Article 8, Section 5(5):

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Article 7, Section 13
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Republic Act No. 7160 (October 10, 1991) AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991
Section 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. (b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not: (1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party; (2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. (3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and (4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the government. (c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS HEREOF BY THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, AND TO REPEAL COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIX Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who has rendered at least twenty years' service either in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. And when a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals has attained the age of fifty-seven years and has rendered at least twenty-years' service in the Government, ten or more of which have been continuously rendered as such Justice or as judge of a court of record, he shall be likewise entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner also hereinafter prescribed, the salary which he

was then receiving. It is a condition of the pension provided for herein that no retiring Justice during the time that he is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein and officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or collect any fee for his appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to the Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to any of its legally constituted officers. Section 2. In case a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals dies while in actual service, his heirs shall receive a lump sum amounting to the salary that said Justice was receiving at the time of his demise for five years if by reason of his length of service in the Government he were already entitled to the benefits of this Act; otherwise his heirs shall only receive a lump sum equivalent to his last salary for two years, in addition to a reimbursement of all premiums that he may have paid under this Act. The same benefits provided in this Section shall be extended to any incumbent Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who, without having attained the length of service required in section one hereof, shall have to retire upon reaching the age of seventy years, or for other causes, such as illness, to be certified to by the tribunal to which the Justice concerned belongs, which render him incapacitated to continue in his position. Section 3. Upon retirement a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals shall be automatically entitled to a lump sum payment of the monthly salary that said Justice was receiving at the time of his retirement for five years, and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of this period of five years, to a further annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. Section 4. A retiring Justice who is entitled to the benefits of any prior retirement gratuity Act shall have the option to choose between the benefits in such Act and those herein provided for, and in such case he shall be entitled only to the benefits so chosen: Provided, however, That a Justice retired under any prior Act and who is thereafter appointed to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals, shall be entitled to the benefits of this Act on condition that, in case he has not fully refunded to the Government the gratuity previously received by him, there shall be deducted from the amount payable to him under this Act such monthly installments as are required in section six of Act Numbered Four thousand and fifty-one, as amended, until the gratuity already received by him shall have been refunded in [Link] Section 5. The Government Service Insurance System shall take charge of the enforcement and operation of this Act, and no Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals shall be entitled to receive any gratuity or pension herein provided unless from the month following the approval of this Act, in case of an actual Justice of any of said courts, or from the month following his appointment, and qualification as such Justice, in case of future appointment, he shall have contributed to the funds of the System by paying a monthly premium of fifty pesos. Section 6. Commonwealth Act Numbered Five hundred and thirty-six and any other provision in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed. Section 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved: June 20, 1953

TAN V. SABANDAL (170 SCRA 211 2/10/89

FACTS: Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of pending administrative complaints filed against him regarding instances when he called himself attorney knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar, he was not allowed to take the lawyers oath. Oppositors evidence sufficiently show that respondent had held himself out as an attorney in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases and he was paid for his legal services He then filed a petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. In a resolution promulgated on November 29, 1983 respondent petition was denied. Respondent asks for forgiveness, understanding and benevolence and promises that, if given a chance to be a member of the Phil. Bar, he would always be faithful to the lawyers oath and conduct himself in an upright manner.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land since then.

The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.

HELD: His petition must be denied.

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.

It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could not but have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where no determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings.

Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

ARTIAGA JR. V. VILLANUEVA

Facts: This case is about the disbarment case filed by Artiaga against Villanueva for alleged unethical [Link] case started with the controversy over 2 parcel of lands with revocable permit applications, originally the permitsbelong to a certain Malabayabas and Suyo, which was later on sold to the client of Artiaga. However on a later date, when the clientof Villanueva filed for revocable permit application it was found out that the area being claimed has already been titled to the clientof Artiaga. Hence the dispute was brought to the Bureau of Lands for [Link] the Director of Lands rendered a decision in favour

of the client of Artiaga, however it was appealed by Villanuevaand the decision was change, after another appeal the final decision was in favour of the client of Artiaga. The decision being finaland executory an order of execution was issued however the client of Villanueva remained in possession of the said parcel of [Link] a series of motions and case where filed by Villanueva as a dilatory tactics to seek a favourable ruling. Issue: Whether or not the acts of Villanueva is considered unethical. Ruling: The court ruled that acts of Atty. Villanueva is in violation of his oath that he wll do no falsehood nor consent to doing of anyin court. According to the court it was clear that atty. Villanueva caused his client to commit perjury so that the forceful entry casewill fall under the jurisdiction of the court, this is shown by the intentional amendment to the original complaint par 5, wherein underthe original complaint the time line was 1960, while on the amended complaint the time stated is 1973, the court state that thereason for such change is so that the action may still be filed or entertained by the court, since the action prescribes one year afteraccrual of cause of [Link] court further states that it is expected that a lawyer will de fend the clients cause with zeal, however in doing so itshould not disregard its duty to the court and the truth. Due to his actions the client was in another case charged with perjury, whichis detrimental to the [Link] court also found that atty. Villanueva is guilty of lack of condor and respect for the court and the rights of hisadversary, as shown in the case, the client of Artiaga has already won the case, however Villanueva filed urgent ex-parte motionsand instead of waiting for the result of such, he perfected his appeal, thus further delaying the implementation of the first lawfulorder of the court. Furthermore when his appeal was denied, Villanueva turned to other venues such as CAR for positive results, indoing so he did not disclose of the prior proceedings that was held in the court thus securing an ex-parte proceeding. In this case thecourt found Villanueva guilty of forum shopping.

MARY MALECDAN vs. PEKAS and KOLLIN

A.C. No. 5830. January 26, 2004 Facts: Atty Pekas and Kollin substituted Atty. Bustamante as a counsels for the Fanged Spouses. Petitioner Malecdan bought a parcel of land located in Baguio City from the Fanged [Link] money was received by Eliza Fanged and deposited in the account of Atty. ArtemioBustamante, then counsel for the latter. The complainant later found out, however, that the saidlot was the subject of a controversy between the former owners and the Fanged [Link] Kollin replaced Bustamante. He filed for a petition for rescission over the contract of sale,without returning the amount of money to Malecdan. While Malecdan was in the US, the Fangedspouses, Atty Bustamante and the PCIB (bank) signed a compromised contract, and Malecdanwas not made a signatory to such contract. They caused the transfer of P30K from the accountof Bustamante to a separate account for Kollin and Pekas as attorneys fees. Now, Malecdan files a case for disbarment against Kollin and Pekas, because not only was sheprejudiced from such withdrawal of money, but they also committed acts against the IBP incontravention/violation to the lawyers oath that they shall uphold the laws of the land. Issue: WON Kollin and Pekas should be suspended? YES Held: It is a settled principle that the compensation of a lawyer should be but a mere incident of thepractice of law, the primary purpose of which is to render public service. The practice of law is aprofession and not a money-making trade. The process of imbibing ethical standards can beginwith the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progressthereafter towards the ideal that a lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an ordinarybusiness proposition but a serious matter of public interest. DECISION: Pekas suspended for 6 months, Kollin for 3 years.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA AC NO. 99-634. JUNE 10, 2002
Facts:

Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyers office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutors office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioners feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, p ostdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.

Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows: It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.

Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic

223 SCRA 378 42 SCAD 287 Legal Ethics Advertisement in the Legal Profession Practice of Law In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The L egal Clinic because of the latters advertisements which contain the following: SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041 8:30am 6:00pm 7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila

GUAM DIVORCE DON PARKINSON An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. 7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767 It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in Star Week of Philippine Sta r wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a clients problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as t he Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are specialists in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys. As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers. ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed. HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyers advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible. The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement: 1. 2. 3. Advertisement in a reputable law list Use of ordinary simple professional card Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant [Link]. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
Facts;

Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from the Supreme Court finding her guilty of violating BP 22. Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.

Issue; WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted. Ruling; The Supreme Court ruled to DENY the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of Suspension and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension. The court found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude citing Secs 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

MELENDRES v DECENA
Facts: (1stcause of action) Aug. 5, 1975: Complainants (spouses Erlinda Dalman & Narciso Melendrez) obtained from Atty. ReynerioDecena(Decena) a loan of P4K. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage. It was made to appear in the REM that the amount borrowed was P5K. Decena assured the spouses that theREMwas a mere formality, and due to this assurance the spouses signed the REM. Despite the assurance, Decena collected from the spouses P500/month as usurious interest. Thespouses paidsuch usurious inter est for 3 months. Because of their failure to pay the amounts, Decena drafted a new REM New contract of mortgage in the amount of P10K with interest at 19%/annum A special power of attorney authorizing Decena to sell the mortgaged property in public auction Spouses never knew the implications of the new REM. They failed to pay their obligation and so Decenaacquiredtheir property in pulic auction and later sold it to Trinidad Ylanan for P12K Spouses then went to Decena with P10K in the hopes of getting their property back. Decena theninforms themthat their debt has soared to P20.4K. With shattered hopes and grief in their hearts (andrama!), the spouses filed this case for disbarment.(2ndcause of action) Spouses filed a case for estafa against Reynaldo Pineda for recovery of P2K Decena entered into a compromise agreement with Pineda. Pineda then paid P500 to [Link] settlementwas never brought to the attention of the spouses nor were they ever consulted aboutsuch. Issue: W/N Decenas acts show gross misconduct and should therefor e be disbarred Held: Yes, Decena shall be disbarred The acts of Decena as to the 1stcause of action constitute deception, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming amember of the bar.

 As to the 2ndcause of action, Decena clearly failed to get the consent of the spouses before entering intoacompromise. Decena also failed to inform the spouses or turn over to them the P500 givento him by Pineda asdownpayment for the settlement of the case. Decenas failure to turn over to the spouses the money undersco res his lack of honesty and candor in dealingwithhis clients

G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983 ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners, vs. HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents. !1
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo) Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila. Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the [Link] to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge. Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: [Link] SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney. On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide: [Link] SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action . Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense. And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal. We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal. In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Paraaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer. WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED. SO ORDERED.1wph1

G.R. No. L-8320

December 20, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIM BEN, defendant-appellant.

Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of violating paragraph 3, Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, for having exhibit cinematographic films of indecent or immoral scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant which is a place open to public view in the City of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the information without the aid of counsel. The minutes of the session of the Court on 31 January 1953 disclose that when the case was called for trial, the appellant was informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired the aid of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to have the information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His answer was in the affirmative. The court interpreter translated the information to him in the local dialect and after the translation he entered a plea of guilty. He was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of guilty the punishment as provided for by law would be imposed upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The Court asked him if he insisted on his plea of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir." At this juncture the fiscal recommended that a fine of P200 be imposed upon the defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional and to pay the [Link] What transpired when the appellant was arraigned shows that his rights were fully protected and safeguarded. The Court complied with its duly when it informed the appellant that it was his right to have the aid of counse. And before pronouncing the sentence the Court took pains to ascertain whether he was aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered. Notwithstanding this precaution and warning, he waived his right to have the aid of counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the information. Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a fine would be imposed. The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the appellant seems to bear out his claim; but such recommendation or one of leniency does not mean that the appellant is not guilty of the crime charged against him. A promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not render the sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and metes out to the defendant a penalty which is provided by law. The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the appellant.

G.R. No. 92349 November 9, 1990 MARIA LUISA ESTOESTA petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GERRY R. GONZALES, Presiding Judge, MTC, Br. 76, Marikina, respondents.
The legal effect of the appearance of a litigant in his own behalf is the focus of controversy in this petition. Petitioner was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries committed against Perla Y. Corpuz in an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. By the same token, on a countercharge of petitioner, Perla Y. Corpuz was charged in an information for the same offense before the same court. The cases were consolidated and after a joint trial on the merits where both parties were duly represented by counsel, the trial court rendered a decision dated January 12, 1989 convicting the petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of arresto menor in its medium period of eleven (11) days to twenty (20) days but acquitting Perla Y. Corpuz with costs de oficio in both cases. Not satisfied therewith petitioner through counsel filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein in due course the judgment appealed from was modified as to the penalty by imposing a straight penalty of eleven (11) days imprisonment. A motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioner was denied by the Regional Trial Court on August 30, 1989. On September 20, 1989, petitioner, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days from September 30, 1989 or up to October 19, 1989 within which to file a petition for review on the ground that she has to look for another lawyer to represent her and prepare the necessary petition. The motion was granted by the appellate court in a resolution dated October 16, 1989. However, instead of filing the petition for review, petitioner in her own behalf filed on October 9, 1989 a written manifestation and motion to withdraw petition for review for the purpose of applying for probation in the court of origin, "she being a first offender and possesses (sic) all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for under the said probation law." 1 The motion was granted by the appellate court in a resolution dated October 24, 1989, copy of which was received by petitioner on October 30, 1989. The division clerk of court of the Court of Appeals made the entry of judgment on October 25, 1989. On November 17, 1989, the petitioner filed a joint or alternative motion for reconsideration and reinstatement of petition for review and petition for relief from judgment with prayer for a temporary restraining order based on the ground that the motion to withdraw the petition for review was filed without the advice of her lawyer and under the honest impression that her application for probation pending with the lower court will be granted. In a resolution dated February 20, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the said motion for lack of merit. Hence this petition for review on certiorari with prayer for restraining order dated March 10, 1990 predicated on the following grounds: I. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING YOUR PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REINSTATE PETITION FOR REVIEW IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE DOCTRINES ENUNCIATED IN THE CASES OF DELGADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 145 SCRA 357; REPUBLIC VS. ARRO, 150 SCRA 626 AND SILVESTRE VS. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 21, NO. L-46366, MARCH 8, 1978. II. THE DENIAL OF YOUR PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REINSTATE HER PETITION FOR REVIEW WOULD PERPETUATE THE SERIOUS AND PATENT ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT ESPECIALLY AS TO THE ALLEGED OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE WITNESSES' DEMEANOR WHEN THE JUDGE WHO PENNED THE DECISION WAS NOT THE SAME JUDGE WHO HEARD THE WITNESSES (WHO) TESTIFIED. 2 The petition is devoid of merit. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. From the foregoing provision of the rule, it is clear that a party in a case may conduct a litigation either personally or by an attorney in the courts. He may also be assisted by an agent or friend for the purpose in the inferior courts. And even if a party may have chosen to appear through counsel, he may at any time dispense with the services of his/her lawyer and prosecute or defend his/her case personally. In this case the Court notes that before the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, the petitioner was duly represented by counsel. However, when she decided to elevate her case to the Court of Appeals she chose to handle her case personally, first, by asking for an extension of time within which to file a petition for review and second, by filing thereafter a petition to withdraw the petition for review to enable her to apply for probation. Unfortunately, under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1257 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990 dated October 5, 1985, it is specifically provided that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted when the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." Thus, as petitioner failed to secure favorable action on her application for probation, she filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the appellate court granting her motion to withdraw or in the alternative, a petition for relief from judgment alleging that she was not duly assisted by counsel then and that she was under the honest impression that she could apply for probation, and that if the motion is granted, petitioner could very well demonstrate that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses by the lower court which was relied upon by the Regional Trial Court is misplaced as the one who decided the case is different from the judge who heard the case. The said alternative motion for reconsideration or petition for relief from judgment, however, was filed only on November 17, 1989, beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner received a copy of the questioned resolution dated October 24, 1989 on October 30, 1989. Hence, said resolution had become final by the time petitioner filed her motion. Besides, the alternative petition for relief from judgment is not accompanied by an affidavit of merit as required by the rules. 3 The Court emphasizes the fact that it is always better for a party to be represented by counsel in a litigation. Nevertheless, it is the right of such party to appear in his or her own behalf to prosecute or defend a cause in court. If in the process petitioner suffered reverses, she has only herself to blame. She is bound by the consequences of her own voluntary act. The judgment of conviction of the petitioner for slight physical injuries inflicted by the petitioner upon the offended party was arrived at by the Regional Trial Court based on the testimony of the offended party corroborated by her witnesses and proof of the injury. Such judgment has become final and petitioner must now face the reality of submitting herself for its execution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. VILLANUEVA

FACTS: On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the Secretary of Justice. Counsel for the accused presented a Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in this case, this time invoking sec. 32 , Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. ISSUE: Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. RULING: The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

In Re: Felipe Del Rosario 52 Phil 399 Legal Ethics Practice of Law is a Privilege

Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took it in 1926 and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in which he alleged that there was a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the 1925 bar exams. He was then admitted to the bar. HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario, together with one Juan Villaflor a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some documents to make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently charged with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however recommended Del Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney. ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct. HELD: Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del Rosario and it is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination. But shouldnt the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again? No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar.

G.R. No. L-35766 July 12, 1973 LIBERATO V. CASALS, and JOSE T. SUMCAD, petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, BR. 1, REBECCA T. PALANCA and GRECAN CO., INC., respondents.
The Court imposes a three-months suspension from the practice of law upon counsel of respondents for improper conduct and abuse of the Court's good faith by his acts in the case at bar manifesting gross disrespect for the Court's processes and a willful disregard of his solemn duty to conduct himself with all good fidelity to the Court and tending to embarrass gravely the administration of justice. Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court as per its resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice and to issue a temporary restraining order restraining respondent court inter alia from proceeding with the hearing of the case 1 pending before it below. Under date of December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel for respondents, stating that while he had received on November 15, 1972 notice of the Court's resolution of November 9, 1972, "no accompanying copy of the petition has been attached thereto, hence the undersigned counsel would not be able to prepare the comments of the respondents as directed in said resolution without said copy." filed his first motion for a ten-day extension of time from receipt of such petition within which to submit respondents' comment. The Court granted such first extension per its resolution of December 15, 1972. Under date of December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of Delante, Orellan & Associates as counsel for respondents filed a verified second motion for extension of ten days from December 15, 1972 within which to submit respondents' comment on the ground "2. That Atty. L.C. Delante, counsel of record, got sick on December 6, 1972 and had not reported to work as yet" as per verified medical certificate attached to the motion and "3. That Atty. Delante has just recovered from his ailment, and has requested the undersigned to specially make this motion for another extension of TEN (10) days in order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents." Under date of December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third motion for "a last extension of fifteen days from December 29, 1972 to submit the required comment, stating "That the undersigned counsel has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments, but due to pressure of work in his office and matters occasioned by the Christmas season, the same has not been finalized and typed out in a clean copy," for filing by the expiry date on December 28, 1972. The Court per its resolution of January 15, 1973 granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five days. Having noted respondents' failure to file their comment notwithstanding the numerous extensions sought by and granted to their counsel, which expired on January 12, 1973, the Court as per its

resolution of April 12, 1973 resolved to require Atty. Delante as counsel for respondents to explain and show cause within ten days from notice why they failed to file the required comment. Atty. Delante filed in due course his explanation dated May 7, 1973, wherein he claimed for the first time that "in view of (his) pressing professional commitments," he requested his clients "to have the answer ... prepared by another lawyer for which reason (respondents) took delivery of the records of the said case from his office and contracted the services of Atty. Antonio Fernandez." Atty. Delante goes on to claim that it was only upon receipt of the Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation that he learned that Atty. Fernandez who had contracted "to prepare an answer, underwent a surgical operation," attaching a copy of Atty. Fernandez' affidavit together with a medical certificate which certified however to the latter's confinement at the Davao Doctors' Hospital only from "Dec. 23-26, 1972" and "(D)aily follow up: Dec. 26, 1972 Jan. 15, 1973." Atty. Fernandez in his affidavit however stated that after his services had been retained by respondents "sometime on December 12, 1972" he "had been confined in the Davao Doctors' Hospital and subsequently operated on for sinusitis" (on December 23-26, 1972) and that Gregorio Caeda, president of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. "saw me in the hospital and asked from me the answer and I told him that I may not be able to proceed and prepare the answer because of the operation that I just had, hence he got the records of the case G.R. No. L-35766 from me." Atty. Delante further submitted the so-called "affidavit" dated May 5, 1973 of Gregorio Caeda, president and general manager of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. supporting his belated claim now that their corporation contracted the services of Atty. Fernandez "to prepare the answer to meet the deadline" and delivered the records of the case to the latter. The so-called "affidavit" is however not sworn to before any official authorized to administer oaths but merely carries the statement "(T)hat the foregoing facts are true and correct as what actually transpired" under the signature of one Rebecca T. Palanca (Secretary-Treasurer)." Atty. Delante pleads that "it is far from (his) intention to cause any undue delay in the disposition of the above-entitled case," and "(T)hat this is the first time it happened to him, and that if given an opportunity to prepare the answer, he will try his best to do it within the period granted by this Honorable Tribunal, and that he assures this Honorable Tribunal that there would be no repetition of this similar incident in the future." He prays that his explanation be accepted and without blinking an eye notwithstanding that the required comment has long been overdue for almost four months at the time that he "be given an opportunity to prepare the necessary answer for the respondents." Counsel for petitioners promptly filed their comments dated May 11, 1973 citing the inconsistencies and contradictions in Atty. Delante's explanation, opposing his plea to still be allowed to file respondents' comment after his "gross and inexcusable negligence" and praying that the petition be considered submitted for resolution by the Court. In an earlier resolution of July 9, 1973, the Court took action on the petition and dismissed the same for insufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the case below and appeal in due course from any adverse decision on the merits being the merits being the proper and adequate remedy. The present resolution concerns Atty. Delante's explanation which the Court finds to be unsatisfactory. Atty. Delante's present explanation that his failure to file respondents' comment is due to the failure of the other lawyer, Atty. Fernandez, contracted by his clients at his instance because of his pressing professional commitments "to do so, because of a surgical operation," is unworthy of credence because it is contrary to the facts of record: In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his belated allegation now that another lawyer had been retained to file the required comment, and no other lawyer, much less Atty. Fernandez, ever entered an appearance herein on behalf of respondents; In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office cited as reason the fact that he had gotten sick on December 6, 1972 and had just recovered and needed the additional 10-day extension "in order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents;" In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the Court "that (he) has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments" and cited "pressure of work in his office" and the Christmas Season for not having "finalized and typed out (the comments) in a clean copy" which comments never came to be submitted to this Court; His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty. Fernandez' medical certificate which shows that he was confined in the hospital for sinusitis only from December 23-26, 1972 and therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to submit the comments by the extended deadline on January 12, 1973; Atty. Fernandez' own affidavit as submitted by Atty. Delante belies the latter's claim that the records of the case had been given to the former, for Atty. Fernandez swore therein that when Gregorio Caeda of respondent corporation saw him at the hospital (sometime between December 23-26, 1972) he advised Caeda of his inability to prepare the "answer" and Caeda got back the records of the case from him; He submits no explanation whatsoever, why if his "final draft of the desired comments" was "already prepared" since year-end of 1972 and only had to be "finalized and typed out" he utterly failed to submit the same notwithstanding the lapse of over six months and worse, in his "explanation" of May 7, 1973 asked yet for "an opportunity to prepare the anser [which] he will try his best to do it within the period granted by the Honorable Tribunal" when he had utterly ignored and disregarded the numerous extensions granted him which lapsed on January 12, 1973; and

 He likewise submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not seeing to it, assuming that Atty. Fernandez was to prepare the required comment, that the required comment was filed within the last extension (that expired on January 12, 1973) secured by him from the Court on his assurance that the final draft was ready and did nothing for three months until after he received the Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation. The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his having allowed his extended period to lapse without submitting the required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and the Court required his explanation, he gave an explanation that is devious and unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own previous representations of record as well as by the "supporting" documents submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove. Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which he let pass without submitting the required comment which according to his motion of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by him and was only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his explanation still brazenly asked the Court for a further period to submit respondents' comment which supposedly had been readied by him for submittal six months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude manifest gross disrespect for the Court's processes and tend to embarrass gravely the administration of justice. In Pajares vs. Abad Santos 2 the Court reminded attorneys that "There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action." It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission to the Philippine Bar, that they will do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the courts and their clients. The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty. Delante as against the pleadings of record in the case at bar evinces a willful disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case "such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts "by an artifice or false statement of false statement of fact or law." 3 The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of the administration of justice if courts could not rely on the submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case. As stated by the Court in one case, "Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned." 4 Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them, (except to file the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the trust imposed on counsel in accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but with the soundest traditions of the profession would require fidelity on their part." Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1959, the Court is inclined to act in a spirit of leniency. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective from his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The clerk of court is directed to circularize notice of such suspension to the Court of Appeals and all courts of first instance and other courts of similar rank. Let copies of this resolution be filed in his personal record and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.