Maths 1900-Present

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Contents
Articles
Russell's paradox Principia Mathematica Koch snowflake Axiom of choice Jordan curve theorem Special relativity Intuitionism Intuitionistic logic Heyting arithmetic Intuitionistic type theory Constructive set theory Constructive analysis ZermeloFraenkel set theory Hairy ball theorem General relativity Hilbert's program Gdel's incompleteness theorems Travelling salesman problem Turing machine Binary number Ham sandwich theorem Enigma machine Colossus computer Game theory ENIAC Prisoner's dilemma Calculator George Plya How to Solve It Erds number Chaos theory Secretary problem Catastrophe theory Conway's Game of Life 1 6 19 24 34 37 55 60 66 67 72 75 76 83 86 119 121 138 153 169 184 187 208 217 236 244 254 269 272 275 280 295 301 306

Diophantine set P versus NP problem Public-key cryptography Fractal Four color theorem Logistic map Kepler conjecture Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem Millennium Prize Problems Hodge conjecture Poincar conjecture Riemann hypothesis YangMills existence and mass gap NavierStokes existence and smoothness Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture Grigori Perelman

315 318 329 339 351 361 367 371 378 381 385 394 418 420 423 427

References
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Russell's paradox

Russell's paradox
In the foundations of mathematics, Russell's paradox (also known as Russell's antinomy), discovered by Bertrand Russell in 1901, showed that the naive set theory created by Georg Cantor leads to a contradiction. The same paradox had been discovered a year before by Ernst Zermelo but he did not publish the idea, which remained known only to Hilbert, Husserl and other members of the University of Gttingen. According to naive set theory, any definable collection is a set. Let R be the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. If R qualifies as a member of itself, it would contradict its own definition as a set containing all sets that are not members of themselves. On the other hand, if such a set is not a member of itself, it would qualify as a member of itself by the same definition. This contradiction is Russell's paradox. Symbolically:

In 1908, two ways of avoiding the paradox were proposed, Russell's type theory and the Zermelo set theory, the first constructed axiomatic set theory. Zermelo's axioms went well beyond Frege's axioms of extensionality and unlimited set abstraction, and evolved into the now-canonical ZermeloFraenkel set theory (ZF).[1]

Informal presentation
Let us call a set "abnormal" if it is a member of itself, and "normal" otherwise. For example, take the set of all geometrical squares. That set is not itself a square, and therefore is not a member of the set of all squares. So it is "normal". On the other hand, if we take the complementary set that contains all non-squares, that set is itself not a square and so should be one of its own members. It is "abnormal". Now we consider the set of all normal sets, R. Determining whether R is normal or abnormal is impossible: If R were a normal set, it would be contained in the set of normal sets (itself), and therefore be abnormal; and if R were abnormal, it would not be contained in the set of all normal sets (itself), and therefore be normal. This leads to the conclusion that R is neither normal nor abnormal: Russell's paradox.

Formal presentation
Define Naive Set Theory (NST) as the theory of predicate logic with a binary predicate schema of unrestricted comprehension: and the following axiom

for any formula P with only the variable x free. Substitute (reusing the symbol y) and universal instantiation we have a contradiction. Therefore NST is inconsistent.

for

. Then by existential instantiation

Set-theoretic responses
In 1908, Ernst Zermelo proposed an axiomatization of set theory that avoided the paradoxes of naive set theory by replacing arbitrary set comprehension with weaker existence axioms, such as his axiom of separation (Aussonderung). Modifications to this axiomatic theory proposed in the 1920s by Abraham Fraenkel, Thoralf Skolem, and by Zermelo himself resulted in the axiomatic set theory called ZFC. This theory became widely accepted once Zermelo's axiom of choice ceased to be controversial, and ZFC has remained the canonical axiomatic set theory down to the present day. ZFC does not assume that, for every property, there is a set of all things satisfying that property. Rather, it asserts that given any set X, any subset of X definable using first-order logic exists. The object R discussed above cannot be

Russell's paradox constructed in this fashion, and is therefore not a ZFC set. In some extensions of ZFC, objects like R are called proper classes. ZFC is silent about types, although some argue that Zermelo's axioms tacitly presuppose a background type theory. In ZFC, given a set A, it is possible to define a set B that consists of exactly the sets in A that are not members of themselves. B cannot be in A by the same reasoning in Russell's Paradox. This variation of Russell's paradox shows that no set contains everything. Through the work of Zermelo and others, especially John von Neumann, the structure of what some see as the "natural" objects described by ZFC eventually became clear; they are the elements of the von Neumann universe, V, built up from the empty set by transfinitely iterating the power set operation. It is thus now possible again to reason about sets in a non-axiomatic fashion without running afoul of Russell's paradox, namely by reasoning about the elements of V. Whether it is appropriate to think of sets in this way is a point of contention among the rival points of view on the philosophy of mathematics. Other resolutions to Russell's paradox, more in the spirit of type theory, include the axiomatic set theories New Foundations and Scott-Potter set theory.

History
Russell discovered the paradox in May or June 1901.[2] By his own admission in his 1919 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, he "attempted to discover some flaw in Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal".[3] In a 1902 letter,[4] he announced the discovery to Gottlob Frege of the paradox in Frege's 1879 Begriffsschrift and framed the problem in terms of both logic and set theory, and in particular in terms of Frege's definition of function; in the following, p.17 refers to a page in the original Begriffsschrift, and page 23 refers to the same page in van Heijenoort 1967: There is just one point where I have encountered a difficulty. You state (p. 17 [p. 23 above]) that a function too, can act as the indeterminate element. This I formerly believed, but now this view seems doubtful to me because of the following contradiction. Let w be the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself. Can w be predicated of itself? From each answer its opposite follows. Therefore we must conclude that w is not a predicate. Likewise there is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves. From this I conclude that under certain circumstances a definable collection [Menge] does not form a totality.[5] Russell would go to cover it at length in his 1903 The Principles of Mathematics where he repeats his first encounter with the paradox:[6] Before taking leave of fundamental questions, it is necessary to examine more in detail the singular contradiction, already mentioned, with regard to predicates not predicable of themselves. ... I may mention that I was led to it in the endeavour to reconcile Cantor's proof...." Russell wrote to Frege about the paradox just as Frege was preparing the second volume of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.[7] Frege did not waste time responding to Russell, his letter dated 22 June 1902 appears, with van Heijenoort's commentary in Heijenoort 1967:126127. Frege then wrote an appendix admitting to the paradox,[8] and proposed a solution that Russell would endorse in his Principles of Mathematics,[9] but was later considered by some unsatisfactory.[10] For his part, Russell had his work at the printers and he added an appendix on the doctrine of types.[11] Ernst Zermelo in his (1908) A new proof of the possibility of a well-ordering (published at the same time he published "the first axiomatic set theory")[12] laid claim to prior discovery of the antinomy in Cantor's naive set theory. He states: "And yet, even the elementary form that Russell9 gave to the set-theoretic antinomies could have persuaded them [J. Knig, Jourdain, F. Bernstein] that the solution of these difficulties is not to be sought in the surrender of well-ordering but only in a suitable restriction of the notion of set".[13] Footnote 9 is where he stakes his

Russell's paradox claim:

9

1903, pp. 366368. I had, however, discovered this antinomy myself, independently of Russell, and had communicated it prior to 1903 to Professor Hilbert among others.[14] A written account of Zermelo's actual argument was discovered in the Nachlass of Edmund Husserl.[15] It is also known that unpublished discussions of set theoretical paradoxes took place in the mathematical community at the turn of the century. van Heijenoort in his commentary before Russell's 1902 Letter to Frege states that Zermelo "had discovered the paradox independently of Russell and communicated it to Hilbert, among others, prior to its publication by Russell".[16] In 1923, Ludwig Wittgenstein proposed to "dispose" of Russell's paradox as follows: The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself. For let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be its own argument: in that case there would be a proposition 'F(F(fx))', in which the outer function F and the inner function F must have different meanings, since the inner one has the form O(f(x)) and the outer one has the form Y(O(fx)). Only the letter 'F' is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself signifies nothing. This immediately becomes clear if instead of 'F(Fu)' we write '(do) : F(Ou) . Ou = Fu'. That disposes of Russell's paradox. (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 3.333) Russell and Alfred North Whitehead wrote their three-volume Principia Mathematica (PM) hoping to achieve what Frege had been unable to do. They sought to banish the paradoxes of naive set theory by employing a theory of types they devised for this purpose. While they succeeded in grounding arithmetic in a fashion, it is not at all evident that they did so by purely logical means. While PM avoided the known paradoxes and allows the derivation of a great deal of mathematics, its system gave rise to new problems. In any event, Kurt Gdel in 193031 proved that while the logic of much of PM, now known as first-order logic, is complete, Peano arithmetic is necessarily incomplete if it is consistent. This is very widely though not universally regarded as having shown the logicist program of Frege to be impossible to complete.

Applied versions
There are some versions of this paradox that are closer to real-life situations and may be easier to understand for non-logicians. For example, the Barber paradox supposes a barber who shaves all men who do not shave themselves and only men who do not shave themselves. When one thinks about whether the barber should shave himself or not, the paradox begins to emerge. As another example, consider five lists of encyclopedia entries within the same encyclopedia:
List of articles about people: Ptolemy VII of Egypt Hermann Hesse Don Nix Don Knotts Nikola Tesla Sherlock Holmes Emperor Knin List of articles starting with the letter L: ... ... List of articles starting with the letter K List of articles starting with the letter L List of articles starting with the letter M L L!VE TV L&H List of articles about places: Leivonmki Katase River Enoshima List of articles about Japan: Emperor Showa Katase River Enoshima List of all lists that do not contain themselves: ... ... List of all lists that do not contain themselves? List of articles starting with the letter K List of articles starting with the letter M List of articles about Japan List of articles about places List of articles about people

Russell's paradox If the "List of all lists that do not contain themselves" contains itself, then it does not belong to itself and should be removed. However, if it does not list itself, then it should be added to itself. While appealing, these layman's versions of the paradox share a drawback: an easy refutation of the Barber paradox seems to be that such a barber does not exist, or at least does not shave (a variant of which is that the barber is a woman). The whole point of Russell's paradox is that the answer "such a set does not exist" means the definition of the notion of set within a given theory is unsatisfactory. Note the difference between the statements "such a set does not exist" and "it is an empty set". It is like the difference between saying, "There is no bucket", and saying, "The bucket is empty". A notable exception to the above may be the GrellingNelson paradox, in which words and meaning are the elements of the scenario rather than people and hair-cutting. Though it is easy to refute the Barber's paradox by saying that such a barber does not (and cannot) exist, it is impossible to say something similar about a meaningfully defined word. One way that the paradox has been dramatised is as follows: Suppose that every public library has to compile a catalog of all its books. Since the catalog is itself one of the library's books, some librarians include it in the catalog for completeness; while others leave it out as it being one of the library's books is self-evident. Now imagine that all these catalogs are sent to the national library. Some of them include themselves in their listings, others do not. The national librarian compiles two master catalogs one of all the catalogs that list themselves, and one of all those that don't. The question is: should these catalogs list themselves? The 'Catalog of all catalogs that list themselves' is no problem. If the librarian doesn't include it in its own listing, it is still a true catalog of those catalogs that do include themselves. If he does include it, it remains a true catalog of those that list themselves. However, just as the librarian cannot go wrong with the first master catalog, he is doomed to fail with the second. When it comes to the 'Catalog of all catalogs that don't list themselves', the librarian cannot include it in its own listing, because then it would include itself. But in that case, it should belong to the other catalog, that of catalogs that do include themselves. However, if the librarian leaves it out, the catalog is incomplete. Either way, it can never be a true catalog of catalogs that do not list themselves.

Applications and related topics

Russell-like paradoxes
As illustrated above for the Barber paradox, Russell's paradox is not hard to extend. Take: A transitive verb <V>, that can be applied to its substantive form. Form the sentence: The <V>er that <V>s all (and only those) who don't <V> themselves, Sometimes the "all" is replaced by "all <V>ers". An example would be "paint": The painter that paints all (and only those) that don't paint themselves. or "elect" The elector (representative), that elects all that don't elect themselves. Paradoxes that fall in this scheme include: The barber with "shave".

Russell's paradox The original Russell's paradox with "contain": The container (Set) that contains all (containers) that don't contain themselves. The GrellingNelson paradox with "describer": The describer (word) that describes all words, that don't describe themselves. Richard's paradox with "denote": The denoter (number) that denotes all denoters (numbers) that don't denote themselves. (In this paradox, all descriptions of numbers get an assigned number. The term "that denotes all denoters (numbers) that don't denote themselves" is here called Richardian.)

Related paradoxes
The liar paradox and Epimenides paradox, whose origins are ancient The KleeneRosser paradox, showing that the original lambda calculus is inconsistent, by means of a self-negating statement Curry's paradox (named after Haskell Curry), which does not require negation The smallest uninteresting integer paradox

Notes
[1] Set theory paradoxes (http:/ / www. suitcaseofdreams. net/ Set_theory_Paradox. htm) [2] Godehard Link (2004), One hundred years of Russell's paradox (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=Xg6QpedPpcsC& pg=PA350), p.350, ISBN978-3-11-017438-0, [3] Russell 1920:136 [4] Gottlob Frege, Michael Beaney (1997), The Frege reader (http:/ / books. google. com/ ?id=4ktC0UrG4V8C& pg=PA253), p.253, ISBN978-0-631-19445-3, . Also van Heijenoort 1967:124125 [5] Remarkably, this letter was unpublished until van Heijenoort 1967 it appears with van Heijenoort's commentary at van Heijenoort 1967:124125. [6] Russell 1903:101 [7] cf van Heijenoort's commentary before Frege's Letter to Russell in van Heijenoort 1967:126. [8] van Heijenoort's commentary, cf van Heijenoort 1967:126 ; Frege starts his analysis by this exceptionally honest comment : "Hardly anything more unfortunate can befall a scientific writer than to have one of the foundations of his edifice shaken after the work is finished. This was the position I was placed in by a letter of Mr Bertrand Russell, just when the printing of this volume was nearing its completion" (Appendix of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. II, in The Frege Reader, p.279, translation by Michael Beaney [9] cf van Heijenoort's commentary, cf van Heijenoort 1967:126. The added text reads as follows: " Note. The second volume of Gg., which appeared too late to be noticed in the Appendix, contains an interesting discussion of the contradiction (pp. 253265), suggesting that the solution is to be found by denying that two propositional functions that determine equal classes must be equivalent. As it seems very likely that this is the true solution, the reader is strongly recommended to examine Frege's argument on the point" (Russell 1903:522); The abbreviation Gg. stands for Frege's Grundgezetze der Arithmetik. Begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet. Vol. I. Jena, 1893. Vol. II. 1903. [10] Livio states that "While Frege did make some desperate attempts to remedy his axiom system, he was unsuccessful. The conclusion appeared to be disastrous...." Livio 2009:188. But van Heijenoort in his commentary before Frege's (1902) Letter to Russell describes Frege's proposed "way out" in some detail the matter has to do with the " 'transformation of the generalization of an equality into an equality of courses-of-values. For Frege a function is something incomplete, 'unsaturated' "; this seems to contradict the contemporary notion of a "function in extension"; see Frege's wording at page 128: "Incidentally, it seems to me that the expession 'a predicate is predicated of itself' is not exact. ...Therefore I would prefer to say that 'a concept is predicated of its own extension' [etc]". But he waffles at the end of his suggestion that a function-as-concept-in-extension can be written as predicated of its function. van Heijenoort cites Quine: "For a late and thorough study of Frege's "way out", see Quine 1955": "On Frege's way out", Mind 64, 145159; reprinted in Quine 1955b: Appendix. Completeness of quantification theory. Loewenheim's theorem, enclosed as a pamphlet with part of the third printing (1955) of Quine 1950 and incorporated in the revised edition (1959), 253260" (cf REFERENCES in van Heijenoort 1967:649) [11] Russell mentions this fact to Frege, cf van Heijenoort's commentary before Frege's (1902) Letter to Russell in van Heijenoort 1967:126 [12] van Heijenoort's commentary before Zermelo (1908a) Investigations in the foundations of set theory I in van Heijenoort 1967:199 [13] van Heijenoort 1967:190191. In the section before this he objects strenuously to the notion of impredicativity as defined by Poincar (and soon to be taken by Russell, too, in his 1908 Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types cf van Heijenoort 1967:150182). [14] Ernst Zermelo (1908) A new proof of the possibility of a well-ordering in van Heijenoort 1967:183198. Livio 2009:191 reports that Zermelo "discovered Russell's paradox independently as early as 1900"; Livio in turn cites Ewald 1996 and van Heijenoort 1967 (cf Livio 2009:268). [15] B. Rang and W. Thomas, "Zermelo's discovery of the 'Russell Paradox'", Historia Mathematica, v. 8 n. 1, 1981, pp. 1522. doi:10.1016/0315-0860(81)90002-1

Russell's paradox
[16] van Heijenoort 1967:124

References
Potter, Michael (15 January 2004), Set Theory and its Philosophy, Clarendon Press (Oxford University Press), ISBN978-0-19-926973-0 van Heijenoort, Jean (1967, third printing 1976), From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1979-1931, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, ISBN0-674-32449-8 Livio, Mario (6 January 2009), Is God a Mathematician?, New York: Simon & Schuster, ISBN978-0-7432-9405-8

External links
Russell's Paradox ([Link] at Cut-the-Knot Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " Russell's Paradox ([Link] by A. D. Irvine. Inconsistent countable set,[Link] ([Link] 115667544?secret_password=2gzzmxsoylip718oxbvd)

Principia Mathematica
The Principia Mathematica is a three-volume work on the foundations of mathematics, written by Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell and published in 1910, 1912, and 1913. In 1927, it appeared in a second edition with an important Introduction To the Second Edition, an Appendix A that replaced 9 and an all-new Appendix C. PM, as it is often abbreviated, was an attempt to describe a set of axioms and inference rules in symbolic logic from which all mathematical truths could in principle be proven. As such, this ambitious project is of great importance in the history of mathematics and philosophy,[1] being one of the foremost products of the belief that such an undertaking may have been achievable. However, in 1931, Gdel's incompleteness theorem proved for good that PM, and in fact any other attempt, could never achieve this lofty goal; that is, for any set of axioms and inference rules proposed to encapsulate mathematics, there would in fact be some truths of mathematics which could not be deduced from them. One of the main inspirations and motivations for PM was the earlier work of Gottlob Frege on logic, which Russell discovered The title page of the shortened version of the Principia allowed for the construction of paradoxical sets. PM sought to Mathematica to *56 avoid this problem by ruling out the unrestricted creation of arbitrary sets. This was achieved by replacing the notion of a general set with notion of a hierarchy of sets of different 'types', a set of a certain type only allowed to contain sets of strictly lower types. Contemporary mathematics, however, avoids paradoxes such as Russell's in less unwieldy ways, such as the system of ZermeloFraenkel set theory.

Principia Mathematica PM is not to be confused with Russell's 1903 Principles of Mathematics. PM states: "The present work was originally intended by us to be comprised in a second volume of Principles of Mathematics... But as we advanced, it became increasingly evident that the subject is a very much larger one than we had supposed; moreover on many fundamental questions which had been left obscure and doubtful in the former work, we have now arrived at what we believe to be satisfactory solutions." The Modern Library placed it 23rd in a list of the top 100 English-language nonfiction books of the twentieth century.[2]

Scope of foundations laid

The Principia covered only set theory, cardinal numbers, ordinal numbers, and real numbers. Deeper theorems from real analysis were not included, but by the end of the third volume it was clear to experts that a large amount of known mathematics could in principle be developed in the adopted formalism. It was also clear how lengthy such a development would be. A fourth volume on the foundations of geometry had been planned, but the authors admitted to intellectual exhaustion upon completion of the third.

The construction of the theory of PM

As noted in the criticism of the theory by Kurt Gdel (below), unlike a Formalist theory, the "logicistic" theory of PM has no "precise statement of the syntax of the formalism". Another observation is that almost immediately in the theory, interpretations (in the sense of model theory) are presented in terms of truth-values for the behavior of the symbols "" (assertion of truth), "~" (logical not), and "V" (logical inclusive OR). Truth-values: PM embeds the notions of "truth" and "falsity" in the notion "primitive proposition". A raw (pure) Formalist theory would not provide the meaning of the symbols that form a "primitive proposition"the symbols themselves could be absolutely arbitrary and unfamiliar. The theory would specify only how the symbols behave based on the grammar of the theory. Then later, by assignment of "values", a model would specify an interpretation of what the formulas are saying. Thus in the formal Kleene symbol set below, the "interpretation" of what the symbols commonly mean, and by implication how they end up being used, is given in parentheses, e.g., " (not)". But this is not a pure Formalist theory.

The contemporary construction of a formal theory

The following formalist theory is offered as contrast to the logicistic theory of PM. A contemporary formal system would be constructed as follows: 1. Symbols used: This set is the starting set, and other symbols can appear but only by definition from these beginning symbols. A starting set might be the following set derived from Kleene 1952: logical symbols "" (implies, IF-THEN, ""), "&" (and), "V" (or), "" (not), "" (for all), "" (there exists); predicate symbol "=" (equals); function symbols "+" (arithmetic addition), "" (arithmetic multiplication), "'" (successor); individual symbol "0" (zero); variables "a", "b", "c", etc.; and parentheses "(" and ")".[3] 2. Symbol strings: The theory will build "strings" of these symbols by concatenation (juxtaposition).[4] 3. Formation rules: The theory specifies the rules of syntax (rules of grammar) usually as a recursive definition that starts with "0" and specifies how to build acceptable strings or "well-formed formulas" (wffs).[5] This includes a rule for "substitution".[6] of strings for the symbols called "variables" (as opposed to the other symbol-types). 4. Transformation rule(s): The axioms that specify the behaviors of the symbols and symbol sequences. 5. Rule of inference, detachment, modus ponens : The rule that allows the theory to "detach" a "conclusion" from the "premises" that led up to it, and thereafter to discard the "premises" (symbols to the left of the line , or symbols above the line if horizontal). If this were not the case, then substitution would result in longer and longer

Principia Mathematica strings that have to be carried forward. Indeed, after the application of modus ponens, nothing is left but the conclusion, the rest disappears forever. Contemporary theories often specify as their first axiom the classical or modus ponens or "the rule of detachment": A, A B B The symbol "" is usually written as a horizontal line, here "" means "implies". The symbols A and B are "stand-ins" for strings; this form of notation is called an "axiom schema" (i.e., there is a countable number of specific forms the notation could take). This can be read in a manner similar to IF-THEN but with a difference: given symbol string IF A and A implies B THEN B (and retain only B for further use). But the symbols have no "interpretation" (e.g., no "truth table" or "truth values" or "truth functions") and modus ponens proceeds mechanistically, by grammar alone.

The logicistic construction of the theory of PM

The theory of PM has both significant similarities, and similar differences, to a contemporary formal theory. Kleene states that "this deduction of mathematics from logic was offered as intuitive axiomatics. The axioms were intended to be believed, or at least to be accepted as plausible hypotheses concerning the world".[7] Indeed, unlike a Formalist theory that manipulates symbols according to rules of grammar, PM introduces the notion of "truth-values", i.e., truth and falsity in the real-world sense, and the "assertion of truth" almost immediately as the fifth and sixth elements in the structure of the theory (PM 1962:4-36): 1. Variables. 2. Uses of various letters. 3. The fundamental functions of propositions: "the Contradictory Function" symbolized by "~" and the "Logical Sum or Disjunctive Function" symbolized by "" being taken as primitive and logical implication defined (the following example also used to illustrate 9. Definition below) as p q .=. ~ p q Df. (PM 1962:11) and logical product defined as p . q .=. ~(~p ~q) Df. (PM 1962:12) (See more about the confusing "dots" used as both a grammatical device and as to symbolize logical conjunction (logical AND) at the section on notation.) 4. Equivalence: Logical equivalence, not arithmetic equivalence: "" given as a demonstration of how the symbols are used, i.e., "Thus ' p q ' stands for '( p q ) . ( q p )'." (PM 1962:7). Notice that to discuss a notation PM identifies a "meta"-notation with "[space] ... [space]":[8] Logical equivalence appears again as a definition: p q .=. ( p q ) . ( q p. ) (PM 1962:12), Notice the appearance of parentheses. This grammatical usage is not specified and appears sporadically; parentheses do play an important role in symbol strings, however, e.g., the notation "(x)" for the contemporary "x". 5. Truth-values: "The 'Truth-value' of a proposition is truth if it is true, and "falsehood if it is false" (this phrase is due to Frege) (PM 1962:7). 6. Assertion-sign: "'. p may be read 'it is true that' ... thus ':p..q ' means 'it is true that p implies q ', whereas '.p'.. q ' means ' p is true; therefore q is true'. The first of these does not necessarily involve the truth either of p or of q, while the second involves the truth of both" (PM 1962:92). 7. Inference: PM 's version of modus ponens. "[If] '. p ' and ' (p q)' have occurred, then ' . q ' will occur if it is desired to put it on record. The process of the inference cannot be reduced to symbols. Its sole record is the

Principia Mathematica occurrence of '. p ' [in other words, the symbols on the left disappear or can be erased]" (PM 1962:9). 8. The Use of Dots: See the section on notation. 9. Definitions: These use the "=" sign with "Df" at the right end. See the section on notation. 10. Summary of preceding statements: brief discussion of the primitive ideas "~ p" and "p q" and "" prefixed to a proposition. 11. Primitive propositions: the axioms or postulates. This was significantly modified in the 2nd edition. 12. Propositional functions: The notion of "proposition" was significantly modified in the 2nd edition, including the introduction of "atomic" propositions linked by logical signs to form "molecular" propositions, and the use of substitution of molecular propositions into atomic or molecular propositions to create new expressions. 13. The range of values and total variation. 14. Ambiguous assertion and the real variable: This and the next two sections were modified or abandoned in the 2nd edition. In particular, the distinction between the concepts defined in sections 15. Definition and the real variable and 16 Propositions connecting real and apparent variables was abandoned in the second edition. 17. Formal implication and formal equivalence. 18. Identity: See the section on notation. The symbol "=" indicates "predicate" or arithmetic equality. 19. Classes and relations. 20. Various descriptive functions of relations.

21. Plural descriptive functions. 22. Unit classes.

Primitive ideas
Cf. PM 1962:90-94, for the first edition: (1) Elementary propositions. (2) Elementary propositions of functions. (3) Assertion: introduces the notions of "truth" and "falsity". (4) Assertion of a propositional function. (5) Negation: "If p is any proposition, the proposition "not-p", or "p is false," will be represented by "~p" ". (6) Disjunction: "If p and q are any propositons, the proposition "p or q, i.e., "either p is true or q is true," where the alternatives are to be not mutually exclusive, will be represented by "p q" ". (cf. section B)

Primitive propositions (Pp)

The first edition (see discusion relative to the second edition, below) begins with a definition of the sign "" 1.01. p q .=. ~ p q. Df. 1.1. Anything implied by a true elementary proposition is true. Pp modus ponens (1.11 was abandoned in the second edition.) 1.2. : p p .. p. Pp principle of tautology 1.3. : q .. p q. Pp principle of addition 1.4. : p q .. q p. Pp principle of permutation 1.5. : p ( q r ) .. q ( p r ). Pp associative principle 1.6. :. q r .: p q .. p r. Pp principle of summation 1.7. If p is an elementary proposition, ~p is an elementary proposition. Pp 1.71. If p and q are elementary propositions, p q is an elementary proposition. Pp

Principia Mathematica 1.72. If p and p are elementary propositional functions which take elementary propositions as arguments, p p is an elementary proposition. Pp Together with the "Introduction to the Second Edition", the second edition's Appendix A abandons the entire section 9. This includes six primitive propositions 9 through 9.15 together with the Axioms of reducibility. The revised theory is made difficult by the introduction of the Sheffer stroke ("|") to symbolize "incompatibility" (i.e., if both elementary propositions p and q are true, their "stroke" p | q is false), the contemporary logical NAND (not-AND). In the revised theory, the Introduction presents the notion of "atomic proposition", a "datum" that "belongs to the philosophical part of logic". These have no parts that are propositions and do not contain the notions "all" or "some". For example: "this is red", or "this is earlier than that". Such things can exist ad finitum, i.e., even an "infinite eunumeration" of them to replace "generality" (i.e., the notion of "for all").[9] PM then "advance[s] to molecular propositions" that are all linked by "the stroke". Definitions give equivalences for "~", "", "", and ".". The new introduction defines "elementary propositions" as atomic and molecular positions together. It then replaces all the primitive propositions 1.2 to 1.72 with a single primitive proposition framed in terms of the stroke: "If p, q, r are elementary propositions, given p and p|(q|r), we can infer r. This is a primitive proposition." The new introduction keeps the notation for "there exists" (now recast as "sometimes true") and "for all" (recast as "always true"). Appendix A strengths the notion of "matrix" or "predicative function" (a "primitive idea", PM 1962:164) and presents four new Primitive propositions as 8.18.13. 88. Multiplicative axiom 102. Axiom of infinity

10

Notation used in PM
One author[1] observes that "The notation in that work has been superseded by the subsequent development of logic during the 20th century, to the extent that the beginner has trouble reading PM at all"; while much of the symbolic content can be converted to modern notation, the original notation itself is "a subject of scholarly dispute", and some notation "embod[y] substantive logical doctrines so that it cannot simply be replaced by contemporary symbolism".[10] Kurt Gdel was harshly critical of the notation: "It is to be regretted that this first comprehensive and thorough-going presentation of a mathematical logic and the derivation of mathematics from it [is] so greatly lacking in formal precision in the foundations (contained in 121 of Principia [i.e., sections 15 (propositional logic), 814 (predicate logic with identity/equality), 20(introduction to set theory), and 21 (introduction to relations theory)]) that it represents in this respect a considerable step backwards as compared with Frege. What is missing, above all, is a precise statement of the syntax of the formalism. Syntactical considerations are omitted even in cases where they are necessary for the cogency of the proofs".[11] This is reflected in the example below of the symbols "p", "q", "r" and "" that can be formed into the string "p q r". PM requires a definition of what this symbol-string means in terms of other symbols; in contemporary treatments the "formation rules" (syntactical rules leading to "well formed formulas") would have prevented the formation of this string. Source of the notation: Chapter I "Preliminary Explanations of Ideas and Notations" begins with the source of the notation: "The notation adopted in the present work is based upon that of Peano, and the following explanations are to some extent modelled on those which he prefixes to his Formulario Mathematico [i.e., Peano 1889]. His use of dots as brackets is adopted, and so are many of his symbols" (PM 1927:4).[12] PM adopts the assertion sign "" from Frege's 1879 Begriffsschrift:[13]

Principia Mathematica "(I)t may be read 'it is true that'"[14] Thus to assert a proposition p PM writes: ". p." (PM 1927:92) (Observe that, as in the original, the left dot is square and of greater size than the period on the right.)

11

An introduction to the notation of "Section A Mathematical Logic" (formulas 15.71)

PM 's dots[15] are used in a manner similar to parentheses. Later in section 14, brackets "[ ]" appear, and in sections 20 and following, braces "{ }" appear. Whether these symbols have specific meanings or are just for visual clarification is unclear. More than one dot indicates the "depth" of the parentheses, e.g., ".", ":" or ":.", "::", etc. Unfortunately for contemporary readers, the single dot (but also ":", ":.", "::", etc.) is used to symbolize "logical product" (contemporary logical AND often symbolized by "&" or ""). Logical implication is represented by Peano's "" simplified to "", logical negation is symbolized by an elongated tilde, i.e., "~" (contemporary "~" or ""), the logical OR by "v". The symbol "=" together with "Df" is used to indicate "is defined as", whereas in sections 13 and following, "=" is defined as (mathematically) "identical with", i.e., contemporary mathematical "equality" (cf. discussion in section 13). Logical equivalence is represented by "" (contemporary "if and only if"); "elementary" propositional functions are written in the customary way, e.g., "f(p)", but later the function sign appears directly before the variable without parenthesis e.g., "x", "x", etc. Example, PM introduces the definition of "logical product" as follows: 3.01. p . q .=. ~(~p v ~q) Df. where "p . q" is the logical product of p and q. 3.02. p q r .=. p q . q r Df. This definition serves merely to abbreviate proofs. Translation of the formulas into contemporary symbols: Various authors use alternate symbols, so no definitive translation can be given. However, because of criticisms such as that of Kurt Gdel below, the best contemporary treatments will be very precise with respect to the "formation rules" (the syntax) of the formulas. The first formula might be converted into modern symbolism as follows:[16] (p & q) =df (~(~p v ~q)) alternately (p & q) =df ((p v q)) alternately (p q) =df ((p v q)) etc. The second formula might be converted as follows: (p q r) =df (p q) & (q r) But note that this is not (logically) equivalent to (p (q r)) nor to ((p q) r), and these two are not logically equivalent either.

Principia Mathematica

12

An introduction to the notation of "Section B Theory of Apparent Variables" (formulas 814.34)

These sections concern what is now known as Predicate logic, and Predicate logic with identity (equality). NB: As a result of criticism and advances, the second edition of PM (1927) replaces 9 with a new 8 (Appendix A). This new section eliminates the first edition's distinction between real and apparent variables, and it eliminates "the primitive idea 'assertion of a propositional function'.[17] To add to the complexity of the treatment, 8 introduces the notion of substituting a "matrix", and the Sheffer stroke: Matrix: In contemporary usage, PM 's matrix is (at least for propositional functions), a truth table, i.e., all truth-values of a propositional or predicate function. Sheffer stroke: Is the contemporary logical NAND (NOT-AND), i.e., "incompatibility", meaning: "Given two propositions p and q, then ' p | q ' means "proposition p is incompatible with proposition q, i.e., if both propositions p and q evaluate as false, then p | q evaluates as true." After section 8 the Sheffer stroke sees no usage. Section 10: The existential and universal "operators": PM adds "(x)" to represent the contemporary symbolism "for all x " i.e., " x", and it uses a backwards serifed E to represent "there exists an x", i.e., "(x)", i.e., the contemporary "x". The typical notation would be similar to the following: "(x) . x" means "for all values of variable x, function evaluates to true" "(x) . x" means "for some value of variable x, function evaluates to true" Sections 10, 11, 12: Properties of a variable extended to all individuals: section 10 introduces the notion of "a property" of a "variable". PM gives the example: is a function that indicates "is a Greek", and indicates "is a man", and indicates "is a mortal" these functions then apply to a variable x. PM can now write, and evaluate: (x) . x The notation above means "for all x, x is a man". Given a collection of individuals, one can evaluate the above formula for truth or falsity. For example, given the restricted collection of individuals { Socrates, Plato, Russell, Zeus } the above evaluates to "true" if we allow for Zeus to be a man. But it fails for: (x) . x because Russell is not Greek. And it fails for (x) . x because Zeus is not a mortal. Equipped with this notation PM can create formulas to express the following: "If all Greeks are men and if all men are mortals then all Greeks are mortals". (PM 1962:138) (x) . x x :(x). x x :: (x) . x x Another example: the formula: 10.01. (x). x . = . ~(x) . ~x Df. means "The symbols representing the assertion 'There exists at least one x that satisfies function ' is defined by the symbols representing the assertion 'It's not true that, given all values of x, there are no values of x satisfying '". The symbolisms x and "x" appear at 10.02 and 10.03. Both are abbreviations for universality (i.e., for all) that bind the variable x to the logical operator. Contemporary notation would have simply used parentheses outside of the equality ("=") sign: 10.02 x x x .=. (x). x x Df Contemporary notation: x((x) (x)) (or a variant) 10.03 x x x .=. (x). x x Df

Principia Mathematica Contemporary notation: x((x) (x)) (or a variant) PM attributes the first symbolism to Peano. Section 11 applies this symbolism to two variables. Thus the following notations: x, y, x, y could all appear in a single formula. Section 12 reintroduces the notion of "matrix" (contemporary truth table), the notion of logical types, and in particular the notions of first-order and second-order functions and propositions. New symbolism " ! x" represents any value of a first-order function. If a circumflex "" is placed over a variable, then this is an "individual" value of y, meaning that "" indicates "individuals" (e.g., a row in a truth table); this distinction is necessary because of the matrix/extensional nature of propositional functions. Now equipped with the matrix notion, PM can assert its controversial axiom of reducibility: a function of one or two variables (two being sufficient for PM 's use) where all its values are given (i.e., in its matrix) is (logically) equivalent ("") to some "predicative" function of the same variables. The one-variable definition is given below as an illustration of the notation (PM 1962:166-167): 12.1 : ( f): x .x. f ! x Pp; Pp is a "Primitive proposition" ("Propositions assumed without proof") (PM 1962:12, i.e., contemporary "axioms"), adding to the 7 defined in section 1 (starting with 1.1 modus ponens). These are to be distinguished from the "primitive ideas" that include the assertion sign "", negation "~", logical OR "V", the notions of "elementary proposition" and "elementary propositional function"; these are as close as PM comes to rules of notational formation, i.e., syntax. This means: "We assert the truth of the following: There exists a function f with the property that: given all values of x, their evaluations in function (i.e., resulting their matrix) is logically equivalent to some f evaluated at those same values of x. (and vice versa, hence logical equivalence)". In other words: given a matrix determined by property applied to variable x, there exists a function f that, when applied to the x is logically equivalent to the matrix. Or: every matrix x can be represented by a function f applied to x, and vice versa. 13: The identity operator "=" : This is a definition that uses the sign in two different ways, as noted by the quote from PM: 13.01. x = y .=: (): ! x . . ! y Df means: "This definition states that x and y are to be called identical when every predicative function satisfied by x is also satisfied by y ... Note that the second sign of equality in the above definition is combined with "Df", and thus is not really the same symbol as the sign of equality which is defined." The not-equals sign "" makes its appearance as a definition at 13.02. 14: Descriptions: "A description is a phrase of the form "the term y which satisfies , where is some function satisfied by one and only one argument."[18] From this PM employes two new symbols, a forward "E" and an inverted iota "". Here is an example: 14.02. E ! ( y) (y) .=: ( b):y . y . y = b Df. This has the meaning: "The y satisfying exists," which holds when, and only when is satisfied by one value of y and by no other value." (PM 1967:173-174)

13

Principia Mathematica

14

Introduction to the notation of the theory of classes and relations

The text leaps from section 14 directly to the foundational sections 20 GENERAL THEORY OF CLASSES and 21 GENERAL THEORY OF RELATIONS. "Relations" are what known in contemporary set theory as ordered pairs. Sections 20 and 22 introduce many of the symbols still in contemporary usage. These include the symbols "", "", "", "", "", "", and "V": "" signifies "is an element of" (PM 1962:188); "" (22.01) signifies "is contained in", "is a subset of"; "" (22.02) signifies the intersection (logical product) of classes (sets); "" (22.03) signifies the union (logical sum) of classes (sets); "" (22.03) signifies negation of a class (set); "" signifies the null class; and "V" signifies the universal class or universe of discourse. Small Greek letters (other than "", "", "", "", "", "", and "") represent classes (e.g., "", "", "", "", etc.) (PM 1962:188): x "The use of single letter in place of symbols such as (z) or ( ! z) is practicallly almost indispensable, since otherwise the notation rapidly becomes intolerably cumbrous. Thus ' x ' will mean ' x is a member of the class '". (PM 1962:188) = V The union of a set and its inverse is the universal (completed) set.[19] = The intersection of a set and its inverse is the null (empty) set. When applied to relations in section 23 CALCULUS OF RELATIONS, the symbols "", "", "", and "" acquire a dot: for example: "", "".[20] The notion, and notation, of "a class" (set): In the first edition PM asserts that no new primitive ideas are necessary to define what is meant by "a class", and only two new "primitive propositions" called the axioms of reducibility for classes and relations respectively (PM 1962:25).[21] But before this notion can be defined, PM feels it necessary to create a peculiar notation "(z)" that it calls a "fictitious object". (PM 1962:188) : x (z) .. (x) "i.e., ' x is a member of the class determined by ()' is [logically] equivalent to ' x satisfies (),' or to '(x) is true.'". (PM 1962:25) At least PM can tell the reader how these fictitious objects behave, because "A class is wholly determinate when its membership is known, that is, there cannot be two different classes having he same membership" (PM 1962:26). This is symbolized by the following equality (similar to 13.01 above: (z) = (z) . : (x): x .. x "This last is the distinguishing characteristic of classes, and justifies us in treating (z) as the class determined by [the function] ." (PM 1962:188) Perhaps the above can be made clearer by the discussion of classes in Introduction to the 2nd Edition, which disposes of the Axiom of Reducibility and replaces it with the notion: "All functions of functions are extensional" (PM 1962:xxxix), i.e., x x x .. (x): () () (PM 1962:xxxix) This has the reasonable meaning that "IF for all values of x the truth-values of the functions and of x are [logically] equivalent, THEN the function of a given and of are [logically] equivalent." PM asserts this is "obvious": "This is obvious, since can only occur in () by the substitution of values of for p, q, r, ... in a [logical-] function, and, if x x, the substitution of x for p in a [logical-] function gives the same truth-value to the truth-function as the substitution of x. Consequently there is no longer any reason to distinguish between

Principia Mathematica functions classes, for we have, in virtue of the above, x x x .. (x). = . ". Observe the change to the equality "=" sign on the right. PM goes on to state that will continue to hang onto the notation "(z)", but this is merely equivalent to , and this is a class. (all quotes: PM 1962:xxxix).

15

Consistency and criticisms

According to Carnap's "Logicist Foundations of Mathematics", Russell wanted a theory that could plausibly be said to derive all of mathematics from purely logical axioms. However, Principia Mathematica required, in addition to the basic axioms of type theory, three further axioms that seemed to not be true as mere matters of logic, namely the axiom of infinity, the axiom of choice, and the axiom of reducibility. Since the first two were existential axioms, Russell phrased mathematical statements depending on them as conditionals. But reducibility was required to be sure that the formal statements even properly express statements of real analysis, so that statements depending on it could not be reformulated as conditionals. Frank P. Ramsey tried to argue that Russell's ramification of the theory of types was unnecessary, so that reducibility could be removed, but these arguments seemed inconclusive. Beyond the status of the axioms as logical truths, the questions remained: whether a contradiction could be derived from the Principia's axioms (the question of inconsistency), and whether there exists a mathematical statement which could neither be proven nor disproven in the system (the question of completeness). Propositional logic itself was known to be consistent, but the same had not been established for Principia's axioms of set theory. (See Hilbert's second problem.)

Gdel 1930, 1931

In 1930, Gdel's completeness theorem showed that propositional logic itself was complete in a much weaker sensethat is, any sentence that is unprovable from a given set of axioms must actually be false in some model of the axioms. However, this is not the stronger sense of completeness desired for Principia Mathematica, since a given system of axioms (such as those of Principia Mathematica) may have many models, in some of which a given statement is true and in others of which that statement is false, so that the statement is left undecided by the axioms. Gdel's incompleteness theorems cast unexpected light on these two related questions. Gdel's first incompleteness theorem showed that Principia could not be both consistent and complete. According to the theorem, within every sufficiently powerful logical system (such as Principia), there exists a statement G that essentially reads, "The statement G cannot be proved." Such a statement is a sort of Catch-22: if G is provable, then it is false, and the system is therefore inconsistent; and if G is not provable, then it is true, and the system is therefore incomplete. Gdel's second incompleteness theorem (1931) shows that no formal system extending basic arithmetic can be used to prove its own consistency. Thus, the statement "there are no contradictions in the Principia system" cannot be proven in the Principia system unless there are contradictions in the system (in which case it can be proven both true and false).

Wittgenstein 1919, 1939

By the second edition of PM, Russell had removed his axiom of reducibility to a new axiom (although he does not state it as such). Gdel 1944:126 describes it this way: "This change is connected with the new axiom that functions can occur in propositions only "through their values", i.e., extensionally . . . [this is] quite unobjectionable even from the constructive standpoint . . . provided that quantifiers are always restricted to definite orders". This change from a quasi-intensional stance to a fully extensional stance also restricts predicate logic to the second order, i.e. functions of functions: "We can decide that mathematics is to confine itself to functions of functions which obey the above

Principia Mathematica assumption" (PM 2nd Edition p.401, Appendix C). This new proposal resulted in a dire outcome. An "extensional stance" and restriction to a second-order predicate logic means that a propositional function extended to all individuals such as "All 'x' are blue" now has to list all of the 'x' that satisfy (are true in) the proposition, listing them in a possibly infinite conjunction: e.g. x1 V x2 V . . . V xn V . . .. Ironically, this change came about as the result of criticism from Wittgenstein in his 1919 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. As described by Russell in the Preface to the 2nd edition of PM: "There is another course, recommended by Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, *5.54ff) for philosophical reasons. This is to assume that functions of propositions are always truth-functions, and that a function can only occur in a proposition through its values. . . . [Working through the consequences] it appears that everything in Vol. I remains true . . . the theory of inductive cardinals and ordinals survives; but it seems that the theory of infinite Dedekindian and well-ordered series largely collapses, so that irrationals, and real numbers generally, can no longer be adequately dealt with. Also Cantor's proof that 2n > n breaks down unless n is finite." (PM 2nd edition reprinted 1962:xiv, also cf new Appendix C). In other words, the fact that an infinite list cannot realistically be specified means that the concept of "number" in the infinite sense (i.e. the continuum) cannot be described by the new theory proposed in PM Second Edition. Wittgenstein in his Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939 criticised Principia on various grounds, such as: It purports to reveal the fundamental basis for arithmetic. However, it is our everyday arithmetical practices such as counting which are fundamental; for if a persistent discrepancy arose between counting and Principia, this would be treated as evidence of an error in Principia (e.g., that Principia did not characterize numbers or addition correctly), not as evidence of an error in everyday counting. The calculating methods in Principia can only be used in practice with very small numbers. To calculate using large numbers (e.g., billions), the formulae would become too long, and some short-cut method would have to be used, which would no doubt rely on everyday techniques such as counting (or else on non-fundamental and hence questionable methods such as induction). So again Principia depends on everyday techniques, not vice versa. Wittgenstein did, however, concede that Principia may nonetheless make some aspects of everyday arithmetic clearer.

16

Gdel 1944
In his 1944 Russell's mathematical logic, Gdel offers a "critical but sympathetic discussion of the logicistic order of ideas"[22]: "It is to be regretted that this first comprehensive and thorough-going presentation of a mathematical logic and the derivation of mathematics from it [is] so greatly lacking in formal precision in the foundations (contained in *1-*21 of Principia) that it represents in this respect a considerable step backwards as compared with Frege. What is missing, above all, is a precise statement of the syntax of the formalism. Syntactical considerations are omitted even in cases where they are necessary for the cogency of the proofs . . . The matter is especially doubtful for the rule of substitution and of replacing defined symbols by their definiens . . . it is chiefly the rule of substitution which would have to be proved" (Gdel 1944:124)[23]

Principia Mathematica

17

Quotations
"From this proposition it will follow, when arithmetical addition has been defined, that 1+1=2." Volume I, 1st edition, page 379 [24] (page 362 in 2nd edition; page 360 in abridged version). (The proof is actually completed in Volume II, 1st edition, page 86 [25], accompanied by the comment, "The above proposition is occasionally useful.")

54.43: From this proposition it will follow, ... that 1+1=2

Footnotes
[1] Irvine, Andrew D. (2003-05-01). "Principia Mathematica (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)" (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ principia-mathematica/ #SOPM). Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University. . Retrieved 2009-08-05. [2] "The Modern Library's Top 100 Nonfiction Books of the Century" (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ library/ books/ 042999best-nonfiction-list. html). The New York Times Company. 1999-04-30. . Retrieved 2009-08-05. [3] This set is taken from Kleene 1952:69 substituting for . [4] Kleene 1952:71, Enderton 2001:15 [5] Enderton 2001:16 [6] This is the word used by Kleene 1952:78 [7] Quote from Kleene 1952:45. See discussion LOGICISM at pages 43-46. [8] In his section 8.5.4 Groping towards metalogic Grattain-Guiness 2000:454ff discusses the American logicians' critical reception of the second edition of PM. For instance Sheffer "puzzled that ' In order to give an account of logic, we must presuppose and employ logic ' " (p. 452). And Bernstein ended his 1926 review with the comment that "This distinction between the propositional logic as a mathematical system and as a language must be made, if serious errors are to be avoided; this distinction the Principia does not make" (p.454). [9] This idea is due to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. See the discussion at PM 1962:xivxv) [10] http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ pm-notation/ [11] Kurt Gdel 1944 "Russell's mathematical logic" appearing at page 120 in Feferman et. al. 1990 Kurt Gdel Collected Works Volume II, Oxford University Press, NY, ISBN 978-0-19-514721-6([Link].) . [12] For comparison, see the translated portion of Peano 1889 in van Heijenoort 1967:81ff. About the only major change I can see is the substitution of for as used by Peano. [13] This work can be found at van Heijenoort 1967:1ff. [14] And see footnote, both at PM 1927:92 [15] The original typography is a square of a heavier weight than the conventional period. [16] The first example comes from [Link] ([Link].). [17] page xiii of 1927 appearing in the 1962 paperback edition to 56. [18] The original typography employs an x with a circumflex rather than ; this continues below [19] See the ten postulates of Huntington, in particular postulates IIa and IIb at PM 1962:205 and discussion at page 206. [20] The "" sign has a dot inside it, and the intersection sign "" has a dot above it; these are not available in the Arial Unicode MS font. [21] Wiener 1914 "A simplification of the logic of relations" (van Hejenoort 1967:224ff) disposed of the second of these when he showed how to reduce the theory of relations to that of classes [22] Kleene 1952:46. [23] Gdel 1944 Russell's mathematical logic in Kurt Gdel: Collected Works Volume II, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, ISBN 0-19-514721 . [24] http:/ / quod. lib. umich. edu/ cgi/ t/ text/ pageviewer-idx?c=umhistmath& cc=umhistmath& idno=aat3201. 0001. 001& frm=frameset& view=image& seq=401

Principia Mathematica
[25] http:/ / quod. lib. umich. edu/ cgi/ t/ text/ pageviewer-idx?c=umhistmath& cc=umhistmath& idno=aat3201. 0002. 001& frm=frameset& view=image& seq=126

18

References
Primary: Whitehead, Alfred North, and Bertrand Russell. Principia Mathematica, 3 vols, Cambridge University Press, 1910, 1912, and 1913. Second edition, 1925 (Vol. 1), 1927 (Vols 2, 3). Abridged as Principia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge University Press, 1962. Alfred North Whitehead; Bertrand Russell (February 2009). Principia Mathematica. Volume One. Merchant Books. ISBN978-1-60386-182-3. Alfred North Whitehead; Bertrand Russell (February 2009). Principia Mathematica. Volume Two. Merchant Books. ISBN978-1-60386-183-0. Alfred North Whitehead; Bertrand Russell (February 2009). Principia Mathematica. Volume Three. Merchant Books. ISBN978-1-60386-184-7. Secondary: Stephen Kleene 1952 Introduction to Meta-Mathematics, 6th Reprint, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam NY, ISBN 0-7204-2103-9. Stephen Cole Kleene; Michael Beeson (March 2009). Introduction to Metamathematics (Paperback ed.). Ishi Press. ISBN978-0-923891-57-2. Ivor Grattan-Guinness (2000) The Search for Mathematical Roots 1870-1940, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J., ISBN 0-691-05857-1 (alk. paper). Ludwig Wittgenstein 2009 Major Works: Selected Philosophical Writings, HarperrCollins, NY, NY, ISBN 978-0-06-155024-9. In particular: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Vienna 1918, original publication in German). Jean van Heijenoort editor 1967 From Frege to Gdel: A Source book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, 3rd printing, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, ISBN 0-674-32449-8 (pbk.)

External links
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Principia Mathematica ([Link] A. D. Irvine. The Notation in Principia Mathematica ([Link] Bernard Linsky. Principia Mathematica online (University of Michigan Historical Math Collection): Volume I ([Link] Volume II ([Link] Volume III ([Link] Proposition 54.43 ([Link] in a more modern notation (Metamath)

Koch snowflake

19

Koch snowflake
The Koch snowflake (also known as the Koch star and Koch island[1]) is a mathematical curve and one of the earliest fractal curves to have been described. It is based on the Koch curve, which appeared in a 1904 paper titled "On a continuous curve without tangents, constructible from elementary geometry" (original French title: Sur une courbe continue sans tangente, obtenue par une construction gomtrique lmentaire) by the Swedish mathematician Helge von Koch.

Construction
The Koch snowflake can be constructed by starting with an equilateral triangle, then recursively altering each line segment as follows: 1. divide the line segment into three segments of equal length. 2. draw an equilateral triangle that has the middle segment from step 1 as its base and points outward. 3. remove the line segment that is the base of the triangle from step 2. After one iteration of this process, the resulting shape is the outline of a hexagram. The Koch snowflake is the limit approached as the above steps are followed over and over again. The Koch curve originally described by Koch is constructed with only one of the three sides of the original triangle. In other words, three Koch curves make a Koch snowflake.

The first four iterations of the Koch snowflake

Properties
The Koch curve has an infinite length because each time the steps above are performed on each line segment of
The first seven iterations in animation

the

figure

there

are

four

times

as

many

line

Koch snowflake

20

segments, the length of each being one-third the length of the segments in the previous stage. Hence, the total length increases by one third and thus the length at step n will be (4/3)n of the original triangle perimeter: the fractal dimension is log 4/log 3 1.26186, greater than the dimension of a line (1) but less than Peano's space-filling curve (2). The Koch curve is continuous everywhere but differentiable nowhere.
The Koch curve

Taking s as the side length, the original triangle area is

. The

side length of each successive small triangle is 1/3 of those in the previous iteration; because the area of the added triangles is proportional to the square of its side length, the area of each triangle added in the nth step is 1/9 of that in the (n-1)th step. In each iteration after the first, 4 times as many triangles are added as in the previous iteration; because the first iteration adds 3 triangles then the nth iteration will add triangles. Combining these two formulae gives the iteration formula:

where

is area of the original triangle. Substituting in

and expanding yields:

In the limit, as n goes to infinity, the limit of the sum of the powers of 4/9 is 4/5, so

So the area of a Koch snowflake is 8/5 of the area of the original triangle, or perimeter of the Koch triangle encloses a finite area. It is possible to tessellate the plane by copies of Koch snowflakes in two different sizes. However, such a tessellation is not possible using only snowflakes of the same size as each other. Since each Koch snowflake in the tessellation can be subdivided into seven smaller snowflakes of two different sizes, it is also possible to find tessellations that use more than two sizes at once.[3]

.[2] Therefore the infinite

Thue-Morse Sequence and Turtle graphics

A Turtle Graphic is the curve that is generated if an automaton is programmed with a sequence. If the ThueMorse sequence members are used in order to select program states: If t(n) = 0, move ahead by one unit, If t(n) = 1, rotate counterclockwise by an angle of /3,
Tessellation by two sizes of Koch snowflake

Koch snowflake the resulting curve converges to the Koch snowflake.

21

Representation as Lindenmayer system

The Koch Curve can be expressed by a rewrite system (Lindenmayer system). Alphabet : F Constants : +, Axiom : F++F++F Production rules: F FF++FF Here, F means "draw forward", + means "turn right 60", and means "turn left 60".

Variants of the Koch curve

Following von Koch's concept, several variants of the Koch curve were designed, considering right angles (quadratic), other angles (Csaro) or circles and their extensions to higher dimensions (Sphereflake):
Variant 1D, 85 angle Illustration Construction The Cesaro fractal is a variant of the Koch curve with an angle between 60 and 90 (here 85).

Cesaro fractal 1D, 90 angle

The first 2 iterations Quadratic type 1 curve 1D, 90 angle

Quadratic type 2 curve

The first 2 iterations. Its fractal dimension equals 1.5 and is exactly half-way between dimension 1 and 2. It is therefore often chosen when studying the physical properties of non-integer fractal objects.

Koch snowflake

22

1D, ln 3/ln (5)

The first 2 iterations. Its fractal dimension equals ln 3/ln (5)=1.37.

Quadratic flake 1D, ln 3.33/ln (5) Another variation. Its fractal dimension equals ln 3.33/ln (5)=1.49.

Quadratic Cross 2D, triangles

The first 3 iterations of a natural extension of the Koch curve in 2 dimensions von Koch surface

Koch snowflake

23
Extension of the quadratic type 1 curve. The illustration at left shows the fractal after the second iteration

2D, 90 angle

Quadratic type 1 surface

Animation quadratic surface . 2D, 90 angle Extension of the quadratic type 2 curve. The illustration at left shows the fractal after the first iteration.

Quadratic type 2 surface 3D, spheres Eric Haines has developed the sphereflake fractal, which is a three-dimensional version of the Koch snowflake, using spheres.

Closeup of Haines sphereflake

Koch snowflake

24

References
[1] Addison, Paul S. Fractals and Chaos - An Illustrated Course. Institute of Physics (IoP) Publishing (1997) ISBN 0-7503-0400-6 - Page 19 [2] Koch Snowflake (http:/ / ecademy. agnesscott. edu/ ~lriddle/ ifs/ ksnow/ ksnow. htm) [3] Burns, Aidan (1994), "78.13 Fractal tilings", Mathematical Gazette 78 (482): 193196, JSTOR3618577.

Edward Kasner & James Newman, Mathematics and the Imagination Dover Press reprint of Simon & Schuster (1940) ISBN 0-486-41703-4, pp 34451.

External links
von Koch Curve ([Link] The Koch snowflake in Mathworld ([Link] Application of the Koch curve to an antenna ([Link] Koch/ [Link]) "A mathematical analysis of the Koch curve and quadratic Koch curve" ([Link] handle/10210/1941/[Link]?sequence=2) (pdf). Retrieved 22 November 2011.

Axiom of choice
In mathematics, the axiom of choice, or AC, is an axiom of set theory equivalent to the statement that "the product of a collection of non-empty sets is non-empty". More explicitly, it states that for every indexed family of nonempty sets there exists an indexed family of elements such that for every . The axiom of choice was formulated in 1904 by Ernst Zermelo in order to formalize his proof of the well-ordering theorem.[1] Informally put, the axiom of choice says that given any collection of bins, each containing at least one object, it is possible to make a selection of exactly one object from each bin. In many cases such a selection can be made without invoking the axiom of choice; this is in particular the case if the number of bins is finite, or if a selection rule is available: a distinguishing property that happens to hold for exactly one object in each bin. For example for any (even infinite) collection of pairs of shoes, one can pick out the left shoe from each pair to obtain an appropriate selection, but for an infinite collection of pairs of socks (assumed to have no distinguishing features), such a selection can be obtained only by invoking the axiom of choice. Although originally controversial, the axiom of choice is now used without reservation by most mathematicians,[2] and it is included in ZFC, the standard form of axiomatic set theory. One motivation for this use is that a number of generally accepted mathematical results, such as Tychonoff's theorem, require the axiom of choice for their proofs. Contemporary set theorists also study axioms that are not compatible with the axiom of choice, such as the axiom of determinacy. The axiom of choice is avoided in some varieties of constructive mathematics, although there are varieties of constructive mathematics in which the axiom of choice is embraced.

Statement
A choice function is a function f, defined on a collection X of nonempty sets, such that for every set s in X, f(s) is an element of s. With this concept, the axiom can be stated: For any set X of nonempty sets, there exists a choice function f defined on X. Thus the negation of the axiom of choice states that there exists a set of nonempty sets which has no choice function. Each choice function on a collection X of nonempty sets is an element of the Cartesian product of the sets in X. This is not the most general situation of a Cartesian product of a family of sets, where a same set can occur more than once as a factor; however, one can focus on elements of such a product that select the same element every time a given set appears as factor, and such elements correspond to an element of the Cartesian product of all distinct sets in

Axiom of choice the family. The axiom of choice asserts the existence of such elements; it is therefore equivalent to: Given any family of nonempty sets, their Cartesian product is a nonempty set.

25

Nomenclature ZF, AC, and ZFC

In this article and other discussions of the Axiom of Choice the following abbreviations are common: AC the Axiom of Choice. ZF ZermeloFraenkel set theory omitting the Axiom of Choice. ZFC ZermeloFraenkel set theory, extended to include the Axiom of Choice.

Variants
There are many other equivalent statements of the axiom of choice. These are equivalent in the sense that, in the presence of other basic axioms of set theory, they imply the axiom of choice and are implied by it. One variation avoids the use of choice functions by, in effect, replacing each choice function with its range. Given any set X of pairwise disjoint non-empty sets, there exists at least one set C that contains exactly one element in common with each of the sets in X.[3] This guarantees for any partition of a set X the existence of a subset C of X containing exactly one element from each part of the partition. Another equivalent axiom only considers collections X that are essentially powersets of other sets: For any set A, the power set of A (with the empty set removed) has a choice function. Authors who use this formulation often speak of the choice function on A, but be advised that this is a slightly different notion of choice function. Its domain is the powerset of A (with the empty set removed), and so makes sense for any set A, whereas with the definition used elsewhere in this article, the domain of a choice function on a collection of sets is that collection, and so only makes sense for sets of sets. With this alternate notion of choice function, the axiom of choice can be compactly stated as Every set has a choice function.[4] which is equivalent to For any set A there is a function f such that for any non-empty subset B of A, f(B) lies in B. The negation of the axiom can thus be expressed as: There is a set A such that for all functions f (on the set of non-empty subsets of A), there is a B such that f(B) does not lie in B.

Restriction to finite sets

The statement of the axiom of choice does not specify whether the collection of nonempty sets is finite or infinite, and thus implies that every finite collection of nonempty sets has a choice function. However, that particular case is a theorem of ZermeloFraenkel set theory without the axiom of choice (ZF); it is easily proved by mathematical induction.[5] In the even simpler case of a collection of one set, a choice function just corresponds to an element, so this instance of the axiom of choice says that every nonempty set has an element; this holds trivially. The axiom of choice can be seen as asserting the generalization of this property, already evident for finite collections, to arbitrary collections.

Axiom of choice

26

Usage
Until the late 19th century, the axiom of choice was often used implicitly, although it had not yet been formally stated. For example, after having established that the set X contains only non-empty sets, a mathematician might have said "let F(s) be one of the members of s for all s in X." In general, it is impossible to prove that F exists without the axiom of choice, but this seems to have gone unnoticed until Zermelo. Not every situation requires the axiom of choice. For finite sets X, the axiom of choice follows from the other axioms of set theory. In that case it is equivalent to saying that if we have several (a finite number of) boxes, each containing at least one item, then we can choose exactly one item from each box. Clearly we can do this: We start at the first box, choose an item; go to the second box, choose an item; and so on. The number of boxes is finite, so eventually our choice procedure comes to an end. The result is an explicit choice function: a function that takes the first box to the first element we chose, the second box to the second element we chose, and so on. (A formal proof for all finite sets would use the principle of mathematical induction to prove "for every natural number k, every family of k nonempty sets has a choice function.") This method cannot, however, be used to show that every countable family of nonempty sets has a choice function, as is asserted by the axiom of countable choice. If the method is applied to an infinite sequence (Xi : i) of nonempty sets, a function is obtained at each finite stage, but there is no stage at which a choice function for the entire family is constructed, and no "limiting" choice function can be constructed, in general, in ZF without the axiom of choice.

Examples
The nature of the individual nonempty sets in the collection may make it possible to avoid the axiom of choice even for certain infinite collections. For example, suppose that each member of the collection X is a nonempty subset of the natural numbers. Every such subset has a smallest element, so to specify our choice function we can simply say that it maps each set to the least element of that set. This gives us a definite choice of an element from each set, and makes it unnecessary to apply the axiom of choice. The difficulty appears when there is no natural choice of elements from each set. If we cannot make explicit choices, how do we know that our set exists? For example, suppose that X is the set of all non-empty subsets of the real numbers. First we might try to proceed as if X were finite. If we try to choose an element from each set, then, because X is infinite, our choice procedure will never come to an end, and consequently, we will never be able to produce a choice function for all of X. Next we might try specifying the least element from each set. But some subsets of the real numbers do not have least elements. For example, the open interval (0,1) does not have a least element: if x is in (0,1), then so is x/2, and x/2 is always strictly smaller than x. So this attempt also fails. Additionally, consider for instance the unit circle S, and the action on S by a group G consisting of all rational rotations. Namely, these are rotations by angles which are rational multiples of . Here G is countable while S is uncountable. Hence S breaks up into uncountably many orbits under G. Using the axiom of choice, we could pick a single point from each orbit, obtaining an uncountable subset X of S with the property that all of its translates by G are disjoint from X. The set of those translates partitions the circle into a countable collection of disjoint sets, which are all pairwise congruent. Since X isn't measurable for any rotation-invariant countably additive finite measure on S, finding an algorithm to select a point in each orbit requires the axiom of choice. See non-measurable set for more details. The reason that we are able to choose least elements from subsets of the natural numbers is the fact that the natural numbers are well-ordered: every nonempty subset of the natural numbers has a unique least element under the natural ordering. One might say, "Even though the usual ordering of the real numbers does not work, it may be possible to find a different ordering of the real numbers which is a well-ordering. Then our choice function can choose the least element of every set under our unusual ordering." The problem then becomes that of constructing a well-ordering, which turns out to require the axiom of choice for its existence; every set can be well-ordered if and

Axiom of choice only if the axiom of choice holds.

27

Criticism and acceptance

A proof requiring the axiom of choice may establish the existence of an object without explicitly defining the object in the language of set theory. For example, while the axiom of choice implies that there is a well-ordering of the real numbers, there are models of set theory with the axiom of choice in which no well-ordering of the reals is definable. Similarly, although a subset of the real numbers that is not Lebesgue measurable can be proven to exist using the axiom of choice, it is consistent that no such set is definable. The axiom of choice produces these intangibles (objects that are proven to exist, but which cannot be explicitly constructed), which may conflict with some philosophical principles. Because there is no canonical well-ordering of all sets, a construction that relies on a well-ordering may not produce a canonical result, even if a canonical result is desired (as is often the case in category theory). This has been used as an argument against the use of the axiom of choice. Another argument against the axiom of choice is that it implies the existence of counterintuitive objects. One example is the BanachTarski paradox which says that it is possible to decompose ("carve up") the 3-dimensional solid unit ball into finitely many pieces and, using only rotations and translations, reassemble the pieces into two solid balls each with the same volume as the original. The pieces in this decomposition, constructed using the axiom of choice, are non-measurable sets. Despite these facts, most mathematicians accept the axiom of choice as a valid principle for proving new results in mathematics. The debate is interesting enough, however, that it is considered of note when a theorem in ZFC (ZF plus AC) is logically equivalent (with just the ZF axioms) to the axiom of choice, and mathematicians look for results that require the axiom of choice to be false, though this type of deduction is less common than the type which requires the axiom of choice to be true. It is possible to prove many theorems using neither the axiom of choice nor its negation; such statements will be true in any model of ZermeloFraenkel set theory (ZF), regardless of the truth or falsity of the axiom of choice in that particular model. The restriction to ZF renders any claim that relies on either the axiom of choice or its negation unprovable. For example, the BanachTarski paradox is neither provable nor disprovable from ZF alone: it is impossible to construct the required decomposition of the unit ball in ZF, but also impossible to prove there is no such decomposition. Similarly, all the statements listed below which require choice or some weaker version thereof for their proof are unprovable in ZF, but since each is provable in ZF plus the axiom of choice, there are models of ZF in which each statement is true. Statements such as the BanachTarski paradox can be rephrased as conditional statements, for example, "If AC holds, the decomposition in the BanachTarski paradox exists." Such conditional statements are provable in ZF when the original statements are provable from ZF and the axiom of choice.

In constructive mathematics
As discussed above, in ZFC, the axiom of choice is able to provide "nonconstructive proofs" in which the existence of an object is proved although no explicit example is constructed. ZFC, however, is still formalized in classical logic. The axiom of choice has also been thoroughly studied in the context of constructive mathematics, where non-classical logic is employed. The status of the axiom of choice varies between different varieties of constructive mathematics. In Martin-Lf type theory and higher-order Heyting arithmetic, the appropriate statement of the axiom of choice is (depending on approach) included as an axiom or provable as a theorem.[6] Errett Bishop argued that the axiom of choice was constructively acceptable, saying "A choice function exists in constructive mathematics, because a choice is implied by the very meaning of existence."[7]

Axiom of choice In constructive set theory, however, Diaconescu's theorem shows that the axiom of choice implies the law of the excluded middle (unlike in Martin-Lf type theory, where it does not). Thus the axiom of choice is not generally available in constructive set theory. A cause for this difference is that the axiom of choice in type theory does not have the extensionality properties that the axiom of choice in constructive set theory does.[8] Some results in constructive set theory use the axiom of countable choice or the axiom of dependent choice, which do not imply the law of the excluded middle in constructive set theory. Although the axiom of countable choice in particular is commonly used in constructive mathematics, its use has also been questioned.[9]

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Independence
Assuming ZF is consistent, Kurt Gdel showed that the negation of the axiom of choice is not a theorem of ZF by constructing an inner model (the constructible universe) which satisfies ZFC and thus showing that ZFC is consistent. Assuming ZF is consistent, Paul Cohen employed the technique of forcing, developed for this purpose, to show that the axiom of choice itself is not a theorem of ZF by constructing a much more complex model which satisfies ZFC (ZF with the negation of AC added as axiom) and thus showing that ZFC is consistent. Together these results establish that the axiom of choice is logically independent of ZF. The assumption that ZF is consistent is harmless because adding another axiom to an already inconsistent system cannot make the situation worse. Because of independence, the decision whether to use of the axiom of choice (or its negation) in a proof cannot be made by appeal to other axioms of set theory. The decision must be made on other grounds. One argument given in favor of using the axiom of choice is that it is convenient to use it because it allows one to prove some simplifying propositions that otherwise could not be proved. Many theorems which are provable using choice are of an elegant general character: every ideal in a ring is contained in a maximal ideal, every vector space has a basis, and every product of compact spaces is compact. Without the axiom of choice, these theorems may not hold for mathematical objects of large cardinality. The proof of the independence result also shows that a wide class of mathematical statements, including all statements that can be phrased in the language of Peano arithmetic, are provable in ZF if and only if they are provable in ZFC.[10] Statements in this class include the statement that P = NP, the Riemann hypothesis, and many other unsolved mathematical problems. When one attempts to solve problems in this class, it makes no difference whether ZF or ZFC is employed if the only question is the existence of a proof. It is possible, however, that there is a shorter proof of a theorem from ZFC than from ZF. The axiom of choice is not the only significant statement which is independent of ZF. For example, the generalized continuum hypothesis (GCH) is not only independent of ZF, but also independent of ZFC. However, ZF plus GCH implies AC, making GCH a strictly stronger claim than AC, even though they are both independent of ZF.

Stronger axioms
The axiom of constructibility and the generalized continuum hypothesis both imply the axiom of choice, but are strictly stronger than it. In class theories such as Von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory and MorseKelley set theory, there is a possible axiom called the axiom of global choice which is stronger than the axiom of choice for sets because it also applies to proper classes. And the axiom of global choice follows from the axiom of limitation of size.

Axiom of choice

29

Equivalents
There are important statements that, assuming the axioms of ZF but neither AC nor AC, are equivalent to the axiom of choice. The most important among them are Zorn's lemma and the well-ordering theorem. In fact, Zermelo initially introduced the axiom of choice in order to formalize his proof of the well-ordering theorem. Set theory Well-ordering theorem: Every set can be well-ordered. Consequently, every cardinal has an initial ordinal. Tarski's theorem: For every infinite set A, there is a bijective map between the sets A and AA. Trichotomy: If two sets are given, then either they have the same cardinality, or one has a smaller cardinality than the other. The Cartesian product of any family of nonempty sets is nonempty. Knig's theorem: Colloquially, the sum of a sequence of cardinals is strictly less than the product of a sequence of larger cardinals. (The reason for the term "colloquially", is that the sum or product of a "sequence" of cardinals cannot be defined without some aspect of the axiom of choice.) Every surjective function has a right inverse. Order theory Zorn's lemma: Every non-empty partially ordered set in which every chain (i.e. totally ordered subset) has an upper bound contains at least one maximal element. Hausdorff maximal principle: In any partially ordered set, every totally ordered subset is contained in a maximal totally ordered subset. The restricted principle "Every partially ordered set has a maximal totally ordered subset" is also equivalent to AC over ZF. Tukey's lemma: Every non-empty collection of finite character has a maximal element with respect to inclusion. Antichain principle: Every partially ordered set has a maximal antichain. Abstract algebra Every vector space has a basis.[11] Every unital ring other than the trivial ring contains a maximal ideal. For every non-empty set S there is a binary operation defined on S that makes it a group.[12] (A cancellative binary operation is enough.) Functional analysis The closed unit ball of the dual of a normed vector space over the reals has an extreme point. General topology Tychonoff's theorem stating that every product of compact topological spaces is compact. In the product topology, the closure of a product of subsets is equal to the product of the closures. Mathematical logic If S is a set of sentences of first-order logic and B is a consistent subset of S, then B is included in a set that is maximal among consistent subsets of S. The special case where S is the set of all first-order sentences in a given signature is weaker, equivalent to the Boolean prime ideal theorem; see the section "Weaker forms" below.

Axiom of choice

30

Category theory
There are several results in category theory which invoke the axiom of choice for their proof. These results might be weaker than, equivalent to, or stronger than the axiom of choice, depending on the strength of the technical foundations. For example, if one defines categories in terms of sets, that is, as sets of objects and morphisms (usually called a small category), or even locally small categories, whose hom-objects are sets, then there is no category of all sets, and so it is difficult for a category-theoretic formulation to apply to all sets. On the other hand, other foundational descriptions of category theory are considerably stronger, and an identical category-theoretic statement of choice may be stronger than the standard formulation, la class theory, mentioned above. Examples of category-theoretic statements which require choice include: Every small category has a skeleton. If two small categories are weakly equivalent, then they are equivalent. Every continuous functor on a small-complete category which satisfies the appropriate solution set condition has a left-adjoint (the Freyd adjoint functor theorem).

Weaker forms
There are several weaker statements that are not equivalent to the axiom of choice, but are closely related. One example is the axiom of dependent choice (DC). A still weaker example is the axiom of countable choice (AC or CC), which states that a choice function exists for any countable set of nonempty sets. These axioms are sufficient for many proofs in elementary mathematical analysis, and are consistent with some principles, such as the Lebesgue measurability of all sets of reals, that are disprovable from the full axiom of choice. Other choice axioms weaker than axiom of choice include the Boolean prime ideal theorem and the axiom of uniformization. The former is equivalent in ZF to the existence of an ultrafilter containing each given filter, proved by Tarski in 1930.

Results requiring AC (or weaker forms) but weaker than it

One of the most interesting aspects of the axiom of choice is the large number of places in mathematics that it shows up. Here are some statements that require the axiom of choice in the sense that they are not provable from ZF but are provable from ZFC (ZF plus AC). Equivalently, these statements are true in all models of ZFC but false in some models of ZF. Set theory Any union of countably many countable sets is itself countable. If the set A is infinite, then there exists an injection from the natural numbers N to A (see Dedekind infinite). Every infinite game Measure theory The Vitali theorem on the existence of non-measurable sets which states that there is a subset of the real numbers that is not Lebesgue measurable. The Hausdorff paradox. The BanachTarski paradox. The Lebesgue measure of a countable disjoint union of measurable sets is equal to the sum of the measures of the individual sets. Algebra Every field has an algebraic closure. Every field extension has a transcendence basis. Stone's representation theorem for Boolean algebras needs the Boolean prime ideal theorem. in which is a Borel subset of Baire space is determined.

Axiom of choice The NielsenSchreier theorem, that every subgroup of a free group is free. The additive groups of R and C are isomorphic.[13] and [14] Functional analysis The HahnBanach theorem in functional analysis, allowing the extension of linear functionals The theorem that every Hilbert space has an orthonormal basis. The BanachAlaoglu theorem about compactness of sets of functionals. The Baire category theorem about complete metric spaces, and its consequences, such as the open mapping theorem and the closed graph theorem. On every infinite-dimensional topological vector space there is a discontinuous linear map. General topology A uniform space is compact if and only if it is complete and totally bounded. Every Tychonoff space has a Stoneech compactification. Mathematical logic Gdel's completeness theorem for first-order logic: every consistent set of first-order sentences has a completion. That is, every consistent set of first-order sentences can be extended to a maximal consistent set.

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Stronger forms of the negation of AC

Now, consider stronger forms of the negation of AC. For example, if we abbreviate by BP the claim that every set of real numbers has the property of Baire, then BP is stronger than AC, which asserts the nonexistence of any choice function on perhaps only a single set of nonempty sets. Note that strengthened negations may be compatible with weakened forms of AC. For example, ZF + DC[15] + BP is consistent, if ZF is. It is also consistent with ZF + DC that every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable; however, this consistency result, due to Robert M. Solovay, cannot be proved in ZFC itself, but requires a mild large cardinal assumption (the existence of an inaccessible cardinal). The much stronger axiom of determinacy, or AD, implies that every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable, has the property of Baire, and has the perfect set property (all three of these results are refuted by AC itself). ZF + DC + AD is consistent provided that a sufficiently strong large cardinal axiom is consistent (the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals).

Statements consistent with the negation of AC

There are models of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in which the axiom of choice is false. We will abbreviate "Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus the negation of the axiom of choice" by ZFC. For certain models of ZFC, it is possible to prove the negation of some standard facts. Note that any model of ZFC is also a model of ZF, so for each of the following statements, there exists a model of ZF in which that statement is true. There exists a model of ZFC in which there is a function f from the real numbers to the real numbers such that f is not continuous at a, but f is sequentially continuous at a, i.e., for any sequence {xn} converging to a, limn f(xn)=f(a). There exists a model of ZFC which has an infinite set of real numbers without a countably infinite subset. There exists a model of ZFC in which real numbers are a countable union of countable sets.[16] There exists a model of ZFC in which there is a field with no algebraic closure. In all models of ZFC there is a vector space with no basis. There exists a model of ZFC in which there is a vector space with two bases of different cardinalities. There exists a model of ZFC in which there is a free complete boolean algebra on countably many generators.[17] For proofs, see Thomas Jech, The Axiom of Choice, American Elsevier Pub. Co., New York, 1973.

Axiom of choice There exists a model of ZFC in which every set in Rn is measurable. Thus it is possible to exclude counterintuitive results like the BanachTarski paradox which are provable in ZFC. Furthermore, this is possible whilst assuming the Axiom of dependent choice, which is weaker than AC but sufficient to develop most of real analysis. In all models of ZFC, the generalized continuum hypothesis does not hold.

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Quotes
"The Axiom of Choice is obviously true, the well-ordering principle obviously false, and who can tell about Zorn's lemma?" Jerry Bona This is a joke: although the three are all mathematically equivalent, many mathematicians find the axiom of choice to be intuitive, the well-ordering principle to be counterintuitive, and Zorn's lemma to be too complex for any intuition. "The Axiom of Choice is necessary to select a set from an infinite number of socks, but not an infinite number of shoes." Bertrand Russell The observation here is that one can define a function to select from an infinite number of pairs of shoes by stating for example, to choose the left shoe. Without the axiom of choice, one cannot assert that such a function exists for pairs of socks, because left and right socks are (presumably) indistinguishable from each other. "Tarski tried to publish his theorem [the equivalence between AC and 'every infinite set A has the same cardinality as AxA', see above] in Comptes Rendus, but Frchet and Lebesgue refused to present it. Frchet wrote that an implication between two well known [true] propositions is not a new result, and Lebesgue wrote that an implication between two false propositions is of no interest". Polish-American mathematician Jan Mycielski relates this anecdote in a 2006 article in the Notices of the AMS. "The axiom gets its name not because mathematicians prefer it to other axioms." A. K. Dewdney This quote comes from the famous April Fools' Day article in the computer recreations column of the Scientific American, April 1989.

Notes
[1] Zermelo, Ernst (1904). "Beweis, dass jede Menge wohlgeordnet werden kann" (http:/ / gdz. sub. uni-goettingen. de/ no_cache/ en/ dms/ load/ img/ ?IDDOC=28526) (reprint). Mathematische Annalen 59 (4): 51416. doi:10.1007/BF01445300. . [2] Jech, 1977, p. 348ff; Martin-Lf 2008, p. 210. [3] Herrlich, p. 9. [4] Patrick Suppes, "Axiomatic Set Theory", Dover, 1972 (1960), ISBN 0-486-61630-4, p. 240 [5] Tourlakis (2003), pp. 209210, 215216. [6] Per Martin-Lf, Intuitionistic type theory (http:/ / www. cs. cmu. edu/ afs/ cs/ Web/ People/ crary/ 819-f09/ Martin-Lof80. pd), 1980. Anne Sjerp Troelstra, Metamathematical investigation of intuitionistic arithmetic and analysis, Springer, 1973. [7] Errett Bishop and Douglas S. Bridges, Constructive analysis, Springer-Verlag, 1985. [8] Per Martin-Lf, "100 Years of Zermelos Axiom of Choice: What was the Problem with It?", The Computer Journal (2006) 49 (3): 345-350. doi: 10.1093/comjnl/bxh162 [9] Fred Richman, Constructive mathematics without choice, in: Reuniting the AntipodesConstructive and Nonstandard Views of the Continuum (P. Schuster et al., eds), Synthse Library 306, 199205, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 2001. [10] This is because arithmetical statements are absolute to the constructible universe L. Shoenfield's absoluteness theorem gives a more general result. [11] Blass, Andreas (1984). "Existence of bases implies the axiom of choice". Contemporary mathematics 31. [12] A. Hajnal, A. Kertsz: Some new algebraic equivalents of the axiom of choice, Publ. Math. Debrecen, 19(1972), 339340, see also H. Rubin, J. Rubin, Equivalents of the axiom of choice, II, North-Holland, 1985, p. 111. [13] http:/ / www. cs. nyu. edu/ pipermail/ fom/ 2006-February/ 009959. html [14] http:/ / journals. cambridge. org/ action/ displayFulltext?type=1& fid=4931240& aid=4931232

Axiom of choice
[15] Axiom of dependent choice [16] Jech, Thomas (1973) "The axiom of choice", ISBN 0-444-10484-4, CH. 10, p. 142. [17] Stavi, Jonathan (1974). "A model of ZF with an infinite free complete Boolean algebra" (http:/ / www. springerlink. com/ content/ d5710380t753621u/ ) (reprint). Israel Journal of Mathematics 20 (2): 149163. doi:10.1007/BF02757883. .

33

References
Horst Herrlich, Axiom of Choice, Springer Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1876, Springer Verlag Berlin Heidelberg (2006). ISBN 3-540-30989-6. Paul Howard and Jean Rubin, "Consequences of the Axiom of Choice". Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 59; American Mathematical Society; 1998. Thomas Jech, "About the Axiom of Choice." Handbook of Mathematical Logic, John Barwise, ed., 1977. Per Martin-Lf, "100 years of Zermelo's axiom of choice: What was the problem with it?", in Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What Has Become of Them?, Sten Lindstrm, Erik Palmgren, Krister Segerberg, and Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen, editors (2008). ISBN 1-4020-8925-2 Gregory H Moore, "Zermelo's axiom of choice, Its origins, development and influence", Springer; 1982. ISBN 0-387-90670-3 Herman Rubin, Jean E. Rubin: Equivalents of the axiom of choice. North Holland, 1963. Reissued by Elsevier, April 1970. ISBN 0-7204-2225-6. Herman Rubin, Jean E. Rubin: Equivalents of the Axiom of Choice II. North Holland/Elsevier, July 1985, ISBN 0-444-87708-8. George Tourlakis, Lectures in Logic and Set Theory. Vol. II: Set Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-511-06659-7 Ernst Zermelo, "Untersuchungen ber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I," Mathematische Annalen 65: (1908) pp.26181. PDF download via [Link] ([Link] jkdigitools/loader/?tx_jkDigiTools_pi1[IDDOC]=361762) Translated in: Jean van Heijenoort, 2002. From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931. New edition. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-32449-8 1904. "Proof that every set can be well-ordered," 139-41. 1908. "Investigations in the foundations of set theory I," 199-215.

External links
Hazewinkel, Michiel, ed. (2001), "Axiom of choice" ([Link] a014270), Encyclopedia of Mathematics, Springer, ISBN978-1-55608-010-4 Axiom of Choice and Its Equivalents at ProvenMath ([Link] includes formal statement of the Axiom of Choice, Hausdorff's Maximal Principle, Zorn's Lemma and formal proofs of their equivalence down to the finest detail. Consequences of the Axiom of Choice ([Link] html), based on the book by Paul Howard ([Link] and Jean Rubin. The Axiom of Choice ([Link] entry by John Lane Bell in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Jordan curve theorem

34

Jordan curve theorem

In topology, a Jordan curve is a non-self-intersecting continuous loop in the plane, and another name for a Jordan curve is a simple closed curve. The Jordan curve theorem asserts that every Jordan curve divides the plane into an "interior" region bounded by the curve and an "exterior" region containing all of the nearby and far away exterior points, so that any continuous path connecting a point of one region to a point of the other intersects with that loop somewhere. While the statement of this theorem seems to be intuitively obvious, it takes quite a bit of ingenuity to prove it by elementary means. More transparent proofs rely on the mathematical machinery of algebraic topology, and these lead to generalizations to higher-dimensional spaces. The Jordan curve theorem is named after the mathematician Camille Jordan, who found its first proof. For decades, it was generally thought that this proof was flawed and that the first rigorous proof was carried out by Oswald Veblen. However, this notion has been challenged by Thomas C. Hales and others.
Illustration of the Jordan curve theorem. The Jordan curve (drawn in black) divides the plane into an "inside" region (light blue) and an "outside" region (pink).

Definitions and the statement of the Jordan theorem

A Jordan curve or a simple closed curve in the plane R2 is the image C of an injective continuous map of a circle into the plane, : S1 R2. A Jordan arc in the plane is the image of an injective continuous map of a closed interval into the plane. Alternatively, a Jordan curve is the image of a continuous map : [0,1] R2 such that (0) = (1) and the restriction of to [0,1) is injective. The first two conditions say that C is a continuous loop, whereas the last condition stipulates that C has no self-intersection points. Let C be a Jordan curve in the plane R2. Then its complement, R2\C, consists of exactly two connected components. One of these components is bounded (the interior) and the other is unbounded (the exterior), and the curve C is the boundary of each component. Furthermore, the complement of a Jordan arc in the plane is connected.

Proof and generalizations

The Jordan curve theorem was independently generalized to higher dimensions by H. Lebesgue and L.E.J. Brouwer in 1911, resulting in the JordanBrouwer separation theorem. Let X be a topological sphere in the (n+1)-dimensional Euclidean space Rn+1, i.e. the image of an injective continuous mapping of the n-sphere Sn into Rn+1. Then the complement Y of X in Rn+1 consists of exactly two connected components. One of these components is bounded (the interior) and the other is unbounded (the exterior). The set X is their common boundary. The proof uses homology theory. It is first established that, more generally, if X is homeomorphic to the k-sphere, then the reduced integral homology groups of Y = Rn+1 \ X are as follows:

Jordan curve theorem This is proved by induction in k using the MayerVietoris sequence. When n = k, the zeroth reduced homology of Y has rank 1, which means that Y has 2 connected components (which are, moreover, path connected), and with a bit of extra work, one shows that their common boundary is X. A further generalization was found by J. W. Alexander, who established the Alexander duality between the reduced homology of a compact subset X of Rn+1 and the reduced cohomology of its complement. If X is an n-dimensional compact connected submanifold of Rn+1 (or Sn+1) without boundary, its complement has 2 connected components. There is a strengthening of the Jordan curve theorem, called the JordanSchnflies theorem, which states that the interior and the exterior planar regions determined by a Jordan curve in R2 are homeomorphic to the interior and exterior of the unit disk. In particular, for any point P in the interior region and a point A on the Jordan curve, there exists a Jordan arc connecting P with A and, with the exception of the endpoint A, completely lying in the interior region. An alternative and equivalent formulation of the JordanSchnflies theorem asserts that any Jordan curve : S1 R2, where S1 is viewed as the unit circle in the plane, can be extended to a homeomorphism : R2 R2 of the plane. Unlike Lebesgues' and Brouwer's generalization of the Jordan curve theorem, this statement becomes false in higher dimensions: while the exterior of the unit ball in R3 is simply connected, because it retracts onto the unit sphere, the Alexander horned sphere is a subset of R3 homeomorphic to a sphere, but so twisted in space that the unbounded component of its complement in R3 is not simply connected, and hence not homeomorphic to the exterior of the unit ball.

35

History and further proofs

The statement of the Jordan curve theorem may seem obvious at first, but it is a rather difficult theorem to prove. Bernard Bolzano was the first to formulate a precise conjecture, observing that it was not a self-evident statement, but that it required a proof. It is easy to establish this result for polygonal lines, but the problem came in generalizing it to all kinds of badly behaved curves, which include nowhere differentiable curves, such as the Koch snowflake and other fractal curves, or even a Jordan curve of positive area constructed by Osgood (1903). The first proof of this theorem was given by Camille Jordan in his lectures on real analysis, and was published in his book Cours d'analyse de l'cole Polytechnique.[1] There is some controversy about whether Jordan's proof was complete: the majority of commenters on it have claimed that the first complete proof was given later by Oswald Veblen, who said the following about Jordan's proof:

His proof, however, is unsatisfactory to many mathematicians. It assumes the theorem without proof in the important special case of a simple [2] polygon, and of the argument from that point on, one must admit at least that all details are not given.

However, Thomas C. Hales wrote:

Nearly every modern citation that I have found agrees that the first correct proof is due to Veblen... In view of the heavy criticism of Jordans proof, I was surprised when I sat down to read his proof to find nothing objectionable about it. Since then, I have contacted a number of the [3] authors who have criticized Jordan, and each case the author has admitted to having no direct knowledge of an error in Jordans proof.

Hales also pointed out that the special case of simple polygons is not only an easy exercise, but was not really used by Jordan anyway, and quoted Michael Reeken as saying:
Jordans proof is essentially correct... Jordans proof does not present the details in a satisfactory way. But the idea is right, and with some [4] polishing the proof would be impeccable.

Jordan's proof and another early proof by de la Valle-Poussin were later critically analyzed and completed by Shoenflies (1924). Due to the importance of the Jordan curve theorem in low-dimensional topology and complex analysis, it received much attention from prominent mathematicians of the first half of the 20th century. Various proofs of the theorem

Jordan curve theorem and its generalizations were constructed by J. W. Alexander, Louis Antoine, Bieberbach, Luitzen Brouwer, Denjoy, Hartogs, Kerkjrt, Alfred Pringsheim, and Schoenflies. Some new elementary proofs of the Jordan curve theorem, as well as simplifications of the earlier proofs, continue to be carried out. A short elementary proof of the Jordan curve theorem was presented by A. F. Filippov in 1950.[5] A proof using the Brouwer fixed point theorem by Maehara (1984). A proof using non-standard analysis by Narens (1971). A proof using constructive mathematics by Gordon O. Berg, W. Julian, and R. Mines et al.(1975). A proof using non-planarity of the complete bipartite graph K3,3 was given by Thomassen (1992). A simplification of the proof by Helge Tverberg.[6]

36

The first formal proof of the Jordan curve theorem was created by Hales (2007a) in the HOL Light system, in January 2005, and contained about 60,000 lines. Another rigorous 6,500-line formal proof was produced in 2005 by an international team of mathematicians using the Mizar system. Both the Mizar and the HOL Light proof rely on libraries of previously proved theorems, so these two sizes are not comparable. Nobuyuki Sakamoto and Keita Yokoyama(2007) showed that the Jordan curve theorem is equivalent in proof-theoretic strength to the weak Knig's lemma.

Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Camille Jordan(1887) Oswald Veblen(1905) Hales (2007b) Ibid A. F. Filippov, An elementary proof of Jordan's theorem, Uspekhi Mat. Nauk, 5:5(39) (1950), 173176 (http:/ / www. mathnet. ru/ php/ archive. phtml?wshow=paper& jrnid=rm& paperid=8482& option_lang=eng) [6] Czes Kosniowski, A First Course in Algebraic Topology

References
Berg, Gordon O.; Julian, W.; Mines, R.; Richman, Fred (1975), "The constructive Jordan curve theorem", Rocky Mountain Journal of Mathematics 5 (2): 225236, doi:10.1216/RMJ-1975-5-2-225, ISSN0035-7596, MR0410701 Hales, Thomas C. (2007a), "The Jordan curve theorem, formally and informally", The American Mathematical Monthly 114 (10): 882894, ISSN0002-9890, MR2363054 Hales, Thomas (2007b), "Jordan's proof of the Jordan Curve theorem" ([Link] Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 10 (23) Jordan, Camille (1887), Cours d'analyse ([Link] pp.587594 Maehara, Ryuji (1984), "The Jordan Curve Theorem Via the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem", The American Mathematical Monthly (Mathematical Association of America) 91 (10): 641643, doi:10.2307/2323369, ISSN0002-9890, JSTOR2323369, MR0769530 Narens, Louis (1971), "A nonstandard proof of the Jordan curve theorem" ([Link] 1102971282), Pacific Journal of Mathematics 36: 219229, ISSN0030-8730, MR0276940 Osgood, William F. (1903), "A Jordan Curve of Positive Area", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society (Providence, R.I.: American Mathematical Society) 4 (1): 107112, ISSN0002-9947, JFM34.0533.02, JSTOR1986455 Ross, Fiona; Ross, William T. (2011), "The Jordan curve theorem is non-trivial" ([Link] doi/abs/10.1080/17513472.2011.634320), Journal of Mathematics and the Arts (Taylor & Francis) 5 (4): 213219, doi:10.1080/17513472.2011.634320. author's site ([Link] [Link])

Jordan curve theorem Sakamoto, Nobuyuki; Yokoyama, Keita (2007), "The Jordan curve theorem and the Schnflies theorem in weak second-order arithmetic", Archive for Mathematical Logic 46 (5): 465480, doi:10.1007/s00153-007-0050-6, ISSN0933-5846, MR2321588 Thomassen, Carsten (1992), "The JordanSchnflies theorem and the classification of surfaces", American Mathematical Monthly 99 (2): 116130, doi:10.2307/2324180, JSTOR2324180 Veblen, Oswald (1905), "Theory on Plane Curves in Non-Metrical Analysis Situs", Transactions of the American Mathematical Society (Providence, R.I.: American Mathematical Society) 6 (1): 8398, ISSN0002-9947, JSTOR1986378

37

External links
M.I. Voitsekhovskii (2001), "Jordan theorem" ([Link] j054370), in Hazewinkel, Michiel, Encyclopedia of Mathematics, Springer, ISBN978-1-55608-010-4 The full 6,500 line formal proof of Jordan's curve theorem ([Link] 1112/html/[Link]) in Mizar. Collection of proofs of the Jordan curve theorem ([Link] at Andrew Ranicki's homepage A simple proof of Jordan curve theorem ([Link] (PDF) by David B. Gauld Application of the theorem in computer science - Determining If A Point Lies On The Interior Of A Polygon ([Link] by Paul Bourke

Special relativity
Special relativity (SR, also known as the special theory of relativity or STR) is the physical theory of measurement in an inertial frame of reference proposed in 1905 by Albert Einstein in the paper "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies".[1] It extends Galileo's principle of relativitythat all uniform motion is relative, and that there is no absolute and well-defined state of rest (no privileged reference frames)to account for the constant speed of light[2]which was previously observed in the Michelson-Morley experimentand postulates that it holds for all the laws of physics, including both the laws of mechanics and of electrodynamics, whatever they may be.[3]

USSR postage stamp dedicated to Albert Einstein

This theory has a wide range of consequences which have been experimentally verified,[4] including counter-intuitive ones such as length contraction, time dilation and relativity of simultaneity. It has replaced the classical notion of invariant time interval for two events with the notion of invariant space-time interval. Combined with other laws of physics, the two postulates of special relativity predict the equivalence of mass and energy, as expressed in the massenergy equivalence formula E=mc2, where c is the speed of light in vacuum.[5][6] The predictions of special relativity agree well with Newtonian mechanics in their common realm of applicability, specifically in experiments in which all velocities are small compared with the speed of light. Special relativity reveals that c is not just the velocity of a certain phenomenonnamely the propagation of electromagnetic radiation

Special relativity (light)but rather a fundamental feature of the way space and time are unified as spacetime. One of the consequences of the theory is that it is impossible for any particle that has rest mass to be accelerated to the speed of light. The theory was originally termed "special" because it applied the principle of relativity only to the special case of inertial reference frames, i.e. frames of reference in uniform relative motion with respect to each other.[7] Einstein developed general relativity to apply the principle in the more general case, that is, to any frame so as to handle general coordinate transformations, and that theory includes the effects of gravity. The term is currently used more generally to refer to any case in which gravitation is not significant. General relativity is the generalization of special relativity to include gravitation. In general relativity, gravity is described using noneuclidean geometry, so that gravitational effects are represented by curvature of spacetime; special relativity is restricted to flat spacetime. Just as the curvature of the earth's surface is not noticeable in everyday life, the curvature of spacetime can be neglected on small scales, so that locally, special relativity is a valid approximation to general relativity.[8] The presence of gravity becomes undetectable in a sufficiently small, free-falling laboratory.

38

Postulates

Reflections of this type made it clear to me as long ago as shortly after 1900, i.e., shortly after Planck's trailblazing work, that neither mechanics nor electrodynamics could (except in limiting cases) claim exact validity. Gradually I despaired of the possibility of discovering the true laws by means of constructive efforts based on known facts. The longer and the more desperately I tried, the more I came to the conviction that only the discovery of a universal formal principle could lead us to assured results... How, then, could such a universal principle be found?

[9]

Albert Einstein: Autobiographical Notes

Einstein discerned two fundamental propositions that seemed to be the most assured, regardless of the exact validity of the (then) known laws of either mechanics or electrodynamics. These propositions were the constancy of the speed of light and the independence of physical laws (especially the constancy of the speed of light) from the choice of inertial system. In his initial presentation of special relativity in 1905 he expressed these postulates as:[1] The Principle of Relativity The laws by which the states of physical systems undergo change are not affected, whether these changes of state be referred to the one or the other of two systems in uniform translatory motion relative to each other.[1] The Principle of Invariant Light Speed "... light is always propagated in empty space with a definite velocity [speed] c which is independent of the state of motion of the emitting body." (from the preface).[1] That is, light in vacuum propagates with the speed c (a fixed constant, independent of direction) in at least one system of inertial coordinates (the "stationary system"), regardless of the state of motion of the light source. The derivation of special relativity depends not only on these two explicit postulates, but also on several tacit assumptions (made in almost all theories of physics), including the isotropy and homogeneity of space and the independence of measuring rods and clocks from their past history.[10] Following Einstein's original presentation of special relativity in 1905, many different sets of postulates have been proposed in various alternative derivations.[11] However, the most common set of postulates remains those employed by Einstein in his original paper. A more mathematical statement of the Principle of Relativity made later by Einstein, which introduces the concept of simplicity not mentioned above is: Special principle of relativity: If a system of coordinates K is chosen so that, in relation to it, physical laws hold good in their simplest form, the same laws hold good in relation to any other system of coordinates K' moving in uniform translation relatively to K.[12]

Special relativity Henri Poincar provided the mathematical framework for relativity theory by proving that Lorentz transformations are a subset of his Poincar group of symmetry transformations. Einstein later derived these transformations from his axioms. Many of Einstein's papers present derivations of the Lorentz transformation based upon these two principles.[13] Einstein consistently based the derivation of Lorentz invariance (the essential core of special relativity) on just the two basic principles of relativity and light-speed invariance. He wrote: The insight fundamental for the special theory of relativity is this: The assumptions relativity and light speed invariance are compatible if relations of a new type ("Lorentz transformation") are postulated for the conversion of coordinates and times of events... The universal principle of the special theory of relativity is contained in the postulate: The laws of physics are invariant with respect to Lorentz transformations (for the transition from one inertial system to any other arbitrarily chosen inertial system). This is a restricting principle for natural laws...[9] Thus many modern treatments of special relativity base it on the single postulate of universal Lorentz covariance, or, equivalently, on the single postulate of Minkowski spacetime.[14][15] From the principle of relativity alone without assuming the constancy of the speed of light (i.e. using the isotropy of space and the symmetry implied by the principle of special relativity) one can show that the space-time transformations between inertial frames are either Euclidean, Galilean, or Lorentzian. In the Lorentzian case, one can then obtain relativistic interval conservation and a certain finite limiting speed. Experiments suggest that this speed is the speed of light in vacuum.[16][17] The constancy of the speed of light was motivated by Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism and the lack of evidence for the luminiferous ether. There is conflicting evidence on the extent to which Einstein was influenced by the null result of the MichelsonMorley experiment.[18][19] In any case, the null result of the MichelsonMorley experiment helped the notion of the constancy of the speed of light gain widespread and rapid acceptance.

39

Lack of an absolute reference frame

The principle of relativity, which states that there is no preferred inertial reference frame, dates back to Galileo, and was incorporated into Newtonian physics. However, in the late 19th century, the existence of electromagnetic waves led physicists to suggest that the universe was filled with a substance known as "aether", which would act as the medium through which these waves, or vibrations travelled. The aether was thought to constitute an absolute reference frame against which speeds could be measured, and could be considered fixed and motionless. Aether supposedly had some wonderful properties: it was sufficiently elastic that it could support electromagnetic waves, and those waves could interact with matter, yet it offered no resistance to bodies passing through it. The results of various experiments, including the MichelsonMorley experiment, indicated that the Earth was always 'stationary' relative to the aether something that was difficult to explain, since the Earth is in orbit around the Sun. Einstein's solution was to discard the notion of an aether and an absolute state of rest. Special relativity is formulated so as to not assume that any particular frame of reference is special; rather, in relativity, any reference frame moving with uniform motion will observe the same laws of physics. In particular, the speed of light in vacuum is always measured to be c, even when measured by multiple systems that are moving at different (but constant) velocities.

Special relativity

40

Reference frames, coordinates and the Lorentz transformation

Relativity theory depends on "reference frames". The term reference frame as used here is an observational perspective in space which is not undergoing any change in motion (acceleration), from which a position can be measured along 3 spatial axes. In addition, a reference frame has the ability to determine measurements of the time of events using a 'clock' (any reference device with uniform periodicity). An event is an occurrence that can be The primed system is in motion relative to the unprimed system with constant assigned a single unique time and location speed v only along the x-axis, from the perspective of an observer stationary in the in space relative to a reference frame: it is a unprimed system. By the principle of relativity, an observer stationary in the "point" in space-time. Since the speed of primed system will view a likewise construction except that the speed they record will be -v. The changing of the speed of propagation of interaction from infinite in light is constant in relativity in each and non-relativistic mechanics to a finite value will require a modification of the every reference frame, pulses of light can be transformation equations mapping events in one frame to another. used to unambiguously measure distances and refer back the times that events occurred to the clock, even though light takes time to reach the clock after the event has transpired. For example, the explosion of a firecracker may be considered to be an "event". We can completely specify an event by its four space-time coordinates: The time of occurrence and its 3-dimensional spatial location define a reference point. Let's call this reference frame S. In relativity theory we often want to calculate the position of a point from a different reference point. Suppose we have a second reference frame S, whose spatial axes and clock exactly coincide with that of S at time zero, but it is moving at a constant velocity v with respect to S along the x-axis. Since there is no absolute reference frame in relativity theory, a concept of 'moving' doesn't strictly exist, as everything is always moving with respect to some other reference frame. Instead, any two frames that move at the same speed in the same direction are said to be comoving. Therefore S and S are not comoving. Define the event to have space-time coordinates (t,x,y,z) in system S and (t,x,y,z) in S. Then the Lorentz transformation specifies that these coordinates are related in the following way:

where

is the Lorentz factor and c is the speed of light in vacuum, and the velocity v of S is parallel to the x-axis. The y and z coordinates are unaffected; only the x and t coordinates are transformed. These Lorentz transformations form a one-parameter group of linear mappings, that parameter being called rapidity. There is nothing special about the x-axis, the transformation can apply to the y or z axes, or indeed in any direction, which can be done by directions parallel to the motion (which are warped by the factor) and perpendicular; see

Special relativity main article for details. A quantity invariant under Lorentz transformations is known as a Lorentz scalar. Writing the Lorentz transformation and its inverse in terms of coordinate differences, where for instance one event has coordinates (x1, t1) and (x1, t1), another event has coordinates (x2, t2) and (x2, t2), and the differences are defined as

41

we get

These effects are not merely appearances; they are explicitly related to our way of measuring time intervals between events which occur at the same place in a given coordinate system (called "co-local" events). These time intervals will be different in another coordinate system moving with respect to the first, unless the events are also simultaneous. Similarly, these effects also relate to our measured distances between separated but simultaneous events in a given coordinate system of choice. If these events are not co-local, but are separated by distance (space), they will not occur at the same spatial distance from each other when seen from another moving coordinate system. However, the space-time interval will be the same for all observers. The underlying reality remains the same. Only our perspective changes.

Consequences derived from the Lorentz transformation

The consequences of special relativity can be derived from the Lorentz transformation equations.[20] These transformations, and hence special relativity, lead to different physical predictions than those of Newtonian mechanics when relative velocities become comparable to the speed of light. The speed of light is so much larger than anything humans encounter that some of the effects predicted by relativity are initially counterintuitive.

Relativity of simultaneity
Two events happening in two different locations that occur simultaneously in the reference frame of one inertial observer, may occur non-simultaneously in the reference frame of another inertial observer (lack of absolute simultaneity). From the first equation of the Lorentz transformation in terms of coordinate differences

it is clear that two events that are simultaneous in frame S (satisfying t = 0), are not necessarily simultaneous in another inertial frame S (satisfying t = 0). Only if these events are colocal in frame S (satisfying x = 0), will they be simultaneous in another frame S.

Event B is simultaneous with A in the green reference frame, but it occurred before in the blue frame, and will occur later in the red frame.

Time dilation
The time lapse between two events is not invariant from one observer to another, but is dependent on the relative speeds of the observers' reference frames (e.g., the twin paradox which concerns a twin who flies off in a spaceship traveling near the speed of light and returns to discover that his or her twin sibling has aged much more).

Special relativity Suppose a clock is at rest in the unprimed system S. Two different ticks of this clock are then characterized by x = 0. To find the relation between the times between these ticks as measured in both systems, the first equation can be used to find: for events satisfying This shows that the time (t') between the two ticks as seen in the frame in which the clock is moving (S'), is longer than the time (t) between these ticks as measured in the rest frame of the clock (S). Time dilation explains a number of physical phenomena; for example, the decay rate of muons produced by cosmic rays impinging on the Earth's atmosphere.[21]

42

Length contraction
The dimensions (e.g., length) of an object as measured by one observer may be smaller than the results of measurements of the same object made by another observer (e.g., the ladder paradox involves a long ladder traveling near the speed of light and being contained within a smaller garage). Similarly, suppose a measuring rod is at rest and aligned along the x-axis in the unprimed system S. In this system, the length of this rod is written as x. To measure the length of this rod in the system S', in which the clock is moving, the distances x to the end points of the rod must be measured simultaneously in that system S'. In other words, the measurement is characterized by t = 0, which can be combined with the fourth equation to find the relation between the lengths x and x: for events satisfying This shows that the length (x') of the rod as measured in the frame in which it is moving (S'), is shorter than its length (x) in its own rest frame (S).

Composition of velocities
Velocities (and speeds) do not simply add. If the observer in S measures an object moving along the x axis at velocity u, then the observer in the S system, a frame of reference moving at velocity v in the x direction with respect to S, will measure the object moving with velocity u' where (from the Lorentz transformations above):

The other frame S will measure:

Notice that if the object were moving at the speed of light in the S system (i.e. u = c), then it would also be moving at the speed of light in the S system. Also, if both u and v are small with respect to the speed of light, we will recover the intuitive Galilean transformation of velocities . The usual example given is that of a train (frame S above) traveling due east with a velocity v with respect to the tracks (frame S). A child inside the train throws a baseball due east with a velocity u with respect to the train. In classical physics, an observer at rest on the tracks will measure the velocity of the baseball (due east) as u = u + v, while in special relativity this is no longer true; instead the velocity of the baseball (due east) is given by the second equation: u = (u + v)/(1 + uv/c2). Again, there is nothing special about the x or east directions. This formalism applies to any direction by considering parallel and perpendicular motion to the direction of relative velocity v, see main article for details.

Special relativity Einstein's addition of colinear velocities is consistent with the Fizeau experiment which determined the speed of light in a fluid moving parallel to the light, but no experiment has ever tested the formula for the general case of non-parallel velocities.

43

Other consequences
Thomas rotation
The orientation of an object (i.e. the alignment of its axes with the observer's axes) may be different for different observers. Unlike other relativistic effects, this effect becomes quite significant at fairly low velocities as can be seen in the spin of moving particles.

Equivalence of mass and energy

As an object's speed approaches the speed of light from an observer's point of view, its relativistic mass increases thereby making it more and more difficult to accelerate it from within the observer's frame of reference. The energy content of an object at rest with mass m equals mc2. Conservation of energy implies that, in any reaction, a decrease of the sum of the masses of particles must be accompanied by an increase in kinetic energies of the particles after the reaction. Similarly, the mass of an object can be increased by taking in kinetic energies. In addition to the papers referenced abovewhich give derivations of the Lorentz transformation and describe the foundations of special relativityEinstein also wrote at least four papers giving heuristic arguments for the equivalence (and transmutability) of mass and energy, for E = mc2. Massenergy equivalence is a consequence of special relativity. The energy and momentum, which are separate in Newtonian mechanics, form a four-vector in relativity, and this relates the time component (the energy) to the space components (the momentum) in a nontrivial way. For an object at rest, the energy-momentum four-vector is (E, 0, 0, 0): it has a time component which is the energy, and three space components which are zero. By changing frames with a Lorentz transformation in the x direction with a small value of the velocity v, the energy momentum four-vector becomes (E, Ev/c2, 0, 0). The momentum is equal to the energy multiplied by the velocity divided by c2. As such, the Newtonian mass of an object, which is the ratio of the momentum to the velocity for slow velocities, is equal to E/c2. The energy and momentum are properties of matter and radiation, and it is impossible to deduce that they form a four-vector just from the two basic postulates of special relativity by themselves, because these don't talk about matter or radiation, they only talk about space and time. The derivation therefore requires some additional physical reasoning. In his 1905 paper, Einstein used the additional principles that Newtonian mechanics should hold for slow velocities, so that there is one energy scalar and one three-vector momentum at slow velocities, and that the conservation law for energy and momentum is exactly true in relativity. Furthermore, he assumed that the energy of light is transformed by the same Doppler-shift factor as its frequency, which he had previously shown to be true based on Maxwell's equations.[1] The first of Einstein's papers on this subject was "Does the Inertia of a Body Depend upon its Energy Content?" in 1905.[22] Although Einstein's argument in this paper is nearly universally accepted by physicists as correct, even self-evident, many authors over the years have suggested that it is wrong.[23] Other authors suggest that the argument was merely inconclusive because it relied on some implicit assumptions.[24] Einstein acknowledged the controversy over his derivation in his 1907 survey paper on special relativity. There he notes that it is problematic to rely on Maxwell's equations for the heuristic massenergy argument. The argument in his 1905 paper can be carried out with the emission of any massless particles, but the Maxwell equations are implicitly used to make it obvious that the emission of light in particular can be achieved only by doing work. To emit electromagnetic waves, all you have to do is shake a charged particle, and this is clearly doing work, so that the emission is of energy.[25][26]

Special relativity

44

How far can one travel from the Earth?

Since one can not travel faster than light, one might conclude that a human can never travel further from Earth than 40 light years if the traveler is active between the age of 20 and 60. One would easily think that a traveler would never be able to reach more than the very few solar systems which exist within the limit of 20-40 light years from the earth. But that would be a mistaken conclusion. Because of time dilation, a hypothetical spaceship can travel thousands of light years during the pilot's 40 active years. If a spaceship could be built that accelerates at a constant 1g, it will after a little less than a year be traveling at almost the speed of light as seen from Earth. Time dilation will increase his life span as seen from the reference system of the Earth, but his lifespan measured by a clock traveling with him will not thereby change. During his journey, people on Earth will experience more time than he does. A 5 year round trip for him will take 6 Earth years and cover a distance of over 6 light-years. A 20 year round trip for him (5 years accelerating, 5 decelerating, twice each) will land him back on Earth having traveled for 335 Earth years and a distance of 331 light years.[27] A full 40 year trip at 1 g will appear on Earth to last 58,000 years and cover a distance of 55,000 light years. A 40 year trip at 1.1 g will take 148,000 Earth years and cover about 140,000 light years. This same time dilation is why a muon traveling close to c is observed to travel much further than c times its half-life (when at rest).[28]

Causality and prohibition of motion faster than light

In diagram 2 the interval AB is 'time-like'; i.e., there is a frame of reference in which events A and B occur at the same location in space, separated only by occurring at different times. If A precedes B in that frame, then A precedes B in all frames. It is hypothetically possible for matter (or information) to travel from A to B, so there can be a causal relationship (with A the cause and B the effect). The interval AC in the diagram is 'space-like'; i.e., there is a frame of reference in which events A and C occur simultaneously, separated only in space. There are also frames in which A precedes C (as shown) and frames in which C precedes A. If it were possible for a cause-and-effect relationship to exist between events A and C, then paradoxes of causality would result. For example, if A was the cause, and C the effect, then there would be frames of reference in which the effect preceded the cause. Although this in itself won't give rise to a paradox, one can show[29][30] that faster than light signals can be sent back into one's own past. A causal paradox can then be constructed by sending the signal if and only if no signal was received previously.
Diagram 2. Light cone

Therefore, if causality is to be preserved, one of the consequences of special relativity is that no information signal or material object can travel faster than light in vacuum. However, some "things" can still move faster than light. For example, the location where the beam of a search light hits the bottom of a cloud can move faster than light when the search light is turned rapidly.[31] Even without considerations of causality, there are other strong reasons why faster-than-light travel is forbidden by special relativity. For example, if a constant force is applied to an object for a limitless amount of time, then integrating F=dp/dt gives a momentum that grows without bound, but this is simply because approaches infinity as approaches c. To an observer who is not accelerating, it appears as though the object's inertia is increasing, so as to produce a smaller acceleration in response to the same force. This behavior is in fact observed in particle accelerators, where each charged particle is accelerated by the electromagnetic force.

Special relativity Theoretical and experimental tunneling studies carried out by Gnter Nimtz and Petrissa Eckle wrongly claimed that under special conditions signals may travel faster than light.[32][33][34][35] It was measured that fiber digital signals were traveling up to 5 times c and a zero-time tunneling electron carried the information that the atom is ionized, with photons, phonons and electrons spending zero time in the tunneling barrier. According to Nimtz and Eckle, in this superluminal process only the Einstein causality and the special relativity but not the primitive causality are violated: Superluminal propagation does not result in any kind of time travel.[36][37] Several scientists have stated not only that Nimtz' interpretations were erroneous, but also that the experiment actually provided a trivial experimental confirmation of the special relativity theory.[38][39][40]

45

Geometry of space-time
Comparison between flat Euclidean space and Minkowski space
Special relativity uses a 'flat' 4-dimensional Minkowski space an example of a space-time. Minkowski spacetime appears to be very similar to the standard 3-dimensional Euclidean space, but there is a crucial difference with respect to time. In 3D space, the differential of distance (line element) ds is defined by ,
Orthogonality and rotation of coordinate systems compared between left: Euclidean space where dx = (dx1, dx2, dx3) are the through circular angle , right: in Minkowski spacetime through hyperbolic angle (red differentials of the three spatial lines labelled c denote the worldlines of a light signal, a vector is orthogonal to itself if it [41] dimensions. In Minkowski geometry, lies on this line). there is an extra dimension with coordinate x0 derived from time, such that the distance differential fulfills

, where dx = (dx0, dx1, dx2, dx3) are the differentials of the four spacetime dimensions. This suggests a deep theoretical insight: special relativity is simply a rotational symmetry of our space-time, analogous to the rotational symmetry of Euclidean space (see image right).[42] Just as Euclidean space uses a Euclidean metric, so space-time uses a Minkowski metric. Basically, special relativity can be stated as the invariance of any space-time interval (that is the 4D distance between any two events) when viewed from any inertial reference frame. All equations and effects of special relativity can be derived from this rotational symmetry (the Poincar group) of Minkowski space-time. The actual form of ds above depends on the metric and on the choices for the x0 coordinate. To make the time coordinate look like the space coordinates, it can be treated as imaginary: x0 = ict (this is called a Wick rotation). According to Misner, Thorne and Wheeler (1971, 2.3), ultimately the deeper understanding of both special and general relativity will come from the study of the Minkowski metric (described below) and to take x0 = ct, rather than a "disguised" Euclidean metric using ict as the time coordinate. Some authors use x0 = t, with factors of c elsewhere to compensate; for instance, spatial coordinates are divided by c or factors of c2 are included in the metric tensor.[43] These numerous conventions can be superseded by using natural units where c = 1. Then space and time have equivalent units, and no factors of c appear anywhere.

Special relativity

46

3D spacetime
If we reduce the spatial dimensions to 2, so that we can represent the physics in a 3D space , we see that the null geodesics lie along a dual-cone (see image right) defined by the equation;

or simply , which is the equation of a circle of radius c dt.

Three dimensional dual-cone.

4D spacetime
If we extend this to three spatial dimensions, the null geodesics are the 4-dimensional cone:

so . This null dual-cone represents the "line of sight" of a point in space. That is, when we look at the stars and say "The light from that star which I am receiving is X years old", we are looking down this line of sight: a null geodesic. We are looking at an event a distance away and a time d/c in the past. For this
Null spherical space.

reason the null dual cone is also known as the 'light cone'. (The point in the lower left of the picture below represents the star, the origin represents the observer, and the line represents the null geodesic "line of sight".) The cone in the t region is the information that the point is 'receiving', while the cone in the +t section is the information that the point is 'sending'. The geometry of Minkowski space can be depicted using Minkowski diagrams, which are useful also in understanding many of the thought-experiments in special relativity.

Physics in spacetime
The equations of special relativity can be written in a manifestly covariant form. The position of an event in spacetime is given by a contravariant four vector with components: We define x0 = ct so that the time coordinate has the same dimension of distance as the other spatial dimensions; so that space and time are treated equally.[44][45][46] Superscripts are contravariant indices in this section rather than exponents except when they indicate a square (it should be clear from the context). Subscripts are covariant indices which also range from zero to three, as with the four-gradient of a scalar field :

Special relativity

47

Transformations of physical quantities between reference frames

Coordinate transformations between inertial reference frames are given by the Lorentz transformation tensor . For the special case of motion along the x-axis:

which is simply the matrix of a boost (like a rotation) between the x and ct coordinates, where ' indicates the row and indicates the column, and

This can be generalized to a boost in any direction, and further to include rotations, at the cost of using spinors and gyrovectors, see Lorentz transformation for details. A transformation of a four-vector from one inertial frame to another (ignoring translations for simplicity) is given by the Lorentz transformation:

where there is an implied summation of ' and ' from 0 to 3. The inverse transformation is:

where

is the reciprocal matrix of

In the case of the Lorentz transformations above in the x-direction:

More generally, most physical quantities are best described as (components of) tensors. So to transform from one frame to another, we use the well-known tensor transformation law[47]

where

is the reciprocal matrix of

. All tensors transform by this rule.

Metric
Given the four-dimensional nature of spacetime the Minkowski metric has components (valid in any inertial reference frame) which can be arranged in a 4 4 matrix:

which is equal to its reciprocal,

, in those frames.

The Poincar group is the most general group of transformations which preserves the Minkowski metric

and this is the physical symmetry underlying special relativity.

Special relativity

48

Invariance
The squared length of the differential of the position four-vector constructed using

is an invariant. Being invariant means that it takes the same value in all inertial frames, because it is a scalar (0 rank tensor), and so no appears in its trivial transformation. Notice that when the line element dx2 is negative that is the differential of proper time, while when dx2 is positive, (dx2) is differential of the proper distance. The primary value of expressing the equations of physics in a tensor form is that they are then manifestly invariant under the Poincar group, so that we do not have to do a special and tedious calculation to check that fact. Also in constructing such equations we often find that equations previously thought to be unrelated are, in fact, closely connected being part of the same tensor equation.

Velocity and acceleration in 4D

Recognising other physical quantities as tensors also simplifies their transformation laws. First note that the velocity four-vector U is given by

Recognising this, we can turn the awkward looking law about composition of velocities into a simple statement about transforming the velocity four-vector of one particle from one frame to another. U also has an invariant form:

So all velocity four-vectors have a magnitude of c. This is an expression of the fact that there is no such thing as being at coordinate rest in relativity: at the least, you are always moving forward through time. The acceleration 4-vector is given by

Given this, differentiating the above equation by produces

So in relativity, the acceleration four-vector and the velocity four-vector are orthogonal.

Momentum in 4D
The momentum and energy combine into a covariant 4-vector:

where m is the invariant mass. The invariant magnitude of the momentum 4-vector is:

We can work out what this invariant is by first arguing that, since it is a scalar, it doesn't matter which reference frame we calculate it, and then by transforming to a frame where the total momentum is zero.

Special relativity We see that the rest energy is an independent invariant. A rest energy can be calculated even for particles and systems in motion, by translating to a frame in which momentum is zero. The rest energy is related to the mass according to the celebrated equation discussed above:

49

Note that the mass of systems measured in their center of momentum frame (where total momentum is zero) is given by the total energy of the system in this frame. It may not be equal to the sum of individual system masses measured in other frames.

Force in 4D
To use Newton's third law of motion, both forces must be defined as the rate of change of momentum with respect to the same time coordinate. That is, it requires the 3D force defined above. Unfortunately, there is no tensor in 4D which contains the components of the 3D force vector among its components. If a particle is not traveling at c, one can transform the 3D force from the particle's co-moving reference frame into the observer's reference frame. This yields a 4-vector called the four-force. It is the rate of change of the above energy momentum four-vector with respect to proper time. The covariant version of the four-force is:

where is the proper time. In the rest frame of the object, the time component of the four force is zero unless the "invariant mass" of the object is changing (this requires a non-closed system in which energy/mass is being directly added or removed from the object) in which case it is the negative of that rate of change of mass, times c. In general, though, the components of the four force are not equal to the components of the three-force, because the three force is defined by the rate of change of momentum with respect to coordinate time, i.e. dp/dt while the four force is defined by the rate of change of momentum with respect to proper time, i.e. dp/d. In a continuous medium, the 3D density of force combines with the density of power to form a covariant 4-vector. The spatial part is the result of dividing the force on a small cell (in 3-space) by the volume of that cell. The time component is 1/c times the power transferred to that cell divided by the volume of the cell. This will be used below in the section on electromagnetism.

Relativity and unifying electromagnetism

Theoretical investigation in classical electromagnetism led to the discovery of wave propagation. Equations generalizing the electromagnetic effects found that finite propagation-speed of the E and B fields required certain behaviors on charged particles. The general study of moving charges forms the LinardWiechert potential, which is a step towards special relativity. The Lorentz transformation of the electric field of a moving charge into a non-moving observer's reference frame results in the appearance of a mathematical term commonly called the magnetic field. Conversely, the magnetic field generated by a moving charge disappears and becomes a purely electrostatic field in a comoving frame of reference. Maxwell's equations are thus simply an empirical fit to special relativistic effects in a classical model of the Universe. As electric and magnetic fields are reference frame dependent and thus intertwined, one speaks of electromagnetic fields. Special relativity provides the transformation rules for how an electromagnetic field in one inertial frame appears in another inertial frame. Maxwell's equations in the 3D form are already consistent with the physical content of special relativity, although they are easier to manipulate in a manifestly covariant form, i.e. in the language of tensor calculus.[48] See main links

Special relativity for more detail.

50

Status
Special relativity in its Minkowski spacetime is accurate only when the absolute value of the gravitational potential is much less than c2 in the region of interest.[49] In a strong gravitational field, one must use general relativity. General relativity becomes special relativity at the limit of weak field. At very small scales, such as at the Planck length and below, quantum effects must be taken into consideration resulting in quantum gravity. However, at macroscopic scales and in the absence of strong gravitational fields, special relativity is experimentally tested to extremely high degree of accuracy (1020)[50] and thus accepted by the physics community. Experimental results which appear to contradict it are not reproducible and are thus widely believed to be due to experimental errors. Special relativity is mathematically self-consistent, and it is an organic part of all modern physical theories, most notably quantum field theory, string theory, and general relativity (in the limiting case of negligible gravitational fields). Newtonian mechanics mathematically follows from special relativity at small velocities (compared to the speed of light) thus Newtonian mechanics can be considered as a special relativity of slow moving bodies. See classical mechanics for a more detailed discussion. Several experiments predating Einstein's 1905 paper are now interpreted as evidence for relativity. Of these it is known Einstein was aware of the Fizeau experiment before 1905,[51] and historians have concluded that Einstein was at least aware of the MichelsonMorley experiment as early as 1899 despite claims he made in his later years that it played no role in his development of the theory.[19] The Fizeau experiment (1851, repeated by Michelson and Morley in 1886) measured the speed of light in moving media, with results that are consistent with relativistic addition of colinear velocities. The famous MichelsonMorley experiment (1881, 1887) gave further support to the postulate that detecting an absolute reference velocity was not achievable. It should be stated here that, contrary to many alternative claims, it said little about the invariance of the speed of light with respect to the source and observer's velocity, as both source and observer were travelling together at the same velocity at all times. The TroutonNoble experiment (1903) showed that the torque on a capacitor is independent of position and inertial reference frame. The Experiments of Rayleigh and Brace (1902, 1904) showed that length contraction doesn't lead to birefringence for a co-moving observer, in accordance with the relativity principle. Particle accelerators routinely accelerate and measure the properties of particles moving at near the speed of light, where their behavior is completely consistent with relativity theory and inconsistent with the earlier Newtonian mechanics. These machines would simply not work if they were not engineered according to relativistic principles. In addition, a considerable number of modern experiments have been conducted to test special relativity. Some examples: Tests of relativistic energy and momentum testing the limiting speed of particles IvesStilwell experiment testing relativistic Doppler effect and time dilation Time dilation of moving particles relativistic effects on a fast-moving particle's half-life KennedyThorndike experiment time dilation in accordance with Lorentz transformations HughesDrever experiment testing isotropy of space and mass Modern searches for Lorentz violation various modern tests Experiments to test emission theory demonstrated that the speed of light is independent of the speed of the emitter.

Experiments to test the aether drag hypothesis no "aether flow obstruction".

Special relativity

51

Relativistic quantum mechanics

Special relativity can be combined with quantum theory to form relativistic quantum mechanics. It is an unsolved question how general relativity and quantum mechanics can be unified; quantum gravitation is an active area in theoretical research. The early Bohr-Sommerfeld atomic model explained the fine structure of alkaline atoms by using both special relativity and the preliminary knowledge on quantum mechanics of the time. Paul Dirac developed a relativistic wave equation now known as the Dirac equation in his honour,[52] fully compatible both with special relativity and with the final version of quantum theory existing after 1926. This theory explained not only the intrinsic angular momentum of the electrons called spin, a property which can only be stated, but not explained by non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and led to the prediction of the antiparticle of the electron, the positron.[52][53] Also the fine structure could only be fully explained with special relativity. On the other hand, the existence of antiparticles leads to the conclusion that a naive unification of quantum mechanics (as originally formulated by Erwin Schrdinger, Werner Heisenberg, and many others) with special relativity is not possible. Instead, a theory of quantized fields is necessary; where particles can be created and destroyed throughout space, as in quantum electrodynamics and quantum chromodynamics. These elements merge in the standard model of particle physics.

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Special relativity
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Eckle et al., Attosecond Ionization and Tunneling Delay Time Measurements in Helium, Science, 322, 1525-1529 (2008) [36] G. Nimtz, Do Evanescent Modes Violate Relativistic Causality?, [Link] Phys. 702, 506-531 (2006) [37] G. Nimtz, Tunneling Violates Special Relativity, arXiv:1003.3944v1 [38] Herbert Winful (2007-09-18). "Comment on "Macroscopic violation of special relativity" by Nimtz and Stahlhofen". arXiv:0709.2736[quant-ph]. [39] Chris Lee (2007-08-16). "Latest "faster than the speed of light" claims wrong (again)" (http:/ / arstechnica. com/ news. ars/ post/ 20070816-faster-than-the-speed-of-light-no-i-dont-think-so. html). . [40] Winful, Herbert G. (December 2006). "Tunneling time, the Hartman effect, and superluminality: A proposed resolution of an old paradox" (http:/ / sitemaker. umich. edu/ herbert. winful/ files/ physics_reports_review_article__2006_. pdf). Physics Reports 436 (1-2): 169. Bibcode2006PhR...436....1W. doi:10.1016/[Link].2006.09.002. . [41] J.A. Wheeler, C. Misner, K.S. Thorne (1973). Gravitation. W.H. Freeman & Co. p.58. ISBN0-7167-0344-0. [42] J.R. Forshaw, A.G. Smith (2009). Dynamics and Relativity. Wiley. p.247. ISBN978-0-470-01460-8. [43] R. Penrose (2007). The Road to Reality. Vintage books. ISBN0-679-77631-1. [44] Jean-Bernard Zuber & Claude Itzykson, Quantum Field Theory, pg 5 , ISBN 0-07-032071-3 [45] Charles W. Misner, Kip S. Thorne & John A. Wheeler,Gravitation, pg 51, ISBN 0-7167-0344-0 [46] George Sterman, An Introduction to Quantum Field Theory, pg 4 , ISBN 0-521-31132-2 [47] M. Carroll, Sean (2004). Spacetime and Geometry: An Introduction to General Relativity (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=1SKFQgAACAAJ) (illustrated ed.). Addison Wesley. p.22. ISBN0-8053-8732-3. . [48] E. J. Post (1962). Formal Structure of Electromagnetics: General Covariance and Electromagnetics. Dover Publications Inc.. ISBN0-486-65427-3. [49] Grn, yvind; Hervik, Sigbjrn (2007). Einstein's general theory of relativity: with modern applications in cosmology (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=IyJhCHAryuUC). Springer. p.195. ISBN0-387-69199-5. ., Extract of page 195 (with units where c=1) (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=IyJhCHAryuUC& pg=PA195) [50] The number of works is vast, see as example: Sidney Coleman, Sheldon L. Glashow, Cosmic Ray and Neutrino Tests of Special Relativity, Phys. Lett. B405 (1997) 249-252, online (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ hep-ph/ 9703240) An overview can be found on this page (http:/ / www. edu-observatory. org/ physics-faq/ Relativity/ SR/ experiments. html) [51] Norton, John D., John D. (2004), "Einstein's Investigations of Galilean Covariant Electrodynamics prior to 1905" (http:/ / philsci-archive. pitt. edu/ archive/ 00001743/ ), Archive for History of Exact Sciences 59: 45105, Bibcode2004AHES...59...45N, doi:10.1007/s00407-004-0085-6,

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Special relativity
[52] Dirac, P.A.M. (1930). "A Theory of Electrons and Protons". Proc. R. Soc. A126: 360. Bibcode1930RSPSA.126..360D. doi:10.1098/rspa.1930.0013. JSTOR95359. [53] C.D. Anderson: The Positive Electron. Phys. Rev. 43, 491-494 (1933)

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Textbooks
Einstein, Albert (1920). Relativity: The Special and General Theory. Einstein, Albert (1996). The Meaning of Relativity. Fine Communications. ISBN 1-56731-136-9 Freund, Jrgen (2008) Special Relativity for Beginners - A Textbook for Undergraduates ([Link] ch) World Scientific. ISBN 981-277-160-3 Logunov, Anatoly A. (2005) Henri Poincar and the Relativity Theory ([Link] (transl. from Russian by G. Pontocorvo and V. O. Soleviev, edited by V. A. Petrov) Nauka, Moscow. Charles Misner, Kip Thorne, and John Archibald Wheeler (1971) Gravitation. W. H. Freeman & Co. ISBN 0-7167-0334-3 Post, E.J., 1997 (1962) Formal Structure of Electromagnetics: General Covariance and Electromagnetics. Dover Publications. Wolfgang Rindler (1991). Introduction to Special Relativity (2nd ed.), Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-853952-0; ISBN 0-19-853952-5 Harvey R. Brown (2005). Physical relativity: space-time structure from a dynamical perspective, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-927583-1; ISBN 978-0-19-927583-0 Qadir, Asghar (1989). Relativity: An Introduction to the Special Theory ([Link] ?id=X5YofYrqFoAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Relativity:+An+Introduction+to+the+Special+Theory+by+ Asghar+Qadir#v=onepage&q&f=false). Singapore: World Scientific Publications. pp.128. ISBN9971-5-0612-2. Silberstein, Ludwik (1914) The Theory of Relativity. Lawrence Sklar (1977). Space, Time and Spacetime ([Link] pg=PA206). University of California Press. ISBN0-520-03174-1. Lawrence Sklar (1992). Philosophy of Physics ([Link] Westview Press. ISBN0-8133-0625-6. Taylor, Edwin, and John Archibald Wheeler (1992) Spacetime Physics (2nd ed.). W.H. Freeman & Co. ISBN 0-7167-2327-1 Tipler, Paul, and Llewellyn, Ralph (2002). Modern Physics (4th ed.). W. H. Freeman & Co. ISBN 0-7167-4345-0

Journal articles
Alvager, et al.; Farley, F. J. M.; Kjellman, J.; Wallin, L. (1964). "Test of the Second Postulate of Special Relativity in the GeV region". Physics Letters 12 (3): 260. Bibcode1964PhL....12..260A. doi:10.1016/0031-9163(64)91095-9. Darrigol, Olivier (2004). "The Mystery of the Poincar-Einstein Connection". Isis 95 (4): 61426. doi:10.1086/430652. PMID16011297. Feigenbaum, Mitchell (2008). "The Theory of Relativity - Galileo's Child". Eprint arXiv:0806.1234 0806: 1234. arXiv:0806.1234. Bibcode2008arXiv0806.1234F. Gulevich, D. R. et al.; Kusmartsev, F. V.; Savel'Ev, Sergey; Yampol'Skii, V. A.; Nori, Franco (2008). "Shape waves in 2D Josephson junctions: Exact solutions and time dilation". Phys. Rev. Lett. 101 (12): 127002. arXiv:0808.1514. Bibcode2008PhRvL.101l7002G. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.101.127002. PMID18851404. Rizzi, G. et al. (2005). "Synchronization Gauges and the Principles of Special Relativity". Found. Phys 34: 183587. arXiv:gr-qc/0409105. Bibcode2004FoPh...34.1835R. doi:10.1007/s10701-004-1624-3. Wolf, Peter; Petit, Gerard (1997). "Satellite test of Special Relativity using the Global Positioning System". Physical Review A 56 (6): 440509. Bibcode1997PhRvA..56.4405W. doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.56.4405.

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External links
Original works
Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Krper ([Link] 1905_17_891-[Link]) Einstein's original work in German, Annalen der Physik, Bern 1905 On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies ([Link] English Translation as published in the 1923 book The Principle of Relativity.

Special relativity for a general audience (no mathematical knowledge required)

Wikibooks: Special Relativity ([Link] Einstein Light ([Link] An award ([Link] cfm?chanID=sa004&articleID=0005CFF9-524F-1340-924F83414B7F0000)-winning, non-technical introduction (film clips and demonstrations) supported by dozens of pages of further explanations and animations, at levels with or without mathematics. Einstein Online ([Link] Introduction to relativity theory, from the Max Planck Institute for Gravitational Physics. Audio: Cain/Gay (2006) - Astronomy Cast ([Link] einsteins-theory-of-special-relativity/). Einstein's Theory of Special Relativity

Special relativity explained (using simple or more advanced mathematics)

Greg Egan's Foundations ([Link] The Hogg Notes on Special Relativity ([Link] A good introduction to special relativity at the undergraduate level, using calculus. Relativity Calculator: Special Relativity ([Link] - An algebraic and integral calculus derivation for E = mc2. Motion Mountain, Volume II ([Link] - A modern introduction to relativity, including its visual effects. MathPages - Reflections on Relativity ([Link] A complete online book on relativity with an extensive bibliography. Relativity ([Link] An introduction to special relativity at the undergraduate level, without calculus. Relativity: the Special and General Theory at Project Gutenberg, by Albert Einstein Special Relativity Lecture Notes ([Link] is a standard introduction to special relativity containing illustrative explanations based on drawings and spacetime diagrams from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Understanding Special Relativity ([Link] The theory of special relativity in an easily understandable way. An Introduction to the Special Theory of Relativity ([Link] (1964) by Robert Katz, "an introduction ... that is accessible to any student who has had an introduction to general physics and some slight acquaintance with the calculus" (130 pp; pdf format). Lecture Notes on Special Relativity ([Link] [Link]) by J D Cresser Department of Physics Macquarie University.

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Visualization
Raytracing Special Relativity ([Link] Software visualizing several scenarios under the influence of special relativity. Real Time Relativity ([Link] The Australian National University. Relativistic visual effects experienced through an interactive program. Spacetime travel ([Link] A variety of visualizations of relativistic effects, from relativistic motion to black holes. Through Einstein's Eyes ([Link] The Australian National University. Relativistic visual effects explained with movies and images. Warp Special Relativity Simulator ([Link] A computer program to show the effects of traveling close to the speed of light. Animation clip ([Link] visualizing the Lorentz transformation. Original interactive FLASH Animations ([Link] from John de Pillis illustrating Lorentz and Galilean frames, Train and Tunnel Paradox, the Twin Paradox, Wave Propagation, Clock Synchronization, etc. Relativistic Optics at the ANU ([Link]

Intuitionism
In the philosophy of mathematics, intuitionism, or neointuitionism (opposed to preintuitionism), is an approach to mathematics as the constructive mental activity of humans. That is, mathematics does not consist of analytic activities wherein deep properties of existence are revealed and applied. Instead, logic and mathematics are the application of internally consistent methods to realize more complex mental constructs.

Truth and proof

The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of intuitionism is its interpretation of what it means for a mathematical statement to be true. In Brouwer's original intuitionism, the truth of a mathematical statement is a subjective claim: a mathematical statement corresponds to a mental construction, and a mathematician can assert the truth of a statement only by verifying the validity of that construction by intuition. The vagueness of the intuitionistic notion of truth often leads to misinterpretations about its meaning. Kleene formally defined intuitionistic truth from a realist position, yet Brouwer would likely reject this formalization as meaningless, given his rejection of the realist/Platonist position. Intuitionistic truth therefore remains somewhat ill defined. Regardless of how it is interpreted, intuitionism does not equate the truth of a mathematical statement with its provability. However, because the intuitionistic notion of truth is more restrictive than that of classical mathematics, the intuitionist must reject some assumptions of classical logic to ensure that everything he proves is in fact intuitionistically true. This gives rise to intuitionistic logic. To an intuitionist, the claim that an object with certain properties exists is a claim that an object with those properties can be constructed. Any mathematical object is considered to be a product of a construction of a mind, and therefore, the existence of an object is equivalent to the possibility of its construction. This contrasts with the classical approach, which states that the existence of an entity can be proved by refuting its non-existence. For the intuitionist, this is not valid; the refutation of the non-existence does not mean that it is possible to find a construction for the putative object, as is required in order to assert its existence. As such, intuitionism is a variety of mathematical constructivism; but it is not the only kind. The interpretation of negation is different in intuitionist logic than in classical logic. In classical logic, the negation of a statement asserts that the statement is false; to an intuitionist, it means the statement is refutable[1] (e.g., that

Intuitionism there is a counterexample). There is thus an asymmetry between a positive and negative statement in intuitionism. If a statement P is provable, then it is certainly impossible to prove that there is no proof of P. But even if it can be shown that no disproof of P is possible, we cannot conclude from this absence that there is a proof of P. Thus P is a stronger statement than not-not-P. Similarly, to assert that A or B holds, to an intuitionist, is to claim that either A or B can be proved. In particular, the law of excluded middle, "A or not A", is not accepted as a valid principle. For example, if A is some mathematical statement that an intuitionist has not yet proved or disproved, then that intuitionist will not assert the truth of "A or not A". However, the intuitionist will accept that "A and not A" cannot be true. Thus the connectives "and" and "or" of intuitionistic logic do not satisfy de Morgan's laws as they do in classical logic. Intuitionistic logic substitutes constructability for abstract truth and is associated with a transition from the proof to model theory of abstract truth in modern mathematics. The logical calculus preserves justification, rather than truth, across transformations yielding derived propositions. It has been taken as giving philosophical support to several schools of philosophy, most notably the Anti-realism of Michael Dummett. Thus, contrary to the first impression its name might convey, and as realized in specific approaches and disciplines (e.g. Fuzzy Sets and Systems), intuitionist mathematics is more rigorous than conventionally founded mathematics, where, ironically, the foundational elements which Intuitionism attempts to construct/refute/refound are taken as intuitively given.

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Intuitionism and infinity

Among the different formulations of intuitionism, there are several different positions on the meaning and reality of infinity. The term potential infinity refers to a mathematical procedure in which there is an unending series of steps. After each step has been completed, there is always another step to be performed. For example, consider the process of counting: 1, 2, 3, The term actual infinity refers to a completed mathematical object which contains an infinite number of elements. An example is the set of natural numbers, N = {1, 2, }. In Cantor's formulation of set theory, there are many different infinite sets, some of which are larger than others. For example, the set of all real numbers R is larger than N, because any procedure that you attempt to use to put the natural numbers into one-to-one correspondence with the real numbers will always fail: there will always be an infinite number of real numbers "left over". Any infinite set that can be placed in one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers is said to be "countable" or "denumerable". Infinite sets larger than this are said to be "uncountable". Cantor's set theory led to the axiomatic system of ZFC, now the most common foundation of modern mathematics. Intuitionism was created, in part, as a reaction to Cantor's set theory. Modern constructive set theory does include the axiom of infinity from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (or a revised version of this axiom), and includes the set N of natural numbers. Most modern constructive mathematicians accept the reality of countably infinite sets (however, see Alexander Esenin-Volpin for a counter-example). Brouwer rejected the concept of actual infinity, but admitted the idea of potential infinity. "According to Weyl 1946, 'Brouwer made it clear, as I think beyond any doubt, that there is no evidence supporting the belief in the existential character of the totality of all natural numbers ... the sequence of numbers which grows beyond any stage already reached by passing to the next number, is a manifold of possibilities open towards infinity; it remains forever in the status of creation, but is not a closed realm of things existing in themselves. That we blindly converted one into the other is the true source of our difficulties, including the antinomies a source of more fundamental nature than Russell's vicious circle principle indicated. Brouwer opened our eyes and made us see how far classical mathematics, nourished by a belief in the 'absolute' that transcends all human possibilities of realization, goes beyond such statements as can claim real meaning and truth founded on evidence." (Kleene (1952): Introduction to Metamathematics, p. 48-49)

Intuitionism Finitism is an extreme version of Intuitionism that rejects the idea of potential infinity. According to Finitism, a mathematical object does not exist unless it can be constructed from the natural numbers in a finite number of steps.

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History of Intuitionism
Intuitionism's history can be traced to two controversies in nineteenth century mathematics. The first of these was the invention of transfinite arithmetic by Georg Cantor and its subsequent rejection by a number of prominent mathematicians including most famously his teacher Leopold Kronecker a confirmed finitist. The second of these was Gottlob Frege's effort to reduce all of mathematics to a logical formulation via set theory and its derailing by a youthful Bertrand Russell, the discoverer of Russell's paradox. Frege had planned a three volume definitive work, but shortly after the first volume had been published, Russell sent Frege a letter outlining his paradox which demonstrated that one of Frege's rules of self-reference was self-contradictory. Frege, the story goes, plunged into depression and did not publish the second and third volumes of his work as he had planned. For more see Davis (2000) Chapters 3 and 4: Frege: From Breakthrough to Despair and Cantor: Detour through Infinity. See van Heijenoort for the original works and van Heijenoort's commentary. These controversies are strongly linked as the logical methods used by Cantor in proving his results in transfinite arithmetic are essentially the same as those used by Russell in constructing his paradox. Hence how one chooses to resolve Russell's paradox has direct implications on the status accorded to Cantor's transfinite arithmetic. In the early twentieth century L. E. J. Brouwer represented the intuitionist position and David Hilbert the formalist position see van Heijenoort. Kurt Gdel offered opinions referred to as Platonist (see various sources re Gdel). Alan Turing considers: "non-constructive systems of logic with which not all the steps in a proof are mechanical, some being intuitive". (Turing 1939, reprinted in Davis 2004, p.210) Later, Stephen Cole Kleene brought forth a more rational consideration of intuitionism in his Introduction to Meta-mathematics (1952).

Contributors to intuitionism
L. E. J. Brouwer Michael Dummett Arend Heyting Stephen Kleene

Branches of intuitionistic mathematics

Intuitionistic logic Intuitionistic arithmetic Intuitionistic type theory Intuitionistic set theory Intuitionistic analysis

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References
[1] Imre Lakatos (1976) Proofs and Refutations

Further reading
"Analysis." Encyclopdia Britannica. 2006. Encyclopdia Britannica 2006 Ultimate Reference Suite DVD 15 June 2006, "Constructive analysis" (Ian Stewart, author) W. S. Anglin, Mathematics: A Concise history and Philosophy, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1994. In Chapter 39 Foundations, with respect to the 20th century Anglin gives very precise, short descriptions of Platonism (with respect to Godel), Formalism (with respect to Hilbert), and Intuitionism (with respect to Brouwer). Martin Davis (ed.) (1965), The Undecidable, Raven Press, Hewlett, NY. Compilation of original papers by Gdel, Church, Kleene, Turing, Rosser, and Post. Republished as Davis, Martin, ed. (2004). The Undecidable. Courier Dover Publications. ISBN978-0-486-43228-1. Martin Davis (2000). Engines of Logic: Mathematicians and the origin of the Computer (1st edition ed.). W. W. Norton & Company, New York. ISBN0-393-32229-7 pbk.. John W. Dawson Jr., Logical Dilemmas: The Life and Work of Kurt Gdel, A. K. Peters, Wellesley, MA, 1997. Less readable than Goldstein but, in Chapter III Excursis, Dawson gives an excellent "A Capsule History of the Development of Logic to 1928". Rebecca Goldstein, Incompleteness: The Proof and Paradox of Kurt Godel, Atlas Books, W.W. Norton, New York, 2005. In Chapter II Hilbert and the Formalists Goldstein gives further historical context. As a Platonist Gdel was reticent in the presence of the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. She discusses Wittgenstein's impact and the impact of the formalists. Goldstein notes that the intuitionists were even more opposed to Platonism than Formalism. van Heijenoort, J., From Frege to Gdel, A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1967. Reprinted with corrections, 1977. The following papers appear in van Heijenoort: L.E.J. Brouwer, 1923, On the significance of the principle of excluded middle in mathematics, especially in function theory [reprinted with commentary, p. 334, van Heijenoort] Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov, 1925, On the principle of excluded middle, [reprinted with commentary, p. 414, van Heijenoort] L.E.J. Brouwer, 1927, On the domains of definitions of functions, [reprinted with commentary, p. 446, van Heijenoort] Although not directly germane, in his (1923) Brouwer uses certain words defined in this paper. L.E.J. Brouwer, 1927(2), Intuitionistic reflections on formalism, [reprinted with commentary, p. 490, van Heijenoort] Jacques Herbrand, (1931b), "On the consistency of arithmetic", [reprinted with commentary, p. 618ff, van Heijenoort] From van Heijenoort's commentary it is unclear whether or not Herbrand was a true "intuitionist"; Gdel (1963) asserted that indeed "...Herbrand was an intuitionist". But van Heijenoort says Herbrand's conception was "on the whole much closer to that of Hilbert's word 'finitary' ('finit') that to "intuitionistic" as applied to Brouwer's doctrine". Hesseling, Dennis E. (2003). Gnomes in the Fog. The Reception of Brouwer's Intuitionism in the 1920s. Birkhuser. ISBN3-7643-6536-6.

Intuitionism Arend Heyting: Heyting, Arend (1971) [1956]. Intuitionism: An Introduction (3d rev. ed. ed.). Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co. ISBN0-7204-2239-6. Kleene, Stephen C. (1991) [1952]. Introduction to Meta-Mathematics (Tenth impression 1991 ed.). Amsterdam NY: North-Holland Pub. Co. ISBN0-7204-2103-9. In Chapter III A Critique of Mathematic Reasoning, 11. The paradoxes, Kleene discusses Intuitionism and Formalism in depth. Throughout the rest of the book he treats, and compares, both Formalist (classical) and Intuitionist logics with an emphasis on the former. Extraordinary writing by an extraordinary mathematician. Stephen Cole Kleene and Richard Eugene Vesley, The Foundations of Intuistionistic Mathematics, North-Holland Publishing Co. Amsterdam, 1965. The lead sentence tells it all "The constructive tendency in mathematics...". A text for specialists, but written in Kleene's wonderfully-clear style. Hilary Putnam and Paul Benacerraf, Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. ISBN 0-521-29648-X Part I. The foundation of mathematics, Symposium on the foundations of mathematics Rudolf Carnap, The logicist foundations of mathematics, p. 41 Arend Heyting, The intuitionist foundations of mathematics, p. 52 Johann von Neumann, The formalist foundations of mathematics, p. 61 Arend Heyting, Disputation, p. 66 L. E. J. Brouwer, Intuitionnism and formalism, p. 77 L. E. J. Brouwer, Consciousness, philosophy, and mathematics, p. 90 Constance Reid, Hilbert, Copernicus - Springer-Verlag, 1st edition 1970, 2nd edition 1996. Definitive biography of Hilbert places his "Program" in historical context together with the subsequent fighting, sometimes rancorous, between the Intuitionists and the Formalists. Paul Rosenbloom, The Elements of Mathematical Logic, Dover Publications Inc, Mineola, New York, 1950. In a style more of Principia Mathematica many symbols, some antique, some from German script. Very good discussions of intuitionism in the following locations: pages 51-58 in Section 4 Many Valued Logics, Modal Logics, Intuitionism; pages 69-73 Chapter III The Logic of Propostional Functions Section 1 Informal Introduction; and p. 146-151 Section 7 the Axiom of Choice.

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Secondary references
A. A. Markov (1954) Theory of algorithms. [Translated by Jacques J. Schorr-Kon and PST staff] Imprint Moscow, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1954 [i.e. Jerusalem, Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1961; available from the Office of Technical Services, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Washington] Description 444 p.28cm. Added t.p. in Russian Translation of Works of the Mathematical Institute, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, v. 42. Original title: Teoriya algorifmov. [QA248.M2943 Dartmouth College library. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, number OTS 60-51085.] A secondary reference for specialists: Markov opined that "The entire significance for mathematics of rendering more precise the concept of algorithm emerges, however, in connection with the problem of a constructive foundation for mathematics....[p. 3, italics added.] Markov believed that further applications of his work "merit a special book, which the author hopes to write in the future" (p. 3). Sadly, said work apparently never appeared. Turing, Alan M. (1939). Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals.

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External links
Ten Questions about Intuitionism ([Link]

Intuitionistic logic
Intuitionistic logic, or constructive logic, is a symbolic logic system differing from classical logic in its definition of the meaning of a statement being true. In classical logic, all well-formed statements are assumed to be either true or false, even if we do not have a proof of either. In constructive logic, a statement is 'only true' if there is a constructive proof that it is true, and 'only false' if there is a constructive proof that it is false. Operations in constructive logic preserve justification, rather than truth. Syntactically, intuitionistic logic is a restriction of classical logic in which the law of excluded middle and double negation elimination are not axioms of the system, and cannot be proved. There are several semantics commonly employed. One semantics mirrors classical Boolean-valued semantics but uses Heyting algebras in place of Boolean algebras. Another semantics uses Kripke models. Constructive logic is practically useful because its restrictions produce proofs that have the existence property, making it also suitable for other forms of mathematical constructivism. Informally, this means that given a constructive proof that an object exists, then that constructive proof can be turned into an algorithm for generating an example of it. Formalized intuitionistic logic was originally developed by Arend Heyting to provide a formal basis for Brouwer's programme of intuitionism.

Syntax
The syntax of formulas of intuitionistic logic is similar to propositional logic or first-order logic. However, intuitionistic connectives are not definable in terms of each other in the same way as in classical logic, hence their choice matters. In intuitionistic propositional logic it is customary to use , , , as the basic connectives, treating A as an abbreviation for (A ). In intuitionistic first-order logic both quantifiers , are needed. Many tautologies of classical logic can no longer be proven within intuitionistic logic. Examples include not only the law of excluded middle p p, but also Peirce's law ((p q) p) p, and even double negation elimination. In The RiegerNishimura lattice. Its nodes are the propositional formulas in one classical logic, both p p and also p p variable up to intuitionistic logical equivalence, ordered by intuitionistic are theorems. In intuitionistic logic, only the logical implication. former is a theorem: double negation can be introduced, but it cannot be eliminated. Rejecting p p may seem strange to those more familiar with classical logic, but proving this statement in constructive logic would require producing a proof for the truth or falsity of all possible statements, which is impossible for a variety of reasons.

Intuitionistic logic Because many classically valid tautologies are not theorems of intuitionistic logic, but all theorems of intuitionistic logic are valid classically, intuitionistic logic can be viewed as a weakening of classical logic, albeit one with many useful properties.

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Sequent calculus
Gentzen discovered that a simple restriction of his system LK (his sequent calculus for classical logic) results in a system which is sound and complete with respect to intuitionistic logic. He called this system LJ. In LK any number of formulas is allowed to appear on the conclusion side of a sequent; in contrast LJ allows at most one formula in this position. Other derivatives of LK are limited to intuitionisitic derivations but still allow multiple conclusions in a sequent. LJ' [1] is one example.

Hilbert-style calculus
Intuitionistic logic can be defined using the following Hilbert-style calculus. Compare with the deduction system at Propositional calculus#Alternative calculus. In propositional logic, the inference rule is modus ponens MP: from and infer

and the axioms are THEN-1: THEN-2: AND-1: AND-2:

AND-3: OR-1: OR-2: OR-3: FALSE: To make this a system of first-order predicate logic, the generalization rules -GEN: from -GEN: from infer infer , if , if is not free in is not free in

are added, along with the axioms PRED-1: , if the term t is free for substitution for the variable x in (i.e., if no occurrence

of any variable in t becomes bound in ) PRED-2: , with the same restriction as for PRED-1

Intuitionistic logic Optional connectives Negation If one wishes to include a connective enough to add: NOT-1': NOT-2': There are a number of alternatives available if one wishes to omit the connective replace the three axioms FALSE, NOT-1', and NOT-2' with the two axioms NOT-1: NOT-2: as at Propositional . Equivalence The connective IFF-1: IFF-2: IFF-3: IFF-1 and IFF-2 can, if desired, be combined into a single axiom conjunction. Relation to classical logic The system of classical logic is obtained by adding any one of the following axioms: (Law of the excluded middle. May also be formulated as (Double negation elimination) (Peirce's law) .) using for equivalence may be treated as an abbreviation, with . Alternatively, one may add the axioms standing for calculus#Axioms. Alternatives to NOT-1 are or (false). For example, one may for negation rather than consider it an abbreviation for , it is

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In general, one may take as the extra axiom any classical tautology that is not valid in the two-element Kripke frame (in other words, that is not included in Smetanich's logic). Another relationship is given by the GdelGentzen negative translation, which provides an embedding of classical first-order logic into intuitionistic logic: a first-order formula is provable in classical logic if and only if its GdelGentzen translation is provable intuitionistically. Therefore intuitionistic logic can instead be seen as a means of extending classical logic with constructive semantics. In 1932, Kurt Gdel defined a system of Gdel logics intermediate between classical and intuitionistic logic; such logics are known as intermediate logics.

Intuitionistic logic Relation to many-valued logic Kurt Gdel in 1932 showed that intuitionistic logic is not a finitely-many valued logic. (See the section titled Heyting algebra semantics below for a sort of "infinitely-many valued logic" interpretation of intuitionistic logic.)

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Non-interdefinability of operators
In classical propositional logic, it is possible to take one of conjunction, disjunction, or implication as primitive, and define the other two in terms of it together with negation, such as in ukasiewicz's three axioms of propositional logic. It is even possible to define all four in terms of a sole sufficient operator such as the Peirce arrow (NOR) or Sheffer stroke (NAND). Similarly, in classical first-order logic, one of the quantifiers can be defined in terms of the other and negation. These are fundamentally consequences of the law of bivalence, which makes all such connectives merely Boolean functions. The law of bivalence does not hold in intuitionistic logic, only the law of non-contradiction. As a result none of the basic connectives can be dispensed with, and the above axioms are all necessary. Most of the classical identities are only theorems of intuitionistic logic in one direction, although some are theorems in both directions. They are as follows: Conjunction versus disjunction: Conjunction versus implication: Disjunction versus implication: Universal versus existential quantification: So, for example, "a or b" is a stronger statement than "if not a, then b", whereas these are classically interchangeable. On the other hand, "not (a or b)" is equivalent to "not a, and also not b". If we include equivalence in the list of connectives, some of the connectives become definable from others: In particular, {, , } and {, , } are complete bases of intuitionistic connectives.

Intuitionistic logic As shown by Alexander Kuznetsov, either of the following connectives the first one ternary, the second one quinary is by itself functionally complete: either one can serve the role of a sole sufficient operator for intuitionistic propositional logic, thus forming an analog of the Sheffer stroke from classical propositional logic:[2]

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Semantics
The semantics are rather more complicated than for the classical case. A model theory can be given by Heyting algebras or, equivalently, by Kripke semantics.

Heyting algebra semantics

In classical logic, we often discuss the truth values that a formula can take. The values are usually chosen as the members of a Boolean algebra. The meet and join operations in the Boolean algebra are identified with the and logical connectives, so that the value of a formula of the form A B is the meet of the value of A and the value of B in the Boolean algebra. Then we have the useful theorem that a formula is a valid sentence of classical logic if and only if its value is 1 for every valuationthat is, for any assignment of values to its variables. A corresponding theorem is true for intuitionistic logic, but instead of assigning each formula a value from a Boolean algebra, one uses values from a Heyting algebra, of which Boolean algebras are a special case. A formula is valid in intuitionistic logic if and only if it receives the value of the top element for any valuation on any Heyting algebra. It can be shown that to recognize valid formulas, it is sufficient to consider a single Heyting algebra whose elements are the open subsets of the real line R.[3] In this algebra, the and operations correspond to set intersection and union, and the value assigned to a formula A B is int(AC B), the interior of the union of the value of B and the complement of the value of A. The bottom element is the empty set , and the top element is the entire line R. The negation A of a formula A is (as usual) defined to be A . The value of A then reduces to int(AC), the interior of the complement of the value of A, also known as the exterior of A. With these assignments, intuitionistically valid formulas are precisely those that are assigned the value of the entire line.[3] For example, the formula (A A) is valid, because no matter what set X is chosen as the value of the formula A, the value of (A A) can be shown to be the entire line: Value((A A)) = int((Value(A A))C) = int((Value(A) Value(A))C) = int((X int((Value(A))C))C) = int((X int(XC))C) A theorem of topology tells us that int(XC) is a subset of XC, so the intersection is empty, leaving: int(C) = int(R) = R So the valuation of this formula is true, and indeed the formula is valid. But the law of the excluded middle, A A, can be shown to be invalid by letting the value of A be {y : y > 0 }. Then the value of A is the interior of {y : y 0 }, which is {y : y < 0 }, and the value of the formula is the union of {y : y > 0 } and {y : y < 0 }, which is {y : y 0 }, not the entire line. The interpretation of any intuitionistically valid formula in the infinite Heyting algebra described above results in the top element, representing true, as the valuation of the formula, regardless of what values from the algebra are assigned to the variables of the formula.[3] Conversely, for every invalid formula, there is an assignment of values to the variables that yields a valuation that differs from the top element.[4][5] No finite Heyting algebra has both these properties.[3]

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Kripke semantics
Building upon his work on semantics of modal logic, Saul Kripke created another semantics for intuitionistic logic, known as Kripke semantics or relational semantics.[6]

Relation to other logics

Intutionistic logic is related by duality to a paraconsistent logic known as Brazilian, anti-intuitionistic or dual-intuitionistic logic.[7] The subsystem of intuitionistic logic with the FALSE axiom removed is known as minimal logic.

Notes
[1] Proof Theory by G. Takeuti, ISBN 0-444-10492-5 [2] Alexander Chagrov, Michael Zakharyaschev, Modal Logic, vol. 35 of Oxford Logic Guides, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 5859. ISBN 0-19-853779-4. [3] Srensen, Morten Heine B; Pawe Urzyczyn (2006). Lectures on the Curry-Howard Isomorphism. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics. Elsevier. p.42. ISBN0-444-52077-5. [4] Alfred Tarski, Der Aussagenkalkl und die Topologie, Fundamenta Mathematicae 31 (1938), 103134. (http:/ / matwbn. icm. edu. pl/ tresc. php?wyd=1& tom=31) [5] Rasiowa, Helena; Roman Sikorski (1963). The Mathematics of Metamathematics. Monografie matematyczne. Warsaw: Pastwowe Wydawn. Naukowe. pp.385386. [6] Intuitionistic Logic (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ logic-intuitionistic/ ). Written by Joan Moschovakis (http:/ / www. math. ucla. edu/ ~joan/ ). Published in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [7] Aoyama, Hiroshi (2004). "LK, LJ, Dual Intuitionistic Logic, and Quantum Logic". Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 45 (4): 193213. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1099238445.

References
Van Dalen, Dirk, 2001, "Intuitionistic Logic", in Goble, Lou, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Blackwell. Morten H. Srensen, Pawe Urzyczyn, 2006, Lectures on the Curry-Howard Isomorphism (chapter 2: "Intuitionistic Logic"). Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics vol. 149, Elsevier. W. A. Carnielli (with A. B.M. Brunner). "Anti-intuitionism and paraconsistency" ([Link] jal.2004.07.016). Journal of Applied Logic Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2005, pages 161-184.

External links
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " Intuitionistic Logic ([Link] logic-intuitionistic/)" -- by Joan Moschovakis. Intuitionistic Logic ([Link] by Nick Bezhanishvili and Dick de Jongh (from the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation at the University of Amsterdam) Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I ([Link] kripke_intuitionism.pdf) by Saul A. Kripke from Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., USA Intuitionistic Logic ([Link] by Dirk van Dalen The discovery of E.W. Beth's semantics for intuitionistic logic ([Link] [Link]) by A.S. Troelstra and P. van Ulsen Expressing Database Queries with Intuitionistic Logic ([Link] hypotheticals/[Link]) (FTP one-click download) by Anthony J. Bonner. L. Thorne McCarty. Kumar Vadaparty. Rutgers University, Department of Computer Science.

Heyting arithmetic

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Heyting arithmetic
In mathematical logic, Heyting arithmetic (sometimes abbreviated HA) is an axiomatization of arithmetic in accordance with the philosophy of intuitionism (Troelstra 1973:18). It is named after Arend Heyting, who first proposed it. Heyting arithmetic adopts the axioms of Peano arithmetic (PA), but uses intuitionistic logic as its rules of inference. In particular, the law of the excluded middle does not hold in general, though the induction axiom can be used to prove many specific cases. For instance, one can prove that x, y N : x = y x y is a theorem (any two natural numbers are either equal to each other, or not equal to each other). In fact, since "=" is the only predicate symbol in Heyting arithmetic, it then follows that, for any quantifier-free formula p, x, y, z, N : p p is a theorem (where x, y, z are the free variables in p). Kurt Gdel studied the relationship between Heyting arithmetic and Peano arithmetic. He used the GdelGentzen negative translation to prove in 1933 that if HA is consistent, then PA is also consistent. Heyting arithmetic should not be confused with Heyting algebras, which are the intuitionistic analogue of Boolean algebras.

References
Ulrich Kohlenbach (2008), Applied proof theory, Springer. Anne S. Troelstra, ed. (1973), Metamathematical investiation of intuitionistic arithmetic and analysis, Springer, 1973.

External links
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Intuitionistic Number Theory [1]" by Joan Moschovakis. Fragments of Heyting Arithmetic [2] by Wolfgang Burr

References
[1] http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ logic-intuitionistic/ #IntNumTheHeyAri [2] http:/ / wwwmath. uni-muenster. de%2Fu%2Fburr%2FHA. ps& ei=1xokUNzGBtOzhAeOhoDACg& usg=AFQjCNHBfKqVZwzEo2FgnF9Eia_Cmo4OZg

Intuitionistic type theory

67

Intuitionistic type theory

Intuitionistic type theory, or constructive type theory, or Martin-Lf type theory or just Type Theory is a logical system and a set theory based on the principles of mathematical constructivism. Intuitionistic type theory was introduced by Per Martin-Lf, a Swedish mathematician and philosopher, in 1972. Martin-Lf has modified his proposal a few times; his 1971 impredicative formulation was inconsistent as demonstrated by Girard's paradox. Later formulations were predicative. He proposed both intensional and extensional variants of the theory. Intuitionistic type theory is based on a certain analogy or isomorphism between propositions and types: a proposition is identified with the type of its proofs. This identification is usually called the CurryHoward isomorphism, which was originally formulated for intuitionistic logic and simply typed lambda calculus. Type Theory extends this identification to predicate logic by introducing dependent types, that is types which contain values. Type Theory internalizes the interpretation of intuitionistic logic proposed by Brouwer, Heyting and Kolmogorov, the so called BHK interpretation. The types of Type Theory play a similar role to sets in set theory but functions definable in Type Theory are always computable.

Connectives of type theory

In the context of Type Theory a connective is a way of constructing types, possibly using already given types. The basic connectives of Type Theory are:

-types
-types, also called dependent product types, are analogous to the indexed products of sets. As such, they generalize the normal function space to model functions whose result type may vary on their input. E.g. writing for -tuples of real numbers, stands for the type of a function that, given a natural number, returns an -tuple of real numbers. The usual function space arises as a special case when the range type does not actually depend on the input, e.g., is the type of functions from natural numbers to the real numbers, which is also written as . Using the CurryHoward isomorphism -types also serve to is a function model implication and universal quantification: e.g., a term inhabiting

which assigns to any pair of natural numbers a proof that addition is commutative for that pair and hence can be considered as a proof that addition is commutative for all natural numbers. The generalisation from function type to dependent product type is analogous to the generalisation from exponentiation of natural numbers to indexed products of them. Consider the expression : in this case, the dummy variable of the product is not mentioned within the term . However, it is clear that exponentiation can be generalised by allowing terms in the product to mention the dummy variable, i.e., by allowing indexing. In its general form, such a product then becomes: .

-types
-types, also called dependent sum types, are analogous to the indexed disjoint unions of sets. As such, they generalize the usual Cartesian product to model pairs where the type of the second component depends on the first. For example, the type stands for the type of pairs of a natural number and an -tuple of real numbers, i.e., this type can be used to model sequences of arbitrary length (usually called lists). The conventional Cartesian product type arises as a special case when the type of the second component doesn't actually depend on the first, e.g., is the type of pairs of a natural number and a real number, which is also written as . Again, using the CurryHoward isomorphism, regular multiplication -types also serve to model conjunction and existential -type is analogous to the generalisation of . quantification. The generalisation of the Cartesian product by the by the indexed sum

Intuitionistic type theory

68

Finite types
Of special importance are 0 or (the empty type), 1 or (the unit type) and 2 (the type of Booleans or classical truth values). Invoking the CurryHoward isomorphism again, stands for False and for True. Using finite types we can define negation as .

Equality type
Given inhabitant of then is the type of equality proofs that is equal to . . There is only one (canonical) and this is the proof of reflexivity

Inductive types
A prime example of an inductive type is the type of natural numbers (dependent) primitive recursion and induction by which is generated by one elimination for any given type and constant: indexed by . An important application of the propositions as types principle is the identification of

. In general inductive types can be defined in terms of W-types, the type of well-founded trees. An important class of inductive types are inductive families like the type of vectors which is inductively generated by the constructors mentioned above, and

. Applying the CurryHoward isomorphism once more, inductive families correspond to inductively defined relations.

Universes
An example of a universe is so far. To every name , the universe of all small types, which contains names for all the types introduced we associate a type with , its extension or meaning. It is standard to assume a , where the universe contains a code . (A hierarchy with this property is called for every natural number

predicative hierarchy of universes:

for the previous universe, i.e., we have

"cumulative".) Stronger universe principles have been investigated, i.e., super universes and the Mahlo universe. In 1992 Huet and Coquand introduced the calculus of constructions, a type theory with an impredicative universe, thus combining Type Theory with Girard's System F. This extension is not universally accepted by Intuitionists since it allows impredicative, i.e., circular, constructions, which are often identified with classical reasoning.

Formalisation of type theory

This formalization is based on the discussion in Nordstrom, Petersson, and Smith. The formal theory works with types and objects. A type is declared by: An object exists and is in a type if: Objects can be equal and types can be equal A type that depends on an object from another type is declared

Intuitionistic type theory and removed by substitution , replacing the variable with the object in .

69

An object that depends on an object from another type can be done two ways. If the object is "abstracted", then it is written and removed by substitution , replacing the variable with the object in .

The object-depending-on-object can also be declared as a constant as part of a recursive type. An example of a recursive type is: Here, is a constant object-depending-on-object. It is not associated with an abstraction. Constants like can be removed by defining equality. Here the relationship with addition is defined using equality and using pattern matching to handle the recursive aspect of . is manipulated as a opaque constant - it has no internal structure for substitution. So, objects and types and these relations are used to express formulae in the theory. The following styles of judgements are used to create new objects, types and relations from existing ones. , is a well-formed type in context . , is a well-formed term of type in context . , and are equal types in context . , and are equal terms of type in context . , is a well-formed context of typing assumptions. (or ). Since is a type, the refers to a type, that maps each object to its corresponding type. In most texts

By convention, there is a type that represents all other types. It is called member of it are objects. There is a dependent type or whether it refers to the object in

is never written. From the context of the statement, a reader can almost always tell whether that corresponds to the type. This is the complete foundation of the theory. Everything else is derived.

To implement logic, each proposition is given its own type. The objects in those types represent the different possible ways to prove the proposition. Obviously, if there is no proof for the proposition, then the type has no objects in it. Operators like "and" and "or" that work on propositions introduce new types and new objects. So is a type that depends on the type and the type . The objects in that dependent type are defined to exist for every pair of objects in new type representing and . Obviously, if or has no proof and is an empty type, then the is also empty.

This can be done for other types (booleans, natural numbers, etc.) and their operators.

Intuitionistic type theory

70

Categorical models of type theory

Using the language of category theory, R.A.G. Seely introduced the notion of a locally cartesian closed category (LCCC) as the basic model of Type Theory. This has been refined by Hofmann and Dybjer to Categories with Families or Categories with Attributes based on earlier work by Cartmell. A category with families is a category C of contexts (in which the objects are contexts, and the context morphisms are substitutions), together with a functor T : Cop Fam(Set). Fam(Set) is the category of families of Sets, in which objects are pairs (A,B) of an "index set" A and a function B: X A, and morphisms are pairs of functions f : A A' and g : X X' , such that B' g = f B - in other words, f maps Ba to B'g(a). The functor T assigns to a context G a set Ty(G) of types, and for each A : Ty(G), a set Tm(G,A) of terms. The axioms for a functor require that these play harmoniously with substitution. Substitution is usually written in the form Af or af, where A is a type in Ty(G) and a is a term in Tm(G,A), and f is a substitution from D to G. Here Af : Ty(D) and af : Tm(D,Af). The category C must contain a terminal object (the empty context), and a final object for a form of product called comprehension, or context extension, in which the right element is a type in the context of the left element. If G is a context, and A : Ty(G), then there should be an object (G,A) final among contexts D with mappings p : D G, q : Tm(D,Ap). A logical framework, such as Martin-Lf's takes the form of closure conditions on the context dependent sets of types and terms: that there should be a type called Set, and for each set a type, that the types should be closed under forms of dependent sum and product, and so forth. A theory such as that of predicative set theory expresses closure conditions on the types of sets and their elements: that they should be closed under operations that reflect dependent sum and product, and under various forms of inductive definition.

Extensional versus intensional

A fundamental distinction is extensional vs intensional Type Theory. In extensional Type Theory definitional (i.e., computational) equality is not distinguished from propositional equality, which requires proof. As a consequence type checking becomes undecidable in extensional type theory. This is because relying on computational equality means that the equality depends on computations that could be Turing complete in general and thus the equality itself is undecidable due to the halting problem. Some type theories enforce the restriction that all computations be decidable so that definitional equality may be used. In contrast in intensional Type Theory type checking is decidable, but the representation of standard mathematical concepts is somewhat complex, since extensional reasoning requires using setoids or similar constructions. It is a subject of current discussion whether this tradeoff is unavoidable and whether the lack of extensional principles in intensional Type Theory is a feature or a bug.

Intuitionistic type theory

71

Implementations of type theory

Type Theory has been the base of a number of proof assistants, such as NuPRL, LEGO and Coq. Recently, dependent types also featured in the design of programming languages such as ATS, Cayenne, Epigram and Agda.

References
Per Martin-Lf (1984). Intuitionistic Type Theory [1] Bibliopolis. ISBN 88-7088-105-9.

Further reading
Bengt Nordstrm; Kent Petersson; Jan M. Smith (1990). Programming in Martin-Lf's Type Theory. Oxford University Press. The book is out of print, but a free version can be picked up from here [2]. Thompson, Simon (1991). Type Theory and Functional Programming [3] Addison-Wesley. ISBN 0-201-41667-0. Granstrm, Johan G. (2011). Treatise on Intuitionistic Type Theory [4] Springer. ISBN 978-94-007-1735-0.

External links
EU Types Project: Tutorials [5] - lecture notes and slides from the Types Summer School 2005 n-Categories - Sketch of a Definition [6] - letter from John Baez and James Dolan to Ross Street, November 29, 1995

References
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] http:/ / intuitionistic. files. wordpress. com/ 2010/ 07/ martin-lof-tt. pdf http:/ / www. cs. chalmers. se/ Cs/ Research/ Logic/ book/ http:/ / www. cs. kent. ac. uk/ people/ staff/ sjt/ TTFP/ http:/ / www. springer. com/ philosophy/ book/ 978-94-007-1735-0 http:/ / www. cs. chalmers. se/ Cs/ Research/ Logic/ Types/ tutorials. html http:/ / math. ucr. edu/ home/ baez/ ncat. def. html

Constructive set theory

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Constructive set theory

Constructive set theory is an approach to mathematical constructivism following the program of axiomatic set theory. That is, it uses the usual first-order language of classical set theory, and although of course the logic is constructive, there is no explicit use of constructive types. Rather, there are just sets, thus it can look very much like classical mathematics done on the most common foundations, namely the ZermeloFraenkel axioms (ZFC).

Intuitionistic ZermeloFraenkel
In 1973, John Myhill proposed a system of set theory based on intuitionistic logic[1] taking the most common foundation, ZFC, and throwing away the axiom of choice (AC) and the law of the excluded middle (LEM), leaving everything else as is. However, different forms of some of the ZFC axioms which are equivalent in the classical setting are inequivalent in the constructive setting, and some forms imply LEM. The system, which has come to be known as IZF, or Intuitionistic ZermeloFraenkel (ZF refers to ZFC without the axiom of choice), has the usual axioms of extensionality, pairing, union, infinity, separation and power set. The axiom of regularity is stated in the form of an axiom schema of set induction. Also, while Myhill used the axiom schema of replacement in his system, IZF usually stands for the version with collection While the axiom of replacement requires the relation to be a function over the set A (that is, for every x in A there is associated exactly one y), the axiom of collection does not: it merely requires there be associated at least one y, and it asserts the existence of a set which collects at least one such y for each such x. The axiom of regularity as it is normally stated implies LEM, whereas the form of set induction does not. The formal statements of these two schemata are:

Adding LEM back to IZF results in ZF, as LEM makes collection equivalent to replacement and set induction equivalent to regularity. Even without LEM, IZF's proof-theoretical power equals that of ZF.

Predicativity
While IZF is based on constructive rather than classical logic, it is considered impredicative. It allows formation of sets using the axiom of separation with any proposition, including ones which contain quantifiers which are not bounded. Thus new sets can be formed in terms of the universe of all sets. Additionally the power set axiom implies the existence of a set of truth values. In the presence of LEM, this set exists and has two elements. In the absence of it, the set of truth values is also considered impredicative.

Myhill's constructive set theory

The subject was begun by John Myhill to provide a formal foundation for Errett Bishop's program of constructive mathematics. As he presented it, Myhill's system CST is a constructive first-order logic with three sorts: natural numbers, functions, and sets. The system is: Constructive first-order predicate logic with identity, and basic axioms related to the three sorts. The usual Peano axioms for natural numbers. The usual axiom of extensionality for sets, as well as one for functions, and the usual axiom of union. A form of the axiom of infinity asserting that the collection of natural numbers (for which he introduces a constant N) is in fact a set.

Axioms asserting that the domain and range of a function are both sets. Additionally, an axiom of non-choice asserts the existence of a choice function in cases where the choice is already made. Together these act like the

Constructive set theory usual replacement axiom in classical set theory. The axiom of exponentiation, asserting that for any two sets, there is a third set which contains all (and only) the functions whose domain is the first set, and whose range is the second set. This is a greatly weakened form of the axiom of power set in classical set theory, to which Myhill, among others, objected on the grounds of its impredicativity. The axiom of restricted, or predicative, separation, which is a weakened form of the separation axiom in classical set theory, requiring that any quantifications be bounded to another set. An axiom of dependent choice, which is much weaker than the usual axiom of choice.

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Aczel's constructive ZermeloFraenkel

Peter Aczel's constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel,[2] or CZF, is essentially IZF with its impredicative features removed. It strengthens the collection scheme, and then drops the impredicative power set axiom and replaces it with another collection scheme. Finally the separation axiom is restricted, as in Myhill's CST. This theory has a relatively simple interpretation in a version of constructive type theory and has modest proof theoretic strength as well as a fairly direct constructive and predicative justification, while retaining the language of set theory. Adding LEM to this theory also recovers full ZF. The collection axioms are: Strong collection schema: This is the constructive replacement for the axiom schema of replacement. It states that if is a binary relation between sets which is total over a certain domain set (that is, it has at least one image of every element in the domain), then there exists a set which contains at least one image under of every element of the domain, and only images of elements of the domain. Formally, for any formula :

Subset collection schema: This is the constructive version of the power set axiom. Formally, for any formula :

This is equivalent to a single and somewhat clearer axiom of fullness: between any two sets a and b, there is a set c which contains a total subrelation of any total relation between a and b that can be encoded as a set of ordered pairs. Formally:

where the references to P(a,b) are defined by:

and some set-encoding of the ordered pair <x,y> is assumed. The axiom of fullness implies CST's axiom of exponentiation: given two sets, the collection of all total functions from one to the other is also in fact a set. The remaining axioms of CZF are: the axioms of extensionality, pairing, union, and infinity are the same as in ZF; and set induction and predicative separation are the same as above.

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Interpretability in type theory

In 1977 Aczel showed that CZF can be interpreted in Martin-Lf type theory,[3] (using the now consecrated propositions-as-types approach) providing what is now seen a standard model of CZF in type theory.[4] In 1989 Ingrid Lindstrm showed that non-well-founded sets obtained by replacing the axiom of foundation in CZF with Aczel's anti-foundation axiom (CZFA) can also be interpreted in Martin-Lf type theory.[5]

Interpretability in category theory

Presheaf models for constructive set theory were introduced by Nicola Gambino in 2004. They are analogous to the Presheaf models for intuitionistic set theory developed by Dana Scott in the 1980s (which remained unpublished).[6][7]

References
[1] Myhill, "Some properties of Intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory", Proceedings of the 1971 Cambridge Summer School in Mathematical Logic (Lecture Notes in Mathematics 337) (1973) pp 206-231 [2] Peter Aczel and Michael Rathjen, Notes on Constructive Set Theory (http:/ / www. ml. kva. se/ preprints/ meta/ AczelMon_Sep_24_09_16_56. rdf. html), Reports Institut Mittag-Leffler, Mathematical Logic - 2000/2001, No. 40 [3] Aczel, Peter: 1978. The type theoretic interpretation of constructive set theory. In: A. MacIntyre et al. (eds.), Logic Colloquium 77, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 5566. [4] Rathjen, M. (2004), "Predicativity, Circularity, and Anti-Foundation" (http:/ / www1. maths. leeds. ac. uk/ ~rathjen/ russelle. pdf), in Link, Godehard, One Hundred Years of Russell s Paradox: Mathematics, Logic, Philosophy, Walter de Gruyter, ISBN978-3-11-019968-0, [5] Lindstrm, Ingrid: 1989. A construction of non-well-founded sets within Martin-Lf type theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic 54: 5764. [6] Gambino, N. (2005). "PRESHEAF MODELS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE SET THEORIES" (http:/ / www. math. unipa. it/ ~ngambino/ Research/ Papers/ presheaf. pdf). In Laura Crosilla and Peter Schuster. From Sets and Types to Topology and Analysis. pp.6296. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198566519.003.0004. ISBN9780198566519. . [7] Scott, D. S. (1985). Category-theoretic models for Intuitionistic Set Theory. Manuscript slides of a talk given at Carnagie-Mellon University

Further reading
Troelstra, Anne; van Dalen, Dirk (1988). Constructivism in Mathematics, Vol. 2. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics. p.619. ISBN0-444-70358-6. Aczel, P. and Rathjen, M. (2001). Notes on constructive set theory ([Link] AczelMon_Sep_24_09_16_56.[Link]). Technical Report 40, 2000/2001. Mittag-Leffler Institute, Sweden.

External links
Laura Crosilla, Set Theory: Constructive and Intuitionistic ZF ([Link] set-theory-constructive/), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Feb 20, 2009 Benno van den Berg, Constructive set theory an overview ([Link] uploaded_files/inlineitem/[Link]), slides from Heyting dag, Amsterdam, 7 September 2012

Constructive analysis

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Constructive analysis
In mathematics, constructive analysis is mathematical analysis done according to the principles of constructive mathematics. This contrasts with classical analysis, which (in this context) simply means analysis done according to the (ordinary) principles of classical mathematics. Generally speaking, constructive analysis can reproduce theorems of classical analysis, but only in application to separable spaces; also, some theorems may need to be approached by approximations. Furthermore, many classical theorems can be stated in ways that are logically equivalent according to classical logic, but not all of these forms will be valid in constructive analysis, which uses intuitionistic logic.

Examples
The intermediate value theorem
For a simple example, consider the intermediate value theorem (IVT). In classical analysis, IVT says that, given any continuous function f from a closed interval [a,b] to the real line R, if f(a) is negative while f(b) is positive, then there exists a real number c in the interval such that f(c) is exactly zero. In constructive analysis, this does not hold, because the constructive interpretation of existential quantification ("there exists") requires one to be able to construct the real number c (in the sense that it can be approximated to any desired precision by a rational number). But if f hovers near zero during a stretch along its domain, then this cannot necessarily be done. However, constructive analysis provides several alternative formulations of IVT, all of which are equivalent to the usual form in classical analysis, but not in constructive analysis. For example, under the same conditions on f as in the classical theorem, given any natural number n (no matter how large), there exists (that is, we can construct) a real number cn in the interval such that the absolute value of f(cn) is less than 1/n. That is, we can get as close to zero as we like, even if we can't construct a c that gives us exactly zero. Alternatively, we can keep the same conclusion as in the classical IVT a single c such that f(c) is exactly zero while strengthening the conditions on f. We require that f be locally non-zero, meaning that given any point x in the interval [a,b] and any natural number m, there exists (we can construct) a real number y in the interval such that |y x| < 1/m and |f(y)| > 0. In this case, the desired number c can be constructed. This is a complicated condition, but there are several other conditions which imply it and which are commonly met; for example, every analytic function is locally non-zero (assuming that it already satisfies f(a) < 0 and f(b) > 0). For another way to view this example, notice that according to classical logic, if the locally non-zero condition fails, then it must fail at some specific point x; and then f(x) will equal 0, so that IVT is valid automatically. Thus in classical analysis, which uses classical logic, in order to prove the full IVT, it is sufficient to prove the constructive version. From this perspective, the full IVT fails in constructive analysis simply because constructive analysis does not accept classical logic. Conversely, one may argue that the true meaning of IVT, even in classical mathematics, is the constructive version involving the locally non-zero condition, with the full IVT following by "pure logic" afterwards. Some logicians, while accepting that classical mathematics is correct, still believe that the constructive approach gives a better insight into the true meaning of theorems, in much this way.

The least upper bound principle and compact sets

Another difference between classical and constructive analysis is that constructive analysis does not accept the least upper bound principle, that any subset of the real line R has a least upper bound (or supremum), possibly infinite. However, as with the intermediate value theorem, an alternative version survives; in constructive analysis, any located subset of the real line has a supremum. (Here a subset S of R is located if, whenever x < y are real numbers, either there exists an element s of S such that x < s, or y is an upper bound of S.) Again, this is classically equivalent

Constructive analysis to the full least upper bound principle, since every set is located in classical mathematics. And again, while the definition of located set is complicated, nevertheless it is satisfied by several commonly studied sets, including all intervals and compact sets. Closely related to this, in constructive mathematics, fewer characterisations of compact spaces are constructively validor from another point of view, there are several different concepts which are classically equivalent but not constructively equivalent. Indeed, if the interval [a,b] were sequentially compact in constructive analysis, then the classical IVT would follow from the first constructive version in the example; one could find c as a cluster point of the infinite sequence (cn)n.

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Uncountability of the real numbers

A constructive version of "the famous theorem of Cantor, that the real numbers are uncountable" is: "Let {an} be a sequence of real numbers. Let x0 and y0 be real numbers, x0<y0. Then there exists a real number x with x0xy0 and xan (nZ+)... The proof is essentially Cantor's 'diagonal' proof." (Theorem 1 in Errett Bishop, Foundations of Constructive Analysis, 1967, page 25.)

ZermeloFraenkel set theory

In mathematics, ZermeloFraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice, named after mathematicians Ernst Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel and commonly abbreviated ZFC, is one of several axiomatic systems that were proposed in the early twentieth century to formulate a theory of sets without the paradoxes of naive set theory such as Russell's paradox. Specifically, ZFC does not allow unrestricted comprehension. Today ZFC is the standard form of axiomatic set theory and as such is the most common foundation of mathematics. ZFC is intended to formalize a single primitive notion, that of a hereditary well-founded set, so that all entities in the universe of discourse are such sets. Thus the axioms of ZFC refer only to sets, not to urelements (elements of sets which are not themselves sets) or classes (collections of mathematical objects defined by a property shared by their members). The axioms of ZFC prevent its models from containing urelements, and proper classes can only be treated indirectly. Formally, ZFC is a one-sorted theory in first-order logic. The signature has equality and a single primitive binary relation, set membership, which is usually denoted . The formula a b means that the set a is a member of the set b (which is also read, "a is an element of b" or "a is in b"). There are many equivalent formulations of the ZFC axioms. Most of the ZFC axioms state the existence of particular sets defined from other sets. For example, the axiom of pairing says that given any two sets a and b there is a new set {a, b} containing exactly a and b. Other axioms describe properties of set membership. A goal of the ZFC axioms is that each axiom should be true if interpreted as a statement about the collection of all sets in the von Neumann universe (also known as the cumulative hierarchy). The metamathematics of ZFC has been extensively studied. Landmark results in this area established the independence of the continuum hypothesis from ZFC, and of the axiom of choice from the remaining ZFC axioms.

History
In 1908, Ernst Zermelo proposed the first axiomatic set theory, Zermelo set theory. However, as first pointed out by Abraham Fraenkel in a 1921 letter to Zermelo, this theory was incapable of proving the existence of certain sets and cardinal numbers whose existence was taken for granted by most set theorists of the time, notably, the cardinal number and, where Z0 is any infinite set and is the power set operation, the set {Z0, (Z0), ((Z0)),...} (Ebbinghaus 2007, p. 136). Moreover, one of Zermelo's axioms invoked a concept, that of a "definite" property, whose operational meaning was not clear. In 1922, Fraenkel and Thoralf Skolem independently proposed

ZermeloFraenkel set theory operationalizing a "definite" property as one that could be formulated as a first order theory whose atomic formulas were limited to set membership and identity. They also independently proposed replacing the axiom schema of specification with the axiom schema of replacement. Appending this schema, as well as the axiom of regularity (first proposed by Dimitry Mirimanoff in 1917), to Zermelo set theory yields the theory denoted by ZF. Adding to ZF either the axiom of choice (AC) or a statement that is equivalent to it yields ZFC.

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The axioms
There are many equivalent formulations of the ZFC axioms; for a rich but somewhat dated discussion of this fact, see Fraenkel et al. (1973). The following particular axiom set is from Kunen (1980). The axioms per se are expressed in the symbolism of first order logic. The associated English prose is only intended to aid the intuition. All formulations of ZFC imply that at least one set exists. Kunen includes an axiom that directly asserts the existence of a set, in addition to the axioms given below (although he notes that he does so only for emphasis (ibid., p. 10)). Its omission here can be justified in two ways. First, in the standard semantics of first-order logic in which ZFC is typically formalized, the domain of discourse must be nonempty. Hence, it is a logical theorem of first-order logic that something exists usually expressed as the assertion that something is identical to itself, x(x=x). Consequently, it is a theorem of every first-order theory that something exists. However, as noted above, because in the intended semantics of ZFC there are only sets, the interpretation of this logical theorem in the context of ZFC is that some set exists. Hence, there is no need for a separate axiom asserting that a set exists. Second, however, even if ZFC is formulated in so-called free logic, in which it is not a theorem that something exists, the axiom of infinity (below) asserts that an infinite set exists. This obviously implies that a set exists and so, once again, it is superfluous to include an axiom asserting as much.

1. Axiom of extensionality
Two sets are equal (are the same set) if they have the same elements.

The converse of this axiom follows from the substitution property of equality. If the background logic does not include equality "=", x=y may be defined as an abbreviation for the following formula (Hatcher 1982, p.138, def.1):

In this case, the axiom of extensionality can be reformulated as

which says that if x and y have the same elements, then they belong to the same sets (Fraenkel et al. 1973).

2. Axiom of regularity (also called the Axiom of foundation)

Every non-empty set x contains a member y such that x and y are disjoint sets.

3. Axiom schema of specification (also called the axiom schema of separation or of restricted comprehension)
If z is a set, and is any property which may characterize the elements x of z, then there is a subset y of z containing those x in z which satisfy the property. The "restriction" to z is necessary to avoid Russell's paradox and its variants. More formally, let be any formula in the language of ZFC with free variables among . So y is not free in . Then:

ZermeloFraenkel set theory In some other axiomatizations of ZF, this axiom is redundant in that it follows from the axiom schema of replacement. The set constructed by the axiom of specification is often denoted using set builder notation. Given a set z and a formula (x) with one free variable x, the set of all x in z that satisfy is denoted

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The axiom of specification can be used to prove the existence of the empty set, denoted

, once the existence of at

least one set is established (see above). A common way to do this is to use an instance of specification for a property which all sets do not have. For example, if w is a set which already exists, the empty set can be constructed as . If the background logic includes equality, it is also possible to define the empty set as . Thus the axiom of the empty set is implied by the nine axioms presented here. The axiom of extensionality implies the empty set is unique (does not depend on w). It is common to make a definitional extension that adds the symbol to the language of ZFC.

4. Axiom of pairing
If x and y are sets, then there exists a set which contains x and y as elements.

The axiom schema of specification must be used to reduce this to a set with exactly these two elements. This axiom is part of Z, but is redundant in ZF because it follows from the axiom schema of replacement, if we are given a set with at least two elements. The existence of a set with at least two elements is assured by either the axiom of infinity, or by the axiom schema of specification and the axiom of the power set applied twice to any set.

5. Axiom of union
For any set there is a set A containing every set that is a member of some member of

6. Axiom schema of replacement

Let be any formula in the language of ZFC whose free variables are among is not free in . Then: , so that in particular

Less formally, this axiom states that if the domain of a definable function f (represented here by the relation set (denoted here by the set is denoted here by ). The form stated here, in which

) is a

), and f(x) is a set for any x in that domain, then the range of f is a subclass of a set (where may be larger than strictly necessary, is

sometimes called the axiom schema of collection.

ZermeloFraenkel set theory

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7. Axiom of infinity
Let abbreviate , where is some set (We can see that is is a valid set by applying the Axiom of Pairing with so that the set ). Then there exists a set X such that the empty set is also a member of X.

is a member of X and, whenever a set y is a member of X, then

More colloquially, there exists a set X having infinitely many members. The minimal set X satisfying the axiom of infinity is the von Neumann ordinal , which can also be thought of as the set of natural numbers .

8. Axiom of power set

Let abbreviate For any set x, there is a set y which is a superset of the power set of x. The power set of x is the class whose members are all of the subsets of x. Axioms 18 define ZF. Alternative forms of these axioms are often encountered, some of which are listed in Jech (2003). Some ZF axiomatizations include an axiom asserting that the empty set exists. The axioms of pairing, union, replacement, and power set are often stated so that the members of the set x whose existence is being asserted are just those sets which the axiom asserts x must contain. The following axiom is added to turn ZF into ZFC:

9. Well-ordering theorem
For any set X, there is a binary relation R which well-orders X. This means R is a linear order on X such that every nonempty subset of X has a member which is minimal under R.

Given axioms 1-8, there are many statements provably equivalent to axiom 9, the best known of which is the axiom of choice (AC), which goes as follows. Let X be a set whose members are all non-empty. Then there exists a function f from X to the union of the members of X, called a "choice function", such that for all Y X one has f(Y) Y. Since the existence of a choice function when X is a finite set is easily proved from axioms 18, AC only matters for certain infinite sets. AC is characterized as nonconstructive because it asserts the existence of a choice set but says nothing about how the choice set is to be "constructed." Much research has sought to characterize the definability (or lack thereof) of certain sets whose existence AC asserts.

Motivation via the cumulative hierarchy

One motivation for the ZFC axioms is the cumulative hierarchy of sets introduced by John von Neumann (Shoenfield 1977, sec.2). In this viewpoint, the universe of set theory is built up in stages, with one stage for each ordinal number. At stage 0 there are no sets yet. At each following stage, a set is added to the universe if all of its elements have been added at previous stages. Thus the empty set is added at stage 1, and the set containing the empty set is added at stage 2; see Hinman (2005, p.467). The collection of all sets that are obtained in this way, over all the stages, is known as V. The sets in V can be arranged into a hierarchy by assigning to each set the first stage at which that set was added to V. It is provable that a set is in V if and only if the set is pure and well-founded; and provable that V satisfies all the axioms of ZFC, if the class of ordinals has appropriate reflection properties. For example, suppose that a set x is added at stage , which means that every element of x was added at a stage earlier than . Then every subset of x is also added at stage , because all elements of any subset of x were also added before stage . This means that any subset of x which the axiom of separation can construct is added at stage , and that the powerset of x will be added at the next stage after . For a complete argument that V satisfies ZFC see Shoenfield (1977).

ZermeloFraenkel set theory The picture of the universe of sets stratified into the cumulative hierarchy is characteristic of ZFC and related axiomatic set theories such as Von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory (often called NBG) and MorseKelley set theory. The cumulative hierarchy is not compatible with other set theories such as New Foundations. It is possible to change the definition of V so that at each stage, instead of adding all the subsets of the union of the previous stages, subsets are only added if they are definable in a certain sense. This results in a more "narrow" hierarchy which gives the constructible universe L, which also satisfies all the axioms of ZFC, including the axiom of choice. It is independent from the ZFC axioms whether V=L. Although the structure of L is more regular and well behaved than that ofV, few mathematicians argue thatV =L should be added to ZFC as an additional axiom.

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Metamathematics
The axiom schemata of replacement and separation each contain infinitely many instances. Montague (1961) included a result first proved in his 1957 Ph.D. thesis: if ZFC is consistent, it is impossible to axiomatize ZFC using only finitely many axioms. On the other hand, Von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory (NBG) can be finitely axiomatized. The ontology of NBG includes proper classes as well as sets; a set is any class that can be a member of another class. NBG and ZFC are equivalent set theories in the sense that any theorem not mentioning classes and provable in one theory can be proved in the other. Gdel's second incompleteness theorem says that a recursively axiomatizable system that can interpret Robinson arithmetic can prove its own consistency only if it is inconsistent. Moreover, Robinson arithmetic can be interpreted in general set theory, a small fragment of ZFC. Hence the consistency of ZFC cannot be proved within ZFC itself (unless it is actually inconsistent). Thus, to the extent that ZFC is identified with ordinary mathematics, the consistency of ZFC cannot be demonstrated in ordinary mathematics. The consistency of ZFC does follow from the existence of a weakly inaccessible cardinal, which is unprovable in ZFC if ZFC is consistent. Nevertheless, it is deemed unlikely that ZFC harbors an unsuspected contradiction; it is widely believed that if ZFC were inconsistent, that fact would have been uncovered by now. This much is certain ZFC is immune to the classic paradoxes of naive set theory: Russell's paradox, the Burali-Forti paradox, and Cantor's paradox. Abian and LaMacchia (1978) studied a subtheory of ZFC consisting of the axioms of extensionality, union, powerset, replacement, and choice. Using models, they proved this subtheory consistent, and proved that each of the axioms of extensionality, replacement, and power set is independent of the four remaining axioms of this subtheory. If this subtheory is augmented with the axiom of infinity, each of the axioms of union, choice, and infinity is independent of the five remaining axioms. Because there are non-well-founded models that satisfy each axiom of ZFC except the axiom of regularity, that axiom is independent of the other ZFC axioms. If consistent, ZFC cannot prove the existence of the inaccessible cardinals that category theory requires. Huge sets of this nature are possible if ZF is augmented with Tarski's axiom (Tarski 1939). Assuming that axiom turns the axioms of infinity, power set, and choice (7 9 above) into theorems.

Independence in ZFC
Many important statements are independent of ZFC (see list of statements undecidable in ZFC). The independence is usually proved by forcing, whereby it is shown that every countable transitive model of ZFC (sometimes augmented with large cardinal axioms) can be expanded to satisfy the statement in question. A different expansion is then shown to satisfy the negation of the statement. An independence proof by forcing automatically proves independence from arithmetical statements, other concrete statements, and large cardinal axioms. Some statements independent of ZFC can be proven to hold in particular inner models, such as in the constructible universe. However, some statements that are true about constructible sets are not consistent with hypothesized large cardinal axioms. Forcing proves that the following statements are independent of ZFC: Continuum hypothesis

ZermeloFraenkel set theory Diamond principle Suslin hypothesis Martin's axiom (which is not a ZFC axiom) Axiom of Constructibility (V=L) (which is also not a ZFC axiom).

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Remarks: The consistency of V=L is provable by inner models but not forcing: every model of ZF can be trimmed to become a model of ZFC+V=L. The Diamond Principle implies the Continuum Hypothesis and the negation of the Suslin Hypothesis. Martin's axiom plus the negation of the Continuum Hypothesis implies the Suslin Hypothesis. The constructible universe satisfies the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, the Diamond Principle, Martin's Axiom and the Kurepa Hypothesis. The failure of the Kurepa hypothesis is equiconsistent with the existence of a strongly inaccessible cardinal. A variation on the method of forcing can also be used to demonstrate the consistency and unprovability of the axiom of choice, i.e., that the axiom of choice is independent of ZF. The consistency of choice can be (relatively) easily verified by proving that the inner model L satisfies choice. (Thus every model of ZF contains a submodel of ZFC, so that Con(ZF) implies Con(ZFC).) Since forcing preserves choice, we cannot directly produce a model contradicting choice from a model satisfying choice. However, we can use forcing to create a model which contains a suitable submodel, namely one satisfying ZF but not C. Another method of proving independence results, one owing nothing to forcing, is based on Gdel's second incompleteness theorem. This approach employs the statement whose independence is being examined, to prove the existence of a set model of ZFC, in which case Con(ZFC) is true. Since ZFC satisfies the conditions of Gdel's second theorem, the consistency of ZFC is unprovable in ZFC (provided that ZFC is, in fact, consistent). Hence no statement allowing such a proof can be proved in ZFC. This method can prove that the existence of large cardinals is not provable in ZFC, but cannot prove that assuming such cardinals, given ZFC, is free of contradiction.

Criticisms
For criticism of set theory in general, see Objections to set theory ZFC has been criticized both for being excessively strong and for being excessively weak, as well as for its failure to capture objects such as proper classes and the universal set. Many mathematical theorems can be proven in much weaker systems than ZFC, such as Peano arithmetic and second order arithmetic (as explored by the program of reverse mathematics). Saunders Mac Lane and Solomon Feferman have both made this point. Some of "mainstream mathematics" (mathematics not directly connected with axiomatic set theory) is beyond Peano arithmetic and second order arithmetic, but still, all such mathematics can be carried out in ZC (Zermelo set theory with choice), another theory weaker than ZFC. Much of the power of ZFC, including the axiom of regularity and the axiom schema of replacement, is included primarily to facilitate the study of the set theory itself. On the other hand, among axiomatic set theories, ZFC is comparatively weak. Unlike New Foundations, ZFC does not admit the existence of a universal set. Hence the universe of sets under ZFC is not closed under the elementary operations of the algebra of sets. Unlike von NeumannBernaysGdel set theory and MorseKelley set theory (MK), ZFC does not admit the existence of proper classes. These ontological restrictions are required for ZFC to avoid Russell's paradox, but critics argue these restrictions make the ZFC axioms fail to capture the informal concept of set. A further comparative weakness of ZFC is that the axiom of choice included in ZFC is weaker than the axiom of global choice included in MK. There are numerous mathematical statements undecidable in ZFC. These include the continuum hypothesis, the Whitehead problem, and the Normal Moore space conjecture. Some of these conjectures are provable with the

ZermeloFraenkel set theory addition of axioms such as Martin's axiom, large cardinal axioms to ZFC. Some others are decided in ZF+AD where AD is the axiom of determinacy, a strong supposition incompatible with choice. One attraction of large cardinal axioms is that they enable many results from ZF+AD to be established in ZFC adjoined by some large cardinal axiom (see projective determinacy). The Mizar system has adopted TarskiGrothendieck set theory instead of ZFC so that proofs involving Grothendieck universes (encountered in category theory and algebraic geometry) can be formalized.

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References
Alexander Abian, 1965. The Theory of Sets and Transfinite Arithmetic. W B Saunders. -------- and LaMacchia, Samuel, 1978, "On the Consistency and Independence of Some Set-Theoretical Axioms, [1] " Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19: 155-58. Keith Devlin, 1996 (1984). The Joy of Sets. Springer. Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus, 2007. Ernst Zermelo: An Approach to His Life and Work. Springer. ISBN 978-3-540-49551-2. Abraham Fraenkel, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, and Azriel Levy, 1973 (1958). Foundations of Set Theory. North-Holland. Fraenkel's final word on ZF and ZFC. Hatcher, William, 1982 (1968). The Logical Foundations of Mathematics. Pergamon Press. Peter Hinman, 2005, Fundamentals of Mathematical Logic, A K Peters. ISBN 978-1-56881-262-5 Thomas Jech, 2003. Set Theory: The Third Millennium Edition, Revised and Expanded. Springer. ISBN 3-540-44085-2. Kenneth Kunen, 1980. Set Theory: An Introduction to Independence Proofs. Elsevier. ISBN 0-444-86839-9. Richard Montague, 1961, "Semantic closure and non-finite axiomatizability" in Infinistic Methods. London: Pergamon Press: 4569. Patrick Suppes, 1972 (1960). Axiomatic Set Theory. Dover reprint. Perhaps the best exposition of ZFC before the independence of AC and the Continuum hypothesis, and the emergence of large cardinals. Includes many theorems. Gaisi Takeuti and Zaring, W M, 1971. Introduction to Axiomatic Set Theory. Springer-Verlag. Alfred Tarski, 1939, "On well-ordered subsets of any set,", Fundamenta Mathematicae 32: 176-83. Tiles, Mary, 2004 (1989). The Philosophy of Set Theory. Dover reprint. Weak on metatheory; the author is not a mathematician. Tourlakis, George, 2003. Lectures in Logic and Set Theory, Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press. Jean van Heijenoort, 1967. From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 18791931. Harvard University Press. Includes annotated English translations of the classic articles by Zermelo, Fraenkel, and Skolem bearing on ZFC. Zermelo, Ernst (1908), "Untersuchungen ber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I", Mathematische Annalen 65: 261281, doi:10.1007/BF01449999 English translation in *Heijenoort, Jean van (1967), "Investigations in the foundations of set theory", From Frege to Gdel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 18791931, Source Books in the History of the Sciences, Harvard University Press, pp.199215, ISBN978-0-674-32449-7 Zermelo, Ernst (1930), "ber Grenzzahlen und Mengenbereiche" [2], Fundamenta Mathematicae 16: 2947, ISSN0016-2736

ZermeloFraenkel set theory

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External links
Hazewinkel, Michiel, ed. (2001), "ZFC" [3], Encyclopedia of Mathematics, Springer, ISBN978-1-55608-010-4 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles by Thomas Jech: Set Theory [4]; Axioms of ZermeloFraenkel Set Theory [5]. Metamath version of the ZFC axioms [6] A concise and nonredundant axiomatization. The background first order logic is defined especially to facilitate machine verification of proofs. A derivation [7] in Metamath of a version of the separation schema from a version of the replacement schema. Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms [8], [Link].

References
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] http:/ / projecteuclid. org/ DPubS/ Repository/ 1. 0/ Disseminate?view=body& id=pdf_1& handle=euclid. ndjfl/ 1093888220 http:/ / matwbn. icm. edu. pl/ tresc. php?wyd=1& tom=16 http:/ / www. encyclopediaofmath. org/ index. php?title=p/ z130100 http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ set-theory/ http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ set-theory/ ZF. html http:/ / us. metamath. org/ mpegif/ mmset. html#staxioms

[7] http:/ / us. metamath. org/ mpegif/ axsep. html [8] http:/ / planetmath. org/ ?op=getobj& amp;from=objects& amp;id=317

Hairy ball theorem

The hairy ball theorem of algebraic topology states that there is no nonvanishing continuous tangent vector field on even dimensional n-spheres. For the ordinary sphere, or 2sphere, if f is a continuous function that assigns a vector in R3 to every point p on a sphere such that f(p) is always tangent to the sphere at p, then there is at least one p such that f(p) = 0. In other words, whenever one attempts to comb a hairy ball flat, there will always be at least one tuft of hair at one point on the ball. The theorem was first stated by Henri Poincar in the late 19th century. This is famously stated as "you can't comb a hairy ball flat without creating a cowlick", or sometimes "you can't comb the hair on a coconut". It was first proved in 1912 by Brouwer.[1]
A failed attempt to comb a hairy 3-ball (2-sphere), leaving an uncomfortable tuft at each pole

Counting zeros
From a more advanced point of view: every zero of a vector field has a (non-zero) "index", and it can be shown that the sum of all of the indices at all of the zeros must be two. (This is because the Euler characteristic of the 2-sphere is two.) Therefore there must be at least one zero. This is a consequence of the PoincarHopf theorem. In the case of the torus, the Euler characteristic is 0; and it is possible to "comb a hairy doughnut flat". In this regard, it follows that for any compact regular 2-dimensional manifold with non-zero Euler characteristic, any continuous tangent vector field has at least one zero.

Hairy ball theorem

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Cyclone consequences
A curious meteorological application of this theorem involves considering the wind as a vector defined at every point continuously over the surface of a planet with an atmosphere. As an idealisation, take wind to be a two-dimensional vector: suppose that relative to the planetary diameter of the Earth, its vertical (i.e., non-tangential) motion is negligible. One scenario, in which there is absolutely no wind (air movement), corresponds to a field of zero-vectors. This scenario is uninteresting from the point of view of this theorem, and physically unrealistic (there will always be wind). In the case where there is at least some wind, the Hairy Ball Theorem dictates that at all times there must be at least one point on a planet with no wind at all and therefore a tuft. This corresponds to the above statement that there will always be p such that f(p) = 0. In a physical sense, this zero-wind point will be the eye of a cyclone or anticyclone. (Like the swirled hairs on the tennis ball, the wind will spiral around this zero-wind point - under our assumptions it cannot flow into or out of the point.) In brief, then, the Hairy Ball Theorem dictates that, given at least some wind on Earth, there must at all times be a cyclone somewhere. Note that the eye can be arbitrarily large or small and the magnitude of the wind surrounding it is irrelevant.
A hairy doughnut (2-torus), on the other hand, is quite easily combable.

A continuous tangent vector field on a 2-sphere with only one pole, in this case a dipole field with index 2. See also an animated version of this graphic.

This is not strictly true as the air above the earth has multiple layers, but for each layer there must be a point with zero horizontal windspeed.

Application to computer graphics

A common problem in computer graphics is to generate a non-zero vector in R3 that is orthogonal to a given non-zero one. There is no single continuous function that can do this for all non-zero vector inputs. This is a corollary of the hairy ball theorem. To see this, consider the given vector as the radius of a sphere and note that finding a non-zero vector orthogonal to the given one is equivalent to finding a non-zero vector that is tangent to the surface of that sphere. However, the hairy ball theorem says there exists no continuous function that can do this for every point on the sphere (i.e. every given vector).

Lefschetz connection
There is a closely related argument from algebraic topology, using the Lefschetz fixed point theorem. Since the Betti numbers of a 2-sphere are 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, ... the Lefschetz number (total trace on homology) of the identity mapping is 2. By integrating a vector field we get (at least a small part of) a one-parameter group of diffeomorphisms on the sphere; and all of the mappings in it are homotopic to the identity. Therefore they all have Lefschetz number 2, also. Hence they have fixed points (since the Lefschetz number is nonzero). Some more work would be needed to show

Hairy ball theorem that this implies there must actually be a zero of the vector field. It does suggest the correct statement of the more general Poincar-Hopf index theorem.

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Corollary
A consequence of the hairy ball theorem is that any continuous function that maps an even-dimensional sphere into itself has either a fixed point or a point that maps onto its own antipodal point. This can be seen by transforming the function into a tangential vector field as follows. Let s be the function mapping the sphere to itself, and let v be the tangential vector function to be constructed. For each point p, construct the stereographic projection of s(p) with p as the point of tangency. Then v(p) is the displacement vector of this projected point relative to p. According to the hairy ball theorem, there is a p such that v(p) = 0, so that s(p) = p. This argument breaks down only if there exists a point p for which s(p) is the antipodal point of p, since such a point is the only one that cannot be stereographically projected onto the tangent plane of p.

Higher dimensions
The connection with the Euler characteristic suggests the correct generalisation: the 2n-sphere has no non-vanishing vector field for n 1. The difference in even and odd dimension is that the Betti numbers of the m-sphere are 0 except in dimensions 0 and m. Therefore their alternating sum is 2 for m even, and 0 for m odd.

Notes
[1] Georg-August-Universitt Gttingen (http:/ / dz-srv1. sub. uni-goettingen. de/ sub/ digbib/ loader?ht=VIEW& did=D28661)

References
Murray Eisenberg, Robert Guy, A Proof of the Hairy Ball Theorem, The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 86, No. 7 (Aug. - Sep., 1979), pp.571574

Further reading
Tyler Jarvis and James Tanton (2003-07-23) (PDF). The Hairy Ball Theorem via Sperner's Lemma ([Link] [Link]/~jarvis/[Link]). Richeson, David S. (2008). Euler's Gem: The Polyhedron Formula and the Birth of Topology ([Link] [Link]/). Princeton University Press. ISBN0-691-12677-1.. See Chapter 19, "Combing the Hair on a Coconut", pp.202218. Reich, Henry (2011). "One-Minute Math: Why you can't comb a hairy ball" ([Link] blogs/nstv/2011/12/[Link]). New ScentistTV.

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General relativity
General relativity, or the general theory of relativity, is the geometric theory of gravitation published by Albert Einstein in 1916[1] and the current description of gravitation in modern physics. General relativity generalises special relativity and Newton's law of universal gravitation, providing a unified description of gravity as a geometric property of space and time, or spacetime. In particular, the curvature of spacetime is directly related to the energy and momentum of whatever matter and radiation are present. The relation is specified by the Einstein field equations, a system of partial differential equations.
A simulated black hole of 10 solar masses as seen Some predictions of general relativity differ significantly from those of from a distance of 600kilometers with the Milky classical physics, especially concerning the passage of time, the Way in the background. geometry of space, the motion of bodies in free fall, and the propagation of light. Examples of such differences include gravitational time dilation, gravitational lensing, the gravitational redshift of light, and the gravitational time delay. The predictions of general relativity have been confirmed in all observations and experiments to date. Although general relativity is not the only relativistic theory of gravity, it is the simplest theory that is consistent with experimental data. However, unanswered questions remain, the most fundamental being how general relativity can be reconciled with the laws of quantum physics to produce a complete and self-consistent theory of quantum gravity.

Einstein's theory has important astrophysical implications. For example, it implies the existence of black holesregions of space in which space and time are distorted in such a way that nothing, not even light, can escapeas an end-state for massive stars. There is ample evidence that the intense radiation emitted by certain kinds of astronomical objects is due to black holes; for example, microquasars and active galactic nuclei result from the presence of stellar black holes and black holes of a much more massive type, respectively. The bending of light by gravity can lead to the phenomenon of gravitational lensing, in which multiple images of the same distant astronomical object are visible in the sky. General relativity also predicts the existence of gravitational waves, which have since been observed indirectly; a direct measurement is the aim of projects such as LIGO and NASA/ESA Laser Interferometer Space Antenna and various pulsar timing arrays. In addition, general relativity is the basis of current cosmological models of a consistently expanding universe.

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History
Soon after publishing the special theory of relativity in 1905, Einstein started thinking about how to incorporate gravity into his new relativistic framework. In 1907, beginning with a simple thought experiment involving an observer in free fall, he embarked on what would be an eight-year search for a relativistic theory of gravity. After numerous detours and false starts, his work culminated in the presentation to the Prussian Academy of Science in November 1915 of what are now known as the Einstein field equations. These equations specify how the geometry of space and time is influenced by whatever matter is present, and form the core of Einstein's general theory of relativity.[2] The Einstein field equations are nonlinear and very difficult to solve. Einstein used approximation methods in working out initial predictions of the theory. But as early as 1916, the astrophysicist Karl Schwarzschild found the first non-trivial exact solution to the Einstein field equations, the so-called Schwarzschild metric. This Albert Einstein developed the theories of special and general relativity. Picture from 1921. solution laid the groundwork for the description of the final stages of gravitational collapse, and the objects known today as black holes. In the same year, the first steps towards generalizing Schwarzschild's solution to electrically charged objects were taken, which eventually resulted in the ReissnerNordstrm solution, now associated with electrically charged black holes.[3] In 1917, Einstein applied his theory to the universe as a whole, initiating the field of relativistic cosmology. In line with contemporary thinking, he assumed a static universe, adding a new parameter to his original field equationsthe cosmological constantto reproduce that "observation".[4] By 1929, however, the work of Hubble and others had shown that our universe is expanding. This is readily described by the expanding cosmological solutions found by Friedmann in 1922, which do not require a cosmological constant. Lematre used these solutions to formulate the earliest version of the Big Bang models, in which our universe has evolved from an extremely hot and dense earlier state.[5] Einstein later declared the cosmological constant the biggest blunder of his life.[6] During that period, general relativity remained something of a curiosity among physical theories. It was clearly superior to Newtonian gravity, being consistent with special relativity and accounting for several effects unexplained by the Newtonian theory. Einstein himself had shown in 1915 how his theory explained the anomalous perihelion advance of the planet Mercury without any arbitrary parameters ("fudge factors").[7] Similarly, a 1919 expedition led by Eddington confirmed general relativity's prediction for the deflection of starlight by the Sun during the total solar eclipse of May 29, 1919,[8] making Einstein instantly famous.[9] Yet the theory entered the mainstream of theoretical physics and astrophysics only with the developments between approximately 1960 and 1975, now known as the golden age of general relativity.[10] Physicists began to understand the concept of a black hole, and to identify quasars as one of these objects' astrophysical manifestations.[11] Ever more precise solar system tests confirmed the theory's predictive power,[12] and relativistic cosmology, too, became amenable to direct observational tests.[13]

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From classical mechanics to general relativity

General relativity can be understood by examining its similarities with and departures from classical physics. The first step is the realization that classical mechanics and Newton's law of gravity admit of a geometric description. The combination of this description with the laws of special relativity results in a heuristic derivation of general relativity.[14]

Geometry of Newtonian gravity

At the base of classical mechanics is the notion that a body's motion can be described as a combination of free (or inertial) motion, and deviations from this free motion. Such deviations are caused by external forces acting on a body in accordance with Newton's second law of motion, which states that the net force acting on a body is equal to that body's (inertial) mass multiplied by its acceleration.[15] The preferred inertial motions are related to the geometry of space and time: in the standard reference frames of classical mechanics, objects in free motion move along straight lines at constant speed. In modern parlance, their paths are geodesics, straight world lines in curved spacetime.[16]

Conversely, one might expect that inertial motions, once identified by observing the actual motions of bodies and making allowances for the external forces (such as electromagnetism or friction), can be used to define the geometry of space, as well as a time coordinate. However, there is an ambiguity once gravity comes into play. According to Newton's law of gravity, and independently verified by experiments such as that of Etvs and its successors (see Etvs experiment), there is a universality of free fall (also known as the weak equivalence principle, or the universal equality of inertial and passive-gravitational mass): the trajectory of a test body in free fall depends only on its position and initial speed, but not on any of its material properties.[17] A simplified version of this is embodied in Einstein's elevator experiment, illustrated in the figure on the right: for an observer in a small enclosed room, it is impossible to decide, by mapping the trajectory of bodies such as a dropped ball, whether the room is at rest in a gravitational field, or in free space aboard an accelerating rocket generating a force equal to gravity.[18] Given the universality of free fall, there is no observable distinction between inertial motion and motion under the influence of the gravitational force. This suggests the definition of a new class of inertial motion, namely that of objects in free fall under the influence of gravity. This new class of preferred motions, too, defines a geometry of space and timein mathematical terms, it is the geodesic motion associated with a specific connection which depends on the gradient of the gravitational potential. Space, in this construction, still has the ordinary Euclidean geometry. However, spacetime as a whole is more complicated. As can be shown using simple thought experiments following the free-fall trajectories of different test particles, the result of transporting spacetime vectors that can denote a particle's velocity (time-like vectors) will vary with the particle's trajectory; mathematically speaking, the Newtonian connection is not integrable. From this, one can deduce that spacetime is curved. The result is a geometric formulation of Newtonian gravity using only covariant concepts, i.e. a description which is valid in any desired coordinate system.[19] In this geometric description, tidal effectsthe relative acceleration of bodies in free fallare related to the derivative of the connection, showing how the modified geometry is caused by the presence of mass.[20]

According to general relativity, objects in a gravitational field behave similarly to objects within an accelerating enclosure. For example, an observer will see a ball fall the same way in a rocket (left) as it does on Earth (right), provided that the acceleration of the rocket provides the same relative force.

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Relativistic generalization
As intriguing as geometric Newtonian gravity may be, its basis, classical mechanics, is merely a limiting case of (special) relativistic mechanics.[21] In the language of symmetry: where gravity can be neglected, physics is Lorentz invariant as in special relativity rather than Galilei invariant as in classical mechanics. (The defining symmetry of special relativity is the Poincar group which also includes translations and rotations.) The differences between the two become significant when we are dealing with speeds approaching the speed of light, and with high-energy phenomena.[22] With Lorentz symmetry, additional structures come into play. They are defined by the set of light cones (see the image on the left). The light-cones define a causal structure: for each event A, there is a set of events that can, in principle, either influence or be influenced by A via signals or interactions that do not need to travel faster than light (such as event B in the image), and a set of events for Light cone which such an influence is impossible (such as event C in the image). These sets are observer-independent.[23] In conjunction with the world-lines of freely falling particles, the light-cones can be used to reconstruct the spacetime's semi-Riemannian metric, at least up to a positive scalar factor. In mathematical terms, this defines a conformal structure.[24] Special relativity is defined in the absence of gravity, so for practical applications, it is a suitable model whenever gravity can be neglected. Bringing gravity into play, and assuming the universality of free fall, an analogous reasoning as in the previous section applies: there are no global inertial frames. Instead there are approximate inertial frames moving alongside freely falling particles. Translated into the language of spacetime: the straight time-like lines that define a gravity-free inertial frame are deformed to lines that are curved relative to each other, suggesting that the inclusion of gravity necessitates a change in spacetime geometry.[25] A priori, it is not clear whether the new local frames in free fall coincide with the reference frames in which the laws of special relativity holdthat theory is based on the propagation of light, and thus on electromagnetism, which could have a different set of preferred frames. But using different assumptions about the special-relativistic frames (such as their being earth-fixed, or in free fall), one can derive different predictions for the gravitational redshift, that is, the way in which the frequency of light shifts as the light propagates through a gravitational field (cf. below). The actual measurements show that free-falling frames are the ones in which light propagates as it does in special relativity.[26] The generalization of this statement, namely that the laws of special relativity hold to good approximation in freely falling (and non-rotating) reference frames, is known as the Einstein equivalence principle, a crucial guiding principle for generalizing special-relativistic physics to include gravity.[27] The same experimental data shows that time as measured by clocks in a gravitational fieldproper time, to give the technical termdoes not follow the rules of special relativity. In the language of spacetime geometry, it is not measured by the Minkowski metric. As in the Newtonian case, this is suggestive of a more general geometry. At small scales, all reference frames that are in free fall are equivalent, and approximately Minkowskian. Consequently, we are now dealing with a curved generalization of Minkowski space. The metric tensor that defines the geometryin particular, how lengths and angles are measuredis not the Minkowski metric of special relativity, it is a generalization known as a semi- or pseudo-Riemannian metric. Furthermore, each Riemannian metric is naturally associated with one particular kind of connection, the Levi-Civita connection, and this is, in fact, the connection that satisfies the equivalence principle and makes space locally Minkowskian (that is, in suitable locally inertial coordinates, the metric is Minkowskian, and its first partial derivatives and the connection coefficients vanish).[28]

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Einstein's equations
Having formulated the relativistic, geometric version of the effects of gravity, the question of gravity's source remains. In Newtonian gravity, the source is mass. In special relativity, mass turns out to be part of a more general quantity called the energymomentum tensor, which includes both energy and momentum densities as well as stress (that is, pressure and shear).[29] Using the equivalence principle, this tensor is readily generalized to curved space-time. Drawing further upon the analogy with geometric Newtonian gravity, it is natural to assume that the field equation for gravity relates this tensor and the Ricci tensor, which describes a particular class of tidal effects: the change in volume for a small cloud of test particles that are initially at rest, and then fall freely. In special relativity, conservation of energymomentum corresponds to the statement that the energymomentum tensor is divergence-free. This formula, too, is readily generalized to curved spacetime by replacing partial derivatives with their curved-manifold counterparts, covariant derivatives studied in differential geometry. With this additional conditionthe covariant divergence of the energymomentum tensor, and hence of whatever is on the other side of the equation, is zero the simplest set of equations are what are called Einstein's (field) equations:

On the left-hand side is the Einstein tensor, a specific divergence-free combination of the Ricci tensor metric. In particular, is the curvature scalar. The Ricci tensor itself is related to the more general Riemann curvature tensor as

and the

On the right-hand side, Tab is the energymomentum tensor. All tensors are written in abstract index notation.[30] Matching the theory's prediction to observational results for planetary orbits (or, equivalently, assuring that the weak-gravity, low-speed limit is Newtonian mechanics), the proportionality constant can be fixed as = 8G/c4, with G the gravitational constant and c the speed of light.[31] When there is no matter present, so that the energymomentum tensor vanishes, the result are the vacuum Einstein equations,

There are alternatives to general relativity built upon the same premises, which include additional rules and/or constraints, leading to different field equations. Examples are BransDicke theory, teleparallelism, and EinsteinCartan theory.[32]

Definition and basic applications

The derivation outlined in the previous section contains all the information needed to define general relativity, describe its key properties, and address a question of crucial importance in physics, namely how the theory can be used for model-building.

Definition and basic properties

General relativity is a metric theory of gravitation. At its core are Einstein's equations, which describe the relation between the geometry of a four-dimensional, pseudo-Riemannian manifold representing spacetime, and the energymomentum contained in that spacetime.[33] Phenomena that in classical mechanics are ascribed to the action of the force of gravity (such as free-fall, orbital motion, and spacecraft trajectories), correspond to inertial motion within a curved geometry of spacetime in general relativity; there is no gravitational force deflecting objects from their natural, straight paths. Instead, gravity corresponds to changes in the properties of space and time, which in turn changes the straightest-possible paths that objects will naturally follow.[34] The curvature is, in turn, caused by the energymomentum of matter. Paraphrasing the relativist John Archibald Wheeler, spacetime tells matter how to move; matter tells spacetime how to curve.[35]

General relativity While general relativity replaces the scalar gravitational potential of classical physics by a symmetric rank-two tensor, the latter reduces to the former in certain limiting cases. For weak gravitational fields and slow speed relative to the speed of light, the theory's predictions converge on those of Newton's law of universal gravitation.[36] As it is constructed using tensors, general relativity exhibits general covariance: its lawsand further laws formulated within the general relativistic frameworktake on the same form in all coordinate systems.[37] Furthermore, the theory does not contain any invariant geometric background structures, i.e. it is background independent. It thus satisfies a more stringent general principle of relativity, namely that the laws of physics are the same for all observers.[38] Locally, as expressed in the equivalence principle, spacetime is Minkowskian, and the laws of physics exhibit local Lorentz invariance.[39]

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Model-building
The core concept of general-relativistic model-building is that of a solution of Einstein's equations. Given both Einstein's equations and suitable equations for the properties of matter, such a solution consists of a specific semi-Riemannian manifold (usually defined by giving the metric in specific coordinates), and specific matter fields defined on that manifold. Matter and geometry must satisfy Einstein's equations, so in particular, the matter's energymomentum tensor must be divergence-free. The matter must, of course, also satisfy whatever additional equations were imposed on its properties. In short, such a solution is a model universe that satisfies the laws of general relativity, and possibly additional laws governing whatever matter might be present.[40] Einstein's equations are nonlinear partial differential equations and, as such, difficult to solve exactly.[41] Nevertheless, a number of exact solutions are known, although only a few have direct physical applications.[42] The best-known exact solutions, and also those most interesting from a physics point of view, are the Schwarzschild solution, the ReissnerNordstrm solution and the Kerr metric, each corresponding to a certain type of black hole in an otherwise empty universe,[43] and the FriedmannLematreRobertsonWalker and de Sitter universes, each describing an expanding cosmos.[44] Exact solutions of great theoretical interest include the Gdel universe (which opens up the intriguing possibility of time travel in curved spacetimes), the Taub-NUT solution (a model universe that is homogeneous, but anisotropic), and Anti-de Sitter space (which has recently come to prominence in the context of what is called the Maldacena conjecture).[45] Given the difficulty of finding exact solutions, Einstein's field equations are also solved frequently by numerical integration on a computer, or by considering small perturbations of exact solutions. In the field of numerical relativity, powerful computers are employed to simulate the geometry of spacetime and to solve Einstein's equations for interesting situations such as two colliding black holes.[46] In principle, such methods may be applied to any system, given sufficient computer resources, and may address fundamental questions such as naked singularities. Approximate solutions may also be found by perturbation theories such as linearized gravity[47] and its generalization, the post-Newtonian expansion, both of which were developed by Einstein. The latter provides a systematic approach to solving for the geometry of a spacetime that contains a distribution of matter that moves slowly compared with the speed of light. The expansion involves a series of terms; the first terms represent Newtonian gravity, whereas the later terms represent ever smaller corrections to Newton's theory due to general relativity.[48] An extension of this expansion is the parametrized post-Newtonian (PPN) formalism, which allows quantitative comparisons between the predictions of general relativity and alternative theories.[49]

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Consequences of Einstein's theory

General relativity has a number of physical consequences. Some follow directly from the theory's axioms, whereas others have become clear only in the course of the ninety years of research that followed Einstein's initial publication.

Gravitational time dilation and frequency shift

Assuming that the equivalence principle holds,[50] gravity influences the passage of time. Light sent down into a gravity well is blueshifted, whereas light sent in the opposite direction (i.e., climbing out of the gravity well) is redshifted; collectively, these two effects are known as the gravitational frequency shift. More generally, processes close to a massive body run more slowly when compared with processes taking place farther away; this effect is known as gravitational time dilation.[51] Gravitational redshift has been measured in the laboratory[52] and using Schematic representation of the gravitational astronomical observations.[53] Gravitational time dilation in the Earth's redshift of a light wave escaping from the surface of a massive body gravitational field has been measured numerous times using atomic [54] clocks, while ongoing validation is provided as a side effect of the operation of the Global Positioning System (GPS).[55] Tests in stronger gravitational fields are provided by the observation of binary pulsars.[56] All results are in agreement with general relativity.[57] However, at the current level of accuracy, these observations cannot distinguish between general relativity and other theories in which the equivalence principle is valid.[58]

Light deflection and gravitational time delay

General relativity predicts that the path of light is bent in a gravitational field; light passing a massive body is deflected towards that body. This effect has been confirmed by observing the light of stars or distant quasars being deflected as it passes the Sun.[59] This and related predictions follow from the fact that light follows what is called a light-like or null geodesica generalization of the straight lines along which light travels in classical physics. Such geodesics are the generalization of the invariance of lightspeed in special relativity.[60] As one examines suitable model spacetimes (either the exterior Schwarzschild solution or, for more than a single mass, the post-Newtonian expansion),[61] several effects of gravity on light propagation emerge. Although the bending of light can also be derived by extending the universality of free fall to light,[62] the angle of deflection resulting from such calculations is only half the value given by general relativity.[63]

Deflection of light (sent out from the location shown in blue) near a compact body (shown in gray)

Closely related to light deflection is the gravitational time delay (or Shapiro delay), the phenomenon that light signals take longer to move through a gravitational field than they would in the absence of that field. There have been numerous successful tests of this prediction.[64] In the parameterized post-Newtonian formalism (PPN), measurements of both the deflection of light and the gravitational time delay determine a parameter called , which encodes the influence of gravity on the geometry of space.[65]

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Gravitational waves
One of several analogies between weak-field gravity and electromagnetism is that, analogous to electromagnetic waves, there are gravitational waves: ripples in the metric of spacetime that propagate at the speed of light.[66] The simplest type of such a wave can be visualized by its action on a ring of freely floating particles. A sine wave propagating through such a ring towards the reader distorts the ring in a characteristic, rhythmic fashion (animated image to the right).[67] Since Einstein's equations are non-linear, arbitrarily strong gravitational waves do not obey linear superposition, making their description difficult. However, for weak fields, a linear approximation can be made. Such linearized gravitational waves are sufficiently accurate to describe the exceedingly weak waves that are expected to arrive here on Earth from far-off cosmic events, which typically result in relative distances increasing and decreasing by or less.

Ring of test particles influenced by gravitational wave

Data-analysis methods routinely make use of the fact that these linearized waves can be Fourier decomposed.[68] Some exact solutions describe gravitational waves without any approximation, e.g., a wave train traveling through empty space[69] or so-called Gowdy universes, varieties of an expanding cosmos filled with gravitational waves.[70] But for gravitational waves produced in astrophysically relevant situations, such as the merger of two black holes, numerical methods are presently the only way to construct appropriate models.[71]

Orbital effects and the relativity of direction

General relativity differs from classical mechanics in a number of predictions concerning orbiting bodies. It predicts an overall rotation (precession) of planetary orbits, as well as orbital decay caused by the emission of gravitational waves and effects related to the relativity of direction. Precession of apsides In general relativity, the apsides of any orbit (the point of the orbiting body's closest approach to the system's center of mass) will precessthe orbit is not an ellipse, but akin to an ellipse that rotates on its focus, resulting in a rose curve-like shape (see image). Einstein first derived this result by using an approximate metric representing the Newtonian limit and treating the orbiting body as a test particle. For him, the fact that his theory gave a straightforward explanation of the anomalous perihelion shift of the planet Mercury, discovered earlier by Urbain Le Verrier in 1859, was important evidence that he had at last identified the correct form of the gravitational field equations.[72] The effect can also be derived by using either the exact Schwarzschild Newtonian (red) vs. Einsteinian orbit (blue) of a lone planet orbiting a star metric (describing spacetime around a spherical mass)[73] or the much [74] more general post-Newtonian formalism. It is due to the influence of gravity on the geometry of space and to the contribution of self-energy to a body's gravity (encoded in the nonlinearity of Einstein's equations).[75] Relativistic precession has been observed for all planets that allow for accurate precession measurements (Mercury, Venus and the Earth),[76] as well as in binary pulsar systems, where it is larger by five orders of magnitude.[77]

General relativity Orbital decay According to general relativity, a binary system will emit gravitational waves, thereby losing energy. Due to this loss, the distance between the two orbiting bodies decreases, and so does their orbital period. Within the solar system or for ordinary double stars, the effect is too small to be observable. This is not the case for a close binary pulsar, a system of two orbiting neutron stars, one of which is a pulsar: from the pulsar, observers on Earth receive a regular series of radio pulses that can serve as a highly accurate clock, which allows precise measurements of the orbital period. Since the neutron stars are very compact, significant amounts of energy are emitted in the form of gravitational radiation.[79] The first observation of a decrease in orbital period due to the emission of gravitational waves was made by Hulse and Taylor, using the binary Orbital decay for PSR1913+16: time shift in pulsar PSR1913+16 they had discovered in 1974. This was the first [78] seconds, tracked over three decades. detection of gravitational waves, albeit indirect, for which they were awarded the 1993 Nobel Prize in physics.[80] Since then, several other binary pulsars have been found, in particular the double pulsar PSR J0737-3039, in which both stars are pulsars.[81] Geodetic precession and frame-dragging Several relativistic effects are directly related to the relativity of direction.[82] One is geodetic precession: the axis direction of a gyroscope in free fall in curved spacetime will change when compared, for instance, with the direction of light received from distant starseven though such a gyroscope represents the way of keeping a direction as stable as possible ("parallel transport").[83] For the MoonEarth system, this effect has been measured with the help of lunar laser ranging.[84] More recently, it has been measured for test masses aboard the satellite Gravity Probe B to a precision of better than 0.3%.[85][86] Near a rotating mass, there are so-called gravitomagnetic or frame-dragging effects. A distant observer will determine that objects close to the mass get "dragged around". This is most extreme for rotating black holes where, for any object entering a zone known as the ergosphere, rotation is inevitable.[87] Such effects can again be tested through their influence on the orientation of gyroscopes in free fall.[88] Somewhat controversial tests have been performed using the LAGEOS satellites, confirming the relativistic prediction.[89] Also the Mars Global Surveyor probe around Mars has been used.[90][91]

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Astrophysical applications
Gravitational lensing
The deflection of light by gravity is responsible for a new class of astronomical phenomena. If a massive object is situated between the astronomer and a distant target object with appropriate mass and relative distances, the astronomer will see multiple distorted images of the target. Such effects are known as gravitational lensing.[92] Depending on the configuration, scale, and mass distribution, there can be two or more images, a bright ring known as an Einstein ring, or partial rings called arcs.[93] The earliest example was discovered in 1979;[94] since then, more than a hundred gravitational lenses have been observed.[95] Even if the multiple images are too close to each other to be resolved, the effect can still be measured, e.g., as an overall brightening of the target object; a number of such "microlensing events" have been observed.[96]

Einstein cross: four images of the same astronomical object, produced by a gravitational lens

Gravitational lensing has developed into a tool of observational astronomy. It is used to detect the presence and distribution of dark matter, provide a "natural telescope" for observing distant galaxies, and to obtain an independent estimate of the Hubble constant. Statistical evaluations of lensing data provide valuable insight into the structural evolution of galaxies.[97]

Gravitational wave astronomy

Observations of binary pulsars provide strong indirect evidence for the existence of gravitational waves (see Orbital decay, above). However, gravitational waves reaching us from the depths of the cosmos have not been detected directly, which is a major goal of current relativity-related research.[98] Several land-based gravitational wave detectors are currently in operation, most notably the interferometric detectors GEO 600, LIGO (three detectors), TAMA 300 and VIRGO.[99] Various pulsar timing arrays are using millisecond pulsars to detect gravitational waves in the 109 to 106 Hertz frequency range, which originate from binary supermassive blackholes.[100] European space-based detector, eLISA / NGO, is currently under development,[101] with a precursor mission (LISA Pathfinder) due for launch in 2014.[102] Observations of gravitational waves promise to complement Artist's impression of the space-borne observations in the electromagnetic spectrum.[103] They are expected to gravitational wave detector LISA yield information about black holes and other dense objects such as neutron stars and white dwarfs, about certain kinds of supernova implosions, and about processes in the very early universe, including the signature of certain types of hypothetical cosmic string.[104]

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Black holes and other compact objects

Whenever the ratio of an object's mass to its radius becomes sufficiently large, general relativity predicts the formation of a black hole, a region of space from which nothing, not even light, can escape. In the currently accepted models of stellar evolution, neutron stars of around 1.4 solar masses, and stellar black holes with a few to a few dozen solar masses, are thought to be the final state for the evolution of massive stars.[105] Usually a galaxy has one supermassive black hole with a few million to a few billion solar masses in its center,[106] and its presence is thought to have played an important role in the formation of the galaxy and larger cosmic structures.[107] Astronomically, the most important property of compact objects is that they provide a supremely efficient mechanism for converting gravitational energy into electromagnetic radiation.[108] Accretion, the falling of dust or gaseous matter onto stellar or supermassive black holes, is thought to be responsible for some spectacularly luminous astronomical objects, notably diverse kinds of active galactic nuclei on galactic scales and stellar-size objects such as microquasars.[109] In particular, accretion can lead to relativistic jets, focused beams of Simulation based on the equations of general highly energetic particles that are being flung into space at almost light relativity: a star collapsing to form a black hole while emitting gravitational waves speed.[110] General relativity plays a central role in modelling all these phenomena,[111] and observations provide strong evidence for the existence of black holes with the properties predicted by the theory.[112] Black holes are also sought-after targets in the search for gravitational waves (cf. Gravitational waves, above). Merging black hole binaries should lead to some of the strongest gravitational wave signals reaching detectors here on Earth, and the phase directly before the merger ("chirp") could be used as a "standard candle" to deduce the distance to the merger eventsand hence serve as a probe of cosmic expansion at large distances.[113] The gravitational waves produced as a stellar black hole plunges into a supermassive one should provide direct information about the supermassive black hole's geometry.[114]

Cosmology
The current models of cosmology are based on Einstein's field equations, which include the cosmological constant since it has important influence on the large-scale dynamics of the cosmos,

where gab is the spacetime metric.[115] Isotropic and homogeneous solutions of these enhanced equations, the FriedmannLematreRobertsonWalker solutions,[116] allow physicists to model a universe that has evolved over the past This blue horseshoe is a distant galaxy that has 14billionyears from a hot, early Big Bang phase.[117] Once a small been magnified and warped into a nearly number of parameters (for example the universe's mean matter density) complete ring by the strong gravitational pull of have been fixed by astronomical observation,[118] further observational the massive foreground luminous red galaxy. data can be used to put the models to the test.[119] Predictions, all successful, include the initial abundance of chemical elements formed in a period of primordial nucleosynthesis,[120] the large-scale structure of the universe,[121] and the existence and properties of a "thermal echo" from the early cosmos, the cosmic background radiation.[122] Astronomical observations of the cosmological expansion rate allow the total amount of matter in the universe to be estimated, although the nature of that matter remains mysterious in part. About 90% of all matter appears to be

General relativity so-called dark matter, which has mass (or, equivalently, gravitational influence), but does not interact electromagnetically and, hence, cannot be observed directly.[123] There is no generally accepted description of this new kind of matter, within the framework of known particle physics[124] or otherwise.[125] Observational evidence from redshift surveys of distant supernovae and measurements of the cosmic background radiation also show that the evolution of our universe is significantly influenced by a cosmological constant resulting in an acceleration of cosmic expansion or, equivalently, by a form of energy with an unusual equation of state, known as dark energy, the nature of which remains unclear.[126] A so-called inflationary phase,[127] an additional phase of strongly accelerated expansion at cosmic times of around seconds, was hypothesized in 1980 to account for several puzzling observations that were unexplained by classical cosmological models, such as the nearly perfect homogeneity of the cosmic background radiation.[128] Recent measurements of the cosmic background radiation have resulted in the first evidence for this scenario.[129] However, there is a bewildering variety of possible inflationary scenarios, which cannot be restricted by current observations.[130] An even larger question is the physics of the earliest universe, prior to the inflationary phase and close to where the classical models predict the big bang singularity. An authoritative answer would require a complete theory of quantum gravity, which has not yet been developed[131] (cf. the section on quantum gravity, below).

97

Advanced concepts
Causal structure and global geometry
In general relativity, no material body can catch up with or overtake a light pulse. No influence from an event A can reach any other location X before light sent out at A to X. In consequence, an exploration of all light worldlines (null geodesics) yields key information about the spacetime's causal structure. This structure can be displayed using PenroseCarter diagrams in which infinitely large regions of space and infinite time intervals are shrunk ("compactified") so as to fit onto a finite map, while light still travels along diagonals as in standard spacetime diagrams.[132] Aware of the importance of causal structure, Roger Penrose and others PenroseCarter diagram of an infinite Minkowski developed what is known as global geometry. In global geometry, the universe object of study is not one particular solution (or family of solutions) to Einstein's equations. Rather, relations that hold true for all geodesics, such as the Raychaudhuri equation, and additional non-specific assumptions about the nature of matter (usually in the form of so-called energy conditions) are used to derive general results.[133]

Horizons
Using global geometry, some spacetimes can be shown to contain boundaries called horizons, which demarcate one region from the rest of spacetime. The best-known examples are black holes: if mass is compressed into a sufficiently compact region of space (as specified in the hoop conjecture, the relevant length scale is the Schwarzschild radius[134]), no light from inside can escape to the outside. Since no object can overtake a light pulse, all interior matter is imprisoned as well. Passage from the exterior to the interior is still possible, showing that the boundary, the black hole's horizon, is not a physical barrier.[135]

General relativity

98 Early studies of black holes relied on explicit solutions of Einstein's equations, notably the spherically symmetric Schwarzschild solution (used to describe a static black hole) and the axisymmetric Kerr solution (used to describe a rotating, stationary black hole, and introducing interesting features such as the ergosphere). Using global geometry, later studies have revealed more general properties of black holes. In the long run, they are rather simple objects characterized by eleven parameters specifying energy, linear momentum, angular momentum, location at a specified time and electric charge. This is stated by the black hole uniqueness theorems: "black holes have no hair", that is, no distinguishing marks like the hairstyles of humans. Irrespective of the complexity of a gravitating object collapsing to form a black hole, the object that results (having emitted gravitational waves) is very simple.[136]

The ergosphere of a rotating black hole, which plays a key role when it comes to extracting energy from such a black hole

Even more remarkably, there is a general set of laws known as black hole mechanics, which is analogous to the laws of thermodynamics. For instance, by the second law of black hole mechanics, the area of the event horizon of a general black hole will never decrease with time, analogous to the entropy of a thermodynamic system. This limits the energy that can be extracted by classical means from a rotating black hole (e.g. by the Penrose process).[137] There is strong evidence that the laws of black hole mechanics are, in fact, a subset of the laws of thermodynamics, and that the black hole area is proportional to its entropy.[138] This leads to a modification of the original laws of black hole mechanics: for instance, as the second law of black hole mechanics becomes part of the second law of thermodynamics, it is possible for black hole area to decreaseas long as other processes ensure that, overall, entropy increases. As thermodynamical objects with non-zero temperature, black holes should emit thermal radiation. Semi-classical calculations indicate that indeed they do, with the surface gravity playing the role of temperature in Planck's law. This radiation is known as Hawking radiation (cf. the quantum theory section, below).[139] There are other types of horizons. In an expanding universe, an observer may find that some regions of the past cannot be observed ("particle horizon"), and some regions of the future cannot be influenced (event horizon).[140] Even in flat Minkowski space, when described by an accelerated observer (Rindler space), there will be horizons associated with a semi-classical radiation known as Unruh radiation.[141]

Singularities
Another generaland quite disturbingfeature of general relativity is the appearance of spacetime boundaries known as singularities. Spacetime can be explored by following up on timelike and lightlike geodesicsall possible ways that light and particles in free fall can travel. But some solutions of Einstein's equations have "ragged edges"regions known as spacetime singularities, where the paths of light and falling particles come to an abrupt end, and geometry becomes ill-defined. In the more interesting cases, these are "curvature singularities", where geometrical quantities characterizing spacetime curvature, such as the Ricci scalar, take on infinite values.[142] Well-known examples of spacetimes with future singularitieswhere worldlines endare the Schwarzschild solution, which describes a singularity inside an eternal static black hole,[143] or the Kerr solution with its ring-shaped singularity inside an eternal rotating black hole.[144] The FriedmannLematreRobertsonWalker solutions and other spacetimes describing universes have past singularities on which worldlines begin, namely Big Bang singularities, and some have future singularities (Big Crunch) as well.[145] Given that these examples are all highly symmetricand thus simplifiedit is tempting to conclude that the occurrence of singularities is an artifact of idealization.[146] The famous singularity theorems, proved using the methods of global geometry, say otherwise: singularities are a generic feature of general relativity, and unavoidable

General relativity once the collapse of an object with realistic matter properties has proceeded beyond a certain stage[147] and also at the beginning of a wide class of expanding universes.[148] However, the theorems say little about the properties of singularities, and much of current research is devoted to characterizing these entities' generic structure (hypothesized e.g. by the so-called BKL conjecture).[149] The cosmic censorship hypothesis states that all realistic future singularities (no perfect symmetries, matter with realistic properties) are safely hidden away behind a horizon, and thus invisible to all distant observers. While no formal proof yet exists, numerical simulations offer supporting evidence of its validity.[150]

99

Evolution equations
Each solution of Einstein's equation encompasses the whole history of a universe it is not just some snapshot of how things are, but a whole, possibly matter-filled, spacetime. It describes the state of matter and geometry everywhere and at every moment in that particular universe. Due to its general covariance, Einstein's theory is not sufficient by itself to determine the time evolution of the metric tensor. It must be combined with a coordinate condition, which is analogous to gauge fixing in other field theories.[151] To understand Einstein's equations as partial differential equations, it is helpful to formulate them in a way that describes the evolution of the universe over time. This is done in so-called "3+1" formulations, where spacetime is split into three space dimensions and one time dimension. The best-known example is the ADM formalism.[152] These decompositions show that the spacetime evolution equations of general relativity are well-behaved: solutions always exist, and are uniquely defined, once suitable initial conditions have been specified.[153] Such formulations of Einstein's field equations are the basis of numerical relativity.[154]

Global and quasi-local quantities

The notion of evolution equations is intimately tied in with another aspect of general relativistic physics. In Einstein's theory, it turns out to be impossible to find a general definition for a seemingly simple property such as a system's total mass (or energy). The main reason is that the gravitational fieldlike any physical fieldmust be ascribed a certain energy, but that it proves to be fundamentally impossible to localize that energy.[155] Nevertheless, there are possibilities to define a system's total mass, either using a hypothetical "infinitely distant observer" (ADM mass)[156] or suitable symmetries (Komar mass).[157] If one excludes from the system's total mass the energy being carried away to infinity by gravitational waves, the result is the so-called Bondi mass at null infinity.[158] Just as in classical physics, it can be shown that these masses are positive.[159] Corresponding global definitions exist for momentum and angular momentum.[160] There have also been a number of attempts to define quasi-local quantities, such as the mass of an isolated system formulated using only quantities defined within a finite region of space containing that system. The hope is to obtain a quantity useful for general statements about isolated systems, such as a more precise formulation of the hoop conjecture.[161]

Relationship with quantum theory

If general relativity is considered one of the two pillars of modern physics, quantum theory, the basis of understanding matter from elementary particles to solid state physics, is the other.[162] However, it is still an open question as to how the concepts of quantum theory can be reconciled with those of general relativity.

Quantum field theory in curved spacetime

Ordinary quantum field theories, which form the basis of modern elementary particle physics, are defined in flat Minkowski space, which is an excellent approximation when it comes to describing the behavior of microscopic particles in weak gravitational fields like those found on Earth.[163] In order to describe situations in which gravity is strong enough to influence (quantum) matter, yet not strong enough to require quantization itself, physicists have formulated quantum field theories in curved spacetime. These theories rely on classical general relativity to describe

General relativity a curved background spacetime, and define a generalized quantum field theory to describe the behavior of quantum matter within that spacetime.[164] Using this formalism, it can be shown that black holes emit a blackbody spectrum of particles known as Hawking radiation, leading to the possibility that they evaporate over time.[165] As briefly mentioned above, this radiation plays an important role for the thermodynamics of black holes.[166]

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Quantum gravity
The demand for consistency between a quantum description of matter and a geometric description of spacetime,[167] as well as the appearance of singularities (where curvature length scales become microscopic), indicate the need for a full theory of quantum gravity: for an adequate description of the interior of black holes, and of the very early universe, a theory is required in which gravity and the associated geometry of spacetime are described in the language of quantum physics.[168] Despite major efforts, no complete and consistent theory of quantum gravity is currently known, even though a number of promising candidates exist.[169] Attempts to generalize ordinary quantum field theories, used in elementary particle physics to describe fundamental interactions, so as to include gravity have led to serious problems. At low energies, this approach proves successful, in that it results in an acceptable effective (quantum) field theory of gravity.[170] At very high energies, however, the result are models devoid of all predictive power ("non-renormalizability").[171]

Projection of a CalabiYau manifold, one of the ways of compactifying the extra dimensions posited by string theory

One attempt to overcome these limitations is string theory, a quantum theory not of point particles, but of minute one-dimensional extended objects.[172] The theory promises to be a unified description of all particles and interactions, including gravity;[173] the price to pay is unusual features such as six extra dimensions of space in addition to the usual three.[174] In what is called the second superstring revolution, it was conjectured that both string theory and a unification of general relativity and supersymmetry known as supergravity[175] form part of a hypothesized eleven-dimensional model known as M-theory, which would constitute a uniquely defined and consistent theory of quantum gravity.[176] Another approach starts with the canonical quantization procedures of quantum theory. Using the initial-value-formulation of general relativity (cf. evolution equations above), the result is the WheelerdeWitt equation (an analogue of the Schrdinger equation) which, regrettably, turns out to be ill-defined.[177] However, with the

Simple spin network of the type used in loop quantum gravity

General relativity introduction of what are now known as Ashtekar variables,[178] this leads to a promising model known as loop quantum gravity. Space is represented by a web-like structure called a spin network, evolving over time in discrete steps.[179] Depending on which features of general relativity and quantum theory are accepted unchanged, and on what level changes are introduced,[180] there are numerous other attempts to arrive at a viable theory of quantum gravity, some examples being dynamical triangulations,[181] causal sets,[182] twistor models[183] or the path-integral based models of quantum cosmology.[184] All candidate theories still have major formal and conceptual problems to overcome. They also face the common problem that, as yet, there is no way to put quantum gravity predictions to experimental tests (and thus to decide between the candidates where their predictions vary), although there is hope for this to change as future data from cosmological observations and particle physics experiments becomes available.[185]

101

Current status
General relativity has emerged as a highly successful model of gravitation and cosmology, which has so far passed many unambiguous observational and experimental tests. However, there are strong indications the theory is incomplete.[186] The problem of quantum gravity and the question of the reality of spacetime singularities remain open.[187] Observational data that is taken as evidence for dark energy and dark matter could indicate the need for new physics.[188] Even taken as is, general relativity is rich with possibilities for further exploration. Mathematical relativists seek to understand the nature of singularities and the fundamental properties of Einstein's equations,[189] and increasingly powerful computer simulations (such as those describing merging black holes) are run.[190] The race for the first direct detection of gravitational waves continues,[191] in the hope of creating opportunities to test the theory's validity for much stronger gravitational fields than has been possible to date.[192] More than ninety years after its publication, general relativity remains a highly active area of research.[193]

Notes
[1] "Nobel Prize Biography" (http:/ / nobelprize. org/ nobel_prizes/ physics/ laureates/ 1921/ einstein-bio. html). Nobel Prize Biography. Nobel Prize. . Retrieved 25 February 2011. [2] Pais 1982, ch. 9 to 15, Janssen 2005; an up-to-date collection of current research, including reprints of many of the original articles, is Renn 2007; an accessible overview can be found in Renn 2005, pp.110ff. An early key article is Einstein 1907, cf. Pais 1982, ch. 9. The publication featuring the field equations is Einstein 1915, cf. Pais 1982, ch. 1115 [3] Schwarzschild 1916a, Schwarzschild 1916b and Reissner 1916 (later complemented in Nordstrm 1918) [4] Einstein 1917, cf. Pais 1982, ch. 15e [5] Hubble's original article is Hubble 1929; an accessible overview is given in Singh 2004, ch. 24 [6] As reported in Gamow 1970. Einstein's condemnation would prove to be premature, cf. the section Cosmology, below [7] Pais 1982, pp.253254 [8] Kennefick 2005, Kennefick 2007 [9] Pais 1982, ch. 16 [10] Thorne, Kip (2003). "Warping spacetime" (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=yLy4b61rfPwC). The future of theoretical physics and cosmology: celebrating Stephen Hawking's 60th birthday. Cambridge University Press. p.74. ISBN0-521-82081-2. ., Extract of page 74 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=yLy4b61rfPwC& pg=PA74) [11] Israel 1987, ch. 7.87.10, Thorne 1994, ch. 39 [12] Sections Orbital effects and the relativity of direction, Gravitational time dilation and frequency shift and Light deflection and gravitational time delay, and references therein [13] Section Cosmology and references therein; the historical development is in Overbye 1999 [14] The following exposition re-traces that of Ehlers 1973, sec. 1 [15] Arnold 1989, ch. 1 [16] Ehlers 1973, pp.5f [17] Will 1993, sec. 2.4, Will 2006, sec. 2 [18] Wheeler 1990, ch. 2 [19] Ehlers 1973, sec. 1.2, Havas 1964, Knzle 1972. The simple thought experiment in question was first described in Heckmann & Schcking 1959

General relativity
[20] Ehlers 1973, pp.10f [21] Good introductions are, in order of increasing presupposed knowledge of mathematics, Giulini 2005, Mermin 2005, and Rindler 1991; for accounts of precision experiments, cf. part IV of Ehlers & Lmmerzahl 2006 [22] An in-depth comparison between the two symmetry groups can be found in Giulini 2006a [23] Rindler 1991, sec. 22, Synge 1972, ch. 1 and 2 [24] Ehlers 1973, sec. 2.3 [25] Ehlers 1973, sec. 1.4, Schutz 1985, sec. 5.1 [26] Ehlers 1973, pp.17ff; a derivation can be found in Mermin 2005, ch. 12. For the experimental evidence, cf. the section Gravitational time dilation and frequency shift, below [27] Rindler 2001, sec. 1.13; for an elementary account, see Wheeler 1990, ch. 2; there are, however, some differences between the modern version and Einstein's original concept used in the historical derivation of general relativity, cf. Norton 1985 [28] Ehlers 1973, sec. 1.4 for the experimental evidence, see once more section Gravitational time dilation and frequency shift. Choosing a different connection with non-zero torsion leads to a modified theory known as EinsteinCartan theory [29] Ehlers 1973, p.16, Kenyon 1990, sec. 7.2, Weinberg 1972, sec. 2.8 [30] Ehlers 1973, pp.1922; for similar derivations, see sections 1 and 2 of ch. 7 in Weinberg 1972. The Einstein tensor is the only divergence-free tensor that is a function of the metric coefficients, their first and second derivatives at most, and allows the spacetime of special relativity as a solution in the absence of sources of gravity, cf. Lovelock 1972. The tensors on both side are of second rank, that is, they can each be thought of as 44 matrices, each of which contains ten independent terms; hence, the above represents ten coupled equations. The fact that, as a consequence of geometric relations known as Bianchi identities, the Einstein tensor satisfies a further four identities reduces these to six independent equations, e.g. Schutz 1985, sec. 8.3 [31] Kenyon 1990, sec. 7.4 [32] Brans & Dicke 1961, Weinberg 1972, sec. 3 in ch. 7, Goenner 2004, sec. 7.2, and Trautman 2006, respectively [33] Wald 1984, ch. 4, Weinberg 1972, ch. 7 or, in fact, any other textbook on general relativity [34] At least approximately, cf. Poisson 2004 [35] Wheeler 1990, [Link] [36] Wald 1984, sec. 4.4 [37] Wald 1984, sec. 4.1 [38] For the (conceptual and historical) difficulties in defining a general principle of relativity and separating it from the notion of general covariance, see Giulini 2006b [39] section 5 in ch. 12 of Weinberg 1972 [40] Introductory chapters of Stephani et al. 2003 [41] A review showing Einstein's equation in the broader context of other PDEs with physical significance is Geroch 1996 [42] For background information and a list of solutions, cf. Stephani et al. 2003; a more recent review can be found in MacCallum 2006 [43] Chandrasekhar 1983, ch. 3,5,6 [44] Narlikar 1993, ch. 4, sec. 3.3 [45] Brief descriptions of these and further interesting solutions can be found in Hawking & Ellis 1973, ch. 5 [46] Lehner 2002 [47] For instance Wald 1984, sec. 4.4 [48] Will 1993, sec. 4.1 and 4.2 [49] Will 2006, sec. 3.2, Will 1993, ch. 4 [50] Rindler 2001, pp.2426 vs. pp. 236237 and Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, pp.164172. Einstein derived these effects using the equivalence principle as early as 1907, cf. Einstein 1907 and the description in Pais 1982, pp.196198 [51] Rindler 2001, pp.2426; Misner, Thorne & Wheeler 1973, 38.5 [52] Pound-Rebka experiment, see Pound & Rebka 1959, Pound & Rebka 1960; Pound & Snider 1964; a list of further experiments is given in Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, table 4.1 on p. 186 [53] Greenstein, Oke & Shipman 1971; the most recent and most accurate Sirius B measurements are published in Barstow, Bond et al. 2005. [54] Starting with the Hafele-Keating experiment, Hafele & Keating 1972a and Hafele & Keating 1972b, and culminating in the Gravity Probe A experiment; an overview of experiments can be found in Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, table 4.1 on p. 186 [55] GPS is continually tested by comparing atomic clocks on the ground and aboard orbiting satellites; for an account of relativistic effects, see Ashby 2002 and Ashby 2003 [56] Stairs 2003 and Kramer 2004 [57] General overviews can be found in section 2.1. of Will 2006; Will 2003, pp. 3236; Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, sec. 4.2 [58] Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, pp.164172 [59] Cf. Kennefick 2005 for the classic early measurements by the Eddington expeditions; for an overview of more recent measurements, see Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, ch. 4.3. For the most precise direct modern observations using quasars, cf. Shapiro et al. 2004 [60] This is not an independent axiom; it can be derived from Einstein's equations and the Maxwell Lagrangian using a WKB approximation, cf. Ehlers 1973, sec. 5 [61] Blanchet 2006, sec. 1.3

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General relativity
[62] Rindler 2001, sec. 1.16; for the historical examples, Israel 1987, pp.202204; in fact, Einstein published one such derivation as Einstein 1907. Such calculations tacitly assume that the geometry of space is Euclidean, cf. Ehlers & Rindler 1997 [63] From the standpoint of Einstein's theory, these derivations take into account the effect of gravity on time, but not its consequences for the warping of space, cf. Rindler 2001, sec. 11.11 [64] For the Sun's gravitational field using radar signals reflected from planets such as Venus and Mercury, cf. Shapiro 1964, Weinberg 1972, ch. 8, sec. 7; for signals actively sent back by space probes (transponder measurements), cf. Bertotti, Iess & Tortora 2003; for an overview, see Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, table 4.4 on p. 200; for more recent measurements using signals received from a pulsar that is part of a binary system, the gravitational field causing the time delay being that of the other pulsar, cf. Stairs 2003, sec. 4.4 [65] Will 1993, sec. 7.1 and 7.2 [66] These have been indirectly observed through the loss of energy in binary pulsar systems such as the HulseTaylor binary, the subject of the 1993 Nobel Prize in physics. A number of projects are underway to attempt to observe directly the effects of gravitational waves. For an overview, see Misner, Thorne & Wheeler 1973, part VIII. Unlike electromagnetic waves, the dominant contribution for gravitational waves is not the dipole, but the quadrupole; see Schutz 2001 [67] Most advanced textbooks on general relativity contain a description of these properties, e.g. Schutz 1985, ch. 9 [68] For example Jaranowski & Krlak 2005 [69] Rindler 2001, ch. 13 [70] Gowdy 1971, Gowdy 1974 [71] See Lehner 2002 for a brief introduction to the methods of numerical relativity, and Seidel 1998 for the connection with gravitational wave astronomy [72] Schutz 2003, pp.4849, Pais 1982, pp.253254 [73] Rindler 2001, sec. 11.9 [74] Will 1993, pp.177181 [75] In consequence, in the parameterized post-Newtonian formalism (PPN), measurements of this effect determine a linear combination of the terms and , cf. Will 2006, sec. 3.5 and Will 1993, sec. 7.3 [76] The most precise measurements are VLBI measurements of planetary positions; see Will 1993, ch. 5, Will 2006, sec. 3.5, Anderson et al. 1992; for an overview, Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, pp.406407 [77] Kramer et al. 2006 [78] A figure that includes error bars is fig. 7 in Will 2006, sec. 5.1 [79] Stairs 2003, Schutz 2003, pp.317321, Bartusiak 2000, pp.7086 [80] Weisberg & Taylor 2003; for the pulsar discovery, see Hulse & Taylor 1975; for the initial evidence for gravitational radiation, see Taylor 1994 [81] Kramer 2004 [82] Penrose 2004, 14.5, Misner, Thorne & Wheeler 1973, 11.4 [83] Weinberg 1972, sec. 9.6, Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, sec. 7.8 [84] Bertotti, Ciufolini & Bender 1987, Nordtvedt 2003 [85] Kahn 2007 [86] A mission description can be found in Everitt et al. 2001; a first post-flight evaluation is given in Everitt, Parkinson & Kahn 2007; further updates will be available on the mission website Kahn 19962012. [87] Townsend 1997, sec. 4.2.1, Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, pp.469471 [88] Ohanian & Ruffini 1994, sec. 4.7, Weinberg 1972, sec. 9.7; for a more recent review, see Schfer 2004 [89] Ciufolini & Pavlis 2004, Ciufolini, Pavlis & Peron 2006, Iorio 2009 [90] Iorio L. (August 2006), "COMMENTS, REPLIES AND NOTES: A note on the evidence of the gravitomagnetic field of Mars", Classical Quantum Gravity 23 (17): 54515454, arXiv:gr-qc/0606092, Bibcode2006CQGra..23.5451I, doi:10.1088/0264-9381/23/17/N01 [91] Iorio L. (June 2010), "On the LenseThirring test with the Mars Global Surveyor in the gravitational field of Mars", Central European Journal of Physics 8 (3): 509513, arXiv:gr-qc/0701146, Bibcode2010CEJPh...8..509I, doi:10.2478/s11534-009-0117-6 [92] For overviews of gravitational lensing and its applications, see Ehlers, Falco & Schneider 1992 and Wambsganss 1998 [93] For a simple derivation, see Schutz 2003, ch. 23; cf. Narayan & Bartelmann 1997, sec. 3 [94] Walsh, Carswell & Weymann 1979 [95] Images of all the known lenses can be found on the pages of the CASTLES project, Kochanek et al. 2007 [96] Roulet & Mollerach 1997 [97] Narayan & Bartelmann 1997, sec. 3.7 [98] Barish 2005, Bartusiak 2000, Blair & McNamara 1997 [99] Hough & Rowan 2000 [100] Hobbs, George. "The international pulsar timing array project: using pulsars as a gravitational wave detector". arXiv:0911.5206. [101] Danzmann & Rdiger 2003 [102] "LISA pathfinder overview" (http:/ / www. esa. int/ esaSC/ 120397_index_0_m. html). ESA. . Retrieved 2012-04-23. [103] Thorne 1995 [104] Cutler & Thorne 2002 [105] Miller 2002, lectures 19 and 21

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[106] Celotti, Miller & Sciama 1999, sec. 3 [107] Springel et al. 2005 and the accompanying summary Gnedin 2005 [108] Blandford 1987, sec. 8.2.4 [109] For the basic mechanism, see Carroll & Ostlie 1996, sec. 17.2; for more about the different types of astronomical objects associated with this, cf. Robson 1996 [110] For a review, see Begelman, Blandford & Rees 1984. To a distant observer, some of these jets even appear to move faster than light; this, however, can be explained as an optical illusion that does not violate the tenets of relativity, see Rees 1966 [111] For stellar end states, cf. Oppenheimer & Snyder 1939 or, for more recent numerical work, Font 2003, sec. 4.1; for supernovae, there are still major problems to be solved, cf. Buras et al. 2003; for simulating accretion and the formation of jets, cf. Font 2003, sec. 4.2. Also, relativistic lensing effects are thought to play a role for the signals received from X-ray pulsars, cf. Kraus 1998 [112] The evidence includes limits on compactness from the observation of accretion-driven phenomena ("Eddington luminosity"), see Celotti, Miller & Sciama 1999, observations of stellar dynamics in the center of our own Milky Way galaxy, cf. Schdel et al. 2003, and indications that at least some of the compact objects in question appear to have no solid surface, which can be deduced from the examination of X-ray bursts for which the central compact object is either a neutron star or a black hole; cf. Remillard et al. 2006 for an overview, Narayan 2006, sec. 5. Observations of the "shadow" of the Milky Way galaxy's central black hole horizon are eagerly sought for, cf. Falcke, Melia & Agol 2000 [113] Dalal et al. 2006 [114] Barack & Cutler 2004 [115] Originally Einstein 1917; cf. Pais 1982, pp.285288 [116] Carroll 2001, ch. 2 [117] Bergstrm & Goobar 2003, ch. 911; use of these models is justified by the fact that, at large scales of around hundred million light-years and more, our own universe indeed appears to be isotropic and homogeneous, cf. Peebles et al. 1991 [118] E.g. with WMAP data, see Spergel et al. 2003 [119] These tests involve the separate observations detailed further on, see, e.g., fig. 2 in Bridle et al. 2003 [120] Peebles 1966; for a recent account of predictions, see Coc, VangioniFlam et al. 2004; an accessible account can be found in Weiss 2006; compare with the observations in Olive & Skillman 2004, Bania, Rood & Balser 2002, O'Meara et al. 2001, and Charbonnel & Primas 2005 [121] Lahav & Suto 2004, Bertschinger 1998, Springel et al. 2005 [122] Alpher & Herman 1948, for a pedagogical introduction, see Bergstrm & Goobar 2003, ch. 11; for the initial detection, see Penzias & Wilson 1965 and, for precision measurements by satellite observatories, Mather et al. 1994 (COBE) and Bennett et al. 2003 (WMAP). Future measurements could also reveal evidence about gravitational waves in the early universe; this additional information is contained in the background radiation's polarization, cf. Kamionkowski, Kosowsky & Stebbins 1997 and Seljak & Zaldarriaga 1997 [123] Evidence for this comes from the determination of cosmological parameters and additional observations involving the dynamics of galaxies and galaxy clusters cf. Peebles 1993, ch. 18, evidence from gravitational lensing, cf. Peacock 1999, sec. 4.6, and simulations of large-scale structure formation, see Springel et al. 2005 [124] Peacock 1999, ch. 12, Peskin 2007; in particular, observations indicate that all but a negligible portion of that matter is not in the form of the usual elementary particles ("non-baryonic matter"), cf. Peacock 1999, ch. 12 [125] Namely, some physicists have questioned whether or not the evidence for dark matter is, in fact, evidence for deviations from the Einsteinian (and the Newtonian) description of gravity cf. the overview in Mannheim 2006, sec. 9 [126] Carroll 2001; an accessible overview is given in Caldwell 2004. Here, too, scientists have argued that the evidence indicates not a new form of energy, but the need for modifications in our cosmological models, cf. Mannheim 2006, sec. 10; aforementioned modifications need not be modifications of general relativity, they could, for example, be modifications in the way we treat the inhomogeneities in the universe, cf. Buchert 2007 [127] A good introduction is Linde 1990; for a more recent review, see Linde 2005 [128] More precisely, these are the flatness problem, the horizon problem, and the monopole problem; a pedagogical introduction can be found in Narlikar 1993, sec. 6.4, see also Brner 1993, sec. 9.1 [129] Spergel et al. 2007, sec. 5,6 [130] More concretely, the potential function that is crucial to determining the dynamics of the inflaton is simply postulated, but not derived from an underlying physical theory [131] Brandenberger 2007, sec. 2 [132] Frauendiener 2004, Wald 1984, sec. 11.1, Hawking & Ellis 1973, sec. 6.8, 6.9 [133] Wald 1984, sec. 9.29.4 and Hawking & Ellis 1973, ch. 6 [134] Thorne 1972; for more recent numerical studies, see Berger 2002, sec. 2.1 [135] Israel 1987. A more exact mathematical description distinguishes several kinds of horizon, notably event horizons and apparent horizons cf. Hawking & Ellis 1973, pp.312320 or Wald 1984, sec. 12.2; there are also more intuitive definitions for isolated systems that do not require knowledge of spacetime properties at infinity, cf. Ashtekar & Krishnan 2004 [136] For first steps, cf. Israel 1971; see Hawking & Ellis 1973, sec. 9.3 or Heusler 1996, ch. 9 and 10 for a derivation, and Heusler 1998 as well as Beig & Chruciel 2006 as overviews of more recent results [137] The laws of black hole mechanics were first described in Bardeen, Carter & Hawking 1973; a more pedagogical presentation can be found in Carter 1979; for a more recent review, see Wald 2001, ch. 2. A thorough, book-length introduction including an introduction to the

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necessary mathematics Poisson 2004. For the Penrose process, see Penrose 1969 [138] Bekenstein 1973, Bekenstein 1974 [139] The fact that black holes radiate, quantum mechanically, was first derived in Hawking 1975; a more thorough derivation can be found in Wald 1975. A review is given in Wald 2001, ch. 3 [140] Narlikar 1993, sec. 4.4.4, 4.4.5 [141] Horizons: cf. Rindler 2001, sec. 12.4. Unruh effect: Unruh 1976, cf. Wald 2001, ch. 3 [142] Hawking & Ellis 1973, sec. 8.1, Wald 1984, sec. 9.1 [143] Townsend 1997, ch. 2; a more extensive treatment of this solution can be found in Chandrasekhar 1983, ch. 3 [144] Townsend 1997, ch. 4; for a more extensive treatment, cf. Chandrasekhar 1983, ch. 6 [145] Ellis & van Elst 1999; a closer look at the singularity itself is taken in Brner 1993, sec. 1.2 [146] Here one should remind to the well-known fact that the important "quasi-optical" singularities of the so-called eikonal approximations of many wave-equations, namely the "caustics", are resolved into finite peaks beyond that approximation. [147] Namely when there are trapped null surfaces, cf. Penrose 1965 [148] Hawking 1966 [149] The conjecture was made in Belinskii, Khalatnikov & Lifschitz 1971; for a more recent review, see Berger 2002. An accessible exposition is given by Garfinkle 2007 [150] The restriction to future singularities naturally excludes initial singularities such as the big bang singularity, which in principle be visible to observers at later cosmic time. The cosmic censorship conjecture was first presented in Penrose 1969; a textbook-level account is given in Wald 1984, pp.302305. For numerical results, see the review Berger 2002, sec. 2.1 [151] Hawking & Ellis 1973, sec. 7.1 [152] Arnowitt, Deser & Misner 1962; for a pedagogical introduction, see Misner, Thorne & Wheeler 1973, 21.421.7 [153] Fours-Bruhat 1952 and Bruhat 1962; for a pedagogical introduction, see Wald 1984, ch. 10; an online review can be found in Reula 1998 [154] Gourgoulhon 2007; for a review of the basics of numerical relativity, including the problems arising from the peculiarities of Einstein's equations, see Lehner 2001 [155] Misner, Thorne & Wheeler 1973, 20.4 [156] Arnowitt, Deser & Misner 1962 [157] Komar 1959; for a pedagogical introduction, see Wald 1984, sec. 11.2; although defined in a totally different way, it can be shown to be equivalent to the ADM mass for stationary spacetimes, cf. Ashtekar & Magnon-Ashtekar 1979 [158] For a pedagogical introduction, see Wald 1984, sec. 11.2 [159] Wald 1984, p.295 and refs therein; this is important for questions of stabilityif there were negative mass states, then flat, empty Minkowski space, which has mass zero, could evolve into these states [160] Townsend 1997, ch. 5 [161] Such quasi-local massenergy definitions are the Hawking energy, Geroch energy, or Penrose's quasi-local energymomentum based on twistor methods; cf. the review article Szabados 2004 [162] An overview of quantum theory can be found in standard textbooks such as Messiah 1999; a more elementary account is given in Hey & Walters 2003 [163] Ramond 1990, Weinberg 1995, Peskin & Schroeder 1995; a more accessible overview is Auyang 1995 [164] Wald 1994, Birrell & Davies 1984 [165] For Hawking radiation Hawking 1975, Wald 1975; an accessible introduction to black hole evaporation can be found in Traschen 2000 [166] Wald 2001, ch. 3 [167] Put simply, matter is the source of spacetime curvature, and once matter has quantum properties, we can expect spacetime to have them as well. Cf. Carlip 2001, sec. 2 [168] Schutz 2003, p.407 [169] A timeline and overview can be found in Rovelli 2000 [170] Donoghue 1995 [171] In particular, a technique known as renormalization, an integral part of deriving predictions which take into account higher-energy contributions, cf. Weinberg 1996, ch. 17, 18, fails in this case; cf. Goroff & Sagnotti 1985 [172] An accessible introduction at the undergraduate level can be found in Zwiebach 2004; more complete overviews can be found in Polchinski 1998a and Polchinski 1998b [173] At the energies reached in current experiments, these strings are indistinguishable from point-like particles, but, crucially, different modes of oscillation of one and the same type of fundamental string appear as particles with different (electric and other) charges, e.g. Ibanez 2000. The theory is successful in that one mode will always correspond to a graviton, the messenger particle of gravity, e.g. Green, Schwarz & Witten 1987, sec. 2.3, 5.3 [174] Green, Schwarz & Witten 1987, sec. 4.2 [175] Weinberg 2000, ch. 31 [176] Townsend 1996, Duff 1996 [177] Kucha 1973, sec. 3 [178] These variables represent geometric gravity using mathematical analogues of electric and magnetic fields; cf. Ashtekar 1986, Ashtekar 1987

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[179] For a review, see Thiemann 2006; more extensive accounts can be found in Rovelli 1998, Ashtekar & Lewandowski 2004 as well as in the lecture notes Thiemann 2003 [180] Isham 1994, Sorkin 1997 [181] Loll 1998 [182] Sorkin 2005 [183] Penrose 2004, ch. 33 and refs therein [184] Hawking 1987 [185] Ashtekar 2007, Schwarz 2007 [186] Maddox 1998, pp.5259, 98122; Penrose 2004, sec. 34.1, ch. 30 [187] section Quantum gravity, above [188] section Cosmology, above [189] Friedrich 2005 [190] A review of the various problems and the techniques being developed to overcome them, see Lehner 2002 [191] See Bartusiak 2000 for an account up to that year; up-to-date news can be found on the websites of major detector collaborations such as GEO 600 (http:/ / geo600. aei. mpg. de) and LIGO (http:/ / www. ligo. caltech. edu/ ) [192] For the most recent papers on gravitational wave polarizations of inspiralling compact binaries, see Blanchet et al. 2008, and Arun et al. 2007; for a review of work on compact binaries, see Blanchet 2006 and Futamase & Itoh 2006; for a general review of experimental tests of general relativity, see Will 2006 [193] See, e.g., the electronic review journal Living Reviews in Relativity (http:/ / relativity. livingreviews. org)

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General relativity Wald, Robert M. (1994), Quantum field theory in curved spacetime and black hole thermodynamics, University of Chicago Press, ISBN0-226-87027-8 Wald, Robert M. (2001), "The Thermodynamics of Black Holes" ([Link] Living Rev. Relativity 4, retrieved 2007-08-08 Walsh, D.; Carswell, R. F.; Weymann, R. J. (1979), "0957 + 561 A, B: twin quasistellar objects or gravitational lens?", Nature 279 (5712): 381, Bibcode1979Natur.279..381W, doi:10.1038/279381a0, PMID16068158 Wambsganss, Joachim (1998), "Gravitational Lensing in Astronomy" ([Link] lrr-1998-12), Living Rev. Relativity 1, retrieved 2007-07-20 Weinberg, Steven (1972), Gravitation and Cosmology, John Wiley, ISBN0-471-92567-5 Weinberg, Steven (1995), The Quantum Theory of Fields I: Foundations, Cambridge University Press, ISBN0-521-55001-7 Weinberg, Steven (1996), The Quantum Theory of Fields II: Modern Applications, Cambridge University Press, ISBN0-521-55002-5 Weinberg, Steven (2000), The Quantum Theory of Fields III: Supersymmetry, Cambridge University Press, ISBN0-521-66000-9 Weisberg, Joel M.; Taylor, Joseph H. (2003), "The Relativistic Binary Pulsar B1913+16"", in Bailes, M.; Nice, D. J.; Thorsett, S. E., Proceedings of "Radio Pulsars," Chania, Crete, August, 2002, ASP Conference Series Weiss, Achim (2006), "Elements of the past: Big Bang Nucleosynthesis and observation" ([Link] [Link]/en/spotlights/BBN_obs/[Link]), Einstein Online ([Link] (Max Planck Institute for Gravitational Physics), retrieved 2007-02-24 Wheeler, John A. (1990), A Journey Into Gravity and Spacetime, Scientific American Library, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, ISBN0-7167-6034-7 Will, Clifford M. (1993), Theory and experiment in gravitational physics, Cambridge University Press, ISBN0-521-43973-6 Will, Clifford M. (2006), "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment" ([Link] [Link]/lrr-2006-3), Living Rev. Relativity, retrieved 2007-06-12 Zwiebach, Barton (2004), A First Course in String Theory, Cambridge University Press, ISBN0-521-83143-1

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Further reading
Popular books Geroch, R (1981), General Relativity from A to B, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ISBN0-226-28864-1 Lieber, Lillian (2008), The Einstein Theory of Relativity: A Trip to the Fourth Dimension, Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, Inc., ISBN978-1-58988-044-3 Wald, Robert M. (1992), Space, Time, and Gravity: the Theory of the Big Bang and Black Holes, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ISBN0-226-87029-4 Wheeler, John; Ford, Kenneth (1998), Geons, Black Holes, & Quantum Foam: a life in physics, New York: W. W. Norton, ISBN0-393- 31991-1 Beginning undergraduate textbooks Callahan, James J. (2000), The Geometry of Spacetime: an Introduction to Special and General Relativity, New York: Springer, ISBN0-387-98641-3 Taylor, Edwin F.; Wheeler, John Archibald (2000), Exploring Black Holes: Introduction to General Relativity, Addison Wesley, ISBN0-201-38423-X Advanced undergraduate textbooks B. F. Schutz (2009), A First Course in General Relativity (Second Edition), Cambridge University Press, ISBN978-0-521-88705-2

General relativity Cheng, Ta-Pei (2005), Relativity, Gravitation and Cosmology: a Basic Introduction, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, ISBN0-19-852957-0 Gron, O.; Hervik, S. (2007), Einstein's General theory of Relativity, Springer, ISBN978-0-387-69199-2 Hartle, James B. (2003), Gravity: an Introduction to Einstein's General Relativity, San Francisco: Addison-Wesley, ISBN0-8053-8662-9 Hughston, L. P. & Tod, K. P. (1991), Introduction to General Relativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN0-521-33943-X d'Inverno, Ray (1992), Introducing Einstein's Relativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN0-19-859686-3 Graduate-level textbooks Carroll, Sean M. (2004), Spacetime and Geometry: An Introduction to General Relativity (http:// [Link]/), San Francisco: Addison-Wesley, ISBN0-8053-8732-3 Grn, yvind; Hervik, Sigbjrn (2007), Einstein's General Theory of Relativity, New York: Springer, ISBN978-0-387-69199-2 Landau, Lev D.; Lifshitz, Evgeny F. (1980), The Classical Theory of Fields (4th ed.), London: Butterworth-Heinemann, ISBN0-7506-2768-9 Misner, Charles W.; Thorne, Kip. S.; Wheeler, John A. (1973), Gravitation, W. H. Freeman, ISBN0-7167-0344-0 Stephani, Hans (1990), General Relativity: An Introduction to the Theory of the Gravitational Field,, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN0-521-37941-5 Wald, Robert M. (1984), General Relativity, University of Chicago Press, ISBN0-226-87033-2

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External links
Relativity: The special and general theory ([Link] ( PDF (http:// [Link]/pdf/[Link])) Einstein Online ([Link] Articles on a variety of aspects of relativistic physics for a general audience; hosted by the Max Planck Institute for Gravitational Physics NCSA Spacetime Wrinkles ([Link] produced by the numerical relativity group at the NCSA, with an elementary introduction to general relativity Courses/Lectures/Tutorials Einstein's General Theory of Relativity ([Link] list=EC6C8BDEEBA6BDC78D) by Leonard Susskind's Modern Physics lectures. Recorded September 22, 2008 at Stanford University Series of lectures on General Relativity ([Link] given in 2006 at the Institut Henri Poincar (introductory courses and advanced ones). General Relativity Tutorials ([Link] by John Baez Brown, Kevin. "Reflections on relativity" ([Link] [Link]. Retrieved May 29, 2005. Carroll, Sean M.. "Lecture Notes on General Relativity" ([Link] Retrieved November 26, 2006. Moor, Rafi. "Understanding General Relativity" ([Link] Retrieved July 11, 2006. Waner, Stefan. "Introduction to Differential Geometry and General Relativity" ([Link] faculty/Stefan_Waner/RealWorld/pdfs/[Link]) (PDF). Retrieved 2006-01-31.

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Hilbert's program
In mathematics, Hilbert's program, formulated by German mathematician David Hilbert, was a proposed solution to the foundational crisis of mathematics, when early attempts to clarify the foundations of mathematics were found to suffer from paradoxes and inconsistencies. As a solution, Hilbert proposed to ground all existing theories to a finite, complete set of axioms, and provide a proof that these axioms were consistent. Hilbert proposed that the consistency of more complicated systems, such as real analysis, could be proven in terms of simpler systems. Ultimately, the consistency of all of mathematics could be reduced to basic arithmetic. However, some argue that Gdel's incompleteness theorems showed in 1931 that Hilbert's program was unattainable. In his first theorem, Gdel showed that any consistent system with a computable set of axioms which is capable of expressing arithmetic can never be complete: it is possible to construct a statement that can be shown to be true, but that cannot be derived from the formal rules of the system. In his second theorem, he showed that such a system could not prove its own consistency, so it certainly cannot be used to prove the consistency of anything stronger. This refuted Hilbert's assumption that a finitistic system could be used to prove the consistency of a stronger theory.

Statement of Hilbert's program

The main goal of Hilbert's program was to provide secure foundations for all mathematics. In particular this should include: A formalization of all mathematics; in other words all mathematical statements should be written in a precise formal language, and manipulated according to well defined rules. Completeness: a proof that all true mathematical statements can be proved in the formalism. Consistency: a proof that no contradiction can be obtained in the formalism of mathematics. This consistency proof should preferably use only "finitistic" reasoning about finite mathematical objects. Conservation: a proof that any result about "real objects" obtained using reasoning about "ideal objects" (such as uncountable sets) can be proved without using ideal objects. Decidability: there should be an algorithm for deciding the truth or falsity of any mathematical statement.

Gdel's incompleteness theorems

Kurt Gdel showed that most of the goals of Hilbert's program were impossible to achieve, at least if interpreted in the most obvious way. His second incompleteness theorem stated that any consistent theory powerful enough to encode addition and multiplication of integers cannot prove its own consistency. This wipes out most of Hilbert's program as follows: It is not possible to formalize all of mathematics, as any attempt at such a formalism will omit some true mathematical statements. An easy consequence of Gdel's incompleteness theorem is that there is no complete consistent extension of even Peano arithmetic with a recursively enumerable set of axioms, so in particular most interesting mathematical theories are not complete. A theory such as Peano arithmetic cannot even prove its own consistency, so a restricted "finitistic" subset of it certainly cannot prove the consistency of more powerful theories such as set theory. There is no algorithm to decide the truth (or provability) of statements in any consistent extension of Peano arithmetic. (Strictly speaking this result only appeared a few years after Gdel's theorem, because at the time the notion of an algorithm had not been precisely defined.)

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Hilbert's program after Gdel

Many current lines of research in mathematical logic, proof theory and reverse mathematics can be viewed as natural continuations of Hilbert's original program. Much of it can be salvaged by changing its goals slightly (Zach 2005), and with the following modifications some of it was successfully completed: Although it is not possible to formalize all mathematics, it is possible to formalize essentially all the mathematics that anyone uses. In particular ZermeloFraenkel set theory, combined with first-order logic, gives a satisfactory and generally accepted formalism for essentially all current mathematics. Although it is not possible to prove completeness for systems at least as powerful as Peano arithmetic (at least if they have a computable set of axioms), it is possible to prove forms of completeness for many interesting systems. The first big success was by Gdel himself (before he proved the incompleteness theorems) who proved the completeness theorem for first-order logic, showing that any logical consequence of a series of axioms is provable. An example of a non-trivial theory for which completeness has been proved is the theory of algebraically closed fields of given characteristic. The question of whether there are finitary consistency proofs of strong theories is difficult to answer, mainly because there is no generally accepted definition of a "finitary proof". Most mathematicians in proof theory seem to regard finitary mathematics as being contained in Peano arithmetic, and in this case it is not possible to give finitary proofs of reasonably strong theories. On the other hand Gdel himself suggested the possibility of giving finitary consistency proofs using finitary methods that cannot be formalized in Peano arithmetic, so he seems to have had a more liberal view of what finitary methods might be allowed. A few years later, Gentzen gave a consistency proof for Peano arithmetic. The only part of this proof that was not clearly finitary was a certain transfinite induction up to the ordinal 0. If this transfinite induction is accepted as a finitary method, then one can assert that there is a finitary proof of the consistency of Peano arithmetic. More powerful subsets of second order arithmetic have been given consistency proofs by Gaisi Takeuti and others, and one can again debate about exactly how finitary or constructive these proofs are. (The theories that have been proved consistent by these methods are quite strong, and include most "ordinary" mathematics.) Although there is no algorithm for deciding the truth of statements in Peano arithmetic, there are many interesting and non-trivial theories for which such algorithms have been found. For example, Tarski found an algorithm that can decide the truth of any statement in analytic geometry (more precisely, he proved that the theory of real closed fields is decidable). Given the CantorDedekind axiom, this algorithm can be regarded as an algorithm to decide the truth of any statement in Euclidean geometry. This is substantial as few people would consider Euclidean geometry a trivial theory.

References
G. Gentzen, 1936/1969. Die Widerspruchfreiheit der reinen Zahlentheorie. Mathematische Annalen 112:493565. Translated as 'The consistency of arithmetic', in The collected papers of Gerhard Gentzen, M. E. Szabo (ed.), 1969. D. Hilbert. 'Die Grundlagen Der Elementaren Zahlentheorie'. Mathematische Annalen 104:48594. Translated by W. Ewald as 'The Grounding of Elementary Number Theory', pp.266273 in Mancosu (ed., 1998) From Brouwer to Hilbert: The debate on the foundations of mathematics in the 1920s, Oxford University Press. New York. S.G. Simpson, 1988. Partial realizations of Hilbert's program [1]. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53:349363. R. Zach, 2005. Hilbert's Program Then and Now [2]. Manuscript, arXiv:math/0508572v1.

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External links
Entry on Hilbert's program [3] at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

References
[1] http:/ / www. math. psu. edu/ simpson/ papers/ hilbert/ hilbert. html [2] http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ math/ 0508572 [3] http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ hilbert-program/

Gdel's incompleteness theorems

Gdel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems capable of doing arithmetic. The theorems, proven by Kurt Gdel in 1931, are important both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics. The two results are widely, but not universally, interpreted as showing that Hilbert's program to find a complete and consistent set of axioms for all mathematics is impossible, giving a negative answer to Hilbert's second problem. The first incompleteness theorem states that no consistent system of axioms whose theorems can be listed by an "effective procedure" (e.g., a computer program, but it could be any sort of algorithm) is capable of proving all truths about the relations of the natural numbers (arithmetic). For any such system, there will always be statements about the natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system. The second incompleteness theorem, an extension of the first, shows that such a system cannot demonstrate its own consistency.

Background
Because statements of a formal theory are written in symbolic form, it is possible to mechanically verify that a formal proof from a finite set of axioms is valid. This task, known as automatic proof verification, is closely related to automated theorem proving. The difference is that instead of constructing a new proof, the proof verifier simply checks that a provided formal proof (or, in instructions that can be followed to create a formal proof) is correct. This process is not merely hypothetical; systems such as Isabelle or Coq are used today to formalize proofs and then check their validity. Many theories of interest include an infinite set of axioms, however. To verify a formal proof when the set of axioms is infinite, it must be possible to determine whether a statement that is claimed to be an axiom is actually an axiom. This issue arises in first order theories of arithmetic, such as Peano arithmetic, because the principle of mathematical induction is expressed as an infinite set of axioms (an axiom schema). A formal theory is said to be effectively generated if its set of axioms is a recursively enumerable set. This means that there is a computer program that, in principle, could enumerate all the axioms of the theory without listing any statements that are not axioms. This is equivalent to the existence of a program that enumerates all the theorems of the theory without enumerating any statements that are not theorems. Examples of effectively generated theories with infinite sets of axioms include Peano arithmetic and ZermeloFraenkel set theory. In choosing a set of axioms, one goal is to be able to prove as many correct results as possible, without proving any incorrect results. A set of axioms is complete if, for any statement in the axioms' language, either that statement or its negation is provable from the axioms. A set of axioms is (simply) consistent if there is no statement such that both the statement and its negation are provable from the axioms. In the standard system of first-order logic, an inconsistent set of axioms will prove every statement in its language (this is sometimes called the principle of explosion), and is thus automatically complete. A set of axioms that is both complete and consistent, however, proves a maximal set of non-contradictory theorems. Gdel's incompleteness theorems show that in certain cases it is not possible to obtain an effectively generated, complete, consistent theory.

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First incompleteness theorem

Gdel's first incompleteness theorem first appeared as "Theorem VI" in Gdel's 1931 paper On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I. The formal theorem is written in highly technical language. The broadly accepted natural language statement of the theorem is: Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true,[1] but not provable in the theory (Kleene 1967, p.250). The true but unprovable statement referred to by the theorem is often referred to as "the Gdel sentence" for the theory. The proof constructs a specific Gdel sentence for each effectively generated theory, but there are infinitely many statements in the language of the theory that share the property of being true but unprovable. For example, the conjunction of the Gdel sentence and any logically valid sentence will have this property. For each consistent formal theory T having the required small amount of number theory, the corresponding Gdel sentence G asserts: "G cannot be proved within the theoryT". This interpretation of G leads to the following informal analysis. If G were provable under the axioms and rules of inference of T, then T would have a theorem, G, which effectively contradicts itself, and thus the theory T would be inconsistent. This means that if the theory T is consistent then G cannot be proved within it, and so the theory T is incomplete. Moreover, the claim G makes about its own unprovability is correct. In this sense G is not only unprovable but true, and provability-within-the-theory-T is not the same as truth. This informal analysis can be formalized to make a rigorous proof of the incompleteness theorem, as described in the section "Proof sketch for the first theorem" below. The formal proof reveals exactly the hypotheses required for the theory T in order for the self-contradictory nature of G to lead to a genuine contradiction. Each effectively generated theory has its own Gdel statement. It is possible to define a larger theory T that contains the whole of T, plus G as an additional axiom. This will not result in a complete theory, because Gdel's theorem will also apply to T, and thus T cannot be complete. In this case, G is indeed a theorem in T, because it is an axiom. Since G states only that it is not provable in T, no contradiction is presented by its provability in T. However, because the incompleteness theorem applies to T: there will be a new Gdel statement G for T, showing that T is also incomplete. G will differ from G in that G will refer to T, rather thanT. To prove the first incompleteness theorem, Gdel represented statements by numbers. Then the theory at hand, which is assumed to prove certain facts about numbers, also proves facts about its own statements, provided that it is effectively generated. Questions about the provability of statements are represented as questions about the properties of numbers, which would be decidable by the theory if it were complete. In these terms, the Gdel sentence states that no natural number exists with a certain, strange property. A number with this property would encode a proof of the inconsistency of the theory. If there were such a number then the theory would be inconsistent, contrary to the consistency hypothesis. So, under the assumption that the theory is consistent, there is no such number.

Meaning of the first incompleteness theorem

Gdel's first incompleteness theorem shows that any consistent effective formal system that includes enough of the theory of the natural numbers is incomplete: there are true statements expressible in its language that are unprovable. Thus no formal system (satisfying the hypotheses of the theorem) that aims to characterize the natural numbers can actually do so, as there will be true number-theoretical statements which that system cannot prove. This fact is sometimes thought to have severe consequences for the program of logicism proposed by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, which aimed to define the natural numbers in terms of logic (Hellman 1981, p.451468). Bob Hale and Crispin Wright argue that it is not a problem for logicism because the incompleteness theorems apply equally to second order logic as they do to arithmetic. They argue that only those who believe that the natural

Gdel's incompleteness theorems numbers are to be defined in terms of first order logic have this problem. The existence of an incomplete formal system is, in itself, not particularly surprising. A system may be incomplete simply because not all the necessary axioms have been discovered. For example, Euclidean geometry without the parallel postulate is incomplete; it is not possible to prove or disprove the parallel postulate from the remaining axioms. Gdel's theorem shows that, in theories that include a small portion of number theory, a complete and consistent finite list of axioms can never be created, nor even an infinite list that can be enumerated by a computer program. Each time a new statement is added as an axiom, there are other true statements that still cannot be proved, even with the new axiom. If an axiom is ever added that makes the system complete, it does so at the cost of making the system inconsistent. There are complete and consistent lists of axioms for arithmetic that cannot be enumerated by a computer program. For example, one might take all true statements about the natural numbers to be axioms (and no false statements), which gives the theory known as "true arithmetic". The difficulty is that there is no mechanical way to decide, given a statement about the natural numbers, whether it is an axiom of this theory, and thus there is no effective way to verify a formal proof in this theory. Many logicians believe that Gdel's incompleteness theorems struck a fatal blow to David Hilbert's second problem, which asked for a finitary consistency proof for mathematics. The second incompleteness theorem, in particular, is often viewed as making the problem impossible. Not all mathematicians agree with this analysis, however, and the status of Hilbert's second problem is not yet decided (see "Modern viewpoints on the status of the problem").

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Relation to the liar paradox

The liar paradox is the sentence "This sentence is false." An analysis of the liar sentence shows that it cannot be true (for then, as it asserts, it is false), nor can it be false (for then, it is true). A Gdel sentence G for a theory T makes a similar assertion to the liar sentence, but with truth replaced by provability: G says "G is not provable in the theory T." The analysis of the truth and provability of G is a formalized version of the analysis of the truth of the liar sentence. It is not possible to replace "not provable" with "false" in a Gdel sentence because the predicate "Q is the Gdel number of a false formula" cannot be represented as a formula of arithmetic. This result, known as Tarski's undefinability theorem, was discovered independently by Gdel (when he was working on the proof of the incompleteness theorem) and by Alfred Tarski.

Extensions of Gdel's original result

Gdel demonstrated the incompleteness of the theory of Principia Mathematica, a particular theory of arithmetic, but a parallel demonstration could be given for any effective theory of a certain expressiveness. Gdel commented on this fact in the introduction to his paper, but restricted the proof to one system for concreteness. In modern statements of the theorem, it is common to state the effectiveness and expressiveness conditions as hypotheses for the incompleteness theorem, so that it is not limited to any particular formal theory. The terminology used to state these conditions was not yet developed in 1931 when Gdel published his results. Gdel's original statement and proof of the incompleteness theorem requires the assumption that the theory is not just consistent but -consistent. A theory is -consistent if it is not -inconsistent, and is -inconsistent if there is a predicate P such that for every specific natural number n the theory proves ~P(n), and yet the theory also proves that there exists a natural number n such that P(n). That is, the theory says that a number with property P exists while denying that it has any specific value. The -consistency of a theory implies its consistency, but consistency does not imply -consistency. J. Barkley Rosser (1936) strengthened the incompleteness theorem by finding a variation of the proof (Rosser's trick) that only requires the theory to be consistent, rather than -consistent. This is mostly of technical interest, since all true formal theories of arithmetic (theories whose axioms are all true statements about

Gdel's incompleteness theorems natural numbers) are -consistent, and thus Gdel's theorem as originally stated applies to them. The stronger version of the incompleteness theorem that only assumes consistency, rather than -consistency, is now commonly known as Gdel's incompleteness theorem and as the GdelRosser theorem.

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Second incompleteness theorem

Gdel's second incompleteness theorem first appeared as "Theorem XI" in Gdel's 1931 paper On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I. The formal theorem is written in highly technical language. The broadly accepted natural language statement of the theorem is: For any formal effectively generated theory T including basic arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability, if T includes a statement of its own consistency then T is inconsistent. This strengthens the first incompleteness theorem, because the statement constructed in the first incompleteness theorem does not directly express the consistency of the theory. The proof of the second incompleteness theorem is obtained by formalizing the proof of the first incompleteness theorem within the theory itself. A technical subtlety in the second incompleteness theorem is how to express the consistency of T as a formula in the language of T. There are many ways to do this, and not all of them lead to the same result. In particular, different formalizations of the claim that T is consistent may be inequivalent in T, and some may even be provable. For example, first-order Peano arithmetic (PA) can prove that the largest consistent subset of PA is consistent. But since PA is consistent, the largest consistent subset of PA is just PA, so in this sense PA "proves that it is consistent". What PA does not prove is that the largest consistent subset of PA is, in fact, the whole of PA. (The term "largest consistent subset of PA" is technically ambiguous, but what is meant here is the largest consistent initial segment of the axioms of PA ordered according to specific criteria; i.e., by "Gdel numbers", the numbers encoding the axioms as per the scheme used by Gdel mentioned above). For Peano arithmetic, or any familiar explicitly axiomatized theory T, it is possible to canonically define a formula Con(T) expressing the consistency of T; this formula expresses the property that "there does not exist a natural number coding a sequence of formulas, such that each formula is either of the axioms of T, a logical axiom, or an immediate consequence of preceding formulas according to the rules of inference of first-order logic, and such that the last formula is a contradiction". The formalization of Con(T) depends on two factors: formalizing the notion of a sentence being derivable from a set of sentences and formalizing the notion of being an axiom of T. Formalizing derivability can be done in canonical fashion: given an arithmetical formula A(x) defining a set of axioms, one can canonically form a predicate ProvA(P) which expresses that P is provable from the set of axioms defined by A(x). In addition, the standard proof of the second incompleteness theorem assumes that ProvA(P) satisfies that HilbertBernays provability conditions. Letting #(P) represent the Gdel number of a formula P, the derivability conditions say: 1. If T proves P, then T proves ProvA(#(P)). 2. T proves 1.; that is, T proves that if T proves P, then T proves ProvA(#(P)). In other words, T proves that ProvA(#(P)) implies ProvA(#(ProvA(#(P)))). 3. T proves that if T proves that (P Q) and T proves P then T proves Q. In other words, T proves that ProvA(#(P Q)) and ProvA(#(P)) imply ProvA(#(Q)).

Gdel's incompleteness theorems

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Implications for consistency proofs

Gdel's second incompleteness theorem also implies that a theory T1 satisfying the technical conditions outlined above cannot prove the consistency of any theory T2 which proves the consistency of T1. This is because such a theory T1 can prove that if T2 proves the consistency of T1, then T1 is in fact consistent. For the claim that T1 is consistent has form "for all numbers n, n has the decidable property of not being a code for a proof of contradiction in T1". If T1 were in fact inconsistent, then T2 would prove for some n that n is the code of a contradiction in T1. But if T2 also proved that T1 is consistent (that is, that there is no such n), then it would itself be inconsistent. This reasoning can be formalized in T1 to show that if T2 is consistent, then T1 is consistent. Since, by second incompleteness theorem, T1 does not prove its consistency, it cannot prove the consistency of T2 either. This corollary of the second incompleteness theorem shows that there is no hope of proving, for example, the consistency of Peano arithmetic using any finitistic means that can be formalized in a theory the consistency of which is provable in Peano arithmetic. For example, the theory of primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA), which is widely accepted as an accurate formalization of finitistic mathematics, is provably consistent in PA. Thus PRA cannot prove the consistency of PA. This fact is generally seen to imply that Hilbert's program, which aimed to justify the use of "ideal" (infinitistic) mathematical principles in the proofs of "real" (finitistic) mathematical statements by giving a finitistic proof that the ideal principles are consistent, cannot be carried out. The corollary also indicates the epistemological relevance of the second incompleteness theorem. It would actually provide no interesting information if a theory T proved its consistency. This is because inconsistent theories prove everything, including their consistency. Thus a consistency proof of T in T would give us no clue as to whether T really is consistent; no doubts about the consistency of T would be resolved by such a consistency proof. The interest in consistency proofs lies in the possibility of proving the consistency of a theory T in some theory T which is in some sense less doubtful than T itself, for example weaker than T. For many naturally occurring theories T and T, such as T = ZermeloFraenkel set theory and T = primitive recursive arithmetic, the consistency of T is provable in T, and thus T can't prove the consistency of T by the above corollary of the second incompleteness theorem. The second incompleteness theorem does not rule out consistency proofs altogether, only consistency proofs that could be formalized in the theory that is proved consistent. For example, Gerhard Gentzen proved the consistency of Peano arithmetic (PA) in a different theory which includes an axiom asserting that the ordinal called 0 is wellfounded; see Gentzen's consistency proof. Gentzen's theorem spurred the development of ordinal analysis in proof theory.

Examples of undecidable statements

There are two distinct senses of the word "undecidable" in mathematics and computer science. The first of these is the proof-theoretic sense used in relation to Gdel's theorems, that of a statement being neither provable nor refutable in a specified deductive system. The second sense, which will not be discussed here, is used in relation to computability theory and applies not to statements but to decision problems, which are countably infinite sets of questions each requiring a yes or no answer. Such a problem is said to be undecidable if there is no computable function that correctly answers every question in the problem set (see undecidable problem). Because of the two meanings of the word undecidable, the term independent is sometimes used instead of undecidable for the "neither provable nor refutable" sense. The usage of "independent" is also ambiguous, however. Some use it to mean just "not provable", leaving open whether an independent statement might be refuted. Undecidability of a statement in a particular deductive system does not, in and of itself, address the question of whether the truth value of the statement is well-defined, or whether it can be determined by other means. Undecidability only implies that the particular deductive system being considered does not prove the truth or falsity of the statement. Whether there exist so-called "absolutely undecidable" statements, whose truth value can never be known or is ill-specified, is a controversial point in the philosophy of mathematics.

Gdel's incompleteness theorems The combined work of Gdel and Paul Cohen has given two concrete examples of undecidable statements (in the first sense of the term): The continuum hypothesis can neither be proved nor refuted in ZFC (the standard axiomatization of set theory), and the axiom of choice can neither be proved nor refuted in ZF (which is all the ZFC axioms except the axiom of choice). These results do not require the incompleteness theorem. Gdel proved in 1940 that neither of these statements could be disproved in ZF or ZFC set theory. In the 1960s, Cohen proved that neither is provable from ZF, and the continuum hypothesis cannot be proven from ZFC. In 1973, the Whitehead problem in group theory was shown to be undecidable, in the first sense of the term, in standard set theory. Gregory Chaitin produced undecidable statements in algorithmic information theory and proved another incompleteness theorem in that setting. Chaitin's incompleteness theorem states that for any theory that can represent enough arithmetic, there is an upper bound c such that no specific number can be proven in that theory to have Kolmogorov complexity greater than c. While Gdel's theorem is related to the liar paradox, Chaitin's result is related to Berry's paradox.

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Undecidable statements provable in larger systems

These are natural mathematical equivalents of the Godel "true but undecidable" sentence. They can be proved in a larger system which is generally accepted as a valid form of reasoning, but are undecidable in a more limited system such as Peano Arithmetic. In 1977, Paris and Harrington proved that the Paris-Harrington principle, a version of the Ramsey theorem, is undecidable in the first-order axiomatization of arithmetic called Peano arithmetic, but can be proven in the larger system of second-order arithmetic. Kirby and Paris later showed Goodstein's theorem, a statement about sequences of natural numbers somewhat simpler than the Paris-Harrington principle, to be undecidable in Peano arithmetic. Kruskal's tree theorem, which has applications in computer science, is also undecidable from Peano arithmetic but provable in set theory. In fact Kruskal's tree theorem (or its finite form) is undecidable in a much stronger system codifying the principles acceptable based on a philosophy of mathematics called predicativism. The related but more general graph minor theorem (2003) has consequences for computational complexity theory.

Limitations of Gdel's theorems

The conclusions of Gdel's theorems are only proven for the formal theories that satisfy the necessary hypotheses. Not all axiom systems satisfy these hypotheses, even when these systems have models that include the natural numbers as a subset. For example, there are first-order axiomatizations of Euclidean geometry, of real closed fields, and of arithmetic in which multiplication is not provably total; none of these meet the hypotheses of Gdel's theorems. The key fact is that these axiomatizations are not expressive enough to define the set of natural numbers or develop basic properties of the natural numbers. Regarding the third example, Dan E. Willard (Willard 2001) has studied many weak systems of arithmetic which do not satisfy the hypotheses of the second incompleteness theorem, and which are consistent and capable of proving their own consistency (see self-verifying theories). Gdel's theorems only apply to effectively generated (that is, recursively enumerable) theories. If all true statements about natural numbers are taken as axioms for a theory, then this theory is a consistent, complete extension of Peano arithmetic (called true arithmetic) for which none of Gdel'