FM 3-21.

31

MARCH 2003

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is

unlimited.
 FM 3-21.31

FIELD MANUAL HEADQUARTERS

NO. 3-21.31 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC, 13 March 2003

THE STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE......................................................................................................................... xi

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF THE STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

Section I. Capabilities ........................................................................................... 1-1
1-1. Combined Arms Assault in the Close Fight ............................. 1-1
1-2. Mobility .................................................................................... 1-2
1-3. Reach ........................................................................................ 1-2
1-4. Enhanced Situational Understanding........................................ 1-2
1-5. Lethality .................................................................................... 1-3
1-6. Force Protection........................................................................ 1-3
1-7. Force Effectiveness................................................................... 1-4
1-8. Joint/Multinational/Interagency Interoperability...................... 1-4
1-9. Full-Spectrum Flexibility.......................................................... 1-4
1-10. Simultaneous Operations .......................................................... 1-4
Section II. How the SBCT Fights........................................................................... 1-5
1-11. Major Theater War.................................................................... 1-6
1-12. Smaller-scale Contingency ....................................................... 1-7
1-13. Peacetime Military Engagement............................................... 1-8
1-14. Battlefield Organization............................................................ 1-9
1-15. Deep, Close, and Rear Areas .................................................. 1-10
1-16. Rules of Engagement and Rules of Interaction ...................... 1-11
Section III SBCT Organization............................................................................. 1-12
1-17. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team ........................................ 1-12
1-18. Infantry Battalions .................................................................. 1-13
1-19. Cavalry Squadron (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and
Target Acquisition [RSTA]) ................................................... 1-14
1-20. Field Artillery Battalion.......................................................... 1-15
1-21. Antitank Company.................................................................. 1-16
1-22. Engineer Company ................................................................. 1-16
1-23. Signal Company...................................................................... 1-17
1-24. Military Intelligence Company............................................... 1-18
1-25. Brigade Support Battalion ...................................................... 1-18
1-26. Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company................ 1-19
1-27. SBCT Command Structure ..................................................... 1-20
1-28. SBCT Staff Structure .............................................................. 1-22

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FM 3-21.31

CHAPTER 2. BATTLE COMMAND

Section I. The Art of Command ............................................................................ 2-1
2-1. Role of the Commander............................................................ 2-1
2-2. Mission Command.................................................................... 2-1
2-3. Location of the Commander ..................................................... 2-2
2-4. Combining the Art of Command and the Science of Control... 2-3
Section II. Command and Control.......................................................................... 2-4
2-5. The Command and Control System.......................................... 2-5
2-6. Command and Control System Infrastructure .......................... 2-5
2-7. Exercising Command and Control............................................ 2-6
2-8. Distribution of SBCT Command and Control .......................... 2-7
Section III. Planning for Operations ...................................................................... 2-10
2-9. Information Systems Enhancement to Decision-Making ....... 2-10
2-10. The Military Decision-Making Process.................................. 2-12
2-11. Roles of the Commander and Executive Officer .................... 2-13
2-12. The Role of Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance . 2-14
Section IV. The Military Decision-Making Process .............................................. 2-14
2-13. Receipt of Mission .................................................................. 2-15
2-14. Mission Analysis .................................................................... 2-16
2-15. Course of Action Development .............................................. 2-16
2-16. Course of Action Analysis (War Game)................................. 2-16
2-17. Course of Action Comparison ................................................ 2-16
2-18. Course of Action Approval..................................................... 2-17
2-19. Orders Production ................................................................... 2-17
2-20. Decision-Making in a Time-Constrained Environment.......... 2-17
Section V. Preparing for Operations..................................................................... 2-23
2-21. Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance ..................... 2-23
2-22. Security ................................................................................... 2-24
2-23. Force Protection...................................................................... 2-24
2-24. Revise and Refine the Plan ..................................................... 2-24
2-25. Coordination and Liaison........................................................ 2-25
2-26. Rehearsals ............................................................................... 2-25
Section VI. Execution ............................................................................................ 2-25
2-27. The Command and Control System during Execution ........... 2-26
2-28. Adapting to Changes............................................................... 2-26
2-29. Assessment.............................................................................. 2-26
2-30. Decisions................................................................................. 2-27
2-31. Directing Action ..................................................................... 2-29

CHAPTER 3. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

PLANNING
Section I. The MDMP and the ISR Operation ...................................................... 3-1
3-1. Overview................................................................................... 3-1
3-2. Responsibilities......................................................................... 3-2
3-3. ISR Planning ............................................................................. 3-3

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3-4. Issue the WARNO .................................................................... 3-6

3-5. Develop and Issue ISR Order ................................................... 3-6
3-6. The ISR Overlay ....................................................................... 3-8
Section II. Collection Management Process......................................................... 3-10
3-7. Intelligence Requirements ...................................................... 3-10
3-8. The Reconnaissance and Surveillance Tasking Matrix .......... 3-12
Section III. Battletracking ISR............................................................................... 3-14
3-9. Process the Information .......................................................... 3-15
3-10. Receive and Record the Message ........................................... 3-15
3-11. Filter the Information.............................................................. 3-15
3-12. Post the Information................................................................ 3-16
3-13. Disseminate the Information................................................... 3-16
3-14. Modify the ISR Plan ............................................................... 3-16
Section IV. Reconnaissance Operations ................................................................ 3-17
3-15. Reconnaissance in Force......................................................... 3-17
3-16. Zone Reconnaissance.............................................................. 3-18
3-17. Integration of the Cavalry Squadron (RSTA) and
the Infantry Battalions ............................................................ 3-19

CHAPTER 4. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section I Characteristics of the Offense............................................................... 4-1
4-1. Surprise ..................................................................................... 4-1
4-2. Concentration............................................................................ 4-2
4-3. Tempo ....................................................................................... 4-3
4-4. Audacity.................................................................................... 4-3
Section II. Forms of Maneuver............................................................................... 4-4
4-5. Envelopment ............................................................................. 4-4
4-6. Turning Movement ................................................................... 4-5
4-7. Infiltration ................................................................................. 4-6
4-8. Penetration ................................................................................ 4-7
4-9. Frontal Attack ........................................................................... 4-8
Section III. Forms of Tactical Offense .................................................................... 4-8
4-10. Movement to Contact................................................................ 4-8
4-11. Attack...................................................................................... 4-11
4-12. Exploitation............................................................................. 4-14
4-13. Pursuit ..................................................................................... 4-17
Section IV. Offensive Planning Considerations..................................................... 4-19
4-14. Force Organization ................................................................. 4-20
4-15. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance .................... 4-21
4-16. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Fundamentals4-22
4-17. Scheme of Maneuver .............................................................. 4-24
4-18. Fires and Effects ..................................................................... 4-25
Section V. SBCT Supporting a Higher Headquarters........................................... 4-26
4-19. BOS Planning Considerations ................................................ 4-26
4-20. Flank Guard ............................................................................ 4-29
4-21. Secure Key Terrain ................................................................. 4-29

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4-22. Conduct Follow-and-Support ................................................. 4-30

4-23. Main Effort in the Attack........................................................ 4-30
4-24. Counterattack in the Defense.................................................. 4-30
4-25. Conduct Follow-and-Assume as an Exploitation
Pursuit Force ........................................................................... 4-31

CHAPTER 5. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Section I.. Fundamentals of the Defense................................................................ 5-1
5-1. Purpose of the Defense ............................................................. 5-1
5-2. Organization of Defensive Actions........................................... 5-1
5-3. Characteristics of the Defense .................................................. 5-4
Section II. Types of Defensive Operations............................................................. 5-7
5-4. Area Defense............................................................................. 5-8
5-5. Mobile Defense....................................................................... 5-11
5-6. Perimeter Defense................................................................... 5-12
Section III. Retrograde Operations ........................................................................ 5-14
5-7. Forms of Retrograde Operations............................................. 5-14
5-8. Delay....................................................................................... 5-14
5-9. Delay Scheme of Maneuver.................................................... 5-17
5-10. Maximizing the Use of Terrain in a Delay ............................. 5-17
5-11. Forcing the Enemy to Deploy and Maneuver in a Delay ....... 5-18
5-12. Avoiding Decisive Engagement in a Delay............................ 5-18
5-13. Parameters of the Delay Order................................................ 5-19
5-14. Alternate and Subsequent Positions in a Delay ...................... 5-19
5-15. Support Considerations in a Delay ......................................... 5-22
5-16. Delay Preparations.................................................................. 5-24
5-17. Execution of a Delay............................................................... 5-25
5-18. Withdrawal.............................................................................. 5-27
5-19. Withdrawal Organization........................................................ 5-27
5-20. Withdrawal Planning Considerations ..................................... 5-28
5-21. Withdrawal Scheme of Maneuver .......................................... 5-29
5-22. Withdrawal Preparation .......................................................... 5-30
5-23. Withdrawal Execution ............................................................ 5-30
5-24. Concealing the Withdrawal .................................................... 5-31
5-25. Disengagement in a Withdrawal............................................. 5-31
5-26. Actions on Contact in a Withdrawal....................................... 5-31
5-27. Terminating the Withdrawal................................................... 5-31
5-28. Retirement............................................................................... 5-32
Section IV. Defensive Planning Considerations .................................................... 5-33
5-29. Defensive Planning Steps ....................................................... 5-33
5-30. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield .............................. 5-34
5-31. Course of Action Development .............................................. 5-36
Section V. Sequence of the Defense..................................................................... 5-38
5-32. Occupation and Establishment of Security............................. 5-38
5-33. Preparation and Continued Security Operations..................... 5-39
5-34. Security Area Engagement ..................................................... 5-39

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5-35. Main Battle Area Engagement................................................ 5-41

5-36. Follow-On Missions ............................................................... 5-42
Section VI. Countermobility, Mobility, and Survivability Integration.................. 5-43
5-37. Countermobility ...................................................................... 5-43
5-38. Survivability............................................................................ 5-47
Section VII. Transition Operations ......................................................................... 5-47
5-39. Reorganization ........................................................................ 5-47
5-40. Exploit..................................................................................... 5-48
5-41. Defend..................................................................................... 5-49

CHAPTER 6. URBAN OPERATIONS

Section I. The SBCT’s Role in Urban Operations ................................................ 6-1
6-1. Isolation .................................................................................... 6-1
6-2. Close Combat............................................................................ 6-1
Section II. Fundamentals of Urban Operations ...................................................... 6-2
6-3. Perform Focused Information Operations and Aggressive ISR
Operations ................................................................................. 6-2
6-4. Understand the Human Dimension........................................... 6-2
6-5. Separate Noncombatants from Combatants.............................. 6-2
6-6. Avoid the Attrition Approach ................................................... 6-2
6-7. Control the Essential................................................................. 6-3
6-8. Minimize Collateral Damage.................................................... 6-3
6-9. Conduct Close Combat ............................................................. 6-3
6-10. Transition Control..................................................................... 6-3
6-11. Restore Essential Services ........................................................ 6-3
6-12. Preserve Critical Infrastructure................................................. 6-4
Section III. Tactical Challenges............................................................................... 6-4
6-13. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Areas of Operation ................ 6-4
6-14. Asymmetrical Threats............................................................... 6-4
6-15. Collateral Damage and Noncombatant Casualties.................... 6-5
6-16. Transition from Stability Operations to Combat Operations.... 6-5
6-17. Enemy Threat............................................................................ 6-5
6-18. Enemy Tactics........................................................................... 6-6
6-19. Potential Enemy Threats........................................................... 6-8
6-20. Urban Mapping ......................................................................... 6-8
6-21. Fires and Effects Support........................................................ 6-14
6-22. Communications ..................................................................... 6-15
6-23. Offensive Operations .............................................................. 6-16
6-24. Defensive Operations.............................................................. 6-20
6-25. Aviation Operations................................................................ 6-23

CHAPTER 7. TACTICAL ENABLING OPERATIONS

Section I. Security Operations............................................................................... 7-1
7-1. Security Missions during SBCT Operations............................. 7-1
7-2. SBCT-Level Security Missions ................................................ 7-3
7-3. Offensive Cover........................................................................ 7-4

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7-4. Defensive Cover ....................................................................... 7-5

Section II. Relief Operations .................................................................................. 7-6
7-8. Planning Considerations ........................................................... 7-7
7-9. Conducting the Relief ............................................................... 7-9
7-10. Command and Control............................................................ 7-10
Section III. Battle Handover and Passage of Lines................................................ 7-10
7-11. Battle Handover ...................................................................... 7-10
7-12. Passage of Lines...................................................................... 7-11
7-13. Forward Passage of Lines ....................................................... 7-16
7-14. Rearward Passage of Lines ..................................................... 7-17
7-15. Rehearsal................................................................................. 7-17
Section IV. Linkup Operations .............................................................................. 7-18
7-16. Command and Control............................................................ 7-18
7-17. Forms of Linkup ..................................................................... 7-19
Section V. River Crossing Operations.................................................................. 7-23
7-18. Types of Crossings.................................................................. 7-23
7-19. Phases of a River Crossing ..................................................... 7-25
7-20. Command and Control............................................................ 7-26
Section VI. Troop Movement ................................................................................ 7-28
7-21. Administrative Movement ...................................................... 7-28
7-22. Tactical Road March............................................................... 7-28
7-23. Tactical Road March Techniques ........................................... 7-30
7-24. Approach March ..................................................................... 7-30
7-25. Assembly Areas ...................................................................... 7-31
7-26. Combat Formations................................................................. 7-33
7-27. Control of Movement.............................................................. 7-39

CHAPTER 8. STABILITY OPERATIONS

Section I. Stability Operations .............................................................................. 8-1
8-1. Purpose...................................................................................... 8-1
8-2. Characteristics of Stability Operations ..................................... 8-3
Section II. Types of Stability Operations ............................................................... 8-4
8-3. Peace Operations....................................................................... 8-4
8-4. Foreign Internal Defense .......................................................... 8-7
8-5. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.......................................... 8-8
8-6. Support to Insurgency............................................................... 8-8
8-7. Support to Counterinsurgency .................................................. 8-8
8-8. Security Assistance ................................................................... 8-9
8-9. Support to Counterdrug Operations........................................ 8-10
8-10. Combating Terrorism.............................................................. 8-10
8-11. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations ................................... 8-11
8-12. Arms Control .......................................................................... 8-12
8-13. Show of Force......................................................................... 8-12
Section III. Planning Considerations ..................................................................... 8-13
8-14. Decentralized Operations........................................................ 8-13
8-15. Rules of Engagement .............................................................. 8-13

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8-16. Rules of Interaction................................................................. 8-14

8-17. Protection ................................................................................ 8-15
8-18. Task Organization................................................................... 8-16
8-19. Media Considerations ............................................................. 8-17
8-20. Operations with Outside Agencies ......................................... 8-18
Section IV. Specific Considerations by BOS......................................................... 8-18
8-21. Intelligence.............................................................................. 8-19
8-22. Maneuver ................................................................................ 8-22
8-23. Aviation Support..................................................................... 8-22
8-24. Fires and Effects ..................................................................... 8-22
8-25. Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability ........................ 8-23
8-26. Air Defense ............................................................................. 8-24
8-27. Combat Service Support ......................................................... 8-24
8-28. Command and Control............................................................ 8-25
8-29. Sequence of Stability Operations Actions .............................. 8-26
Section V Techniques .......................................................................................... 8-27
8-30. Patrols ..................................................................................... 8-28
8-31. Observation Posts ................................................................... 8-28
8-32. Static Security Posts................................................................ 8-29
8-33. Searches .................................................................................. 8-30
8-34. Roadblocks and Other Checkpoints........................................ 8-33

CHAPTER 9. SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Section I. Characteristics of Support Operations .................................................. 9-1
9-1. Types of Support Operations .................................................... 9-1
9-2. The Army’s Role in Support Operations .................................. 9-2
9-3. Forms of Support Operations.................................................... 9-3
Section II. Planning Considerations ....................................................................... 9-5
9-4. Considerations for Support Operations..................................... 9-5
9-5. Planning Process ....................................................................... 9-6
9-6. Command and Control.............................................................. 9-7
9-7. Maneuver .................................................................................. 9-7
9-8. Intelligence................................................................................ 9-8
9-9. Information Gathering .............................................................. 9-8
9-10. Fires and Effects ....................................................................... 9-8
9-11. Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability .......................... 9-9
9-12. Air Defense ............................................................................. 9-10
9-13. Logistics.................................................................................. 9-10
9-14. Other Planning Considerations ............................................... 9-10
Section III. Pattern of Operations .......................................................................... 9-11
9-15. Response ................................................................................. 9-11
9-16. Recovery ................................................................................. 9-12
9-17. Restoration .............................................................................. 9-12
Section IV. Sequence of Operations ...................................................................... 9-13
9-18. Movement into the Area of Operations .................................. 9-13
9-19. Establishing the Base of Operations ....................................... 9-13

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9-20. Maintenance of Support.......................................................... 9-14

9-21. Terminating Operations .......................................................... 9-14
9-22. Transition to Combat .............................................................. 9-15
Section V. Training Considerations...................................................................... 9-15
9-23. Training for Support Operations............................................. 9-16
9-24. Specific Training for DSO or FHA Missions ......................... 9-17

CHAPTER 10. COMBAT SUPPORT

Section I. Fires and Effects ................................................................................. 10-1
10-1. Mission and Capabilities......................................................... 10-1
10-2. Field Artillery ......................................................................... 10-3
10-3. Air Support ............................................................................. 10-3
10-4. Naval Gunfire ......................................................................... 10-4
Section II. Information Operations....................................................................... 10-4
10-5. Civil Affairs ............................................................................ 10-5
10-6. Psychological Operations ....................................................... 10-5
10-7. Public Affairs.......................................................................... 10-6
Section III. Maneuver Support............................................................................... 10-6
10-8. Engineer Functions ................................................................. 10-6
10-9. Staff Engineer Section ............................................................ 10-7
10-10. Engineer Company ................................................................. 10-8
10-11. Mobility .................................................................................. 10-9
10-12. Countermobility .................................................................... 10-11
10-13. Survivability.......................................................................... 10-10
10-14. Military Police Support......................................................... 10-12
10-15. Military Police Company Organization................................ 10-14
10-16. Employment and Planning Considerations........................... 10-14
Section IV. Air and Missile Defense ................................................................... 10-14
10-17. Air Defense Airspace Management Cell Capabilities .......... 10-14
10-18. Operational Functions........................................................... 10-14
Section V. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical ................................................... 10-15
10-19. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Organization ................. 10-15
10-20. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance ................... 10-16
10-21. Smoke Operations................................................................. 10-17
Section VI. Intelligence........................................................................................ 10-18
10-22. Purpose.................................................................................. 10-18
10-23. Employment and Planning Considerations........................... 10-18
10-24. Military Intelligence Company............................................. 10-19
Section VII. Signal 10-20
10-25. Signal Support....................................................................... 10-20
10-26. Signal Company Organization.............................................. 10-20
10-27. Brigade Signal Company Communications and Equipment 10-23
10-28. Electronic Preparation of the Battlefield .............................. 10-25

CHAPTER 11. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Section I. CSS Planning Considerations ............................................................. 11-1

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11-1. General Guidelines ................................................................. 11-1

11-2. SBCT Responsibilities............................................................ 11-2
11-3. Predeployment Activities........................................................ 11-3
Section II. CSS in the SBCT ................................................................................ 11-3
11-4. Brigade Support Battalion ...................................................... 11-4
11-5. Theater Contracting Support................................................... 11-5
11-6. Human Resources Support...................................................... 11-7
11-7. Legal Support.......................................................................... 11-8
11-8. Religious Support ................................................................... 11-8
11-9. Financial Management.......................................................... 11-10
11-10. Enemy Prisoners of War Management ................................. 11-11
11-11. Mortuary Affairs ................................................................... 11-12
11-12. Communications ................................................................... 11-13
11-13. Command and Control Systems ........................................... 11-13
Section III. Supply and Transportation Operations............................................... 11-17
11-14. Classes of Supply.................................................................. 11-17
11-15. Routine Resupply.................................................................. 11-20
11-16. Immediate Resupply ............................................................. 11-22
11-17. Supply and Transportation Considerations........................... 11-23
11-18. Supply and Transportation Augmentation............................ 11-23
Section IV. Maintenance Operations ................................................................... 11-23
11-19. SBCT Maintenance Concept ................................................ 11-23
11-20. Maintenance Requirements................................................... 11-24
11-21. Company Role ...................................................................... 11-25
11-22. Battalion Role ....................................................................... 11-26
11-23. SBCT Role............................................................................ 11-26
11-24. Maintenance Augmentation.................................................. 11-27
Section V. Health Service Support ..................................................................... 11-27
11-25. Preventive Medicine ............................................................. 11-27
11-26. Mental Health ....................................................................... 11-28
11-27. Soldiers Wounded in Action................................................. 11-28
11-28. Health Service Support Augmentation ................................. 11-32
11-29. Soldiers Killed in Action ...................................................... 11-32
Section VI. Reconstitution and Weapons Replacement....................................... 11-33
11-30. Reconstitution ....................................................................... 11-33
11-31. Personnel Replacement Procedures ...................................... 11-34
11-32. Replacement and Salvaging of Equipment........................... 11-34
Section VII. CSS From Outside the SBCT ........................................................... 11-34
11-33. Intermediate Staging Base .................................................... 11-34
11-34. Contractor and Host Nation Support .................................... 11-35
11-35. Explosive Ordnance Disposal............................................... 11-36
11-36. Field Services........................................................................ 11-36
11-37. General Engineering Support................................................ 11-37

APPENDIX A. CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS.............................................. A-1

APPENDIX B. ASSURED MOBILITY............................................................B-1

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APPENDIX C. RISK MANAGEMENT AND FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE C-1

APPENDIX D. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS AND COMPLIANCE....... D-1
APPENDIX E. INTEGRATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS,
MECHANIZED, AND LIGHT FORCES ...................................E-1
APPENDIX F. AVIATION SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS ............. F-1
APPENDIX G. AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS................................................. G-1
GLOSSARY ...................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ........................................................................................... Index-1

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PREFACE

The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is designed to be a full

spectrum, early entry combat force. It has utility in all operational
environments against all projected future threats. It possesses significant
utility for divisions and corps engaged in a major-theater war; however,
the SBCT is optimized to meet the challenges of smaller-scale
contingencies.

This manual describes how the SBCT optimizes organizational effectiveness while
balancing lethality, mobility, and survivability against requirements for rapid strategic
deployability. The SBCT includes a cavalry squadron (reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition [RSTA]), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
integration capability, imbedded human intelligence (HUMINT), psychological
operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), and robust combined arms infantry battalions.
This manual provides the commander and staff with the tactics and techniques to exploit
these elements and ensure the SBCT’s versatility across the full range of potential
requirements, from providing the security necessary to conduct stability operations
during peacetime military engagements to conducting offensive and defensive operations
in a major theater war against localized threats.

Although this manual does not implement any international agreements, the material
presented herein is in accordance with related international agreements.

The proponent of this publication is the US Army Infantry School. Send comments and
recommendations to [email protected] or on DA Form 2028 directly to
Commandant, US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ATD, Fort Benning, Georgia
31905-5593.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer
exclusively to men.

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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT
TEAM

The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is a full-spectrum combat

force that provides division, corps, or joint task force commanders a
unique capability across the spectrum of conflict. The SBCT balances
lethality, mobility, and survivability against the requirements for rapid
strategic deployability. The SBCT’s cavalry squadron (reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition [RSTA]); robust intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integration capability; and
combined arms infantry battalions ensure its versatility across the full
range of operations (offense, defense, stability, and support). This chapter
highlights the capabilities and limitations of the SBCT, discusses likely
scenarios in which the SBCT may be employed, and provides an overview
of the SBCT’s organizational structure.

Section I. CAPABILITIES
The SBCT can be deployed rapidly and can be sustained by an austere support structure
for up to 72 hours of independent operations. The SBCT conducts operations against
conventional or unconventional enemy forces in all types of terrain and climate
conditions and all spectrums of conflict (major theater war [MTW], smaller-scale
contingency [SSC], and peacetime military engagement [PME]). During continuous
operations, leaders and soldiers must think faster, make decisions more rapidly, and act
more quickly than the enemy. Refer to Appendix A, Continuous Operations, for a
detailed discussion of the effects of extended continuous operations on soldiers and
leaders. The SBCT can perform its mission throughout the entire spectrum of military
operations (offensive, defensive, stability, and support) but may require some
augmentation for certain missions. The SBCT may deploy as part of an early entry force
and may fight by itself or as part of a division or corps. The SBCT’s operational
capabilities are--
• Combined arms assault in the close fight.
• Mobility.
• Reach.
• Enhanced common operational picture (COP).
• Lethality.
• Force protection and survivability.
• Joint, multinational, or interagency operability.
• Full-spectrum flexibility and augmentation.
• Simultaneous operations.

1-1. COMBINED ARMS ASSAULT IN THE CLOSE FIGHT

The SBCT achieves decisive action with combined arms at the infantry company level by
applying the effects of direct fires from the mobile gun system (MGS), indirect fires from
mortars and artillery, and joint effects of other services to support the infantry assault.

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FM 3-21.31

The SBCT possesses a substantial capability, through its infantry and reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition units, to place units and soldiers in positions of
advantage throughout the area of operations.

1-2. MOBILITY
Strategically, the SBCT is capable of rapid deployment by air into any theater of
operations. Operationally, the SBCT is capable of intra-theater deployment by ground, by
sea, or by air transport. Tactically, the SBCT has versatile mobility with the Stryker
vehicle that combines the best capabilities of mechanized and light infantry
organizations. (Refer to Appendix B, Assured Mobility, for further information on SBCT
mobility.) The Stryker allows the SBCT to maintain mobility through complex, close
urban terrain, and it allows for a rapid repositioning capability that light infantry forces
lack. The Stryker enhances tactical mobility and allows the SBCT to strike the enemy in
depth, reposition its reserve rapidly, secure lines of communications, and conduct
nonlinear company and battalion fights and essential RSTA operations in noncontiguous
areas of operation. While the Stryker enhances the SBCT’s mobility, subordinate units
are not tethered to the vehicles.

1-3. REACH
Reach is the ability of a deployed military force to rapidly access information, conduct
collaborative information-sharing with, and receive support from, other units deployed
in-theater but not in the chain of command and from out of theater assets unconstrained
by geographic proximity, echelon, or command relationship. The SBCT’s capability for
reach enhances its force effectiveness by allowing the SBCT commander and staff to
exploit a multitude of non-organic resources to accomplish assigned missions.
a. The SBCT executes reach on a routine, deliberate basis as a combat power and
sustainment multiplier in five primary areas: fires and effects; intelligence and
information; planning and analysis; force protection; and sustainment. In addition to
enhancing the SBCT’s ability to accomplish its assigned mission, reach also enhances its
operational agility. Reach is executed primarily through the Army force (ARFOR),
although the ARFOR may authorize direct linkages between the SBCT and resource
providers when it is prudent and efficient to do so. Staffs must understand the capabilities
available through reach and how best to employ them for mission success.
b. Reach allows the supporting headquarters to provide detailed analytical support to
the SBCT commander and staff. This support includes anticipating and initiating
collection against long lead-time requirements, synthesizing available information on the
area of operation (AO), orchestrating the collection efforts of existing intelligence
organizations, and sophisticated computer analysis of a course of action (COA) to help
speed the military decision-making process (MDMP). The degree of support needed
depends on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) and should be tailored, as
the operation develops, to ensure seamless intelligence support.

1-4. ENHANCED SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

The SBCT employs a multi-level, integrated suite of intelligence, reconnaissance, and
surveillance assets to develop and share a common operational picture throughout the

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force. These information systems (INFOSYS) provide the SBCT commander with a
unique capability to visualize, describe, and direct the brigade through the full spectrum
of operations and terrain in which the unit may be operating.
a. The COP is an operational picture tailored to the SBCT commander's
requirements for information of friendly forces, enemy forces, and the terrain. It is based
on common data and information shared with subordinate (or adjacent) commands.
Analysis of the COP together with a commander’s application of his experience,
expertise, intuition, and judgment establishes a relationship among the factors of METT-
TC that leads to situational understanding. Situational understanding facilitates decision-
making by identifying opportunities for mission accomplishment, threats to the force and
mission accomplishment, and gaps in information. Although critical information may be
available via national and theater reach assets, the cavalry squadron (RSTA) (organic to
the SBCT) is the primary force for providing data and combat information to build the
knowledge base necessary for the SBCT to achieve situational understanding. Organic
human intelligence (HUMINT) assets provide in-depth understanding of the local and
regional nonmilitary (civil considerations) factors that typically influence the outcome of
operations within a smaller-scale contingency.
b. Due to its extensive reach capabilities, the SBCT’s ISR analytical and
management assets have access to intelligence and analysis from sources above the
SBCT in addition to its organic HUMINT collectors and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs). Situational understanding enables the force to avoid surprise, make rapid
decisions, control the time and place to engage in combat, shape the battlespace with fires
and effects, and achieve decisive outcomes. The SBCT is equipped with the Army battle
command system (ABCS) family of systems in order to carry out effective information
management and achieve the quality of information sharing needed for effective
planning, preparation, and execution of assigned missions.

1-5. LETHALITY
The SBCT’s lethality is derived from its ability to focus overmatching combined arms
support to the infantry assault at identified decisive points. Its array of direct and indirect
fire systems allows the SBCT to shape the AO and achieve decisive outcomes using the
MGS; tube-launched, optically tracked wire-guided (TOW) IIA/B antiarmor missiles;
Javelin antiarmor missiles; 120-mm, 81-mm, and 60-mm mortars; and 155-mm artillery.
Direct fire systems focus on destroying hardened and or fortified positions in support of
infantry assaults. Battalion-, squadron-, and company-level organic mortars enhance
timely and effective indirect fire engagements by providing immediate support and the
ability to maximize the effects of high-angle fires. The antiarmor capability (antitank
company and Javelin missiles) within the SBCT mitigates the presence of enemy armored
forces within the area of operations.

1-6. FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection encompasses those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions
against personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve
the SBCT’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and
incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable
the effective employment of the force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. The

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SBCT meets force protection challenges through the application of a variety of

capabilities including mobility, enhanced situational understanding, and tactical
deception.

1-7. FORCE EFFECTIVENESS

The SBCT achieves force effectiveness by exploiting the abilities of its skilled soldiers
and capable leaders. In addition to the human dimensions, the enhanced tactical mobility
afforded by the infantry carrier vehicle (ICV) and the fidelity of the COP provided by the
technological advances in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, allow the SBCT commander to see the friendly, see the
enemy, see the terrain, conduct rapid effective decision-making, and bring effects and or
forces to bear at identified decisive points.

1-8. JOINT/MULTINATIONAL/INTERAGENCY INTEROPERABILITY

Although the SBCT is expected to always operate under ARFOR command, the SSC
environment may require it to maintain direct links with multinational forces and US and
foreign governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in the conflict, crisis,
or instability. In many situations, the SBCT will benefit from exploiting the knowledge
and capabilities residing within these organizations. Effective interaction is especially
important in an environment where the adversary is primarily employing unconventional
capabilities rather than conventional military power to achieve an end. In some
circumstances, the SBCT headquarters or subordinate elements actively participate in
civil-military activities and may operate subordinate to civil-military organizations.
Interoperability with these organizations is essential and is best facilitated through the
exchange of a liaison officer (LNO). The fact that the SBCT’s communications systems
may not be compatible with the civil-military organization increases the need for an
exchange of knowledgeable LNOs properly equipped to communicate in accordance with
(IAW) the table of organization and equipment (TOE).

1-9. FULL-SPECTRUM FLEXIBILITY

The SBCT is primarily manned and equipped to conduct operations in an SSC. However,
conditions may develop that require added capabilities not resident within the SBCT.
When the SBCT participates in an MTW, it will do so as a subordinate element of a
division or corps. Its mobility and organic ISR assets make it invaluable to a division or
corps commander in an MTW. As with any brigade, adjustments to task organization
may be required. Likely additions to the SBCT task organization may include aviation,
armor, engineers, and air defense. The SBCT may be required to give portions of its
cavalry squadron (RSTA) or military intelligence company (MICO) to other divisional or
corps units.

1-10. SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS

The SBCT’s INFOSYS and organizational structure allow it to plan and execute
operations simultaneously. This capability is critical to the brigade’s success in SSCs and
PMEs as these environments require a wide range of tasks to be executed in conjunction
with one another. It is highly likely that during a typical SSC the brigade will have its
RSTA cavalry squadron (RSTA) conducting a relief in place with a legacy force while

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one infantry battalion is escorting relief convoys and the other two infantry battalions are
executing combat operations within an urban area. The brigade has the capability to
successfully plan and execute several types of missions simultaneously.

Section II. HOW THE SBCT FIGHTS

The frequency of joint contingency operations in the 1990s sharply increased the
significance of the strategic responsiveness of the US military’s force structure. Although
the Army was capable of full-spectrum dominance, it had not optimized its organization
and force structure for discrete and rapid strategic response in the face of an increasingly
broad range of operational demands posed by its participation in an MTW, SSC, or PME
(Figure 1-1). Meeting these requirements demands a rapidly deployable, highly integrated
combined arms force. This force must be able to achieve overmatching combat power
against an increasingly sophisticated enemy in any terrain. The SBCT is equipped,
manned, and designed to provide this capability.

Figure 1-1. Full spectrum of conflict.

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1-11. MAJOR THEATER WAR

A major theater war represents the most serious conventional military scenario that the
Army may face. An MTW has the greatest potential of occurring in regions containing
moderate to well-developed infrastructures (especially roads, rail, and bridges), large
complex urban areas, and diverse weather patterns. With the vital interests of the nation
at stake, it is the one scenario that must result in victory. Although current assessments
project MTW as the least likely to occur, many current regional powers could pose a
substantial challenge to the United States, possibly with little warning.
a. The Enemy. Enemy forces likely will be advanced industrial-age forces with
some high technology niches characterized by mechanized, motorized, and light forces.
These forces will be equipped with newer generation tanks and infantry fighting vehicles
and will have significant numbers of antitank guided missile (ATGM) systems, man-
portable air defense (MANPAD) weapons, advanced fixed and or rotary wing aviation
assets, missiles, rockets, artillery, mortars, and mines. They will possess an integrated air
defense system and a robust military and civilian communications capability.
Additionally, they will likely possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These forces
are capable of long term, sustained, high tempo brigade- and division-level operations.
They can also conduct sustained unconventional combat operations and limited duration
(limited objective) attacks. Current and predicted trends indicate that these enemy forces
will acquire more sophisticated and advanced information technology.
b. Full-Spectrum Operations in an MTW. An MTW involves operations across
the full range of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations; however the
operational focus is on offensive and defensive operations (Figure 1-2). The SBCT can
conduct all four types of offensive operations (attack, movement to contact, exploitation,
and pursuit). The SBCT can conduct both linear and nonlinear defenses within the area
defense, mobile defense, and retrograde concepts. Humanitarian issues such as
overpopulation, resource shortages, natural disasters, and inadequate response capability
(local, regional, or global) would probably complicate operations during an MTW.
Stability operations or support operations will address these problems.

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Figure 1-2. Major theater war.

1-12. SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCY

A smaller-scale contingency is an operation, limited in terms of duration and geography,
which is short of a major theater war. Left unchecked, an SSC can quickly escalate into
an MTW. The physical environment of an SSC may include a range of complex and
challenging features, such as very restrictive or urbanized terrain, a weak transportation
and logistical infrastructure, environmental hazards, and diverse weather patterns. The
political situation in the operational area may be uncertain, with varying levels of
acceptance among local populations and a range of participation by coalition,
interagency, and nongovernmental organizations partners. In such situations, potential
adversaries may avoid open terrain in order to degrade the proven effectiveness of our
target acquisition capabilities and standoff precision fires.
a. The Enemy. Enemy forces in these environments will employ middle- to low-end
industrial-age forces characterized by limited armored forces, mostly equipped with small
numbers of early generation tanks, some mechanized forces, but predominately
motorized infantry. Guerrillas, terrorists, paramilitary units, special purpose forces,
special police, and local militias will be present in the environment. These forces are
primarily equipped with ATGM systems, MANPAD systems, mortars, machine guns,
and explosives. These forces are expected to have robust communications using
conventional military devices augmented by commercial equipment such as cell phones.
These forces are not capable of long term, sustained, high tempo combat operations. They
are capable of conducting long term, sustained, unconventional terrorist and guerrilla
operations. Current and predicted trends indicate the presence of more sophisticated and
advanced information technology.
b. Full-Spectrum Operations in an SSC. An SSC involves operations across the
full range of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations (Figure 1-3, page 1-8).
At their most demanding, SSCs may require the simultaneous execution of offensive and
defensive combat operations against the armed forces of lesser military powers (possibly

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not on the scale of an MTW) as well as stability operations in support of a broader

mandate. The wide range of SSC operations also includes the increasing likelihood of
stability actions such as peace enforcement, implementation of peace accords, evacuation
of US nationals, or the provision of humanitarian relief. Given the complex nature of an
SSC, it is likely that an SBCT mission may initially take the form of offensive or
defensive operations with subordinate stability operations. An SBCT may eventually
transition to focus on stability operations with subordinate offensive and defensive
operations. As mentioned earlier, one of the brigade’s significant capabilities is its ability
to plan and execute simultaneous operations.

Figure 1-3. Smaller-scale contingency.

1-13. PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

A peacetime military engagement encompasses all military activities that involve other
nations and is intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. PMEs include
programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to shape the
international environment, improve mutual understanding with other countries, and
improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Operations in
support of peacetime engagement are normally interagency in character and are designed
to address the fundamental causes of instability that can lead to regional conflict. A PME

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further serves to demonstrate US resolve to allies and adversaries alike, conveying

democratic ideals, deterring aggression, and helping to relieve sources of instability.

1-14. BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION

Battlefield organization is the allocation of forces in the AO by purpose of operation,
which consists of three all-encompassing categories: decisive, shaping, and sustaining.
Commanders may choose to use the “decisive point,” “main effort,” “supporting effort”
method to articulate his organization of forces if this better facilitates the commander’s
ability to visualize, describe, and direct actions. These purposes form the basis of the
commander’s concept of operations.
a. Decisive Operations. Decisive operations at any echelon (accomplished by a
designated main effort) directly achieve the purpose of the mission of the higher
headquarters. The decisive operation conclusively determines the outcome of battles and
engagements. At the SBCT level, there is only one decisive operation. However, multiple
actions conducted simultaneously throughout the depth of the AO may facilitate a
decisive operation. The decisive operation is normally weighted while economizing on
the effort allocated to concurrent shaping operations.
b. Shaping Operations. Shaping operations (or supporting efforts) establish the
conditions for the success of the decisive operation.
(1) When expressing his intent, the commander clearly and succinctly defines how
the effects of shaping operations support the decisive operation. Shaping operations use
the full range of military power to neutralize or reduce enemy capabilities and create the
conditions that contribute to the success of a decisive operation. Shaping operations may
occur simultaneously or in sequence with the decisive operation and may involve any
combination of forces. Normally the commander economizes on the amount of force
devoted to shaping operations that occur simultaneously with the decisive operation. At
times, however, the commander may determine that the preponderance of military forces
must be devoted to shaping operations in order to produce conditions and effects for a
decisive operation to be successful.
(2) If the commander determines that the force available does not permit
simultaneous decisive and shaping operations, he sequences shaping operations around
the decisive operation. Commanders of shaping operations designate units to accomplish
their own decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. Regardless of the type of
operation, a shaping operation may become the decisive operation if circumstances or
opportunity demand. Therefore, the commander weights the new decisive operation at the
expense of other concurrent shaping operations.
(3) Shaping operations can take many forms including support to attacks and
defenses, security, actions of the reserve before commitment, and the movement of
friendly forces to positions of advantage from which to launch subsequent decisive
operations.
c. Sustaining Operations. Sustaining operations are those that assist the shaping
and decisive operations by assuring freedom of action and continuity of operations,
combat service support (CSS), and command and control (C2). Sustaining operations
include CSS, sustainment base security and maintenance, movement control, terrain
management, infrastructure development, and rear area and base security (line of
communication [LOC] protection and headquarters protection). Sustaining operations are

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inseparable from decisive and shaping operations, although they are not by themselves
decisive or shaping. Sustaining operations occur throughout the area of operations and
not only within a designated rear area. Failure to sustain normally results in failure of the
overall effort. Sustaining operations underwrite the tempo of the overall operation,
assuring the ability to take advantage of any opportunity without hesitation or delay.
Commanders of sustaining operations designate main and supporting efforts.

1-15. DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR AREAS

While the SSC environment will typically be characterized by noncontiguous areas of
operation, there will be situations, primarily MTW, where the commander must describe
decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations in spatial (linear) terms and time. Traditional
linear situations involve conventional combat and linear arrangement of maneuver forces.
Ground forces share boundaries and orient against a similarly organized enemy force
while protecting sustainment functions. In some multinational operations, the capability
and doctrine of coalition or alliance partners may dictate spatial organization of the
battlefield. In such situations, the commander directs and focuses operations in deep,
close, and rear areas. In a noncontiguous environment, the most decisive results occur
when the commander carefully designs decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to act
simultaneously in combinations against the enemy throughout the AO.
a. Deep Areas. The deep area is an area designated away from the close area for the
purpose of shaping enemy forces prior to their arrival in the close area. Thus, the deep
area relates to the close area not only by proximity, but also in terms of time and space.
The SBCT may have a “deep fight” in terms of space or time. If so, an infantry battalion
would conduct close combat to shape the enemy force. Advanced information technology
and modern weapons systems continue to increase the pertinence and lethality of
conducting operations in a deep area. In the past, deep strikes were aimed at slowing and
disrupting the advance of enemy forces. SBCT forces may engage and defeat entire
formations at substantial distances from the close area via joint or organic lethal effects.
This capability gives the SBCT greater depth and allows for simultaneous action.
Commanders of forces operating within the deep area may designate their own close,
deep, and rear areas, depending upon circumstance.
b. Close Areas. The close area is that area where the commander envisions close
combat taking place or being imminent. Close combat includes the activities of forces in
direct support of the elements engaging in close combat, such as direct support field
artillery. Within the close area, the commander synchronizes overmatching effects with
the intent of using maneuver and direct supporting fires in decisive action. Within the
close area, one unit will be designated the main effort, while other units are supporting
efforts. Commanders of forces engaged in the close area may designate subordinate deep
areas, close areas, and rear areas.
c. Rear Areas. Rear areas at any echelon in a linear sense are those areas behind
close areas that are normally designated for support activities. The rear area may be
contiguous with combat areas or may be geographically separate from them. Operations
in rear areas assure freedom of action and continuity of operations, sustainment, and C2.
The SBCT normally designates a rear area, but a battalion does not. When employed in
an MTW, the SBCT is a force multiplier to a division or corps because of its ability to
conduct rear area security operations over a large geographic region. On the nonlinear

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battlefield that typifies an SSC, it is difficult to define “rear areas” spatially in a

traditional sense. In essence, rear areas are those locations from which sustaining
operations occur.

1-16. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND RULES OF INTERACTION

Effective command guidance and a detailed understanding of rules of engagement (ROE)
and rules of interaction (ROI) are critical to the SBCT's mission accomplishment across
the spectrum of conflict. ROE are directives that explain the circumstances and
limitations under which US forces initiate and continue combat engagement with forces
encountered. These rules reflect the requirements of the laws of war, operational
concerns, and political considerations when the operational environment shifts from
peace to conflict and back to peace. ROI embody the human dimension of combat. They
lay the foundation for successful relationships with the myriad of factions and individuals
that play critical roles in the SBCT's operations. ROI encompass an array of interpersonal
communication skills, such as persuasion and negotiation.
a. Rules of engagement are always significant to the ability of commanders and
soldiers to successfully accomplish the mission. They may originate in law, treaty, or
settlement terms and commanders’ guidance. They are closely related to force protection.
While they vary considerably between missions, ROE always allow soldiers to protect
themselves from deadly threats. The SBCT’s operations incorporate ROE throughout the
full spectrum of military operations (offensive, defensive, stability, and support).
(1) Numerous legal issues require close coordination with the brigade operational law
team (BOLT). The ROE must consider these legal issues; they must be worded in a
simple, easy-to-understand manner. Broad limitations may consist of restrictions on
aviation operations at particular times and in specified areas, prohibitions on crossing
political boundaries, and requirements to refrain from apprehending or limiting the
movement of designated groups or individuals.
(2) On the other hand, ROE commonly rule out the use of some weapons and may
impose special limitations, such as the requirements for warning shots and single shot
engagements. The SBCT’s sniper elements provide this capability. SBCT soldiers must
be trained to interpret and apply the ROE effectively in all full-spectrum operations. It is
imperative that everyone understand the ROE thoroughly since small-unit leaders and
individual soldiers must make politically-critical ROE decisions promptly and
independently. ABCS tools support effective distribution of ROE and can assist
commanders in confirming conditions that the ROE identify as threatening or innocuous.
b. Rules of interaction are directives that govern the SBCT soldiers’ interaction with
civilians. ROI lay the foundation for successful relationships with the many factions and
individuals that play key roles throughout the SBCT’s AO. ROI, like ROE, will be
common to all SBCT operations throughout the full spectrum of operations.
(1) ROI are tools (both limiting and permissive) that enable the soldier to deal with
the nontraditional situations that will be prevalent throughout MTW, SSC, and PME. ROI
enhance the soldier’s ability to survive in uncertain situations by giving him a clearly
defined set of parameters on interaction. Simultaneously, ROI serve to aid the SBCT in
mission accomplishment by ensuring even-handed interaction with civilians throughout
the AO.

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(2) ROI are linked to ROE for each particular operation. ROI will likely come from
the higher headquarters and can be made more, but not less, restrictive by the SBCT. ROI
must be tailored to the specific region, culture(s), and or populations affected by the
operation. Like ROE, ROI can be effective only if they are thoroughly rehearsed and
understood by every member of the SBCT.

Section III. SBCT ORGANIZATION

As a full-spectrum combat force, the SBCT organization allows commanders to scale
their force to accept like-type forces such as additional infantry or intelligence
organizations. The SBCT commander can also accept augmentation of units or elements
that are not organic to the SBCT structure such as lift and or attack aviation, armor,
rocket artillery, air defense, military police, civil affairs, psychological operations,
combat and construction engineers, and additional command and control systems assets
with requisite CSS support for each system. The ability to scale his force also allows a
commander to deploy without all of his organic assets or, once deployed, to use only the
combat power required by mission analysis. For example, the SBCT commander may
decide to attack without his vehicles. This organizational flexibility allows the SBCT to
function in its primary role as the major participant in an SSC, in a MTW as part of a
division or corps structure, or to serve as a “guarantor combat force” in a stability or
support operation.

1-17. THE STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

The SBCT has an approximate personnel strength of 3,500 soldiers and is pre-configured
in ready-to-fight combined arms packages. The design includes embedded unit-based
capabilities such as military intelligence, signal, engineer, antitank, artillery, and CSS
elements (Figure 1-4). This design allows the SBCT to fight combined arms down to
company level to create combat power with flexibility in complex and urban terrain. The
following paragraphs provide an overview of some key organic assets available to the
SBCT.

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Figure 1-4. The Stryker brigade combat team.

1-18. INFANTRY BATTALIONS

The infantry battalions (Figure 1-5, page 1-14) serve as the primary maneuver force for
the brigade and are designed as a three-by-three organization of three rifle companies
with three rifle platoons each. Companies fight as combined arms teams with an section
of organic 81-mm mortars, an MGS platoon, and a sniper team. The infantry battalion
mission is to close with and destroy or defeat enemy forces within the full spectrum of
modern combat operations. The battalions are organized to maintain tactical flexibility
within restricted and severely restricted terrain. All of the SBCT’s INFOSYS and data
collection capabilities are enabled in order to get the infantry battalions to the decisive
place and time in accordance with the commander’s intent.

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Figure 1-5. SBCT infantry battalion.

1-19. CAVALRY SQUADRON (RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND

TARGET ACQUISITION [RSTA])
The cavalry squadron (RSTA) of the SBCT is carefully designed to provide accurate and
timely information over a large operating environment (Figure 1-6). (See FM 3-20.96 for
a more detailed discussion of cavalry squadron [RSTA] capabilities.) This environment is
characterized by a new enemy armed with equipment advances in global weapons
proliferation and unconventional terrorist and or guerilla operating tactics. The
geographical area in which these enemies choose to operate is characterized by varying
terrain ranging from complex urban sprawl to weak infrastructure supported by inferior
roads, bridges, and transportation networks. The cavalry squadron (RSTA) provides a
great deal of the information required by the commander and staff to conduct proper
planning, direct operations, and visualize the future battlefield. The squadron possesses
robust capabilities to successfully meet the varied and unique intelligence, surveillance,

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and reconnaissance challenges inherent in smaller-scale contingency operations and in

major theaters of war. The cavalry squadron (RSTA) has an extensive HUMINT
capability and acts as the eyes and ears of the commander. In addition, RSTA operations
allow the commander to shape the battlefield, accepting or initiating combat at the time
and place of his choosing.

Figure 1-6. Cavalry squadron (RSTA).

1-20. FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

The field artillery battalion (Figure 1-7) is the SBCT commander’s direct support (DS)
artillery. Three batteries of M-198 towed 155-mm artillery provide DS fires and effects.
(See FM 6-50 for a more detailed discussion of field artillery battalion capabilities.)

Figure 1-7. Field artillery battalion.

1-21. ANTITANK COMPANY

The antitank company (Figure 1-8) serves as the SBCT’s primary tank-killer by
providing standoff fires against enemy armor, particularly in open terrain. The company

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consists of three platoons, each with three ATGM vehicles. (See FM 3-21.91 for a more
detailed discussion of antiarmor company capabilities.)

Figure 1-8. Antitank company.

1-22. ENGINEER COMPANY

The engineer company (Figure 1-9) serves as the SBCT’s primary means for mobility.
Contingencies requiring survivability or construction will require that the SBCT be
augmented with additional engineer assets. The engineer company consists of three
engineer mobility platoons and one mobility support platoon. (See FM 3-34.221 for a
more detailed discussion of the SBCT engineer company capabilities.)

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Figure 1-9. Engineer company.

1-23. SIGNAL COMPANY

The signal company (Figure 1-10) is organic to the SBCT and provides its C2 operations
support. The company installs, operates, and maintains the SBCT wide area network
(WAN). The company configures and manages the tactical internet (TI) and command
post to command post data networks. The network operations (NETOPS) section
establishes a network operations and security center (NOSC) at the SBCT main command
post (CP) and at the tactical command post (TAC CP). The company's nodal platoon
establishes an alternate NOSC at the SBCT rear CP. The signal company is responsible
for connecting the SBCT to the global information grid (GIG). (See FM 6-02.2 for a
more detailed discussion of the SBCT signal company capabilities.)

Figure 1-10. Signal company.

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1-24. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

The military intelligence company consists of a small headquarters section, an ISR
integration platoon, an ISR analysis platoon, and a tactical HUMINT platoon (Figure 1-
11). The ISR analysis and ISR integration platoons are operational control (OPCON) to
the SBCT S2 and provide support to the development of the SBCT COP, targeting
effects, situation development, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). They
integrate and analyze cross-battlefield operating systems (BOS) reconnaissance and
surveillance reporting to develop intelligence products in response to priority information
requirements (PIR). The tactical HUMINT platoon provides the SBCT with an organic
capability to conduct HUMINT collection (interrogation, debriefing, tactical questioning,
tactical source operations, and limited document exploitation) and counterintelligence
(CI) activities (CI assessments, CI analysis, preliminary investigations, and
counterintelligence force protection source operations). The HUMINT capability is
directed toward assessing the enemy and environmental and civilian considerations
(answering PIR). The CI capability is directed toward identifying and recommending
countermeasures for enemy intelligence collection (protecting essential elements of
friendly information [EEFI]). (See FM 2-19.402 for a more detailed discussion of the
SBCT military intelligence company capabilities.)

Figure 1-11. Military intelligence company.

1-25. BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION

The brigade support battalion (BSB) performs distribution-based and centralized logistics
while providing health service support (HSS) and Class VIII resupply for the brigade.
The small size of the battalion significantly minimizes its footprint (Figure 1-12).
However, the BSB will maintain enough CSS capability for self-sustained operations for

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72 hours of combat operations. The BSB commander also serves on the SBCT
commander’s special staff. (See FM 4-93.7 for a more detailed discussion of SBCT
brigade support battalion capabilities.)

Figure 1-12. Brigade support battalion.

1-26. BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY.

The headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commander works closely with and
answers to the SBCT executive officer (XO) (Figure 1-13, page 1-20). The HHC
commander is responsible for the training of assigned personnel; maintenance of organic
equipment; and the support, security, and movement of the SBCT main CP and TAC CP
IAW unit standing operating procedures (SOP).
a. Headquarters Company. Commanded by a captain, the headquarters company
provides administrative and logistical support to each headquarters section.

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b. Headquarters Section. The HHC headquarters section provides the personnel,

equipment, and staff expertise to command and control and provides information
management and communications capabilities that enable the brigade commander to plan
and execute missions. The brigade commander and brigade staff reside in this section.

Figure 1-13. Headquarters and headquarters company.

1-27. SBCT COMMAND STRUCTURE

The commander’s staff must function as a single, cohesive unit. Each staff member must
know his duties and responsibilities and be familiar with the duties and responsibilities of
other staff members. The staff focuses on assisting the commander in mission
accomplishment. The staff contributes to the commander making and executing timely
decisions (Figure 1-14).

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Figure 1-14. SBCT staff structure.

a. Brigade Commander. The commander has total responsibility and accountability

for the SBCT and its actions. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively
using all available resources for planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling all
military forces in accomplishing assigned missions. He provides his subordinates with
missions, resources, and a clear statement of his intent.
b. Executive Officer. The executive officer directs, coordinates, supervises, and
trains the staff. The XO is responsible for all staff activities, such as the development of
orders. He is responsible for the operations of the main CP. The XO integrates and
synchronizes combat support (CS) and CSS to support all operations. He manages the
information flow within the SBCT to include the commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIR). Additionally, because of the XO’s unique relationship with the
commander, he understands the commander’s intent better than, or at least as well as, the
subordinate commanders. The XO is prepared to assume command of the SBCT at any
time. In addition, he oversees the support and employment of separate company and
smaller size CS units.
c. Staff. The staff exists to assist the commander with making and implementing
decisions. The staff aids the commander with recognizing and anticipating battlefield

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events so he can make better decisions and act on those decisions faster than the enemy
can act. Once a decision is made, the commander depends on his staff to communicate
his decision to subordinates, synchronize and coordinate supporting actions, and
supervise execution to ensure his decision is carried out according to his intent.

1-28. SBCT STAFF STRUCTURE

The staff structure of an SBCT consists of a personal staff group, coordinating staff
group, and special staff group. The commander organizes his staff within a command
group, TAC CP, main command post (main CP), and SBCT support area (brigade support
area [BSA] CP) in order to plan, prepare for, and execute combat operations. Staff duties,
functions, and procedures are defined in FM 101-5. The following provides a description
of the key responsibilities of staff officers during combat operations.
a. Personal Staff. Personal staff members work under the commander’s immediate
control and directly assist him in the exercise of command (Figure 1-15). The commander
establishes guidelines or gives specific guidance when a personal staff officer should
inform or coordinate with the XO or other members of the staff.

Figure 1-15. Personal staff.

(1) Command Sergeant Major. Primarily, the command sergeant major (CSM)
advises the commander on all matters concerning the enlisted soldiers of the SBCT. He
enforces established policies and standards concerning enlisted personnel performance
and conduct and mission preparations of the SBCT. He performs other duties that the
commander prescribes, to include receiving and orienting newly assigned enlisted
personnel and helping to inspect command activities. He monitors the morale and
discipline of the SBCT and recommends actions, as necessary. The CSM focuses his
attention on functions critical to the success of the operation.
(2) Chaplain. The chaplain serves as a confidential advisor to the commander on the
spiritual fitness and the ethical and moral health of the command. The chaplain exercises
staff supervision and technical control for religious support throughout the SBCT’s area
of operations. He is responsible for the development, implementation, and coordination
of religious support assets, operations, and activities. He provides and coordinates
privileged and sensitive personal counseling and pastoral care to the unit’s command,
soldiers, authorized civilians, and families.
(a) The unit ministry team (UMT) is composed of a chaplain and one enlisted
chaplain assistant (Figure 1-16). The UMT facilitates and coordinates religious support
across the AO. The UMT advises the commander on humanitarian aspects and the impact
of command policies on indigenous religions. It locates where it can best coordinate,
communicate, and facilitate religious support.

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(b) The chaplain assistant is an active member of the unit’s noncommissioned officer
(NCO) support channel for religious support issues and soldier welfare. He assesses
interpersonal and spiritual well being that can affect unit morale.

Figure 1-16. Unit ministry team.

(3) Staff Judge Advocate. The SBCT staff judge advocate (SJA) is an assigned
brigade legal advisor who serves under the technical supervision of the division staff
judge advocate as a brigade personal and special staff officer. The SBCT SJA is also the
chief of the brigade operational law team located in the fires and effects coordination cell
(FECC) information operations (IO) section. The BOLT functions as part of the FECC
and as the SBCT’s legal team.) The SBCT SJA provides operational law advice to the
commander. He also provides legal advice during the military decision-making process
regarding ROE, targeting, and other legal aspects of operations. Additionally, the SBCT
SJA provides legal advice regarding international law and the law of war, and either
provides or coordinates legal services in military justice, administrative and civil law,
contract and fiscal law, claims, and legal assistance. The BOLT consists of the SBCT
SJA and the legal NCO and is co-located in the FECC IO section (Figure 1-17).

Figure 1-17. Brigade operational legal team.

b. Coordinating Staff. Coordinating staff members have primary staff

responsibility for one or more broad fields of interest and are the commander’s principal
staff assistants (Figure 1-18, page 1-24).

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Figure 1-18. Coordinating staff.

(1) Personnel Section. The personnel section (S1) is responsible for all matters
concerning human resources to include personnel readiness, personnel services, and
headquarters management (Figure 1-19). Key functions of the S1 section include--
• Monitoring and analyzing personnel strength and projecting future personnel
requirements.
• Requesting, receiving, processing, and delivering replacement personnel.
• Managing casualty operations.
• Planning and supervising morale support activities, postal services, awards,
and administration of discipline.
• Providing personnel service support including finance and legal services.

Figure 1-19. S1 section.

(2) Intelligence Section. The intelligence section (S2) is the staff element responsible
for all matters concerning military intelligence (MI), counterintelligence, and security
operations (Figure 1-20, page 1-26). Included within the intelligence section is the S2x
team. This team functions as the coordinator for all HUMINT and CI functions within the
SBCT (see FM 2-19.402 for a detailed discussion of the S2x and S2x team). The

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intelligence cell gathers, analyzes, and disseminates information collected on the enemy,
terrain, and civilian population and maintains the enemy component of the COP. The cell
works under the direction of the SBCT S2 and consists of the tactical intelligence officer
(TIO), the S2x, intelligence analysts, and possibly the MICO commander. The
intelligence cell works with the current operations and future planning cells as well as the
cavalry squadron (RSTA) commander, S3, and S2 to plan and synchronize the
reconnaissance and surveillance plan in support of the PIR. The cell also works closely
with the FECC in the execution of targeting and combat damage assessment. Key
functions of the S2 section include--
• Coordinating the IPB for staff planning, decision making, and targeting.
• Coordinating with the entire staff and recommending PIR for the CCIR.
• As the brigade collection manager, nominating collection taskings for all the
SBCT’s collection assets to the S3.
• Supporting planning for reconnaissance and surveillance operations in
coordination with the XO, S3, cavalry squadron (RSTA) commander, and
MICO commander.
• Providing all-source intelligence that answers the PIR.
• Maintaining the current situation regarding enemy and environmental factors
and updating IPB and the intelligence estimate.
• Identifying and evaluating intelligence collection capabilities as they affect
the AO security, counter-surveillance, signal security, security operations, and
force protection.
The S2x is the intelligence staff officer for HUMINT and CI activities. The S2x provides
focus and technical support for all CI and HUMINT activities. He ensures the collection,
analysis, and dissemination of HUMINT and CI-related intelligence and information is in
concert with the commander’s critical information requirements.

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FM 3-21.31

Figure 1-20. S2 section.

(3) Operations and Training Section. The operations and training section (S3) is the
principal staff element responsible for all matters concerning plans, operations, and
training (Figure 1-21, page 1-28). Key functions of the S3 section include--
• Preparing, coordinating, authenticating, publishing, and distributing the
command SOP, operation orders (OPORDs), fragmentary orders (FRAGOs),
warning orders (WARNOs), and other products involving contribution from
other staff sections.
• Planning for ISR operations in coordination with the XO, S2, cavalry
squadron (RSTA) commander, and MICO commander.
• Synchronizing tactical operations to include reviewing and coordinating
subordinate plans and actions.
• Coordinating and directing terrain and airspace management.
• Recommending priorities for allocating critical command resources and
support.
• Directly assisting the commander in controlling preparation for, and execution
of, operations.

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 FM 3-21.31

• Staffing, executing, and supervising operational security (OPSEC).

• Coordinating civil and military operations in the absence of the S5.
(a) Current Operations Cell. The current operations cell monitors and controls
operations throughout the SBCT AO and maintains the COP. It coordinates with higher
and adjacent units, analyzes relevant information, and provides recommendations to the
commander. The cell is normally manned by two battle captains (S3 and S2), the S3
sergeant major, battle staff NCOs, liaison teams, and communications personnel. The
current operations cell also maintains contact with the plans cell in the rear CP. This
allows it to anticipate future ISR requirements and keep the commander informed of
planning being conducted beyond 24 hours.
(b) Plans Cell. The future plans cell maintains a current and projected view of the
situation and plans operations to be conducted beyond 24 hours based on the orders from
higher headquarters, projected outcomes of the current operation, and the SBCT
commander's guidance. The cell consists of two S3 plans officers and battle staff NCOs;
it is augmented by the other staff sections (or cells) as required during planning. At a
minimum, the cell should include representatives from the cavalry squadron (RSTA),
intelligence cell (to include the S2x team), FECC, maneuver support (MANSPT) cell,
and the BSB. The cell works closely with higher headquarters to enhance parallel and
collaborative planning.

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FM 3-21.31

Figure 1-21. S3 section.

(c) Brigade Liaison Teams. Also resident within the brigade S3 section are the
brigade liaison teams (Figure 1-22). During operations and during normal daily activity,
these teams provide liaison between units to help facilitate communications, preserve
freedom of action, and maintain flexibility. Liaison ensures that the SBCT, along with
adjacent commands, remains aware of respective tactical situations by providing them
with exceptional, critical, or routine information; verification of information; and
clarification of operational questions. Liaison teams also can provide a digital
communications link and COP to analog units that are not equipped with a comparable
ABCS capability.

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 FM 3-21.31

Figure 1-22. Liaison team.

(4) Logistics Section. The logistics section (S4) is the principal staff element
responsible for coordinating the logistics integration of supply, maintenance,
transportation, and services for the brigade. The S4 section is the link between the BSB
and subordinate units (Figure 1-23, page 1-30). Key functions of the S4 section include--
• Recommending and coordinating locations for main supply routes (MSRs)
and logistics support areas.
• Projecting requirements and coordinating all classes of supply, except Class
VIII (medical), according to the commander’s priorities.
• Monitoring and analyzing the equipment and logistics readiness status of the
brigade.
• Developing and synchronizing CSS to include supply, transportation,
maintenance, and services.
• Directing and controlling the operations of the BSB CP.

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FM 3-21.31

Figure 1-23. S4 section.

(5) Signal Section. The signal section (S6) is primarily responsible for all command
and control information systems (C2 INFOSYS) operations including network
management, automation management, and information security. The S6 works closely
with the signal company to provide support to all SBCT command and control nodes and
attached or assigned elements (Figure 1-24). Key functions of the S6 section include--
• Advising the commander on communications requirements.
• Establishing, managing, and maintaining communications links, including
reach communications.
• Planning and coordinating network terminals.
• Determining system requirements needed for support based on the tactical
situation.
• Informing the commander of primary and alternate communications
capabilities.
• Recommending database configurations.
• Establishing and enforcing network policies and procedures.
• Preparing signal estimates.
• Developing Annex H (Signal) to the OPORD.
• Advising the commander and other users on the requirements, capabilities,
and use of the available systems.
• Coordinating signal interfaces with those elements not operating with ABCS.
• Monitoring the status of communications, to include WAN, combat net radio
(CNR), near-term digital radio (NTDR), enhanced position locating reporting
system (EPLRS)/TI, and global broadcast service (GBS).

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 FM 3-21.31

• Monitoring network performance and database configuration and planning

system reconfigurations caused by changes in the tactical situation,
communications connectivity, and system initialization instructions.
• Reporting network changes to the commander.
• Training users on automation information systems.
• Training users to establish and interconnect networks.
• Preparing communications network security plans, instructions, and SOPs.
• Developing security policies and procedures for network operations.
• Reporting threats to network security.

Figure 1-24. S6 section.

c. Special Staff Officers and Elements. Special staff officers and elements help the
commander and other members of the staff in their professional or technical functional
areas (Figure 1-14, page 1-21). They also assist in the IPB process by providing input on
their functional areas. The specific number and type of special staff officers depends on
the brigade’s task organization. Special staff officers are organized according to
functional areas. In some cases, a special staff officer is a unit commander. Typical
special staff officers and elements that will support the SBCT include the following:
(1) Effects Coordinator. The field artillery battalion commander serves as the SBCT
effects coordinator (ECOORD). He is responsible for all fires and effects planning and
coordination for the SBCT. He advises the SBCT commander on the capabilities and
employment of fires and effects and is responsible for obtaining the commander’s
guidance for desired effects and their purpose. The ECOORD is part of the command
group and locates where he can best execute the SBCT commander’s intent for fires and
effects. The deputy effects coordinator (DECOORD) is the principal fire support (effects)

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staff planner in the SBCT main CP and works in the effects coordination cell (Figure 1-
25.

Figure 1-25. Fires and effects coordination cell.

(2) Fires and Effects Coordination Cell. The fires and effects coordination cell
coordinates all fires and effects for the SBCT and assists both the current operations and
future plans cells. It serves as a liaison between the SBCT and the artillery battalion, IO,
civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and intelligence and electronic
warfare (IEW) assets. The FECC is a product of the effects-based fires concept and is a
standing organization within the SBCT headquarters. The cell works under the direction
of the ECOORD (the artillery battalion commander) and consists of a fire and effects
section, a targeting and counterfire (T&C) section, an IO section, and the TACP. The
FECC is led and directed by the deputy effects coordinator.
(a) Deputy Effects Coordinator. The DECOORD is a field artillery major that plans,
coordinates, and orchestrates full-spectrum fires and effects in time, space, and purpose
against high pay-off targets (HPTs) within the AO to support the SBCT commander’s
intent. His primary means to plan, integrate, and orchestrate fires and effects is via FECC.
The DECOORD serves as the primary assistant to the effects coordinator and is the
permanent full-time liaison between any direct support field artillery assets and the

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 FM 3-21.31

SBCT. He assists the SBCT S3 in integrating fires and effects into the SBCT's maneuver
plan (to include reconnaissance and surveillance), and he is responsible for the
development of the SBCT fire support plan.
(b) Fires and Effects Element. A fire and effects element is embedded within the
FECC and is supervised by the DECOORD. The DECOORD is the liaison between the
artillery battalion and the SBCT. He works closely with the ECOORD to ensure mutual
understanding of all aspects of fires and effects planning, coordination, and execution in
support of the SBCT. He represents the ECOORD when he is not available and helps the
SBCT S3 integrate fire support into the commander's concept of operation. The mission
of the fires and effects element is to plan, coordinate, and synchronize lethal and selected
non-lethal (smoke and illumination only) fire support in support of SBCT operations. The
focus of these actions is on the attack of valid targets throughout the AO using organic
and joint fire support assets to achieve decisive effects on the enemy. The fires and
effects element works in coordination with the SBCT S3 to produce the following
products for the SBCT order: target selection standards (TSS), attack/effects guidance
matrix (A/EGM), essential fires and effects tasks, target/effects synchronization matrix
(T/ESM), and field artillery support plan (FASP)
(c) Targeting and Counterfire Element. The FECC T&C section’s mission is to direct
the execution of the targeting process (the detect, deliver, and assess portions) and to
execute the counterfire program for the SBCT. Both missions are critical to the success of
SBCT operations. The section must be proactive when executing the counterfire program
to significantly reduce or eliminate the enemy’s indirect fire capabilities before they can
be brought to bear against SBCT forces. Important T&C section targeting functions
include:
• Collecting and processing battlefield information and intelligence to identify
targets.
• Disseminating targeting information.
• Requesting and analyzing combat damage reports.
• Providing assessments that inform and are integrated back into the ongoing
targeting process.
Important T&C section counterfire functions include:
• Coordinating and controlling the employment of the SBCT target acquisition
assets.
• Coordinating and controlling radar zone coverage for SBCT counterfire radars
and any attached radars.
• Providing input into reconnaissance and surveillance planning and execution.
• Processing valid target information for supporting fires and effects assets
(including IO assets) to execute in accordance with the T/ESM.
(d) Air Force Liaison Officer/Tactical Air Control Party. The air liaison officer
(ALO) is the senior Air Force officer of the tactical air control party (TACP) supporting
the SBCT. He is responsible for supervising TACP personnel and forward air controllers
(FACs) as well as coordinating tactical air (TACAIR) assets and operations for the
SBCT. The TACP coordinates close air support (CAS) missions with the FECC and the
SBCT S3. It also works with the air defense and airspace management (ADAM) cell to
manage airspace in the SBCT’s AO to include flying UAVs and deconfliction with
USAF aircraft as well as aircraft from other services. The ALO and TACP are normally

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FM 3-21.31

located with the rear CP during planning and preparation; during execution, however, the
ALO will normally locate with the command group.
(e) Information Operations Coordinator. The information operations coordinator
(IOCOORD) advises the SBCT commander on all information operations matters.
Additionally, the IOCOORD participates in the development of IPB products and works
with the fires and effects cell throughout the targeting process. The IOCOORD is a key
synchronizer of the SBCT’s non-lethal effects.
(f) Information Operations Element. An information operations element is embedded
within the FECC and consists of information operations, CA, and PSYOP personnel. The
IO element plans (within a 24 hour window) and coordinates information operations and
other non-lethal battlefield effects in support of the SBCT. The information operations
officer coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes information operations elements. These
operations include the degradation of enemy command and control, military deception,
counterdeception, operations security, information assurance, computer network defense
teams, and the use of counterintelligence teams. The IO element works in concert with
the SBCT S3 and conducts close coordination with the S2, S6, and other SBCT staff
elements as necessary. The IO element is the principal staff element for all matters
concerning civil-military operations (the civilian impact on military operations and the
impact of military operations on the civilian populace). The IO officer supervises the
efforts of augmentation elements such as PSYOP detachments, CA teams, electronic
attack teams, special IO teams, and public affairs teams. The IO element may request
support for specific functions from higher headquarters. Such functions may include
electronic warfare, computer network attack, special information operations,
psychological operations, and counterpropaganda (including public affairs and civil
affairs) based on METT-TC considerations. The IO element integrates and synchronizes
these augmentation assets with reconnaissance and surveillance operations and the
maneuver plan.
(3) Maneuver Support Coordinator. The senior maneuver support officer in the
maneuver support cell serves as the principal maneuver support planner in the SBCT
main CP. He ensures that coordination is conducted with echelons above division (EAD)
engineers and military police and is responsible to the brigade commander for all
maneuver support efforts and requirements within the AO.
(4) Maneuver Support Cell. The MANSPT cell is responsible for planning,
integrating, and synchronizing mobility and or survivability and military police (MP)
support for all operations (Figure 1-26).
(a) The senior MP planning officer within the MANSPT cell serves as the SBCT MP
and is responsible for MP planning, coordination, and synchronization of MP maneuver
elements. He serves as the principal advisor to the SBCT commander on matters relating
to MP support. He recommends the allocation of resources, tasks, and priority of support.
He performs OPCON of any MP assets provided to the SBCT and supervises the
execution of any MP missions. Dependent upon METT-TC, the SBCT could receive
support ranging from platoon- to company-size units from a division or corps. During
offensive operations, MPs best support the brigade’s maneuver and mobility by
facilitating movement control and refugee, casualty, and or enemy prisoner of war (EPW)
evacuation and control. In the defense, MPs are best employed in the area security role to
enhance the SBCT’s maneuver and mobility. The MP planner, as part of the MANSPT

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 FM 3-21.31

cell, provides for the synchronization and weighting of the MP effort in support of the
SBCT’s main effort just as any other asset.
(b) The MANSPT cell also assists the SBCT staff with developing engineer plans to
include engineer task organization, scheme of engineer operations, and obstacle plans.
The senior engineer officer serves as SBCT engineer and is responsible for engineer
planning and coordination. It coordinates all military and civilian engineer efforts within
the SBCT’s AO and controls engineer assets and units not task organized to the SBCT’s
subordinate units.
(c) The MANSPT cell also supports the SBCT with terrain analysis products. The
digital topographic support (DTS) team provides 24-hour digital terrain data production
support and analysis using the digital topographic support system (DTSS).

Figure 1-26. Maneuver support cell.

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FM 3-21.31

(5) Air Defense and Air Space Management Cell Coordinator. The senior air and
missile defense (AMD) officer within the ADAM cell is the primary air defense and
airspace management advisor to the SBCT commander. He coordinates with the SBCT
AMD units and divisional and corps staff on all Army airspace command and control
(A2C2) aspects.
(6) Air Defense and Airspace Management Cell. Air defense and aviation personnel
man the ADAM cell (Figure 1-27). They provide the commander and staff with special
area expertise operating out of either the main or rear CP. The ADAM cell is responsible
for planning, coordinating, integrating, and controlling air defense and airspace
management for the SBCT, to include developing air defense plans, air defense artillery
(ADA) task organization, scheme of air defense operations, and reconnaissance and
surveillance planning. This cell also provides control over any ADA assets and units not
directly task organized to the SBCT’s subordinate units. The ADAM cell also coordinates
aviation operations in support of the SBCT, providing the commander with
synchronization and control of aviation operations. The ADAM cell assists the staff with
these duties, to include A2C2 of UAV operations, airspace management, tactical
employment of aviation assets, and positioning of forward arming and refueling points
(FARPs).

Figure 1-27. Air defense and airspace management cell.

(6) Military Intelligence Company Commander. The MICO commander responds to

the tasking of the SBCT commander. He organizes for combat based on the mission,
scheme of support, task organization, and specified and implied tasks contained in the
SBCT's order. The MICO commander uses the order to plan, prepare, execute, and assess
the MICO's operations. Normally, the ISR analysis and ISR integration platoons are
OPCON to the SBCT S2 while providing analysis and intelligence production

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 FM 3-21.31

capabilities to the S2 and ISR tasking and visualization capabilities to the commander,
S3, and S2 in support of SBCT operations. The MICO's tactical HUMINT platoon
remains under the command and control of the MICO commander and provides general
support (GS) to the SBCT or DS to subordinate elements of the SBCT, dependent on an
analysis of the factors of METT-TC. The MICO commander advises the S2 and the
SBCT commander on the proper utilization of MICO ISR assets and the proper
utilization of any ISR assets attached to the SBCT that are not specifically attached to
other SBCT subordinate elements. The MICO commander assists the SBCT S3 and S2,
the ECOORD, and the cavalry squadron (RSTA) commander with planning and
conducting C2-protect and C2-attack operations. The MICO CP normally locates with or
near the SBCT main CP.
(7) Brigade Support Battalion Commander. The BSB commander is also considered
a special staff officer. He advises the SBCT commander on all combat service support
matters. Due to the austere CSS structure of the battalions within the SBCT, the BSB
commander plays a significant role in sustaining the combat effectiveness of the SBCT as
a whole. He commands and controls the BSB to provide the SBCT with essential CSS
functions. The BSB commander exercises OPCON over CSS units operating in the
brigade support area. The BSB commander’s support operations officer serves as the
focal point for all logistics support to the SBCT. The support operations officer’s primary
role is to coordinate, synchronize, and supervise execution of direct logistic support (all
classes of supply, maintenance, medical, transportation, and field services) for the SBCT
and divisional and or corps units operating within the SBCT AO. The BSB support
operations officer and the SBCT S4 work closely in planning and synchronizing CSS.
(8) SBCT Surgeon. The SBCT surgeon is responsible for the technical control of all
medical activities in the command. The brigade surgeon oversees and coordinates HSS
activities through the brigade surgeon’s section (BSS) and the brigade staff (Figure 1-28).
He keeps the brigade commander informed on the status of HSS for brigade operations
and on the health of the command. The brigade surgeon and his staff are located within
the brigade main tactical operations center (TOC) where they work with the brigade S3 to
develop the HSS input to the brigade OPORD and operation plan (OPLAN). For
additional information on the BSS (digitized), refer to FM 4-02.21.

Figure 1-28. SBCT surgeon section.

(9) Medical Plans and Operations Cell. The medical plans and operations cell is
assigned to the BSS. It is staffed with a medical plans officer and a medical operations

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FM 3-21.31

sergeant. The medical plans and operations cell is under the supervision of the brigade
surgeon. This cell collocates with the future plans cell either at the main or rear CP. In
coordination with the health services support officer (HSSO) and the health services
materiel officer (HSMO) of the BSB support operations section, it is responsible for the
development of the HSS portion of the brigade OPLAN and OPORD. The BSS
coordinates the GS and DS relationships of the organic medical units and medical units
and elements under OPCON or attached to the SBCT. The BSS is also responsible for--
• Developing HSS staff estimates for supporting brigade operations.
• Developing and coordinating the medical brigade HSS plan with the brigade
staff, forward support battalion (FSB), forward support medical company
(FSMC), and maneuver battalion medical platoons.
• Developing the HSS annex of the brigade OPLAN and OPORD.
• Coordinating through higher headquarters for corps medical support
reinforcement and or augmentation, as required.
• Verifying emergency supply requests and taking the necessary action to
expedite delivery.
• Monitoring Class VIII resupply levels to ensure adequate stockage for support
of brigade operations.

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CHAPTER 2
BATTLE COMMAND
Battle command is the exercise of command in operations against a
hostile, thinking enemy. It is employed to link the leadership element of
combat power to operations. Battle command principally is an art that
employs skills developed by professional study, constant practice, and
considered judgment. Commanders, assisted by staff, visualize the
operation, describe it in terms of intent and guidance, and direct the
actions of subordinates within their intent. They direct operations in terms
of the battlefield operating systems and directly influence operations by
their physical presence supported by their command and control system.
Command of the SBCT remains a personal function. The capabilities
provided via the information systems infrastructure provide the
commander with an ability to lead and make decisions from anywhere on
the battlefield while remaining closely tied to planning and preparation
ongoing in the main command post.

Section I. THE ART OF COMMAND

Command is the authority that a commander lawfully exercises over subordinates by
virtue of rank and assignment. Leaders possessing command authority strive to use it
with firmness, care, and skill. Command is more an art than a science, although it
exhibits characteristics of both. The "art of command" requires expert performance of a
specific skill using intuitive faculties that cannot be gained solely by study or education.
Command also requires a conscious and skillful exercise of authority to fulfill command
responsibilities through decision-making and leadership.

2-1. ROLE OF THE COMMANDER

The SBCT commander’s knowledge, experience, and personality determine how he
interacts with his unit through command and control. The commander decides what he
needs to do and the best method to do it. He leads his unit through the process in mission
accomplishment. He drives the process through mission command. He establishes a
command climate for his unit, prepares it for operations, commands it during operations,
and assesses his subordinates. The commander refines the SBCT’s command and control
system and operates it based upon his personality. Within the limitations of current C2
systems architecture, he establishes a system to meet the unique demands that he places
on it, the abilities and personalities of his subordinates, and the capabilities of the
equipment in the SBCT.

2-2. MISSION COMMAND

Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution
based on mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Mission orders leave the
“how” of mission accomplishment to the subordinates by allowing them maximum
freedom of planning and action to accomplish missions. Successful mission command
results from subordinate leaders exercising disciplined initiative to accomplish missions
within the commander's intent. Mission command requires an environment of trust and

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mutual understanding. The four elements of mission command are commander's intent,
subordinate initiative, mission orders, and resource allocation.
a. Commander's Intent. Commander's intent is a clear, concise statement of what
key tasks the unit must do and what conditions the unit must meet to succeed with respect
to the enemy, terrain, and to the desired end state. The commander formulates and
communicates his intent to ensure unity of effort during operations, allowing
subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative.
b. Subordinate Initiative. Initiative is the assumption of responsibility to decide
and initiate independent actions when the commander's concept or order is no longer
applicable or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to the accomplishment of the
commander's intent presents itself. Subordinates decide how to achieve their assigned
missions within the delegated freedom of action and the exercise of disciplined initiative
during execution; however, they have an absolute responsibility to fulfill the
commander's intent.
c. Mission Orders. A mission order is a technique for completing combat orders to
allow subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action to accomplish missions that
leave the "how" of mission accomplishment to the subordinate. The commander
intervenes to direct coordination, restore operations, or exploit success. At a minimum,
mission orders state--
• Task organization.
• Commander's intent and concept of operations.
• Unit mission.
• Subordinate unit missions.
• Mission essential coordinating instructions.
d. Resource Allocation. The commander allocates appropriate resources to
subordinates to enable them to accomplish their missions. The commander also must
consider information (or the C2 INFOSYS infrastructure) as a resource and share it
through all levels of his command.

2-3. LOCATION OF THE COMMANDER

Previously, the commander was torn between the conflicting requirement to visualize the
battlefield and the requirement for his physical presence in the main or tactical command
post to participate in the MDMP. This dilemma slowed the planning and execution of
operations while frustrating the commander’s efforts to “get out of the command post.”
a. All commanders within the SBCT have the ability to visualize their battlespace in
all dimensions and to share a COP. They also have the ability to precisely locate and
track high payoff targets and conduct simultaneous operations employing lethal and non-
lethal means while operating with joint and multinational forces. In addition, SBCT
commanders retain the ability to recognize and protect their own and other friendly
forces. The commander cannot, however, fully visualize the battlefield while directing
and synchronizing the efforts of his SBCT from only a computer screen at a CP. He must
move from the command post to assess the situation face-to-face with subordinate
commanders and their soldiers. The INFOSYS within the SBCT permit a commander to
position himself where he can best command without depriving himself of the ability to
respond to opportunities and changing circumstances.

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b. The commander can be virtually anywhere on the battlefield to best affect

ongoing operations without disrupting the planning and preparation for future operations.
Near real-time information updates, continuous assessment, and command decisions can
be briefed, approved, and disseminated from SBCT to company level via the command
and control infrastructure.

2-4. COMBINING THE ART OF COMMAND AND THE SCIENCE OF

CONTROL
The commander is the key to command and control in the SBCT. Foremost among his
roles is his ability to combine the art of command and the science of control. He must use
a methodology of visualizing the battlespace, describing his visualization to subordinates,
directing action to achieve results, and leading the unit to mission accomplishment, while
continually assessing the situation.
a. Visualize. The commander's visualization is the core mental process that supports
his decision-making and is the key by which the commander combines the art of
command and the science of control. It is the process of achieving a clear understanding
of the SBCT's current state with relation to the enemy and the environment, developing a
desired end state which represents mission accomplishment, and determining the
sequence of activities that moves the SBCT from its current state to the end state. The
commander begins to visualize the desired end state when he receives a mission or
perceives a change in the mission. He applies his current situational understanding to the
received or perceived mission. As he analyzes or receives staff analysis of the mission, he
develops a mental image of the friendly forces in relation to the enemy, the environment,
and possible future operations at the conclusion of the operation, or the end state. The
commander's visualization is his assessment tool throughout the operation, and he should
focus on three main factors.
(1) Understand the Current State of Friendly and Enemy Forces. This is situational
understanding (SU), which the commander derives from applying his judgment,
experience, expertise, and intuition to the information provided to him by the staff in the
form of the COP. This SU includes physical factors, human factors, and the relationships
between friendly and enemy forces and the environment that represent potential
opportunities or threats for the SBCT.
(2) Foresee a Feasible Outcome. The commander must identify a feasible outcome
to the operation that results in mission success and leaves the SBCT postured for the next
operation.
(3) Visualize the Dynamics Between Opposing Forces. The commander must
identify the dynamics throughout the sequence of actions. This includes evaluating
possible enemy reactions and friendly counteractions. This evaluation may lead to the
identification of possible decision points throughout the operation.
b. Describe. The commander describes his visualization by participating in the
MDMP during planning and preparing for an operation and during execution.
Specifically, his commander's intent, planning guidance, anticipated decision point(s),
and his CCIR all serve to guide and to focus the command and control system to support
his decision-making and communicate his decision for execution. The command and
control system infrastructure is available to assist the commander in describing his
visualization. However, he should not accept the products of the system unquestioned. He

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must apply his judgment, experience, expertise, and intuition before making a decision
and describing that decision to subordinates. During preparation, the commander uses the
rehearsal to further describe his intent and concept to his subordinates, to identify and
discuss options at decision points, to synchronize activities within the SBCT and among
subordinate units, and add to his own visualization. During execution, the commander
continues to visualize the implication of events, and he describes his conclusions to his
staff and subordinates through updated CCIR and guidance.
c. Direct. The commander directs when he has made a decision and communicates
that decision to his subordinates through an order.
(1) Plan. Orders should enable subordinates to understand their situation, their
commander's mission and intent, and their own mission. The order (WARNO or
OPORD) should provide unity of effort in exercising disciplined initiative by subordinate
commanders. Clear direction is essential to mission success; however, commanders must
strike a balance between necessary, but minimum direction and overly detailed direction.
The commander (or the staff) assigns graphical, written, or procedural control measures
(permissive or restrictive) to prevent units from impeding one another and to impose
necessary coordination. The commander should impose only the minimum control
measures necessary to provide essential coordination and deconfliction among units.
(2) Prepare. During preparations, the commander must update and validate his
visualization as the results of reconnaissance and surveillance operations become
available. He must determine whether new information (on enemy forces, friendly forces,
or the environment) invalidates his plan, requires him to adjust the plan, or validates the
plan with no further changes. The earlier the commander identifies the need for
modifications, the easier it is for him to incorporate and synchronize changes into his
plan. He describes the implications of his visualization and directs actions to effect his
changes to the plan through an order (WARNO, OPORD, or FRAGO).
(3) Execute. Execution includes a continuous process of assessing the current state of
the operation and making adjustments to exploit opportunities and to account for
unforeseen enemy actions. Combining the art of command and the science of control is
most evident during execution. The commander exercises judgment and initiative
continuously, assessing the situation and making decisions, often with incomplete,
conflicting, and vague information. Waiting for perfect information is rarely an option.
During execution, the commander uses his visualization, continuously updated with a
current COP, to ensure that subordinate units execute appropriate measures for the actual
situation. A major part of the "art of command" is to know when the plan must change,
what criteria point toward a need for changes, and then determining what required
changes will get the maximum effectiveness from the unit. The commander directs these
actions primarily through a FRAGO.

Section II. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control consists of two components: the commander and the command
and control system. The commander uses the command and control system to exercise C2
over forces to accomplish a mission.

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2-5. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

The command and control system is the arrangement of personnel, information
management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential to the commander to
plan, prepare for, execute, and assess operations.
a. Personnel. The command and control system in an SBCT begins with people. No
amount of technology can reduce the importance of the human dimension since combat
involves soldiers.
b. Information Management. Information management (IM) consists of the C2
INFOSYS and relevant information (RI). The C2 INFOSYS provide the commander with
a vehicle for exercising command and control. These systems provide an accuracy and
reliability that can accelerate decision-making within the SBCT. The C2 INFOSYS also
make mission execution efficient and effective, allowing the commanders and staffs to
spend more time and energy on the art and human dimension of command and control.
c. Procedures. Procedures are standard and detailed sequences of activities within
the SBCT to accomplish tasks. They govern actions within the command and control
system to effectively and efficiently exercise command and control. Adhering to
procedures minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitance as commanders
rapidly shift forces to meet contingencies.
d. Equipment and Facilities. The equipment and facilities provide sustainment and
a work environment for the other elements of the command and control systems.

2-6. COMMAND AND CONROL SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE

Command and control infrastructure is a system of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment,
facilities, and communications and computers. It is designed to collect, process, store,
display, and disseminate the information needed to develop a common operating picture
in support of a commander’s mission, and it supports a commander’s exercise of
command and control across the range of military operations through regulation of forces
and functions IAW the commander’s intent.
a. The command and control infrastructure (Figure 2-1, page 2-6) provides the
commander and staff with the ability to plan, prepare, and execute using resilient voice
and data communications networks (a portion of the INFOSYS) to enable effective
command and control on the battlefield. This capability includes the conduct of
operations from alert through redeployment. It also includes conduct of
counterintelligence operations to deny the adversary’s ability to do the same. The SBCT
integrates the command and control infrastructure through maneuver, fires and effects,
logistics, force protection, information operations, and intelligence.
b. The SBCT’s command and control infrastructure is organized to leverage fully
the opportunities presented by near real-time access to all RI and a near-complete COP
through the available INFOSYS. The command and control organization provides all
commanders within the SBCT with the capability to “see” and understand their AO in all
its dimensions. It provides a shared COP of the situation, precisely locates and tracks
critical targets, synchronizes simultaneous operations with lethal and nonlethal means,
operates with joint and multinational forces, and recognizes and protects its own forces.
This capability allows significantly enhanced synchronization of widely dispersed, highly
mobile forces in execution as well as in planning to mass effects. The SBCT’s INFOSYS

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employ “smart technology” to enable organizations to identify and adapt to the changing
patterns of a nondoctrinal or difficult-to-template enemy.

Figure 2-1. Command and control system infrastructure.

2-7. EXERCISING COMMAND AND CONTROL

The SBCT commander must place the command and control system into action to
exercise command and control. Exercising command and control is dynamic throughout
the operations process.
a. Although planning, preparing, executing, and assessing occur continuously in
operations, they need not occur sequentially. The SBCT must prepare to perform all four
actions simultaneously, with the commander at the center of the process (Figure 2-2).
b. The operations process is execution-focused rather than planning focused. The
command and control INFOSYS compress planning to allow more time to focus on
execution. The INFOSYS do this in two ways.
(1) The INFOSYS allow better collaborative and parallel planning among echelons
within the SBCT.
(2) The INFOSYS provide a more accurate COP, allowing forces to execute faster
with less detailed planning.

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Figure 2-2. The operations process.

2-8. DISTRIBUTION OF SBCT COMMAND AND CONTROL

The SBCT’s staff sections normally are distributed among four command and control
organizations: the command group and or TAC CP, main command post, and rear
command post. The SBCT commander organizes the staff within each command post to
perform essential staff functions to aid him with planning and in controlling operations.
Enhanced command post capabilities allow the commander to maintain CP functionality
regardless of the spatial positioning of the staff. The modularized design of each function
(for example, plans, effects, maneuver support) provides the commander with the
flexibility to tailor his command posts based on his assessment of the current and future
situation. These command and control organizations are normally positioned within the
SBCT's AO to maintain flexibility, redundancy, survivability, and mobility.
a. Command Group. The command group exists primarily as a portion of the TAC
CP. While the commander can separate his command vehicle (CV) from the TAC CP and
maintain a minimum of connectivity to the SBCT’s INFOSYS, his ability to maintain a
comprehensive flow of information from the staff and subordinates is limited. The
command group normally lacks the ability to sustain itself beyond 12 hours and its
security must also be considered. The command group, deployed with the TAC CP in its
entirety, provides the commander with full INFOSYS capability and increased
sustainability and security. The command group normally consists of the commander and
other key staff officers as directed by the commander. Its purpose is the direct command
and control of the SBCT. The command group is not a permanent organization; rather, it
is formed anytime the SBCT commander goes forward to control an operation. The
command group is equipped to operate separate from the TAC CP wherever the SBCT
commander feels it is necessary to influence operations with rapid decisions and orders.
The commander determines the actual placement of personnel within the command
group.
(1) The commander fights the battle from the command group and normally locates
near the most critical event, normally with the main effort headquarters. From this
forward location, the commander is better able to observe critical events, maintain
communications, and sense the battle. Despite the increased capability provided by the

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C2 INFOSYS, command remains a personal endeavor. The commander should leverage

the C2 INFOSYS to untether himself from the main CP so he can physically “see” his
subordinates and the terrain he is to fight on without affecting his decision-making
ability.
(2) The commander considers the following in determining his location on the
battlefield:
• Linkage of the ABCS network to make timely decisions, including the ability
to judge the progress, condition, and morale of his forces. Within technical
limitations, communications systems adapt to the needs of the commander,
not vice versa.
• Time and location of critical events and or decision points that have the
greatest impact on mission accomplishment. Ideally, the commander selects a
location where he can observe the conditions that aid in making a critical
decision.
• Security for the command group, including the commander's personal
protection.
b. Tactical Command Post. The tactical command post is a temporary C2
organization that directly assists the commander with controlling current operations. The
S3 is responsible for the activities and employment of the TAC CP.
(1) The TAC CP organization is simpler, smaller, and more austere than the main CP.
It operates as one integrated cell that provides intelligence, current operations, and
effects. It is composed of those elements that the commander deems necessary. When not
deployed, the TAC CP personnel assist operations in the main CP. Its small size and high
mobility allow frequent displacement and a comparatively low electronic signature to
maintain security. The TAC CP is normally manned with--
• The SBCT S3.
• A current operations officer, normally the assistant S3.
• An intelligence officer, normally the assistant S2.
• DECOORD/ALO.
• Other staff area representatives such as MANSPT and or ADAM, if directed
by the S3 or SBCT commander.
(2) In addition to controlling current operations, the TAC CP serves the following
functions:
• Provides the command group with combat information and intelligence.
• Relays the commander’s decisions and instructions, as required.
• Provides the net control station for the SBCT command radio net and backup
net control station for the operations and intelligence (OI) radio net.
• Provides a forward location for issuing orders.
• Provides a forward planning facility, if necessary.
• Serves as the main CP when the main CP is displacing or unable to function.
• Exercises command and control over special operations such as a passage of
lines, relief in place, shift of the main effort, or construction of a strongpoint.
• Provides command and control for a special task force.
c. Main Command Post. The main CP has a broader and more capable current
operations battle tracking capability than the TAC CP. The main CP has a greater ISR

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planning and controlling capability, which allows it to process data received from the
cavalry squadron (RSTA), the military intelligence company, and other ISR assets. The
fires and effect coordination cell is also located at the main CP; this allows the ECOORD
to monitor ongoing lethal and non-lethal effects and provide the commander with
recommendations on the execution and assessment of the targeting process within the
brigade AO. The main and rear CPs are able to maintain constant awareness of the
other’s actions through the SBCT C2 INFOSYS. The SBCT XO is responsible for
supervising all staff activities and functions within the main CP. The main CP operates
from a stationary position and moves as required to maintain control of the operation. In
linear operations environments, it locates behind the infantry battalion CPs and, if
possible, out of enemy medium artillery range. In nonlinear operations (noncontiguous
areas of operations), it locates where it can best support SBCT operations and is least
vulnerable to potential hostile actions. This may be within the AO or from "sanctuary” (a
location outside the immediate AO). The main CP provides the following functions:
• Controls current operations when the TAC CP is not deployed.
• Assumes functions of the TAC CP if it is destroyed or incapable of
functioning.
• Synchronizes combat, combat support, and combat service support activities
in support of the overall operation.
• Provides a focal point for the development of intelligence.
• Supports SBCT and subordinate commander’s decision-making by
monitoring, analyzing, and disseminating information.
• Monitors and anticipates the commander’s decision points.
• Coordinates with higher headquarters and adjacent units.
• Keeps the higher headquarters informed.
• Provides net control station for the OI radio net and backup net control station
for the command radio net.
• Produces and disseminates the commander’s FRAGOs for execution within
the current 24 hour window.
• Controls reconnaissance and surveillance operations.
The cavalry squadron (RSTA) command posts (the TAC CP or command group) locate
where they can synchronize reconnaissance and surveillance with ongoing operations.
Possible options include the following:
• Collocate with the SBCT TAC CP when deployed as an early entry force.
• Locate in the AO to conduct reconnaissance operations while the main CP
resides in "sanctuary."
• Locate in an assigned AO, especially during stability (or support) operations.
• Locate at a passage of lines to perform liaison and command and control.
d. Rear Command Post. The rear CP controls and coordinates the administrative
and logistical support for the SBCT. The rear CP consists of the SBCT S1, S4, and any
attached military police elements. The rear CP collocates with the BSB support
operations section in the BSA. The SBCT S1 and S4 work closely with the BSB support
operations officer to coordinate combat service support for the SBCT. The rear CP is
under OPCON of the BSB commander for defense of the BSA. The rear CP serves the
following functions:

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• Tracks the current battle.

• Provides combat service support representation to the plans cell for planning
and integration.
• Sustains operations.
• Forecasts and coordinates future requirements.
• Serves as the entry point for units entering the SBCT rear area.
• Monitors MSRs and controls combat service support traffic.
• Coordinates the evacuation of casualties, equipment, and EPWs.
• Coordinates the movement of the BSA with the main CP.

Section III. PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS

Planning for operations leads to a commander making decisions during execution. At its
core, decision-making is knowing "if" to decide, then "when" and "what" to decide. It
includes understanding the consequence of decisions. Decisions are the means by which
the commander translates his vision of the end state into action. Decision-making is both
science and art. Many aspects of military operations--movement rates, fuel consumption,
weapons effects--are quantifiable and, therefore, part of the science of war. Other
aspects--the impact of leadership, complexity of operations, and uncertainty regarding
enemy intentions--belong to the art of war. The MDMP is an established and proven
analytical process. The MDMP adapts the Army’s analytical approach to problem
solving. It is a tool that assists the commander and staff in developing estimates and a
plan. The digitization of our Army and its battlefield operating systems has not changed
the steps of the MDMP; it has enhanced them. While the formal problem-solving process
described in this chapter may start with the receipt of a mission, and has as its goal the
production of an order, the analytical aspect of the MDMP is continuous during
operations (including execution) with constant feedback and updates of information.

2-9. INFORMATION SYSTEMS ENHANCEMENT TO DECISION-MAKING

The C2 INFOSYS will enhance both the science and the art of war in two primary ways.
a. First, the INFOSYS will provide commanders and staffs with a better
understanding of their battlespace. Information will be--
• Collected more effectively.
• Processed faster and more accurately.
• Stored in a manner that provides instant access through distributed databases.
• Displayed in a more useable, tailored, and current format.
• Disseminated to the right place faster, with fewer errors, and less lag time than
analog systems.
The systems include the ability to access analytical expertise and databases of Army,
national, and civilian institutions and the ability to create virtual staffs. Virtual staffing,
the bringing together of organic and non-organic elements independent of locations in or
out of the area of operation, can be used to develop and update the staff database and
refine courses of action and the plan. The C2 INFOSYS and information management
will make estimates more accurate, complete, and current than was possible with analog
systems. Creating and maintaining a current, complete COP is essential to the MDMP
and is the foundation for all estimates.

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b. The second area where these systems improve the MDMP is in parallel and
collaborative planning. Parallel planning occurs when two echelons conduct their
planning nearly simultaneously. Parallel planning can only happen when the higher
headquarters produces timely warning orders and shares information with subordinate
headquarters as it becomes available. Parallel planning allows each echelon to make
maximum use of time available, and it requires significant interaction between echelons.
Collaborative planning (Paragraph 2-26, Coordination and Liaison) is the real-time
interaction of commanders and staffs at two or more echelons. It is facilitated by C2
INFOSYS that allow real time exchange of data, voice, and video so that commanders
and staffs can work together during all phases of planning.
(1) The INFOSYS facilitate both parallel and collaborative planning. These systems
make sharing information much easier through a COP; distributed databases; increased
speed and accuracy of dissemination of orders, plans, and guidance; and improved
connectivity between echelons for the sharing of information and the passing of questions
and answers with greater speed.
(2) Collaborative planning must be used judiciously. While it is a powerful planning
tool, it can also be a negative factor. Collaborative planning is not appropriate for all
situations.
(a) Collaborative planning is most appropriate when time is scarce and a limited
number of options are being considered. It is particularly useful when the commander and
his staff can benefit from the input of subordinate commanders and staffs.
(b) Collaborative planning is not appropriate in cases where the staff is working a
large number of courses of action or branches and sequels, many of which will be
discarded. Involving subordinates in this instance will waste precious time working
options that are later discarded. Collaborative planning is also not appropriate in many
cases during ongoing operations where extended planning sessions will take commanders
and staffs away from conducting current operations.
(c) As a rule of thumb, if the commander is directly involved in time sensitive
planning, some level of collaborative planning is probably called for. The commander,
not the staff, must make the decision to conduct collaborative planning. Only the
commander can commit subordinate commanders to using their time for collaborative
planning.
c. The INFOSYS will improve the time lines to conduct full planning and will assist
the commander with his situational understanding. Figure 2-3, page 2-12, illustrates the
cognitive hierarchy. The commander and staff must process the information available to
them. Processing raises the meaning of information from data to understanding. The data
is organized and processed to create the databases of information. Processing then takes
the data in the database and adds meaning to the relevant information with progressively
higher levels of complex and cognitive methods that create a common operational
picture.
d. Processing also includes lower-level mechanical methods such as organizing,
collating, plotting, and arranging data and information. However, effective processing
requires analysis and evaluation (higher-level cognitive methods) for data to become
knowledge. Through its estimates, the staff creates knowledge for the commander. The
commander then applies his judgment to the staff estimates and COP and formulates his
situational understanding. Processing depends primarily on well-trained and adaptive

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analysts to provide insight. To achieve understanding, decision-makers apply judgment to

the knowledge and the staff estimates. Understanding enables informed decisions with
less-than-perfect data. Understanding generates action. With situational understanding
and a mission, commanders can then visualize their battlespace and take action by issuing
their commanders’ guidance, intent, and selection of CCIR.

Figure 2-3. Cognitive hierarchy.

2-10. THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The MDMP is a detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time-consuming process used when
adequate planning time and sufficient staff support are available to develop and
thoroughly examine numerous friendly and enemy courses of action. This examination
typically occurs when developing the commander's estimate and operation plans, when
planning for an entirely new mission, and during extended operations. The underlying
concurrent processes of IPB, risk assessment, targeting, force protection, and military
deception planning provide the information that is used as part of the standardized
planning in the MDMP. The MDMP helps the commander and staff to examine a specific
situation and, by applying thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional
knowledge, reach a logical decision. The MDMP is the foundation on which planning in
a time-constrained environment is based. The products created during the MDMP can
and should be used during subsequent planning sessions when time may not be available
for a thorough reexamination but where significant parts of existing information and
analysis of the factors of METT-TC have not changed substantially. (See Section IV for a
detailed explanation of the MDMP and the use of MDMP in a time-constrained
environment.)
a. The MDMP relies on doctrine, especially the terms and symbols (graphics)
consolidated in FM 101-5-1. The professional understanding of a defined common
lexicon particular to the profession of arms and the Army are essential to the MDMP.
Using approved terms and symbols facilitates the rapid and consistent assessment of the

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situation and creation and implementation of plans and orders by minimizing confusion
over the meanings of terms and symbols used in the process.
b. Using the unabbreviated MDMP provides the following advantages:
• It analyzes and compares multiple friendly and enemy COAs in an attempt to
identify the best possible friendly COA.
• It produces the greatest coordination and synchronization for an operation and
minimizes the risk of overlooking a critical aspect of the operation.
• It results in a detailed operation order or operation plan.
c. The disadvantage of using the unabbreviated MDMP is that it is a time-
consuming process.

2-11. ROLES OF THE COMMANDER AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER

The commander is in charge of the military decision-making process. He decides what
procedures within the MDMP to use in each situation, including whether or not to use
collaborative planning. The commander’s intent is the driving force behind the MDMP.
The planning process hinges on a clear articulation of his commander’s visualization. The
C2 INFOSYS provide the commander with an unprecedented level and quality of
information that will help focus his attention on the critical elements of the situation and
enable him to better understand the environment in which he is operating.
a. The commander is personally responsible for planning, preparing, and executing
operations. From start to finish, the commander's personal role is central: his
participation in the process provides focus and guidance to the staff. However, there are
responsibilities and decisions that are the commander's alone. The amount of his direct
involvement is driven by the time available, his personal preferences, and the experience
and accessibility of the staff. The less time available, the less experienced the staff, and
the less accessible the staff, the greater the commander’s involvement. When the
commander is linked with his staff by the C2 INFOSYS, he is more accessible and has
more tools to provide guidance and to stay involved in the process, regardless of his
location within the area of operation. (See Paragraph 2-20, Decision-Making in a Time-
Constrained Environment, for a discussion of increased commander involvement in the
decision-making process.)
b. The commander uses the entire staff during the MDMP to explore the full range
of probable and likely enemy and friendly courses of action and to analyze and compare
his own organization's capabilities with those of the enemy. This staff effort has one
objective: to collectively integrate information with sound doctrine and technical
competence to assist the commander in his decisions, leading ultimately to effective
execution. Through the use of C2 INFOSYS, the commander guides not only the staff but
subordinate commanders as well and uses the C2 INFOSYS to access additional data,
from national or higher echelons, to help in analyzing both the environment in which he
is operating and the enemy.
c. The XO manages, coordinates, and disciplines the staff's work and provides
quality control. He must understand the commander's guidance and intent because he
supervises the entire process. He ensures the staff has the information, guidance from the
commander, and facilities it needs. He determines timelines for the staff, establishes
briefback times and locations, enforces the information management plan, and provides
any unique instructions to guide the staff to completing the MDMP process.

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d. By issuing guidance and participating in formal and informal briefings, the

commander and XO guide the staff through the decision-making process. In a
collaborative environment, the commander can extend this participation directly to
subordinate commanders and staffs. Warning orders are used to facilitate parallel
planning. Such interaction helps the staff and subordinates to resolve questions and
involves them in the complete process. The selected course of action and its
implementing operation order are directly linked to how well both the commander and
the staff accomplish each step of the MDMP.

2-12. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND

RECONNAISSANCE
The SBCT commander deploys the cavalry squadron (RSTA) early in the planning
process to facilitate early intelligence collection. However, the cavalry squadron (RSTA)
should not be deployed without first considering, as a minimum, the reconnaissance and
surveillance planning factors found during mission analysis (Paragraph 2-14).
a. The commander and staff analyze the information collected from the cavalry
squadron (RSTA), MICO, and other ISR assets and incorporate this information into the
planning process. The commander and staff ensure ISR operations are continuous while
planning, preparing for, and executing the mission. Information collected during
reconnaissance and surveillance may result in initial plans or courses of action being
modified or even discarded. The earlier the need for modifications can be identified, the
easier the modifications can be incorporated and synchronized into the plan. Further,
when the plan changes, the commander must modify his reconnaissance and surveillance
objective to support the new plan.
b. ISR operations assist significantly in developing courses of action. Conducted
early in the planning process, it can help confirm or deny the commander's initial
assessment (visualization). Information may also allow him to immediately focus on a
specific course of action, or eliminate courses of action that the reconnaissance shows to
be infeasible. When conducting ISR operations, the commander must determine if the
benefits outweigh the risks.

Section IV. THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The MDMP is a single, established, and proven analytical process. It is an adaptation of
the Army’s analytical approach to problem solving that assists the commander and his
staff in describing the commander’s visualization and expressing his directives in the
form of an OPLAN or OPORD (Figure 2-4). The complete MDMP is described in FM
101-5. It is a seven-step process that is summarized in this section.

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Figure 2-4. The steps in the MDMP.

2-13. RECEIPT OF MISSION

The staff receives a new mission in the form of an OPORD from a higher headquarters,
or the commander recognizes an opportunity that requires a significant change to the

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current operation. The staff begins to collect the data and resources necessary to conduct
mission analysis. The XO develops the timeline to structure the staff’s efforts, and the
commander issues initial guidance to his staff that focuses them on developing initial
CCIR, authorized movement, level of detail required in the MDMP, and initial ISR
requirements. The result of this step is a WARNO that alerts subordinate units to an
impending mission change.

2-14. MISSION ANALYSIS

Mission analysis is crucial to the MDMP. It allows the commander to begin his
commander’s visualization (FM 6-0). Mission analysis consists of 17 tasks, not
necessarily sequential, and results in the staff formally briefing the commander. Analysis
of the higher headquarters mission is the start point that generates the intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as described in FM 2-91.3. The staff analyzes the
specified, implied, and essentials task laid out in the higher headquarters’ order. It
reviews the available assets, and identifies critical facts and assumptions. The commander
makes an initial assessment of where he might take tactical risk (FM 100-14). The
commander and staff identify non-tactical risk hazards and make an initial assessment of
the risk level for each hazard. (See Appendix C, Risk Management and Fratricide
Avoidance, and Appendix D, Environmental Concerns and Compliance.) The results of
mission analysis are the initial CCIR, an ISR plan, the SBCT’s mission, the commander’s
initial intent for the operation, and the commander’s guidance for the staff on developing
COAs. These products are distributed to subordinates in the form of WARNO #2 and an
ISR order.

2-15. COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

The staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. This begins with analyzing
relative combat power and generating maneuver options. The staff arrays initial forces to
accomplish critical tactical tasks and develops the scheme of maneuver that synchronizes
the tasks using the battlefield framework. The final result is a COA statement and sketch
that clearly portrays how the SBCT will accomplish the mission and explains the scheme
of maneuver. The COA statement and sketch serve as the basis for the COA analysis war
game.

2-16. COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS (WAR GAME)

The staff develops a set of standards used to evaluate each COA. The standards may be
based on the principles of war, commander’s guidance, doctrinal principles for the
operation being conducted, or whatever measure is deemed important by the commander.
The staff conducts a war game of each COA using an action, reaction, and counteraction
methodology. This allows them to view the likely outcome of the battle, allocate
resources, synchronize BOS, and develop control measures. The results of each war game
are assessed using evaluation criteria established by the commander and recorded for
comparison against other COAs.

2-17. COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

The staff evaluates each COA and the advantages and disadvantages of each COA to
determine which COA best accomplishes the mission without undue risk. Each COA is

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briefed to the commander, and the staff makes its recommendation on the most preferred
option.

2-18. COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL

The commander selects a COA, modifies it as required to better meet his intent, or rejects
all of them and has the staff develop new ones. The commander then finalizes his intent
and CCIR based on the chosen COA. He gives guidance to the staff on the type of order
to produce, rehearsals to conduct, and priorities for CS and CSS assets. The staff issues
WARNO #3 reflecting these changes.

2-19. ORDERS PRODUCTION

The staff finalizes the plan based on the commander’s approval guidance and prepares to
publish a written order, brief an oral order, transmit a digital order, or a combination
thereof. The order includes graphical overlays and staff annexes as appropriate.

2-20. DECISION MAKING IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT

The MDMP is the foundation on which planning in a time-constrained environment is
based. The products created during the MDMP can and should be used during subsequent
planning sessions when time may not be available for a thorough reexamination but
where significant parts of existing information and analysis of the factors of METT-TC
have not changed substantially. The focus of any planning process should be to quickly
develop a flexible, tactically sound, fully integrated, and fully synchronized plan that
increases the likelihood of mission success with the fewest possible casualties. However,
any operation may go beyond the initial plan. The most detailed staff estimates cannot
anticipate every possible branch or sequel, enemy action, unexpected opportunities, or
changes in mission directed from higher headquarters. Fleeting opportunities or
unexpected enemy actions may require a quick decision to implement a new or modified
plan.
Before a unit can conduct decision-making in a time-constrained environment, it must
master all of the steps in the MDMP. A unit can only shorten the MDMP if it fully
understands the role of each and every step of the process and the requirements to
produce the necessary products. Training on these steps must be thorough and result in a
series of staff battle drills that can be tailored to the time available. Training on the
MDMP must be stressful and replicate realistic conditions and time lines. Although the
task is difficult, all staffs must be able to produce a simple, flexible, tactically sound plan
in a time-constrained environment. Any METT-TC factor, but especially limited time,
may make it difficult to follow the entire MDMP. An inflexible process used in all
situations will not work. The MDMP is a sound and proven process that can be modified
with slightly different techniques to be effective when time is limited. There is still only
one process, however, and omitting steps of the MDMP is not the solution. Anticipation,
organization, and prior preparation are the keys to success in a time-constrained
environment.
The commander decides how to abbreviate the MDMP. What follows are suggested
techniques and procedures that will save time. They are not exhaustive nor the only ways
to save time, but they have proven useful. These techniques are not necessarily sequential
in nature, nor are all of them useful in all situations. What works for a unit depends on its

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proficiency and the factors of METT-TC in a given situation. The commander can use
these, or techniques of his own choosing, to abbreviate the process. Figure 2-5 is an
example of an abbreviated MDMP outline.

Figure 2-5. Example of an abbreviated MDMP outline.

a. General Considerations. The MDMP is abbreviated when there is too little time
for a thorough and comprehensive application of the process. The most significant factor
to consider is time. It is the only nonrenewable, and often the most critical, resource.
(1) There are four primary techniques to save time.
(a) The first is to increase the SBCT commander's involvement, allowing him to
make decisions during the process without waiting for detailed briefings after each step.

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(b) The second technique is for the commander to become more prescriptive in his
guidance by limiting options. This saves the staff time by focusing members on those
things the commander feels are most important.
(c) The third technique, and the one that saves the most time, is for the commander to
limit the number of courses of action developed and war-gamed. The goal is an
acceptable course of action that meets mission requirements in the time available, even if
it is not optimal. He can also direct that the staff refine only one course if he has
personally and mentally conducted the MDMP to come up with his acceptable course of
action.
(d) The fourth technique is to maximize parallel planning. Although parallel planning
is the norm during the MDMP, maximizing its use in a time-constrained environment is
critical.
(2) In a time-constrained environment, the importance of warning orders increases as
available time decreases. A verbal warning order now followed by a written order later
(or posted to a database) is worth more than a written order one hour from now. The same
warning orders used in the MDMP should be issued when abbreviating the process.
(3) In addition to warning orders, units must share all available information with
subordinates, especially IPB products, as early as possible. The C2 INFOSYS greatly
increase this sharing of information and the commander’s visualization through
collaboration with his subordinates.
(4) While the steps used in a time-constrained environment are the same, many of
them may be done mentally by the SBCT commander or with less staff involvement than
during the MDMP. The products developed when the process is abbreviated may be the
same as those developed for the MDMP; however, they may be much less detailed and
some may be omitted altogether. Unit SOPs tailor this process to the commander’s
preference for orders in this environment.
(5) When developing the plan, the staff may initially use the MDMP and develop
branches and sequels. During execution, they may abbreviate the process. A unit may use
the complete process to develop the plan while a subordinate headquarters abbreviates the
process.
b. The Commander's Role. The SBCT commander decides what adjustments to
make to the MDMP, giving specific guidance to the staff to focus the process and save
time. If the commander has access to only a small portion of the staff or none at all, he
will need to rely even more on his own expertise, intuition, creativity, and understanding
of the environment and the art and science of warfare. He may have to decide on his
course of action, mentally war-game the outcome, and confirm his decision to the staff all
in a relatively short time. If so, his decision will be based more on his experience than on
a formal integrated staff process. The commander may elect to have his staff spend most
of its time developing, refining, and war-gaming his course of action rather than
developing multiple courses of action.
(1) The commander should avoid changes to his guidance unless a significantly
changed situation dictates major revisions. Frequent minor changes to the guidance can
result in lost time as the staff makes constant minor adjustments to the plan.
(2) The commander should consult with subordinate commanders before making a
decision, if possible. Subordinate commanders are closer to the fight and can more
accurately portray the enemy's situation and that of their own unit. Additionally,

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consulting with subordinates will give them insight into the upcoming operation and
allow them to maximize parallel planning. The use of the C2 INFOSYS greatly enhances
this concept of maximizing parallel planning between the SBCT and the subordinate
units.
(3) In situations where the SBCT commander must decide quickly, if time is
available he should contact his higher headquarters and advise them of his selected
course of action because it may affect the branches and sequels that his superiors are
planning. However, the SBCT commander should not sacrifice exploiting an opportunity
if he cannot contact higher headquarters.
c. The Staff's Role. The importance of staff estimates increases as time decreases.
Decision-making in a time-constrained environment almost always takes place after a
unit has entered into the area of operation and has begun to execute operations. This
means that the IPB, an updated COP, and some portion of the staff estimates should
already exist. Detailed planning before operations provides the basis for information that
the commander will need to make decisions as operations continue. Staff members must
keep their estimates up to date so that when planning time is limited they can provide
accurate assessments quickly and move directly into course of action development. When
time is short, the commander and staff use as much of the previously analyzed
information and products from earlier decisions as possible. Although some of these
products may change significantly, many (such as the IPB that is continuously updated)
will remain the same or require little change.
(1) The staff must use every opportunity to maximize parallel planning with the unit’s
higher headquarters. Maximizing parallel planning can save significant time, but if not
carefully managed, it can also waste time. As a general rule, the staff must never get
ahead of the higher headquarters in the planning process. The majority of the planning
time should be spent developing the foundation of the plan, such as mission analysis. The
staff should not develop and analyze courses of action without specific guidance and
approval from higher headquarters.
(2) Collaborative planning may be used to further speed up decision-making.
Collaborative planning facilitates subordinate parallel planning and takes advantage of
the subordinates' intimate knowledge of their area of operation and associated threats and
opportunities. Collaborative planning among staffs is plausible; however, there will often
be tension between taking a commander away from an ongoing fight and the need to
involve him in collaborative planning. Only the SBCT commander can determine which
takes precedence and require a subordinate commander to participate in a collaborative
planning session.
d. Receipt of Mission. This part of the process does not change in a time-
constrained environment. However, the commander decides at this step whether or not to
abbreviate the MDMP and, if so, specifies how he wants to do it.
e. Mission Analysis. The commander’s direct involvement is essential to saving
time during mission analysis. He must personally supervise and manage the mission
analysis. If time is not available to conduct a detailed mission analysis, the commander,
his staff, and subordinate commanders (if collaborative tools are available) will rapidly
perform mission analysis. In extreme circumstances, mission analysis may be a mental
process conducted by the commander and key staff. This should be the exception rather
than the norm.

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(1) The IPB process requires constant attention. Many delays during mission analysis
can be traced to poorly conducted IPB. The S2 must quickly update the IPB based on the
new mission and changed situation. This is critical to focus the cavalry squadron (RSTA)
and other ISR assets early to collect information that confirm adjustments to the initial
plan. Event templates must be as complete as possible prior to the mission analysis
briefing. Because event templates are the basis for war gaming, they must be constantly
updated as new information becomes available.
(2) Staff officers conduct as formal a mission analysis briefing as time allows.
However, they may be forced to brief their estimates orally, covering only information
that has changed from the last staff estimate, placing the remainder of the information on
a shared database. When severely time-constrained, they brief only critical information
that directly affects the new mission. If the commander has been directly involved in the
mission analysis, he may decide to skip the mission analysis briefing completely.
f. Commander's Guidance. One way to save time is in the issuance of the
commander's guidance. The elements of the commander’s guidance may be the same as
the MDMP, but the guidance is much more detailed and directive. The commander can
provide detailed information outlining what he expects in each course of action
developed, including tentative task organization, decision points, and scheme of
maneuver. He may also determine which enemy courses of action he wants to war-game
against as well as the branches or sequels he wants incorporated in each course of action.
Detailed guidance keeps the staff focused by establishing parameters within which to
work. Commander's guidance must be constantly reviewed and analyzed. As the situation
changes and information becomes available, the commander may need to update or alter
his guidance. This type of detailed guidance limits the staff’s flexibility and initiative to
save time, but it allows the staff more time to synchronize the course of action during the
war gaming session. Once the guidance is issued, the staff immediately sends a WARNO
to subordinate units. Alternatively, if subordinate commanders and staffs are part of a
collaborative process, they will get this updated guidance during the collaborative
session. However, the staff must still capture this guidance and publish it in a WARNO.
g. Course of Action Development. A significant amount of time is gained by
increased commander involvement in course of action development, resulting in detailed
and directive commander’s guidance. The greatest savings in time for the MDMP comes
from the commander directing the staff to develop only a few courses of action (or a
single course of action) instead of many.
• The commander and selected staff (to include selected subordinate
commanders and staffs, if collaborative tools are available) save additional
time by conducting a hasty war game once the courses of action are
developed.
• From the hasty war gaming session, the commander can make an early
decision, allowing him to refine his course of action and make any necessary
adjustments prior to the detailed war game.
• The hasty war game can also be used to select a single course of action for
further development. It allows the staff to concentrate on synchronizing the
course of action rather than on continuing to develop it during the detailed war
gaming session.

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• When time is severely limited, the quickest process comes from the
commander personally deciding to immediately begin developing one COA,
with branch plans against the enemy's most probable course of action.
• The commander determines which staff officers are critical to assist him in
this process, depending on the type of operation being planned. As a
minimum, he normally includes the XO, S3, S2, and ECOORD.
• Limiting the number of COAs is a risky approach and provides the staff with
little flexibility to apply its creativity and to explore options.
h. Course of Action Analysis. The commander and staff must war-game the courses
of action to ensure all elements are fully integrated and synchronized. An early decision
to limit the number of courses of action to be war-gamed, or to develop only one course
of action, saves the greatest amount of time in this process. When war-gaming the
courses of action, it is best to do so against all feasible enemy courses of action. At a
minimum, the actions at the decisive point must be war-gamed against the enemy's most
probable course of action. The commander’s direct involvement saves significant time in
this step by allowing the staff to focus on only the most essential aspects of the war game.
• The commander can supervise the war gaming session and be prepared to
make decisions, provide guidance, delete unsatisfactory concepts, and assist in
keeping the staff focused.
• The commander must always assess risk. He must evaluate the course of
action to ensure it will not render the force incapable of anticipated operations
or lower the unit's combat effectiveness beyond acceptable levels.
• The commander and staff must identify and prioritize the critical events they
want analyzed. Analyzing essential tasks can identify these critical events.
• Staff officers save time if they specifically define and limit the evaluation
criteria before they begin the war gaming session.
• The commander can greatly increase effectiveness by specifying the most
critical factors to his selected course of action and their weighting.
• The staff works to support the commander’s plan. If the staff determines that
it cannot support the commander's plan, a new course of action must be
developed.
• The use of recorders is particularly important. The INFOSYS greatly simplify
this process as information can be entered in preformatted forms in shared
databases that represent either briefing charts or actual appendices to orders.
• The location used for the war gaming session must be prepared and
configured by the time the staff is ready to conduct the war gaming session.
• Automated briefing products must be updated, digital terrain maps for the area
of operation loaded in the appropriate INFOSYS, and automated tools for
war-gaming must have correct data entered.
• When only one course of action is developed, the purpose of the course of
action analysis is to verify, refine, synchronize, and integrate the commander's
course of action and recommend modifications as necessary.
In a severely time-constrained environment, and if digital tools allow, units may combine
the war gaming process with the rehearsal in a virtual environment, including both the
command and staff and subordinate commanders and staffs.

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i. Course of Action Comparison. If the commander decides to war-game only one

course of action, or if he chooses one during the war gaming session, no course of action
comparison is needed. If multiple courses of action have been war-gamed and the
commander has not made a decision, the staff must conduct the course of action
comparison. Limiting the evaluation criteria and weighting factors is the only significant
shortcut in this step.
j. Course of Action Approval. If the commander has observed and participated in
the planning process, the decision may be rapidly apparent and the commander can make
an on-the-spot decision. If the commander has not participated in the process to this
point, or has not made a decision, a decision briefing is required. Good course of action
comparison charts and sketches assist the commander in visualizing and distinguishing
between each course of action. The staff must ensure the courses of action meet the
course of action criterion, Complete. Time can also be saved by limiting the course of
action briefing to only the decisive action and or selected critical points. If only one
course of action was developed, no decision is required unless the developed course of
action becomes unsuitable, infeasible, or unacceptable, in which event another course of
action must be developed.
k. Orders Production. In a time-constrained environment, time is important and a
verbal FRAGO may be issued first versus a written order. However, the staff must
capture all the information in any verbal orders and warning orders and post a written
order in a shared database to follow up on any previously issued orders. Once the
decision is made not to issue a verbal order, the staff immediately sends out a WARNO.

Section V. PREPARING FOR OPERATIONS

The SBCT’s preparation activities improve its ability to successfully conduct
contemplated operations. At a minimum, these activities include: plan refinement,
rehearsals, reconnaissance and surveillance, coordination, inspections, and movement.
Preparation occurs anytime the SBCT is not executing. Ideally, preparation begins with
the receipt of an order (as does planning) and ends as execution begins. Assessment
during preparation monitors the progress of readiness to conduct operations. The
commander evaluates preparations against his criteria for success to determine variances
and to forecast the significance of those variances for mission accomplishment.

2-21. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integration is fundamental to information
superiority. Effective ISR synchronization and coordination eliminates unit and
functional collection efforts that are conducted in isolation and which prevent the
collective sharing and processing of information and intelligence.
• Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing,
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information
concerning foreign countries or areas and information and knowledge about
an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or
understanding.
• Surveillance involves continuously observing an area to collect information.
Wide-area and focused surveillance provide valuable information.

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• Reconnaissance assets collect information and can validate current

intelligence or predictions. Reconnaissance units, unlike other units, are
designed to collect information.
During preparation, the SBCT commander answers his CCIR and improves his
knowledge about the enemy and terrain through the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and other
ISR assets that may be available to him. An ISR operation is planned and executed with
the same level of importance as any operation. Reconnaissance and surveillance is not a
static, one-time effort that achieves a single goal and then ends. As the cavalry squadron
(RSTA) and other ISR assets gather information (answering the CCIR), the staff should
modify the collection plan to account for new information requirements and to redirect
efforts to collect additional information. The commander and staff must continuously
review intelligence products against the current situation; they redirect the cavalry
squadron (RSTA) or other ISR assets to focus on the most important unknowns
remaining, emphasizing the current CCIR. The SBCT commander must balance his need
for information with the ability of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) to gather it, the risk to
the cavalry squadron (RSTA) during collection, the ability to sustain the cavalry
squadron (RSTA) over time and distance, the requirement to have the cavalry squadron
(RSTA) available at critical times and places to support the decisive action, and the
availability (time, type, and quantity) of other ISR assets. (See Chapter 3, ISR
Operations.)

2-22. SECURITY
Security measures taken during preparation prevent surprise and reduce uncertainty
through local security and OPSEC. Local security and OPSEC prevent the enemy from
discovering the SBCT's plan and protect the force from unforeseen enemy actions. The
goal in conducting security operations is to prevent the enemy from gathering EEFI.
Security operations are a dynamic effort that anticipates and prevents enemy intelligence-
gathering efforts.

2-23. FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection includes air and missile defense; nuclear, biological, and chemical
defense; antiterrorism; defensive information operations; and security to operational
forces and means. Unable to challenge the Army in conventional combat, adversaries
seek to frustrate Army operations by resorting to asymmetric means, weapons, or tactics.
Force protection counters these threats. The SBCT uses skillful and aggressive
counterintelligence and threat assessments to decrease the vulnerability of friendly forces.
Dispersion during movement helps reduce losses from enemy fires and asymmetric
actors. Camouflage discipline, local security, and field fortifications do the same.
Protection of electronic links and nodes is vital to protecting information, information
systems, and soldiers. The commander and staff develop and initiate actions during
planning but conduct the actions during preparation and execution.

2-24. REVISE AND REFINE THE PLAN

The SBCT commander adjusts plans based on new information. The enemy is also acting
while the SBCT is preparing for an upcoming operation. As assumptions prove true or
false, as the cavalry squadron (RSTA) (or other ISR assets) confirm or deny enemy

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actions and dispositions, and as the status of subordinate units change, the SBCT
commander determines whether the new information invalidates the plan, requires him to
adjust the plan, or validates his plan.

2-25. COORDINATION AND LIAISON

During preparation, the SBCT conducts necessary coordination with higher, lower,
adjacent, and supporting units. This may include sending and receiving liaison teams.
Coordination includes the establishment of all communication links to guarantee
continuous contact during execution. This is especially critical when the SBCT is a
subordinate element of an organization that lacks the C2 INFOSYS and when units who
lack the same INFOSYS are subordinated to the SBCT. Coordination is essential for
synchronization during execution.
a. Coordination. Exchanging information is critical to successful coordination.
Coordination may be both internal and external. Internal coordination occurs within the
SBCT staff. External coordination involves subordinate and supporting units and or staffs
and higher headquarters. External coordination is sometimes referred to as "collaborative
planning." Coordination has four objectives.
(1) It ensures an understanding of the commander's intent and an understanding of
subordinate and supporting unit roles.
(2) It ensures that all affected and interested personnel have been consulted or
informed so they may respond as desired or adjust their plans and actions.
(3) It avoids conflict and duplication of effort among subordinate units, reducing the
risk of fratricide and the expenditure of resources.
(4) It ensures that the commander and staff consider all relevant factors and
effectively employ all available assets.
b. Liaison. Liaison provides a means of direct communications between
headquarters. Liaison may begin with planning and continue throughout preparation and
execution.

2-26. REHEARSALS
The intent of a rehearsal is to practice actions to improve performance during execution.
The extent of rehearsals depends on the time available. Rehearsals allow participants to
become familiar with the plan and to translate the plan into a visual impression that
orients them to the environment and other units when executing. Rehearsals imprint a
mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the upcoming operation. Rehearsals
also provide a forum for subordinate and supporting leaders to coordinate. Rehearsals
emphasize times, locations, and solutions for coordinating actions to achieve
synchronization at critical points during execution.

Section VI. EXECUTION

Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the
mission using INFOSYS to assess progress and make decisions. Inherent in the dynamic
nature of execution is deciding to execute planned actions as well as deciding to adjust
the plan based on changes in the situation. Combining the art of command and the
science of control is most evident during execution. The commander exercises judgment
and initiative continuously, assessing the situation and making decisions, often with

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incomplete, conflicting, and vague information. During execution, the commander uses
his visualization, continuously updated with a current COP, to assess the progress of
operations. His CCIR, continuously updated during the operation, guides his information
updates. Decision-making during execution follows an "assess, decide, and direct" model,
with the MDMP at its core.

2-27. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM DURING EXECUTION

During execution, the command and control system (Paragraph 2-5) must continuously
manage RI. It must compare the COP against the commander's intent, identify variances
from the plan, and recommend solutions for the commander to decide, correct, or exploit
the variances. Finally, the command and control system must direct actions to execute
decisions to counter unforeseen enemy or friendly actions or to exploit opportunities.

2-28. ADAPTING TO CHANGES

The SBCT uses one of two methods to adapt to changes. The first method begins during
planning and consists of anticipating changes and developing branches and sequels to the
plan to deal with them. Anticipating changes does not end with planning; it continues
throughout preparation and execution. The second method of adapting to changes is
improvising, taking action, or adopting solutions to unforeseen changes during the
operation. While improvisation is not the preferred method, situations frequently arise
requiring its use. The real difference between the two methods is time. Anticipation
occurs when the enemy actions are foreseen early enough to develop an analytical
response. Improvisation occurs when the enemy action is unexpected and does not allow
time for formal planning of a response.

2-29. ASSESSMENT
Assessing an operation during execution is an essential and continuing task. It is a
deliberate comparison of forecast outcomes to actual events, using the commander's
criteria for success to judge operational success at any point during the operation. The
commander and staff assess the probable outcomes of the ongoing operation to determine
whether changes are required to accomplish the mission, to react to unforeseen threats, or
to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. The commander uses SU to assess the
ongoing operation rather than to decide among various courses of action to determine if
the current plan is (or is not) still valid.
a. Monitoring the Operation. The commander and staff monitor the ongoing
operation to determine if it is progressing satisfactorily according to the current plan
(including any FRAGO that may have modified it). The staff monitors the various facts
and assumptions that were the basis of the plan to ensure these remain valid or to see if
there is a need for new facts and assumptions that might affect current and future
operations. Monitoring uses RI to develop a clear understanding of the SBCT's current
state in relation to the enemy and the environment. The staff processes this RI and
presents it to the commander as a clear operational picture.
b. Evaluating the Criteria for Success. The commander and staff continue to
evaluate the commander's criteria for success during execution. The staff must
continuously update its estimates and its source of assessment to supplement and support
the commander's visualization. Assessing success results in two outcomes.

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(1) The operation is progressing satisfactorily and observed variances between

expectations and the current situation are minor or within acceptable levels. Progress
meets the commander's intent and the concept of operations is still relevant to the
situation. The result is that the operation continues as planned and leads to decisions
foreseen by the plan.
(2) The operation as a whole is not proceeding according to expectations. The
observed variances endanger the success of the operation. This assessment can result
from unforeseen enemy successes or friendly failures, and it also can result if
performance of critical indicators is much better than expected, presenting a significant
opportunity to the SBCT. The commander makes a decision to eliminate the threat or to
take advantage of the unforeseen opportunity.

2-30. DECISIONS
The SBCT commander should not hesitate to modify his plan if it is necessary to save the
force, to accomplish the mission, or to achieve greater success. Adhering to a plan when
the situation has changed might waste resources and opportunities. The flexibility to
adapt to changing situations is the hallmark of a good commander. The SBCT must train
to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities and to leverage the C2 INFOSYS to
disseminate decisions quickly. Deciding during execution consists of two basic types of
decisions: execution decisions and adjustment decisions.
a. Execution Decisions. These decisions implement anticipated actions and are
directed by the order. The most basic form of this type of decision is applying combat
power or conducting activities as outlined within the plan, or within the commander's
intent. Executing branches and sequels are execution decisions.
(1) Critical Routine Functions. The SBCT must accomplish routine tasks during
execution. Although these tasks occur routinely, the commander must consciously
consider them during execution. Failure to consider these routine tasks can waste
resources, squander opportunities, or lead to mission failure.
(a) Conduct Continuous ISR Operations. ISR operations are a continuous process that
feed the commander information to assist his decision-making. The SBCT commander
should never keep the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and other ISR assets in reserve. During
execution, these assets should be focused on answering the commander's CCIR and
looking for opportunities for the SBCT to exploit.
(b) Adjust IR and CCIR Based on the Situation. The commander and staff must
continue to review the CCIR during execution. The staff continues to analyze IR against
the mission and updated commander's intent to identify those indicators that may directly
affect the commander's decision-making. As CCIR are answered or the situation changes,
the commander must develop new CCIR. The staff must disseminate these new CCIR to
subordinate and supporting units. The staff must develop a new collection plan and
allocate assets (cavalry squadron [RSTA] or other ISR assets) to answer the commander's
new CCIR.
(c) Track the Battle. Battle tracking monitors designated elements of the COP that are
tied to the commander's criteria for success. Battle tracking requires special attention on
the part of all staff officers. The XO and S3 must continue to monitor the progress of
movement and recommend changes as required.

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(d) Refine the Targeting Process. The commander's decisions provide the basis for
targeting decisions made in support of the continuing operation (execution). The
commander remains alert to situations when he must give or modify targeting guidance to
the staff. His guidance will synchronize the targeting process to continue achieving
effects (lethal and or non-lethal) on the enemy.
(e) Manage the Movement and Positioning of Combat Support and Combat Service
Support Units. Massing the effects of combat power at a decisive point requires not just
the maneuver of combat forces but also the movement of combat support and combat
service support forces. Using combat support and combat service support forces to shape
must not interfere with the movement of combat forces to the decisive point. In the heat
of executing a mission, it is easy to lose sight of the time required to reposition combat
support and combat service support forces. The commander and staff must ensure that the
movement of combat units does not outpace the movement of combat support and
combat service support units. The commander's visualization should include the time
required to move all of the SBCT assets to get to the right place at the right time.
(f) Continue Terrain Management. The SBCT must carefully track the location and
land utilization of all units within the area of operations. Deconflicting land use among
units in the SBCT's area of operations is difficult but necessary during execution. The
staff must ensure that adequate space, including the use of routes, is available at the right
time to support critical activities. The commander's visualization should determine what
space is required for what force at what time to support the decisive action.
(2) Planned Actions. The commander or staff must recognize that a particular event
or action directed by the OPORD has met preconditions (events or triggers) for execution
and direct the execution of this planned action. Modifying planned actions to fit the
current situation is still considered a planned action. Branches and sequels to an order (or
plan) are planned actions.
b. Adjustment Decisions. Adjustment decisions modify the plan to respond to
unanticipated threats or opportunities. Typically, a commander's adjustment decision
requires further synchronization across the BOS. The commander describes his
visualization of the adjustment through additional guidance. He must pay particular
attention to the effects of adjustment decisions on targeting and give sufficient guidance
to support the targeting process. Adjustments take one of three forms: reallocation of
resources, changing the concept, and changing the mission.
(1) Reallocation of Resources. The simplest adjustment is to reallocate resources.
The commander can allocate additional combat support or reinforce a combat unit with
additional combat forces. The commander should reinforce success if it creates the
opportunity for more success.
(2) Changing the Concept. Changing the concept of the operation adjusts the way in
which the operation is conducted without changing the mission. Most often, this modifies
the decisive action to exploit an unforeseen opportunity or to counter an unexpected
threat. The commander's most important adjustment decision is the commitment of the
reserve. Employing the reserve successfully requires anticipation and visualization. These
allow the commander to task-organize, position, and move the reserve force in a manner
that minimizes any loss of momentum with its commitment.
(3) Changing the Mission. The commander may opt to change his mission if, during
execution, he sees that he cannot resolve a problem to accomplish his mission by

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reallocating resources or changing the concept. He should only do this as a last resort,
and the change to the mission must still accomplish the higher commander's intent.
Synchronizing the SBCT’s new actions is the greatest problem this type of decision
presents.
(4) Adjustment Decision Methods. When making adjustments to a unique or
complex situation, and if time is available, the MDMP is preferred. When there is not
sufficient time for the MDMP or during fast-paced combat operations, decision-making
may become more intuitive for the commander. Intuitive (or recognition) decision-
making emphasizes the commander's knowledge, judgment, experience, education,
intellect, boldness, perception, and character.
(a) Using the MDMP. The commander may opt to use an abbreviated MDMP,
focusing the staff on one course of action. This method also uses intuitive decision-
making. It begins with the commander using his current SU to visualize and mentally
formulate a single course of action that solves the unforeseen problem. He directs the
staff to analyze and refine the COA. The commander resolves any inadequacies the staff
detects through its analysis by revising or modifying the given course of action rather
than developing a new one.
(b) Recognition Decisions. This type of decision-making requires the greatest
involvement of the commander and the least involvement from the staff. It relies on the
commander’s experience in the use of intuitive decision-making to be successful. The
commander visualizes the solution to a problem immediately, with little or no analysis of
alternatives or outcomes necessary. Recognition decisions do not necessarily follow the
MDMP; however, the commander's decisions are well grounded in an understanding of
the enemy and terrain, the updated commander's estimate and staff estimates, and the
OPORD that began the operation. This approach focuses on SU, assessing significant
variances, and selecting and or refining an acceptable decision mentally instead of
comparing multiple options to select the optimal answer.

2-31. DIRECTING ACTION

Any decision to change a plan requires a change in the application of combat power and a
resynchronization to mass effect on the enemy. The SBCT commander must direct action
that applies combat power to effect execution or adjustment decisions. The FRAGO is the
normal means to direct changes during execution. The C2 INFOSYS give the command
and control system the capability to automate orders (and graphics) production and
dissemination, especially for execution decisions that use data and information stored on
a shared database.
a. Synchronize Operations. After the SBCT commander makes a decision during
execution, his staff must resynchronize the ongoing operation to maximize the
application of combat power against the enemy. This resynchronization includes
informing subordinates, integrating assets, incorporating the decision into the targeting
process, and deconflicting subordinate actions. The staff uses the INFOSYS to reduce
duplication, confusion, and problems that may occur from the change. Resynchronization
should be used only to the extent required to ensure mission accomplishment. Excessive
synchronization may waste valuable resources and opportunities.
b. Maintain Continuity. Continuity (fewest changes) allows for a greater chance of
successful execution. Continuity does not inhibit flexibility; the SBCT commander and

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his staff should only make changes to current operations necessary to solve a problem.
Maintaining the current plan as much as possible allows subordinates to focus on only a
few discrete changes. The commander and staff should avoid changes that may preclude
options for future operations.

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CHAPTER 3
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND
RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING
The Army has conducted reconnaissance and surveillance tasks since
its inception. The production of intelligence (the product resulting from
the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and
interpretation of available information concerning an enemy force or area
of operation) has always been critical to successfully accomplishing the
mission. ISR is the term currently applied to a combined arms enabling
operation that combines what has previously been described as
reconnaissance and surveillance (a maneuver or collection task) with the
production and dissemination of intelligence (a staff task). ISR is a
constant, continuous, and optimized operation that focuses on the
collection of relevant information that is analyzed to create intelligence to
support the commander’s and or leader’s situational understanding and
the operational cycle.
This chapter is intended to serve as a guide to understanding the ISR
operation and its associated planning process. Staff planners need to
understand the relationships between IPB, collection management, and
the decision-making process to successfully plan effective ISR operations.
The information presented in this chapter is arranged and discussed
sequentially to reflect the order of these processes.

Section I. THE MDMP AND THE ISR OPERATION

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations are used to collect information
about the enemy, terrain, weather, and other aspects of the AO that will affect friendly
combat operations.

3-1. OVERVIEW
Within the SBCT, ISR combines the product (intelligence) with the information-
gathering actions of reconnaissance and surveillance. ISR operations are conducted to
answer information requirements (for example, confirmation or denial of enemy courses
of action, targeting information) and maintain the SBCT common operational picture.
Additionally, ISR goes a step further to facilitate situational understanding. Where
reconnaissance and surveillance answered the “what,” “where,” and “when” on the
battlefield, ISR has the additional requirement of answering “why.” The two primary
organic ISR elements of the SBCT are the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and the MI
company.
a. While not mutually exclusive, the following characteristics describe successful
ISR operations:
• Enabling operation.
• Combined arms operation.
• CCIR-focused.
• Continuous operation.
• Facilitates commander’s visualization and decision-making.

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• Facilitates the application of the other four elements of combat power.

• Orients on the area of operations.
• Requires a staff or analysis capability.
b. The ISR process is driven by IPB and centers on the commander’s information
requirements. The ISR synchronization matrix serves as the baseline for ISR operations
and as a guide for preparation of the ISR OPORD. The SBCT staff develops and
monitors the ISR tasking matrix, with input from commanders and other staff members.
The SBCT S3 and staff, in conjunction with the cavalry squadron (RSTA), develop the
ISR OPORD, and the commanders implement it. The ISR OPORD must be synchronized
with current and future operations. The ISR OPORD must provide for the rapid shifting
and diversion of resources as the situation develops or alters or as tasks and requirements
are satisfied.
c. The IPB process is integral to the development of the ISR plan. The IPB process
will not be discussed in detail in this chapter. FM 34-130, FM 34-2-1, and FM 34-80
contain additional information on the IPB process, collection management, and ISR
planning.

3-2. RESPONSIBILITIES
The SBCT XO or S3 should designate an ad hoc ISR planning cell to conduct planning
and dissemination of ISR orders. In the past, development of the ISR plan habitually fell
on the SBCT S2 since he normally coordinated ISR assets and was the primary user of
ISR products. With the advent of national and tactical intelligence sensors, an increased
emphasis is being placed on the S2 and his ability to fuse both national and tactical
intelligence to target enemy units and disseminate the results. This will allow the
commander to place indirect fires on the enemy to impede, harass, or attrit him, then
employ maneuver forces to destroy him.
a. S2. The SBCT S2 and S3 must work in concert with the entire staff and cavalry
squadron (RSTA) to identify collection requirements and implement the ISR plan. The
S2 determines collection requirements and develops the ISR matrix with input from the
staff BOS representatives and continues to work with the staff planners to develop the
ISR order.
(1) The S2 section coordinates with subordinate units, primarily the cavalry squadron
(RSTA), infantry battalions, and MI company in development of the ISR plan in order to
meet the needs of the subordinates and the commander. Coordination with higher
headquarters is essential to ensure that higher collection tasks are met and that the ISR
effort at all echelons is integrated.
(2) The S2 and S2x identify those ISR assets (HUMINT, imagery intelligence
[IMINT], measurement and signatures intelligence [MASINT], or signals intelligence
[SIGINT]) which can provide answers to the commander’s PIR and CCIR. Assets
required to answer the commander’s intelligence requirements may be tasked within the
SBCT or they may be requested through the SBCT S2 to the G2 at division, joint task
force (JTF) headquarters, adjacent units, and cooperating forces.
b. S3. The S3 is the primary ISR integrator within the SBCT. He coordinates and
directs the ISR operations planning and execution. Through the plans cell, the S3
collaboratively plans the ISR operation and ensures its synchronization with the full
support of all the SBCT’s capabilities. The S3 should appoint a battle captain from the S3

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section as the ISR battle captain, whose sole duty is to implement, track, and synchronize
support to and for ISR operations.
c. ISR Battle Captain. The battle captain works closely with the S2, collection
manager, and cavalry squadron (RSTA) staff planners during execution of the ISR
operation. He must, therefore, have a total understanding of all intelligence gathering
assets, their tasks, and status. On execution of the ISR OPORD, he monitors task
compliance and, as required, works with the S2 and collection manager to ensure that all
intelligence gaps and requirements are covered by an ISR asset. For example, he may re-
task assets to observe a named area of interest (NAI) which cannot be covered by an in-
place asset (such as a RSTA reconnaissance platoon) due to restrictive terrain, or he may
re-task assets to replace a destroyed collector. The battle captain must understand the
functionality of the digital systems with which he will work as well as the automated
tools at his disposal to accomplish ISR synchronization. (See FM 2-19.401/ST, Digital
Brigade Intelligence Operations, Chapter 2.) He should have the authority to coordinate,
task, and support ISR assets as required; he monitors the implementation of the current
ISR order, directing changes as required.
d. Fires and Effects Coordination Cell. The FECC coordinates the lethal and non-
lethal effects that will support the conduct of the SBCT’s ISR operations. Early
positioning of assets in the ISR planning process is critical and should be treated as a
battle drill within the unit’s tactical SOP for ISR operations.
e. Maneuver Support Cell. The SBCT commander will often require information
concerning the trafficability of roads, bridges, and urban areas. The maneuver support
cell must be able to not only support the units conducting ISR operations but also direct
subject matter experts to answer information requirements for the commander.
f. S4. The S4 directs and synchronizes the logistical support of the SBCT ISR
operation.
g. BSB. The BSB positions assets to support the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and other
SBCT assets conducting ISR operations within the AO. These include emergency classes
of supply (such as Class III, Class IV) and medical assets.

3-3. ISR PLANNING

ISR operations require a continuous, collaborative, and parallel planning process between
the SBCT staff and the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and MICO. The following paragraphs
present a generic outline of how this collaboration could work.
a. Upon receiving initial ISR guidance from the brigade (for example, general
concept of the impending mission, initial information requirements, time constraints), the
cavalry squadron (RSTA) staff identifies the tools and techniques required to answer PIR
and CCIR for the brigade commander. In collaboration with the SBCT staff, it integrates
other brigade assets into an overall ISR plan. That plan forms the basis for the squadron
internal OPORD and drives early employment of RSTA and brigade assets to answer
information requirements that are then fed back into the MDMP to refine and focus the
emerging SBCT operation order. Critical to successful ISR operations is the early
identification of information requirements within the MDMP cycle. These requirements
may change over time, but the SBCT’s ISR assets (for example, the cavalry squadron
[RSTA]) will be postured to adjust to the changing information demands.

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b. In order to support an ISR OPORD, the initial ISR plan is developed early during
the decision-making process (Figure 3-1). The ISR plan for the next operation should be
developed for implementation as a portion of the later phases of the current operation.
Time is the critical factor. The all source analysis system-remote work station (ASAS-
RWS), maneuver control system (MCS), and other digital systems greatly enhance the
SBCT’s ability to conduct parallel planning to assist in overcoming the time limitations
placed on the staff. The RSTA and other assets must receive the SBCT plan early enough
to conduct their own planning and rehearsals to achieve the desired results.
c. The SBCT commander must be intimately involved in the ISR planning process
and must quickly and clearly articulate his CCIR to the staff. He charges the XO, S3, S2,
and other key staff officers with preparation of the ISR plan and development and
dissemination of the ISR OPORD (Figure 3-2, page 3-6). Once the ISR plan is
formulated and the ISR OPORD executed, the CCIR and PIR drive any modifications
needed to answer intelligence requirements. If required, modifications to the ISR
OPORD will be identified by the S2 and staff and executed by the S3.
d. From an ISR perspective, ISR planners need to know what intelligence assets (for
example, sensors) are available to them as well as their capabilities and limitations in
fulfilling needed intelligence requirements since these are critical to successful ISR
operations. See Section IV for a list of collectors, processors, and dissemination systems
available to the SBCT in support of ISR operations.
e. ISR operation planning requires several subtle changes from the historical
reconnaissance and surveillance planning conducted by legacy forces. Once the SBCT
commander perceives or receives a new mission, he and the SBCT staff develop the
initial information requirements to support it. This guidance is delivered to the cavalry
squadron (RSTA) as soon as it is available and may or may not be formally published in
a WARNO. The SBCT S2 conducts an initial assessment of the initial requirements to
determine what SBCT-level assets (MICO, S2x, for example) can fill them.
Requirements appropriate for the assets of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and MICO are
forwarded for their refinement and planning.

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Figure 3-1. The ISR decision-making process.

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Figure 3-2. The planning cycle.

3-4. ISSUE THE WARNO

The commander and his staff need not wait until planning is completed before issuance of
the WARNO. Operations can commence with minimal information needed to set the
operation in motion and details related to the operations provided in the ISR OPORD.
The WARNO should include a sufficient amount of detail related to ISR activities to
allow ISR planning to commence and allow the squadron and battalion commanders to
begin their planning process (MDMP). At a minimum the WARNO provided to the
cavalry squadron (RSTA), infantry battalions, MICO, and attached ISR assets should
include the task organization, the zone or AO the ISR assets will operate in, CCIR, and
an initial location of any critical operations identified by the commander. If this
information is not available at the time the WARNO is issued, the S3 may prepare and
issue a second WARNO.

3-5. DEVELOP AND ISSUE ISR ORDER

After receiving the WARNO, the cavalry squadron (RSTA) commander and staff then
develop a more detailed ISR plan. This should be accomplished in a collaborative manner
with the SBCT plans cell, allowing the plan to develop as an SBCT operation. Once the
plan is completed, it is recommended that an ISR planning meeting be held (either

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virtually or in person) at the SBCT level. This will allow the SBCT staff (under the
direction of the XO or S3) to integrate and synchronize the cavalry squadron (RSTA)
plan at the SBCT level. All members of the SBCT staff should be represented at the
meeting to provide for a true combined arms effort focused on answering the SBCT
commander’s information requirements.
a. Once the ISR plan is completed, it is communicated to the SBCT in the form of a
WARNO. The order should not be tied to a specific timeline within the SBCT’s planning
process, as its publication will be situation dependent. However, the ISR plan must be
communicated to provide for enough time to posture the SBCT’s assets to support the
information needed for COA development and analysis. This would normally require the
issuance of the order prior to the SBCT’s mission analysis brief to the commander. As
CCIR and other information requirements are answered and changed, the SBCT plans
cell and cavalry squadron (RSTA) staff adjust the ongoing ISR operation to support the
new needs.
(1) Once the adjustments are made (such as new NAIs, changes in effects support,
movement of logistical assets), the SBCT plans cell publishes it as an additional
WARNO. To those units already executing the ISR operation, this order may appear
more as a FRAGO; however, within the SBCT planning process it remains a WARNO.
These orders are published as necessary to maintain the ISR operational focus of the
SBCT. They include the ISR instructions found within the SBCT’s OPORD.
(2) ISR operations continue throughout the SBCT’s execution of the mission and are
re-focused based on the SBCT commander’s informational needs that support his current
decision-making and those needs that will drive the next mission (Figure 3-2). The SBCT
XO or S3 must ensure that, as the ISR focus shifts, it does not lose its combined arms
nature at the SBCT level.
b. The OPORD should include the commander’s guidance, TAIs, NAIs, PIR, and or
specific information requirements (SIR), tentative locations of critical observation posts
(OPs), known friendly and enemy obstacles, and tasking requirements for specific ISR
assets. The OPORD will establish boundaries, AOs, or “limits of responsibility,”
movement instructions, and where subordinate units can conduct ISR operations. It may
also direct subordinate units to secure their AO from enemy observation and prepare for
enemy reconnaissance forces entering their sector. It also must contain the necessary
synchronization at the SBCT level to ensure a combined arms effort is generated.
c. Key elements of successful ISR operations are their continuous nature and the
ability of units and collectors to rapidly transition from one mission or phase to the next.
Plans must anticipate and address the sustainment and rapid reconstitution of ISR assets.
Some operations may permit reconstitution after each phase or during redeployment as
units are retasked. Some plans may provide for early relief from low priority missions,
echeloning, sequencing, or phasing of ISR assets to permit reconstitution or placing
assets in reserve in order for them to adequately prepare for the next mission or phase of
the operation.
d. Additionally, ISR operations must be supported by indirect fires, and this requires
the development of a detailed fires and effects plan. Positioning, ammunition
requirements, and the reconstitution needs of the SBCT’s fire support assets must also be
considered and included in the plan.

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3-6. THE ISR OVERLAY

The ISR overlay (digital or hard copy) is the ISR plan in graphic form (Figure 3-3). The
purpose of the ISR overlay is to show both the assets and the key staff officers exactly
where the ISR assets are operating. Overlay graphics and symbols can be extracted from
FM 101-5-1.
a. There are two parts to the ISR overlay. The first part is the graphic display of
deployed or planned deployment of ISR assets. The second part is the marginal data
consisting of the legend, administrative data, specific instructions to each asset, and the
distribution list. (Refer to FM 34-2-1 for specifics.) The ISR overlay, at a minimum,
should contain:
• Friendly boundaries.
• Limits of responsibilities.
• NAIs, TAIs, CAS target boxes (CTB), field artillery (FA)/mortar targets.
• Current and planned fire support coordination measures (FSCMs).
• Start points, release points, checkpoints.
• Infiltration routes, exfiltration routes, and resupply routes.
• Known friendly and enemy obstacles, natural obstacles, restrictive terrain, and
gaps.
• Graphics depicting zone, area, or route reconnaissance.
• Primary, alternate, and supplementary positions.
• Sectors of scan for sensors.
• Restricted operations zone (ROZ), air corridors, and other A2C2 control
measures.

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DRAFT Figure 3-3. Revised overlay figure.

b. After the ISR assets deploy to collect against their NAIs, onboard precision
lightweight global positioning system receivers (PLGRs) and or global positioning
system (GPS) are used to automatically update their location. Upon receipt of this
information, the SBCT staff sections and subordinate commanders will update their
digital maneuver, CS, and CSS overlays in their respective digital systems.

NOTE: Fratricide from indirect fires is a major danger to ISR assets operating
forward of the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) or in non-contiguous
AOs. Unit SOPs for reporting, tracking, and establishing restrictive fire
support coordinating measures are required to protect ISR assets from
friendly fire.

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NOTE: The ISR plan is never a finished product. Like the collection plan, it
undergoes continuous revision as dictated by changes to the situation or
modification of the commander’s PIR and or IR. However minor the
adjustments might be, the basis of the plan is formed from the thorough
analysis of the decision support template (DST) and the commander’s CCIR.

Section II. COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Collection management synchronizes the activities of the SBCT’s information-gathering
assets to provide intelligence to the SBCT commander needed to confirm his COA
selection and targeting requirements. Integral to this process is the S2 collection manager,
who acquires the information that satisfies the commander’s intelligence requirements
within timelines that support operational decisions. The S2, in coordination with the S3
and the staff, ensures all available collection resources are providing the required
intelligence information and recommends adjustments to asset locations, if required.

3-7. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Intelligence requirements generally focus on meeting the commander’s intelligence needs
in order to--
• Prevent surprise.
• Support war gaming and planning.
• Support decisions related to friendly COAs.
• Engage high payoff targets in support of friendly COA.
Collection management is cyclic in nature. At SBCT and battalion level, the S2,
collection manager (in concert with the S3), and staff will follow the steps listed below to
develop and refine the intelligence collection plan.
a. Step 1. Develop Requirements. This step involves the identification,
prioritization, and refinement of uncertainties concerning the enemy and battlefield
environment that must be resolved to accomplish the SBCT mission. The overall purpose
of this step is to receive, analyze, and prioritize the intelligence requirements from higher,
subordinate, and adjacent units.
(1) The IPB process facilitates the identification of unknowns related to weather,
terrain, and the enemy (disposition, organization, equipment). What is known about the
enemy has targeting implications and may result in identifying TAIs; what is not known
has reconnaissance implications and may require development of NAIs to focus and
control reconnaissance activities. The gaps in this knowledge will generate information
requirements, which form the basis of the commander’s CCIR. Normally, these gaps are
identified during mission analysis in the decision-making process. The commander’s
guidance given at the end of the mission analysis brief provides directions to the SBCT
staff. He also provides the staff with his intent for the operation and the CCIR that
support his intent.
(2) The commander states PIR and IR, or they are recommended by the staff and
approved by the commander. PIR and IR provide focus to the collection plan. For
example, a PIR may be to determine that the enemy has selected a COA. When answered,
this requirement provides the commander with the time to make decisions and maneuver
or execute the desired effects inside the enemy’s decision cycle.

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(3) The SBCT commander’s intent for fires, mobility, or other battlefield effects and
the SBCT’s deep battle plan provide additional requirements that must be included in the
ISR plan. The identification and attack of HPTs requires the establishment of TAIs;
targets; observation posts; and the assignment of assets to find, engage, and provide battle
damage assessments (BDAs). The results of these fires also provide valuable information
and help the commander to make timely decisions.
(4) When the staff receives intelligence requirements from higher, subordinate, and
adjacent units, it should prioritize and consolidate them with the commander’s PIR. Once
all requirements have been identified, they are converted into specific taskings for ISR
assets. When a requirement cannot be feasibly collected by a collection asset, the S2 must
provide an explanation to the requester.
b. Step 2. Develop ISR Synchronization Plan. This step involves the selection,
integration, and synchronization of the best ISR collectors to cover each intelligence
collection requirement based on resource availability and capability. With the linkage of
ISR sensors through force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) and other
digital systems, the SBCT S2 can develop and disseminate a timely and highly accurate
picture of the enemy. Integration and synchronization are accomplished through
development and refinement of the ISR matrix. This matrix is the graphic representation
of the SBCT’s collection strategy and the assets used to execute that strategy. During this
step, staff representatives, the collection manager, the ISR analysis and integration
platoons, and the SBCT’s FECC initiate a close working interface related to mission
management. The S2 collection manager is the resident expert on collector capabilities
and limitations and knows the status and availability of collectors and processors. These
may be organic to the SBCT, may be coordinated through division or JTF, or may be
digitally downlinked to the ISR integration platoon’s command ground station (CGS).
c. Step 3. Task or Request Collection. This step involves the implementation of
the intelligence collection plan through execution of system-specific taskings or requests
for collection. The tasking process provides the selected collection unit with specific,
prioritized requirements. The staff becomes intimately involved in the intelligence
collection process. The ISR OPORD is the tool that identifies the SBCT commander’s
collection strategy to higher, subordinate, and adjacent units. When collection tasks or
requests are passed to units, they must provide specific details that clearly define the
collection requirement and make sense to the collector. These requirements are--
• Clearly defined collection requirements in either pre-formatted taskings or
free text messages.
• Latest time the information is of value.
• Reporting instructions (format).
• When and how long to collect.
d. Step 4. Disseminate. This step involves the delivery of intelligence, combat
information, and targeting data to the user who requested or needs it. Digitization allows
a very high volume of data to be received, correlated, analyzed, and viewed graphically.
With digitization, information can be disseminated to flow directly from the collector or
processor to the requester in near real-time. Information must be passed from collector to
analytical elements for rapid fusion, evaluation, and analysis. Critical
information/intelligence must be rapidly identified and disseminated to avoid becoming
filtered out or lost in a database. In addition, information not relevant to the SBCT’s

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information needs only clogs the system and serves to slow the processing and
dissemination process. Direct dissemination is especially important for intelligence that
supports maneuver decisions and targeting efforts. The S2 must determine which
information to send the consumer/user based on individual need, security requirements,
and data perishability. Information must be distributed as soon as possible via voice,
FBCB2, MCS, ASAS-RWS, or any other BOS digital systems. See FM 34-2, Collection
Management and Synchronization Planning, for dissemination techniques and methods.

NOTE: The optimal mix is to send graphics and or text immediately via digital means
with a notice that voice clarification can be accomplished if the digital traffic
is not understood. Under all circumstances, it is important to ensure that the
recipient received the information sent.

e. Step 5. Evaluate Reporting. Step five determines how well the ISR systems are
satisfying the SBCT’s intelligence requirements as well as those of subordinate, adjacent,
and higher units. The S2, in coordination with the ISR analysis and integration platoons,
must continually evaluate information produced as a result of the ISR collection process
to ensure it is satisfying the commander’s PIR and or IR. It is important to determine if
the collection asset is accurately reporting what it sees based on its capabilities and if the
report answers the original question. If the PIR and or IR are not being answered, and
based on the S2’s recommendation, the S3 may task the relocation of sensors or the
collection manager will request support from higher headquarters to answer specific
information requirements. The objective is to fully satisfy intelligence requirements in a
timely manner while keeping the intelligence system fully synchronized. It is vitally
important that both the S3 and the S2 collection manager remain aware of the status of
collection systems and the requirements levied on them. Additionally, it is imperative to
determine when collection requirements have been satisfied or are no longer of value.
Units and collectors tasked with obsolete or outdated requirements can then be identified
as available for other collection requirements.
f. Step 6. Update Collection Planning. As the current tactical situation changes,
adjustments to the overall collection plan are made to keep intelligence efforts
synchronized to optimize collection and exploitation capability. Intelligence requirements
are constantly updated to ensure that intelligence gathering efforts are synchronized with
current operations while also supporting future operations planning. As PIR and IR are
answered, the ISR collection plan/synchronization matrix is updated. The collectors are
repositioned and or re-focused to begin answering other intelligence questions.

3-8. THE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE TASKING MATRIX

It is important to include detailed instructions for each ISR collector shown on the
overlay. The ISR tasking matrix is the tool used. Figure 3-4, page 3-14, shows an
example of an ISR tasking matrix.
a. The first column shows the priority of each mission and depicts which ones are
the commander’s PIR.
b. The next column provides the asset with terrain focus through the NAI number or
grid coordinate.
c. The start/stop column informs the asset of the times for the mission.

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d. The SIR column explains to the assets exactly what they are to obtain, look, or
listen for (target).
e. The next set of columns lists the unit or assets tasked to conduct each mission. An
“X” placed under an asset identifies the tasking.
f. The coordination column tells the assets which units to coordinate with for the
mission.
g. The last column provides the assets with reporting requirements.

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DRAFT Figure 3-4. Sample ISR tasking matrix.

Section III. BATTLETRACKING ISR

Regardless of the type of CP or tactical operations center, each must be able to record and
display the combat information and intelligence received from higher, subordinate, and

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adjacent units. Additionally, the CP or TOC must assist with the dissemination of time
sensitive targeting- and decision-focused information.

3-9. PROCESS THE INFORMATION

The CP and or TOC must have an ability to quickly process the information, record and
post it, and disseminate critical information needed by users to enhance their battle
planning and decision-making.
a. The SBCT ISR plan and PIR provide the commander with the capability to
anticipate the enemy’s intent and maintain the initiative on the battlefield. The staff must
be able to track the battle using its digitized systems and automated tools to provide the
commander timely and pertinent information.
b. Information flow between staff members and subordinate units begins upon the
receipt of information. With digitization, information can be quickly shared at all
command levels and among all staff members. Digitization enhances the ease by which
the primary and special staff can conduct war gaming, coordinate and synchronize
actions, and conduct needed cross talk prior to and during battle. The unit must develop
SOPs that promote intra- and inter-staff operations and negate duplication of effort and
information. The commander must be provided accurate and timely information on which
to base his combat decisions.

3-10. RECEIVE AND RECORD THE MESSAGE

The SBCT and battalion CPs receive combat information from top down and bottom up
communications feeds.
a. At the battalion level, the bottom up feeds will generally be supplied via FBCB2
in the form of spot and or size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE)
reports. Both top down and bottom up intelligence and combat information are fused by
the S2 in concert with the ISR analysis platoon. This intelligence information is then
provided immediately to the user, ASAS-RWS, or other C2 INFOSYS.
b. For those subordinate units that are not digitally equipped, voice or message
traffic will be used to provide needed intelligence or intelligence updates.
c. BDA is an important part of the battletracking and recording process. The results
of the BDA are integral to the S2’s assessments of enemy strength and ability to sustain
combat operations. When the requirement within a PIR concerns an HPT, the collector
must ensure that post-strike battle damage is assessed and accurately reported. If the
collector observing the target area is unable to provide the BDA due to METT-TC
factors, the S3 tasks another collector to assess the resultant damage.

3-11. FILTER THE INFORMATION

In a digitized environment, all commanders and staff officers at SBCT and battalion level
can expect to receive voluminous amounts of data prior to, during, and after the start of
battle. Procedures must be in place to filter critical information. The battle captain, along
with the S2 and the ISR analysis and integration platoons, plays a key role in this process.
He must be able to quickly review incoming combat information, sort it according to
criticality and user need, and prioritize it for integration and fusion. The ASAS-RWS can
be used to track the commander’s PIR and will automatically alert the operator when
information is received regarding PIR specifics. In addition, TOC personnel must be

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aware of the CCIR. CCIR consist of EEFI, friendly force information requirements
(FFIR), and PIR. CCIR, when answered, require an immediate alert to the commander.

3-12. POST THE INFORMATION

As the situation develops, the S2 will monitor the enemy situation and update the COP to
assist the commanders with their battle evaluation and decision-making. The S2 is also
responsible for providing friendly units with the enemy situation via MCS or FBCB2.
The S3 is responsible for providing the friendly relevant picture of the battlefield to the
S2 via MCS. Units must develop SOPs which clearly define the who, what, when, where,
and how combat information will be tracked, posted, and disseminated. The conventional
map with overlays will serve as a backup for battletracking and posting of combat
information. However, the conventional map and other manual displays may not need to
be meticulously posted if the enemy picture resides in the ASAS-RWS database.

3-13. DISSEMINATE THE INFORMATION

Answers obtained to the PIR require immediate dissemination. These answers often
influence the commander’s decision-making process and force employment. This
information can be digitally transmitted and received both horizontally and vertically
between the C2 INFOSYS and FBCB2 via the TI. The user of the information received
must be aware that the information when collected was in near real-time and must
evaluate the value and validity of the data in terms of current events. To prevent
information bottleneck, it is the SBCT S2’s responsibility to develop procedures and
close working ties with the analytical control team (ACT) so that combat information is
quickly filtered, analyzed, fused, and disseminated by the fastest means possible to all
users within the SBCT. While fused intelligence may be the best intelligence, partially
analyzed or raw intelligence may serve to cue the commander as to enemy intentions that
were not previously addressed during the war gaming process.

3-14. MODIFY THE ISR PLAN

Whether modifying reporting requirements because of new reporting criteria, new or
modified PIR, loss of an asset, or changes in mission, the S2 (in concert with the ISR
analysis and integration platoons) must be ready to modify the ISR plan to fit the
commander’s needs. Modifications to the ISR OPORD will be identified and executed by
the XO or S3. During modification of the ISR plan, the following considerations should
be addressed:
• What collection assets need to be shifted?
• What is the new collection requirement (for example, focus)?
• What is the target location?
• Must the collector move to a new location?
• What is the risk in moving the collector? Is it worth the potential information
to be gained?
• Does the collector functionally match the collection requirement based on
METT-TC?
• What and when does the collector report?
• How does the collector report?
• Who does the collector report to?

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Situation templates (SITEMPs) updated during previous battle phases can be used as a
baseline for re-focusing the ISR effort. ISR assets are re-tasked as appropriate for follow-
on missions.

Section IV. RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

Reconnaissance is a focused operation to gather timely and accurate information about
enemy forces and the terrain within a specific area. The SBCT, as part of higher
headquarters operations, may be assigned reconnaissance missions. The most likely
missions for the SBCT are reconnaissance in force and zone reconnaissance. As part of
all SBCT operations, the SBCT commander may assign any of the reconnaissance
missions to a subordinate unit. Reconnaissance planning and execution in support of
SBCT operations is discussed in Chapter 2, Battle Command, and Chapter 4, Offensive
Operations.

3-15. RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

A reconnaissance in force is a deliberate, limited objective attack by at least a battalion-
size force. It uses the method of aggressive reconnaissance, augmenting other ISR assets
to obtain information about the enemy. Reconnaissance in force locates and tests the
disposition, strength, intention, and reactions of an enemy force. However, as part of a
reconnaissance in force, other units may infiltrate enemy positions and conduct
reconnaissance. A reconnaissance in force may be assigned when the commander desires
more specific information on the enemy and when this information cannot be gathered by
any other means.
a. Organization. The lack of information about the enemy force may dictate that the
SBCT organize a force that is large enough and strong enough to sufficiently develop the
situation, protect the force, cause the enemy to react, and put the enemy at some risk.
Based on these requirements, the SBCT may be tasked by a higher headquarters (or the
SBCT may task a subordinate unit) to conduct a reconnaissance in force. A
reconnaissance in force is normally conducted as a movement to contact or a series of
attacks across a broad frontage. It may also consist of a series of strong, but small,
offensive actions to test the enemy’s reactions at selected points in his disposition. The
enemy’s reaction, or lack thereof, may reveal a weakness. However, the SBCT
commander must also recognize that the reconnaissance in force may lead to an
engagement of his forces under unfavorable conditions, and it may also reveal future
friendly plans to the enemy. For these reasons, the SBCT must produce a plan that
provides sufficient detail about the extrication of forces and the exploitation of success.
b. Exploitation of Gaps or Weak Points. If the reconnaissance in force finds a gap
or a weak point in the enemy’s disposition, the higher headquarters must be prepared to
immediately exploit that weakness. The SBCT commander can exploit the situation by
directing the unit conducting the reconnaissance in force to continue the attack, or he may
commit additional forces to pass through and continue the attack.
c. Task of Reconnaissance in Force. A unit conducting a reconnaissance in force
performs the following tasks within the limits of its capabilities:
• Penetrates the enemy’s security zone to determine its size and depth.
• Determines the strength and disposition of the enemy main battle area (MBA)
positions.

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• Attacks enemy positions and attempts to cause the enemy to react by using
local reserves or counterattack routes and forces, employing fire support
assets, adjusting positions, and employing specific weapon systems.
• Determines weaknesses in the enemy’s dispositions that can be exploited.
d. Planning Considerations. The plan for conducting a reconnaissance in force
must include--
• Defined objectives.
• Commander’s intent.
• Limitations (to include a limit of advance).
• Augmentation of additional combat and ISR assets.
• Risk specified in terms of friendly strengths and operational reach.
• Key terrain to seize, to retain, or to control.
• Actions for the commitment of follow-on forces.
• Control measures such as boundaries, objectives, and phase lines to focus the
operation.
• Known and templated obstacles.

3-16. ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

Zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all
routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within an AO. A zone reconnaissance is
assigned when the enemy situation is vague or when information concerning cross-
country mobility, not along a specified axis of advance, is desired. The SBCT
commander, through his intent, may focus the reconnaissance on the enemy, the terrain,
or a combination of the two. Zone reconnaissance is a precursor to subsequent combat
operations.
a. Time-Consuming Operation. A zone reconnaissance is a deliberate, time-
consuming process; it takes more time than any other reconnaissance mission. If time is a
constraining factor to accomplishing the zone reconnaissance, the SBCT commander
must focus his reconnaissance particularly at the enemy or other objectives defined by the
higher commander. Each situation requires a certain minimum time for adequate
reconnaissance and an acceptable level of risk. The commander must direct the pace of
operations based on his risk analysis.
b. SBCT-Level Zone Reconnaissance. An SBCT-level zone reconnaissance is
normally force-oriented. A force-oriented zone reconnaissance will not spend time
collecting data about bridges or fords unless specifically directed or required to do so.
The SBCT should direct its reconnaissance efforts to find all of the elements that satisfy
PIR, as well as identify massed enemy formations and other enemy forces that are
specifically a danger to the higher headquarters but are not listed as PIR. This type of
reconnaissance usually has a specific time by which the reconnaissance must be
completed. The SBCT normally conducts a zone reconnaissance by dividing its AO into
subordinate AOs (contiguous or noncontiguous) and assigning reconnaissance or
offensive tasks to subordinates. Since this form of the zone reconnaissance is principally
constrained by time, the SBCT will need to designate objectives and NAIs to properly
focus the reconnaissance of subordinates.

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3-17. INTEGRATION OF THE CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA) AND THE

INFANTRY BATTALIONS
There are numerous ways (offensively and defensively) that the cavalry squadron
(RSTA) and the infantry battalion’s companies and reconnaissance platoons can work
together to accomplish the SBCT's reconnaissance objectives. The following are
examples of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and the infantry battalions working together
during combat operations:
• During an SBCT movement to contact, the cavalry squadron (RSTA)
reconnaissance troops may hand over key observation post positions to
battalion reconnaissance platoons as they advance through the AO.
• During an SBCT movement to contact, the RSTA reconnaissance platoons
may bring the infantry battalion reconnaissance squads into position and keep
them informed about terrain, enemy positions, and obstacles that have already
been found.
• During an SBCT attack, the battalion reconnaissance platoons can provide
overwatch for the cavalry squadron (RSTA) reconnaissance troops as they
continue movement to their next series of OPs or to continue reconnaissance
of the area or zone.
• In the defense, the infantry battalion reconnaissance elements may also be
integrated into the SBCT's overall counter-reconnaissance operation.
• In counterreconnaissance operations, the infantry battalion reconnaissance and
cavalry squadron (RSTA) scouts provide stealthy observation, augmenting
other ISR assets and providing early warning of the enemy’s reconnaissance
elements.
• In counterreconnaissance operations, the reconnaissance elements and scout
teams (finders) locate the enemy reconnaissance forces and then move other
counter-reconnaissance elements (finishers) to the enemy force (Figure 3-5,
pge 3-20).
• In the defense, the infantry battalion and RSTA reconnaissance elements can
be employed in depth to provide multiple screens for the
counterreconnaissance force.
Infantry battalions may be required to provide some portion of their combat to assist the
cavalry squadron (RSTA) in obtaining information requirements or breaking contact from
the enemy. The cavalry squadron (RSTA) may also need logistical support for its troops
if it is operating in a highly decentralized manner. Due to the large distances between its
subordinate elements, the squadron may have difficulty keeping them supplied, and the
SBCT commander may task an infantry battalion to assist.

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Figure 3-5. Counter-reconnaissance organization of SBCT RSTA and

infantry battalion reconnaissance platoons.

In order for an infantry battalion reconnaissance platoon and the cavalry squadron
(RSTA) to work together, the infantry battalion, cavalry squadron (RSTA), and SBCT
staffs need to coordinate the following:
• C2 INFOSYS infrastructure management.
• Command and control responsibilities.
• Terrain management.
• Collection plan (NAI coverage and intelligence gaps).
• Fires and effects control measures.
• Fratricide avoidance measures.

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CHAPTER 4
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
An SBCT dictates the nature, scope, and tempo of offensive operations.
While the manner in which an SBCT orchestrates offensive operations
throughout the full spectrum of conflict will be different in many respects
to legacy forces, the doctrinal characteristics of offensive operations
remain unchanged. The command and control systems (specifically the
INFOSYS) and a capability to access higher echelon information
databases allow the SBCT commander to visualize and anticipate
opportunities, conduct rapid decision-making, and direct the execution of
decisive combat. The C2 INFOSYS, reach capability, and organic force
structure allow the SBCT to conduct offensive operations throughout its
assigned area of operations.

Section I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE

While the characteristics of offensive operations remain unchanged, the SBCT's unique
capabilities allow it to conduct offensive operations with greater precision and rapidity
than other organizations in the past. In past military operations, US ground forces
conducting combat operations spent precious lives and extraordinary amounts of
munitions and time to develop situations to the point where they had enough clarity to
develop the best solution to the tactical problem. The sensors and INFOSYS within the
SBCT will allow the commander to visualize the battlefield better than his counterparts,
both past and present; however, they will not eliminate casualties or render obsolete
dismounted combined arms infantry assaults. The SBCT’s fight will ultimately result in a
personal human endeavor wherein fear, uncertainty, and chance still play a part.

4-1. SURPRISE
Surprise is defined as attacking the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he
is not physically or mentally prepared (FM 3-0). The successful integration of surprise
into any offensive operation provides an initial tactical advantage over the enemy by
delaying his reactions, confusing his command and control efforts, and forcing him to
make decisions for which he is unprepared. Combat actions are particularly complex as
the SBCT confronts its opponents at relatively close ranges in restrictive terrain. While
satellites, UAVs, and other technological ISR assets may not be readily available to the
enemy, global and national news, intelligence from sympathetic countries, local
nationals, and discrete reconnaissance and surveillance by belligerents may be available
to the enemy. These provide excellent sources of information that could undermine the
SBCT's attempts at surprise. The SBCT commander and staff must perform a thorough
analysis of EEFI and PIR and guard them in order to preserve the element of surprise
while conducting tactical deception and IO to veil intended combat actions.
a. The SBCT has several capabilities that lend themselves to achieving surprise.
First, the tremendous potential for the cavalry squadron (RSTA) to gain accurate and
timely information on the enemy allows the commander to take advantage of enemy
weaknesses and to disrupt enemy movement, allowing combat forces to gain surprise.
Second, the mounted speed of the three maneuver battalions provides the SBCT

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commander the option to rapidly position combat power, limiting the enemy's ability to
react. Finally, the SBCT's ability to attack over various classifications of terrain through
any type of weather, day or night, will keep the enemy off-balance.
b. The SBCT can achieve surprise in several ways. IO and tactical deception are a
key foundation to encourage the enemy to relax or to gain a false sense of the tactical
environment. The SBCT must use tactical deception through feints and demonstrations as
a precursor to actual offensive operations. The key to successful deception is to show the
enemy what he expects to see. It is not necessary to completely fool the enemy. Often,
surprise is achieved by causing the enemy to hesitate physically or in his decision-
making, allowing the SBCT to retain the initiative by concentrating forces and adjusting
tempo as the tactical situation requires.

4-2. CONCENTRATION
Concentration is defined as the ability to mass the effects of combat power (FM 3-0).
While the SBCT commander must concentrate overwhelming effects on the defending
enemy force as part of the decisive operation, he must be tactically cautious in massing
combat forces to do so. An enemy may stand and fight large formations in open, rolling
terrain, or he may rely instead on mines, indirect fire, or some type of terrorist (or other
asymmetric) action. It is likely that the SBCT’s opponent will seek close combat in
urban or severely restricted terrain where it is difficult for US forces to employ fires and
bring infantry forces to bear in overmatching numbers. To counter this threat,
commanders must plan to defeat the enemy when and where the SBCT is least
vulnerable. Most importantly, the commander must optimize the SBCT's ability to
operate in a dispersed manner, utilizing its mounted speed to quickly mass forces in
operations driven by rapid decision-making based on accurate and timely information
from the cavalry squadron (RSTA).
a. The cavalry squadron (RSTA), combined with access to other ISR and higher
echelon information databases, clarifies the situation in severely restrictive and urban
terrain. This clarification allows the SBCT to conduct maneuver and mass forces and
effects at the decisive point to achieve overmatching combat power against the enemy.
The ability to mass fires and effects resides throughout the SBCT. It starts with the ability
of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) to gain contact (electronic or physical) with the enemy.
Near real-time information, not only on enemy disposition, composition, and strength but
also on the trafficability of routes into the objective, allows the SBCT to place precision
fires and effects on the enemy, jam his communications, isolate any forces attempting to
withdraw or reinforce while also allowing the infantry to conduct the decisive operation.
Unrestricted maneuver, with assistance from the engineers when needed, allows the
infantry to quickly mass the effects (concentration) of direct fire without massing
formations for too long.
b. The SBCT has the flexibility to concentrate fires at the lowest level and the ability
to fight as a combined arms team at the company level. Concentration of direct fires in a
combined arms infantry assault in any terrain is the final component of decisive combat.
This is the SBCT’s strength.

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4-3. TEMPO
Tempo is defined as the rate of military action (FM 3-0). Following the use of surprise to
gain the initiative, the attacker controls the tempo in order to maintain relentless pressure
on the enemy. Relentless pressure forces the enemy to make decisions for which he is
unprepared, to conduct maneuver for which he has not rehearsed, and prevents him from
recovering from the initial shock of an attack. The ability to conduct decision-making
during execution originates with the development of branches and sequels during
planning. The data and information provided by the cavalry squadron (RSTA), combined
with the other ISR assets, the INFOSYS, and the mounted speed of the infantry, allows
the SBCT commander to execute branches and sequels at predetermined decision points
during the course of a battle. The key to maintaining the appropriate tempo is to
anticipate enemy reaction during planning and quickly maneuver forces during execution
to seize the opportunity it presents.
a. The SBCT’s tempo will fluctuate. Tempo will be slow as the cavalry squadron
(RSTA) focuses its reconnaissance and surveillance effort to confirm and or deny the PIR
for the attack. At the same time, the SBCT can use other ISR assets and access to
ARFOR and national assets to compliment the cavalry squadron (RSTA)'s efforts. In
combination, these two capabilities provide the SBCT S2 with the ability to clarify the
situation for the commander with great accuracy.
b. The SBCT commander must exercise tactical patience as reconnaissance and
surveillance is conducted. Once he attains the clarity necessary to allow the appropriate
decision, he issues necessary FRAGOs and is able to increase the operational tempo as he
transitions the SBCT to the attack.
c. While clarity and SU are necessary to conduct decision-making, the SBCT
commander cannot be overly reliant upon technology to the point he expects, and waits
for, “perfect” intelligence. The commander must guard against hesitation while waiting
for perfect SU or to set the conditions for attack without error or casualties. This situation
occurs when the commander and staff attempt to fight the plan instead of a freethinking
enemy. To drive the tempo of an offensive operation, the SBCT commander makes
tactical decisions quickly, taking prudent risk to seize opportunities as they are presented.
d. At times, and under exceptional circumstances, the reconnaissance and
surveillance efforts of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) may not yield the degree of clarity
the commander desires to transition into offensive operations with maneuver forces. This
is most likely to occur if the enemy adopts something similar to a security zone. The
cavalry squadron (RSTA) is not organized to fight for intelligence; therefore, an effective
enemy security zone may deny the SBCT commander the fidelity he desires for an attack.
In such circumstances, the commander adjusts the tempo of the operation to conduct a
reconnaissance in force with his maneuver battalions. The reconnaissance in force
maintains tempo while providing the clarity the commander needs to begin maneuvering
forces to attack the enemy’s decisive points.

4-4. AUDACITY
Audacity is defined as the state of being bold with a reasoned disregard of normal
constraints. The willingness and ability of the SBCT commander to execute offensive
operations with audacity is a key component to success. Audacious action normally
occurs when an unexpected opportunity arises during the course of an attack. Subordinate

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commanders must be prepared to act quickly within the SBCT commander's intent to
exploit these opportunities by refocusing combat power, committing reserves, increasing
the tempo, or whatever maneuver decision is required to overwhelm the defender. It is
entirely possible and in fact likely that the path to success will lie on an avenue
unanticipated in the plan. In the past, armies have relied upon the “genius” of the
commander to anticipate and seize unforeseen opportunities. The SBCT commander will
maintain this feel for the battle. However, the cavalry squadron (RSTA), the robust ISR
capability available to him, and C2 INFOSYS capability will aid him to an unprecedented
degree in this personal responsibility to visualize the upcoming battle.

Section II. FORMS OF MANEUVER

The SBCT commander selects the form of maneuver based on his analysis of the factors
of METT-TC to develop a course of action. The forms of maneuver are--
• Envelopment.
• Turning movement.
• Infiltration.
• Penetration.
• Frontal attack.

4-5. ENVELOPMENT
The envelopment (Figure 4-1) is the preferred form of maneuver. It seeks to apply
strength against weakness, striking a moving or stationary enemy from an unexpected
direction (an assailable flank). If an assailable flank does not exist, the SBCT creates one
by using another form of maneuver. The preponderance of the SBCT's combat power
avoids the enemy where his force is most protected and where his fires are concentrated.
The cavalry squadron (RSTA), or other ISR assets, allows the SBCT to develop the
situation out of contact. The SBCT can then maneuver out of contact and envelop the
enemy on its own terms. Another option is for the SBCT to fix the enemy with one force
(task organization is METT-TC dependent) then attack the enemy with a preponderance
of the remaining available force.

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Figure 4-1. Envelopment.

4-6. TURNING MOVEMENT

A turning movement (Figure 4-2, page 4-6) is used to destroy or force the withdrawal of
a defending enemy. The SBCT passes around and avoids the enemy's main force and
secures an objective in the enemy's rear area along his line of communications, causing
him to abandon his prepared defensive positions to address this threat. Turning
movement allows the SBCT to fight a repositioning enemy on terms and conditions that
are favorable to the SBCT. The SBCT normally will conduct a turning movement as part
of a higher headquarters' operation.

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Figure 4-2. Turning Movement.

4-7. INFILTRATION
Infiltration (Figure 4-3) is the covert movement of all or part of the attacking force
through enemy lines to an objective in the enemy's rear area. Infiltration normally is used
before an attack that is using another form of maneuver. An infiltration may be used to
reconnoiter the enemy force or objective, to attack the enemy from an unexpected
location, or to seize terrain to support a future attack. The SBCT normally infiltrates ISR
assets or infantry to obtain information or to support the attack by destroying vulnerable
key targets or seizing key terrain. Planning for an infiltration must be detailed and
synchronized.

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Figure 4-3. Infiltration.

4-8. PENETRATION
The penetration (Figure 4-4, page 4-8) ruptures the enemy defense along a narrow front
to create an assailable flank, gain a foothold in the enemy's defense, or gain access to the
enemy's rear area. The SBCT’s ability to rapidly mass combat power at the point of
penetration while achieving surprise as to the intended location of the point of penetration
is critical to success.

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Figure 4-4. Penetration.

4-9. FRONTAL ATTACK

The frontal attack is used to attack the enemy across a wide front and along the most
direct approach. It is used to overrun and destroy a weakened enemy or fix the enemy.
The SBCT may conduct a frontal attack against a stationary or moving enemy force.
Unless a frontal attack is executed with overwhelming speed and combat power against a
weaker enemy, it will seldom be decisive.

Section III. FORMS OF TACTICAL OFFENSE

The SBCT conducts, or participates in, movements to contact, attacks, exploitations, and
pursuits across the full spectrum of conflict. The SBCTs cavalry squadron (RSTA) and
INFOSYS do not negate the need to conduct traditional movements to contact. However,
the actual techniques used during a movement to contact may be modified to fit the
capabilities found within the SBCT. Attacks, exploitations, and pursuits may be
conducted sequentially or simultaneously throughout the SBCT’s AO.

4-10. MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

A movement to contact is an offensive operation designed to develop the situation and
gain or reestablish contact with the enemy. It is used when the tactical situation is unclear
or when contact with the enemy has been lost. The SBCT's cavalry squadron (RSTA) and
other ISR assets may reduce the need to conduct a movement to contact as SU allows the
commander to determine where significant enemy forces are located. However, enemy
information operations may degrade the accuracy of the commander's SU. In this
instance, the SBCT will conduct a movement to contact. A movement to contact develops

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the situation and maintains the SBCT commander's freedom of action once contact has
been gained. The SBCT may conduct a movement to contact as part of a higher unit's
movement to contact, or the SBCT commander may direct a movement to contact any
time during an operation. The following are fundamentals of a movement to contact:
• Focus all efforts on finding the enemy.
• Make initial contact with the ISR assets or with the cavalry squadron (RSTA).
• Task-organize the SBCT and use movement formations to attack rapidly
throughout the area of operation.
• Plan to facilitate flexible response throughout the AO.
• Maintain contact once contact is made.
The SBCT commander develops an ISR plan that ensures all ISR assets are employed to
answer the PIR and facilitate his decision-making. The cavalry squadron (RSTA),
augmented by other ISR assets and the SBCT's ability to access higher echelon sensors,
observes NAIs throughout the SBCT's AO and area of interest. The cavalary squadron
(RSTA)'s efforts may allow the commander to transition the SBCT from a movement to
contact to an attack or a defense prior to the infantry battalions making contact with the
enemy. The SBCT may apply one of the following techniques when conducting a
movement to contact: approach march or search-and-attack.
a. Approach March Technique. The approach march technique is the traditional,
linear technique for conducting a movement to contact. The technique is an advance of a
combat unit when direct physical contact with the enemy is expected and desired. Using
this technique, the SBCT will normally organize into a security force, advance guard,
main body, flank guards, and rear guard. When the SBCT participates as part of a
divisional or corps movement to contact (using the approach march technique) in an
MTW, it will likely fill the roles of security force, flank guards, or rear guard. The
commander visualizes how the SBCT will be deployed when contact with the enemy is
made. Based upon this visualization and the answers to his PIR, he may move the SBCT
in a single column or in multiple columns.
(1) Security Force. This force focuses more on reconnaissance and surveillance than
on combat. The SBCT staff develops its reconnaissance and surveillance plan to ensure
the appropriate combination of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and other ISR assets is
available to observe NAIs throughout the AO, answer the PIR, and facilitate the
commander's decision-making. When possible, the SBCT infiltrates the ISR assets
throughout the AO. The cavalry squadron (RSTA) and other ISR assets shape the AO for
the SBCT commander and may allow for a timely and efficient transition to an attack or a
defense prior to the advance guard making contact with the enemy.
(2) Advance Guard. The advance guard is a task-organized unit or detachment that
precedes a formation to protect the main body from ground observation or surprise by the
enemy. The advance guard develops the situation to protect the deployment of the main
body when it is committed. The SBCT commander, through his analysis of the factors of
METT-TC and his SU during execution, will determine how far forward of the main
body the advance guard will operate. The advance guard must operate within the
supporting range of the main body in order to not be too vulnerable, but it should operate
far enough forward to successfully accomplish its mission. The advance guard provides
its own advance guard, flank guards, and rear guard. When the SBCT is moving along

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multiple axes, each lead infantry battalion serves as an advance guard. The SBCT may
assign the following tasks to the advance guard:
• Reinforce the reconnaissance and surveillance efforts of the security force.
• Destroy enemy security forces within its capabilities.
• Destroy or repel all enemy reconnaissance forces.
• Bypass or breach obstacles along the main body's axis of advance.
• Fix, suppress, or block enemy forces to develop the situation for the main
body.
(3) Main Body. The main body will contain the preponderance of the SBCT's combat
power. Based on the commander's intent and concept, the main body keeps a sufficient
distance from the advance guard to maintain flexibility. Although some level of security
might be felt because of the COP and units to the front, flanks, and rear, the main body
must still maintain local security and be prepared to rapidly deploy and attack the enemy.
Depending on his visualization, answers to the PIR, and the fidelity of other information,
the SBCT commander may designate a portion of the main body as the reserve. The
reserve gives the SBCT commander flexibility to react to unforeseen circumstances.
(4) Flank and Rear Guards. SBCT forces screen or guard the flanks and rear of the
SBCT if adjacent units are not protecting the SBCT’s flank or rear. Flank and rear guard
responsibilities typically reside with the main body force. The flank security forces must
be task organized to provide information and early warning, to repel anticipated enemy
attacks or to delay enemy attacks long enough for the main body to react. The SBCT
commander may task-organize ISR assets to the main body force to enhance the ability of
the flank and rear guards to accomplish their missions during movement.
b. Search-and-Attack Technique. A search-and-attack is a decentralized
movement to contact, requiring multiple, coordinated patrols to locate and destroy the
enemy. It is most often used when operating within noncontiguous areas of operation
during an SSC. The SBCT conducts this form of the movement to contact to destroy
enemy forces, deny the enemy certain areas, to protect the force, or for information
collection. Execution of the search-and-attack will typically be by company-sized
elements in battalion-sized AOs. During a search-and-attack, the SBCT task-organizes its
subordinate units into finding, fixing, and finishing forces, and may task its subordinate
units to conduct the following missions:
• Locate enemy positions or habitually traveled routes.
• Destroy enemy forces within its capability or to fix and or block the enemy
until reinforcements arrive.
• Maintain surveillance of a larger enemy force through stealth until
reinforcements arrive.
• Search urban areas.
• Secure military or civilian property or installations.
• Eliminate enemy influence within the AO.
(1) Finding the Enemy. Much time may be required to develop relevant information
on the enemy. The SBCT must leverage its cavalry squadron (RSTA) and other ISR
assets to enhance the commander's understanding. The cavalry squadron (RSTA) may
arrive in the AO prior to the remainder of the SBCT. Information on enemy activities in
the AO gained through the cavalry squadron (RSTA)'s reconnaissance and surveillance
efforts will help the SBCT commander focus the search-and-attack. The commander may

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subdivide the SBCT's AO to allow the cavalry squadron (RSTA) to conduct a zone
reconnaissance while the infantry battalions, with attached ISR assets, conduct a search-
and-attack.
(2) Fixing the Enemy. The SBCT will task its subordinate units with one of the
following actions after the commander has developed his SU:
• Block enemy escape and or reinforcement routes for another unit to attack.
The blocking unit maintains contact and positions its forces to isolate or fix
the enemy so another unit can attack. The INFOSYS will be critical for the
attacking unit to destroy the enemy and prevent fratricide of the blocking unit.
• Conduct an attack. This occurs if it is in line with the commander's intent and
concept. The attacking force must be able to generate sufficient combat power
for a decisive operation.
• Maintain surveillance. The unit avoids detection and reports enemy
composition, disposition, and activities.
(3) Finishing the Enemy. Once the enemy force has been fixed, the SBCT may task
its subordinate units to conduct one of the following:
• Conduct an attack.
• Block an escaping enemy for another unit to attack.
• Continue reconnaissance and surveillance activities with a refined CCIR.
• Employ lethal or non-lethal fires and effects.

4-11. ATTACK
An attack is a type of offensive operation characterized by coordinated movement
supported by fires and effects. Attacking is the primary means of destroying or defeating
an enemy force, of seizing or securing terrain, or both. Attacks take place along a
continuum defined at one end by the issuance of a FRAGO that directs the execution of
deliberate offensive operations by forces immediately available . The other end of the
continuum is defined by published, detailed orders with multiple branches and sequels,
detailed knowledge of all aspects of the enemy's disposition, a force that has been task-
organized specifically for the mission, and the conduct of extensive rehearsals. Most
attacks fall within the continuum as opposed to its extreme ends. The cavalry squadron
(RSTA), other ISR assets, INFOSYS, and reach capability allow the SBCT to apply the
best of these extreme ends during planning and execution to facilitate quick decision-
making while still maintaining a good doctrinal foundation for a successful attack.
a. Situational Understanding. The SBCT commander takes every opportunity to
gain and refine data and tactical information regarding the enemy. He uses his cavalry
squadron (RSTA) and other ISR assets to gather data and information and process it into
the relevant information and intelligence that eventually feed into his understanding.
Relevant information and intelligence gathered during planning is especially useful to
determine the feasibility and acceptability of a developed course of action. If the SBCT
commander feels that he lacks appropriate knowledge of the situation, he may not
continue with an attack. Instead, he may conduct a movement to contact or refine his ISR
effort.
b. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Effort. The SBCT commander
ensures that the ISR effort is continuous throughout the operations process (plan, prepare,
execute, and assess) for an attack. The enemy's attempts to modify his defenses will be

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detected. This early detection allows the SBCT commander to adjust his scheme of
maneuver as the enemy situation becomes clearer. The SBCT commander uses all
available ISR assets (HUMINT and technological) separately or in combination with the
cavalry squadron (RSTA)'s efforts to provide the inputs to develop his SU. The two
fundamental employment techniques for reconnaissance that support an attack are
reconnaissance-pull and reconnaissance-push.
(1) Reconnaissance-Pull. The objective of reconnaissance-pull is to find weaknesses
in enemy dispositions that can be exploited by the main body. The cavalry squadron
(RSTA) and other ISR assets are deployed over a broad area of operations that allows
them to identify enemy weaknesses to exploit and enemy strengths to avoid. Once these
have been identified, the SBCT commander exploits the situation by choosing a course of
action that allows his decisive operation (main effort) to attack the enemy's weaknesses
and penetrate gaps in the enemy's defense. He then commits forces to widen the gap and
envelop the enemy. The cavalary squadron (RSTA) and other ISR assets continue to
move, avoiding enemy strengths and "pulling" the SBCT deep into the enemy's rear area
of operations.
(2) Reconnaissance-Push. The objective of reconnaissance-push is to identify the
obstacles and enemy forces that the main body must overcome to assault the objective in
a previously chosen location in accordance with the order that deployed the cavalry
squadron (RSTA) (typically WARNO2). Once the cavalry squadron (RSTA) has made
contact with the enemy, it develops the situation within its capabilities. If the objective is
the enemy force, the cavalry squadron (RSTA) orients on it to maintain contact and
determine the enemy's disposition.
c. Special Purpose Attacks. The SBCT commander can execute an attack to
achieve different results or for special purposes. The SBCT will normally execute special
purpose attacks in an MTW or SSC. The commander's intent and an analysis of the
factors of METT-TC determine the specific form of special purpose attack. These forms
of the attack share the same planning, preparation, and execution considerations as other
offensive operations. These subordinate forms of an attack are--
• Raids.
• Counterattacks
• Spoiling attacks.
• Feints.
• Demonstrations
(1) Raids. A raid is an attack that involves swift, temporary penetration of enemy
territory for a specific mission. The SBCT conducts raids to capture prisoners,
installations, or enemy materiel; to destroy enemy installations or materiel; to obtain
specific information of a hostile force; to liberate captured friendly personnel or materiel;
or to deceive or harass enemy forces. A raid is a small-scale attack that always ends with
a planned withdrawal. Raids require detailed reconnaissance and surveillance planning
and may rely on infantry battalion reconnaissance platoons or ISR assets rather that the
cavalry squadron (RSTA) (METT-TC dependent). The SBCT normally assigns raids to
subordinate forces. The raiding force may operate within or outside its normal area of
operation. The raiding force moves to its objective by infiltration (mounted or
dismounted), quick violent attack, or by air. Specific planning considerations for a raid
include the following:

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• Conduct detailed reconnaissance and maintain constant surveillance of the

raid objective to ensure the enemy situation remains unchanged and within the
capabilities of the raiding force.
• Position fire support systems to provide responsive fires and effects during the
approach, actions on the objective, and the withdrawal.
• Establish clear abort criteria for the raid. These may include loss of personnel,
equipment or support assets, or changes in the enemy situation on or near the
raid objective.
• Develop contingency plans (branches) for enemy contact prior to and after
actions on the objective.
• Plan casualty evacuation and raiding force extraction during the approach,
actions on the objective, and the withdrawal.
(2) Counterattacks. A counterattack is executed from a defense to defeat an attacking
enemy force or retake key terrain and regain the initiative. The counterattacking force
ultimately conducts the decisive operation in the defense when committed; therefore, it
should become the main effort upon its commitment. The SBCT commander may plan
counterattacks as part of the SBCT's defensive plan. The SBCT may be the
counterattacking force for a higher headquarters' defensive plan, if that higher
organization lacks sufficient mobility and firepower in its subordinate units.
(3) Spoiling Attacks. A spoiling attack is executed from a defense to disrupt the
enemy's attack preparations and is executed in the same manner as an attack. Spoiling
attacks focus on the enemy's critical systems and forces that would have the greatest
impact on the SBCT. These systems and forces include, but are not limited to, command
and control systems, ISR assets, fire support forces, and any identified unconventional
threat. Spoiling attacks are conducted as often as necessary to deny the enemy adequate
attack preparation. The SBCT, with it organic cavalry squadron (RSTA) and other ISR
assets, normally conducts spoiling attacks as part of a higher headquarters.
(4) Feints. A feint is intended to deceive the enemy and draw attention and combat
power away from the main effort and force the enemy to employ his reserves away from
the main effort or remain in position, attract enemy supporting fires away from the main
effort, force the enemy to reveal defensive fires or weaknesses, or to gain surprise. Feints
must be of sufficient strength and composition to cause the desired enemy reaction.
Feints must appear to be real; therefore, some contact with the enemy is required. The
SBCT may execute a feint as part of a higher headquarters' attack or may include a feint
as part of its own deception plan. Planning for a feint follows the same sequences as any
other attack. Special planning considerations include the following:
• Assign attainable objectives.
• Ensure the feint is resourced to appear as the main effort or as a credible threat
to the enemy.
• Establish clear guidance regarding force preservation.
• Ensure adequate means of detecting the desired enemy reaction.
• Designate clear disengagement criteria for the feinting force.
• Issue clear follow-on missions to the feinting force.
(5) Demonstrations. A demonstration is used for deception. The SBCT executes it
with the intention of deceiving the enemy; however, no contact is intended. A
demonstration must be made clearly visible to the enemy without being obviously

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deceptive to the enemy. Demonstration forces use fires and effects, movement of
maneuver forces, smoke, electronic warfare (EW) assets, and communications equipment
to support the deception plan. Specific planning considerations include the following:
• Establish a means to determine the effectiveness of the demonstration.
• Establish a limit of advance (LOA) for the demonstration forces that allow the
enemy to see the demonstration without being able to effectively engage it
with direct or indirect fires.
• Establish other security measures necessary to prevent engagement by the
enemy.
• Employ demonstrations to reinforce enemy expectations and contribute to the
main effort's success.
• Develop contingency plans (branches) for enemy contact and to avoid
decisive engagement with the enemy.
• Issue clear follow-on missions to the demonstration force.

4-12. EXPLOITATION
Exploitation is the bold continuation of an attack to increase success and take advantage
of weakened or collapsed enemy defenses. Its purpose is to prevent reconstitution of
enemy defenses; prevent enemy withdrawal; secure deep objectives; and destroy enemy
C2 facilities, logistics, and forces. The SBCT commander configures his CCIR to
facilitate decision-making and to help recognize the existence of this transition point
within the offensive framework. The cavalry squadron (RSTA) and infantry battalions
will continue to conduct tasks similar to those executed during the attack, and it is only in
the condition of the enemy that there will be any noticeable difference. The SBCT
commander and staff must maximize the ability to rapidly develop plans that facilitate
seamless continuation of the offense as it transitions from attack into exploitation. Thus,
ISR efforts for future operations must be tied to, and conducted simultaneously with,
ongoing offensive operations. Once the exploitation begins, the enemy is given no relief
from offensive pressure. In traditional (linear) combat, should the lead force be unable to
continue the mission, follow-and-support forces rapidly assume responsibility. Within
nonlinear combat, it is more likely that the SBCT must employ attacks against
disorganized enemy units throughout an AO. As the SBCT destroys more enemy forces, it
gains greater freedom of movement within the AO. The SBCT commander task-organizes
HUMINT ISR assets to directly support the infantry battalions. Increased access to
EPWs, noncombatants, and document and or electronic exploitation produces a cascading
effect that yields greater clarity on disposition of the remaining enemy.
a. Form of Exploitation. The exploitation may take the form of an MTC or a series
of attacks during hasty operations. The commander will usually issue a series of
FRAGOs that designate--
• Movement formation.
• The positions of each battalion within that formation.
• Any required modification to task organization.
• Bypass criteria.
• Revised or new contol measures that assist the maneuver such as objectives,
boundary changes, LOA, and FSCM.

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b. Control Measures. The commander uses control measures to retain his tactical
options to converge on the most important axis or to redirect his exploitation effort on a
new axis. These control measures should be flexible and capable of rapid adjustments to
reflect changing conditions. For an example of control measure used during exploitation
operations, refer to Figure 4-5. The commander balances the need to prevent fratricide
with the need to allow his battalion commanders the ability to take advantage of
opportunities.

Figure 4-5. Exploitation control measures in a contiguous AO.

c. Initiation of an Exploitation. The exploitation is initiated when an enemy force

is having difficulty maintaining its position. Although local exploitations may appear
insignificant, their cumulative effects can be decisive. Depending on the situation and its
task organization, the SBCT can exploit its own success, it can be used as an exploiting
force for a higher echelon, or it can follow-and-support another exploiting force. The
commander must be ready at all times to use every opportunity afforded by the enemy for
exploitation. Updated intelligence is crucial to accurately predicting the exact conditions
required to transition from an attack to an exploitation. Such indicators include--
• Higher headquarters reports the threat of use of WMD by enemy forces.
• An increase in prisoners captured.
• An increase in abandoned materiel.
• The overrunning of artillery, command facilities, signal installations, and
supply dumps.
• Enemy reconnaissance intensifies.
• Enemy fires decrease in intensity and effectiveness.
• Units become intermingled.
• Reports confirm the capture or absence of enemy leaders.

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d. Transition. The transition to the exploitation may be abrupt or so gradual it is

hardly distinguishable. The commander’s primary concern when initiating an exploitation
resulting from a successful attack is to shift his force into the appropriate combat
formation and task-organize it with additional capabilities and resources to take
advantage of a short window of opportunity. The SBCT would normally maneuver on a
wide front and may move on two axes. When moving on two axes, each battalion must be
task-organized to operate independently. After transition, units should make every effort
to continue the advance without halting. They bypass enemy resistance when possible
and make the most of available fire support when appropriate targets are presented. Fire
support, target acquisition systems, and observers are positioned well forward with lead
elements. Key fire and effects considerations are as follows:
• Plan fires and effects to support the attacks.
• Incorporate CAS and attack helicopters, which are well suited for exploitation.
• Establish FSCM between exploiting and converging forces.
• Keep the ECOORD advised of locations of lead elements to facilitate positive
clearance of fires.
• Use families of scatterable mines (FASCAM) to delay or fix the enemy.
• Consider the loss of maneuver space.
• Position fire support assets well forward.
• Plan for continous fires and effects.
e. Follow Through. Once the exploitation begins, it is carried out to the final
objective. The enemy should be given no relief from offensive pressure. Should the lead
force be unable to continue the mission, follow-and-support forces must rapidly assume
responsibility. Enemy forces encountered are not engaged unless they are a threat to the
SBCT or cannot be bypassed. This decision rests with the next higher commander;
however, freedom of action is normally delegated to commanders in the exploitation.
f. Follow-and-Support Forces. Follow-and-support forces clear the bypassed areas
and expand the area of exploitation. Follow-and-support forces are normally battalion or
higher formations employed primarily in exploitation and pursuit operations to facilitate
maintaining the momentum of the attack. They may also be used in a penetration. A force
with a follow-and-support mission is not a reserve but a committed unit. Follow-and-
support forces assist attacking units by relieving them of tasks that would otherwise slow
their advance. Follow-and-support forces can --
• Widen or secure the shoulders of the penetration by breaking through other
enemy defenses.
• Block the movement of enemy reinforcements.
• Destroy bypassed pockets of resistance.
• Relieve elements of the attacking force that have been left to block or contain
enemy forces.
• Secure the flanks of a penetration to prevent the enemy from closing it.
• Open and secure lines of communications.
• Secure decisive terrain overrun or bypassed by the attacking unit.
• Protect key installations or areas.
• Guard prisoners of war.
• Reinforce or assume mission of leading force.

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• Widen breach lanes.

• Clear MSRs.
• Contol dislocated civilians.
When augmented with additional CSS assets, these follow-and-support forces may also
be assigned to control and process refugees and collect and manage casualties.
g. Decentralized Execution. Decentralized execution is characteristic of the
exploitation; however, the commander maintains enough control to prevent over
extension of the command. Minimum control measures are used. Aerial reconnaissance
and Army attack or reconnaissance aircraft maintain contact with the enemy movements
and keep the commander advised of enemy activities. Close air support aircraft, fires and
effects assets, and attack helicopters can attack moving enemy reserves, withdrawing
enemy columns, enemy constrictions at choke points, and enemy forces that threaten the
flanks of the exploiting force. Security of ground supply columns must be considered and
an aerial resupply may be necessary. Exploiting forces take advantage of captured
supplies whenever possible.

4-13. PURSUIT
A pursuit is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off an enemy force
attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (FM 3-90). The pursuit normally
follows a successful exploitation and the enemy attempts to conduct a retrograde, The
primary function of pursuit is to complete the destruction of the enemy force. As a
successful exploitation develops and the enemy begins to lose the ability to influence the
situation, the SBCT may be ordered to execute the pursuit. In the pursuit, the SBCT may
point its advance toward a physical objective; however, the mission is the destruction of
the enemy’s main force. The SBCT's ability to share and rapidly disseminate information
facilitates the transition into pursuit. Most enemy forces will attempt to flee the area or
blend into the local population; however, some enemy forces, motivated by ideology or
ethnic and or religious convictions, may hold out. To complete the destruction of those
enemy forces attempting to flee the AO, the SBCT designates direct pressure and
encircling forces. The commander's analysis of the factors of METT-TC determines the
composition of these forces. Infantry, supported by elements of the cavalry squadron
(RSTA) or other ISR assets, have the superior tactical mobility to conduct pursuit
operations against those enemy forces fleeing the AO.
a. Indicators of the Enemy’s Collapse. Friendly forces in the exploitation are alert
for indicators of an enemy collapse that would permit a pursuit operation. There are
several indicators of a weakening enemy:
• Continued advance without strong enemy reaction.
• An increased number of captured prisoners, abandoned weapons, and
unburied dead.
• A lessening of enemy artillery fire.
• A lack of enemy countermeasures.
b. Initiating a Pursuit. The pursuit is ordered when the enemy force can no longer
maintain its position and tries to escape. The commander exerts unrelenting pressure to
keep the enemy force from reorganizing and preparing its defenses. The SBCT may be a
part of a higher headquarters, functioning as either the direct-pressure or encircling force.

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The commander organizes and conducts pursuit operations by designating subordinate

commands to produce the effects of a direct pressure force and an encircling force.
(1) Direct Pressure Force. The mission of a direct-pressure force is to prevent enemy
disengagement and subsequent reorganization of the defense and to inflict the most
casualties. Leading elements contain or bypass small enemy pockets of resistance that are
then reduced by follow-and-support units. At every opportunity, the direct pressure force
envelops, cuts off, and destroys enemy elements, provided such actions do not interfere
with its primary mission. The enemy is not allowed to break contact.
(2) Encircling Force. The mission of an encircling force is to get behind the enemy
and block his escape so that he can be destroyed between the direct-pressure and
encircling forces. The encircling force advances along or flies over routes paralleling the
enemy’s line of retreat to reach defiles, communication centers, bridges, and other key
terrain ahead of the enemy main force. When conditions permit, the SBCT attempts a
double envelopment of retreating enemy main forces or their subordinate elements.
Enemy rear guards or forces on flank positions are not permitted to divert the main force
from its mission. If the encircling force cannot outdistance the enemy, it attacks the
enemy main body on its flank. If the enemy’s main force establishes itself on a position
from which it cannot be easily dislodged, the pursuing commander launches an attack to
restore fluidity. The SBCT commander should consider augmenting the encircling force
with ISR assets such as UAVs and remote-sensing systems. The cavalry squadron
(RSTA)’s HUMINT capability should be augmented from the SBCT’s MICO to conduct
“pursuit” operations when enemy forces are attempting to blend into the civilian
population.
c. Control Measures. The commander uses control measures to retain his tactical
options to converge on the most important axis or to redirect his pursuit effort on a new
axis. These control measures should be flexible and capable of rapid adjustments to
reflect changing conditions. For an example of control measure used during pursuit
operations refer to Figure 4-6. Centralized planning and decentralized execution
characterize the pursuit. The commander balances the need to prevent fratricide with the
need to allow his battalion commanders the ability to take advantage of fleeting
opportunities.

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Figure 4-6. Pursuit control measures.

d. Fires and Effects. Fire and effects assets are placed well forward with the lead
elements of the direct-pressure force. Such positioning facilitates the delivery of fire and
effects support for both the direct-pressure and encircling force. Fires and effects assets
perform two key tasks in the pursuit: slowing the retreat of enemy forces and preventing
resupply and reinforcement of enemy force fires. CSS assets should follow the direct-
pressure force to enhance its security. During a pursuit, the SBCT may also serve as a
higher headquarters follow-and-support force. (See Paragraph 4-12 on exploitation.)

SECTION IV. OFFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The SBCT’s unique ISR and the capability to access higher echelon database to retrieve
information may alter the manner in which it actually plans, prepares for, and executes an
attack and may result in some unique planning considerations (Figure 4-7, page 4-20).

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Figure 4-7. Planning considerations.

4-14. FORCE ORGANIZATION

The commander task-organizes forces within the SBCT after he chooses a scheme of
maneuver. The task organization allocates sufficient combat power to allow subordinate
units to accomplish their assigned purposes. The structure of the SBCT and its INFOSYS
reduces the number of unknowns and allows the task organization to be tailored to meet
the specific threat.
a. The cavalry squadron (RSTA) primarily executes reconnaissance and surveillance
for the SBCT. In instances where the enemy situation remains vague, additional forces
are allocated to assist in the reconnaissance effort. The ISR assets of the MICO may be
attached to or operate in direct support of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) to facilitate the
reconnaissance effort. The S2x section, under the direction of the SBCT S2, has access to
higher intelligence collectors and is able to garner those capabilities to help in the ISR
effort. When the enemy mounts an effective security zone that denies the cavalry
squadron (RSTA) the ability to provide the tactical information that the SBCT
commander needs to make decisions during execution, he may direct an infantry battalion
to conduct a movement to contact or limited attacks through the enemy security zone.
From the SBCT commander’s perspective, these operations constitute a reconnaissance-
in-force and feed sufficient information to build a level of understanding needed to
facilitate decision-making by the commander and obtain decisive combat action.
b. Across the full spectrum of conflict, the SBCT commander carefully considers
security force requirements. Unlike an MTW, an SSC will rarely have clearly defined
flanks and rear areas. Forces must be allocated to protect critical assets within the SBCT
AO against conventional and unconventional attacks. Force organization reduces the
amount of dedicated security through a COP and mutual support. Additionally, the
cavalry squadron (RSTA) and other ISR assets will provide passive security through the
conduct of their operations.
c. The SBCT can conduct both linear and nonlinear operations within contiguous or
noncontiguous areas of operations. The mounted speed of the subordinate units within the
SBCT allows the SBCT to conduct nonlinear operations while maintaining the ability to

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provide mutual support. This flexibility allows the SBCT to conduct battalion-level
operations against multiple objectives within the SBCT's areas of operation.
d. The SBCT commander has greater latitude in the designation and composition of
his reserve. Reserves should be designated at appropriate levels to address unforeseen
events. The amount of combat power allocated to the reserve depends primarily on the
level of uncertainty about the enemy. The increased ability of the SBCT to gain a better
degree of understanding about the enemy should allow the commander to tailor the
reserve to meet the specific threats and opportunities. At times the situation may allow
the SBCT to retain only a small, but tailored, force as the reserve because there is little
likelihood of catastrophic failure or all of the infantry battalions are conducting
significant operations simultaneously. At other times, the SBCT commander may
determine that his degree of SU allows him to tailor subordinate forces to a level that will
ensure their success and therefore he does not designate a reserve.

4-15. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is a broad category of assets designed to
support planning, intelligence development, decision-making, and targeting. The ISR
effort is a combined-arms maneuver operation that employs the cavalry squadron (RSTA)
and other ISR assets to observe, by visual or other detection methods, NAIs and TAIs in
order to collect data, information, or combat information. Intelligence encompasses the
products shared on the COP and in databases, as well as the processes used to collect,
process, and analyze data and relevant information. Surveillance involves the systematic
observation of a particular NAI by visual, electronic, photographic, or other means.
Target acquisition by specialized and non-specialized ISR assets provides detection,
identification, and location of targets in sufficient detail to permit the effective
employment of fires and effects.
a. The increased capabilities of the SBCT in intelligence acquisition and rapid
precision fires and effects dictate that ISR assets be tightly integrated into a single
operation to facilitate mission accomplishment.
b. The S2 integrates IPB and other MDMP products into his analysis of all
intelligence and information coming into the main CP from the cavalry squadron
(RSTA), other ISR assets, and higher echelon intelligence assets and databases. The S2
attempts to answer the PIR, recommends refined PIR for the commander to consider,
confirms probable enemy COAs and intentions, and explains enemy actions in
relationship to the current friendly operation. The product of this process is available on a
shared database facilitating the ability of the SBCT commander and his subordinate
commanders to make timely and effective decisions regardless of their location on the
battlefield. Ultimately, reconnaissance and surveillance operations set the conditions for
the success of the unit in the close fight.
c. The SBCT conducts reconnaissance and surveillance using organic and
supporting HUMINT and technical assets. The data, information, and combat information
collected from these assets, when combined with intelligence provided by the higher
echelon assets, help the SBCT commander visualize a nearly complete picture of the
enemy and environment within the SBCT's battlespace. Specifically, the SBCT employs
an appropriate number of its ISR assets throughout its AO in order to identify favorable

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terrain and determine the enemy’s composition, disposition, activities, strengths, and
possible vulnerabilities.
d. The INFOSYS allow information to be passed from the cavalry squadron (RSTA)
and other ISR assets to decision-makers and targeting cells in a timely manner. The ISR
order (and collection plan) is published early in the MDMP process (not later than
WARNO2), with sufficient enemy detail and operational coordination to focus the
SBCT's ISR effort. This information allows the SBCT to--
• Seize and maintain the initiative.
• Develop and disseminate effective maneuver and fires and effects plans prior
to contact.
• Detect, identify, and destroy high payoff targets early.
• Allow follow-on forces to maneuver rapidly, and without obstruction, to the
objective.
• Keep uncommitted forces available as long as possible in preparation for
action at decisive points.
• Recognize and exploit fleeting opportunities presented by discovered enemy
weaknesses.
• Share a common operational picture.
• Reduce the risk of surprise by enemy operations.

4-16. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

FUNDAMENTALS
Successful ISR operations depend on the following fundamentals:
• Maintain a continuous ISR effort.
• Focus ISR assets on answering PIR and or IR.
• Integrate the staff in ISR planning.
• Maximize ISR assets.
• Collect, process, and disseminate information rapidly and accurately.
a. Maintain a Continuous ISR Effort. Reconnaissance and surveillance is a
continuous process. In order to accomplish this, the employment of reconnaissance and
surveillance forces and or assets needs to be cycled to provide for continuous
reconnaissance and surveillance and rest and maintenance periods. ISR assets are
normally not held in reserve. However, with the increase in ISR assets available to the
SBCT, commanders must give consideration to their mission, duration, rest, resupply,
and subsequent mission requirements. When the SBCT does not have adequate organic
resources to achieve or sustain the required reconnaissance and surveillance effort, it
requests integration of other ISR assets from division, corps, joint task force, and national
systems to cover areas, or time periods, when assistance is needed.
b. Focus ISR Assets on answering PIR and IR. The PIR identifies the critical
enemy information needed by the commander to support his battlefield visualization and
decision-making. The PIR and the staff's IR provide focus to the collection plan and
prevent the wasteful employment of ISR assets. The PIR filter information available to
the commander and support his decisions that will affect overall mission
accomplishment. The IR are requirements for intelligence to fill a gap in the
commander’s knowledge and understanding of his battlespace. In addition to the PIR,
there will also be higher commander's PIR and subordinate units' IR that may influence

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the focus of the SBCT's collection plan. The collection plan should focus on collection of
information to support the PIR and provide observation of the decision points on the
battlefield. The increase in the number of ISR collection assets available to the SBCT
increases the importance of a focused and synchronized collection plan. The amount of
data and information gained from the increased number of assets may quickly overwhelm
the S2 section with superfluous reports that prevent relevant information from getting to
the decision makers in a timely manner. Focusing the reconnaissance and surveillance
effort ensures that only the PIR and specific IR are answered; therefore, ISR collection
assets are not wasted looking for information that is not relevant to the commander's
decisions.
c. Integrate the Staff in ISR Planning. The S2 and S3 rely upon the entire staff to
assist in the planning and execution of reconnaissance and surveillance by providing--
• Subject matter expertise.
• ISR assets.
• CS and CSS support.
• Communications, connectivity, and information management planning.
• IR submissions.
d. Maximize ISR Assets. The SBCT maximizes the capabilities of its ISR assets by
ensuring that collection requirements specify what needs to be collected, where it needs
to be collected, who collects it, and when it needs to be collected and reported in order
for the SBCT to successfully accomplish the mission. The cavalry squadron (RSTA) and
other ISR assets compliment each other with their different capabilities. For example, a
joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) may have gaps in its area
coverage because of terrain features that interrupt line of sight. Once these gaps are
identified, they are covered by another asset such as a UAV. Each asset's strength
compensates for another asset's weakness. Cross-cueing--using one system to trigger
another--is a way to maximize the capabilities of ISR assets. JSTARS only indicates that
something is moving. This indication may trigger the employment of a UAV to positively
identify the target.
e. Collect, Process, and Disseminate Information Rapidly and Accurately. The
INFOSYS within the SBCT enhance both the accuracy of the intelligence collected and
the timeliness with which it can be processed and disseminated. Once data or information
arrives at the collection manager, it is processed and disseminated to users such as the
SBCT commander, key staff officers, and the fires and effects coordination cell. This is
accomplished through the INFOSYS. Combat information goes directly (unprocessed) to
the SBCT commander for his consideration. In order to conduct reconnaissance and
surveillance continuously, the SBCT supplements its organic ISR collection assets with
intelligence from higher headquarters and additional maneuver, fires and effects, or force
protection assets. These assets provide the SBCT with a variety of options to draw upon,
each with its own capabilities. Table 4-1 shows the ISR collection assets that are
generally direct support to an SBCT.

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Asset Planning Range Function Interoperability

IREMBASS Detection Range Detects moving targets: ASAS-RWS
Personnel 3-50 m personnel, wheeled &
Wheeled 15-250 m tracked vehicles; sensors:
Tracked 25-350 m seismic/acoustic/magnetic/
infrared

CGS 300 Km Receiver/Preprocessor; G2 /ASAS, ASAS-RWS

primary gateway for BDE AQF/ JSTARS,
GRCS, A2C2s, UAV
GBS/BADD

CI Teams and N/A Question sources to obtain G2/S2, ASAS-RWS

Interrogators information to satisfy
intelligence requirements

Prophet 300 Km Controls and receives ESM ASAS-RWS, FBCB2

data from prophet land and
air systems.

Sentinel 40 Km Provides search and track FAADC2I, Linebacker,

functions against fixed and Avenger
rotary wing aircraft.

Q-36 RADAR Arty, Mortars 12km Mortar and artillery locating AFATDS, FBCB2
Rockets 24 Km radar, optimized for
short-range high angle
weapons.

Q-37 RADAR Arty/Rocket Long range/low angle weapons.

30/50 Km

Table 4-1. ISR collection assets.

4-17. SCHEME OF MANEUVER

The SBCT directs its decisive operation (or main effort) against an objective, ideally an
enemy weakness, to cause the collapse of the enemy. By doing so, the SBCT sustains the
initiative and reduces its own vulnerabilities. The SBCT commander seeks to identify an
assailable flank, poorly defended avenue of approach, or a smaller unit lacking mutual
support that he can exploit to gain a tactical advantage. When attacking a well-prepared
enemy defense, the commander normally plans to isolate, then destroy, vulnerable
portions of the enemy defense throughout the depth of the zone of attack.
a. The commander and staff develop the plan using a reverse planning process from
actions on the objective to the assembly area. They incorporate plans for exploiting
success and unforeseen opportunities that may develop during execution. Emphasis is
placed on synchronizing maneuver, fires and effects, and support throughout the
reconnaissance and surveillance effort and the attack. Reconnaissance and surveillance
facilitates maneuver, allowing combat forces to move on specific routes to objectives,
without significant enemy contact. The composition, disposition, and strength of the
enemy force drive the type of attack that the SBCT conducts (see Paragraph 4-11).
b. The staff considers the enemy’s ability to mass combat power, reposition his
forces, or commit his reserve. The SBCT develops a scheme of maneuver to mass
sufficient combat power to defeat the enemy. The reverse planning process is an essential

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tool in building an effective plan to attack an enemy. By starting with actions on the
objective and working back to the assembly area, the staff can allocate combat power,
mobility assets, and fires and effects (suppression and smoke).

4-18. FIRES AND EFFECTS

The fires and effects coordination cell obtains guidance from the commander regarding
the effects desired in time, space, and purpose within the AO; it then plans, coordinates,
and achieves the desired effects utilizing organic and attached assets.
a. The integration of fires and effects within the SBCT includes lethal indirect and
direct fire systems and non-lethal effects.
(1) Infantry battalion and cavalry squadron (RSTA) mortars provide the majority of
obscuration and indirect fires to these elements while the artillery battalion provides fires
and effects to the SBCT.
(2) Non-lethal effects include IO, CA, computer network attack/defense (CNA/D),
and legal support of civil-military operations. Information operations include OPSEC,
EW, PSYOP, military deception, counterpropaganda, and possibly the destruction of
infrastructure.
b. The nature of restrictive and urban terrain presents some special considerations.
The ability to direct and observe fires and effects within isolated compartments of
restrictive and urban terrain is required down to the platoon. Minimum engagement
ranges are as important as maximum ranges.
c. Considerations for the fires and effects plan include--
• Movement of the fires and effects assets to enable destruction and or
engagement of HPTs.
• Movement of the fires and effects assets to support the reconnaissance and
surveillance effort.
• Location and employment of combat observation lasing terams (COLTs) to
facilitate precision fires and effects.
• Using deception fires to confuse the enemy as to the location of the decisive
operation (or main effort).
• Planning suppressive and obscuring fires and effects at the point of
penetration.
• Planning suppressive and obscuring fires and effects in support of breaching
operations.
• Planning fires and effects in support of the approach to the objective. These
fires engage enemy security forces, destroy bypassed enemy forces, and
screen friendly movement.
• Synchronizing fires on the objective to suppress, neutralize, or destroy enemy
forces that most affect the SBCT's movement to the objective.
• Planning targets to attack repositioning enemy forces and the movement of
enemy reserves.
• Planning fires and effects beyond the objective to support an attack or
defense.
• Using fires and effects, or CAS, to delay or neutralize enemy reserves.
• Planning locations of critical friendly fire zones (CFFZs) to protect critical
assets such as support forces, breaching efforts, and artillery assets.

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• Planning to secure counterfire radars.

• Planning for desired effects on civilian populations
• Planning to break the enemy's will to fight through lethal and non-lethal
effects.

Section V. SBCT SUPPORTING A HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

The effective employment of the SBCT with both mechanized and light forces or a JTF
headquarters requires detailed and coordinated planning and an understanding of the
SBCT's capabilities and limitations. The SBCT may be part of a division, corps, or JTF
decisive operation or main effort. However, it is more likely to execute an attack as part
of a higher headquarters shaping operation, act as a reserve, conduct economy-of-force
operations, or (if attached to a mechanized force) conduct offensive operations in
restrictive or urban terrain while other elements operate in open and somewhat
unrestricted terrain. A higher headquarters has many options on how to employ an
attached SBCT. For more information on the integration of heavy and light forces, refer
to Appendix E, Integration of Special Operations, Mechanized, and Light Forces.

4-19. BOS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The SBCT commander must be ready to advise the higher commander how to best
employ his force. Critical areas in the planning process include the command and support
relationship, the composition of the CS and CSS support, and the effective use of terrain.
A common SOP or understanding of each unit's SOP is essential to the synchronization
of combat, CS, and CSS units.
a. Intelligence. Given the significant capabilities of its ISR assets, the SBCT can
expect to detach elements of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) or MICO to the higher
headquarters. The SBCT commander should brief the higher commander that this may
degrade the expected capabilities of the SBCT. Unless supporting a digitized force, the
SBCT must provide the supported headquarters with a robust LNO command and control
package. The J3/G3 must consider the capabilities of the SBCT in severely restricted
terrain and urban areas. The J2/G2 must recommend to the higher commander as PIR the
enemy assets or intentions that are particularly dangerous to the SBCT. Reconnaissance
and surveillance plans should be developed jointly between the SBCT and the higher
headquarters. When working with higher headquarters that are not yet digitized, the
SBCT commander must plan for a different tempo and possibly more physical contact
with the enemy when developing plans in conjunction with that force.
b. Maneuver. Mechanized forces are better suited for unrestricted than restricted
terrain. The SBCT retains this same mobility; however, with a larger number of
infantrymen, it provides the versatility to fight in restrictive and severely restrictive
terrain (much like a light force) where enemy mobility is limited and long-range
precision fires are muted.
(1) The SBCT does not have the protection requisite to fight and maneuver against
armored opponents in unrestricted terrain. The higher commander must consider that it is
possible to move (infiltration or air assault) the SBCT infantry battalions so far that the
SBCT begins to lose the characteristics that make the SBCT commander uniquely able to
share a COP, gain SU, and make decisions. While some of the SBCT has a limited ability
to take components of the INFOSYS across the forward line of own troops (FLOT)

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during infiltrations and air assault operations, the SBCT will function in a degraded
mode. Aerial retransmission of voice and data must be redundant and carefully planned
and coordinated. Similarly, the higher commander must consider the nature of the
objective and the duration of the operations that take the SBCT’s forces away from their
Stryker vehicles and sustaining bases for lengthy periods of time. The SBCT will require
resupply of ammunition and batteries within 48 hours of crossing the FLOT.
(2) The digital INFOSYS capability also presents a challenge. The SBCT will know
the location of its subordinate elements and have an unprecedented level of clarity on
enemy forces within the AO. Analog units working with the SBCT provide the requisite
lethality, protection, and sustainment but may not be able to tie into the INFOSYS,
thereby degrading the SBCT. The SBCT commander and staff must aggressively query
analog units for information so as not to degrade the tempo of information flow, mission
planning, and execution of combat tasks. These units will require LNO teams with
INFOSYS to communicate information with the SBCT.
(3) The SBCT cannot fight comparably sized mechanized and or armor forces in open
rolling terrain. The SBCT antitank company provides a limited antiarmor capability to
the SBCT. The SBCT will require augmentation if intended to fight a comparably sized
mechanized and or armor force. This augmentation will likely take the form of an armor
or mechanized task force that incorporates tank, antitank, engineers, and mechanized
infantry elements.
(4) The cavalry squadron (RSTA) may be required to screen or conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance against an armored threat. This may require
augmentation of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) with antiarmor systems, a robust fires and
effects element, or armored and or mechanized forces.
(5) Aviation augmentation from JTF, corps, or division is required to conduct air
assault operations, assist in casualty evacuation, support attacks, and conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance. (See Appendix F, Aviation Support of Ground
Operations.) The augmenting aviation force should have the capability to move one
infantry company in one lift, provide extensive antiarmor protection across the AO,
extend the range of reconnaissance, and expand considerably the SBCT's flexibility. It
could also add a countermobility capability by distributing air-delivered mine fields.
Aviation augmentation will normally be OPCON for a specific duration and then return
to the higher headquarters' control.
c. Fires and Effects. The SBCT may detach all or part of the artillery battalion to
participate in the higher headquarters' fires and effects plan. If the SBCT is required to
conduct an attack, the higher commander must recognize that the cavalry squadron
(RSTA) and other ISR assets will precede the ISR effort, and that effort must be
supported by a detailed and synchronized fires and effects plan.
(1) The SBCT is vulnerable to artillery fires. The higher headquarters' fires and
effects plan must prioritize the suppression of those systems that threaten the SBCT
during its employment in an attack.
(2) The SBCT may receive fires and effects augmentation from the higher
headquarters. Augmentation may be in the form of reinforcing field artillery, additional
target acquisition capabilities, or a higher priority of fires, especially for the conduct of
proactive counterfire or to support SBCT offensive operations. Assured linkages to plan

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and employ joint fires and information operations capabilities will enhance the SBCT
commander's ability to shape the battlespace.
d. Air Defense. The SBCT ties into the higher headquarters' air defense plan via the
ADAM cell, equipped with the air and missile defense work station (AMDWS), in the
main CP. Since the SBCT has no active air defense capabilities beyond point defense
with its Stryker self-defense weapons and its crew-served weapons, it would require
coverage from the higher unit's air defense assets. When employing attached air defense
assets within the SBCT AO, the commander ensures their effects afford redundant
protection of those key INFOSYS nodes necessary for successful mission
accomplishment. It is essential that the attached ADA assets are tied into the SBCT’s
INFOSYS to ensure that they enhance the fidelity of the COP by sharing information
provided from their related ADA BOS COP.
e. Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability. The SBCT must plan to receive
engineer augmentation when part of a mechanized force. The SBCT’s mechanical
breaching assets are best suited for obstacles associated with the situations in an SSC.
The light force commander, with his limited engineering capability, may not augment the
SBCT. However, a higher commander must consider that breaching or gap crossing by
the SBCT will take time, and he should provide the appropriate level of support in order
to maintain the correct tempo of the overall force.
(1) Additional engineer capabilities across all engineer battlespace functions will be
required--mobility, countermobility, survivability, reconnaissance, and sustainment
support. In essence, engineer augmentation will require an engineer battalion (versus the
organic company) that can be task-organized to provide improved direct support to
maneuver elements and to accomplish the other significant engineer tasks inherent within
an offensive operation. (Refer to FM 3-34-221 for additional information.) Augmentation
requirements include improvement in general engineering, engineer reconnaissance,
terrain visualization, and expanded staff support at SBCT and battalion levels. Engineer
augmentation will be provided from the higher headquarters and its employment
integrated by the MANSPT cell. In a linear battlefield, engineers do not typically perform
general engineering tasks while in the offense. However, in a non-contiguous
environment, engineers could perform tasks across the full spectrum of operations, to
include general engineering.
(2) The SBCT likely will be augmented by an MP company that is capable of
expanding capabilities for area security; EPW operations; police intelligence operations;
route, logistical, and physical security; counterreconnaissance; crowd control; law and
order; and criminal investigation. A smoke and decontamination company with a
biological detection platoon will be required to add capabilities for thorough fixed-site
decontamination; large area, long duration obscuration; biological detection and early
warning; and expanded nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance.
f. Command and Control. The SBCT and higher headquarters must exchange
LNO teams. Analog units lack the capabilities inherent in the C2 INFOSYS. When the
higher headquarters is analog, the SBCT commander must account for a requirement to
physically locate with the higher headquarters throughout the planning. There will be
greater demands on the SBCT commander and his staff to physically attend meetings and
briefings that will affect the normal battle rhythm of the SBCT. Detailed briefbacks are
required at the SBCT level of attached analog combat, CS, and CSS units to ensure

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timing, synchronization, and understanding of intent. The SBCT commander and

commanders and staffs of analog units must understand the capabilities and limitations of
the other’s units and their command and control systems. The S6 from each unit ensures
connectivity and interoperability during combined arms operations. An exchange of unit
tactical and digitized SOPs and signal operating instructions (SOI) must occur
immediately on attachment.
g. Combat Service Support. The BSB will require comprehensive augmentation
from JTF, division, or corps across all functional areas of support. The CSS augmentation
package will need to be tailored to overcome SBCT sustainment requirements for a
variety of systems and vehicles not resident within the higher headquarters' logistics
structure, an expanded area of operations, potentially higher operational tempo, and
probable requirements to establish direct support with maneuver elements.

4-20. FLANK GUARD

The SBCT can secure an exposed flank for an attacking force in restrictive terrain by
clearing severely restricted areas or small urban areas along the axis of advance. In the
same vein, the SBCT can secure key terrain that dominates a mechanized or light force's
approaches to the objective. This utilization of the SBCT in a large-unit attack frees the
mechanized or light force commander from drawing on any of his maneuver forces and
limited number of infantrymen required on the objective. It also allows the mechanized
force to maintain a fast tempo during movement, giving the defender less time to react
and synchronize. For the SBCT, this would still be an attack. The SBCT is uniquely
manned and equipped to fight in such terrain, thus providing the higher commander with
a force that is optimized for this type of mission. The SBCT's tactical mobility allows it
to easily join the mechanized force at a later point in the operation if required to do so.

4-21. SECURE KEY TERRAIN

The SBCT can secure choke points and clear restrictive terrain astride the mechanized
force's axis of advance. Conducting such operations in restricted terrain is both time
consuming and resource intensive. Higher commanders must account for the time and
resources required as the SBCT approaches the AO, clarifies the situation, and conducts
attacks. Higher commanders must also ensure that the SBCT has sufficient combat power
to successfully accomplish the mission. The SBCT's ability to conduct this type of
mission facilitates the unimpeded advance of mechanized forces during their movement.
a. The SBCT may conduct an infiltration in order to secure key terrain, interrupt
enemy lines of communication, or destroy a high payoff target. The SBCT has an
adequate amount of infantrymen and firepower to infiltrate and attack. The information-
gathering capability of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and other ISR assets provide critical
information necessary to successfully conduct an infiltration. This form of maneuver is a
viable option for the mechanized force commander to employ the SBCT due to the ability
of the SBCT’s infantry forces to infiltrate (mounted or dismounted) during hours of
limited visibility and communicate adjustments to the tactical plan through the
INFOSYS.
b. The SBCT can also conduct an air assault operation to seize key terrain. An air
assault gives a commander the ability to position forces deep when no feasible infiltration
(mounted or dismounted) routes are available and there is a need to attack a target

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quickly in severely restricted terrain. As with the infiltration, the cavalry squadron
(RSTA) and other ISR assets give the SBCT the ability to gather timely and accurate data
and information on a far objective and then establish observation posts around the
objective during execution. This allows the infantry battalions to focus on the objective
knowing that adequate early warning through the ISR assets is available.

4-22. CONDUCT FOLLOW-AND-SUPPORT

The SBCT can conduct follow-and-support missions with a mechanized or light force.
This allows the mechanized or light force the tactical freedom to bypass small pockets of
resistance and maintain the momentum of the operation with the assurance that its lines
of communication are secure. Consequently, the mechanized or light force can focus on
its subsequent objectives during an exploitation or pursuit. The cavalry squadron (RSTA)
and other ISR assets give the SBCT the unique ability to observe multiple NAIs and
routes, thus providing the SBCT and higher commander with an unprecedented degree of
fidelity of their COP regarding isolated or bypassed enemy units. The mounted speed and
firepower of the infantry battalions provide the necessary tactical flexibility to focus or
refocus combat power as the situation is clarified by the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and
other ISR assets.

4-23. MAIN EFFORT IN THE ATTACK

The SBCT can be the main effort for a mechanized force when the objective is in an
urban area or when it is in terrain that severely restricts employment of combat vehicles.
The mechanized force would serve as a supporting force to isolate the objective area and
augment the SBCT as needed. The ability of the SBCT to support itself in close
operations throughout the depth of the AO and its strong infantry force make the SBCT
the best choice to conduct an attack against an enemy defending in restrictive or urban
terrain. The SBCT can also be the main effort for a light force when the objective is
distant and the terrain favors the mobility of the Stryker platforms within the
organization. The light force may infiltrate or conduct an air assault operation to isolate
the objective area or augment the SBCT as needed.

4-24. COUNTERATTACK IN THE DEFENSE

The SBCT can be an effective force for use as a counterattack. The SBCT’s tactical
mobility and INFOSYS enable it to react quickly and decisively when called upon to
execute a counterattack in support of a defense. The SBCT is best used in such a role in
situations that maximize its strengths. The best example of where a commander might
dedicate an SBCT as a counterattack force is in restrictive terrain (urban or complex)
where the enemy situation appears fluid. Such a situation allows the SBCT to employ its
ISR assets to clarify the situation as the enemy attacks and then move the infantry
battalions rapidly through terrain that appears severely restrictive to a position of
advantage. In this manner, the SBCT is able to gain tactical surprise against the enemy
force and achieve a decisive result in favor of its higher headquarters. The SBCT can also
be effective in less restrictive terrain, but its lack of antiarmor protection and organic
mobility and countermobility assets prevents it from truly maximizing its strengths.

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4-25. CONDUCT FOLLOW-AND-ASSUME AS AN EXPLOITATION OR

PURSUIT FORCE
In certain situations the SBCT is well suited to follow and assume the mission of either a
heavy or light force. While a higher commander rarely dedicates a force to exploit or
pursue, he can direct his staff to plan such an offensive operation as a branch or sequel.
a. By placing an SBCT in the follow-and-assume role, the commander can easily
direct efforts to either a pursuit or exploitation. Additionally, based on the SBCT’s ISR
capability, the SBCT commander is better able to identify an enemy force preparing to
withdraw or regroup. Once the commander identifies those conditions, the SBCT can
rapidly move forward and either begin a pursuit (in the case of a withdrawing enemy) or
continue an exploitation (if the enemy defenses have been broken). The SBCT
commander can then move his infantry battalions out of direct contact with the enemy to
either seize key terrain or to strike an enemy force as it attempts to conduct a retrograde.
In either case, the SBCT is able to maintain constant pressure on the enemy through
mobility and enhanced fidelity of its common operational picture of the enemy and
terrain through its organic INFOSYS.
b. The SBCT is best suited to conduct these operations in more restricted areas. A
withdrawing or broken enemy can use restricted terrain to regroup and prepare its
defenses. The SBCT’s infantry battalions are well equipped to assault these positions
before they are well established. In open and rolling terrain, the SBCT may be challenged
to generate the combat power required to maintain a pursuit or exploitation if the enemy
is able to position heavy forces in well-prepared defenses. In that case, the higher
commander should augment the SBCT with additional combat power (armor,
mechanized infantry, artillery support, CAS) in order to maintain offensive pressure or
choose to establish defensive positions until he is able to get his other units forward to
continue the mission. As the SBCT continues to exert pressure on the enemy, the higher
commander can transition his other units and prepare them to continue the offense once
the SBCT has culminated.

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CHAPTER 5
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The immediate purpose of defensive actions is to resist, defeat, or
destroy an enemy attack and gain the initiative for the offense. Defensive
actions alone may not be decisive--they must be combined with or
followed by offensive action. As part of higher echelon’s defensive
operations, the SBCT may defend, delay, withdraw, or counterattack. It
may also perform security tasks. The SBCT may defend as part of the
higher headquarters’s MBA, as a separate brigade, or it may conduct
autonomous defensive operations or stability operations within an SSC.
The higher headquarters conducts operations to create the conditions for
the SBCT’s success by controlling the introduction of enemy forces into
the MBA and weakening the enemy prior to close combat.

Section I. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE

This section discusses the fundamentals of the defense in the context of the SBCT’s
particular operational style.

5-1. PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE

The main purpose of the defense is to force or deceive the enemy into attacking under
unfavorable circumstances, defeat his attack, and regain the initiative. The defending
commander seeks to dictate where the fight will occur by preparing the terrain and the
conditions to his advantage while simultaneously denying the enemy adequate
intelligence. Defense is a temporary measure used to identify or create enemy
weaknesses. Use of the defense provides the opportunity to change to the offense. In
general, the SBCT defends to--
• Defeat or destroy an attacking enemy.
• Increase the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing him to concentrate his forces.
• Gain time.
• Deny enemy entry into an area or retain terrain.
• Economize forces in one area to apply decisive force elsewhere.
• Prepare to resume the offensive.
• Develop favorable conditions for offensive actions.
• Reduce the enemy’s capability for offensive operations.

5-2. ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

The SBCT normally organizes defensive battlefields in a contiguous manner with forces
arrayed in a security area, main battle area, and rear area (Figure 5-1, page 5-2).

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Figure 5-1. Typical organization of a defensive battlefield.

a. Security Area. As the enemy attack approaches the AO, the SBCT commander
and staff monitor the situation via ISR operations and the COP to anticipate the enemy’s
arrival and the timing of other friendly events such as passages of lines and battle
handover. The commander may also make final adjustments to his defensive plan during
this time. When the higher echelon establishes a security force, the SBCT’s security
forces assist the rearward passage of lines for these forces and accept battle handover.
Security forces maintain contact with advancing enemy forces and report critical
information. The SBCT often uses security forces, fires and effects, and obstacles within
the security area to disrupt the enemy’s momentum and weaken his forces. As the enemy
advances into the SBCT’s security area, MBA forces make final preparations for the
ensuing battle.
(1) Specific Guidance and Tasks. No matter what task organization he implements,
the SBCT commander should provide the force with specific guidance and tasks. These
may include--
• Duration of the mission.
• Results to be achieved against the enemy.
• Specific CCIR with associated NAIs and TAIs.
• Avenues of approach to be monitored with PIR and last time information is of
value (LTIOV).
• CS and CSS.

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• Disengagement and withdrawal criteria and rearward passage coordinating

instructions.
• Follow-on tasks or missions.
(2) Simultaneous Missions. Using SBCT resources to establish a security area while
simultaneously requiring the SBCT to defend the MBA is risky and divides the attention
of the commander. Whenever possible, this should be avoided.
b. Main Battle Area. The battle is fought in the MBA. The SBCT uses defending
forces and reserves supported by obstacles, fires, and a viable deception plan to cause the
enemy attack to culminate within the MBA.
(1) Defending MBA forces normally identify the enemy’s main attack, reduce his
combat power, and shape his advance. Reserves are used to counterattack or contain
enemy penetrations. Depending on the purpose of the defense, success is achieved by
retention of a designated area or by the defeat and or destruction of an enemy force. In a
delay, success is achieved by controlling the enemy advance, causing him to repeatedly
deploy and maneuver, and inflicting maximum damage on his force. Friendly forces
immediately reorganize and prepare for an enemy counterattack or follow-on missions
upon conclusion of a successful defense.
(2) The SBCT and its battalions deploy the bulk of their combat power in the MBA.
The SBCT MBA extends from the FEBA to the forward battalions’ rear boundaries.
Battalion main battle areas are subdivisions of the SBCT’s MBA. The FEBA marks the
foremost limit of the areas in which the preponderance of ground combat units deploy,
excluding the areas in which security forces are operating.
(3) The SBCT commander assigns the battalion MBAs by establishing unit
boundaries. SBCT and battalion commanders establish areas of operation, battle
positions, or strong points to implement their concepts of operations. As in all operations,
commanders promote freedom of action by using the least restrictive control measures
necessary to implement their tactical concepts.
c. Rear Area. The rear area of any SBCT is where the majority of the echelon’s
sustaining operations occur. The SBCT commander designates a rear area regardless of
whether he has organized his AO into contiguous or noncontiguous subordinate AOs.
(1) When designated in the context of contiguous areas of operation, the rear area for
any particular command is the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear
of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily
for the performance of support functions (FM 3-0).
(a) The SBCT commander designates an individual responsible for conducting his
sustaining operations within the rear area after considering the factors of METT-TC. He
provides that individual with the necessary command and control resources to direct the
echelon’s sustaining operations. Doctrinally, that individual will be the brigade support
battalion commander.
(b) Regardless of the specific sustaining operations performed by an organization
occupying the rear area, its focus on other than combat operations leaves them more
vulnerable than combat organizations in close areas. Commanders may protect rear areas
with combat forces to defend CS and CSS units and facilities. Geography or other
circumstances may cause the commander to designate a noncontiguous rear area;
however, this increases the challenge associated with providing rear area security due to

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the physical separation from combat units that would otherwise occupy a contiguous
area.
(2) On the noncontiguous battlefield typical of most SSC operations, the rear area
may be difficult to define. A commander has a noncontiguous area of operations when
one or more of his subordinate forces’ areas of operation do not share a common
boundary (FM 3-0).
(a) In essence, a rear area exists wherever combat forces are not present within the
SBCT’s defensive AO. During the MBA fight, protection of rear areas is necessary to
ensure freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. The threat to the rear area is
even more important in a noncontiguous area when the SBCT may be forced to defend in
a nonlinear fashion.
(b) The commander must employ some elements of the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and
other ISR assets to ensure the viability of moving counterattack forces upon the interior
lines of his area defense. When analysis reveals the threat in the “rear area” to be
significant enough to threaten the C2 INFOSYS infrastructure, the SBCT may be forced
to constrict the defense and utilize some of its own combat forces to provide protection.

5-3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE

Much like offensive operations, the SBCT in defense differs from its more traditional
counterparts only in its operational style. The characteristics of the defense remain
largely unchanged. Due to its advantages in information, lethality, and mobility, the
SBCT can defend in linear as well as nonlinear frameworks (Figure 5-2). The ISR
capabilities within the SBCT structure enable the SBCT to locate and discern the
enemy’s decisive and shaping operations and the means by which he will conduct these
operations. Preparation, security, disruption, massing effects, decentralized operations,
and flexibility continue to characterize SBCT defensive operations.

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Figure 5-2. Linear and nonlinear operations.

a. Preparation. Against an opponent operating in a more conventional style, the

SBCT commander determines likely enemy avenues of approach, likely enemy schemes
of maneuver, where to kill the enemy, unit positioning, integration of both obstacles and
indirect fires, and he assigns missionsaccordingly.
(1) The S2, S3, and BOS representatives execute the MDMP under the XO’s
supervision for the commander’s approval. The C2 INFOSYS architecture allows the
commander to circulate on the battlefield while issuing guidance and approving products
throughout the process. C2 INFOSYS capability allows the staff to access higher
echelon’s sophisticated computer analyses of enemy COAs and friendly plans.
(2) Defensive preparations include the following:
• Enact force protection measures, which involve action against conventional
threats (preparation of fighting positions, digging in C2 INFOSYS nodes, and
so forth) as well as asymmetric threats (terrorist attacks and WMD
employment).
• Designate a reserve.
• Conduct rehearsals.
• Position forces in depth, whether the defense is in a contiguous or
noncontiguous AO (Figure 5-3, page 5-6). They may have operational
combinations of both linear and nonlinear in a contiguous and noncontiguous
AO (Figure 5-4, page 5-6).
• Reinforce terrain to favor the defender.

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Figure 5-3. Contiguous and non-contiguous areas of operation.

Figure 5-4. Operational combinations.

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b. Security. Since a force defends to conserve combat power for use elsewhere or at
a later time, commanders must secure the force. The SBCT secures the force through
integrated security operations tied to the cavalry squadron (RSTA) and ISR assets. The
SBCT ensures security by employing reconnaissance elements throughout the depth and
breadth of its assigned AO. The cavalry squadron (RSTA), sensor, and HUMINT assets
at the SBCT level conduct reconnaissance to define and confirm the threat spatially (at
extended ranges) and in terms of time and manner. Deception and information operations
confuse the enemy as to the SBCT’s manner of defense and aid in securing the force.
c. Disruption. Defenders disrupt an attacker’s tempo and synchronization by
countering his initiative and preventing him from massing overwhelming combat power.
Disruption attacks the enemy’s will to fight. Deep precision fires, scatterableminefields
(SCATMINEs), unexpected defensive positions, decentralized operations, local
counterattacks at all levels, as well as deliberate or hasty attacks delivered by a highly
mobile reserve force combine to disrupt the enemy’s attack and break his will to continue
offensive operations. Repositioning forces, aggressive local force protection measures,
random employment of roadblocks, ambushes, checkpoints, and information operations
combine to disrupt the threat of asymmetrical attack. Priority targets for deep fires
include the enemy’s indirect fire systems, breaching and bridging assets, and C2
INFOSYS. Attacks on these disrupt enemy efforts to fight as a combined arms team.
Maneuver units deceive the enemy as to the nature of their defense and employ local
combined arms counterattacks to break the tempo of his attack. The SBCT’s integrated
ISR capability produces dominant information that allows the commander to see and
prevent the enemy from fully preparing his attack.
d. Massing Effects. The SBCT shapes and decides the battle by massing the effects
of overwhelming combat power. Effects should be synchronized in time and space and be
rapid and unexpected so that they break the enemy’s offensive tempo and disrupt his
attack. The commander employs integrated ISR to shift the effects of fires and maneuver
forces so that they are repeatedly focused and refocused to achieve decisive, destructive,
and disruptive effects upon the enemy’s attack. The commander must be bold in
achieving overwhelming combat effects at the decisive point by employing dominant SU
to take acceptable risks in other areas.
e. Flexibility. The defender gains flexibility by sound preparation, disposition in
depth, retention of reserves, and effective command and control. The defense is
characterized by rapid simultaneous and collaborative planning with flexible execution.
Contingency planning permits flexibility. Flexibility also requires that the SBCT
commander "see the battlefield" to detect the enemy's scheme of maneuver early. IPB
determines likely enemy actions, and security elements verify which actions are
occurring.

Section II. TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

There are three types of defensive actions: area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde
operations. (See Section III for a discussion of retrograde operations.) Each of these types
of defensive actions contains elements of the others and usually contains both static and
dynamic aspects. Battalions serve as the primary maneuver elements or terrain-
controlling units for the SBCT in all types of defensive operations. They may defend

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AOs or positions or may serve as security forces or reserves as part of a synchronized

defense by a higher headquarters.

5-4. AREA DEFENSE

The area defense concentrates on denying an enemy force access to designated terrain for
a specific time. Outright destruction of the enemy may not be a criterion for success. The
focus is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in
mutually supporting positions, controlling the terrain between positions. The defeat
mechanism is fires into engagement areas, usually supplemented by intervention of a
reserve. The commander uses his reserve force to reinforce fires, add depth, block
penetrations, restore positions, or counterattack to destroy enemy forces and seize the
initiative. Area defenses are conducted when--
• The mission requires holding certain terrain for a specific period of time.
• There is enough time to organize the position.
• The battalion or SBCT has less mobility than the enemy.
• The terrain limits counterattacks to a few probable employment options.
• The terrain affords natural lines of resistance and limits the enemy to a few
well-defined avenues of approach, thereby restricting the enemy’s maneuver.
a. The SBCT commander selects one of two general positioning techniques for an
area defense: forward or defense in depth. However, the higher commander may define
the general defensive scheme for the SBCT. The specific mission may impose constraints
such as time, security, and retention of certain areas that are significant factors in
determining how the SBCT will defend.
(1) Forward Defense. The intent of a forward defense is to prevent enemy
penetration of the defense. Due to its lack of depth, a forward defense is the least
preferred form of maneuver. The SBCT deploys the majority of its combat power into
forward defensive positions near the FEBA (Figure 5-5). The SBCT fights to retain its
forward position and may conduct counterattacks against enemy penetrations or to
destroy enemy forces in forward engagement areas (EAs). Often, counterattacks are
planned forward of the FEBA to defeat the enemy. A forward defense is used when--
• Terrain forward in the AO favors the defense.
• Strong existing natural or man-made obstacles, such as a river or a rail line,
are located forward in the AO.
• The assigned AO lacks depth due to the location of the area or facility to be
protected.
• Cover and concealment in the rear portion of the AO is limited.
• Higher headquarters directs the SBCT to retain or initially control forward
terrain.

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Figure 5-5. Example of a forward defense.

(2) Defense in Depth. An in-depth defense is the preferred form of maneuver. It

reduces the risk of the attacking enemy force quickly penetrating the defense. The enemy
is unable to exploit a penetration because of additional defensive positions employed in
depth. The in-depth defense provides more space and time to defeat the enemy attack. It
provides the commander more time to gain information about the enemy’s intentions and
likely future actions before decisively committing to a plan of his own (Figure 5-6, page
5-10). An in-depth defense is used when--
• The mission allows the SBCT to fight throughout the depth of the AO.
• The terrain does not favor a defense well forward and there is better
defensible terrain deeper in the AO.
• Sufficient depth is available in the AO.
• Cover and concealment forward in the AO is limited.
• WMDs may be used.

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Figure 5-6. Defense in-depth.

b. Planning. The commander must consider all the factors of METT-TC in order to
determine how best to concentrate his efforts and economize forces. Detailed analysis of
terrain may be the most important process that the commander and his staff complete. A
successful defense relies on a complete understanding of terrain in order to determine
likely enemy courses of action and the optimal positioning of the SBCT’s assets to
counter them. The commander’s keys to a successful defense are--
• Capability to concentrate effects.
• Depth of the defensive area.
• Security.
• Ability to take full advantage of the terrain.
• Flexibility of defensive operations.
• Timely resumption of offensive action.
• Support.
c. Preparation. During preparation, the commander and staff monitor preparatory
actions and track the higher and adjacent unit situations and the enemy situation. They
must update and refine plans based on additional reconnaissance and updated intelligence
information. They conduct much of the preparation phase simultaneously with security
operations, continuing even as forward-deployed forces gain contact with the enemy. The
SBCT and higher headquarters’ staffs must assure that battalions defending maintain a

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highly accurate view of the enemy, the environment, and significant civilian factors.
Some sensors and their downlinks may be directly assigned for these operations.
Elements of the SBCT reconnaissance and higher echelon aviation assist the SBCT in
defending large AOs, assuming responsibility for specified enemy forces as the situation
develops. Maintaining contact with the enemy and sustaining surveillance of every part
of the SBCT’s area of interest is of special importance in a defense. The loss of
reconnaissance coverage demands immediate attention.

5-5. MOBILE DEFENSE

The mobile defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction
or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (FM 3-0). A division
or corps most frequently conducts a mobile defense, but the SBCT is also capable of
doing so.
a. Depth. A mobile defense requires considerable depth in the area of operations in
order for the commander to shape the battlefield, causing the enemy to extend his lines of
communication and support, expose his flanks, and dissipate his combat power. The
terrain must allow the commander to maneuver to attack an enemy flank or rear. Mobile
defense focuses on destroying the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance
into a position that exposes him to counterattack and envelopment. The commander holds
the majority of his available combat power in a striking force for his decisive operation, a
major counterattack. He commits the minimum possible combat power to his fixing force
that conducts shaping operations to control the depth and breadth of the enemy’s
advance. The fixing force also retains the terrain required to conduct the striking force’s
decisive counterattack.
(1) The factors of METT-TC may dictate that a unit conducts a mobile defense when
defending against an enemy force with greater combat power but less mobility. A
commander may also employ a mobile defense when defending a large area of operations
without well-defined avenues of approach such as flat, open terrain. The mobile defense
is preferred in an environment where the enemy may employ weapons of mass
destruction because this type of defense reduces the vulnerability of the force to attack
and preserves its freedom of action.
(2) FBCB2 improves the ability of the friendly force to gain and maintain a COP,
which reduces the risk associated with this type of defense.
b. Striking Force. The mobile defense concentrates on the destruction or defeat of
the enemy through a decisive counterattack. The focus is on defeating or destroying the
enemy by allowing him to advance to a point where he is exposed to a decisive
counterattack by the striking force. The striking force is a dedicated force composed of
the bulk of the combat power and weighted with the majority of the available combat
multipliers.
c. Fixing Force. A fixing force shapes the battlefield and the enemy, setting the
conditions for the striking force. (See Chapter 4 for a discussion on offensive operations.)
The SBCT most often conducts a force-oriented attack against a stationary enemy that
has been stopped by the area defense and reserve. The SBCT may conduct a force-
oriented attack against a moving enemy if the area defense cannot stop the enemy’s
advance. During these attacks, the SBCT or its battalions may act as the security, main
body, or reserve force.

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5-6. PERIMETER DEFENSE

The commander can employ the perimeter defense as an option when conducting an area
or mobile defense. A perimeter defense is a defense oriented in all directions (Figure 5-
7). The SBCT uses it for self-protection. The SBCT establishes a perimeter defense when
it must hold critical terrain in areas where the defense is not tied in with adjacent units.
The SBCT may also form a perimeter when it has been bypassed and isolated by the
enemy and must defend in place.

Figure 5-7. Perimeter defense.

a. Planning Considerations. While in a perimeter defense, the SBCT should

consider--
• Providing as much depth as the diameter of the perimeter allows through the
location of security elements and reserve.
• Planning obstacles to fix or block the enemy so he can be engaged effectively.
• Maintaining an antiarmor heavy reserve.
• Controlling surrounding areas to a range beyond that of enemy mortars and
rockets and direct fire weapons.
• Providing mutual support between defending forces to allow integration of
observation, surveillance, prearranged indirect fires, and sensors.
• Positioning of reserves to permit reaction to any threat.
• Use of natural defensive characteristic of the defense.

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b. Retention of Key Terrain. The SBCT retains terrain that is key to facilitating
future operations such as linkup, extraction, or breakout. The commander employs a
security force outside the perimeter for early warning.
c. Command and Control. If the SBCT forms the perimeter because of isolation,
then combat, CS, and CSS elements from other units come under the tactical command of
the senior combat commander in the perimeter. The commander assigns missions to these
elements based on support capabilities.
d. Combat Service Support. CSS elements may support from inside the perimeter
or from another location depending on the mission and status of the SBCT, the type of
transport available, the weather, and the terrain. All CSS assets inside the perimeter
should be in a protected location from which they can provide continuous support.
Because resupply is often by air, the position should include or be near a landing or drop
zone. The availability of landing zones (LZs) and drop zones (DZs) protected from the
enemy's observation and fire is a main consideration in selecting and organizing the
position. Since aerial resupply is vulnerable to weather and enemy fires, commanders
must emphasize supply economy and protection of available stocks.
e. Reserve. The reserve is a force that is withheld from action in order to be
committed at a decisive moment. It provides the commander with the flexibility to exploit
success or deal with a tactical setback and the flexibility to respond in situations where
there is a great deal of uncertainty about the enemy. Situational obstacles, fires, CAS, and
attack aviation will increasingly be used to augment reserve forces.
(1) The choice of a force designated to be a reserve depends upon the factors of
METT-TC.
(2) The reserve’s likely tasks are issued as planning priorities and may include one or
more of the following:
• Counterattack locally.
• Defeat enemy air assaults.
• Block enemy penetrations.
• Reinforce a decisively engaged battalion.
• Secure high-value assets.
(3) During defensive preparations, the SBCT commander may employ his reserve in
other tasks such as security operations, defense of a portion of the second line of defense
behind the perimeter elements, or rear area security. The reserve must have the mobility
to react to enemy action in any portion of the perimeter. It is positioned to block the most
dangerous avenue of approach and is assigned on-order positions on other critical
avenues. If the enemy penetrates the perimeter, the reserve blocks the enemy penetration
or counterattacks to restore the perimeter. After committing the reserve, the commander
must decide whether to designate a new reserve force based on METT-TC. The
commander must balance the need for additional reserves with the constraints that will
incur upon a subordinate commander’s requirement to conduct his mission.
(4) The commander and staff must determine where and under what conditions the
reserve force is likely to be employed in order to position it effectively and give it
appropriate planning priorities. The reserve force commander must analyze his assigned
planning priorities, conduct coordination with the SBCT and ensure coordination has
been conducted with units that will be affected by his maneuver and commitment, and

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provide information to the commander and staff on routes and employment times to
designated critical points on the battlefield.
f. Counterattack. The SBCT may conduct local counterattacks to restore or
preserve defensive integrity. Unless defensive operations have left the SBCT largely
unscathed, the SBCT may lack the ability to conduct a significant counterattack by itself.
Within the context of the higher echelon’s operations, the SBCT may execute a
counterattack to support the defensive posture, or as part of a larger force seeking to
complete the destruction of the enemy’s attack, or as part of a transition to offensive
operations.

Section III. RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

A retrograde operation is a forced or voluntary movement away from an enemy force or
to the rear. Retrograde operations are conducted to improve a tactical situation or to
prevent a worse situation from developing. SBCTs normally conduct retrogrades as part
of a larger force but may conduct independent retrogrades as required, such as when
conducting an area or point raid. In either case, the SBCT‘s higher headquarters must
approve the operation. Retrograde operations--
• Resist, exhaust, and defeat enemy forces.
• Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
• Avoid contact in undesirable conditions.
• Gain time.
• Disengage forces from battle for use elsewhere in other missions.
• Reposition forces, shorten lines of communication, or conform to movements
of other friendly units.

5-7. FORMS OF RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

The three forms of retrograde operations are delay, withdrawal, and retirement.
a. Delay. This operation trades space for time and preserves friendly combat power
while inflicting maximum damage on the enemy.
b. Withdrawal. A withdrawal is a planned, voluntary disengagement from the
enemy, which may be conducted with or without enemy pressure.
c. Retirement. A retirement is an operation in which a force that is not in contact
with the enemy moves to the rear in an organized manner.

NOTE: Maintenance of morale is essential among subordinate leaders and troops in a

retrograde operation. Movement to the rear may seem like a defeat or a threat
of isolation unless soldiers have confidence in their leaders and know the
purpose of the operation and their roles in it.

5-8. DELAY
In a delay, the SBCT trades space for time and inflicts maximum damage on the enemy.
Inflicting damage is normally secondary to gaining time. The SBCT may execute a delay
when it has insufficient combat power to attack or defend or when the higher unit’s plan
calls for drawing the enemy into an area for a counterattack. Delays gain time to--
• Allow other friendly forces to establish a defense.
• Cover a withdrawing force.

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• Protect a friendly force’s flank.

• Function as an economy of force effort to allow other forces to counterattack.
a. Two Forms of Delay. Based upon the commander’s intent and METT-TC
factors, a delay mission can have essentially two forms: delay within an area of
operations or delay forward of a specific control measure.
(1) Delay within an Area of Operations. The SBCT may be assigned a mission to
delay within an area of operations. The higher commander normally provides guidance
regarding intent and desired effect on the enemy, but he minimizes restrictions regarding
terrain, time, and coordination with adjacent forces. This form of a delay is normally
assigned when force preservation is the highest priority and there is considerable depth to
the SBCT or higher headquarters area of operations.
(2) Delay Forward. Delay forward is used to slow an enemy advance for a specific
period of time or defeat specified enemy formations within an area to support the higher
commander’s concept of operations. It often involves the decisive engagement of a part
of, or the entire, unit. Delay forward presents a high risk to the unit. The SBCT may be
assigned a mission to delay forward of a specific control measure for a specific period of
time. This mission would be assigned when the higher headquarters or SBCT must
control the enemy’s attack and retain specified terrain to achieve some purpose relative to
another element, such as setting the conditions for a counterattack, for completion of
defensive preparations, or for the movement of other forces or civilians. The focus of this
delay mission is clearly on time, terrain, and enemy destruction. It carries a much higher
risk, with the likelihood of part of the SBCT becoming decisively engaged. The timing of
the operation is controlled graphically by a series of phase lines with associated dates and
times to define the desired delay-until period.
b. Culmination of the Delay. Delay missions usually conclude in one of three
ways: a defense, a withdrawal, or a counterattack. Planning options should address all
three possibilities.
c. Delay Organization. Unless operating independently, the SBCT organizes its
forces based on the factors of METT-TC. It normally organizes into a security force,
main body, and reserve, but a wide AO may preclude the use of SBCT-controlled
security forces and reserves. In this case, the SBCT may direct its battalions to organize
their own security, main body, and reserve forces. The SBCT commander can designate a
battalion as the security or reserve force for the SBCT.
d. Delay Planning Considerations. The delay requires close coordination of forces
and a clear understanding of the scheme of maneuver and commander’s intent by
subordinates. The potential for loss of control is high in delay operations, making cross-
talk and coordination between subordinate leaders extremely important. Subordinate
initiative is critical, but it must be in the context of close coordination with others. Plans
must be flexible, with control measures throughout the AO allowing forces to be
maneuvered to address all possible enemy options.
(1) General Considerations. The commander determines the end state of the delay
based on the higher commander’s intent and specific parameters of the higher
headquarters’ delay order. The commander considers the factors of METT-TC, especially
the effects of the terrain, to identify advantageous locations from which to engage the
enemy throughout the depth of the AO. Specific delay planning considerations the
commander and staff must determine include--

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• Force array and allocation of combat multipliers, particularly fires and

obstacles.
• Where and when to accept decisive engagement.
• Acceptable level of risk for each subordinate force.
• Form of delay and control measures (companies delay in sector, control by
battle positions, or some other method).
• Integration of obstacle intent and essential fires and effects tasks (EFETs).
• Likely subsequent mission, transition point(s), and conditions.
(2) SBCT Order. The SBCT order must clearly articulate the parameters of the delay
mission. It specifically addresses subordinate missions in terms of space, time, and
friendly strength. It also provides directions for actions if the subordinate unit is unable to
meet the terms of its delay mission. Table 5-1 gives an example of the parameters of a
delay mission order issued to a subordinate battalion.

“Inf Bn 1-2 delays forward of PL BLUE (space) until 020900 FEB XX

(time) to allow Inf Bn 2-2 to prepare its defense. Do not lose more than
30% combat power (friendly strength). If unable to meet mission parameters
provide at least a 30 minute warning before initiating rearward passage of
lines and battle handover with Inf Bn 2-2 along PL BLUE. Upon
completion of RPOL, assume the SBCT reserve.”

Table 5-1. Example of the parameters of a delay.

(3) Effects of Terrain. The staff analyzes the effects of terrain and the anticipated
enemy situation to identify positions that offer the best opportunity to engage, delay, and
inflict damage on the enemy force. As the staff develops delay positions and control
measures, it calculates enemy closure rates and compares them to friendly displacement
rates between positions. Time and space factors dictate the amount of time subordinate
units have to engage the enemy and move before becoming decisively engaged; these
factors are calculated for each avenue of approach. The staff should develop triggers for
displacement to positions in depth.
(4) Enemy Vulnerabilities. The staff analyzes the terrain and expected enemy
situation to identify advantageous locations from which to engage the enemy at existing
obstacles such as chokepoints or urban or complex terrain. They also consider possible
locations to plan counterattacks. Situational and event templates must tell the commander
and staff where the enemy is likely to be at certain times. This helps them decide where
to emplace obstacles, where to mass fires, and if or where decisive engagement is likely
or required.
(5) Maneuver Considerations. The staff considers maneuver actions, fires, obstacles,
and the employment of other supporting assets necessary to degrade the enemy’s mobility
and support friendly forces’ disengagement to subsequent positions. This is especially
critical at locations and times when battalions or the entire SBCT may become decisively
engaged with the enemy. As the staff develops and refines the plan, it develops decision
points for key actions, including triggers for the employment of fires and situational or
reserve obstacles; displacement of subordinate units to subsequent positions; and

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movement of indirect fire assets, C2 INFOSYS facilities, and CSS units. The staff also
selects routes for reinforcements, artillery, CPs, and CSS elements to use and
synchronizes their movements with the delaying actions of forward units.

5-9. DELAY SCHEME OF MANEUVER

The scheme of maneuver must allow the SBCT to dictate the pace of the delay and
maintain the initiative. The commander selects positions that allow his forces to inflict
maximum damage on the enemy, support their disengagement, and enable their
withdrawal. He may choose to delay from successive or alternating delay positions,
depending on the strength of the battalions and the width of the AO.
a. Areas of Operations. Areas of responsibility are defined by establishing AOs or
battle positions (BPs) for each battalion and developing control measures to ensure
adequate control while supporting decentralized freedom of action. Deep, parallel AOs
are normally assigned to delaying battalions. AOs are assigned in the same manner as
discussed previously in Section I. Each enemy avenue of approach is assigned to only
one subordinate unit. Boundaries are used to define battalion AOs. When boundaries are
drawn, terrain that provides fields of fire and observation into an area is assigned to the
unit responsible for that AO or BP. Contact points and other control measures are
established to support flank unit coordination. The commander and staff make provisions
for coordinated action along avenues of approach that diverge and pass from one
subordinate AO to another
b. Control Measures. The SBCT’s battalions organize their maneuver in a similar
fashion. The SBCT commander may decide to add additional control measures, to
include phase lines, battle positions, engagement areas, or attack-by-fire positions that
allow the SBCT commander to direct the fight more closely and give subordinates a
clearer picture of how he envisions fighting the delay.
c. Delay Positions. When determining the scheme of maneuver, positions should
incorporate as many of the following characteristics as possible:
• Good observation and long-range fields of fire.
• Covered or concealed routes of movement to the rear.
• A road network or areas providing good cross-country trafficability.
• Existing or reinforcing obstacles to the front and flanks.
• Maximum use of highly defensible terrain.

5-10. MAXIMIZING THE USE OF TERRAIN IN A DELAY

Delay positions should be on terrain that controls likely enemy avenues of approach,
allows engagements against the enemy where his movement is most canalized, and
facilitates maximum delay with minimum forces. Long-range direct fires are highly
desirable because they force the enemy to deploy and move carefully and because they
reduce the likelihood of unintended decisive engagement of companies and platoons.
Integrating force positioning and movement with terrain, fires, and situational obstacles
helps inflict maximum damage on the enemy while allowing friendly freedom of
maneuver and disengagement. If not constrained by commander’s guidance and rules of
engagement, the cover and movement restrictions of urban areas should be extensively
exploited if they cannot be readily bypassed.

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5-11. FORCING THE ENEMY TO DEPLOY AND MANEUVER IN A DELAY

Engagement at maximum ranges of all weapons systems causes the enemy to take time-
consuming measures to deploy, develop the situation, and maneuver to drive the delaying
force from its position. An aggressive enemy commander will not deploy if he correctly
determines that friendly forces are delaying; he will use his mass and momentum to
develop sufficient pressure to cause friendly forces to fall back or become decisively
engaged. Therefore, the delay must include the deadly integration of direct and indirect
fires and situational obstacles to make the enemy doubt the nature of the friendly mission
and leave him no choice but to deploy and maneuver.

5-12. AVOIDING DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT IN A DELAY

A key to a successful delay is to maintain a mobility advantage over the attacking enemy
and avoid decisive engagement. The SBCT seeks to increase its mobility while degrading
the enemy’s ability to move. The SBCT improves its mobility by--
• Maintaining contact with the enemy, maintaining reconnaissance and security
on flanks, and coordinating with adjacent units to prevent forces from being
isolated.
• Reconnoitering routes and BPs.
• Improving routes, bridges, and fording sites between delay positions, as time
and resources permit.
• Using indirect fires and obstacles to support disengagement and to cover
movement between positions.
• Task-organizing and positioning breaching assets within subordinate
formations to breach enemy obstacles rapidly.
• Using multiple routes.
• Controlling traffic flow and restricting refugee movements to unused routes.
• Keeping logistical assets uploaded and mobile.
• Caching ammunition on rearward routes. Ensure that units know the locations
of these supply points (create a supply point icon in FBCB2). If possible, the
supply point should be guarded and prepared for destruction if not used by
delaying forces.
• Task-organizing additional medical and equipment evacuation assets to the
battalions to increase their ability to disengage and displace rapidly.
• Positioning available air defense assets to protect bridges and choke points on
rearward routes.
The SBCT degrades the mobility of the enemy by--
• Maintaining continuous pressure on the enemy throughout the area of
operation.
• Attacking logistics as well as maneuver and fire support assets.
• Occupying and controlling chokepoints and key terrain that dominate high-
speed avenues of approach.
• Destroying enemy reconnaissance and security forces, which blinds the enemy
and causes him to move more cautiously.
• Engaging at maximum ranges.
• Employing a combination of directed situational and reserve obstacles.

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• Employing indirect fires, smoke, and CAS, if available.

• Using deception techniques such as dummy positions.
• Attaching enemy engineer assets.

5-13. PARAMETERS OF THE DELAY ORDER

An order for a delay mission must specify certain parameters.
a. The order must direct one of two alternatives--delay throughout the depth of the
AO or delay forward of a specific line or area for a specific period of time.
(1) A mission of delay within an AO implies that force integrity is a prime
consideration. In this case, the battalion delays the enemy as long as possible while
avoiding decisive engagement.
(2) If the delaying force is ordered to hold the enemy forward of a given phase line
(PL) for a specified time, mission accomplishment outweighs preservation of the force’s
integrity. Such a mission may require the force to defend a given position until ordered to
displace.
b. The order must specify acceptable risk. Acceptable risk ranges from accepting
decisive engagement in an attempt to hold terrain for a given period of time to avoiding
decisive engagement in order to maintain the delaying force’s integrity. The depth
available for the delay, the time needed by the higher headquarters, and subsequent
missions for the delaying force determine the amount of acceptable risk.
c. The order must specify whether the delaying force may use the entire AO or
whether it must delay from specific BPs. A delay using the entire AO is preferable, but a
delay from specific positions may be required to coordinate two or more units in the
delay.
d. The SBCT order and commander’s intent should define for the battalions what the
scheme of maneuver is, what the priorities are, and how much freedom the subordinate
leaders have in maneuvering their forces. During delay operations, the SBCT commander
usually gives the battalions very little freedom. Unless the battalion is delaying on an
avenue of approach that is essentially isolated, he specifies constraints on maneuver and
requirements for coordination. The SBCT commander defines the criteria for
disengagement, movement to subsequent positions or areas, checkpoints, or phase lines
from which, or forward of which, the company must fight.

5-14. ALTERNATE AND SUBSEQUENT POSITIONS IN A DELAY

If during planning the commander chooses to delay using battle positions, he can use
either alternate positions or subsequent positions. In both techniques, the delaying forces
maintain contact with the enemy between delay positions. Table 5-2, page 5-20, shows
the advantages and disadvantages of the two techniques.

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METHOD OF USE WHEN. . . ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

DELAY
Delay from AO is wide. Reduced fratricide Limited depth to the
subsequent Forces available risk. delay positions.
positions. are not adequate to Ease of C2. Easier to penetrate or
be positioned in Repeated rearward isolate units.
depth. passages not Less time is available to
required. prepare each position.
Less flexibility.
Delay from AO is narrow. Allows positioning More difficult C2;
alternate Forces are in depth. requires continuous
positions. adequate to be Harder for enemy coordination.
positioned in to isolate units. Requires passage of
depth. More flexibility. lines, increasing
vulnerability and
fratricide potential.

Table 5-2. Comparison of methods of delay.

a. Delay by Alternate Positions. In a delay by alternate positions (Figure 5-8), two

or more units in a single AO occupy delaying positions in depth. As the first unit engages
the enemy, the second occupies the next position in depth and prepares to assume
responsibility for the operation. The first force disengages and passes around or through
the second force. It then moves to the next position and prepares to reengage the enemy
while the second force takes up the fight. Both the SBCT and battalion can use this
scheme of maneuver. At the SBCT level, if the AO is narrow, the SBCT employs
battalions in depth occupying alternate positions. This enables the SBCT to develop a
strong delay, with forces available to counterattack or assist in the disengagement of the
battalion in contact. At the battalion level, using alternate positions helps maintain
pressure on the enemy and helps prevent platoons or companies from being decisively
engaged. A delay from alternate positions is particularly useful on the most dangerous
avenues of approach because it offers greater security and depth than a delay from
subsequent positions. However, it also poses the highest potential for fratricide and
vulnerability as units pass through or near each other.

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Figure 5-8. Delay by alternate positions.

b. Delay by Subsequent Positions. The battalion uses a delay by subsequent

positions (Figure 5-9, page 5-22) when the assigned AO is so wide that available forces
cannot occupy more than a single tier of positions. This is the more common form of a
delay operation given the expanded AOs in which the SBCT and battalions normally
operate. In a delay from subsequent positions, the majority of forces are arrayed along the
same PL or series of BPs. The forward forces delay the enemy from one PL to the next
within their assigned AOs. At battalion level, this is the least preferred method of
delaying since there is a much higher probability of forces becoming isolated or
decisively engaged, particularly if the delay must be maintained over more than one or
two subsequent positions. Additionally, the battalion has limited ability to maintain
pressure on the enemy as it disengages and moves to subsequent positions unless the
battalion has been allocated additional (and adequate) indirect fire support.

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Figure 5-9. Delay by subsequent positions.

5-15. SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS IN A DELAY

For a delay mission to be successful, the SBCT will need to use the discrete capabilities
of its supporting units.
a. Fire Support. Key considerations for the fire support plan include the following:
• Attack the enemy throughout the AO.
• Engage the enemy with fires to inflict casualties and disrupt his approach
before he gets to friendly delaying positions. Plan final protective fires (FPFs)
for each series of delaying positions to support disengagement.
• Mass fires on high-payoff targets and canalizing terrain to limit the
momentum of the enemy’s attack.
• Ensure fires are tied to obstacles.
• Plan and designate priority targets along routes from one delaying position to
the next.
• Mass all available fire support (and effects) to support disengagements.
• Use smoke to screen friendly movements and for deception.
b. Engineer Support. Key considerations for the scheme of engineer operations
include the following:
• When operating in a wide AO, task-organize countermobility assets to the
companies, decentralizing control and execution.
• Task-organize mobility assets to companies to support mobility requirements.
Consider logistical requirements and support of CSS assets in task-organizing
mobility assets.
• Develop the obstacle plan to support disengagement of delaying forces and to
shape the enemy’s maneuver to meet the commander’s intent.
• Consider countermobility requirements for all delaying positions throughout
the depth of the AO.

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• Integrate SCATMINEs at delay positions to support disengagement and

movement to subsequent positions.
• Consider the impact of the obstacle effort on the movement of friendly forces
and future operations.
• Develop obstacle restrictions, establish lanes and guides, and employ
obstacles to support mobility requirements.
• Provide for closing lanes behind friendly forces with scatterable or hand-
emplaced mines.
• Develop clear criteria for execution of reserve and situational obstacles and
Integrate decisions for their execution in the decision support template.
• Construct survivability positions in depth, as required, to support
repositioning forces.
c. Air Defense. Key considerations for the available air defense plan include--
• Synchronize the movement and positioning of air defense artillery assets with
the delaying forces.
• Plan for adequate air defense coverage of friendly forces during movements
from one delaying position to another.
• Consider protection along movement routes, chokepoints, and bridges that
friendly forces intend to use.
d. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Support. SBCT planning defines NBC
operations in the delay. Battalions may coordinate for reconnaissance assets if available
in the SBCT. Decontamination operations in the delay focus on individual and crew
operational decontamination procedures until the conclusion of the operation, when
thorough decontamination can be accomplished. If smoke generators are available, the
battalion may employ them for deception, obscuring movement and positions, or
obscuring portions of the battlefield to reduce enemy visibility and ease of movement.
e. Combat Service Support. CSS for a delay is particularly complex.
Communication within the CSS system, accurately tracking the battle, and anticipating
support requirements are especially important. Key planning considerations include--
• Keep the CSS assets mobile and supplies uploaded.
• Request heavy equipment transports (HETs) to support rapid evacuation of
damaged equipment.
• Emphasize maintenance support forward with short evacuation times; use all
available assets (to include firepower-damaged vehicles) to evacuate damaged
vehicles to the rear.
• Synchronize refueling and resupply operations with the scheme of maneuver
and the anticipated enemy situation to ensure continuity of support.
• Increase emergency Class III and V supplies positioned forward.
• Do not coordinate for throughput too far forward; doing so might cause assets
to be caught in the fight or add to route congestion. Depending on the
situation, this may not apply during the initial preparations for the delay.
• Plan routes for CSS assets that do not conflict with maneuver elements.

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f. Health Service Support. Providing HSS for the delay may also be difficult since
enemy actions and the maneuver of combat forces complicate forward area acquisition of
patients. Planning considerations for HSS should include--
• Positioning a Stryker medical evacuation vehicle (MEV) with each of the
companies and requesting medical evacuation augmentation support from the
brigade support medical company (BSMC).
• Integrating the evacuation routes with the obstacle plan.
• Marking CCPs and evacuation routes for day and night operations.
• Positioning treatment elements forward but to the rear of the maneuvering
forces.
• Identifying alternate treatment, casualty collection point (CCP), and
ambulance exchange point (AXP) sites with triggers to reposition.
• Planning for the use of both standard and nonstandard evacuation platforms.
• Rehearsing casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures using nonstandard
platforms and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) procedures with standard
platforms.
• Observing time and the means available to remove patients from the
battlefield. In either a stable situation or in the advance, time is important only
as it affects the physical well-being of the wounded. In a delay, time is
important. As available time decreases, the use of nonstandard evacuation
platforms will increase, and companies must be prepared to withdraw, moving
their casualties with them.
• Integrating the effective use of air assets into the MEDEVAC plan is essential.

5-16. DELAY PREPARATIONS

Defensive planning considerations discussed in Section II also apply as the SBCT
prepares to conduct the delay.
a. Inspections. The commander inspects planning and preparations of his
subordinate units to ensure--
• Maneuver, fire, and obstacle plans are consistent with his intent.
• Flank coordination between delaying battalions is conducted to maintain
cohesion and mutual support during the delay.
• Defensive preparations are proceeding according to established timelines.
• All leaders have a clear understanding of the scheme of maneuver and the
commander’s intent.
b. Rehearsals. When conducting a rehearsal for a delay, key leaders practice the
operation against all feasible enemy COAs to promote flexibility of decision-making,
plans, and execution. The SBCT commander examines each subordinate unit
commander’s plan as he fights the delay during the rehearsal and pays close attention to
the following:
• Direct and indirect fire instructions.
• Timing of movements and delaying actions from one position to the next with
special attention paid to the disengagement criteria.
• Means and methods of disengaging from the enemy and maintaining contact
with the enemy as the force moves to subsequent positions.

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• Execution of situational and reserve obstacles to include closure of lanes.

• Movement times, routes, and positioning of CS and CSS assets.
The SBCT commander also rehearses plans to deal with potential reverses, enemy
penetrations, and unanticipated decisive engagement. The rehearsal serves to further
synchronize the movement of combat forces, CS, and CSS units. It is especially
important to portray movement times and required routes realistically during the
rehearsal to identify potential conflicts.

5-17. EXECUTION OF A DELAY

The SBCT moves key forces and support to prepare for the delay. This initial movement
includes movement into the security area and MBA.
a. Security Area Actions. The SBCT deploys security forces forward of the initial
delay positions to give early warning and reaction time of the enemy’s approach. The
security force normally detects and destroys enemy reconnaissance and security elements
without risking decisive engagement. The security force relies heavily on indirect fires
and CAS to engage enemy forces, screen movements, and support disengagement.
Forward battalions are normally responsible for conducting the forward security mission.
As the enemy approaches, security forces detect the attack and report enemy maneuver
and locations. Enemy information is entered into the COP, which enhances the capability
of the entire force. The commander uses this information, combined with other available
intelligence about the enemy, to determine the enemy’s composition, strength, and
direction and rate of attack.
b. Main Battle Area Engagement. The SBCT forces the enemy to deploy and
attack by its use of fires and obstacles, massing effects quickly for a short period to inflict
the maximum damage on the enemy at the maximum range. To avoid decisive
engagement, the SBCT must disengage before the enemy can breach obstacles or mass
effective fire on the delay position. Observers positioned to the flanks in depth continue
to observe and shift indirect fires as forces delay to subsequent positions. Companies may
move by bounds within the SBCT or battalion to maintain direct fires on the enemy and
cover movement. Short, intense engagements at near maximum range with sustained
indirect fires and covering obscurants are the key to successful delay operations.
c. Controlling the Delay. The SBCT commander must closely control the
disposition, displacement, and maneuver of his forces in order to maintain the cohesion
of the delay operation and keep the entire SBCT synchronized with the remainder of the
higher headquarters. FBCB2 represents a major advantage in force tracking. Given the
potential for loss of positive control, it is critical that the SBCT commander clearly
establish parameters for displacement.
(1) As it executes the delay, the SBCT and battalion commanders must continually
assess their situation and requirements to displace with the following considerations:
• What are the size, activity, and location of attacking enemy forces? Are
elements of the SBCT threatened with decisive engagement or bypass?
• What is the status of adjacent units?
• Are supporting assets, particularly artillery and mortars, postured to support
movement? If not, how long will it take them to be ready?
• Are the obstacles supporting the present position still intact and effective?
• Are direct and indirect fires effective?

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• How strong is this position in relation to other positions the force might
occupy?
• What is the ammunition status?
• Are displacement routes clear?
(2) The SBCT must always make decisions about displacement and timing in the
context of the higher echelon commander’s intent and priority for the delay (for example,
is time more important than force preservation, or vice versa). In many instances, the
SBCT or elements of it must accept decisive engagement to execute the mission and then
break contact as the situation permits or in conjunction with another force's counterattack.
d. Counterattacks. The SBCT can rarely execute a substantial counterattack during
a delay by itself unless it is part of the higher headquarters scheme of maneuver.
Generally, counterattacks executed by the SBCT in its own scheme of maneuver are
company- to possibly battalion-size counterattacks designed to support disengagement of
forces or to destroy penetrations. Whenever possible, the SBCT executes counterattacks
to counter penetrations, to gain a temporary degree of initiative or freedom of action, and
to avoid a predictable pattern of operation.
e. Decisive Engagement. The SBCT and battalions avoid becoming decisively
engaged except when necessary to prevent the enemy from reaching a specified area too
early or when a part of the force must be risked to protect the entire force. If elements of
the SBCT are threatened with decisive engagement or have become decisively engaged,
the SBCT commander may take actions to support their disengagement. In order of
priority, he may do any of the following:
• Allocate priority of all supporting fires to the threatened unit. This is the most
rapid and responsive means of increasing the unit’s combat power.
• Employ CAS or attack helicopters to suppress the enemy and restore freedom
of maneuver to the SBCT.
• Reinforce the unit. In a delay mission, particularly over a wide AO, the SBCT
may not be able to do this quickly enough with ground maneuver forces.
• Conduct a counterattack to disengage the unit.
Once forces have become decisively engaged, they must not break contact without
adequate measures by the SBCT to prevent the enemy from rapidly pursuing and
destroying the force piecemeal.
f. Terminate the Delay. A delay mission ends with another planned mission such
as a defense, withdrawal, or attack. Ideally, an SBCT that has been delaying conducts a
rearward passage of lines through the established defense of another friendly force.
Digitized C2 INFOSYS make this difficult operation far less dangerous than it is with
analog means. The battalion executes its actions in the context of the SBCT’s actions. If
it defeats the enemy attack during the delay, the SBCT may--
• Maintain contact while another force counterattacks.
• Withdraw to perform another mission.
• Transition to the offense.
In all cases, the commander must plan for the expected outcome of the delay based on the
situation and the higher commander’s plan.

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5-18. WITHDRAWAL
Withdrawal is a planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy
force. Withdrawals may or may not be conducted under enemy pressure. The two types
of withdrawals are assisted and unassisted.
a. Assisted. The assisting force occupies positions to the rear of the withdrawing
unit and prepares to accept control of the situation. It can also assist the withdrawing unit
with route reconnaissance, route maintenance, fire support, and CSS. Both forces closely
coordinate the withdrawal. After coordination, the withdrawing unit delays to a battle
handover line, conducts a passage of lines, and moves to its final destination.
b. Unassisted. The withdrawing unit establishes routes and develops plans for the
withdrawal, then establishes a security force as the rear guard while the main body
withdraws. CSS and CS elements normally withdraw first, followed by combat forces. To
deceive the enemy as to the friendly movement, the SBCT or battalion may establish a
detachment left in contact if withdrawing under enemy pressure. As the unit withdraws,
the detachment left in contact disengages from the enemy and follows the main body to
its final destination.

5-19. WITHDRAWAL ORGANIZATION

As with the delay, the SBCT normally organizes into a security force, main body, and
reserve. It may elect to use a single battalion or elements of a battalion as the security or
reserve force. It may also organize a detachment left in contact or stay-behind forces if
required by the enemy situation. If operating independently, the SBCT organizes itself in
the same manner. FBCB2 is a major asset in withdrawals, and the SBCT should plan for
its continuous operations before withdrawals.
a. Security Force. The security force maintains contact with the enemy until
ordered to disengage or until another force takes over the task. It simulates the continued
presence of the main body, which requires additional allocation of combat multipliers
beyond that normally allocated to a force of its size. When withdrawing under enemy
pressure, the security force establishes or operates as a detachment left in contact to
provide a way to break contact from the enemy sequentially. When conducting the
withdrawal without enemy pressure, the security force acts as a rear guard because the
most probable threat is a pursuing enemy.
b. Detachment Left In Contact. The detachment left in contact (DLIC) is an
element that is left in contact as part of the previously designated (usually rear) security
force while the main body conducts its withdrawal. Its purpose is to remain behind to
deceive the enemy into believing the SBCT or battalion is still in position while the
majority of the unit withdraws. The detachment left in contact should be one of the
strongest of the subordinate units with the most capable leadership. It will be the unit
under the greatest pressure, and the success of the withdrawal often depends on its
effectiveness. The commander must establish specific instructions about what to do if the
enemy attacks and when and under what circumstances to delay or withdraw. The SBCT
organizes a detachment left in contact in one of three ways (Figure 5-10, page 5-28).

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Figure 5-10. Detachment left in contact.

(1) Single Battalion. A single battalion operates as the detachment left in contact.
This is the most effective option since it provides for effective task organization and C2.
(2) DLIC Element Formed from Each Battalion. Each battalion provides forces for
the detachment-left-in-contact mission. The resulting DLIC element then operates under
the SBCT’s control. This is the least desirable option since it complicates C2 and task
organization and requires significant changes to the communications architecture. The
SBCT most commonly uses this option when the subordinate battalions have lost
significant portions of their command and control capabilities.
(3) Battalion Control of Separate DLICs. Each battalion establishes and controls its
individual DLIC. The SBCT uses this option when it is operating over a wider area or
one with multiple corridors in the withdrawal AO. It allows for effective dispersion of
forces while maintaining standard C2 relationships.

5-20. WITHDRAWAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Because the force is most vulnerable if the enemy attacks, the commander and staff
normally plan for a withdrawal under enemy pressure. It also develops contingency plans
for a withdrawal without enemy pressure.
a. Planning Considerations. During planning, the commander and staff specifically
consider the following:
• Disengagement criteria (time, friendly situation, enemy situation).
• Plan for a deliberate break in contact from the enemy.
• Plan for deception to conceal the withdrawal for as long as possible.
• Rapid displacement of the main body, safeguarded from enemy interference.
• Selection and protection of withdrawal routes and alternates.
• Siting of obstacles behind the DLIC to complicate pursuit.
b. Commander's Intent. The commander develops his vision of the battle based on
withdrawing under enemy pressure. He must determine the composition and strength of
the security force, main body, and reserve. The commander must clearly define how he
intends to deceive the enemy as to the execution of the withdrawal; how he intends to

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disengage from the enemy (use of maneuver, fires, and obstacles); and the final end state
of the operation in terms of time, location, and disposition of forces.

5-21. WITHDRAWAL SCHEME OF MANEUVER

A withdrawal may be assisted or unassisted and may take place with or without enemy
pressure (Figure 5-11, page 5-30). The plan considers which of the variations the SBCT
faces based on the higher headquarters’ order and the enemy situation.
a. Assisted Withdrawal. In an assisted withdrawal, the staff coordinates the
following with the assisting force:
• Actions of the assisting security force that the battalion will pass through or
around.
• Reconnaissance of withdrawal routes.
• Forces to secure choke points or key terrain along the withdrawal routes.
• Elements to assist in movement control, such as traffic control points.
• Required combat, CS, and CSS to assist the withdrawing battalion in
disengaging from the enemy.
b. Unassisted Withdrawal. In an unassisted withdrawal, the SBCT establishes its
own security and disengages itself from the enemy. It reconnoiters and secures routes that
it uses in its rearward movement while sustaining itself during the withdrawal.
c. Withdrawal under Enemy Pressure. In a withdrawal under enemy pressure, all
units other than the rear guard or DLIC withdraw simultaneously when available routes
allow. The following factors influence the decision to withdraw simultaneously:
• Subsequent missions.
• Availability of transportation assets and routes.
• Disposition of friendly and enemy forces.
• Level and nature of enemy pressure.
• Degree of urgency associated with the withdrawal.
(1) Transition. The element that will be the DLIC or rear guard must transition to
cover the SBCT’s AO. Simultaneously, the SBCT must prepare its CSS assets and the
remainder of the force to begin a rapid withdrawal to the rear. The SBCT should seek to
move on two routes to gain speed and shorten formations. Using more than two routes
exceeds the ability of the SBCT to maintain security. Often, only a single route will be
available.
(2) Breaking Contact. The SBCT commander has essentially two options for
breaking contact: break contact using deception and stealth or break contact quickly and
violently under the cover of supporting fires reinforced by obstacles to delay pursuit. He
bases his choice on the factors of METT-TC.
d. Withdrawal without Enemy Pressure. When conducting a withdrawal without
enemy pressure, the commander can focus the plan on the best method to displace forces
rapidly. He has the option of taking calculated risks that increase his force’s displacement
capabilities. He may order the main body to conduct a tactical road march instead of
moving in tactical formations, or he may move on as many routes as are available with
reduced security in order to gain speed.

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Figure 5-11. Types of withdrawals.

5-22. WITHDRAWAL PREPARATION

The commander prepares the SBCT for the withdrawal through inspections and
rehearsals in the same fashion as discussed with other defensive operations. Inspections
for this mission focus on subordinate unit preparations to ensure a clear understanding of
the scheme of maneuver and his intent. During an assisted withdrawal, the SBCT
commander ensures adequate coordination for battle handover and passage of lines. The
focus of the rehearsal for the withdrawal is actions to maintain security, disengagement
from the enemy, and the movement of forces. When possible, key leaders or liaisons
from the assisting force should attend the rehearsal. The commander ensures control
measures, to include fire support coordination measures, fully support the withdrawal.
Leaders rehearse the plan against the full range of possible enemy actions. They rehearse
contingencies for reverting to a delay, commitment of the reserve, and enemy interdiction
of movement routes.

5-23. WITHDRAWAL EXECUTION

Execution of the SBCT withdrawal essentially follows this pattern:
• Task-organizing and positioning security and deception forces.
• Reconnaissance of withdrawal routes and subsequent positions.
• Preparation of obstacles to support the DLIC and withdrawal.
• Preparing wounded soldiers and damaged equipment and nonessential
supplies for movement.
• Moving nonessential CS and CSS units to the rear.
• Positioning MPs and other assets for traffic control.
• Initiating movement, leading with forward security forces.
• Breaking of DLIC's contact and movement as a rear guard.

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5-24. CONCEALING THE WITHDRAWAL

The first priority is to conceal the withdrawal from the enemy. As the SBCT initiates the
initial movement of forces, measures must be taken to maintain OPSEC. The following
actions assist in maintaining OPSEC:
• Use military deception, to include feints and demonstration, to cause the
enemy to believe the SBCT intends to attack or defend.
• Maintain communication and information security.
• Avoid establishing patterns of movement that may indicate friendly intentions.
• Establish security focused on destroying enemy reconnaissance forces.
• Use multiple withdrawal routes.
• Move during limited visibility and along covered and concealed routes.

5-25. DISENGAGEMENT IN A WITHDRAWAL

The security force remains in position and maintains a deception while the main body
moves as rapidly as possible rearward to intermediate or final positions. After the main
body withdraws a safe distance, the SBCT commander orders the security force to begin
its rearward movement. Once the security force begins moving, it assumes the duties of a
rear guard. The security element must balance security and deception with speed as it
disengages. It maintains tactical movement and security techniques until it is clear that
the enemy is not pursuing and contact has been broken; it then withdraws as rapidly as
possible. The main body moves rapidly on multiple routes to designated positions. It may
occupy a series of intermediate positions before completing the withdrawal. Usually CS
and CSS units, along with their convoy escorts, move first and precede combat units in
the movement formation. The staff enforces the disciplined use of routes during the
withdrawal. Despite confusion and enemy pressure, subordinate units must follow
specified routes and movement times.

5-26. ACTIONS ON CONTACT IN A WITHDRAWAL

Security forces counter any enemy attempts to disrupt the withdrawal or pursue the
SBCT. If the security force and the reserve cannot prevent the enemy from closing on the
main body, the SBCT commander commits some or all of the main body to prevent the
enemy from interfering further with the withdrawal. The main body delays, attacks, or
defends as required by the situation. In this event, the withdrawal resumes at the earliest
possible time. If the enemy blocks movement to the rear, friendly forces shift to alternate
routes and bypass the interdicted area. Alternatively, they may attack through the enemy.

5-27. TERMINATING THE WITHDRAWAL

Once the SBCT successfully disengages from the enemy, it normally has the following
options:
• Rejoin the overall defense.
• Transition into a retirement.
• Continue moving away from the enemy and towards its next mission area.
The higher headquarters defines the next mission. Follow-on missions are normally
planned as the withdrawal is being planned or executed.

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5-28. RETIREMENT
A retirement is a retrograde operation in which a force that is not in contact with the
enemy moves to the rear in an organized manner. The battalion conducts a retirement as
part of the SBCT to reposition for future operations.
a. Organization. The commander and staff develop a movement plan based on the
terrain and enemy situation. They develop the movement formation and order of
movement to balance the need for security and speed. Security forces are established to
protect the main body from surprise, harassment, or attack by any pursuing enemy forces.
Each march column normally maintains an advance guard, rear guard, and flank security
(Figure 5-12). The main body may organize into an approach march or tactical road
march if speed is most important and the need for security is low.

DRAFT Figure 5-12. Retirement operations.

b. Planning Considerations. The commander and staff develop a movement plan

based on the terrain, friendly situation, commander’s guidance, and enemy situation.
They develop the movement formation and order of movement to balance the need for
security and speed. Security forces protect the main body from surprise, harassment, or
attack by any pursuing enemy forces. Each march column normally maintains an advance
guard, rear guard, and flank security, depending on the situation with adjacent friendly
forces and the likelihood of enemy interference. The main body may organize into an
approach march or tactical road march if speed is most important and the need for
security is low.

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c. Preparation. During preparations, the SBCT and subordinate units conduct

rehearsals and prepare for the movement. OPSEC and security operations are maintained.
Advance priorities and quartering parties are dispatched as required.
d. Execution. During a retirement, the SBCT and its subordinate units normally
move to assembly areas to prepare for future operations. Battalions move in accordance
with established movement times and routes. Strict adherence to the movement plan is
essential to avoid congestion. The staff closely supervises the execution of the movement
plan. CSS and CS units usually move to the rear first.

Section IV. DEFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

This section contains planning considerations applicable for defensive operations.
Sections II and III contain additional considerations specific for area defense and
retrograde operations.

5-29. DEFENSIVE PLANNING STEPS

Planning a defensive operation is a complex effort requiring detailed planning and
extensive coordination.
a. Commander’s Vision. The first step is the expression of the SBCT commander’s
visualization of anticipated enemy actions integrated with the staff’s IPB. The IPB should
not differ significantly between the SBCT commander and his higher headquarters, but it
should provide the SBCT commander and staff with a clear understanding of how the
higher headquarters commander envisions the enemy will fight and his plan for the
operation. From that, the SBCT commander and staff refine the IPB to focus on the
details of the operation in the SBCT AO. The higher commander normally defines where
and how the SBCT will defeat or destroy the enemy. The SBCT commander defines how
he envisions the SBCT will execute its portion of the higher echelon fight.
b. How and Where to Defeat the Enemy. The SBCT commander and staff base
their determination of how and where to defeat the enemy on where they believe the
enemy will go, the terrain, and the forces available. The SBCT commander may define a
defeat mechanism that includes use of single or multiple counterattacks to achieve
success. The subordinate commander and staff analyze their unit’s role in the SBCT fight
and determine how to achieve success. In an area defense, the SBCT usually achieves
success by massing the cumulative effects of obstacles and fires to defeat the enemy
forward of a designated area, often in conjunction with a higher echelon counterattack. In
a delay operation, success is achieved by combining maneuver, fires, obstacles, and the
avoidance of decisive engagement until conditions are right to achieve the desired effect
of gaining time or shaping the battlefield for a higher echelon counterattack.
c. Forces and Assets Available. The commander and staff analyze the forces and
assets available, paying particular attention to the obstacle assets and fire support
allocated by the SBCT. The staff must define the engineer and fire support allocation in
terms of capability. For example, they should define engineer capability in terms of the
number of obstacles of a specific effect engineers can emplace in the time available. Fire
support analysis should include the number of targets that can be engaged with an
expected result at what point in the battle.
d. Effects. With a definitive understanding of the assets available, the SBCT
commander and staff determine what effects forces, fires, and obstacles must achieve on

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enemy formations by avenue of approach and how these effects will support the SBCT’s
defeat mechanism. They define the task(s) and purpose for subordinate units and
establish priorities for CS and CSS. They develop obstacle and fire support plans
concurrently with the defensive force array, again defining a task and purpose for each
obstacle and target in keeping with the commander’s stated essential fires and effects
tasks and intended obstacle effects. The desired end state is a plan which defines how the
commander intends to mass the effects of direct and indirect fires with obstacles and use
of terrain to shape the battlefield and defeat or destroy the enemy.

5-30. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

As with all tactical planning, IPB is a critical part of defensive planning. It helps the
commander to define where to concentrate combat power, where to accept risk, and
where to plan potential decisive actions. The staff integrates intelligence from the higher
echelon’s collection efforts and from units operating forward of the SBCT. This includes
intelligence from spot reports (SPOTREPs), tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs),
JSTARS, and other higher-level collection assets. Early warning of enemy air attacks, air
mobile insertions, and infiltration also are vitally important to provide adequate reaction
time to counter these threats as far forward as possible. To aid in the development of a
flexible defensive plan, the IPB must present all feasible enemy courses of action. The
essential areas of focus are--
• Terrain analysis.
• Determination of enemy force size and likely COAs with associated decision
points.
• Determination of enemy vulnerabilities.
a. Terrain Analysis. The staff determines ground and air mobility corridors and
avenues of approach to determine where the enemy can maneuver to reach his likely
objectives and to identify limitations on friendly maneuver and positioning. Identification
of terrain such as chokepoints that create potential enemy vulnerabilities and
opportunities for friendly attack is critical. The SBCT engineer can provide terrain
analysis products utilizing the DTSS, which can help in identifying critical terrain and in
positioning weapons systems and intelligence assets. Once they receive their area of
operation for reconnaissance or preparation, subordinate units can conduct their own
terrain analysis using physical reconnaissance and the line-of-sight analysis function in
FBCB2. The terrain analysis must achieve a level of fidelity that allows for effective
positioning of direct fire weapons systems and observers. It must identify intervisibility
lines, fields of fire, and dead spaces and integrate the effects of weather. The higher
headquarters staff can assist the SBCT staff by supplying weather impact on
trafficability, visibility, and systems operations through data generated by the integrated
meteorological system (IMETS) at higher echelons. The result of the terrain analysis
should be modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and identification of defensible
areas. The SBCT staff should transmit results of the analysis digitally to subordinate
units. When it has analyzed the SBCT’s assigned AO, the staff should expand its analysis
to adjacent AOs and areas forward and to the rear of the SBCT.
b. Determine Enemy Force Size, Likely COAs, and Decision Points. The staff
determines the size of enemy force that each avenue of approach and mobility corridor
can support. The expected size of the enemy force drives determination of friendly force

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allocation, fires, and obstacle efforts. It also assists the commander and staff in
understanding how the enemy will utilize his forces and the terrain. The enemy COAs
developed must be feasible and reflect the enemy’s flexibility and true potential. All
COAs should define the following:
• Likely enemy objectives.
• Enemy composition, disposition, and strength.
• Schemes of maneuver, to include routes, formations, locations and times the
enemy may change formations, possible maneuver options available to the
enemy, and key decision points.
• Time and distance factors for the enemy’s maneuver through the area of
operation.
• Likely employment of all enemy combat multipliers including artillery, air
defense, obstacles, chemical strikes, dynamic obstacles, and attack aircraft.
• Likely use of all enemy reconnaissance assets and organizations to include
likely reconnaissance objectives, reconnaissance avenues of approach, times
to expect enemy reconnaissance, and likely locations of enemy observers and
observation posts.
• Identification and likely locations of enemy HVTs, such as artillery
formations, reserves, and C2 INFOSYS nodes.
• Likely locations, compositions, strength, employment options, and time and
distance factors for enemy reserves and follow-on forces.
• Locations of enemy decision points that determine selection of a specific
course.
• Likely breach sites, strike areas, and points of penetration.
The staff should graphically portray the results of this IPB step on a situation template
with a COA statement and appropriate notes. The S2 and staff use this to develop the
initial ISR plan that initiates reconnaissance and security operations. As planning
progresses, they must update the plan to include fire support operations, resulting in a
complete ISR plan. The staff should distribute all products digitally to the entire staff and
subordinate units to support parallel planning.
c. Determine Enemy Vulnerabilities. The staff identifies potential enemy
vulnerabilities based on the enemy’s tactics, friendly and enemy capabilities, the terrain,
and the weather. To engage the enemy where the terrain puts him at a disadvantage, the
staff identifies--
• Restrictive terrain that may slow the enemy’s attack, cause a separation of
forces, create difficulties in command and control, or force the enemy to
conduct defile drills (for example, narrow valleys, passes, or urban areas).
• Chokepoints or natural obstacles that may cause a loss of momentum, a
potential fragmenting of forces, or a vulnerable concentration of forces (for
example, rivers and canals).
• Terrain that canalizes enemy formations into areas that provide defending
forces good fields of fire, observation, and flanking fires.
• Areas dominated by key or defensible terrain that allows massing of fires.
To be successful at providing IPB products to support the commander and subordinate
units, the entire staff must participate as a whole. They must be knowledgeable in
friendly and enemy capabilities and terrain analysis and be able to execute the process

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rapidly. The results must be detailed, legible, and disseminated quickly to support
planning at all echelons.

5-31. COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

The following paragraph focuses on specifics of COA development for defensive
operations. (FM 101-5 discusses the planning processes in detail.)

NOTE: This process is often abbreviated depending on the situation and the
commander. Frequently, the commander may develop the course of action
himself and have the staff focus on war gaming and synchronization.

a. Analyze Relative Combat Power. The commander and staff analyze friendly
and enemy combat power to gain insight on capabilities, limitations, and weaknesses
associated with both forces. They consider the elements of combat power (maneuver,
firepower, protection, leadership, and information) along with the effects of combat
multipliers (smoke, chemical, IEW, and logistical capabilities). In the defense, they pay
particular attention to the potential created by the terrain and the SBCT’s countermobility
and survivability capabilities and to the enemy’s actual ability to employ forces in each
defended area. They analyze each avenue of approach. This analysis, coupled with higher
commander’s intent and analysis of the terrain, often determines whether the SBCT
defends forward in the AO or integrates delay actions into the defensive scheme in order
to shape the battlefield and maintain adequate force ratios.
b. Generate Options. Defensive COAs must account for all possible enemy actions
and must provide for the full extent of the SBCT fight. Since the defender cedes the
initiative at first and generally fights at a numerical disadvantage, full utilization of
available combat power can be a major concern. The following guidelines can help
generate defensive options.
(1) Ensure the entire staff understands the mission and the results of the mission
analysis process.
(2) Determine the desired end state of the mission in terms of the higher and SBCT
commander’s intent, concept of the operation, and the factors of METT-TC. The end
state may focus on retention of terrain or defeat of an enemy force, depending on the
purpose of the defense.
(3) Study the terrain and feasible enemy COAs to determine where and how to defeat
the enemy attack. This should result in--
• Determination of the MBA, security area, and rear area.
• Determination of the defeat mechanism (main effort), including task(s) and
purpose.
• Identification of the enemy’s probable decisive and shaping operations
required to create conditions for his successful attack. This includes fires and
obstacles and must include the task(s) and purpose(s).
• Determination of key terrain the SBCT must retain or control.
• Determination of where to engage enemy formations.
• Determination of areas of risk.

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c. Array Initial Forces. The commander and staff array forces within the MBA,
security area, and rear area, starting with the main effort followed by each supporting
effort. Some guidelines for this process include the following:
• Based on the probable size enemy force on each avenue of approach, identify
the required combat forces, the EFETs, and the obstacle effects required for
each effort (main or supporting) to accomplish its task.
• Allocate the number and type forces required by each effort to accomplish its
task and purpose. Allocate only the minimum combat power to ensure that the
decisive operation has overwhelming combat power.
• Balance the required combat forces, EFETs, and obstacle effects with
available capabilities based on the commander’s guidance and the most likely
enemy COA.
• Array battalion-size maneuver units, usually against brigade-size avenues of
approach. Consider allocation of maneuver companies.
• Array CS and CSS assets based on requirements, not sizes of units.
• Allocate the types of forces to each effort that make best use of the forces'
capabilities and available weapons systems.
• Weight the decisive operation with sufficient combat power to ensure it can
achieve its task and purpose.
• Allocate minimum combat power required for supporting efforts to achieve
their assigned tasks.
• Array and allocate reconnaissance and security forces.

NOTE: The SBCT can overcome shortfalls in combat power by modifying the COA,
changing task organization, increasing the use of combat multipliers, or using
economy of force elsewhere.

d. Develop the Scheme of Maneuver. The commander and staff develop the
scheme of maneuver by refining the initial array of forces to coordinate the operation and
showing the relationship of friendly forces to each other, the enemy, and the terrain. They
develop and refine other supporting plans, such as fire support and engineer support,
simultaneously. It is critical that the plan developed is sufficiently flexible to succeed
against all feasible enemy COAs and is capable of defeating major enemy efforts along
unlikely avenues of approach or against supporting efforts. The scheme of maneuver also
must address how to exploit defensive success. A fully developed defensive scheme--
• Identifies where and when the commander will accept risk.
• Identifies critical events and, if required, phases of the operation.
• Designates the main effort with associated task(s) and purpose(s), by phase.
• Designates supporting efforts with associated task(s) and purpose(s), defining
how they support the main effort.
• Designates the reserve and its planning priorities.
• Defines reconnaissance and security operations.
• Provides for withdrawal of the security force.
• Outlines the movement and positioning of forces.
• Describes the concept of fires.

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• Integrates obstacle effects with maneuver and fires.

• Establishes the priority of support for CS and CSS units.
• Identifies the maneuver options that may develop during execution.
• Identifies means and mechanisms for exploiting defensive success.
e. Assign Headquarters. With the scheme of maneuver developed, the commander
and staff determine the task organization and C2 INFOSYS arrangement of subordinate
headquarters. The task organization must account for the entire battlefield framework and
include arrangements for special operations such as passage of lines. The assignment of
headquarters must pay particular attention to the impact on the tactical internet and the
requirements to move unit affiliations within the communications architecture.
f. Prepare COA Statements and Sketches. The staff develops a COA sketch and
explanatory statement for each completed COA. All COAs must meet the criteria of
suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness as defined in
FM 101-5. The staff should develop supporting plans (fire support, engineer, air defense)
simultaneously.

Section V. SEQUENCE OF THE DEFENSE

As the commander and staff plan a defensive mission, they generally consider
preparation and execution. Preparation normally consists of occupation and establishment
of security and defense preparation and continued security operations. Execution consists
of security area engagement, MBA engagement, and follow-on missions. The following
general sequence of operations applies to planning and executing all defensive
operations.

5-32. OCCUPATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY

The commander and staff must plan how the SBCT will move into its AO and establish
security. The SBCT may assume a defensive mission at the conclusion of an offensive
operation or may move into an area to prepare for an anticipated enemy attack. The
SBCT may conduct a movement to contact, approach march, or tactical road march to
occupy the AO. The enemy situation and time available are the driving factors in this
decision. The establishment of security is the first priority. Commanders should consider
the impact of local populations on security and work (in conjunction with CA teams) with
local civil-military authority to reduce or negate that impact. Normally, the higher
headquarters has established some form of security before the SBCT moves into the area.
However, the unit must still provide for it’s own security, especially on expanded or
complex terrain. If transitioning from an offensive operation, the SBCT establishes the
security area well beyond the desired main battle area in order to prevent the enemy from
observing and interrupting defensive preparations and identifying unit positions. If it
cannot push the security area forward to achieve this, the SBCT may have to hold its
position initially as it transitions and then withdraw units to the defensive main battle
area, establishing a security force in the process.
a. Movement into Unsecured Area of Operation. The commander and staff must
plan, supervise, and resource defensive preparations to build the strongest possible
position prior to the enemy’s attack. Defensive preparations include setting the
communication architecture and digital network, positioning weapon systems, positioning
ISR assets, constructing obstacles, developing fire plans, fortifying positions, maintaining

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routes, and rehearsing plans. During this phase, the SBCT maintains security through the
use of forces conducting screen, guard, and or area security missions. OPSEC,
information security, obstacle protection, and air defense are also vital to the overall
security effort. The preparation phase may last from a few hours to days, depending on
the enemy situation. After clearing the SBCT’s rear area and the area where the battalions
will be positioned, the security force should position itself to--
• Prevent enemy observation of defensive positions.
• Defeat infiltrating reconnaissance forces.
• Prevent the enemy from delivering direct fires into the SBCT defenses.
• Provide early warning of the enemy’s approach.
b. Positioning of Forces. In contiguous or linear defenses, the SBCT commander
normally organizes and defines the security area forward of the FEBA, assigning the
battalions their own AOs or BPs to prevent gaps in the SBCT security. The key is to
integrate operations at the higher echelons and again at the SBCT level, using all
available resources to execute security operations.
c. Leaders' Reconnaissance. When feasible, the commander and subordinate
leaders conduct a reconnaissance of the AO to develop most of the plan based on their
view of the actual terrain. The commander and staff develop a plan for the leaders’
reconnaissance that includes provisions for security, leaders and key staff members
required to participate, designation of a recorder, areas to be reconnoitered, and time
allocated for the reconnaissance. When available, the SBCT commander may use
aviation assets to conduct the leaders' reconnaissance.

5-33. PREPARATION AND CONTINUED SECURITY OPERATIONS

Preparation of the defense includes planning and plan refinement, positioning of forces,
constructing obstacles, planning and synchronizing fires, positioning logistics, and
conducting inspections and rehearsals. Throughout the preparation phase, security
operations must continue without interruption. Security forces may be assigned any
combination of screen, guard, and area security missions. The cavalry squadron (RSTA)
as well as higher headquarters assets may be positioned to screen and provide early
warning along most likely enemy avenues of approach, reinforced in depth with sections
or platoons from the companies.
a. Security. Security is a consideration throughout the area of operations. The SBCT
must array security forces in depth to provide protection and to reduce the potential for
enemy infiltration. It must also secure the main battle area to prevent enemy
reconnaissance, reduction of obstacles, targeting of friendly positions, and other
disruptive actions. Companies must secure obstacles, battle positions, and hide positions.
Elements in the SBCT rear area must provide their own security, augmented by vehicles
that are being repaired. With extended lines of communication, the SBCT may also
secure logistical elements moving forward from the BSA to support the SBCT.
b. Dispersion. Forces should be widely dispersed and hidden to reduce vulnerability
and to aid in OPSEC.
c. Integration. Integrate reconnaissance and ground maneuver units in the security
forces. Utilize reconnaissance forces primarily to locate enemy elements and attack them
with indirect fires but not to engage in direct fire attack except in self-defense. Clearly

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establish the C2 headquarters and communication architecture for the security force (this
can be one of the most challenging missions in terms of tactical internet management).

5-34. SECURITY AREA ENGAGEMENT

As the enemy attack approaches the AO, the commander and staff monitor the situation
via ISR operations and the COP to anticipate the enemy’s arrival and timing of friendly
events such as passages of lines and battle handover. The commander may also make
final adjustments to his defensive plan during this time. When the higher headquarters
establishes a security force, the SBCT’s security forces assist the rearward passage of
lines for these forces and accept battle handover. Security forces maintain contact with
advancing enemy forces and report combat information. The SBCT often uses security
forces, fires (lethal and non-lethal), and obstacles within the security area to disrupt the
enemy’s momentum and weaken his forces.
a. As the enemy advances into the SBCT’s security area, MBA forces make final
preparations for the ensuing battle. The SBCT normally establishes a security area to
provide early warning and reaction time, deny enemy reconnaissance efforts, and protect
the MBA. The forward security mission is normally executed as a guard or screen. There
are three general options for organizing the security force (Figure 5-13):
• Forward defending battalions establish their own security areas.
• Battalions provide security forces that operate with the cavalry squadron
(RSTA) under the SBCT’s direct control.
• A battalion operates the SBCT’s security force.
b. The higher echelon commander defines the depth of the SBCT’s security area
through control measures and his concept of operations. The SBCT’s security area
extends from the FEBA to the SBCT’s forward boundary. Depth in the security area
provides forces in the MBA more reaction time and allows the security force more area in
which to detect and engage enemy forces. A very shallow security area may require more
forces and assets to provide the needed reaction time. The SBCT commander must
clearly define the objective of the security area. He states the tasks of the security force(s)
in terms of time required or expected to maintain security, results to achieve against the
enemy, disengagement and withdrawal criteria, and follow-on tasks. He identifies
specific avenues of approach and NAIs that the security force must cover. Security forces
also assist the rearward passage of lines of higher echelon security forces at the battle
handover line (BHL).

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Figure 5-13. Options for organizing the security area.

c. Transition. As security area engagements transition into the main battle area,
security area forces withdraw to initial MBA or reserve positions. Some elements may
maneuver to the flanks to maintain surveillance on enemy avenues of approach,
providing early warning and execution of fires against following enemy forces.

5-35. MAIN BATTLE AREA ENGAGEMENT

The MBA is where the SBCT deploys the bulk of its combat power against the enemy.
a. The SBCT’s MBA extends from the FEBA to the forward battalions’ rear
boundary. The commander selects his MBA based on the higher commander’s concept of
operations, IPB, initial ISR results, and his own estimate of the situation. The commander
assigns responsibilities within the MBA by assigning boundaries to subordinate
battalions. If the commander does not assign boundaries to subordinate battalions, the
SBCT is responsible for terrain management, security, clearance of fires, and
coordination of maneuver within the entire AO. The commander may control his forces
by assigning battalions an AO, BP, or strongpoint.
b. An AO gives battalions freedom of maneuver and fire planning within a specific
area. A defense in the AO allows the battalion commander to distribute his fires to suit
the terrain and anticipated enemy situation. Battalion AOs are situated against enemy
brigade-sized avenues of approach. A battalion's AO must provide adequate depth based
on its assigned tasks, the terrain, and the anticipated size of the attacking enemy force. An
AO requires continuous coordination with flank units for security and to maintain a
coherent defense. The commander cannot allow subordinate battalions total freedom to
develop their defenses if the SBCT’s defense is to remain cohesive. Control measures
such as PLs, EAs, obstacle belts, and BPs are used to coordinate battalion defenses within
the MBA (Figure 5-14, page 5-42). During defensive preparations, the commander and
staff use confirmation briefs, back briefs, inspections, and supervision to ensure battalion
defenses are coordinated and that unacceptable gaps do not develop.

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Figure 5-14. Example control measures used to coordinate defense by AO.

c. The commander assigns a battalion a BP when he wishes to control its fires,

maneuver, and positioning. Boundaries are normally still assigned to provide space for
battalion security, CS, and CSS elements that normally operate outside a BP. When the
commander does not establish unit boundaries, the SBCT is responsible for fires,
security, terrain management, and maneuver between positions of different battalions.
The BP prescribes a primary direction of fire by the orientation of the position. Battalion
BPs are positioned and oriented on well-defined enemy brigade-size avenues of
approach. A battalion BP must provide sufficient space for dispersion and depth of
weapon systems, supplementary and alternate positions, and flanking fires, if possible.
The commander defines when and under what conditions the battalion can displace from
the BP or maneuver outside it. The use of prepared or planned BPs with the associated
tasks of prepare or reconnoiter also provides flexibility to rapidly concentrate forces and
adds depth to the defense.
d. A strongpoint is a heavily fortified BP tied into a natural obstacle or restrictive
terrain to create an anchor for the defense. A strongpoint implies retention of terrain with
the purpose of controlling key terrain and or blocking, fixing, or canalizing enemy forces.
Defending units require permission from the higher headquarters to withdraw from a
strongpoint. Strongpoints are prepared for all-around defense.

5-36. FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS

Following a successful defense, there may be a period of confusion that the defender can
exploit. Given the information-gathering capabilities of the SBCT, counterattacks based
on branches and sequels to the plan can be executed quickly before the enemy can secure
his gains or organize a defense. METT-TC and the higher commander’s concept of
operations dictate the SBCT’s follow-on mission. If the situation prevents offensive
action, the SBCT continues to defend. As in the initial establishment of the defense,
gaining an area in which to conduct security operations is critical. Even if the SBCT is to
maintain the defense, a local counterattack can provide space for a security area and time

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to reorganize. Any attack option must pay particular attention not only to the terrain and
enemy, but also to friendly obstacles (and their self-destruction times or neutralization
times, if applicable) and areas where dual-purpose improved conventional munitions
(DPICM) or bomblets have been used. If it cannot counterattack to gain an adequate
security area, the SBCT may have to direct one battalion to maintain contact with the
enemy and guard the AO while others move to reestablish the defense farther to the rear.
Whether continuing to defend or transitioning to offensive operations, the SBCT must
quickly reorganize

Section VI. MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY,

AND SURVIVABILITY INTEGRATION
Much of the strength of a defense rests on the integration and construction of reinforcing
obstacles, exploitation of existing obstacles, and actions to enhance the survivability of
the force through construction of fighting positions and fortifications. The commander’s
intent focuses mobility/survivability (M/S) planning through his articulation of obstacle
intent (target, relative location, obstacle effect) and priorities and establishment of
priorities for survivability and mobility. Guided by that intent, the SBCT engineer
develops a scheme of engineer operations (SOEO) that includes engineer task
organization, priorities of effort and support, subordinate engineer unit missions, and M/S
instructions for all units. Chapter 10 contains information on engineer systems and
capabilities.

5-37. COUNTERMOBILITY
The commander and staff develop the obstacle plan concurrently with the fire support
plan and defensive scheme, guided by the higher commander’s intent. They must
integrate into the intelligence collection plan the use of intelligent minefields such as
intelligent munitions systems (IMS), if allocated. The commander’s intent for
countermobility should contain three elements: target, effect, and relative location.
a. Target. The target is the enemy force that the commander wants to affect with
fires and tactical obstacles. The commander identifies the target in terms of the size and
type of enemy force, the echelon, the avenue of approach, or a combination of these
methods.
b. Effect. This is the intended effect that the commander wants the obstacles and
fires to have on the targeted enemy force. Tactical obstacles produce one of the following
effects: block, turn, fix, or disrupt (Table 5-3, page 5-44). In order for the obstacle(s) to
achieve their desired effect, they must be covered by observed indirect and direct fires.
The obstacle effect drives integration, focuses subordinate fires, and focuses the obstacle
effort.
c. Relative Location. The relative location is where the SBCT commander wants
the obstacle effect to occur against the targeted enemy force. Whenever possible, the
commander identifies the location relative to the terrain and maneuver or fire control
measures to integrate the effects of obstacles with fires.

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OBSTACLE FIRES AND OBSTACLE

EFFECT PURPOSE OBSTACLES MUST: CHARACTERISTICS
Break up enemy Cause the enemy to deploy Do not require extensive
formations. early. resources.
Interrupt the enemy's Slow part of his formation Difficult to detect at long
DISRUPT timetable and C2. while allowing part to range.
➊ Cause premature advance unimpeded.
commitment of
breach assets.
Cause the enemy to
piecemeal his attack.
Slow an attacker Cause the enemy to deploy Arrayed in depth.
within an area so he into attack formation Span the entire width of
can be attrited. before encountering the the avenue of approach.
FIX Generate the time obstacles. Must not make the terrain
➋ necessary for the Allow the enemy to appear impenetrable.
friendly force to advance slowly in an EA
disengage. or AO.
Make the enemy fight in
multiple directions once he
is in the EA or AO.
Force the enemy to Prevent the enemy from Tie into impassable
move in the direction bypassing or breaching the terrain at the anchor
desired by the obstacle belt. point.
friendly commander. Maintain pressure on the Consist of obstacles in
enemy force throughout depth.
TURN
the turn. Provide a subtle
➌
Mass direct and indirect orientation relative to the
fires at the anchor point of enemy's approach.
the turn.
Stop an attacker Prevent the enemy from Must tie into impassable
along a specific bypassing or penetrating terrain.
avenue of approach. through the belt. Consist of complex
BLOCK Prevent an attacker Stop the enemy's advance. obstacles.
➍ from passing through Destroy all enemy breach Defeat the enemy's
an AO or EA. efforts. mounted and dismounted
Stop the enemy from breaching effort.
using an avenue of
approach and force
him to use another
avenue of approach.
Table 5-3. Obstacle effects.

d. Tactical Obstacles. Obstacles are force-oriented combat multipliers. The SBCT

employs tactical obstacles to attack the enemy’s ability to move, mass, and reinforce
directly. Tactical obstacles are integrated into the scheme of maneuver and fires to
produce specific obstacle effects. Obstacles alone do not produce significant effects
against the enemy; obstacles must be integrated with fires to be effective. The engineer

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section in Chapter 10 provides information on engineer capabilities. The following are

the three types of tactical obstacles.
(1) Directed Obstacles. The SBCT directs obstacles as specified tasks to the
maneuver battalion through the use of obstacle groups. The battalion may use the same
technique, but more likely will be specific about the location and type of obstacle. The
commander may use directed obstacles or obstacle groups to achieve specific obstacle
effects at key locations on the battlefield. In this case, the staff plans the obstacle control
measures and resources and determines measures and tasks to subordinates to integrate
the directed obstacles with fires.
(2) Situational Obstacles. Situational obstacles are obstacles that the SBCT or
battalion plans and possibly prepares before an operation; however, they do not execute
the obstacles unless specific criteria are met. Situational obstacles are “be-prepared”
obstacles and provide the commander flexibility for employing tactical obstacles based
on battlefield developments. The commander may use engineer forces to emplace tactical
obstacles rapidly, but more often he relies on scatterable mine systems. The SBCT staff
normally plans situational obstacles to allow the commander to shift his countermobility
effort rapidly to where he needs it the most, based on the situation. Execution triggers for
situational obstacles are integrated into the decision support template. (See FM 90-7,
Chapter 7.) Situational obstacles must be well integrated with tactical plans to avoid
fratricide. Given the changes in engineer force structure, tactical concepts, and
capabilities, situational obstacles are increasingly used in lieu of conventionally emplaced
obstacles.
(3) Reserve. Reserve obstacles are obstacles for which the commander restricts
execution authority. These are “on-order” obstacles. The commander specifies the unit
responsible for constructing, guarding, and executing the obstacle. Examples of reserve
obstacles include preparing a bridge for destruction or an obstacle to close a lane. Units
normally prepare reserve obstacles during the preparation phase. They execute the
obstacle only on command of the authorizing commander or when specific criteria are
met. (See FM 90-7, Chapter 6.) It is critical for the unit to understand and rehearse
actions to execute reserve obstacles.

NOTE: In addition to tactical obstacles, units also employ protective obstacles.

Protective obstacles are a key component of survivability operations,
providing friendly forces with close-in protection. (See FM 90-7.)

e. Tactical Obstacle Planning. Detailed obstacle planning begins during COA

development. The engineer focuses on the following five specifics in his SOEO for the
obstacle plan.
(1) Direct and Indirect Fire Analysis. The direct and indirect fire analysis examines
how engineers can best use obstacles to enhance the direct and indirect fire plan. The
engineer must have a fundamental understanding of the direct and indirect fire and
maneuver plans and the SBCT’s organization of the EA to integrate obstacles effectively.
The engineer must consider SBCT and battalion EAs, target reference points (TRPs),
indirect fire targets, unit locations, enemy formations, avenues of approach, and the
higher commander’s obstacle intent in order to effectively integrate obstacles.

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Synchronization of direct and indirect fires with obstacles multiplies the relative effect on
the enemy.
(2) Obstacle Intent Integration. The engineer plans directed obstacle groups during
the COA development process. Obstacle groups integrated into the COA sketch
graphically depict the commander’s obstacle intent to support the maneuver plan.
Obstacle groups target specific enemy elements based on the SITEMP. The engineer
generally allocates an obstacle group against a battalion-sized avenue of approach with
respect to the EAs, TRPs, indirect fire targets, unit locations, enemy formations, and AAs
assessed during the direct fire analysis. This process parallels the staff's placement of a
company against the same size enemy force. The intent of the obstacle groups supports
subordinate unit task and purpose. The engineer recommends specific obstacle group
effects to the commander based on terrain, resources, time available, and the SBCT
commander’s obstacle intent.
(3) Obstacle Priority. The staff determines the priority of each obstacle group. The
commander's intent and the most likely enemy COA clearly influence the priority. The
obstacle priority should reflect the battalion’s most critical obstacle requirement. The
battalion engineer considers flank protection, weapons types and ranges, and the overall
commander's intent for the entire force before placing obstacle priority on the main EA.
Priorities assist the engineer in allocating resources and ensuring that the most critical
obstacle groups are constructed first.
(4) Mobility Requirements. The engineer identifies the SBCT mobility requirements
by analyzing the scheme of maneuver, counterattack (CATK) options, reserve planning
priorities, CS and CSS movement requirements, and adjacent and higher unit missions,
maneuver, and movement. The engineer integrates this analysis into obstacle group
planning and avoids impeding friendly maneuver whenever possible. Because the bulk of
the engineer force is committed to countermobility and survivability during defensive
preparation, the SBCT commander uses clear obstacle restrictions on specific areas
within the SBCT AO to maintain mobility. If obstacles must be constructed along a
mobility corridor that primarily supports friendly movement, a lane or gap (and
associated closure procedures) must be planned and rehearsed. These lanes or gaps may
be closed with situational or reserve obstacles.
(a) Beyond preparing and marking lanes and gaps through obstacles, engineers
normally perform mobility tasks once defensive preparations are complete. Mobility
assets may then be positioned to counter templated enemy situational obstacles or be
task-organized to the reserve, CATK force, or any other unit that must maneuver or move
subsequent to the execution of the defense. To do this effectively, the engineers and the
supported maneuver unit must integrate, prepare, and rehearse. Since this manner of
mobility support is critical to the success of the maneuver plan, timely linkup and
coordination must be factored into the overall defensive preparation timeline.
(b) Sometimes the SBCT may require significant mobility support during defensive
preparation. Examples may include route clearance, road repair or maintenance, and LZ
and pick-up zone (PZ) clearance. SBCT engineers are adequately resourced to perform
this type of mobility support, but they clearly cannot concurrently prepare the defense
and execute these tasks. Thus, the SBCT requires augmentation from a divisional
multifunction engineer battalion. These engineers perform general engineering tasks,
leaving the SBCT engineers available to construct the SBCT defense.

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5-38. SURVIVABILITY
Survivability operations in support of ground maneuver elements are increasingly limited
given force structure and tactical concepts. Digging in combat vehicles is a technique that
still has value in many situations, but the increasing need for mobility in defensive
operations and the proliferation of precision munitions reduce the effectiveness of static,
dug-in forces. Survivability efforts within the SBCT should focus on protection of assets
that must remain relatively static (such as communication nodes), support of logistical
and decontamination operations, and survivability for defending dismounted infantry.

Section VII. TRANSITION OPERATIONS

During the planning for the defensive battle, the SBCT commander and staff must discern
from the higher headquarters operations order what the follow-on missions will be and
how they intend to achieve them. They must set the conditions for successful transition
before the defensive battle is joined. The SBCT reorganizes after the battle and normally
exercises one of two options: continue the defense or attack. The period immediately
after a successful defense can be a period of confusion and vulnerability for both enemy
and friendly forces. This period is a contest for the initiative and control of the situation.
Both forces will attempt to regain balance, reorganize, and resume coordinated
operations. The SBCT normally attempts to exploit the situation through offensive action.
The enemy will likely attempt to consolidate, hold gains, and defend. If the SBCT is able
to attack prior to the enemy being able to consolidate, the enemy is kept off balance and
reactive to the SBCT. However, if the SBCT is unable to consolidate and establish a
defense, the enemy gains a significant tactical advantage. The force that ultimately gains
the initiative and control of the situation is the one that reorganizes and acts the quickest.
Therefore, it is imperative that the SBCT develops plans early in the planning cycle for
exploiting success through immediate offensive action.

5-39. REORGANIZATION
The SBCT must quickly reorganize to continue the defense or transition into follow-on
missions. Reorganization includes all measures taken to maintain the combat
effectiveness of the SBCT or return it to a specified level of combat capability. All units
undertake reorganization activities during the defense, as the situation allows, to maintain
their combat effectiveness. More extensive reorganization is normally conducted after the
SBCT defeats an enemy attack. The following tasks normally are included in
reorganization:
• Establish and maintain security.
• Destroy or contain enemy forces that still threaten the SBCT.
• Reestablish a coherent defense. This may include moving forces, adjusting
boundaries, changing task organization, and coordinating with flank units.
• Replace or shift reconnaissance assets and observers.
• Reestablish the SBCT chain of command, key staff positions, and C2
INFOSYS facilities lost during the battle.
• Treat and evacuate casualties.
• Conduct emergency resupply operations.
• Recover and repair damaged equipment.

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• Send relevant logistics and battle reports by FM voice and digital means (if so
equipped).
• Process EPWs as required.
• Repair or emplace additional obstacles and construct additional fighting
positions.

5-40. EXPLOIT
In a successful defense, the enemy reaches his culminating point within the MBA. The
defensive plan must address missions following successful operations and how the SBCT
commander envisions the transition to the offense. The higher headquarters’ follow-on
missions for the SBCT govern this plan. The staff must begin planning for future
offensive operations as it develops defensive and obstacle plans. The commander and
staff must develop maneuver plans, control measures, obstacle restrictions, and CSS
plans that enable the SBCT to quickly transition to follow-on offensive missions. Once
minimum reorganization activities are completed, the commander orders his forces to
attack key objectives that are the most damaging to the enemy and that posture the SBCT
for future operations (Figure 5-15). As the objective of the attack is reached, the SBCT
consolidates and continues more extensive reorganization to prepare for future
operations.

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Figure 5-15. Exploiting success.

5-41. DEFEND
The SBCT continues to defend when follow-on enemy forces are continuing to attack or
when the SBCT’s strength prevents resumption of the offense. It may be necessary for
the SBCT to reestablish its defense deeper in the AO, or the SBCT may reestablish its
defense along its original positions. The time available and condition of the SBCT
normally dictate which defensive option the SBCT will employ. The commander (aided
by his staff) develops branches and sequels during the initial planning process that
prepare the SBCT for the eventuality of continued enemy attacks. The commander
transmits the refined plan via a FRAGO, and the SBCT then consolidates, reorganizes
and prepares to continue the defense.

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CHAPTER 6
URBAN OPERATIONS
Urban environments include some of the world’s most difficult terrain
in which to conduct military operations. Urban terrain confronts
commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found in other
environments. Cities vary immensely depending on their history, the
cultures of their inhabitants, their economic development, the local
climate, available building materials, and many other factors The urban
environment, like all environments, is neutral and affects all sides equally.
The leader that can best understand and exploit the effects of the urban
area has the best chance of success.
The US has worldwide interests that directly relate to global security.
As a result, US forces will be deployed into urban environments to
neutralize or stabilize extremely volatile political situations or defeat an
enemy force that has sought protection afforded by urban terrain. The
SBCT is uniquely equipped and manned to confront the challenges of
defeating an asymmetrical threat from an enemy force operating in an
urban environment. This chapter provides the tools necessary for planning
and executing missions in an urban environment as an SBCT.

Section I. THE SBCT’S ROLE IN URBAN OPERATIONS

Although the close combat during urban operations (UO) is infantry-centric, SBCT,
armor, and mechanized units operate as an integral force in both shaping and decisive
operations. SBCT, armor, and mechanized units are the optimal forces to isolate or
prevent enemy reinforcement during urban operations. They operate with light infantry
forces in the close fight by providing precise and overwhelming firepower and the ability
to gain positional advantage over the enemy.

6-1. ISOLATION
Isolation holds the key to victory in urban operations. If the attacker fails to isolate the
urban area, the defender can reinforce and resupply his forces, protracting the operation
and significantly decreasing the attacker’s resources and his will to continue. If the
defender becomes isolated, the attacker will seize the initiative and can force the defender
to take considerable risk (such as a breakout or executing a counterattack) to survive.
SBCT, armor, and mechanized forces are optimal for executing isolation operations
because they possess the speed, agility, firepower, and protection necessary to
successfully shape the urban area for offensive or defensive operations.

6-2. CLOSE COMBAT

The SBCT operates with infantry forces in the close fight providing fires and shock effect
to defeat the enemy and his will to resist. Historically, the close fight in urban combat has
consisted of street-to-street fighting resulting in high casualties and high expenditure of
resources. The SBCT possesses the capability to use precision fires and maneuver to gain
positional advantage and seize the initiative away from the enemy. The SBCT uses
FBCB2, maneuver, and situational understanding to properly position forces and destroy

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the enemy as he reacts to threats from multiple directions. The SBCT relies on its
capability to maneuver as a result of its enhanced situational understanding to destroy the
enemy. This capability affords the SBCT a primary advantage in accomplishing assigned
missions in urban environments.

Section II. FUNDAMENTALS OF URBAN OPERATIONS

Urban operations are among the most difficult and challenging missions a brigade can
undertake. To understand the complexity of the urban battlefield, the SBCT commander
and his staff apply the following tactical fundamentals.

6-3. PERFORM FOCUSED INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND

AGGRESSIVE ISR OPERATIONS
The density of noncombatants and information sources make effective IO a necessity
when confronted with any mission in an urban area. The SBCT may be highly successful
in its execution of tactical operations on a consistent basis, but a failure to control the
information flow from within the urban area could result in overall mission failure. The
SBCT must leverage the IO capability found in the FECC in order to gain and maintain
information superiority throughout all phases of the urban operation. In order to develop
an effective course of action, the SBCT commander and his staff must initiate aggressive
ISR operations. Urban operations require significant HUMINT reconnaissance because
sensors and other technological devices may not be as effective in such environments.
The SBCT has a significant HUMINT capability that is coordinated by the S2x through
the HUMINT operations cell. Additionally, the SBCT can leverage the HUMINT assets
found within the cavalry squadron (RSTA) to accomplish its ISR goals. Using the C2
INFOSYS, the staff can develop urban maps that include a common reference system
(such as numbering buildings) to assist subordinate units with C2.

6-4. UNDERSTAND THE HUMAN DIMENSION

The human dimension of the urban environment often has the most significance and
greatest potential for affecting the outcome of UO. The SBCT commander must carefully
consider and understand how to influence the allegiance and morale of a civilian
population that may decisively affect operations. The SBCT commander must assesses
the attitudes, culture, and factional allegiances present in the urban environment when
planning his COA.

6-5. SEPARATE NONCOMBATANTS FROM COMBATANTS

Promptly separating noncombatants from combatants facilitates UO by reducing some of
the restrictions on firepower and enhancing force protection. Using attached PSYOP and
CA units, the SBCT can diminish some of the enemy’s asymmetrical advantages. This
important task becomes more difficult when the adversary is an unconventional force that
can mix with the civilian population. The SBCT commander should also consider
coordinating with international organizations if large numbers of refugees are expected.

6-6. AVOID THE ATTRITION APPROACH

UO that use linear and methodical COAs based on firepower normally result in high
casualties and significant collateral damage. Enemy forces tend to encourage this

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approach to lengthen the operation, expend US resources, and challenge our will to
sustain attritional engagements. SBCT commanders should only consider this approach if
required to do so or when attempting to gain contact or fix enemy forces as part of a
larger operation.

6-7. CONTROL THE ESSENTIAL

Many urban areas are too large to be completely occupied or even effectively controlled
by either friendly or enemy forces. The SBCT focuses its efforts on controlling only
those areas that are essential to mission accomplishment. At a minimum, this requires
control of terrain whose possession or control provides a marked advantage. In the urban
environment, key terrain may be determined by its functional, political, or social
significance. By controlling what is essential, the SBCT commander can concentrate
combat power where it is needed. This decision implies risk in those areas that he
chooses not to control in order to mass overwhelming combat power in other areas.

6-8. MINIMIZE COLLATERAL DAMAGE

By employing the C2 INFOSYS, the SBCT commander develops an understanding of the
urban AO. The SBCT commander refines his visualization and, with the staff, develops
COAs that maximize fires and effects without inflicting unnecessary collateral damage.
The SBCT commander determines what firepower restrictions are necessary that will still
allow for mission accomplishment, and he then compensates for them through
information operations, PSYOP, or CA operations.

6-9. CONDUCT CLOSE COMBAT

Urban operations require closing with the enemy and decisively defeating him. Close
combat in UO is resource intensive, requires properly trained and equipped forces, and
has the potential for high casualties. The SBCT must use close combat as its decisive
operation only after shaping the urban area through aggressive ISR, isolation, and the use
of precision fires. While close combat is essential for defeating a determined enemy, the
SBCT commander leverages his knowledge of the enemy to avoid costly house-to-house
fighting. By maintaining a COP with his subordinate commanders, the SBCT commander
can direct the infantry battalions to move out of direct contact with the enemy to a
position of advantage and choose the place and time where he wants to join the enemy in
close combat.

6-10. TRANSITION CONTROL

UO must be planned to accomplish assigned missions in the most expeditious manner.
The end state of UO is the transfer of control to civilian or other agency control. The
SBCT must thoroughly develop a transition plan that ensures the restoration of peaceful
conditions and avoids further disruption to stability within the AO.

6-11. RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

The SBCT commander must plan to restore essential services that may fail to function
upon their arrival or cease to function during an operation. Essential services include
power, food, water, sewage, medical care, and law enforcement. When planning for and
conducting Army UO, units can use less destructive munitions and capabilities to keep

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potentially vital infrastructure intact. Initially, the SBCT may be the only element able to
restore or provide essential services. Failure to do so may result in serious health
problems for the civilians, which can affect the health of the SBCT and negatively impact
overall mission success. The SBCT must be prepared to transfer responsibility for
providing essential services to other agencies, international organizations, or the local
government as quickly as possible.

6-12. PRESERVE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The SBCT commanders must analyze the urban area to identify critical infrastructure and
attempt to preserve the critical elements for post-combat sustainment operations, stability
operations, support operations, or the health and well-being of the indigenous population.
Urban areas remain in the AO after combat operations have ceased. Post-combat UO are
unavoidable. The SBCT may have to initiate actions to prevent an enemy or a hostile
civilian group from removing or destroying critical infrastructure. Such infrastructure
may include cultural resources such as religious and historical places. In some cases,
preserving the infrastructure may be the assigned objective of the urban operation.

Section III. TACTICAL CHALLENGES

The SBCT will face a number of challenges during the planning, preparation for, and
execution of urban operations.

6-13. CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS AREAS OF OPERATIONS

The SBCT must be prepared to conduct full spectrum operations in both contiguous and
non-contiguous AOs.
a. The SBCT conducts contiguous operations in an AO that facilitates mutual
support of combat, CS, and CSS elements