HAZOP
Loss Prevention
Loss prevention in chemical industries involve:
Identification and assessment of major hazards
Control of hazards by containment, substitution,
improved maintenance
Control of process by utilizing automatic control,
relief system , interlock, alarm
Limitation of loss when accident happens
Loss Prevention
The major formalized techniques are:
Hazards and Operability (HAZOP)
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Failure mode-and-effect analysis (FMEA)
Safety indexes
Safety audit
What is HAZOP?
Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential
HAZard and OPerating problems
A qualitative technique based on guide-words to
help provoke thoughts about the way deviations
from the intended operating conditions can lead to
hazardous situations or operability problems
HAZOP is basically for safety
Considerable engineering insight is involved
HAZOP Study
HAZOP study are applied during :
Normal operation
Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading, reduced
output, plant start-up and shut-down
Suitability of plant materials, equipment and instrumentation
Provision for failure of plant services, e. g . steam, electricity,
cooling water
Provision for maintenance.
HAZOP Team
HAZOP studies are carried out using a
`brainstorming' approach by a team, chaired and
coordinated by a qualified person experienced in
HAZOPs:
Team Leader
Team Secretary
Process Engineer
Mechanical Engineer
Commissioning/Operations
Engineer/Manager
Instrument Engineer
Strength of HAZOP
HAZOP is a systematic, reasonably comprehensive
and flexible.
It gives good identification of cause and excellent
identification of critical deviations.
The use of keywords is effective and the whole
group is able to participate.
HAZOP is an excellent well-proven method for
studying large plant in a specific manner.
Weakness of HAZOP
HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious with a
tendency for boredom for analysts.
It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented,
although the technique should be amenable to human error
application.
HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and
therefore omits many scenarios.
Guide Words
NONE /No
e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump failure;
REVERSE
Opposite, e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump
failure
MORE
Quantitative increase, e.g., MORE FLOW, Temp,
LESS
Quantitative increase, e.g., LESS FLOW, Temp,
As Well As
Qualitative increase, e.g. impurity.
valve closed or jammed :
PART OF
Qualitative decrease, Change in composition high or
low concentration of mixture; additional reactions in
reactor or other location ; feed change.
Other than
Nothing of the intent happen, completely different
occurs
8
HAZOP Steps
These guide words are applied to flow,
temperature, pressure, liquid level and composition.
Deviation of these variables from normal operation
is considered
The consequences of these deviations on the
process is then assessed.
The measures needed to correct these
consequences are then established
This process enables a comprehensive evaluation of
Hazard control systems and produces recommendations for any
necessary modifications. The overall result is a reduction in both
hazards and potential operational problems
HAZOP STUDY REPORT FORM
TITLE :
HAZOP Study Form
Sheet 1 of
LINE 1 :
CAUSES
DEVIATION
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING PROVISIONS
ACTIONS, QUESTIONS OR
RECOMMENDATIONS
11
Storage Tank
To
atmosphere
RV-1
Nitrogen
PV-2
To flare
PICA
Equipment & Valve
FV
Flow control valve
T
Tank
P
Pump
PV
Pressure control valve
RV
Relief valve
V
Valve
PV-1
V-8
V-7
V-5
H
From tank
trucks
TIA
Storage
Tank
LIA
V-1
V-2
FICA
PI
L
To process
V-4
V-3
FV-1
Instrument
L
Level
T
Temperature
P
Pressure
F
Flow
I
Indicator
C
Controller
A
Alarm
HAZOP Table - level
Cause
Deviation
Consequences
Safe guard
Action
Level
Less
More
NO
1. Rupture
discharge line
Reagent release
Potential fire
LIA
Estimate release quantity
2. V3 open or
broken
Reagent release
Potential fire
LIA
Estimate release quantity
3. V1 open or
broken
Reagent release
Potential fire
LIA
V1 protection
4. Tank rupture
Reagent release
Potential fire
LIA
What external event
cause tank rupture
5. Too much truck
unload
Overfill
Reagent release via
RV1
LIA
Does RV1 allow for
liquid release?
Consider high level alarm
shutoff
6. Reverse flow
from process
Overfill
Reagent release via
RV1
LIA
Consider check valve at
pump discharge
Consider high level alarm
shutoff at feed
Same as less
HAZOP Table - pressure
Pressure
Less
More
9. Break in nitrogen
or flare line
Reagent release
Potential fire
PICA
Consider independent
PLA
10. Lose nitrogen
Tank implode
Reagent release
PICA
Consider vacuum break
valve
11. PV2 fails closed
Tank implodes
Reagent release
PICA
Consider PAL
12. PICA fails,
closing PV2
Tank implodes
Reagent release
13. PICA fails,
closing PV1
Reagent release via
RV1
Tank rupture if RV1
fails
PICA
What PV1 and RV1
capacity
14. PV1 fails closed
Reagent release via
RV1
Tank rupture if RV1
fails
PICA
Consider independent
PAH
15. V7 closed
Reagent release via
RV1
Tank rupture if RV1
fails
PICA
Is V7 locked open
16. Overfill tank
Truck unload
Tank rupture if RV1
fails
PICA
Consider second high
level shutoff
17. Temperature of
inlet higher
than normal
Reagent release in
RV1
Tank rupture if RV1
fails
PICA
What prevent high temp
of feed
Consider PAH
18. Volatile
impurities in
feed
Reagent release in
RV1
Tank rupture if RV1
fails
PICA
Consider PAH
Consider sampling before
unloading
Tank not designed for
vacuum
Hazop Table - composition
Cause
Deviation
Consequences
Safe guard
Action
Composition
Other than
7. Wrong reagent
Possible reaction
As well as
8. Impurities in
reagent
Problem in reactor
Tank rupture
Consider sampling before
unload
Are other material
delivered in tank
Are unloading connection
different
HAZOP Table - Temperature
Temperature
Less
High
19. Temperature of
inlet cooler
than usual
Possible vacuum
Thermal stress on tank
What are temp limits of
tank
20. Low tank
pressure
See 9-12
Thermal stress on tank
What are pressure limits
of tank
21. temperature of
inlet is higher
than usual
See 17
Thermal stress on tank
What are temp limits on
tank
22. external fire
Tank fails
Reagent release
What could cause
external fire
What are fire protection
capabilities
Is fire protection
adequate
Preliminary HAZOP Example
Cooling Coils
Monomer
Feed
Refer to reactor system shown.
The reaction is exothermic. A cooling system is
provided to remove the excess energy of reaction.
In the event of cooling function is lost, the
temperature of reactor would increase. This would
lead to an increase in reaction rate leading to
additional energy release.
Cooling Water to Sewer
Cooling
Water In
The result could be a runaway reaction with
pressures exceeding the bursting pressure of the
reactor. The temperature within the reactor is
measured and is used to control the cooling water
flow rate by a valve.
Perform HAZOP Study
T
C
Thermocouple
17
Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor
Guide Word
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Action
NO
No cooling
Cooling water valve
malfunction
Temperature increase in
reactor
Install high temperature
alarm (TAH)
REVERSE
Reverse cooling
flow
Failure of water source
resulting in backward
flow
Less cooling, possible runaway
reaction
Install check valve
MORE
More cooling flow
Control valve failure,
operator fails to take action
on alarm
Too much cooling, reactor cool
Instruct operators
on procedures
AS WELL AS
Reactor product
in coils
More pressure in reactor
Off-spec product
Check maintenance
procedures and
schedules
OTHER THAN
Another material
besides cooling
water
Water source
contaminated
May be cooling inefffective
and effect on the reaction
If less cooling, TAH will
detect. If detected, isolate
water source. Back up
water source?
18
Case Study Shell & Tube Heat
Exchanger
Using relevant guide works, perform HAZOP study on shell & tube
heat exchanger
Process
fluid
Cooling water
19
HAZOP on Heat Exchanger
Guide Word
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Action
NONE
No cooling water flow
Failure of inlet cooling
water valve to open
Process fluid temperature is
not lowered accordingly
Install Temperature
indicator before and after
the process fluid line
Install TAH
MORE
More cooling water
flow
Failure of inlet cooling
water valve to close
Output of Process fluid
temperature too low
Install Temperature
indicator before and after
process fluid line
Install TAL
LESS
Less cooling water
Pipe leakage
Process fluid temperature too
low
Installation of flow meter
REVERSE
Reverse process fluid
flow
Failure of process fluid inlet
valve
Product off set
Install check valve (whether
it is crucial have to check?)
CONTAMINATION
Process fluid
contamination
Contamination in cooling
water
Outlet temperature too low
Proper maintenance and
operator alert
20
Documents needed for HAZOP Study
For Preliminary HAZOP
Process Flow Sheet ( PFS or PFD )
Description of the Process
For Detailed HAZOP
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram ( P & ID )
Process Calculations
Process Data Sheets
Instrument Data Sheets
Interlock Schedules
Layout Requirements
Hazardous Area Classification
Description of the Process
Planning for HAZOP
Additional required information:
Safety procedures documents
Relief/venting philosophy
Chemical involved
Piping specifications
Previous HAZOP report
Planning for HAZOP
Carry out the study
Record the results (may need a secretary)
Follow-up of actions noted
final report contain resolution of all
recommended actions
must appoint someone as leader to check progress
of action
team may meet again if answers to questions do
not simply lead to an action
team may meet again if significant design changes
in interim report
Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members
HAZOP leader
Plan sessions and timetable
Control discussion
Limit discussion
Encourage team to draw conclusion
Ensure secretary has time for taking note
Keep team in focus
Encourage imagination of team members
Motivate members
Discourage recriminations
Judge importance issues
Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members
HAZOP Secretary
Take adequate notes
Record documentations
Inform leader if more time required in taking
notes
If unclear, check wording before writing
Produce interim lists of recommendations
Produce draft report of study
Check progress of chase action
Produce final report
Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members
Process Engineer
Provide a simple description
Provide design intention for each process
unit
Provide information on process conditions
and design conditions
Provide a simple description
Provide design intention for each process
unit
Provide information on process conditions
and design conditions
Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members
Mechanical Design Engineer
Provide specification details
Provide vendor package details
Provide equipment and piping layout
information
Instrument Engineer
Provide details of control philosophy
Provide interlock and alarm details
Provide info on shutdown, safety features
Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members
Plant Engineer or Manager
Provide information on compatibility with any
existing adjacent plant
Provide details of site utilities and services
Provide (for study on existing plant) any update on
maintenance access and modifications
Shift Operating Engineer or Supervisor
Provide guidance on control instrumentation
integrity from an operating experience view point
Provide (for study on existing plant) information on
plant stability at the specified control parameters
Provide information on experienced operability
deviations of hazard potential
Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members
Chemist
Provide details of process chemistry
Provide details of process hazards
(polymerisations, byproducts, corrosion etc)
Project Engineer
Provide details of cost and time estimation
and also budget constraints.
Ensure rapid approval if required
