Article 1157 Navales vs.

Rias Facts: Vicente Navales filed a complaint with the CFI of Cebu against Eulogia [Link], claiming the latter should be sentenced to pay him the sum of 1,200 pesos as damages, together with the costs and such other expenses as the court might consider just and equitable.

damages to the person who was defeated in the action and sentenced to be ejected from the land which he improperly occupied with his house. No proof has been submitted that a contract had been entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants, or that the latter had committed illegal acts or omissions or incurred in any kind of fault or negligence, from any of which an obligation might have arisen on the part of the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff. For this reason, the claim for indemnity, on account of acts performed by the sheriff while enforcing a judgment, can not under any consideration be sustained.

The claim was due because of the order of pulling down and destruction of the house erected in Daanbuangan, town of Naga, Island of Cebu. Breakdown for damages: P1,000 amount of construction and P200 - amount prejudicial to him because no reimbursement was made. Defendant denied such allegation. The judge rendered its decision declaring that the decision was illegal, and that the action of the deputy sheriff Bacayo was illegal, hence they are liable for the damage caused to the plaintiff worth P500. Issue: WON the defendant are liable for the damages against the plaintiff Held: In the order of execution issued to the deputy sheriff, the directive portion of the judgment of the justice of the peace was inserted, and it contained the essential statement that the said judgment, by reason of its not having been appealed from, had become final, and from the contents of the same may be inferred that there had been an action for ejectment between the above-named parties, and that there was no reason why it should not be enforced when it had already become final and acquired the nature of res adjudicata. Assuming that the order for execution of final judgment was issued in accordance with the law, and in view of the fact that it has not been alleged nor proven that the sheriff when complying with the same had committed trespass or exceeded his functions, it must be presumed according to section 334 (14) of the said Code of Procedure, that the official duty was regularly performed. Therefore, it is not possible to impute liability to the plaintiff who obtained the judgment and the execution thereof, when the same was not disputed nor alleged to be null or illegal, and much less to compel the payment of

Virata vs. Ochoa Facts:

On September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is the employer of Ochoa; that for the death of Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted on September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City.

On December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal liability.

On February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said case to withdraw the reservation to file a separate civil action; the private prosecutor actively participated in the trial and presented evidence on the damages

On June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to institute a separate civil action

On July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio Virata, commenced a Civil Action at the CFI of Cavite at Bacoor, for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa

On August 13, 1976 the defendants, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action,

(Criminal Case) pending between the same parties for the same cause.

Facts: Petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de Barili ("Hospicio") is a charitable organization created as a body corporate in 1925 by Act No. 3239. The law was enacted in order to formally accept the offer made by Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui to establish a home for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids and incapacitated and helpless persons. Section 4 of Act No. 3239 provides that "[t]he personal and real property donated to the [Hospicio] by its founders or by other persons shall not be sold under any consideration."

On September 8, 1976 the CFI of Rizal at Pasay City a decision of the Criminal Case acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he caused an injury by name accident; and that on January 31, 1977, the CFI of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to Civil Case for damages. Issue: WON Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata. Held: According to the Code Commission: 'The foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery. The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation. Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence. Hospicio De San Jose, De Barili Cebu City vs. DAR

On 10 October 1987, the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) Region VII issued an order ordaining that two parcels of land owned by the Hospicio be placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor of twenty-two (22) tillers thereof as beneficiaries. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, a land reform law, was cited as legal basis for the order. The Hospicio filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary, citing the aforementioned Section 4 of Act No. 3239. It argued that Act No. 3239 is a special law, which could not have been repealed by P.D. No. 27, a general law, or by the latters general repealing clause.

The Order of the DAR Secretary was assailed in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether a provision in the law prohibiting the sale of the properties donated to the charitable organization that was incorporated by the same law bars the implementation of agrarian reform laws as regards said properties. Held: Section 4 of Act No. 3239 prohibits the sale "under any consideration" of the lands donated to the Hospicio. But the land transfers mandated under P.D. No. 27 cannot be considered a conventional sale under our civil laws. Generally, sale arises out of a contractual obligation. Thus, it must meet the first essential requisite of every contract that is the presence of consent. Consent implies an act of volition in entering into the agreement. The absence or

vitiation of consent renders the sale either void or voidable. In this case, the deprivation of the Hospicios property did not arise as a consequence of the Hospicios consent to the transfer. There was no meeting of minds between the Hospicio, on one hand, and the DAR or the tenants, on the other, on the properties and the cause which are to constitute the contract that is to serve ultimately as the basis for the transfer of ownership of the subject lands. Instead, the obligation to transfer arises by compulsion of law, particularly P.D. No. 27. Agrarian reform is justified under the States inherent power of eminent domain that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. It has even been characterized as beyond the traditional exercise of eminent domain, but a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The twin process of expropriation of lands under agrarian reform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been aptly described in common law jurisdictions as "sale made under the process of the court, and in the mode prescribed by law," and "which is not the voluntary act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc."20 The term has not been precisely defined in this jurisdiction, but reference to the phrase itself is made in Articles 223, 232, 237 and 243 of the Civil Code, which uniformly exempt the family home "from execution, forced sale, or attachment."21 Yet a forced sale is clearly different from the sales described under Book V of the Civil Code which are conventional sales, as it does not arise from the consensual agreement of the vendor and vendee, but by compulsion of law. Still, since law is recognized as one of the sources of obligation, there can be no dispute on the efficacy of a forced sale, so long as it is authorized by law. Issue: Whether the sale prohibited under Section 4 of Act No. 3239 includes even a forced sale. Held: Evidently, the word "sale," as contemplated by the framers of the law in 1925, pertains to its concept in civil law, with the requisite of consent being present. It cannot refer to sales or dispositions that arise by operation of law, such as through judicial execution, or, as in this case, expropriation.

Thus, we can hardly characterize the acquisition of the subject properties from the Hospicio for the benefit of the tenants as a sale, within the contemplation of Section 4 of Act No. 3239. The transfer arises from compulsion of law, and not the desire of any parties. Even if the Hospicio had voluntarily offered to surrender its properties to agrarian reform, the resulting transaction would not be considered as a conventional sale, since the obligation is created not out of the mandate of the parties, but the will of the law. The DARRO Order did note that Section 4 of Act No. 3239 is not applicable in this case, since the transfer is compulsory on the part of the landowner, unlike in ordinary sale. Regrettably, the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals failed to apply that sound principle, preferring to rely instead on the conclusion that Section 4 was repealed by P.D. No. 27 and the CARL. Nonetheless, even assuming for the nonce that Section 4 contemplates even forced sales such as those through expropriation, we would agree with the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals that Section 4 is deemed repealed by P.D. No. 27 and the CARL. PP vs. Paniterce Facts: Domingo Paniterce was charged with the crimes of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness against his daughter. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge.

On June 4, 2005, he was committed to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City. He filed an appeal with the CA and the CA rendered its decisionon August 22, 2008 affirming the decision of the RTC with some modification. Paniterce filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA of his intention to appeal before the Supreme Court. He filed his supplemental brief on June 16, 2009, while the OSG filed a Manifestation on June 18, 2009 stating that the supplemental brief of Paniterce did not raise new issue in his appeal. However, in a letter dated October 12, 2009, the SC received a letter from the Assistant Director for Prisons and Bureau of Corrections informing them of the death of Paniterce on August 22, 2009 at the New Bilibid Prison. Issue:

What is the effect of the death on the present appeal Held: According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts xxxx e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party

instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Clearly, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Paniterces appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of the crimes charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Paniterce had incurred criminal liabilities, they were totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because Paniterces appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him when he died, his civil liabilities arising from the crimes, being civil liabilities ex delicto, were likewise extinguished by his death. Consequently, the appealed Decision dated August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals finding Paniterce guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness, sentencing him to imprisonment, and ordering him to indemnify his victims had become ineffectual.