AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.

versus JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO CANVASS THE VOTES FOR PRESIDENT & VICE PRESIDENT IN THE MAY 10 2004 ELECTIONS By a petition for prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in the May 10 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress on June 11 2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing. Issue: Whether or not legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress supports Pimentels arguments against the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress after the adjournment of Congress. Held: NO. Pimentels claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. Moreover, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned on 25 May 1992. Thereafter, on 22 June 1992, the Eight Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice President, respectively. LOREN B. LEGARDA v. NOLI L. DE CASTRO Loren B. Legarda filed before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal a petition to annul the proclamation of Respodent Noli L. De Castro as the Vice-President of the Philippines. The protest filed by Legarda consisted of two aspects. The First Aspect covers the alleged erroneous, manipulated and/or falsified results of the election. While the Second pertains to the revision of the ballots of the precincts specified in the protest. The Second Aspect was earlier dismissed by the Supreme Court for the failure of Legarda to pay the required deposit for the expenses. ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner clearly and convincingly proved the presence of manipulation or falsification of election results HELD: We are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. The most relevant precedent on this issue is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, a decision rendered by this Tribunal, which held that:

The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiagos term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-[too] crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be

summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules; (4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible.

Pormento v. Estrada and COMELEC Joseph Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted [resigned according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Private respondent Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001] from office and was not able to finish his term. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Eraps candidacy and filed a petition for the latters disqualification, which was however denied by the COMELEC 2nd Division. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes. Issue: Does the challenge on Estradas qualification to run again for president an actual controversy? Ruling: NO, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be

raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

Macalintal v pet Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional. Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution. The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution. Held: Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the

COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

nixon v fitzgerald A cost-management expert for the Air Force was fired after he testified in front of Congress about cost overruns in certain military projects. The Defendant, the President of the United States Richard Nixon (Defendant), claimed that he made the firing decision. The President of the United States (President) is shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages for acts done in his official capacity as President. Facts. The Plaintiff, Ernest Fitzgerald (Plaintiff), was fired from his job with the Air Force as cost-management analyst because he embarrassed his superiors by testifying about certain cost-overruns. The Air Force said he was fired because of reorganization and a reduction in force. An internal memo was passed through White House staff saying the Plaintiff was a top notch cost expert but with very low marks of loyalty and recommended that they let him bleed. At a press conference, the Defendant said he personally made the decision to fire the Plaintiff. The White House later retracted the statement saying that the Defendant had confused the Plaintiff with another employee. The Plaintiff brought suit and the Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground of absolute immunity from suit. Issue. Does the President have absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in his official capacity? Held. Yes, the President is immune from suit from his official acts as a matter of public policy rooted in the structure of government mandated by the separation of power principle. This immunity stems from the Presidents unique position in the constitution scheme and the immense importance of his duties. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is worried about diverting the Presidents energies to the concerns related to private lawsuits. clinton v jones Procedural Posture: Paula Corbin Jones filed suit in federal district court in Arkansas against William Jefferson Clinton and Arkansas state trooper Danny Ferguson over an incident that was alleged to have occurred on May 8, 1991. Clinton filed motions asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity and prohibit Jones from refiling the suit until after the end of his presidency. The district court rejected the presidential immunity argument but allowed that no trial would take place until Clinton was no longer president. Both Clinton and Jones appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. Disposition: In a 9-0 decision, the court held in favor of Jones, affirming the district courts right to decide this case. Facts: Bill Clinton was elected to the presidency in 1992 and reelected in 1996. Prior to the presidency, Clinton held the office of governor of Arkansas. In 1994, Paula Corbin Jones filed suit in federal district court in Arkansas against Clinton and Arkansas state trooper Danny Ferguson over an incident that was alleged to have occurred at the Excelsior Hotel on May 8, 1991, in Little Rock. Jones, then an employee of the state, was working at the registration desk of a conference in which Governor Clinton delivered a speech. Jones alleges

Trooper Ferguson told her that Governor Clinton wanted to see her in his room, and Ferguson escorted her to the room. Once in the room, Clinton begins to make unwanted sexual advances towards Jones. Clinton denies the allegations and claims that the lawsuit is politically motivated. Relevant Provision of Constitution: Article II, specifically separation of power principles. Question: Whether the constitution protects a sitting president from a lawsuit that seeks damages from an unofficial act that occurred before becoming president? Holding: The Federal Constitution did not require that federal courts, in all but the most exceptional cases, defer civil damages litigation against the President until the Presidents term ended when such litigation was based on actions allegedly taken before the Presidents term began, in part because (a) a temporary immunity from suit for unofficial acts, grounded purely in the identity of the Presidents office, was unsupported by precedent of the Supreme Court, and (b) the doctrine of separation of powers did not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until the President left office; and (2) it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court, which had jurisdiction to decide the case at hand, to defer the trial until the President left office, in part because (a) such a lengthy and categorical stay took no account of the individuals interest in bringing the case to trial, (b) the decision to postpone the trial was premature, and (c) no impingement upon the Presidents conduct of his office had been shown. Reasoning: (Stevens) There is no support for immunity for unofficial conduct. The doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the president until he leaves office. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three co-equal branches of government. Concurrence: (Breyer) The constitution does not automatically grant the president immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his private conduct. The president cannot simply rest upon the claim that a private civil lawsuit for damages will interfere with the constitutionally assigned duties of the executive branch without detailing any specific responsibilities or explaining how or degrees. estrada v desierto In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office

and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day. After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President (2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

Rubrico vs. Arroyo Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency. Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case . ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent. HELD: The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his comembers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ [GR NO. 191805, NOVEMBER 15, 2011] Doctrine: The presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the presidents incumbency but not beyond.

Facts: Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Datawith Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

Issue: Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit

Held: No. As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez pimentel v ermita This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting secretaries of their respective departments. On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. Issue: Is President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session, constitutional? Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. Rufino vs. Endriga President Marcos issued EO 30 creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees, who were all appointed by President Marcos, were

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, Juan Ponce-Enrile, Andres Soriano, Jr., Antonio Madrigal, Father Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P. Soliongco, and Ernesto Rufino.

After the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15, the CCP's charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the "pressure or influence of politics." PD 15 increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.

After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board. Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili, and Manuel T. Maosa.

On 22 December 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board "shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x." In case "only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP]." The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.

The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Maosa's term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees, namely, Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, together with Cabili, Father Bernardo P. Perez, Eduardo De los Angeles, Ma. Cecilia Lazaro, and Gloria M. Angara. President Estrada retained Fr. Perez, De los Angeles, Lazaro, and Angara as trustees. Endriga's term was to expire on 26 July 1999, while the terms of Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, and Fernandez were to expire on 6 February 1999. The Endriga group maintained that under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year term could only be terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any vacancy in the Board. The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."

The Court referred the Endriga group's petition to the Court of Appeals "for appropriate action" in observance of the hierarchy of courts. On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision under review granting the quo warranto petition. The Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees. On the other hand, the appellate court's Decision ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board. In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the appointing power. The Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group's motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga group's motion for immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.

Ruling: Appointment Power of President Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth group of officers. The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers. Scope of Appointment Power of the Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions or Boards The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explain this intent

beyond any doubt. The framers of the 1987 Constitution changed the qualifying word inferior to the less disparaging phrase lower in rank purely for style. However, the clear intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint. Congress may vest the authority to appoint only in the heads of the named offices Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lowerranked officers. xxx In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers. The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board. This is in contrast to the Presidents power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the heads of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word heads refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members xxx. Presidents Power of Control The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the Presidents power of control over the Executive branch. xxx The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department falls under the Office of the President.

Since the President exercises control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President shall have control of all executive x x x offices, Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions. The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion. In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis. The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over all the executive x x x offices. If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. Of course, the Presidents power of control does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies whose proceedings and decisions are judicial in nature and subject to judicial review, even as such quasi-judicial bodies may be under the administrative supervision of the President. It also does not extend to local government units, which are merely under the general supervision of the President.

De Castro v. JBC This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. RULING Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. There is a justiciable issue We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY. Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict: The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Justification of the Supreme Court: First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language. Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.

There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to depoliticize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals. Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010. Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the

prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court. Sec. 9, Article VIII says: xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC. WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. ABAKADA V ERMITA Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no passon provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist. Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT.

Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove.

Ruling: The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that the law effectively nullified the Presidents power of control over the Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. The Court cannot also subscribe to the position of petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view of the phrase upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. Neither does the Court find persuasive the submission of petitioners Escudero, et al. that any recommendation by the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter. When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it simply means that as head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the Chief Executive. The multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, such as the Department of Finance, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as such, occupies a political position and holds office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, is subject to the direction of the President."[55] In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect.[56] The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact, namely, whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (24/5%) or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the

previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.[57] Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.[58] As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism, the same deserves scant consideration. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.[59] The insinuation by petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or create the conditions to bring about either or both the conditions precedent does not deserve any merit as this argument is highly speculative. The Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. The Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances. When the Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-lived. Biraogo vs. Truth commission When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. --- Justice Jose P. Laurel Facts: The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1; 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; 3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and 5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief. Held: Legal Standing of the Petitioners The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of [Link], the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus: The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To

determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency) and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo. While the cases are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017. ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact laws and decrees If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional

HELD: Take-Care Power This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials andemployees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government. The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees? The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President

Arroyos ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and aHouse of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al. OVERVIEW: This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did so citing the following bases: The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to bring down the President; Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of events ensued: February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend. February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I. February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration. The two were later taken into custody by Gen.

Senga. However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military. The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan. The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows: Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas. Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents

Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al. The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand. ISSUES: 1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic; 2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners contention that the said proclamation has none of it; 3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble. HELD: 1. The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be decided provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case. 2. Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove. 3. Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions. Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in ones presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge both of which are not present in Davids warrantless arrest. This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.

Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal. TENET et al. v. DOE et ux. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. [Link] January 11, 2005Decided March 2, 2005

Respondent husband and wife filed suit against the United States and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), asserting estoppel and due process claims for the CIAs alleged failure to provide them with financial assistance it had promised in return for their espionage services during the Cold War. The District Court denied the Governments motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, finding that respondents claims were not barred by the rule of Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, prohibiting suits against the Government based on covert espionage agreements. Affirming in relevant part, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Totten posed no bar to reviewing some of respondents claims and thus the case could proceed to trial, subject to the Governments asserting the evidentiary state secrets privilege and the District Courts resolving that issue. Held: Respondents suit is barred by the Totten rule. In Totten, this Court concluded with no difficulty that the President had the authority to bind the United States to contracts with secret agents, observed that the very essence of such a contract was that it was secret and had to remain so, and found that allowing a former spy to bring suit to enforce such a contract would be entirely incompatible with the contracts nature. The Ninth Circuit was quite wrong in holding that Totten does not require dismissal of respondents claims. It reasoned that Totten developed merely a contract rule, prohibiting breach-of-contract claims seeking to enforce an espionage agreements terms but not barring due process or estoppel claims. However, Totten was not so limited. It precludes judicial review in cases such as respondents where success depends on the existence of their secret espionage relationship with the [Link]., at 107. The Ninth Circuit also claimed that Totten had been recast simply as an early expression of the evidentiary state secrets privilege, rather than a categorical bar to respondents claims, relying mainly on United States [Link], 345 U.S. 1, in which widows of civilians killed in a military plane crash sought privileged military information in their wrongful death action against the Government. While the Reynolds Court looked to Totten in invoking the well established state secrets privilege, it in no way signaled a retreat fromTottens broader

holding that lawsuits premised on alleged espionage agreements are altogether forbidden. The Court later credited Tottens more sweeping holding in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Ed. Project,454 U.S. 139, 146147, thus confirming its continued validity. Reynoldstherefore cannot plausibly be read to have replaced Tottens categorical bar in the distinct class of cases that depend upon clandestine spy relationships. Nor does Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, which addressed constitutional claims made by acknowledged (though covert) CIA employees, support respondents claim. Only in the case of an alleged former spy is Tottens core concern implicated: preventing the existence of the plaintiffs relationship with the Government from being revealed. The state secrets privilege and the use of in camerajudicial proceedings simply cannot provide the absolute protection the Court found necessary in enunciating the Totten rule. The possibility that a suit may proceed and an espionage relationship may be revealed is unacceptable. Forcing the Government to litigate these claims would also make it vulnerable to graymail, i.e., individual lawsuits brought to induce the CIA to settle a case out of fear that litigation would reveal classified information that might undermine covert operations. And requiring the Government to invoke the privilege on a case-by-case basis risks the perception that it is either confirming or denying relationships with individual plaintiffs. Gudani vs. Senga Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of Joint Task Force Ranao by the AFP Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon. Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent. However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. ` While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee in

spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance; that such directive was in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command; and that the two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then. On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners violation of the aforementioned directive. The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. ISSUE Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is unconstitutional? RULING The Petition is dismissed. Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry? Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and independent specie of presidential authoritythe commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the

land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that [t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under house arrest by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting: to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered. As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldiers speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. For there is no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldiers ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between

obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Judicial relief as remedy: The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts. Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the other branchs assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries. Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts. Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the courtmartial, considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of

Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, all officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP], and points out that he is no longer in the active service. However, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP GRP and the MILF were scheduled to sign a MOA-AD Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOAAD, this Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. The Solicitor General, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP. The parties met in Kuala Lumpur, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting." A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.

Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. Ruling: Whether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a). The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. The principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative.

These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a proposal for new legislation coming from the President. Kulayan vs. Tan 3 members from international committee of the red cross were kidnapped in sulu, by the members of the ASG. A task force was created by the ICRC and the PNP, which then organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee.

The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Its armed forces component was headed by respondents General Juancho Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The PNP component was headed by respondent Police Superintendent Bienvenido G. Latag, the Police Deputy Director for Operations of the ARMM.

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force, a group of armed male civilians coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul.

The organization of the CEF was embodied in a Memorandum of Understanding entered into between 3 parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag.

The Whereas clauses of the Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the municipal mayors to offer their services in order that the early and safe rescue of the hostages may be achieved.

Puno, announced to the media that government troops had cornered some 120 Abu Sayyaf members along with the 3 hostages. However, the ASG made contact with the authorities and demanded that the military pull its troops back from the jungle area.

The government troops yielded and went back to their barracks; the Philippine Marines withdrew to their camp, while police and civilian forces pulled back from the terrorists stronghold by 10 to 15km. Threatening that one of the hostages will be beheaded, the ASG further demanded the evacuation of the military camps and bases in the different barangays in Jolo.

The authorities were given no later than 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of 31 March 2009 to comply. Governor Tan issued Proclamation 1-09, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim.

Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship to Musin,Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji Hadjirul Bambra,Abdugajir Hadjirul, as well as PO2 Marcial Hajan, SPO3 Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and jeepney driver Abduhadi Sabdani,were also arrested. The affidavit of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation 1-09. The following day, 2 April 2009, the hostage Mary Jane Lacaba was released by the ASG. On 4 April 2009, the office of Governor Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the Guidelines for the Implementation of Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring a State of Emergency in the Province of Sulu. These Guidelines suspended all Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the PNP, and allowed civilians to seek exemption from the gun ban only by applying to the Office of the Governor and obtaining the appropriate identification cards. The said guidelines also allowed general searches and seizures in designated checkpoints and chokepoints. On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul,

Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Ruling: Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic.

One executive, one commander-in-chief As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior, it has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.

Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president

Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-inChief powers to which the calling-out powers constitutes a portion. The Presidents Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution

Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nations supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.

As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts as the leader of the countrys police forces, under the mandate of Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that, The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the framing of this provision, Fr. Bernas defended the retention of the word control, employing the same rationale of singularity of the office of the president, as the only Executive under the presidential form of government. Regarding the countrys police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations

Furthermore according to the framers, it is still the President who is authorized to exercise supervision and control over the police, through the National Police Commission

In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President

Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will be discussed subsequently. Respondents, however, justify this stance by stating that nowhere in the seminal case of David v. Arroyo, which dealt squarely with the issue of the declaration of a state of emergency, does it limit the said authority to the President alone. Respondents contend that the ruling in David expressly limits the authority to declare a national emergency, a condition which covers the entire country, and does not include emergency situations in local government units.

This claim is belied by the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to security, such as lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the President who possesses the sole authority to exercise calling-out powers. As reflected in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission: Thereafter, Mr. Padilla proposed on line 29 to insert the phrase ORPUBLIC DISORDER in lieu of invasion or rebellion. Mr. Sumulong stated that the committee could not accept the amendment because under the first section of Section 15, the President may call out and make use of the armed forces to prevent or suppress not only lawless violence but even invasion or rebellion without declaring martial law. He observed that by deleting invasion or rebellion and substituting PUBLIC DISORDER, the President would have to declare martial law before he can make use of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless invasion or rebellion. Mr. Padilla, in reply thereto, stated that the first sentence contemplates a lighter situation where there is some lawless violence in a small portion of the country or public disorder in another at which times, the armed forces can be called to prevent or suppress these incidents. He noted that the Commander-in-Chief can do so in a minor degree but he can also exercise such powers should the situation worsen. The words invasion or rebellion to be eliminated online 14 are covered by the following sentence which provides for invasion or rebellion. He maintained that the proposed amendment does not mean that under such circumstances, the President cannot call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress the same.

Ampatuan vs. Puno After the Massacre, President Arroyo, issued proclamation 1946 placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She also director AFP and PNP to to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. AO 273 was issued transferring supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). But, due to issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A)

amending the former, by delegating instead of transferring supervision of the ARMM to the DILG. Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials,[4] filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional governments powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.[5] Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City ofCotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers.[6] Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them. In its comment for the respondents, [7] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places.[8] She issued the proclamation pursuant to her calling out power[9] as Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.[10] She must use her judgment based on intelligence reports and such best information as are available to her to call out the armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever these reared their ugly heads. On the other hand, the President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. These orders did not authorize a take over of the ARMM. They did not give him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials.[11] The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings. [12] Further, the assailed proclamation and administrative orders did not provide for the exercise of emergency powers.[13] Although normalcy has in the meantime returned to the places subject of this petition, it might be relevant to rule on the issues raised in this petition since some acts done pursuant to Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A could impact on the administrative and criminal cases that the government subsequently filed against those believed affected by such proclamation and orders. The Ruling of the Court Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to

prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power,[18] it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,[19] it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.[21] In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans.[23] Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places. Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not withdrawn the declaration of a state of emergency under Proclamation 1946. It has been reported[24] that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there is still a need to disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the presence of troops in those places is still necessary to ease fear and tension among the citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite the passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre. Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the Presidents actions. Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session

to review the validity of the Presidents action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. II. THE ISSUES

Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and academic? III. THE RULING Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power,[18] it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,[19] it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too. But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with, the OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for the Presidents decision to call out the armed forces. In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans.[23] Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places. Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not withdrawn the declaration of a state of emergency under Proclamation 1946. It has been reported[24] that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there is still a need to

disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the presence of troops in those places is still necessary to ease fear and tension among the citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite the passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre. Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the Presidents actions. AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions. Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making. Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA - that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege. Issues: Substantive Issues: 1. Whether the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information. 2. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto (whether they are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege).

3. of 4. 5.

Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages the negotiation process. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege. Whether the Respondents failed to claim executive privilege on time.

(Substantive) 1. YES. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern. In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern and public interest both embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure. Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making. 2. YES. The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, wherein petitioners were seeking information from the Presidents representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court held that applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers

exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. The Court also stressed that secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information. It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. The Court also addressed the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by saying: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our peoples right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof. 3. NO. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. However, the information must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. 4. NO. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-bycase, ad hoc basis. [E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of the competing interests, taking into account factors such as the relevance of the evidence, the availability of other evidence, the seriousness of the litigation, the role of the government, and the possibility of future timidity by government employees. In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong and sufficient showing of need. The arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this standard stated in the decided cases. There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement. Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to

convince this Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making unless the initial offers are also published. 5. NO. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received from the House Committee and petitionerCongressman Aguja were mere requests for information. The House Committee refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecias alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance. While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials out of respect for their office until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege. Vinuya vs. Romulo Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Ruling:It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a duty to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf when rights are injured.62 However, at present, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States to exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad.63 Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor opinio juris has evolved in such a direction. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty, and there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment.641avvphi1 We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law.65 However, petitioners take quite a theoretical leap in claiming that these proscriptions automatically imply that that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes, particularly since petitioners do not demand the imputation of individual criminal

liability, but seek to recover monetary reparations from the state of Japan. Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Indeed, precisely because of states reluctance to directly prosecute claims against another state, recent developments support the modern trend to empower individuals to directly participate in suits against perpetrators of international crimes.66 Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General Assembly resolutions calling for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of states does not yet support the present existence of an obligation to prosecute international crimes.67 Of course a customary duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot find enough evidence to reasonably assert its existence. To the extent that any state practice in this area is widespread, it is in the practice of granting amnesties, immunity, selective prosecution, or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity."68 Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens. The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describingobligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. The concept was recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction: x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasiuniversal character. The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice.69 The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.70 Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,71 but peremptory norms began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.72 The recognition

of jus cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).73 Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,74 the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms. After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that "there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens."75 In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that "the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals."76 Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.78 Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of petitioners, and we cannot begin to comprehend the unimaginable horror they underwent at the hands of the Japanese soldiers. We are also deeply concerned that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, the petitioners appear to be without a remedy to challenge those that have offended them before appropriate fora. Needless to say, our government should take the lead in protecting its citizens against violation of their fundamental human rights. Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners cause. Paguia vs. Office of the President Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davides age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees. In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioners standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.4 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither petitioners citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davides appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question. On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23s mandated retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent Davide.

Ruling: First. Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We have granted access to citizens suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of "transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution.5 Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.6 None of petitioners allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a "clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than petitioners generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law.1avvphi1 The same conclusion holds true for petitioners invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers contributions to the states coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.7 However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFAs total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davides nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw salary,8 negating petitioners claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds."9 Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioners suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."10 Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct. Constantino & the Freedom From Debt Coalition vs Gov. Cuisia of BSP During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents. HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives tonegotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government. The act of the respondents are not unconstitutional. Exception There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benignprerogative of pardon (mercy). There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. Fortich vs. Corona A lot located in bukidnon, owned by NQSRMDC, one of the petitioners. The said land was leased to Del Monte Philippines, during the period of the lease, the land was placed under compulsory acquisition. NQSRMDC resisted the action of the DAR, it sought and was granted a prohibition by the DARAB. Despite the order, a memorandum was issued, directing the Land Bank to open an account in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the property.

NQSRMDC objected to the action, and filed a motion to nullify the actions by the Land bank and the Regional director. DARAB ordered the Regional director and land bank to comply with the order. Gov. Fortich passed a resolution designating areas along bukidnon-sayre highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated. The DAR secretary ordered the regional director to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of property. Gov. Fortich appealed the order of denial to the office of the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon. To prevent the order of the Secretary of DAR, NQSRMDC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Dominguez, the Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, sent a memorandum to the President, endorsing favorably the project with a recommendation that the DAR secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application for the conversion of land. The Secretary of DILG also recommended the conversion of the land, and requested the President to hold the implementation of the order to distribute the land in question. The CA issued a resolution ordering the parties to observe the status quo, pending the resolution of the petition. In resolving the appeal, the OP, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, issued a decision reversing the DAR Secretarys decision. An MR was filed of the OP decision. In compliance with the OP decision, NQSRMDC and DECS executed a MOA for the donation of 4 hectares of the land to DECS, to establish a school. NQSRMDC discovered that the title was no longer in its name. it found out that during the pendency of the petition for certiorari in the CA and appeal to the OP, the DAR cancelled the title, and transferred to the Republic of the Philippines. A complaint was filed for annulment and cancellation in the RTC. The MR of DAR was denied by Executive Secretary Ruben Torres. A 2nd MR was filed. The OP resolved the protest by striker by issuing a resolution(Win/Win), penned by Secretary Renato Corona. Ruling: Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29,1996 can still be substantially modified by the Win-Win Resolution. We rule in the negative. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides: SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in reopening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down. Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street in a 1918 case, is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.