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Microeconomics Exam Guide

This 3 sentence summary provides the essential information about the document: The document is an economics exam for ECON 201 - Introduction to Microeconomics consisting of 2 parts, with Part I being 35 multiple choice questions worth 35 marks and Part II being 5 long answer questions worth 25 marks. The exam instructs students to write their answers in pen or pencil, and not to remove any pages from the exam. It provides spaces for the student to fill in their name, student number, and grades for Parts I and II as well as the total exam grade.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
97 views10 pages

Microeconomics Exam Guide

This 3 sentence summary provides the essential information about the document: The document is an economics exam for ECON 201 - Introduction to Microeconomics consisting of 2 parts, with Part I being 35 multiple choice questions worth 35 marks and Part II being 5 long answer questions worth 25 marks. The exam instructs students to write their answers in pen or pencil, and not to remove any pages from the exam. It provides spaces for the student to fill in their name, student number, and grades for Parts I and II as well as the total exam grade.

Uploaded by

Khalil Ben Jemia
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Concordia University Department of Economics ECON 201 INTRODUCTION TO MICROECONOMICS inter 2012 COMMON !

IN"# E$"MIN"TION %ERSION 1


!IRST N"ME& ''''''''''''''''''''''' #"ST N"ME& '''''''''''''''''''''''''''

STUDENT NUM(ER& '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' )*ease read a** instr+ctions caref+**y, 1. The exam consists of two parts. (i) Part I: 35 multiple-choice questions (35 marks) (ii) Part II: !hoose 5 out of " lon# questions ("5 marks). %rite &our name' stu(ent I) an( answers for the multiple-choice questions on the computer scansheet with a penci*. Please' also write the version of the exam on the computer scan-sheet. *or Part II' write all &our answers on this exam. )o not use a((itional +ooklets. ,ou are allowe( to use a non-pro#ramma+le calculator an( a paper (ictionar&' pro-i(e( that the& are appro-e( +& the in-i#ilator(s). ,ou ma& use either pen or pencil to pro-i(e &our answers for Part II. ,ou are not allowe( to tear an& pa#es out of this exam.

$.

3. .. -rades& Part I:

//////////

Part II: //////////

Total:

)art I& M+*tip*e [Link] /+estions, rite yo+r ans0ers on t.e comp+ter [Link] in )ENCI# 1Tota*234 mar5s6, 1. It has +een o+ser-e( that uni-ersit& enrolment in !ana(a is hi#her (urin# perio(s of hi#h unemplo&ment. 0 possi+le explanation for this is that a) (urin# perio(s of hi#h unemplo&ment' professors teach +etter. +) when prospects for #ettin# a 1o+ are poor' the opportunit& cost of #ettin# a 1o+ is lower. c) when prospects for #ettin# a 1o+ are poor' the opportunit& cost of (oin# nothin# is hi#her. d6 [Link] prospects for 7ettin7 a 8o9 are poor: t.e opport+nity cost of 7oin7 to +niversity is *o0er, $. 0n 2l&mpic soccer pla&er re-eals that she ha( #i-en up a 1o+ that pai( 335'444 per &ear to train full-time. 5he recei-e( a #rant of 36'444 per &ear from 5ports !ana(a' +ut this coul( not co-er all her trainin# expenses. 7er foo( an( rent were 31"'444 an( trainin# expenses were 314'444. %hat is her annual opportunit& cost of participatin# in the 2l&mpics8 a) 319'444. +) 335'444. c6 ;3<:000, () 3."'444. 3. %hich of the followin# statements is (are) normati-e8 a) If income increases' sales of luxur& #oo(s will fall. +) %hen minimum wa#es are raise(' unemplo&ment rises. c) 0ll of the a+o-e. d6 None of t.e a9ove, .. If the nominal price of tickets to see the +an( :$ has increase( from 3144 to 3154 (urin# a fi-e &ear inter-al' an( the consumer price in(ex has risen from a -alue of 1"4 to $44' then the real price increase in ticket price is: a) 54;. +) .4;. c) 34;. d6 20=, 5.%hich one of the followin# statements is false8 a6 If t.e economist 0ants to e>amine t.e distri9+tion of income in 1?@A: timeB series data s.o+*d 9e +sed, +) If the economist wants to examine the relationship +etween a(-ertisin# expen(itures an( sales (urin# 16<9' cross-section (ata is use(. c) If the economist wants to examine the effect of intellectual a+ilit& upon earnin#s' cross-section (ata coul( +e use(. () If the economist wants to forecast #ross national pro(uct +ase( upon o+ser-ations from pre-ious &ears' timeseries (ata shoul( +e use(. ". !onsi(er the #oo(s electronic rea(ers an( electronic +ooks. In response to a price (ecline in e-+ooks' the market for e-rea(ers shoul( show a) an inwar( shift in (eman(. 96 an o+t0ard [Link] in demand, c) an inwar( shift in suppl&. () an outwar( shift in suppl&. 9. 0n effecti-e price ceilin# on a pharmaceutical (ru# will ha-e no effect on the quantit& tra(e( if: a6 t.e s+pp*y c+rve is vertica*, +) the suppl& cur-e is hori=ontal. c) the (eman( cur-e is hori=ontal. () the (eman( cur-e is -ertical. <.If #oo(s > an( ? are su+stitutes' an increase in the price of > causes: a) quantit& (eman(e( of > to fall an( the (eman( cur-e for ? to shift towar( the ori#in. 96 a decrease in C+antity demanded for D and an o+t0ard [Link] of EFs demand c+rve, c) quantit& (eman(e( of > remains constant' +ut the (eman( for ? (ecreases. () the (eman( cur-e for +oth > an( ? shift. 6. 5uppose the per-unit tax on cars is raise(. If the (eman( for cars is e-er&where unit elastic an( the suppl& cur-e is upwar( slopin# then this will cause tax re-enue to ///. @7int : Tax re-enue A 5pen(in# +& consumers minus firm re-enue. :se elasticit& to fi#ure out what happens to consumer spen(in#. :se (ia#ram to fi#ure out what happens to firm re-enueB. a6 rise $

+) fall c) sta& constant () rise if the suppl& elasticit& is less than one an( fall if the suppl& elasticit& is #reater than one 14.)ata on the prices' quantities sol(' an( a-era#e incomes of +u&ers of >olt !ola an( !oke' o-er se-eral &ears' are shown +elow. ,ear Price of >olt Price of !oke 0-era#e Income of Cu&ers 3$5'444 3$5'444 335'444 335'444 Duantit& of >olt 5ol(

$444 31.44 E can 31.44 E can 15'444 cases $441 31.44 E can 31..4 E can $5'444 cases $44$ 31.44 E can 31..4 E can 15'444 cases $443 31..4 E can 31..4 E can 5'444 cases The arc income elasticit& of >olt is: a) 1.5 +) -4."9 c6 B1,4 () not (etermina+le' #i-en that all the -aria+les are chan#in#. 11.5uppose the market suppl& cur-e for some #oo( is upwar( slopin#. If the imposition of an excise tax causes no chan#e in the equili+rium quantit& sol( in the market' the #oo(Fs (eman( cur-e must +e ////////' meanin# that the +ur(en of the tax has fallen completel& on the ////////. a) :nit elastic #o-ernment. +) 7ori=ontal firms. c6 %ertica*G cons+mers, () 7ori=ontal consumers. 1$.!urrentl& >oe an( 7al&na are consumin# the same amount of straw+erries' +ut >oeFs (strai#ht line) (eman( cur-e is much more elastic than 7al&naFs at the current price. %hich statement is true8 a6 Ha*ynaFs cons+mer s+rp*+s e>ceeds DoeFs, +) 7al&naFs consumer surplus equals >oeFs. c) Go statement can +e ma(e re#ar(in# consumer surpluses. () >oeFs consumer surplus excee(s 7al&naFs. 13.:sin# a suppl& an( (eman( (ia#ram of &our own' if a per unit tax is impose(' the more elastic the suppl& cur-e' the: a) more likel& the (ea(wei#ht loss is to +e affecte(. 96 *ar7er t.e dead0ei7.t *oss, c) lar#er the (ea(wei#ht loss to pro(ucers. () smaller the (ea(wei#ht loss to consumers. 1.. %hen economists (escri+e a #oo( as +ein# Fun(er-price(F' the& mean that: a) output shoul( +e increase( +ecause the mar#inal social +enefit in consumption excee(s the mar#inal social cost of pro(uction. 96 too m+c. of t.e 7ood is 9ein7 prod+ced since [Link] is a ne7ative e>terna*ity associated 0it. t.e 7ood, c) resources are properl& allocate( since societ& wants more of the #oo( at a lower price. () there is an un(er-allocation of resources in the pro(uction of the #oo(. 15. 0 consumer maximi=es his total utilit& when #oo(s 0 an( C are consume( in quantities such that H:0EH:C a) equals the ratio of total utilit& of 0 to that of C. +) equals the ratio of the price of C to the price of 0. c) alwa&s equals unit&. d6 none of t.e a9ove

1". 5uppose a#ain that ,uri +u&s so& milk an( oran#es an( has not &et exhauste( his +u(#et. 7is H: of an a((itional carton of so& milk is $4 an( its price is 31.$5' whereas his H: for an a((itional oran#e costin# 54 cents is 9. *rom this situation' we can (e(uce that he shoul(: a) +u& more oran#es. +) re(uce his consumption of so& milk. c6 9+y more soy mi*5, () (i-i(e his +u(#et equall& +etween so& milk an( oran#es. 19. 0 (eman( cur-e slopes (ownwar( +ecause a) since the mar#inal utilit& increases with increase( consumption' people will +e ea#er to +u& more at lower prices. 96 since t.e mar7ina* +ti*ity decreases 0it. increased cons+mption: t.e price m+st fa** in order to ind+ce peop*e to 9+y more, c) since total utilit& increases with increase( consumption' a lower price is necessar& to encoura#e increase( pro(uction. () lower prices mean a lower consumer surplus which will encoura#e increase( consumption. 1<.If &ou are a risk-neutral person an( ha-e the chance to pla& a #ame where the pro+a+ilit& of winnin# 314.44 is $4; an( the pro+a+ilit& of losin# 33.44 is <4;: a)&ou will +e willin# to pla& the #ame. +) &ou will +e willin# to pla& the #ame +ecause this is a fair #am+le. c)&ou ma& or ma& not pla& the #ame' (epen(in# on how &ou +alance the lo-e of risk with the pro+a+ilit& of loss on a-era#e. d6 yo+ 0i** not p*ay t.e 7ame as it is not a favora9*e one, [Link] has two choices: a 54; chance of winnin# 3$4 an( a 54; chance of losin# 3$4 -ersus a $4; chance of winnin# 3144 an( an <4; chance of losin# 3$4. %hich choice has the lar#er expecte( -alue8 a)Coth choices ha-e the same expecte( -alue. +) The 54;-54; chance. c)Coth ha-e ne#ati-e expecte( -alues an( neither shoul( +e selecte(. d6 T.e 20=B@0= [Link], $4. >onathan has two choices: a 54; chance of winnin# 3$4 an( a 54; chance of losin# 3$4 -ersus a $4; chance of winnin# 3144 an( an <4; chance of losin# 3$5. 0ssume that >onathan is a risk-a-erse in(i-i(ual' then he will choose the followin# option: a6 T.e 40=B40= [Link] as [Link] option is *ess ris5y 9et0een t.e t0o, +) >onathan is in(ifferent +etween the two options an( can (eci(e +& flippin# a coin an( then (eci(e on the +asis of coin outcome. c)The $4;-<4; choice as this option is less risk& +etween the two. () Gone of the a+o-e. $1. If total pro(uct is at a maximum' then a) a-era#e pro(uct must +e fallin# an( +e equal to =ero. +) a-era#e pro(uct must equal mar#inal pro(uct. c) mar#inal pro(uct must +e #reater than =ero an( must +e fallin#. d6 mar7ina* prod+ct m+st 9e fa**in7 and 9e eC+a* to Iero, $$. If factor prices increase' a) a firm will mo-e to a lower point on its lon#-run a-era#e cost cur-e onl&. +) there will +e no chan#e in the cost cur-es in the lon# run. c) there will +e a (ownwar( shift in the lon#-run a-era#e cost cur-e +ut not in the short-run a-era#e cost cur-e. d6 9ot. t.e *on7Br+n and [Link]+n avera7e cost c+rves 0i** [Link] +p0ard, $3. %hich of the followin# statements a+out the relationship +etween mar#inal pro(uct an( a-era#e pro(uct is correct8 a) %hen a-era#e pro(uct excee(s mar#inal pro(uct' mar#inal pro(uct must +e risin#. +) 0-era#e pro(uct equals mar#inal pro(uct when mar#inal pro(uct is at its maximum. c6 .en mar7ina* prod+ct is fa**in7 and avera7e prod+ct is 9e*o0 mar7ina* prod+ct: [Link] avera7e prod+ct is risin7, () 0-era#e pro(uct equals mar#inal pro(uct at mar#inal pro(uctFs lowest point. $.. If a firm (ou+les all its inputs an( output as a result triples then the firm is experiencin# a6 increasin7 ret+rns to sca*e, .

+) (ecreasin# returns to scale. c) economies of scale. () the law of (iminishin# returns. $5. If an in(ustr& is compose( of two firms (temporaril&) an( the& ha-e short-run mar#inal cost cur-es of the form H! A 5 I 4.1D an( H! A < I 4.$D respecti-el&' how much will each suppl& if the #oin# price is 3148 a6 40 and 10, +) $4 an( .4. c) 34 an( 54. () 15 an( .4. $". The perfectl& competiti-e firmJs short run suppl& cur-e is the upwar(-slopin# part of its a)a-era#e -aria+le cost cur-e' at all points a+o-e the point of 0K!min. +) mar#inal cost cur-e' at all points a+o-e the point of 0*!min. c)mar#inal re-enue cur-e' at all points a+o-e the point of minimum a-era#e total cost. d6 mar7ina* cost 1MC6 c+rve: at a** points a9ove t.e point [Link] MC 2 "%C, $[Link] the short run' a monopolist with a loss of 354' alon# with mar#inal re-enue of 3$4' an( mar#inal cost of 315' shoul( a) shut (own. +) expan( output an( raise price. c6 e>pand o+tp+t and c+t price, () cut output an( raise price. $<. Inefficienc& results from monopol& +ecause a) hi#h monopol& prices are not equita+le. 96 a monopo*y +nderBprod+ces re*ative to t.e idea* at [Link]. societyJs mar7ina* cost2mar7ina* 9enefit, c) it makes qualit& pro(ucts that cost a lot. () all of the a+o-e. $6. !artels are inherentl& unsta+le as' a6 "t t.e a7reed +pon prod+ction *eve* price remains .[Link] [Link] t.e mar7ina* cost of prod+ction, +) !artels are forme( +& cheaters. c) !artels are alwa&s forme( +& man& firms an( hence coor(ination is not possi+le. () Coth a L c. 34. :n(er monopolistic competition' lon#-run economic profits ten( towar( =ero +ecause of a)economic inefficienc&. +) pro(uct (ifferentiation. c)the (ownwar(-slopin# (eman( cur-e facin# each firm. d6 t.e *ac5 of 9arriers to entry, 31. 0 ke& characteristic of monopolisticall& competiti-e market structure is: a)2ne firm pla&s the (ominant role in the in(ustr&. 96 Se7mented mar5et does not a**o0 a monopo*istica**y competitive firm to f+**y e>p*oit economies of sca*e, c)M-er& firm in the in(ustr& sells a homo#enous pro(uct. () *irms earn economic profit in the lon# run. 3$. %hich of the followin# is not a requirement of a #ame8 a) Pla&ers. +) Pa&offs. c6 Dominant strate7ies, () ?nowle(#e of the pa&offs. 33. *or the followin# question' assume that in !ana(a the opportunit& cost of coal is 1E3 +arrel of oil an( the opportunit& cost of oil is 3 tons of coal. 0ssume that in Can#la(esh the opportunit& cost of coal is 1E. +arrel of oil an( the opportunit& cost for oil is . tons of coal. %ho has the comparati-e a(-anta#e in pro(ucin# coal an( who has the comparati-e a(-anta#e in pro(ucin# oil8 a6 (an7*ades. .as comparative advanta7e in prod+cin7 coa* and Canada .as t.e comparative advanta7e in prod+cin7 oi*, +) Can#la(esh has comparati-e a(-anta#e in pro(ucin# coal an( also has the comparati-e a(-anta#e in pro(ucin# oil. c)!ana(a has comparati-e a(-anta#e in pro(ucin# coal an( Can#la(esh has the comparati-e a(-anta#e in pro(ucin# oil. 5

() !ana(a has comparati-e a(-anta#e in pro(ucin# +oth coal an( oil. 3.. 0ssume that the (omestic (eman( for mp3 pla&ers is #i-en +& P A <4 - D. The suppl& of (omestic pro(ucers is #i-en +& P A 14 I D' an( the international suppl& +& P A 15. If this is an open econom& then the num+er of quantities of import of mp3 for this econom& is: a)54 96 <0 c).4 () $4 35. Two !ana(ian workers' 0lan an( >essica' can each pro(uce sto-es or coffee. 0lan can pro(uce either 154 k# of coffee or 1 sto-e per month. >essica can pro(uce either "4 k# of coffee or 1 sto-e per month. 7ow much of each #oo( is pro(uce( if each worker speciali=es accor(in# to comparati-e a(-anta#e8 a)$ sto-es an( "4 k# coffee +) 1 sto-e an( "4 k# coffee c)$ sto-e an( $14 k# coffee d6 None of t.e a9ove )art II& "ns0er !I%E of t.e fo**o0in7 SI$ C+estions, If more [Link] five C+estions are ans0ered: on*y t.e first five attempted 0i** 9e mar5ed 1Tota*2<4 mar5s6, /+estion K 1 113 mar5s6 5uppose the prices of (ou#hnuts (() an( coffee (c) are P( A 3. an( Pc A 3$' an( we o+ser-e the consumer to purchase exactl& three (ou#hnuts an( two cups of coffee e-er& (a&. (i) Nraph the resultin# +u(#et constraint on a (ia#ram ((ou#hnuts on the -ertical axis an( coffee on the hori=ontal axis)' with intercepts clearl& marke(' explainin# how &ou arri-e at the answers. %hat is the consumerJs total income8 (3 marks) "ns& Income 2 3L;M N 2L;2 2 ;1<, Intercepts are& d 2 1<OM 2 M 1on t.e vertica* a>is6 G c 2 1<O22@ 1on t.e .oriIonta* a>is6 (ii) !alculate the slope of the +u(#et line an( explain what it stan(s for. If the H: from coffee consumption at the chosen +un(le is equal to 144' fin( the utilit& o+taine( from consumin# the thir( (ou#hnut. (3 marks) "ns& s*ope 2 B )cO)d 2 B 2OM 2 B 1O2 2 B 0,4 It means [Link] to p+[Link] one more c+p of coffee t.e cons+mer needs to 7ive +p .a*f a do+7.n+t, "t t.e optima* 9+nd*e& 1MUdO)d621MUcO)c6 MU of t.e 3rd do+7.n+t 2 1100LM6O22 200 (iii) Gow suppose the #o-ernment su+si(i=es coffee pro(ucers such that the new market price of coffee is 31 per cup. Illustrate #raphicall& an( explain what happens to the HO5' quantit& consume( of coffee an( quantit& consume( of (ou#hnuts. (. marks). "ns& "s a res+*t of t.e s+9sidy: t.e 9+d7et *ine rotates o+t0ard aro+nd t.e vertica* intercept, T.e 9+d7et *ine is no0 f*atter P .as a s*ope eC+a* to 0,24 T.e ne0 MRS is: 1OM 2 0,24, T.e C+antity cons+med of coffee 0i** increase 1since it is no0 re*ative*y c.eaper6: and t.e C+antity cons+med of do+7.n+ts 0i** increase as 0e** 1since itJs a comp*ement for coffee in cons+mption6, T.e ne0 optima* 9+nd*e 0i** comprise more of 9ot. 7oods after t.e s+9sidy, (i-) Instea( of the su+si(& in (iii)' assume now that the consumer loses his 1o+ an( thus experiences a (rop in income to 3< per (a&. Illustrate the new +u(#et constraint an( the new optimal +un(le on a (ia#ram. 0ssume that +oth #oo(s are normal. (3 marks). "ns& ne0 eC+i*i9ri+m s.o+*d 9e positioned 9e*o0 and to t.e *eft on a *o0er indifference c+rve, Income no0 is ;@: 9+t prices are +nc.an7ed, T.+s t.e ne0 9+d7et *ine is para**e* and to t.e *eft of t.e o*d one, /+estion K2 113 mar5s6 !onsi(er the Harket for milk in 5askatchewan. If P is the price of milk (cents per litre) an( D is the quantit& of litres (in millions per month)' suppose that the (eman( an( suppl& cur-es for milk are #i-en +&: "

)eman(: 5uppl&: (i) 0ssumin# there is no #o-ernment inter-ention in this market' what is the equili+rium price an( quantit&8 ($ marks) ) 2 1<4 cents per *itre 12 ;1,<4 per *itre6 and / 2 M mi**ion *itres O mont. (ii) *in( consumer surplus' pro(ucer surplus an( the total social surplus. ($ marks) CS 2Q1224B1<46LMRO22120 )S 2Q11<4B246LMRO222@0 TS 2M00 Gow suppose the #o-ernment #uarantees milk pro(ucers a price of 3$ per litre an( promises to +u& an& milk that the pro(ucers cannot sell. (iii) *in( the new quantit& tra(e( on the market' the price pai( +& consumers' the price recei-e( +& pro(ucers an( the quantit& of milk the #o-ernment woul( +e +u&in# (per month) with this s&stem of price support. Ooun( all (ecimals to the nearest hun(re(th. ($ marks) / 2 1224B2006O14 2 1,<<<< 1,<A mi**ion *itres O mont.

)rice paid 9y cons+mers 2 price received 9y se**ers 2 ;2 O *itre of mi*5 /+antity 9o+7.t 9y t.e 7overnment 2 1200B246O34 1200B2246O14 2 4 B 1,<A 23,33 mi**ion *itres (i-) Ni-en this polic& of price control' fin( the new consumer surplus' pro(ucer surplus' the cost to the #o-ernment an( the (ea(wei#ht loss. (. marks)

CS 2 Q1224B2006L1,<ARO22 20,@A4 )S 2 Q1200B246L4RO22M3A,4

20,@@

Costs to t.e 7overnment 2 14 1,<A6 L 2 2 ;<,<< mi**ion D # 2 c.an7e in cons+mer s+rp*+s N c.an7e in prod+ce s+rp*+s N c.an7e in 7overnment f+nds2 120,@@ B 1206 N 1M3A,4B2@06 B <<< 2 B??,12 N 14A,4 B <<< 2 B<0A,<2, D #2TSJBTS2120,@@NM3A,4B<<<6BM002B<0A,<2, (-) Gow assume that instea( of price control' the #o-ernment imposes a specific tax to +e pai( +& the suppliers. The tax shoul( result in an equili+rium price equal to 3$ per litre of milk. *in( the ma#nitu(e of this tax. (3 marks) t 2 specific ta> 1in cents O *itre of mi*56 "t ;2 per *itre cons+mer is 0i**in7 to p+[Link] 2 1224B2006O14 2 1,<A mi**ion *itres T.e ta> inc*+sive S+pp*y& ) 2 24 N 34/ N t Since 1/21,<A: )2 2006 *ies on t.e ta>Binc*+sive s+pp*y 200 2 24 N 34L1,<A N t t 2 11<,44 cents per *itre 2 ;1,1A per *itre /+estion K3 113 mar5s6 5uppose that the resi(ents of a traffic con#este( area (eman( that their municipalit& works on re(ucin# noise an( traffic pollution in their nei#h+ourhoo(. The municipalit& cooperates with the resi(ents an( con-e&s their request to the 9

#o-ernment as their (eman( a#rees with the #o-ernmentJs en-ironmental o+1ecti-e of pollution re(uction throu#h the facilitation of access to pu+lic transportation. The pri-ate mar#inal +enefit from consumin# pu+lic transport is: P=30-QD an( the mar#inal cost of pu+lic transport pro-ision is: P=10+0.5QS' where P is the price per trip an( Q measures the num+er of trips ma(e per month. The mar#inal external +enefit (HMC) of pu+lic transportation is: MEB=0.5QD' so the social +enefit (eman( cur-e is )230B 0,4/D, (i) %hat shoul( +e the quantit& of trips that achie-es allocati-e efficienc&8 (3 marks) To [Link] a**ocative efficiency& 130B/6N10,4/6210N0,4/ 30B0,4/210N0,4/ /220 trips, (ii) %hat shoul( +e the amount of the specific su+si(& to achie-e the efficient quantit&8 (. marks) "t t.e a**ocative*y efficient C+antity 2 20 trips& )rice on socia* demand 2 30B0,4L20230B102 ;20 )rice on private demand 2 30B202;10 S+9sidy per trip 2 ;20B;102 ;10 O trip (iii) %hat is the cost of the su+si(& to #o-ernment8 (3 marks) Tota* cost of s+9sidy pro7ram 2 1s+9sidy per pass6 L 1a**ocative*y efficient C+antity6 2 ;10 L 20 2;200 (i-) The lower price an( increase( quantit& (eman(e( of pu+lic transport resultin# from the su+si(& lea-es +oth pu+lic transport passen#ers an( the nei#h+ourhoo(Js resi(ents happier than +efore. %hat coul( +e sai( a+out the nature of pu+lic transportation8 %as pu+lic transportation un(er-pro(uce( or o-er- pro(uce( +efore the su+si(& was applie(8 (3 marks) "ns& since more p+9*ic transport cons+mption 9y passen7ers .as 9ot. a private and e>terna* mar7ina* 9enefit p+9*ic transport is a 7ood [Link] 7enerates a positive e>terna*ity fa**in7 +pon t.e residents of t.e traffic con7ested area, (efore t.e s+9sidy 0as app*ied and 0it. no 7overnment intervention: t.e positiveB e>terna*ity prod+cin7 7ood 0as +nderBprod+ced *eavin7 dead 0ei7.t *oss in t.e mar5et for p+9*ic transportation,

/+estion KM 113 mar5s6 There is a sin#le mo-ie theatre in the town of *rien(l& Ca&. There are two (istinct #roups of mo-ie #oers. Nroup one has a (eman( cur-e #i-en +& P A 1$ P 1E$D an( #roup two is compose( of 34 in(i-i(uals each willin# to pa& 31$. The owner incurs a fixe( cost each time he shows the mo-ie of 334 an( a cost of 3$ per in(i-i(ual who pa&s to enter. (i) Illustrate #raphicall& the two (eman( cur-es' la+elin# the intercepts carefull&. ($ marks) Do0n0ard s*opin7 D intercepts 12: 2MG .oriIonta* *ine at ) 2 ;12 +p to C 2 30 . (ii) Illustrate #raphicall& the market (eman( cur-e P that is the total of these two #roups to#ether. ($ marks) HoriIonta* +p to 30 at )212: [Link] s*opes do0n fo**o0in7 t.e do0n0ard s*opin7 demand. (iii) !ompute the profit that the owner woul( make if he char#e( a price of 3< to e-er&+o(&. ($ marks) 30 L ;< N @ L ;< B ;30 2 ;1?@. <

(i-) 5uppose now that he can separate the two #roups an( can therefore char#e them each a separate price. 5o he is now a monopolist an( will maximi=e his profit +& choosin# a quantit& in each #roup that he shoul( sell tickets to' correspon(in# to the rule H! A HO. 5o (raw the HO an( H! for each of the two su+markets an( illustrate #raphicall& the num+er of people from each #roup he shoul( sell tickets to. (. marks) MR is same as D in t.e case of t.e .oriIonta* demandG so .e s.o+*d s+pp*y every9ody .ere, In t.e do0n0ard s*opin7 case MR 2 12 1/ .ence [Link] MC 2 MR [Link] / 2 10: ) 2 ;A, (-) !ompute his total profit in this situation. (3 marks) 30 L ;10 N 10L;4 B ;30 2 ;320.

/+estion K4 113 mar5s6 Peter pro(uces to&s accor(in# to the pro(uction function D A Q I .Q $ P R Q3' where D is output an( Q is la+or. The mar#inal pro(uct cur-e is #i-en +& HPQ A 1 I <Q P S Q$. (i) )eri-e an expression for the a-era#e pro(uct of la+or. ($ marks) ") 2 1N M# 1OM#2. (ii) These are re#ular shape( a-era#e an( mar#inal pro(uct cur-es. Illustrate them on a #raph' an( compute the -alue of their intercepts on the -ertical axis. ($ marks) Intercepts are 1 for ") and M). (iii) %hat is the -alue of Q where the 0PQ is at its maximum8 (3 marks) .ere ") 2 M): # 2 @, (i-) 5ince we know that the a-era#e cost cur-e 0! can +e written as 0! A %a#eE0P Q ' if the wa#e is % A 3"<' what is the -alue of the 0! at its minimum8 ($ marks) "C 2 <@O1A 2 M. (-) If this firm is a perfect competitor' what price will it char#e for its output in the lon# run8 ($ marks) ) 2 min "C& ) 2 ;M. (-i) If this firm is a monopolist in the market' can we sa& how much hi#her its price will +e relati-e to the perfect competitor8 ($ marks) No& 0e do not 5no0 t.e D c+rve: .ence 0e donJt 5no0 t.e MR c+rve .

/+estion K< 113 mar5s6 The (omestic market for cheese is #i-en +& P A 14< P $D an( P A 1" I 1E.D. These are the (eman( an( suppl& con(itions. The #oo( can +e supplie( internationall& at a constant price P A $..

(i)

Illustrate the (omestic market in the a+sence of tra(e an( sol-e for the equili+rium price an( quantit& ((onJt +e concerne( if &ou #et a fraction in &our answer). ($ marks) )22<,22: / 2 M0,@?.

(ii)

%ith free tra(e illustrate the market #raphicall& an( compute the total amount purchase(' an( compute the amount supplie( +& (omestic an( international suppliers each. ($ marks) Tota* amo+nt p+rc.ased2M2: amo+nt s+pp*ied domestica**y232: amo+nt s+pp*ied internationa**y: i,e, imports2M2B32210,

(iii) 5uppose now that the #o-ernment implements a price floor in the (omestic market equal to 3.<. Illustrate the market outcome #raphicall&. (3 marks) )rice f*oor *ine is .oriIonta* at )2M@, (i-) *or the outcome with a price floor' compute the quantit& supplie( +& (omestic an( international suppliers respecti-el&. (3 marks) "mo+nt p+[Link] and s+pp*ied domestica**y230: imports20. (-) Illustrate #raphicall& the total supplierEpro(ucer surplus at the price floor outcome. (3 marks) It is t.e area 9et0een price of M@ and t.e ori7ina* s+pp*y c+rve )21<N/OM: +p to /230,

The Mn(

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