Case under State Immunity E. MERRITT v.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (21 March 1916) 34 PHIL 311 [kindly put the name of the ponente here] FACTS BACKGROUND. Plaintiff (Merritt) was driving a motorcycle toward the western part of Padre Faura (Calle Padre Faura) with a speed of 10 to 12 miles an hour upon crossing Taft Avenue. When he was 10 feet from the southwest intersection, the General Hospital ambulance turned suddenly to the right side of Taft Ave. without sounding the horn. Such act violated the Motor Vehicle Act which prescribes that after passing the center, the vehicle should have turned south to reach the left side. This resulted to the ambulances collision with the plaintiff who was six feet from the southwest point. o The plaintiff sustained the severe injuries as diagnosed by Dr. Saleeby. He suffered depression in the left parietal region, wound in the same area and in the back of the head, and nose bleeding. He was also unconscious. His pulse was weak and irregular at the time of his operation (10:00pm). His right leg was also broken that the fracture extended to the outer skin. o He had a weak mental condition and was also slightly deaf. [were these a consequence of the accident? The wording may mean that he had been like that even before] o Because of this condition, the plaintiff could no longer perform his duties as a contractor efficiently that he had to dissolve the partnership he formed with the engineer. FIRST STAGE. Legislature passed Act no. 2457 effective Feb. 3, 1915, enabling the plaintiff to file suit against the government. The government cannot be sued by an individual without its consent.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads: An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen; Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and

Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore, By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that: SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same. SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

SECOND STAGE. Both parties appealed regarding judgement rendered by Court of First Instance of Manila City (which was in favor of the plaintiff with the sum of P14,471). o The plaintiff said the trial court erred: 1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," 2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint." o Meanwhile, the defendant said the trial court erred: 1) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur 2) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur 3) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741

ISSUES Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? The issue is whether the government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists. RULINGS The Court was in full accord with the trial court that the accident was due to the negligence of the chauffeur.

o The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. The Court also found that the trial court erred in calculating the amount to be paid for the plaintiffs loss of wages. There are two items questioned that constitute the P14,741 (the original total amount to be given to the plaintiff): o 1) P5,000 for permanent injuries. The Court found no justification to increase this amount. o 2) P2,666 for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. According to records, the plaintiffs services as contractor amounted to P1,000 per month. However, the trial court limited the actual time only to the time the plaintiff was confined which was 2 months and 21 days. The Court said it was clear that the plaintiff was incapacitated for 6 months, 2 of which was spent in the hospital and the remainder at his home. Thus, the amount of damages is P18,075. It was also established that the government can only be made liable for the acts of its officers and employees when they act as special agents. The chauffeur of the ambulance was not a special agent. (See citation on Supreme Court of Spain below). The Court ruled that Legislature is responsible in finding whether the government is legally liable for the amount of damages. o For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

CITATION OF CASES & OTHER LAWS: As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, [what is this reference? a book? A manual?] thus: By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability

and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Apfelbacher vs. State of Wisconsin: It (removing states immunity from suit) simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from wellestablished principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.) Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284): Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. (Art. 1903 was cited in examining substantive laws touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees) Supreme Court of Spain in defining the scope of paragraph 5: It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.) That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or

omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)