already become final and executory. This notwithstanding, the President
treated the case as still open and stated in his memorandum that the findings of the
Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force "will be inputs to the resolution of the case now
pending at the Office of the President regarding the said land" (emphasis ours).
15
The
President took cognizance of the special circumstances surrounding the tardy filing by the
DAR of its motion for reconsideration. The DAR lawyers assigned to the Sumilao case
received the Torres decision only after the lapse of the reglementary fifteen-day period
for appeal. The copy of the decision intended for them was passed from one office to
another, e.g., the Records Section of the DAR, the Office of the DAR Secretary, the
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, before it finally reached the DAR Litigation Office.
It does not appear to be just that DAR will be made to lose a significant case because of
bureaucratic lapses. Viewed in this context, we should rule that the President suspended
the effectivity of Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and that his exercise of
discretion in this regard cannot be assailed as whimsical.
I also respectfully submit this act of the President also finds full sanction
under the corollary principles of presidential power of control and qualified political
agency.
"This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk
and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa to
mean 'the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.' It is said to be at
the very 'heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.'
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the
President, is the 'Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.' As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive,
'all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person o[r] the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.' . . .
Thus, and in short, 'the President's power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department.'"
16


By suspending the fifteen-day-period for filing a motion for reconsideration
and re-opening the Torres decision, the President clearly exercised his control power over
an alter-ego within the framework of a constitutional and presidential system of
governance.
The President's suspension of the fifteen-day rule for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be characterized as arbitrary. The Sumilao problem raises
fundamental issues which conflict between land reform and the industrialization of the
countryside, the power of control by the President over his alter egos vis-a-vis the power
of local governments to convert agricultural land to industrial land. The resolution of
these issues has far reaching implications on the success of our land reform program.
Indeed, their successful resolution can bring peace or rebellion in our countryside. The
President should not be frustrated by an administrative procedural rule that he himself
promulgated, from formulating a creative, legal solution to the Sumilao problem. There is
no denying the liberal interpretation equally accorded to both administrative and judicial
rules in order to promote their object to the extent that technicality be not a bar to the
vindication of a legitimate grievance. We have trumpeted the truism that when
technicality ceases to be an aid to justice, the courts are justified in excepting from its
operation a particular case.
17
We ought not to deny the same power to the Chief
Executive who heads a co-equal branch of government.
Second. The petitioners are estopped from assailing the authority of the Office
of the President to re-open the Sumilao case and resolve it based on the report of the
Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force. Undeniably, petitioners participated in the
processes conducted by the task force. Their participation in the administrative
proceedings without raising any objection thereto, bars them from raising any
jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.
18
Petitioners
Carlos O. Fortich and Rey B. Baula, Bukidnon Governor and Sumilao Mayor,
respectively, were named members of the task force.
19
The president ordered the task
force to confer with the representatives of, among others, the landowner, namely
petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation.
20
In a letter dated October
20, 1997 addressed to the President, the counsel for NQSR Management and
Development Corporation expressed its reluctance "to comment on the merits and
demerits of the [motion for intervention and motion to admit additional evidence filed by
the farmer beneficiaries] out of respect of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals where these cases are presently pending''.
21
NQSR Management and
Development Corporation, however, did not question the authority of the President to
constitute the task force despite its express adherence to the declaration made by then
Executive Secretary Torres as to the finality of his March 29, 1997 decision. It was
confident that its interests would be promoted and protected by Bukidnon Governor
Fortich who himself filed the appeal from the order of DAR Secretary Garilao
22
and
Sumilao Mayor Baula who certified as correct Resolution No. 24 approved by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao on March 4, 1993 converting the 144-hectare property
from agricultural to industrial/institutional land.
23
But when the "win-win" resolution was
issued by the Office of the President on November 7, 1997, allowing the conversion into
industrial land of only forty four (44) hectares of the 114-hectare Sumilao property and
ordering the distribution of the rest to qualified farmer beneficiaries, petitioners were
flabbergasted. Mr. Norberto Quisumbing, Jr. could hardly hide his disdain over that
resolution in his letter to the provincial agrarian reform officer protesting as absurd and
arbitrary the valuation of the 100 hectares at P5.1 million pesos. That resolution was
allegedly an "unprecedented turn-around which is most difficult for the discerning public
to appreciate".
24

The "win-win" resolution being adverse to petitioners, they now assail the
authority of the President to modify the Torres decision. Under the above-mentioned
circumstances, however, the principle of estoppel applies to effectively bar petitioners
from raising the issue of jurisdiction.
25
While lack of jurisdiction of the court or quasi-
judicial body may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the
proceedings before it will estop him from assailing its lack of jurisdiction.
26
This Court
has always frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction when adverse.
27

Third. Considering the special circumstances of the case as detailed above, it
would better serve the ends of justice to obtain a definitive resolution of the issue raised
in the instant petition and remand the same to the Court of Appeals where jurisdiction
over this appeal lies. Noteworthy, is the pendency in the Court of Appeals of two more
cases involving the Sumilao property: (1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, entitled,
"N.Q.S.R. Management & Development Corporation and Bukidnon Agro-Industrial
Association, Petitioners, vs. Hon. Ernesto Garilao, Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform; Rogelio E. Tamin, DAR Regional Director, Region X; Nicanor Peralta,
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, Region X; Dolores Apostol, Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer, Sumilao, Bukidnon, Respondents";
28
and (2) Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, entitled, "Rodolfo Buclasan, et al., Petitioners, vs. Hon. Leonardo N.
Demecillo, as Judge of RTC, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch IX and NQSR Management
and Development Corporation, Respondents".
29

The remand of the instant petition to the Court of Appeals would enable said
court to consolidate the same with the two other cases pending there which undoubtedly
contemplate of the same factual milieu and raise invariably the same issues as in this
petition, leaving no room for further confusion that will surely be wrought by the
rendition of conflicting decisions affecting a single controversy.
For the above reasons, I vote to grant the motions for reconsideration filed by
the respondents and the intervenors who should be allowed to intervene pursuant to sec.
1, Rule 19 and to remand the instant petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
proceedings.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 1003-1004.
2. Rollo, p. 1029.
3. Rollo, p. 1101.
4. Rollo, p. 1029.
5. 222 SCRA 173, 182 [1993].
6. Rollo, p. 1004, (Emphasis supplied].
7. Rollo, pp. 1009-1010.
8. See also Eugenio vs. Drilon, 252 SCRA 106, 108, 114-115 [1996].
9. Rollo, p. 1010 (Emphasis supplied).
10. Rollo, p. 1009 (Emphasis supplied).
11. Article III, Section 16, 1987 Constitution.
12. Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 258 SCRA 159, 163 [1996].
13. Dulos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 188 SCRA 413, 422 [1990].
14. Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.
15. Second paragraph of Section 7, Administrative Order No. 18, dated February
12, 1987. See also Section 4, Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
16. 265 SCRA 50-51, 56 [1996].
17. Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil. 279-280, 283-284 [1939].
18. Ibid.
19. Rollo, p. 654. See also OP decision dated March 29, 1996, Rollo, p. 166.
20. Rollo, p. 111.
21. The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Reviewer-Primer, Third Edition (1997), p.
441.
22. Rollo, 61-62.
23. Rollo, pp. 166-167.
24. Matalam vs. Commission on Elections, 271 SCRA 733 [1997].
25. Rollo, p. 164.
26. Rollo, pp. 164-165.
27. Consolidated Comment/Opposition to Respondents' Motions for
Reconsideration, p. 25; Rollo, p. 1082.

PUNO, J., dissenting:
1. Rollo, pp. 89-98.
2. Rollo, pp. 99-106.
3. Rollo, pp. 107-114.
4. Dated June 28, 1995, Rollo, pp. 115-120.
5. Decision dated March 29, 1996, p. 5, Rollo, p. 167.
6. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 which governs appeals to the Office of
the President provides:
"SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall,
except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases."
7. Order dated June 23, 1997, issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D.
Torres, Rollo, p. 192.
8. Section 6, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
9. Torres v. Caluag, et al., 17 SCRA 808, 811 (1966).
10. Paras, Edgardo L., Rules of Court Annotated, 1989 Edition, Volume 1, pp. 17-
18, commenting on People's Homesite & Housing Corp. v. Tiongco, 12 SCRA 471
(1964).
11. Section 5(5), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
12. Section 3, Chapter 2, Title I, Book III, Administrative Code of 1987.
13. Cortes, Irene R., The Philippine Presidency: A Study of Executive Power, 1966
Edition, p. 75, citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 32 (1926).
15. Memorandum from the President dated October 15, 1997, Rollo, p. 807.
16. Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290, 295-296 (1992), citing Mondano
v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955); Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939);
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 (1967); De Leon v. Carpio, 178
SCRA 457 (1989).
17. People's Homesite & Housing Corp. v. Tiongco, 12 SCRA 471, 475-476 (1964).
18. Realty Exchange Venture Corporation v. Sendino, 233 SCRA 665, 671 (1994).
19. Memorandum from the President dated October 15, 1997, Rollo, p. 807.
20. Ibid.
21. Rollo, p. 806.
22. Letter-Appeal dated June 28, 1995, Rollo, pp. 115-120.
23. Excerpt from the Minutes of the Sangguniang Bayan Regular Session held on
March 4, 1993, Rollo, pp. 73-74.
24. Letter dated December 29, 1997, p. 1, Rollo, p. 808.
25. Zamboanga City Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Buat, 243 SCRA 47, 51 (1995);
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 414 (1993); Aquino v. Court of
Appeals, 204 SCRA 240 (1991); Salen v. Dinglasan, 198 SCRA 623 (1991); Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968).
26. Ibid.
27. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 36 (1968).
28. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, Rollo, pp. 121-146.
29. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, Rollo, pp. 652-687.