Book 1
Book 1
Emirates Upgrade
First
Edition
“BOOK 1”
(AIRBUS - A330)
“October – 2008”
This book has been written and published as a reference book to assist all
Emirates pilots who are going or being in their Upgrade command process.
All materials herein are gathered and collected from pilots with emirates airlines
during their upgrade process, recurrent or line training.
Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained
within this book, however it’s the responsibility of all pilots to make sure that
the information in this book is up-to-date according to Emirates’s latest updates
as per the Company CD, FCI’s or any sort of updating venues.
All pilots are highly appreciated to submit their feedback, suggestions, comments
or anything that might be helpful to our colleagues now or in future.
[email protected]
FOREWAORD
I would like to say a big thank you for all the people who
provided me with this amount of useful information that led
to the publishing of this book, I hope their time, effort and
study will be reflected on all of us during our upgrade
process, I wish you a very successful upgrade.
Pre-Face ……………………………………………………………CONGRATULATIONS
SECTION 1 …………………………………………………………INTRODUCTION
CONGRATULATIONS!
During your service with Emirates you should have heard good stories, bad stories about
the upgrade process, so just put faith in your self and be confident you can do it, just do
your home work and make some effort to achieve your goal which you have always
dreamed off.
This book is intend to give you a hand during your preparation for your upgrade on the
A330 Aircraft, I gathered all available information that made sense to me that it might be
needed and combined them in TWO different books, (BOOK 1 and BOOK 2), Book one
is “THE PROCESS GUIDE “, which includes most of the official material provided by
the company, and Book 2 “SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION”, which include some
good information collected from Emirates Pilots and a trusted internet sites.
I have tried my best to gather as much information as I can from all my friends,
colleagues, instructors and experienced, knowledged, trusted pilots, and combined them
in this document for the benefit of all of us.
I wish all the best for all of us, and hope this document will give some help for all my
colleagues approaching their upgrade time, GOOD LUCK.
A.B
1. INTRODUCTION
As stipulated in the FOM the minimum experience for normal command are as follows:
If you are fulfilling the above requirements, then once your time comes the process is as follows:
1- Each month there is a Fleet Review Meeting which will review your file for an INITIAL
SUITABILITY ASSESMENT (details in Section 1 of this document).
2- Once you have been successfully selected by the Fleet Review Board, you will be notified in
Writing to conduct a DETAILED SUITABILTY ASSESMENT as follows:
3- Upon the successful completion of the above requirements, candidate will be invited for
INTERVIEW with Fleet Management (details are listed in Section 2 of this document).
4- Successful candidates will be receive offers for their upgrade course dates.
The following is your upgrade footnotes, it will be detailed in the following sections of this document.
The following documents will be extracted to cover all the requirements and different upgrade
process steps:
-FOM (OM-A)
-TM 334 Part 1
-OM-D
-FCI’s and FCN’s (If available)
Note: Please make sure to update any changes that might happen as per updates on
company CD, FCI’s, FCN’s.
◊ The Fleet management shall advise unsuccessful candidates in writing and shall provide details of the
assessment on which the recommendations are based.
This written notification will also specify the conditions and/or performance criteria necessary for future
upgrade consideration.
◊ The outcome of the Review Meeting will be deemed to be the Flight Operations management’s final
decision in this respect.
◊ An upgrade candidate who is successful in the Initial Suitability Assessment will be put forward for
Detailed Suitability Assessment.
Upgrade PPC with a grading of 3 must be reviewed by VPFT and CFI Airbus/Boeing to decide on the
continuation or termination of Upgrade Training.
Before being offered a second upgrade course, the First Officer will undergo an assessment process that
will include a technical quiz and Command Assessment Sectors as determined by the Fleet Standards Dept.
If any developmental training is required this will be identified and the First Officer sent to the Training
Dept to undergo the required training. If the First Officer is determined suitable for his second attempt at
upgrade then he will conduct a final assessment flight with either the Chief Pilot or his nominated deputy.
1) General:
◊ For the purposes of this policy, the A330, A340 and A380 will be considered to be the same aircraft type.
◊ The freeze period is the period of time a pilot is not permitted to change aircraft type.
Freeze periods are not cumulative.
Freeze periods commence from the date of FLC.
Upgrade on the current type may take place during the freeze period.
Freeze periods may be varied to meet company requirements. Any such variation must be authorised by
SVPFO or EVP-E & O.
2) Captains:
◊ After completion of initial training (Upgrade/DEC), Captains will be frozen on type from FLC for a
minimum of six years.
Note: Please make sure to update any changes that might happen as per updates on
company CD, FCI’s, FCN’s.
General
Foreword
The A330 Upgrade course has been designed to cater for the needs of a rapidly expanding fleet.
This requirement has led to a course that will provide suitably qualified First Officers with the
adequate training required, to qualify them as competent Aircraft Commanders in Emirates.
Objectives
The Command Upgrade Training is provided in order to achieve the following goals.
• Acquired the flying skills and competency required to operate from the Left Hand Seat (LHS);
• Acquired the leadership qualities and the technical and procedural knowledge required to command the
operation of the aircraft;
• Meet the standards established in the FOM.
2. To ensure that newly qualified Captains will comply with Line Operation Standards through the
implementation of standardized training programmes.
Foreword
The Upgrade Ground School forms the initial part of the Upgrade training programme. During
the course a variety of topics will be addressed in the form of lectures, presentations, discussions
and practical application thereof.
Thorough preparation is required by the upgrade candidate. Candidates are required to log
on to the Crew Portal, Training / Generic / Upgrade, as required pre-reading and questionnaires
must be downloaded from the crew portal Topics, summarized below will be presented in a
modular format. Please refer to the downloadable course footprint and timetable sent by Flight
Training Administration for the exact dates and times.
Objective
Module 2 – Performance
A major component of upgrade training is being fully conversant with a Captains’ duties and
responsibilities. A pre-course questionnaire on policy and procedures and pre-reading on the
subject of aviation law will assist a candidate to gain extensive knowledge and awareness of
international, local (GCAA) and company legal requirements. A thorough understanding of
when and how to apply the procedures provided in company documentation is required to
ensure that both individual and company integrities are maintained.
In-flight normal and abnormal scenarios will be proposed at various stages of flight, requiring,
through role play, practice of all the topics briefed and trained in Module 1 – 3. Candidates
will be required to provide input through review and discussion on various aspects of flight
operations. The topics will include:
Module 4 dealt with small scenarios based on various stages of flight. In this module two full
flights are given as examples requiring the candidates, through group exercise, to plan and
complete a safe and efficient flight in the given circumstances. Through this classroom practice of
LOS training, all aspects of the airlines operation should be fully understood.
Module 6 – Fleet
Foreword
This phase will provide a training forum to prepare the candidate for successful completion of the
PPC and AWOPS/ZFT phases, whilst operating from the LHS.
Objectives
The FFS Training for type-rated First Officers is divided into two phases, i.e. RHS to LHS
conversion and preparation for the LOS/LOE phase.
The first 3 sessions encompass the pre-PPC training. The candidate must display a good
understanding of failure items and the handling of the aircraft during normal and abnormal
operations, before recommendation for the PPC can be made.
F1U: provides a familiarization from the LHS, a review of flight characteristics, and a review
of some Emergency and Abnormal Procedures.
F2U & F3U: provides a review of some additional Emergency and Abnormal procedures.
PPCI: is the Initial Pilot Proficiency Check as per OM-D - Training Manual Vol A33/4 Part 2. On
successful completion of the PPCI the student will proceed to F5U.
F5U: All Weather Operations and Zero Flight Time. Refer to relevant chapters.
Note: FIU / F2U / F3U may be conducted with 2 Upgrade Trainees swapping seat’s or with a Line
F/O in the R.H.S. In the case of a Line F/O in the RHS, Item’s that have been covered in the
1st half of the session need not be repeated.
Foreword
All Upgrade candidates are required to complete a simulator exercise at SANAA and
SEYCHELLES airport.
The simulator exercise is designed to familiarise the candidate with that particular Cat C
aerodrome, with a large emphasis placed on training. During the session the Instructor will
highlight important aspects and considerations for safe operations into that airport.
Each familiarisation takes approximately 1 hour. The Sanaa familiarisation is conducted after
LOS1 and the Seychelles familiarisation is conducted after LOS2. As the training takes place
immediately after a LOS there is little time avail for a formal briefing. Therefore the student must
have complete a thorough review of the OM-C RAIG beforehand Refer to TM 5.23 Category C
Airfield training for details.
2.1.3.5 LOS
– See section 5.19 of TM 334 Part1 (Below).
Foreword
This phase consists of 4 FFS sessions, with the emphasis being again on training. The first
3 sessions will be Line Orientated Simulation (LOS), with the last one being the Line
Orientated Evaluation (LOE).
The 4 simulator sessions will be interspersed with normal upgrade line training sectors, during
which time the line training syllabus will be completed to a satisfactory standard. These sectors
have been inserted between the 3 LOS and the 1 LOE session to further enhance the overall
training value, and to generally assist in building the confidence and ability of the upgrade
candidate. The allotted amount of sectors, as per FTPM, will be completed before the LOE,
followed by the Final Line Check (FLC). Training rostering will endeavor to produce a roster,
whereby the candidate will fly between 4 to 8 line sectors from the LHS, between each simulator
session.
Objectives
To observe and develop the ability of the candidate to handle various emergencies
and abnormalities in “real time”, and realistic operational conditions.
To observe and develop the candidates knowledge in technical and procedural matters.
To observe CRM behaviours and task management when subjected to potentially demanding
scenarios.
To develop the skills, knowledge and the application of knowledge so that upgrade candidates
will have the tools to:
Training Guidelines
During the LOS phase, the emphasis is on training. The scenarios will be run as realistically
as possible, however the TC is encouraged to intervene and discuss pertinent issues as
required to assist in developing the candidate. If necessary the use of the simulator “freeze”
facility is acceptable for the TC to stress an important point of instruction. During this phase
the candidate must demonstrate a good standard, or show signs of improving towards this,
before being recommended for the LOE. Should the standard not be achieved within the
allocated sessions, then extra training may be scheduled at the discretion of VPFT and/or
CFI/CFE.
During the LOS and LOE sessions, the TC will act as engineer, purser, ATC and any other
character as may be required. The emphasis on training must be maintained during the LOS
phase.
The final LOS is conducted as a Progress Review without any instructor intervention. On
successful completion of this exercise, the candidate will be recommended for the LOE. The
LOE will be run as a normal flight in all aspects.
All LOS and LOE forms consist of 2 pages, filling in and signing of these forms is as per standard
Emirates practice.
Use Of Video
It is recommended that the video equipment be used to record the entire Loft as this gives
increased value to the debriefing. It clearly highlights CRM aspects and in many cases will greatly
assist in getting across an important teaching point. The student should provide a blank 180
minute video tape for each session, if he wishes he can use the same tape and record over it.
The tape must be erased after each session and the student must not be allowed to take it home.
During the simulator session the instructor should note the times at which items of interest occur
and use this as a guide during replay. Debriefing in this manner may increase the debriefing time
however this method has been well received by the crews that have undergone upgrade training.
LOS Rules
• Only 1 MEL prior to pushback. This may or may not be combined with further failures to affect
the outcome of the flight.
• Only 1 failure allowed during taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above.
• After takeoff, only 1 x recoverable failure, and 1 x unrecoverable failure may be given. These
failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure, eg. Hydraulic system failure due to
engine shutdown.
• Weather conditions are to be realistic with changes as indicated on the forecast The content
and failure scenarios of each LOS will be at the discretion of the TC in accordance with the
prescribed guidelines in OM-D.
LOS/LOE Guidelines
If a particular LOFT does not take up the entire simulator session, then a second mini-loft may be
introduced and conducted by the TC.
– See Training Manual Volume A33/4 Part 2, Section 5.17 of TM 334 Part 1(Below).
General:
The Zero Flight Time module is a training event. As a general rule, all the items in the syllabus
should be completed and repeated, if necessary, until proficiency is achieved. At the end of the
session the instructor shall certify the trainees proficiency by ticking the ZFTT box on the Synthetic
Training Report Form.
5.5.1 General:
The Low Visibility Operations module is a combination training / checking event. There is
significant preparation required for this module. The trainee should prepare by reviewing the
document references listed below.
2.1.3.8 LIFUS
– See section 5.21 of TM 334 Part 1 (Below).
General
The Line Training Syllabus presented has been developed from the Airbus recommended listing
of Line Training subjects.
Line Training is intended to familiarise new entry, upgraded pilots, and pilots who are transferring fleets,
with the operation of their new aircraft type, their respective crew duties, and the characteristics of our
route network environment. It must highlight the duties, and the characteristics of our route network
environment. It must highlight the difficulties and traps that could affect the safety and the efficiency of
the flight, and provide comprehensive guidance regarding the use of all the resources that are available
to support the Company’s flying operations.
Line Training will also include the technical items on the syllabus, which can not be taught in the
simulator. These may include: weather radar, ETOPS and comprehensive use of the FMS.
The main objective of Line Training is to consolidate the training received on the ground in order
to deliver to the Fleet highly competent, safe and standardised pilots. At the completion of their
Line Training, these pilots must have demonstrated that they have reached a high level of technical and
operational knowledge, as well as good flying skills, and that they are capable and efficient cockpit
resource managers.
The Briefings are listed in flight phase order until parking. The topics are then listed in procedural order.
Preparation is key: Before each flight thorough route study is essential. OM-C RAIG (Route and
Aerodrome Information Guide) is a good starting point. You can obtain old LIDO en-route charts
and Aerodrome charts from Nav Services, located in the Emirates Operations Centre (EOC).
These charts will be out dated but are still useful for route study.
We recommend you buy an ATLAS. You are bound to be flying over unfamiliar territory and
a ‘geographical awareness’ is essential. When you get transferred to “LVIV Control” it would be
nice to know which country you are over, not to mention the pronunciation.
A day or two before your flight you can ask the operations clerks at the CBC to print off a CFP
and NOTAMS for that particular sector. It will not be exactly as per the flight you will be doing but
it will be a great aid in preparation, especially when covering NOTAMS. It will also help with time
management, as you will know which items are need-to-know and which can be covered later, in
flight. A good time to get these is immediately following a duty when signing off, obtain the
CFP/NOTAMS for your next flight, so you can study at home.
Study: Line Training will require an in-depth knowledge of the FOM and the FCOM’s.
Thorough knowledge of all chapters is expected and required. For study purposes we
recommend you give particular emphasis to FOM chapters 11-15 and chapter 20.
Your Training File contains a Line Training Syllabus. Each subject will be covered by your various
Training Captains you must arrive for you flight well prepared. The Line Training Study Guide and
Completion standard is designed to help you study, please use this document to your advantage.
Time Management: Your pick-up will be approximately 2hrs15mins prior to flight (depending on
location – check FOM). Arrival time at CBC will vary, however, cabin crew are instructed to depart
CBC for the aircraft at STD -75 mins. The bus ride from CBC to the aircraft can take 15- 20mins
depending on the parking bay. Time Management at the briefing stage is critical.
Prioritisation is essential, make sure you know the minimum requirements FOM 12.2.
OM-D Extracts
The following are exact extracts from the OM-D latest version up to date as of October 2008.
Note: Please make sure to update any changes that might happen as per updates on
company CD, FCI’s, FCN’s.
2.1.3.1 General
The Company may upgrade First Officers to command on their existing fleet or select first officers
for an upgrade on a different type. Direct Entry Captains (DEC) may also be employed. DECs
and Upgrade First Officers complete a course of training and checking, detailed in the applicable
type specific training manual, which incorporates the required elements of Initial, Conversion and
Upgrade Command training courses.
2.1.3.2 Authority
The CFE and CFI-A/B shall ensure that upgrade command training and checking programmes are
established in the Operations Manual and approved by the Authority.
The candidate shall complete the training detailed and successfully complete the associated
proficiency and other tests to the standard detailed in Chapter One – Specification of Training and
Checking – Assessment.
The Upgrade Command course is conducted in accordance with a detailed course syllabus,
included in the applicable type specific training manual.
- Pilots progressing from First Officer to Captain will undertake ground school training
emphasizing the duties and responsibilities of a Commander.
- Human factors topics in relation to Crew Resource Management (CRM) will be trained and
practiced. At the end of the course, candidates should have an understanding of how to
maintain safe and efficient operations.
- During this ground school, exercises will be undertaken to enhance sound and effective management,
decision making, leadership and communication skills.
• Aircraft Performance
• Crew Recourse Management (CRM)
• Airline Management and Flight Safety
• Command Responsibilities, expectations and achievement standards.
• Line Orientated Simulation exercises covering the following topics:
• Aircraft Systems Management - Normal and Emergency procedures
• All Weather Operations (LVO)
• Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS)
• Diversion and Suitable Airport planning
• Flight Planning
• Fuel Management
• Aviation Law for Aircraft Commanders
Details of the upgrade simulator training modules can be found in the applicable type specific Training
Manual. The Upgrade FFS Modules are summarised as follows:
Note: For guidelines on the conduct of LOS/E, refer to the LOS and LOE Appendix.
3. INTERVIEW PROCESS
Upon completion of the requirements stipulated in the FOM and previously stated in Section 1 of
this document, candidates will be invited for an interview with Fleet Management where the
results of the Assessment Process will be discussed and a decision will be made as to the
candidate’s suitability to commence the upgrade training program.
-Fleet Management.
-Human Resources representative.
-Recruitment representative.
The interview will take about 15 min to 1 hour depending on the panel and your answers ☺.
Questions will vary between personal, technical, operational or daily operation including a real
scenario for a flight with different problems on ground and before departure. Problems will be time
critical and sometimes to judge your awareness of the FOM, decision making process and
company operational policies.
In the following pages you will find a very good summary of some points you need to focus and it
really covers some of the interview questions as well as the experience of many pilots who have gone
through their interview process and would like to share their experience with their colleagues, I tried
to gather as much interview sessions as I can from both Airbus and Boeing pilots respectively so
please if you come across an interview with a Boeing pilot, please disregard the specific type
technical info and procedures.
- Limitations
- Tech Log, Daily Validity, What must be signed
- MEL, Concessions, verbal,
- Captain performed items
- Company Ops Spec, Where, what does it contain?
- Aircraft Documentation Folder
- Fuel Policy, extra, when
- Reduced Reserve Fuel, conditions, actions
- Continue without Alternate, conditions
- Fuel uplift check
- Tankering, how to maximize calculation
- Fuel emergency
- AWO Minima, Take-off / Landing
- Take-Off Alternate requirements, when, distance
- ETOPS, Suitable Alternate, weather deteriorates?
- Alternate Airport weather requirements, 2 Alts when?
- Circling Minima
- Visual requirements
- Stable approach criteria
- Flight parameter callouts by PNF
- Orbit
- Autoland
- Approach ban point
- Company speed limits
- Derated Take-off, when must you use TOGA
- FO takeoff / landing restrictions, taxi
- Minimum cabin crew
- Captain Responsibilities, whose authority, when, where (ie)hotel?
- ZFW LMC, 300, 700, +700, LMC Fuel? LMC bag weights
- New CFP when?
- Need to reduce TO weight, priorities
- New Captain limits
- ASRs, when, GCAA
- Fire fighting / Rescue
- Capt is PF mandatory when?
- Departure / Arrival delays, time, Pax PA, Ops call info
- Arming of doors
- Autobrakes recommended
- Land ASAP (RED) when
- Mayday vs PAN
- Flight Duty period, local night, max duty with positioning
- Flight Duty Period extensions
- Latest publication amendments numbers
Interview
• Scenario involved a flight to BAH with considerations for fuel planning, F/O landing
restrictions, dispatch with no engineer, all with a difficult F/O and how I would handle him.
• What would you do if the FO was ‘running down’ the company while you were on duty.
• Relate a complex situation you have been involved in.
• Non-adherence to SOP's, when/why?
• Relate a time you have had to assert yourself.
• What do you think of EK command criteria?
3 Panel members
Duration : 20 – 25 min
1. If there has been a failed check ride in the past it will come up and be discussed. This may
include any abnormal write up you may have had, not necessarily a failed check ride.
2. What do you think a good Captain is (should be) ?
a. Include Leadership roles.
b. How to motivate crew.
c. Etc.
3. Have you had any difficult situations in the past (could be as Captain or F/O) ? Explain if full
detail.
4. Have you had any conflicting experiences ?
5. What is enroute reserve fuel ? This will lead into the next question.
6. You are in LHR after pushing off the gate and find out you must off load a bag. What are the
considerations ? You notice that you no longer have CFP fuel, what will you do ? Refueling
is not an option. After exhausting your great knowledge on flying at a more economical
speed, closer alternate, blah, blah, you are stuck with what you got and it’s not enough.
a. LMC
b. RRP
i. New CFP
ii. DP, etc
7. Following through with the above scenerio….you now end up with a medical emergency.
What are your considerations ? How are you going to handle it ? What is your role in this
case ?
8. You are approaching the Lamborne VOR for LHR. Weather is fluctuating above and below
Cat III limits. First of all what are the limits ? And second of all what are you going to do ?
9. Are both autopilots engaged in a autoland ?
10. What considerations must you take into effect for a NPA ? This questions is referring to the
QRH checklist. There is also a question regarding the EK policy that you must fly a NPA at
least once a month and then annotate in the VR.
11. Know EGT limits.
Stabilization Criteria
Capt Limitations
What is CPDLC
What is ADS
A330 -420 m
-Not approved NAT MNPS
-RNP 4 Approved
-RVSM approved
-CPDLC/ADS approved
Scenarios:
-Cabin Crew Pregnant – Can she fly (No…License)
-Fat Lady thinks she is preg-can u off load her
-Fight with F/O-now to get talking-SOP’s
That’s about it
Good luck
What are the factoring figures to be used....they give you different options so just know the
numbers.
What is min fuel for landing with commitment to destination, destination and alternate.....they
gave me two of these options, can't remember which.
They gave me 3 different questions with pictures of a PFD and asked me what law we were
operating under.....didn't like those at all, just couldn't remember that stuff.
Picture of ECAM fuel page with jettison showing on left wing and in Amber....what is happening
here?
What is initial attitude for double engine flameout and is it weight dependant?
ECAM fuel page with aft transfer occurring and upper ECAM showing "trim tank transfer"....why?
When can you dispatch without contingency fuel, never or when using decision point procedure?
What's true about dest alternate, need one navaid if weather is CAVOK, weather below CAVOK
you need 2 navaids or both of the above?
For taxi you have toe brake pressure applied and you release the park brake. The triple indicator
drops to zero...is this normal?
HR QUESTIONS
1. Tell us about your career up to joining EK
2. Tell us a time when you were really pushed time wise during a flight
3. Tell us about a time when you had a conflict with cabin crew, Captain, F/O- how did you resolve it?
4. Tell us a time when you were put into a difficult situation after all planning failed
5. How are you finding life in Dubai?
6. How has your experience at EK been?
Consider
-Contaminated RTOW for KUL and DAC (DAC has a Max ZFW) remembering max payload for min cost.
-F/O limits.
-Alternate limits(met VIS for cat 1 not RVR).
-Fuel in center tank (below all limits for RTOW and fuel limitations but use the penalty of carrying 1.2 - .9 t in the center
tank min cost).
Then a purser handling ops question (PREGGO..."WASNT ME" or maybe a dg or weapons or Inad/Depo scenario)
Pushback status before or after start or MEL and engineer is a bit lax about procedures "just jiggle the switch" what to
do.. be firm about getting fixed and signed.
Nothing unusual about the flight to DAC.
DAC on ground, he drew a map of the taxi way and said the a/c is halfway to the RWY and an ACARS load sheet rev2
pops out what would you do. F/O is taxing (I just said keep taxiing to hold short of RWY, set brakes you have control,
advise ATC and review what the load final 2 is about) Mine was ZFW - 270 and 3 PAX less. Had to call company and
enquire about what type of people and if bags offloaded etc.
Alternate Wx limits, planning and enroute (jepps mins enroute only apply)
Basically he was very easy going and light toned, even joking a bit. He really wants to see your gut reaction and
legal reaction to all the scenarios.
No surprises really, just know the basics and he was glad to see if you had the key points but wanted to check the
FOM just to be sure.
Take your time, don’t rush and just do what you have been doing all the time, everything we yapped about is
there.
1. Psychometric assessment
2. Technical quiz
• 30 questions in 30 minutes
o These questions are mainly from the multiple choice B 777 questions
o 2 to 4 Dangerous Goods questions
3. Final interview
2) You reach the airplane and you see that the techlog hasn’t been
signed. Only missing the signature. What do you do ?
Call SMNC to know if the captain is still ther ? ( gone)
At the same time, the red cap asks if he can start the boarding
o I ask him to wait 5 minutes, the time to solve my
problem, he says he is going to put my responsibility for
the delay and I accept it .
Obviously, only the signature is missing as all the other boxes
were filled and we decide to go and raise a CSR.
3) APU auto shutdown due to APU controller. You are in the black.
What are your actions?
Check list
Stop boarding + PA
Engineer + MEL
Ground power
S P for engine start
Check if dest has the appropriate equipment
4) NOTOC
5 or 6 containers are loaded with radioactive products( TI = 12.4)
at last minute. What do you do ?
You accept after you checked the TI or
You refuse it because you don’t know if it is loaded
on the bottom of the container
5) You have a MEL cat C dated of 10th of june at 17:40. What do you
do?
Dated on the 10th means active from the 11th at 00:00 until the
20th of june 23:59. Then, we can go.
6) And what if you have a split duty in IST and land in Dubai at 01:00
LT ?
As we takeoff before midnight, MEL is a pre dispatch document,
we can go.
7) During taxi, you have a comm message and a new load sheet, final
2…
Stop and coordinate with ATC
Contact load control and discover that LMC, - 3 pax and – 270
kg ( check that bags are not on board )
No perfo change… We continue
8) You arrive at IST, gate 223 and it is really not your day, the ground
kart doesn’t connect… Neither the second one …
The right engine is turning, so, I coordinate with everybody(
Engineer, ground staff, ATC…) and connect the bridge on the
left( disembark PAX)
Then, I start the left and shutdown the right. Proceed for bags(
offload and load), cargo and fuel( + 2hrs of fuel( 2.5 tons) to
cover the rest of the ground ops
Start left and shutdown right to allow pax. Arm a second door.
9) The end
Then S.P stepped in asking the maximum duty period and what if you are now into the position for
the last leg or a single leg (2 hrs max)
Scenario:
MNL to DXB
Rain, wind 120/15-22 (Crosswind)
During pushback ,prior to engine start FO push status page and you get a "Hydr Dem right", what you do?
Ask to be pulled in and get the engineer to fix it.
REFUELING WITH PAX ON BOARD AND PURSER IS NOT HAPPY L5 GETTING PADDLE OF
WATER . Want it closed but ask for another one to be armed>
Close and manned and since there is no other door she needs to accept it.
During taxi TWR advice full length is not available and OPT doesn't have the intersection takeoff
point, considerations?
• Ask for backtrack,
• Push into position for full length
• Set for a different RWY if wind gets within limits OR
• Decrease RWY length by distance unusable entering the data in the Notams.
I was scheduled for this interview on a day when S.P’s roster was showing a cross day off. I was
a bit concerned and asked P.D. She confirmed that interview is still ON and I was impressed to
know that S.P works on his off days as well. Good management.
I reached there a bit early and after waiting for a while was received by S.P. In his office he was
accompanied by R.M from HR. They both introduced themselves. S.P briefed me about how the
interview will be conducted. During that he asked me what was my understanding about the
interview and how had I prepared for it. Off course I told him that I had ruined my one month
leave in Dubai studying for this interview.
Then R.M asked me about my past experience in aviation and all the typical questions about
occasions of:
Since I went through my log book thoroughly and recalled quite a lot of occasions regarding these
questions so I had answers to all most all the questions that she asked.
Than it was S.P’s turn. Scenario was from DXB-LGW. Low visibility ops in Dubai and LGW.
Alternate was LHR AND BHX. LHR also low vis and BHX was fine. I have reached late in the
CBC with my F/O and our cabin crew had already left. Basically he was looking at the
Then we go to the a/c and red cap wants to get boarding clearance. I told him we need to see the
techlog first and also I want to talk to the purser and than will be able to give the boarding
clearance.
Then we had a CAT C MEL and expiry was the same day midnight UTC so I accepted that.
Then purser came to me with a pregnant woman case whose medical certificate was one month
old. She was having twins and was in her 31st week. Not a problem.
Than we completed our boarding and push back. Eng start was normal and we taxi out. He
wanted to know my considerations during taxi and what taxi speed will I maintain.
During taxi we got an EICAS “TCAS” message. We checked the MEL and it says A/C SHOULD
not depart Dubai with a TCAS U/S. We talked to maintenance and there point of view was that we
have been dispatched and it is a SHOULD case and not a MUST case. I checked the
requirement for MNPS airspace and off course it was not required, but I still decided to get it
rectified considering busy airspace in Europe and expected holdings and stacking at LGW. So we
decided to return and that was it.
Stefan said I have no further questions. They told me to wait outside and than after a short while
called me and gave me the good news.
Over all it was a very comfortable environment. Stefan’s perspective is to see that you know your
stuff very well. The earlier you can make it happen the easier the interview is. So my advice is to
thoroughly understand and remember your books particularly FOM along with all the FC’Is plus
all the supplementary procedures.
Best wishes.
I reached EOC an hour early ( just in case there was an accident) and then waited till I got called
in by May B.K. She introduced me to S.P and P.D that were waiting in the room. At that point S.P
started a mini brief on what to expect and made it clear that if at any stage I wasn’t sure or didn’t
feel comfortable about a question or a situation, to speak up and say so. I found it very very
professional and felt that they really wanted to put you in a situation you can feel free to answer
the questions with no pressure. P.D started asking questions regarding a brief history on my
career, what made me move to Emirates and an example on when I had to make a difficult
decision thinking outside the procedures. Then was S.P’s turn.
What would you do to prepare for the flight the day before?
Well, basically he wants to hear that you don’t go clubbing’ the night before…
You are picked up late and your F/O is in the car and you can see fog everywhere on the way to
CBC.
You get to CBC and spot your crew going thru security. What do you tell them?
You get to the briefing area now, what are your considerations?
Min time brief (as per FOM) and check the rest on the bus ride.
Basically do the same as above (Min Time brief and go to the Aircraft since the crew already left).
You Arrive on Board and the Purser wants to start boarding.
What do you tell her? (Chk the Techlog ,Slot Check with the Dispatcher, refueling)
10 days following the day of discovery…well you know all that stuff don’t you?
The purser asks again to board, refueling still going ,so OK but 2 bridges required.
A pregnant pax having twins with a letter issued the 10th of OCT stating no complications and in
the 26th week. Today is NOV 12th so we are in the 31st. Therefore no problem we can accept her.
Ready to go now and we start the Engine at the gate and ask for the Pushback.
During the push and BEFORE the other engine start the F/O pushes the Status Key and there is
HYD DEM PUMP L displayed. Considerations?
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Preparing For Your Emirates Upgrade Section 3
Interview Process
I said to my self: 1 engine has started already so I would disregard that and go.
During taxi we Received Load sheet edition 2. What are your actions?
Stop, ATC evaluate the changes (3 PAX no bags minus 275 KG) Call SMNC to see if they’re part
of a group and continue.
I said it’s below minima ‘cause we need 150 for all the positions.
He said ok now RVR is within minima and you takeoff but you lose visibility at 75 Knots.
I said it’s below 80 so we Stop. He said ok, now you are airborne and around 2000 ft they tell you
to contact the company ASAP.
I said I would wait till above MSA then handover the control to the F/O and call the Company.
Tell the F/O to stop the climb and reduce the speed, declare a Mayday etc.. etc..
He wanted to know step by step the FOM actions for a RED ALERT in FLIGHT
Also having elected to return to DXB I decided to land below the minima
(Remember ? The weather is still cat 3 but we only have CAT 2 avail in DXB)
And also to use the Autoland that is not certified for overweight landing.
S.P called me back 5 minutes later and gave me the good news.
Instead of asking for radar vectors after declaring an Emergency with the ATC, it would have
been better to ask for a holding on the PPOS so you always know where you are.
Another point was that I assumed that the ATC would have provided the steps for the
precautionary disembarkation and I should have instead asked the Company.
Other than that I found the whole process very professional and relaxed.
They really want you to pass and I’m sure they already know if you gonna have problems. So my
advise is, study hard before the Interview and when is your turn, relax, be yourself and it’s going
to be very easy!........Best Luck!
I wasn’t prepared for this part of the interview, I was asked all the usual questions:
Did I know what to expect, Who had I spoken to regarding the interview?
Give an example of a confrontation you have had with a cabin crew member, how did I resolve
the situation? ( she wouldn’t let it go!!)
Weather :
TEMPO 9999
TEMPO 2000m HZ BR
You arrive at the aircraft and you notice the left cowling open…….what are your considerations?
I then went through everything like a normal line flight, went through the weather, I was asked
who would fly? What are the new F/O’s restrictions? Do I need a take off alternate? When do you
need a t/off alternate?
Engineer comes in and says it will take 2 hours to fix problem……your considerations?
He then put some times up on the board, and worked out that we would be out of duty time. How
can we extend our duty time? How much discretion can you go in to?
Two of the Philipino cabincrew then decide that they don’t want to operate because of going into
discretion……how would you handle them?
Finally engineer says plane is ready. He has fixed it and there are no MELs relating to this
problem, however, there is one already in the book. It is a category “C,” due to expire at mid night
tonight, before you land, can you go? How long is cat “C” MEL valid for?
Pushing back and F/O pushes STATUS button. “ HYD PRESS DEM R”….what do you do? Stop
push back / ATC/ tell engineer. He says cycle the switch, he has had this problem before. I asked
to be towed back to the gate and have him come and do it. This would add a further 20 min delay.
I stuck to my guns and asked to be pulled back in. Engineer comes in and sorts out prob. ( In the
debrief he told me I should have just done what the engineer asked and saved the 20min delay)
As we are taxiing out for dept, ATC says full length is not available…..my considerations? Stop/
new figures from laptop etc…
Depart, Abeam BKK, unable to get level requested, and FMC reserves are below what is required
( needed 6.1 tonnes and FMC showing 5.7 tonnes) Considerations?
When can you commit to destination? What are the criteria? ( he wanted to know exact wording
from the FOM)
Present were S.P and a lady from HR. HR began the proceedings with the usual touchy-feely
questions like: "Tell me when you had to be assertive; Tell me when you had a disagreement with
a captain or cabin crew; Tell me about a time in the airplane when you were pressed for time and
how you handled it."
After about a half hour of that, S.P took over with a flight scenario:
DXB-CMB-SIN
Due to traffic I'm arriving late at CBC so I was asked about the minimum requirement for Pre-
Flight Briefing.
As opposed to other candidates, I was not given any "real" paperwork. Instead Stefan wrote out
all the details on a whiteboard in his office.
Weather in DXB and SIN was good but rain and 4000 m forecast for CMB. Our destination
alternate was TRV with TEMPO indicating only 2500 m with ILS U/S. Applying the required
minima I requested a new alternate since TRV would be tight and in coordination with dispatch
we nominated GOA as the new alternate.
He asked who would fly the sector and after looking at the wx and crosswind I stated that I'd let
the F/O choose.
During the cockpit preparations and while passengers are boarding the APU suddenly quits.
"What are your actions?" Call engineering for power and A/C cart, summon purser to stop
boarding e.t.c. The APU can't be fixed so we will dispatch without it. "Your concerns?" ETOPS
restrictions, ground/pwr cart availability in CMB and SIN.
We also had another MEL (Category C) which would exceed 10 days in a couple of hours before
landing in CMB so he asked it we could go with that, and the answer was YES since the MEL is a
Pre-Dispatch document and unlike the daily check, a MEL validity can expire during flight. But, of
course in this case, repair would have to be done in CMB or a concession would be required.
Stefan put me as PF and during taxi-out in DXB we receive a new loadsheet, Final 2, with a ZFW
drop of 275 kg and minus 3 pax. "Your actions." Hand controls and ATC to FO, while I call load
control on the other radio to ascertain that the passengers' bags were not on the plane. He
seemed to be happy with that and I didn't have to elaborate any further. Then shortly before
taking the runway for departure we get a TCAS EICAS. "Actions?" Call MCC, explain the
situation, ask for suggestions, switch transponders, and consult the MEL. Stefan says the MEL
says (in this case) do not depart DXB. I express my desire to MCC to have it fixed, due to dodgy
ATC on both upcoming sectors but with an estimated time of repair (according to MCC) of 2:45
hrs and considering implications of FDP, I elect to depart without TCAS. I was then asked about
when you could use max discretion of 3 hrs versus 2 hrs.
Then we find ourselves on the ramp in CMB and after parking none of the power- or air-carts are
working and I'm asked for step-by-step actions. Advise ATC, Purser, and the Station that we will
need to keep one engine running for the whole ground stop. First the right engine for deplaning
and expedited boarding then cross-bleed-starting the left before shutting down the right so
baggage and cargo can be offloaded and loaded and fueling take place. I elect to take some
extra fuel to allow for this procedure.
The good news: I managed to convince him to give me the upgrade letter.
The bad news : The rumors about the interview being cancelled is ,well, still a rumor!
I prepared the way most guys did all the usual manuals, with particular emphasis on things like
fuel policy, flight planning, handling, safety and security, AWOPS, cold weather ops, Etops
(sounds like the entire FOM !). Memorise it if u can because if you can quote verbatim from
there in the first 5 mins, half the battle is won. FCOM Vol 1 ,the AFM, and the Document folder
on board are also good reading, especially the Supplementary procedures and limitations.
From my own experience, and from a few others who have gone before me, my 2 cents
worth….
The day itself; He was extremely pleasant and professional. He knows that it’s a big day for you
and tries to put you at ease. Establish a rapport with him early. He can be quite witty...end of
the day he’s not there to kill you. He needs to see that you are confident with ease and able to
laugh and relax during what is a really stressful point in your career. However, do not get lulled
into a state of being too relaxed as well, he is very good at that. He knows that you have read
the books backwards so the earlier you can show him this in the interview, the easier it will be.
But the most important thing that he seems to look for is a logical management model/style.
Anybody can repeat the numbers, but how you apply it in out of the box ,grey situations is the
clincher.
Alternate OMAL : 260/4, 4000m, HZ,NSC, 28/16, 1019, tempo 3000m HZ, BR, VOR DME
approach only
I went through the weather thoroughly e.g, DME : crosswind not a problem and weight more
than 250 tons so no limitations on Xwind limits, vis 3500m with tempo 1500m so no problem for
takeoff and for immediate return with a Cat 1 ILS, well above FO limits, BLSN is the runway
contaminated? No, only blowing snow, Ok so no RTOW issues, BLSN visually deceptive so
possible threat(include in threat briefing later), cloud, Temp, QNH ok, tempo is applicable, vis
already discussed, +SHSN confirm its dry snow because heavy wet snow is no go.
Similar weather analysis for Dest and Alt. Volunteer information even if he does not specifically
ask you, he wants to see your thought process.I told him that during the actual preflight brief, I will
pull out the adverse weather supp procedure and the Boeing deice/anti ice worksheet from the
blank forms folder and brief from there. I also spoke about Cold Wx Ops ( kind of precipitation,
kind of fluid,1 or 2 trucks, EK spray pattern or otherwise, comms via headset, if lose comms,
exchange mobile numbers etc..)
As you can see, DXB weather is not a factor, but OMAL is because we need circling or
NPA+200ft/1000m.I asked whether there is a circling approach and there was ,so need
1000(round up to nearest 100ft)+5km.Having gone through the Wx, I let the F/O fly if he wants
to. Was asked the criteria for takeoff alternate and FO minimums. If MEL restricts us to 120
Min ,are we still ETOPs? Yes we are. some questions on EETOPS, since I brought it up!
Q : Tech log is all filled in with a defect from the last sector, but not signed.
A ; I said will contact SMNC first to try to contact the Captain or FO,then call MCC to inquire
about any significant downlinks from the aircraft over the past 5 days or so. Eng has done a
transit check, and I will ask him to have a look in the onboard maint(CMC) computer have
any active leg faults that might impact the flight. SMNC calls back that unable to contact the
flight crew .I said I am happy to accept the aircraft as I have verified that the aircraft is fit for
service and will release and accept the aircraft in the tech log.I will also make a note in the
voyage record about what I have done.
I said I will call ATC to ask for dispensation to deice at the gate. Not allowed. So I said I will
need to keep one Engine running on the side of the aircraft that is not being deiced, ATC
doesn’t understand because of English problems : ( , I was on the verge of calling for our
stunning Russian cabin crew to translate : ), But I ask for the deicing chap to come upstairs and
explain my plan, he says no problem. (Ok, saved the stunning Russian for language lessons
later in the cruise!) So push to remote deice spot after 1 eng started at the gate with normal
de/anti ice one side at a time.
During taxi ,due congestion HOT time expired. I explained HOT protocol and said that as long
as a PCI is done before takeoff and the fluid is still effective with the wings clean, we can
takeoff. was asked how I was gonna conduct the PCI as well as the engine runups ( FO does
the PCI ,make sure he knows what he is looking for and eng runup one at a time to 50%N1/60
min)
Finally ,we takeoff and during cruise, of course a passenger falls sick! Medlink contact and page
for doctor, nurse…started looking for possible diversion spots. Purser comes back and informs us
that pax is worsening fast. Medlink prefers we go to Tiblisi. for the purposes of the scenario,
Tiblisi is an approved 777 alternate, wx was ok with Cat 1 ILS. Ran through my diversion
considerations quickly and decided to go to Tiblisi with the intent of dispatching myself out of
there considering FTL, dump if required to get myself no overweight, refueling ,tech support,
parking position if no B777 tow bar etc….went through all the actions step by step with me taking
control for the landing. after landing, considerations for quick getaway e.g: FTL, Captain’s
authority for refueling, Transit check, new OFP, ATC FLT PLN.
At the beginning he explained the interview, how it will be conducted and that he will be asking
me some HR questions and later some operational ones, giving me a sort of scenario.>
HR:
1. My aviation career
2. A time where I had to take a quick decision
3. A time where I had to go outside the FOM
SCENARIO:
On the bus to the airport snow starts to fall with temp of -1 C: what are your thoughts ... cold Wx
ops, Rwy, RTOW, de-icing, FO, engineer, purser, pax, planning: alternate AUH FCST with tempo
2000 BR: need to change it with RAK, same fuel on the OFP because 100nm, but new on ATC
flight plan.
RWY condition in DME: patches of ice 50% rwy: rwy is SSW because the contamination is more
than 25%.
MEL: CAT C expiring al 2359Z: we can go, in DXB the MEL needs to be fix. In cruise I will remind
DXB MC via acars.
De-icing is needed. In DME it is be done with Engs OFF and at a remote stand, not at the gate,
the OM and the engineer says.
While the last pax are boarding the APU ... quits, what are your actions:
1. EICAS + checklist
2. Talk to engineer to get an ext pwr
3. Talk to pax and advice them to be patient for a few minutes
... Now ... we still need to de-ice at a remote stand .... first I ask ground to de-ice at the stand but
they reply that for environmental reasons it's not possible.
I ask the F/O and the engineer if they have any suggestions ... we could start left engine, push
back to the de-icing remote stand, de-ice right side of the a/c.
Then stop the de-icing, x-bleed start right engine, shut down left one and de-ice left side of a/c.
We need to get extra fuel, 1 ton. Fuel truck gone, 2hrs wait. We can continue using the
contingency fuel.
HOT 2310-2330z. Time now is 2340z. what do you do? PCI and if the A/C is clean we can go.
At the hold short load sheet edition No.2: minus 270kgs and 3 pax missing.
I advice ground 3 minutes delay. I call ops and I find out that 2 of their bags are inside the A/C ....
I said that this is a security breach and that I need to off load them.
I request Ops to organize for refueling, deicing again and MC for a concession for the MEL
expiring at 2359z.
He then suggested that I could get in contact with FCDM and security in DXB.
They could have more info about these pax and their bags, like that they were in transit and the
bags travelled already on another flight ... or other details ...
He said that sometimes we need to go outside the FOM lines and be "creative" in order to bring
back an A/C.
Good luck.
Scenario:
MNL to DXB
Rain/ wind 120/15-22 (Crosswind)
During pushback ,prior to engine start /O push status page and you get a "Hydr Dem right", what
you do?
Ask to be pulled in and get the engineer to fix it.
REFUELING WITH PAX ON BOARD AND PURSER IS NOT HAPPY L5 GETTING PADDLE OF
WATER . Want it closed but ask for another one to be armed>
Close and manned and since there is no other door she needs to accept it.
During taxi TWR advice full length is not available and OPT doesn't;t have the intersection takeoff
point, considerations?
What are your considerations? What do you do? What do you say to your F/O, purser...
Min flt prep then quick brief to CC to leave CBC asap, brief in bus if necessary
Check F/O LVO qualify, LVO in OPS, check 10 AWO for T/O mins
Special brief for LVO ( slow taxi, cat II holding points, mel, t/o alternate, lights,...)
Extra fuel for ground ops in DXB (he asked me how much and I said 1 extra ton)
Calculate req fuel asap to determine max payload with load control
You arrive at the aircraft and you have a MEL CAT C item expiring today. Are you legal?
MEL is pre-dispatch doc so as long as you T/O before 2359 Z, you are ok
During taxi, new load sheet edition 2 from printer ZFW drop 285KG. What do you do?
Contact load control and ask what are the changes. He said 3 pax so you have to make
sure that they have no bags on board and if they are not part of a group
Red bomb warning just after T/O. What do you do in the correct sequence?
Push alt hold verify for obstacles (above MSA) transfer controls to F/O go to PINGO
Declare mayday std-by for intentions, NN check-list, purser to flight deck with NITS
Declare that you go back to DXB in emergency, ask for stairs at designated area
and fire brigade. Disregard overweight landing autoland and wx restrictions, you just want
to land asap. Update info with purser prior landing (precautionary/emergency evac).
4. Pre-Course Notes
1. Introduction
Congratulations on your award of a command assignment!
As you await the commencement of your training in excited anticipation you may well be feeling
somewhat daunted at the amount of work you will have to do in a relatively short time.
These notes are designed to help you focus on the key aspects of your new role and help make your
upgrade training as beneficial as possible.
We certainly do not underestimate the strong base of knowledge, expertise and experience that you have
gained as a First Officer. In many ways, Command Training will not teach you anything new. It will,
however, give you opportunities to develop and improve your leadership and management skills. This
process of improvement does not stop at your check to line. There will always be room for improvement
throughout your career as an Airline Captain.
You will find that your command training is consistent with the type of CRM training you have had in
recent years and it is consistent with the A.A.M. model, (discussed below). It is also useful to consider
how this training fits in with the flight operations mission statement “to operate Emirates’ aircraft in
the safest and most efficient way,” and in accordance with our strategic goals:
The safety message is one that we are very well aware of but it is worth emphasising that the pilots are
often the last line of defense. All parts of the Company should be working towards this goal, but there
may be times when you feel that this is not the case. As a Captain you may well have a wider
understanding of, and exposure to, safety issues than others in the organisation. You also have the
authority, supported by company policy and legislative force, to say ‘No!’.
As pilots we are often sceptical about cost-saving measures, but the simple fact is that we have to run an
airline cost efficiently, over time, if we are to stay in business. There are a number of ways that you, as a
Captain, will be able to contribute to this efficiency. Our industry has always been a competitive one and
this fact is unlikely to change. As a company we need Captains who are up to the challenge of making
their contribution towards improvements in efficiency. How we attract and look after customers is also
an important part of the profit equation. Whilst we do not have a great deal of face-to-face contact with
customers we should not underestimate the effects (positive and negative) of our communications with
them in building customer value.
In any company, especially large ones, maintaining staff motivation is a challenge. You may well
recognise periods in your career when personal motivation has slumped but as you are about to take the
most significant step in an Airline Pilot’s career your motivation level is probably high. As a Captain it is
worth reflecting on how you motivate those around you. The way you go about your job has the potential
to significantly enhance the people you work alongside. It affects not only your First Officer and Cabin
Crew, but also Engineers, Ground Staff and others.
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Preparing For Your Emirates Upgrade Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
2. Human Factors
You bring a unique combination of knowledge, skills and attitude with you as you embark upon your
training. These are all equally important, but it is fair to say that with the correct attitude, the other
factors will, in all likelihood, fall into place. It is therefore appropriate to spend some time focussing on
some of the human factor aspects of Captaincy.
2.1. Leadership
Leadership is a concept that is easier to recognise than it is to define. ‘Leadership’ is not a quality that
you either have or don’t have. It is a complex set of skills that can be learnt and continually improved,
upon with reflection and application. The whole of your command training is about leadership but here
are a few preliminary points to think about:
As a Captain you will hold an important leadership role by virtue of the authority vested upon you in that
position. It is important that you develop your own leadership style and have the confidence to back your
own judgement. You will have seen a variety of leadership styles and techniques throughout your career.
It is worthwhile thinking over some of the challenging situations that you have been involved in as a
crewmember. Were there particular techniques that the Captain used that were effective or ineffective?
It is also important to recognise that different leadership styles are needed in different situations.
Normal operations may allow for a participative style that would not be appropriate in an emergency. As
a Captain you must be able to quickly adapt to the situation. A ‘laissez-faire’ style in an emergency will
only exacerbate the problem, whilst an ‘autocratic’ style in normal operations will cause resentment and
frustration. One particular challenge that some of you will face is to be a newly qualified Captain flying
with First Officers that have thousands of hours more than you on type.
It is important that you do not abdicate your leadership. You have the authority that goes with your
position. Remember also that the First Officer is a very useful resource available to you.
Research and practical experience consistently point to team building as an important factor in team
performance. The key activity to facilitate team building is the pre- flight briefing. You have a lot to do
at Operations, but remember there will always be time constraints that make your job as a Captain more
difficult. When faced with these challenges it is often simply a matter of doing the best job in the time
available. A good briefing need not take up much time.
It is not necessary to labour the point regarding normal operations, but you should provide specific
information and guidance with respect to unusual or non-standard situations. The same applies to your
flight crew briefings, if necessary.
Team building is ongoing. It is not something that is restricted to the pre- flight stage. You can take
advantage of quieter periods in flight to communicate with your Purser and crew regarding any
operational needs. Team building with your First Officer is also something you should think about. This
may be a matter of discussing who flies which sector taking into account the weather, recency, alertness,
practice requirements, preferences and, of course, the destination.
Also a good team player does not shirk his or her share of the work.
2.3. Communication
The importance of effective communication will not be new to you but there are some points that are
worth emphasising as you focus on your new role. In Emirates we have a disciplined approach to using
standard terminology. This is vital as it is driven by the number of differing nationalities on the flight
deck. Miscommunication will occur, but being standard in your speech will keep these instances to a
minimum. The benefit of standard phraseology is that it defines a common vocabulary and provides
specific direction to deal with many operational situations. It is important, however, not to let our
communication be limited in situations where standard phraseology does not provide guidance. It is also
important to recognise that there is a wide variety of communications that occur on the flight deck.
Communication is not simply about passing information. There is also a social / relational aspect. You
are probably aware that as a First Officer you frequently used indirect communications to good effect.
As a Captain you need to be aware that much of the communication that you receive from subordinates
and other airline staff will be indirect. There may be times that you have to ask people to be more
specific with the information they provide if you think they are being too ‘socially sensitive’.
You, as the Captain, must establish a very open style of communication. You should ‘share the plan’
with your crew. This does not in any way undermine your authority. If fact it enhances it and promotes
the flow of information that will contribute to sound decision making.
Unofficial Document Page 3 of 10
Preparing For Your Emirates Upgrade Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
2.4. Decision-making
As a Captain, you make the decisions, but the process of decision making involves other crewmembers
and resources. The aim is to minimise risk whilst maximising the effectiveness and efficiency of the
operation. The decisions you will have to make will vary greatly in complexity and importance.
Sometimes your decision will be the first acceptable option (e.g. land ASAP in an emergency). At other
times it may be to find the optimal decision after taking into account many variables (e.g. A diversion
due to weather or maintenance requirements).
In your decision-making, keep in mind the operating priorities of Safety, Economy, Comfort, and
Schedule. It is always important to approach decisions in a thorough and constructive manner. A useful
mnemonic may help. The one that is provided in Emirates is A.A.M.
Firstly, when a problem occurs concentrate on flying the aircraft, then ensure a safe trajectory/phase of
flight and finally communicate. Aviate - Navigate - Communicate are the golden rules.
A -Assess the problem. (ANC, “Stay below the line,” time management)
A -Action the problem. (ECAM / EICAS / Recalls / Checklist / Plan)
M -Manage the needs. (Prioritise - Individual / Task / Group-Communicate)
Further essential reading is contained in your CRM course notes and in the Route Manual chapter one.
Remember that you are now the leader / manager of the situation, something you may have not practised
for some time. As the situation develops do not forget to evaluate your actions at each significant point,
or decision, in the ongoing situation.
You may also find it helpful to think about decision- making in the following terms:
Remember that it is your job to analyse the situation and find the critical limiting factor. It may one of
many things such as; time, fuel, runway length or even the weather. Stay below the line, ask questions
and ensure that you have all the relevant information, prior to embarking on a course of action. Some
seconds spent gathering information; planning and directing the instigation of that plan will save many
minutes later in the operation.
An important point to emphasise with regard to evaluation is what happens after the situation has been
dealt with. Some events require you to de-brief the crew at an appropriate time and place. You may also
have reporting requirements. For you own benefit, you should also evaluate your decisions that do not
require a formal report. Ask yourself what you did well and what you could do have done better to
handle a similar situation in the future.
Indeed as pert of your preparation you should study other Commanders decisions. You should analyse
their situations, with the benefit of hindsight, and without the stressor of time, to see if you agree with
the decisions made, and if not, decide what you would have done in similar circumstances. Indeed, if you
did not agree with their decisions you should also analyse why you did not agree and decide, perhaps at a
later date after further consideration, why you did not agree.
Early CRM programmes endeavoured to improve air safety by eliminating error. The focus was on
interpersonal issues and promoting a team concept. More recently it has been recognized that we operate
in an environment where systemic threats contribute to errors. From the mid 1990s it became apparent
that eliminating error completely was an unrealistic goal. Researchers changed tack somewhat and
attempted to record and classify threats and errors as they actually occurred on the Flight Deck. This
differed from much of the previous research, which reconstructed and analysed accidents and incidents
after the event. The findings from observing crews on normal scheduled flights indicate an average of
two errors per flight. (It could well be higher but the observers probably do not pick up every error that
crews make.) Fortunately most of the errors we make do not end in disaster, because of effective ‘error
management’. This is the process of correcting an error before it becomes consequential. Most errors
occur in the Taxi/Take Off/Climb/Descent/Approach/Landing phase, which probably is no surprise.
Another point worth highlighting is that crews that make intentional violations are also more likely to
make unintentional errors. This underlines the importance of adherence to SOP's and of knowing the
Company requirements as laid down in the OM-A (FOM). Workload management and contingency
planning also reduce errors and help crews deal with the errors they make.
2.6. Cognition
Our brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time.
It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. Restrictions in attention and filtering may
reduce the processing of sensory inputs therefore thought awareness and training we can implement
ways of overcoming these shortfalls. Some examples are: avoiding information overload, task sharing,
avoiding mindsets and practising psychomotor skills (‘motor-actions’).
2.7. Stress
Recognising the effects of stress in yourself and others is important if you are to understand that the
effect stress has on team performance. Stress is caused by a combination of external factors, workplace
factors and personality. Some level of stress is inevitable and, in fact, desirable in our workplace.
However, beyond a certain point, the cumulative effects of stress will cause performance to decline
possibly in a very rapid manner. There are many symptoms of acute and chronic stress and individuals
will vary in how they react.
Tunnel vision/fixation
Increased error rate
Perspiration/high heart rate
Sleeplessness/fatigue/inability to relax
Irritability
Depression/loss of interest in work
Long term health effects.
As well as coping with stressful tasks as a Captain, the Command Training process itself can be a
stressful time. On the whole, pilots are not particularly good at recognising stress and seeking assistance.
Hopefully an organised approach to your training and maintaining a healthy lifestyle will help avoid and
alleviate stress. If you do feel that stress is having a negative effect on your ability to do your job, don’t
ignore the assistance you can get. Often family and friends can be of great support and, perhaps, help
you keep things in perspective. Do not hesitate to discuss issues of concern with your Training Captains
and Fleet Training Manager. If it is necessary to take some time out or get expert assistance it is far
better to do this sooner rather than later.
Command training is hard work. There is a lot to cover and a high standard to achieve. It should not,
however, be an ordeal. Remember that the training system is designed to help you reach the standard, it
is not a hurdle designed to trip you up.
Hopefully conflict will not feature regularly in your everyday work. Effective team building and
communication will reduce the likelihood of conflict but it will inevitably occur from time to time. There
is no point being too prescriptive about how to deal with such occurrences as personalities and situations
will vary greatly, but here are a few points that may be worth considering.
Focus on the facts: Often conflict arises because not everyone has the same information and
remember, you may be the one that is missing the critical piece. Clarifying exactly what the problem
is, and why it is a problem will make it easier to resolve.
Focus on the task: Sometimes conflicts have little to do with the task at hand and can be a dangerous
distraction. As a Captain, it is important that you control the situation. In some cases, discussion
should be deferred until the appropriate time and place.
Refer to the appropriate documents and people: Sometimes conflict can be resolved by referring the
other party to the appropriate company documentation or by seeking the opinion of another suitably
qualified person. There is no point making a discussion of policy or procedure a matter for personal
argument.
Do it better next time: We all have situations that we know could have been handled more effectively.
As an effective Captain it is important that you reflect on your handling of difficult situations and think
of ways that you could improve your handling of them.
We are all different and have different ways that we prefer to take on new information and learn new
skills. Some learn well by observation, others prefer a hands-on approach. Some are quick at applying
general principles whilst others may prefer to see concrete examples. You are probably aware of what
learning styles and techniques work best for you. If you haven’t thought about it much, now is a good
time to start.
Your instructors and Training Captains will give you a clear idea of what is required, but it is up to you
to work out how to go about it. It is important to set out a disciplined timetable to make sure you cover
all areas. Remember that prior planning prevents a poor performance. It is also important that you
discipline yourself to take regular breaks whilst studying, and don’t attempt to work seven days a week
throughout your training and preparation.
As all pilots recognise, there is no such thing as a perfect flight. This is something you should become
even more aware of as a Captain, because your role has the added dimension of leadership. There will
always be areas that need improvement and, as we are all different, we each have different strengths and
weaknesses. It is also important that Emirates is a ‘learning organisation’, thus to continue to improve
there must be effective and constructive feedback.
The feedback that Captains provide is vital. This can be done through formal channels such as Captains
Special Reports and the Voyage Report and informally through direct contact with the appropriate
management. You also have the opportunity as a Captain to help other people improve by sharing
knowledge and experience. It is often easy to become discouraged in seeking to help improve the
organisation. Results tend not to be immediately visible and, due to organisational constraints, feedback
mechanisms to Captains are sometimes imperfect. However it is important that we maintain a positive
approach in this matter. In a rapidly changing environment, if you are not striving to improve as an
organisation, you are probably in decline.
3. Commercial Environment
We are working in an industry that has become increasingly volatile. Companies come and go. Fleet
structure and schedules change very rapidly here at Emirates. Whether we like it or not, we are business
managers in a very challenging economic environment. It is important that we understand the
commercial environment to ensure that we can make decisions that are appropriate. It is also important
to understand the public relations/customer satisfaction impact of our decisions. We may not need to
know a great deal about the balance sheet or profit and loss statement, but we should all have a clear
understanding of how our decisions can affect Emirates profitability.
On the cost side of the equation, fuel is the major variable expense for most airlines. You do not have to
justify the fuel uplift you decide on but the company would like to know, if just for statistical records,
why extra fuel was required.
Take the amount that you think is needed to do the job safely. However, where safety permits, we can
help reduce cost by carrying the flight planned amount. There are also a number of other ways we can
minimise our fuel burn, which you should consider. On a day-to-day basis, it is good to be aware of
actual fuel burn and sector time compared with planned figures. Also having an awareness of the
seasonal variations in delays in approach due to weather or traffic, i.e. WX in Male’ during the monsoon
and Traffic in Nice during the film awards or car race periods. Minimising delays within your power is
the other major cost contribution you can make. The cost of rolling delays is difficult to estimate but it is
certain to be quite significant when you consider the inefficiencies caused, not to mention the effect on
our customer’s satisfaction. Also the cost of an unnecessary diversion has to be judged in comparison to
carrying holding fuel.
On the revenue side, your main contribution is in terms of customer satisfaction. Obviously the primary
concern of your passengers is that you do your job safely. You can also contribute to high levels of
customer satisfaction through the way you interact with your passengers.
The main form of interaction you will have with customers is by way of the PA.
Timely supply of information is consistently reported as a key factor in customer satisfaction and this is
something that you can have a direct effect on. Guidance is given in the OM-A (FOM) on the use of the
Public Address System. Here are some further comments for you consideration:
Many pilots speak too fast. You will need to speak slower than normal conversation. About 100-125
words per minute is a reasonable guide.
It is useful to have a standard ‘spiel’ but try to vary it to make sure it does not come across as clichéd.
Try to sound (and be) sincere. Be honest, but you may have to be selective in the information you provide.
If you are trying to explain something complex or awkward, make notes before your PA to make
sure you communicate clearly.
Avoid using jargon or technical terminology.
Ask for feedback regarding clarity and volume from Pursers. This may not be offered unsolicited.
When travelling as a passenger, listen to PA's that are particularly effective or ineffective and
continue to improve your own technique.
4. Resource Base
As a Captain you have many resources available to you. These may be in the form of crewmembers;
ATC and manuals carried on the aircraft. There is also the resource of the Integrated Operations Centre
(IOC) available to you, SMNC, MCC and conference call facilities, and DNATA Movement Control
(MOCON). It is important that you have a good understanding of how the IOC and MOCON work and
what they can offer you.
It is anticipated that you will be given the opportunity to visit the IOC, MOCON and Engineering at
some stage in your training, (non-official personal visits are also allowed). In the meantime make sure
you are familiar with the various ways that you can contact them.
5. Knowledge Base
As an experienced airline pilot you already have a very solid knowledge base. A good understanding of
regulations, procedures and policies will help you to make consistently sound decisions. There are some
things that you should know from memory. Other areas require a ‘working knowledge’. There are also
things that you should not attempt to memorise, but should be able to be referenced efficiently when the
need arises. If it is not clear what sort of information fits into each category, your Training Captains will
help clear up any ambiguity.
Depending on your background and previous experience, your knowledge requirements will vary
slightly. You should however have a working knowledge of the OM-A (FOM), the LIDO and the
FCOM’s. You should concentrate on revising the areas that will affect you specifically as a Captain.
The sections below provide some general guidance.
On a day-to-day basis most of the requirements that affect our operation are covered comprehensively in
the OM-A (FOM). However it is important to have a good understanding of from where the
requirements are derived. It may also be necessary from time to time to refer to the primary document
for a greater understanding. The full CAR’s of the UAE and AIP’s of the countries we operate to are
kept at Flight Operations.
5.2. LIDO.
As mentioned above, it is best to work through the whole manual to revise all areas. Particular attention
should be made to your duties and responsibilities as an Emirates Captain.
You must be thoroughly conversant with Emirates SOP’s, as previously discussed. You should also
have a working knowledge of the Supplementary Techniques, FCOM bulletins and the OEB’s. You
should also revise Limitations and Abnormal and Emergency Procedures.
A general knowledge of all the FCOM’s is a decided advantage, during your Command Training. Also
the management of various emergency situations, i.e. who should be the PF / PNF, knowing what the
ECAM/EICAS or Checklist procedure is trying to achieve and what will be available to Aviate,
Navigate, and Communicate.
A working knowledge of the route manual is essential for you to properly prepare for your flight and
simulator training. You must be able to quickly extract information about diversion airports, DARD and
other less time critical information. Being familiar with the information in this manual will enable you to
prepare quickly and efficiently for both simulator and line training.
6. Skills
Manipulative skill is generally not a major point of difficulty in command training. You will have plenty
of opportunity for practice and, of course, a very good standard is expected. You may find however, that
as you settle in on the line your manipulative standard drops slightly as you are concentrating on the ‘big
picture’ aspects of the operation. It is important that you maintain your standards for a number of
reasons. One of which is to inspire confidence from your First Officer and the rest of the crew. You may
have to pick which sectors you fly to make sure you keep in practice. You should also bear in mind
recency requirements when planning your flying for the day.
7. Conclusion
These notes do not provide you with a recipe for success in your command training. Rather they are
designed to get you thinking about the general principles involved, so that you can prepare these
principles prior to putting them into place during your training and after your check to line. You will find
flying as a Captain very satisfying and enjoyable, but command is not without its challenges and
frustrations. You will have to be thoroughly conversant with a Captain's duties and responsibilities, and
be developing a high level of knowledge and understanding of many topics. Through training you will be
able to develop you skills and show an attitude that meets the company’s expectations.
We are all different and some people will pick up some aspects of the job quicker than others.
The important thing as a Captain is to ‘put it all together.’ Do not hesitate to seek extra assistance if you
need it. Your Training Captains and your Fleet Training Manager are in a position to help, should you
call upon them. We also recognise that the Captain’s position is not an easy one. Not every decision that
you make will be perfect, but it is important not to let fear of making a mistake inhibit you from
exercising confident command leadership.
All the very best with your command training and enjoy the view from the left-hand seat!
Please refer to the Ground school roster that has been issued to you via My Mint for the details of your course on a daily
basis. You may refer to the Crew Portal while on Sim Training. Crew Portal > Main Menu > Sim Roster
Please arrange to collect your training file from Flight Training Content Management team, Emirates Training College
(ETC), 2nd Floor. Please note that you are required to complete and submit a GCAA application form for your Licence to
the Flight Training Admin Assistants. This form will be available in your training file. Please complete Part 1; Part 2
(section 5) – circle “P2 deletion”; Part 3; Part 8; signature and date. This is a mandatory requirement.
Kindly submit a clear paper copy of the following to Flight Training Admin, ETC, 2nd Floor, as it is a mandatory
requirement to process your Licence with GCAA:-
• 1 copy - valid Passport copy - with passport holder's picture & details page.
• 1 copy - valid UAE visa page - The UAE visa endorsed page, please check if visa is not expired.
• 1 copy - valid & current UAE licence copy (ATPL) - showing both sides of the card on same page.
• 1 copy - valid & current UAE medical certificate or Temporary medical cert - showing both sides of the card on same
page.
• 1 colour passport size colour photograph on white background
On arrival at the College, please collect the visitor’s swipe card from the Security Desk in exchange of your ID or any other
identification card to gain access to Flight Operations Training. Please ensure you collect your ID card and return the
swipe card prior to leaving the College.
1. A paper copy of the FOM will be available for use during the ground school. The FOM can be collected from the
Flight Training Content Management on day 1 of your ground school. Please ensure you return the FOM on the
last day of your ground school.
3. The Crew Portal > Home Page > Training - Generic > Nomination as Commander, containing pre-reading
information on Command Preparation, Aviation Law and Rights of a Commander is to be reviewed before the
ground school.
4. Please familiarise yourself with A330 Nomination as Commander Training Manual which may be viewed on
Crew Portal > Home Page > Training Manuals > A330 Training
The transportation arrangements can be viewed from: Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training - Generic > Transport
Arrangements.
Note: In the event that a Flight Crew has to leave the Ground School Training session for any urgent reason/s, he/she must
inform either the FTSM or the relevant Training Chief before leaving the Training College.
As per the Company’s regulations you are required to attend in your Uniform.
Office Hours:
07:00 to 15:30 – Sunday to Wednesday
07:00 to 15:00 – Thursday
Please refer to the Ground school roster that has been issued to you for the date and time of your
course.
You may view the Classroom details mentioned on the roster that has been issued to you. The
Classroom Utilisation sheet is also posted on the CBT Area Entrance Door and in the FCTI’s Area at
the Emirates Training College (aircraft shaped building), Flight Training Department, 1st Floor. The
Classroom Utilization sheet can also be accessed from: Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training –
Generic > Class room Utilization Sheet
Most of the training courses are held at the Emirates Training College. However, if any of your
sessions are held at the Emirates Aviation College (EAC) Sim Building, the location can be viewed
from Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training – Generic > EAC SIM Building Class room Location
On arrival at the College, please collect the visitor’s swipe card from the Security Desk in exchange of
your ID or any other identification card to gain access to Flight Operations Training. Please ensure
you collect your ID card and return the swipe card prior to leaving the College.
Please find attached the Pre-reading material for your CRM Upgrade Course. Kindly read it thoroughly
as it forms an integral part of the course. Your attention is drawn specifically to the following:-
• American Airlines
• Swissair 111 Investigation Report – Exec Summary
CRM Pre-reading
2005.pdf (333 ...
The transportation arrangements can be viewed from: Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training
Generic> Transport Arrangements
As per the Company’s regulations you are required to come in your Uniform.
Office Hours:
07:00 to 15:30 – Sunday to Wednesday
07:00 to 15:00 - Thursday
The details of the visit are as follows (timings are approximate). You may refer to the location map
from: Crew Portal > Main Menu >
Training Airbus > Upgrade > New EK II Engg gate Location Map
Training Boeing > Upgrade> New EK II Engg gate Location Map
IOC(NCC)/Engineering Visits:
• Pick up from Training College at 1200hrs to arrive at the new EK Engineering Gate-EK II near
Hangar D for IOC (NCC)/Engg. visits at 1230hrs.
¾ Contact: IOC (NCC) - SMNC on Tel: 04-2182201 or 04-2991011/6061 at the security gate for
prior notification.
¾ Contact: Engineering – Base Shift Manager on 050-6458762 or 04-208 5259 for prior
notification and approximate finishing time at NCC.
¾ Contact: Mr. Francis T/ Mr. Sajith Thayath on Tel: 04-2181216/8, if you face any problems at
the Security. Mr. Ayman Murad El Hag (for gate passes) on Tel: 04-2181221.
• Return from IOC (NCC) / Engineering visit to Training College at 1515 hrs (approximately,
coordinate with bus driver).
If you foresee any delay or if you finish prior to the scheduled time, you can call Central Services on
2184538/2184539/2184540.
As per the Company’s regulations you are required to come in your Uniform.
• Visits should be strictly followed in the order as given below(timings are approximate):-
1st Visit - To IOC (NCC): 1230 - 1345 2nd Visit - To Engg. area: 1345 - 1500
• Please call the contact numbers mentioned above of the respective areas for tour co-ordination.
• Please contact the new Police EK II Gate Tel: 04-2151563 for the Gate passes, if delayed or if not
yet available at the Gate.
Office Hours:
07:00 to 15:30 – Sunday to Wednesday
07:00 to 15:00 – Thursday
(OLD COURSE)
Upgrade Ground Flight Operations Training
School Syllabus
DAY ONE
INTRODUCTION
Guidance will be given on how to be prepared and what expectations are to be anticipated,
however the Upgraders are to show that they are developing proficiency toward their new position. A
full description of the upgrade programme from Day 1 until the final line assessment is to be provided
by the Instructor.
COMPANY PROCEDURE
A FOM review; emphasis is placed on an Emirates Captains’ responsibilities and duties. Also
discussed are specific areas of the FOM where guidance is specified in how to conduct routine and
non-routine flight operations; the policies and procedures to be followed and circumstances where the
Captain, in the interest of safety, may take whatever course of action he deems necessary.
ENGINEERING
A visit to Network Control (IOC) and Engineering is conducted so that a wider understanding of
the whole operation is achieved and also provides the opportunity to ask operational and maintenance
related questions.
DAY TWO
FLIGHT SAFETY
The General Manager Flight Safety presents a summary of the departments’ functions. Procedures in
the case of an incident or accident, the requirements for reporting of air safety incidents are discussed
and a visual presentation of the FOQA programme. Specific areas and recent trends of ASIR are
highlighted; further discussion is invited from the participants.
DANGEROUS GOODS
This is a review of dangerous goods procedures and an update of new information in the new
IATA Dangerous Goods Manual. A Captain’s responsibilities in relation to the carriage of these goods
and applicable operational considerations are to be understood.
AIR LAW
Legal responsibilities, the boundaries and authority bestowed upon an Aircraft Commander
derived from International and Local Law are clarified with a review of the Chicago, Warsaw and
Tokyo conventions. The outcomes of recent legal cases in relation to notification of seatbelt usage are
discussed along with proposed changes to the UAE law, specifically in the handling of disruptive
passengers.
DAY THREE
DAY FOUR
PERFORMANCE
This is a review of FAR/JAR, ICAO, and Jeppesen requirements together with FCOM and EK
performance criteria and its practical application.
The review is assisted through the aid of a questionnaire to be completed as part of home study before
the course. The questions refer to various performance sections within the FCOM’s, which aren’t
usually employed in normal operations, however a detailed knowledge would be required in abnormal
situations.
Operational knowledge and the correct use of the laptop (BLT / LPC) in normal and abnormal
configurations is heightened through realistic examples.
SUITABLE AIRPORTS
Instruction is given on guiding principals in the selection of adequate and suitable alternate
airports in cases of technical and non-technical related in-flight abnormal/emergency situations, i.e.
where to go, how to proceed, continue, return or divert.
DIVERSIONS
Once the decision has been made divert, the procedures for operations to EK and non-EK station
airports are considered, i.e. re-plan a continued flight or preparing for an unscheduled night stop.
Guidance is provided on how and what expected tasks must be completed by the crew in an
unscheduled night stop at a non – EK airport.
FUEL MANAGEMENT
Details of fuel planning, normal and RRSV planning, plus in-flight considerations and
procedures when the flight is forecast to land with less than the Company Minimum Reserve (CMR)
requirement. Examples of various situations are given so that unnecessary diversions are avoided.
DAY FIVE
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
Major emergency and abnormal procedures/checklists are clarified. For example:
1. Emergency Electrical configuration
2. Dual engine flame out
3. Smoke / Toxic fumes
4. Fuel leak
5. Volcanic ash
6. Unreliable airspeed
Current Operational Engineering and FCOM Bulletins are reviewed.
MEL
A revision of the various sections in the MEL, specifically guidance is given in the practical
operational use of the MEL.
For their own protection, and in the Company's interests, Aircraft Commanders are expected
to have:
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International Aviation Law
This is the primary source of all UAE Aviation Law. This document contains the basic
provisions of UAE Aviation Law, and also specifically identifies acts which will lead to punitive
measures being taken against offenders.
• A term of imprisonment not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding fifty
thousand dirhams for piloting an aircraft when drunk to such an extent as to impair his
capacity to pilot the aircraft. Also the same penalties are legislated against a pilot-in-
command who has failed to enter the required information in the documents or record
of the aircraft, or who has altered such information (Article 69)
• A term of imprisonment not exceeding three years and a fine not exceeding one
hundred thousand dirhams, or either penalty, for carrying munitions or weapons of
war, or committing smuggling (or the intent to smuggle), (Article 70)
This document contains the detailed administrative provisions required to implement the Civil
Aviation Law. This document is amended biannually. Copies of this document are kept in the
Emirates Operations Centre (E.O.C.)
The Conventions are prepared by the ICAO Legal Committee, and are then agreed to and
signed by a number of States. After a pre-determined number of States become "signatories"
to the Convention, it is said to be in force.
After a State becomes a "signatory" to the Convention, it is expected that the State will enact
"enabling legislation" to enact the Convention under local law. Be aware that it is not
uncommon for a State to be a signatory to a Convention, but has failed to pass enabling
legislation.
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International Aviation Law
The Chicago Convention established the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO),
which formally came into being on May 13, 1947.
The aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and
techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and
development of international air transport so as to:
(a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation
throughout the world;
(b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful
purposes;
(c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air
navigation facilities for international civil aviation;
(d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular,
efficient and economical air transport;
(e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable
competition;
(f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully
respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to
operate international airlines;
(g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States;
(h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation;
(i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international
civil aeronautics. (The Chicago Convention, Article 44)
Annexed to the Chicago Convention are the following annexes that constitute the basis of air
law as the pilot knows it:
Annex 1 - Aircrew Licensing
Annex 2 - Rules of the Air
Annex 3 - Met. Services for International Aviation
Annex 4 - Aeronautical C harts
Annex 5 - Units of Measurement
Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft
Annex 7 - Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks
Annex 8 - Airworthiness of Aircraft
Annex 9 - Facilitation
Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecommunications
Annex 11 - Air Traffic Services
Annex 12 - Search and Rescue
Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident Investigation
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International Aviation Law
Annex 14 - Aerodromes
Annex 15 - Aeronautical Information Services
Annex 16 - Environmental Protection
Annex 17 - Security - Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of
Unlawful Interference
Annex 18 - Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air
Of particular relevance to the Airline Commander are Annex 2 Rules of The Air, and Annex
11 Air Traffic Services. Extracts from both of these Annexes are found in the Jeppesen
Manual, Air Traffic Control Section.
Extracted from ICAO Document 8168 (Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Aircraft Ops.
[PANS-OPS].)
Outlines the parameters that instrument procedures are based on, to emphasise the
necessity of compliance with charted procedures.
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International Aviation Law
Extracted from Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services
(PANSRAC - Doc. 4444)
Contains excerpts from Joint Airworthiness Operations (JAR-OPS) legislation. The Joint
Airworthiness Authority (JAA) comprises a number of European States that have agreed to
harmonise aviation legislation across their jurisdictions. A State is said to be “JAR Compliant” if it’s
aviation legislation is in accordance with JAR-OPS requirements.
State variations to ICAO Standards. It is necessary to review this section to verify if a State has
enacted non-ICAO procedures (e.g., holding speeds, communication procedures, emergency
procedures, classification of airspace, etc.). For example, Saudi Arabia “SCATANA” procedures and
TIBA procedures, China and C.I.S. states Emergency Descent requirements, U.K. TMA Holding
speeds and required call on initial contact with Radar Departure.
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International Aviation Law
Signatory States to the Chicago Convention agree that over the High Seas, the Rules of The Air (with
no State differences) shall apply to all aircraft.
In Summary
The Aircraft Commander is legally responsible for the disposition and safe operation of the
aircraft (Annex 2 and Annex 6). It is his responsibility to ens ure that all legal requirements
have been met before accepting flight plans and accepting the aircraft from maintenance.
The Company has a legal obligation to the local regulatory authority to ensure that
appropriate protocols are in place to meet all legal requirements, however, the Aircraft
Commander must remember that in most areas, he bears final legal responsibility.
Failure to take all reasonable actions to ensure all legal requirements are met could be
considered as negligence, or breach of "duty of care". Deliberate failure to observe any rule
could be considered as reckless conduct or wilful misconduct.
The Montreal Convention primarily focuses on the rights of passengers and consignors to
claim for damages for death, injury, damage or loss of baggage or goods. The Convention
applies a principle of “strict liability” up to a nominal sum, (e.g., for the death of a passenger,
the carrier is strictly liable for a sum of 100,000 Special Drawing Rights [SDRs,
approximately US$135,000]).
For a plaintiff to be awarded sums in excess of the limit of strict liability, it is incumbent upon
the carrier to prove that:
(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier, or
its servants and agents; or
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third
party. (Article 21)
The implications for the aircraft commander are that plantiffs will attempt to prove that the
actions of the Captain were a causal factor in the damages claimed against, and that these
actions were negligent, wrongful, or constituted an omission that the normal pilot should not
make. If the court accepts that this was the case, the carrier’s liability is unlimited. Under the
now defunct Warsaw Convention, it was necessary to prove that the Carrier or its agents
acted recklessly, or with wilful misconduct. It is probable that it is now easier to prove that the
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carrier or its agents acted negligently or did not perform an act that was contributory to the
damages claimed against.
The Warsaw Convention primarily provided protection for carriers, and specified limitations of
liability for carriers. The Montreal Convention howeve r primarily protects the rights of
passengers and consignors. The carrier is burdened with the requirement to prove that it or
its agents did not act in a negligent manner to preserve limits of liability.
For the Montreal Convention to apply, the following tests must be satisfied:
• the plaintiffs injury or damages are directly related to the flight in question (for
passenger injury or death, the event must occur on the aircraft, or in the
process of embarkation or disembarkation [Article 17]).
Under the Warsaw Convention, plaintiffs had to prove that the Carrier or its agents acted
recklessly. Historically Courts have found Aircraft Commanders to have acted recklessly
under the following circumstances
• For failure to switch on the seat belt sign when entering an area of
forecast turbulence (Goldman v. Thai Airways International, [1983])
The Judge's finding in this case was predicated on the fact that the
Airline's Flight Operations Manual (which was presented as evidence
in Court) stated explicitly that the seat belt sign was to be switched
on before entering an area of forecast turbulence.
In all these cases, having proved wilful misconduct or reckless conduct (depending on
whether the Warsaw Convention or the amending Hague Protocol applied), the plaintiff was
then able to claim damages in excess of the Warsaw Convention limits of liability. In the U.S.,
particularly, the pecuniary damages awarded may be extraordinarily high, as the U.S. law
system allows the award of punitive damages to express societal disapproval.
The implications to the Aircraft Commander are obvious, be aware of the fact that your best
defence in the event of an accident or incident is to prove that you followed manufacturers,
and company procedures to the letter! Any procedural shortcut could be considered grounds
for negligence in a Court of Law.
protocol's intent is to ensure that such acts do not go unpunished. States party to this
Convention are obligated to take all measures to restore control of the aircraft to its
commander, or to preserve his control of it.
The Tokyo Convention defines the acts to which its provisions apply:
The Tokyo Convention makes specific reference to the powers of the Aircraft Commander.
Additionally specific licence is granted to the Aircraft Commander to disembark any person,
suspected of committing any act as specified in Article 1:
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2. The aircraft commander shall report to the authorities of the State in which
he disembarks any person pursuant to this Article, the fact of ,and the reasons
for, such disembarkation. (The Tokyo Convent ion, Article 8)
The powers of the Aircraft Commander take effect when the aircraft is in-flight, the exact
definition of when the aircraft is in-flight is found in Article 5:
For any action taken in accordance with this Convention, complete exemption from liability is
specified:
For actions taken in accordance with this Convention, neither the aircraft
commander, any other member of the crew, any passenger, the owner or
operator of the aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf the flight was
performed shall be held responsible in any proceeding on account of the
treatment undergone by the person against whom the actions were taken.
(The Tokyo Convention, Article 10)
The UAE
The UAE is a signatory to the Tokyo Convention (Effective date 15/7/81). The Tokyo
Convention is mentioned specifically in the introduction the UAE Civil Aviation Law
document where reference is made to Federal Decree No. 9 (1981), which recognises the
UAE’s accession to the Tokyo Convention.
The Tokyo Convention is also specifically mentioned in the UAE Civil Aviation Regulations,
Part 7, the relevant section is reproduced below:
(b) Hague Convention 1970: contracting states agree to make the seizure of an
aircraft by force or intimidation - "hijacking" - an offence punishable by severe
penalties; and to make offenders subject to prosecution or extradition;
The UAE, unlike other legal jurisdictions, does not elaborate in law in matters relating to the
Tokyo Convention. Most jurisdictions specifically legislate against certain acts mentioned in
the Tokyo Convention, and specifically mention punitive measures that may be taken against
offenders. The UAE Civil Law does make mention of certain criminal acts on board aircraft,
the relevant section is reproduced below:
Notice under paragraph one, that an act of violence is mentioned specifically in relation to
possible danger to the safety of the flight!
Aircraft Commanders should also be aware that in the event of a passenger suffering injury or
death whils t under restraint, civil action would probably be taken against the Aircraft
Commander for breach of his duty of care to the passenger. The implications of this are
obvious, should a passenger be restrained, ensure that he/she is placed under close
supervision for the remainder of the flight!
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In Summary
• The Aircraft Commander has the power to restrain any passenger who he/she suspects
of committing, or being about to commit an offence, or any act that compromises good
order and discipline on board the aircraft.
• Pursuant to this Convention, the Aircraft Commander has the right to have any person
disembarked in a signatory country. All signatory States agree to receive any passenger
offloaded in such circumstances.
• According to this Convention, the Aircraft Commander's authority takes effect the moment
the external doors are closed.
• In the event of action being taken against a passenger, make careful notes of the events,
preferably with a timeline, and take the names of passengers who could supply evidence
at any later enquiry.
Taxying Accidents/Incidents
Should the aircraft suffer an accident or incident during taxy, the local legislation of the State
I which the aircraft is located would apply. No International Conventions would be applicable
in this instance.
The UAE
In the UAE, an accident during taxy which resulted in death/injury or damage to property
would be treated in a similar manner to a road accident! The Local Police authorities would
take action based on the Statutes relating to road law.
In conversation with the Dubai Airport Safety Officer, it was verified that agreement has been
reached between Dubai Police and the Airport Safety Officer, that the Safety Office will
exercise jurisdiction in any incident related to aircraft ground taxying
In Summary
• In the event of a taxying accident, remain with the aircraft (quoting safety concerns), until
the Company has been notified of the circumstances, and appropriate legal assistance
has been obtained.
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• If a passenger requests to disembark the aircraft, and this can be done without major
disruption or inconvenience, you must allow them to do so. Failing to allow a
passenger to disembark in these circumstances could conceivably result in a civil action
against the Aircraft Commander for "false imprisonment".
Diplomats
• Diplomats enjoy a high level of immunity from legal process. The specific document of
International Law which documents this is the “Vienna Convention on International
Relations and Optional Protocols (1961)”. This document, of course, does not relate
specifically to aviation, but deals with the way that diplomats, diplomatic mail, and
diplomat’s possessions are dealt with, and the immunities that they enjoy.
Carrying Deportees
• In some jurisdictions (e.g., Australia and Singapore), the Aircraft Commander shares
responsibility with the Operator for landing an individual with unsatisfactory
documentation.
• If you are required to carry a deportee, ask to see the notice of deportation. (Note: The
Flight Operations Manual [FOM] specifically states that the Captain must be informed
when Deportees [DEP] or Inadmissible [INAD] passengers are carried.)
• The Immigration authorities can authorise the offload of a commercial passenger to allow
the carriage of a deportee.
• In Air Law there is no "right of innocent passage" as in Maritime Law. All transits of
another State's airspace must be pre-arranged in bilateral negotiations. Be able to quote
overflight clearances when queried.
• Every State has the right to search any aircraft. In the event of being involved in such a
search, ensure the authorites are accompanied by aircraft crew, (quoting safety
concerns).
• Any State has the right to demand that an aircraft in it’s airspace land and be searched.
Customs Authorities
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• Customs Authorities have broad reaching powers to search and detain. Unlike the Police
they do not have to show reasonable cause to conduct a search. Co-operate at all times,
if they wish to search an aircraft, ensure that they are accompanied by aircraft crew.
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In Summary
• When interviewed - cooperate fully with the accident investigator and the Police.
Limit your statements to descriptions of events, do not speculate, or attempt to
apportion blame in any way.
The material presented in this document is presented as information to promote awareness of legal
matters. The above does not constitute legal advice per se. To obtain legal advice consult an
accredited Aviation Lawyer!
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http://icarus.iasl.mcgill.ca/
For information on ICAO, refer to the following Internet address:
http://www.icao.org/
Books
Diederiks-Verschoor, I.H.Ph. (1997), An introduction to air law (6th. Ed.). The Hague, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International
Gifis, S.H. (1996), Law dictionary (4th Ed.). New York: Barron's Educational Series
Goldhirsch, L.B. (2000). The Warsaw convention annotated: A legal handbook. The Hague,
The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International
Pengilley, W & McPhee, J. (1994), Law for aviators. Sydney, Australia: Legal Books
Unmack, T. (1999). Civil aviation: Standards and liabilities. London, U.K.: LLP Professional
Publishing
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Intentionally Left Blank
Rights and responsibilities of an
Aircraft Commander
A330 Training Department
Rights and Responsibilities
of The Aircraft Commander Flight Operations Training
The following references are drawn from the United Arab Emirates Civil Aviation
Regulations, issue 2003-2, issued 1/7/2003, valid until 1/1/04.
(a) Deviation from track: if the aircraft is off track, action shall be ta ken
forthwith to adjust the heading of the aircraft to regain track as soon as
practical.
(b) Variation in true airspeed: if the average true airspeed at cruising level
between reporting points varies or is expected to vary by plus or minus 5
per cent of the true airspeed, from that given in the flight plan, the
appropriate ATC unit shall be so informed.
(c) Change in time estimate: if the estimate for the next applicable
reporting point, flight information region boundary or destination
aerodrome, whichever comes first, is found to be in error in excess of three
minutes from that notified to ATC, or such other period of time as
prescribed by the appropriate ATS authority or on the basis of air
navigation regional agreements, a revised estimated time shall be notified as
4.4.1 The pilot in command shall be responsible for the safety of all crew members,
passengers and cargo on board the aircraft when the doors are closed. The pilot in
command shall also be responsible for the operation and safety of the applicable
aircraft from the moment:
(a) the aeroplane is ready to move for the purpose of taking off until the
moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the flight and the engine(s)
used as primary propulsion units are shut down, or
(b) the helicopter engine(s) are started until the helicopter finally comes to rest
at the end of the flight, with the engine(s) shut down and the rotor blades
stopped.
4.4.2 The pilot in command shall be responsible for reporting all known or suspected
defects in the aircraft to the operator, at the termination of the flight.
4.4.3 The pilot in command shall be responsible for notifying the nearest appropriate
authority by the quickest available means of any accident involving the aircraft,
resulting in injury or death of any person or substantial damage to the aircraft or
property.soon as possible to the appropriate ATS unit.
4.4.4 The pilot in command shall ensure that the checklists specified in this Subpart are
complied with in detail.
4.4.5 The pilot in command shall be responsible for the journey log book or the general
declaration containing the information listed in Subpart B.
4.4.6 The pilot in command shall not permit any activity during a critical phase of
flight, which could distract any flight crewmember from the performance of his or
her duties and interfere in any way with the proper conduct of those duties. For
the purposes of this paragraph, critical phases of flight includes all ground
operations involving taxi, takeoff and landing, and all other flight operations
conducted below 10000 feet, except cruise flight.
1.5.2 Authority
When immediate actions are necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft or of
persons or property on board the aircraft, any crew member and any other person
on board an aircraft may (without the authority of the Pilot-in-Command), take
such reasonable measures including restraint. As he has reasonable grounds to
believe, such situations would be deemed to have been so critical, from a safety
viewpoint that no time was available to obtain the authority of the Pilot-in-
Command, for instance:
(a) to prevent a person from opening an aircraft door; or
(b) to prevent self -inflicted bodily harm to any person on board an aircraft.
Note: Criminal or civil proceedings could be brought against crew members for
assault or false imprisonment if restraining measures are applied other
than in good faith and in circumstances as described above. Crew
members finding it necessary to act without the authority of the Pilot-in-
Command, can expect to be protected by law provided the action can be
proved to be reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. The
interpretation of what is "reasonable and necessary" may be difficult for
an individual CCM to determine. The use of immediate and direct
measures to restrain a person will be rare and only employed when the
safety of the aircraft or persons or property on board is at immediate risk.
Contents
Note, wherever possible, all accident reports are taken from the official findings, edited for sake of brevity
On 23 September l999, at about 2247 local time, a Qantas Boeing 747-438 aircraft registered VH-OJH (callsign
Qantas One) overran runway 21 Left (21L) while landing at Bangkok International Airport, Thailand. The overrun
occurred after the aircraft landed long and aquaplaned on a runway which was affected by water following very
heavy rain. The aircraft sustained substantial damage during the overrun. None of the three flight crew, 16 cabin
crew or 391 passengers reported any serious injuries.
The first officer was the handling pilot for the flight. The crew elected to use flaps 25 and idle reverse as the
configuration for the approach and landing. in accordance with normal company practice (since December 1996).
At various stages during the approach to runway 21L, the crew were informed by air traffic control that there was a
thunderstorm and heavy rain at the airport, and that visibility was 4 km (or greater). At 2240, a special weather
observation taken at Bangkok airport noted visibility as 1,500 m and the runway visual range (RVR) for runway 21
Right (21R) as 750 m. The Qantas One crew was not made aware of this information, or the fact that another
aircraft (callsign Qantas 15) had gone around from final approach at 2243:26. At 2244:53, the tower controller
advised that the runway was wet and that a preceding aircraft (which landed at approximately 2240) reported that
braking action was ‘good’.
The Qantas One crew noted no effect from the weather until visibility reduced when the aircraft entered very heavy
rain as it descended through 200 ft on late final approach. The aircraft then started to deviate above the 3.15 degree
glideslope, passing over the runway threshold at 169 kts at a height of 76 ft. Those parameters were within company
limits. (The target speed for the final approach was 154 kts, and the ideal threshold crossing height was 44 ft.)
When the aircraft was approximately 10 ft above the runway, the captain instructed the first officer to go around. As
the first officer advanced the engine thrust levers, the aircrafts mainwheels touched down (1,002 m along the 3,150
m runway, 636 m beyond the ideal touchdown point). The captain immediately cancelled the go-around by
retarding the thrust levers, without announcing his actions. Those events resulted in confusion amongst the other
pilots, and contributed to the crew not selecting (or noticing the absence of) reverse thrust during the landing roll.
Due to a variety of factors associated with the cancellation of the go-around, the aircraft's speed did not decrease
below the touchdown speed (154 kts) until the aircraft was 1,625 m or halfway down the runway.
The investigation established that, during the landing roll, the aircraft tyres aquaplaned on the water-affected
runway. This limited the effectiveness of the wheelbrakes to about one third of that for a dry runway. In such
conditions and without reverse thrust, there was no prospect of the crew stopping the aircraft in the runway distance
remaining after touchdown. The aircraft overran the 100 m stopway (at the end of the runway) at a speed of 88 kts,
before stopping 220 m later with the nose resting on an airport perimeter road.
The depth of water on the runway when the aircraft landed could not be determined but it was sufficient to allow
dynamic aquaplaning to occur (i.e. at least 3 mm). The water buildup was the result of heavy rain on the runway in
the preceding minutes, and possibly because the runway was ungrooved.
During the examination of the performance of the aircraft on the runway, it became evident that the flaps 25/idle
reverse thrust landing procedure used by the crew (and which was the 'preferred' company procedure) was not
appropriate for operations on to water-affected runways. The appropriate approach/landing procedure was flaps
30/full reverse thrust. This had the characteristics of a lower approach speed, of being easier to fly in terms of speed
control and runway aim point (for most company pilots), and of providing maximum aerodynamic drag after
touchdown when the effectiveness of the wheelbrakes could be reduced because of aquaplaning Had this
configuration been used, the overrun would most probably have been avoided.
As with other company B747-900 pilots, the crew had not been provided with appropriate procedures and training
to properly evaluate the potential effect the Bangkok Airport weather conditions might have had on the stopping
CRM Course Pre Reading Page 4
performance of the aircraft. In particular, they were not sufficiently aware of the potential for aquaplaning and of
the importance of reverse thrust as a stopping force on water-affected runways.
No evidence of fire was found during the post-accident examination of the aircraft.
After the aircraft came to a stop, the flight crew initiated a process of gathering information from the cabin
concerning the extent of the aircraft damage. The failure of the passenger address and cabin interphone systems was
a major hindrance to the crew s efforts to assess the situation in the cabin. Some important information regarding
the cabin environment and the external condition of the aircraft did not reach the flight crew. In addition, there were
gaps in the information available to the flight crew, the possible significance of which was not considered by them
in deciding whether or not to keep the passengers on the aircraft. The captain assessed that the appropriate response
was to wait for outside assistance and then conduct a precautionary disembarkation, rather than initiate an
immediate evacuation.
Normal radio communications between the aircraft and the control tower were lost for a few minutes after the
aircraft came to a stop. Additionally, the aircraft could not be seen from the tower because of the reduced visibility
and the emergency response vehicles were restricted to sealed surfaces by the wet conditions. These issues
contributed to the emergency response vehicles arriving at the aircraft about 10 minutes after the accident.
Approximately 20 minutes after the accident, the crew initiated a precautionary disembarkation from the right side
of the aircraft using the emergency escape slides. Although the disembarkation was achieved largely without
incident, there were arguably sufficient 'unknowns' concerning the condition of the aircraft, and possible related
hazards, for an earlier evacuation to have been conducted
On 23 Aug 2000, at 1930 local time, Gulf Air flight GF-072 from Cairo, an airbus A320, crashed at sea 3 miles
north-east of Bahrain Airport.
GF-072 was cleared for a VOR/DME approach for Runway 12 at Bahrain. 1 nm from touchdown at an altitude 600
feet, the crew requested a left hand orbit, which ATC approved. Having flown the orbit beyond the extended centre-
line on a south-westerly heading, the crew initiated a missed approach. Observing the manoeuvre, the ATC offered
a Radar Vector which the crew accepted. GF-072 crossed the runway on a north-easterly heading with a shallow
climb to 1000 feet. GF-072 entered into a descent until impact. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all
143 persons on board were killed.
The Flight
The airplane had been cleared to land on Rway 12 at BAH, but crashed at sea 3 miles NE of the airport soon after
initiating a go-around following the second landing attempt. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces, and all
143 persons on board were killed. Night, VMC existed at the time of the accident. According to the cockpit voice
recorder (CVR), the captain was performing the pilot-flying (PF) duties, and the first officer was performing the
PNF duties.
At 1921:48, as GF-072 was descending through approx 14,000 feet amsl and 30 nm north-west of Bahrain,
Dammam App gave the following instruction to GF-072:
Gulf Air 072, uh, self navigation for 12 is approved. Three point five (3,500 feet) as well approved and Bahrain
Approach (127.85 MHz) approved.
Several seconds later, the captain asked, “Gulf Air 072, confirm we can go for 12?” Dammam App responded,
“Affirmative. Three approves (approvals) you have. Direct for one two (Runway 12). Three point five (3,500 feet)
approved. (127.85 MHz) approved.”
The CVR then recorded the captain instructing the first officer to contact Bahrain Approach. After the first officer
made contact, Bahrain Approach stated, “……cleared (for) self position and, uh, as you’re cleared by Dhahran.
Confirm 3,500 feet.”
The CVR then recorded the captain telling the first officer, “tell them we are cleared to 7,000 feet.” The first officer
complied and Bahrain Approach responded again to flight GF-072 to continue descent to 3,500 feet.
After the flight-crew began executing the approach checklist, Bahrain Approach instructed GF-072 At 1923:21 to
continue descent to 1,500 feet and report when established on the VOR/DME for Runway 12.
At 1923:36, the CVR recorded the first officer asking, “V bugs?” and the captain responded, “V bugs, 136, 206
knots, set.”
At 1924:38, the CVR recorded the captain saying to the first officer, Now you see you have to be ready, for all this,
okay? If (it) change on you all of a sudden, you don’t say I’ll go. You have to know DME. If you can make it or
not. Okay? This was followed by another comment by the captain, Now, I’ve just changed all the flight plan,
RADNAV, everything for you, before you even blink. Yeah? Okay Ammy?
At 1925:15, with the airplane 9 nm from Runway 12, 1873 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 313 knots, the captain
stated, “final descent is seven DME.”
At 1925:37, with the airplane 7.7 nm from Runway 12, 1715 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 272 knots, the captain
instructed the first officer to “call established”.
At 1925:45, 7 nm from the runway, Bahrain Approach cleared GF-072 for the VOR/DME approach to Runway 12
and instructed the flight to contact Bahrain Tower.
At 1926:00, the CVR recorded the captain saying, “final green”,
At 1926:04 the first officer contacted Bahrain Tower and stated that GF-072 was “eight DME, established.” Tower
controller then cleared GF-072 to land and reported wind from 090 degrees at eight knots. The first officer
acknowledged the transmission.
At 1926:13, with the airplane 5.2 nm from the runway, 1678 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 224 knots, the captain
called for “flaps one.” Seconds later, the captain called for “gear down”, and FDR data subsequently showed the
landing gear moving to the gear-down position.
At 1926:37, the CVR recorded the captain stating, “Okay, visual with airfield.” Seconds later, FDR data showed
the autopilot and flight director being disengaged.
At 1926:49 and 2.9 nm from the runway, the airplane descended through 1,000 feet AGL.
At 1926:51, with the airplane 2.8 nm from the runway, 976 feet AGL, and 207 knots, the captain stated, “Have to
be established by five hundred feet.” Flaps “two” were then selected. As the flight continued on its approach for
Runway 12, the captain stated at 1927:06 and again at 1927:13, “….we’re not going to make it.”
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At 1927:23, the captain instructed the first officer to “Tell him to do a 360 left (orbit).” The first officer complied
and the request was approved by Bahrain Tower. The left turn was initiated 0.9 nm from the runway, 584 feet AGL,
and an airspeed of 177 knots. During the airplane’s left turn, FDR data showed the flap configuration going from
flaps “two” to flaps “three” and then to flaps full.
At 1928:17, the captain called for landing checklist.
At 1928:28, with the airplane approximately half-way through the left turn, the first officer stated, “landing
checklist completed.” After three-fourths of the 360 turn, the airplane rolled out to wings level. FDR data showed
that the airplane’s altitude during the left turn ranged from 965 feet to 332 feet AGL, and that the airplane’s bank
angle reached a maximum of 36 degrees.
At 1928:57, after being cleared again by Bahrain Tower to land on Runway 12, the captain stated, “…we overshot
it.” FDR data then showed the airplane beginning to turn left again, followed by changes consistent with an increase
in engine thrust.
At 1929:07, the captain stated, “tell him going around” and FDR data indicated an increase to maximum TOGA
engine thrust. Bahrain Tower responded with, “I can see that. 072 sir uh….would you like radar vectors….for final
again?” The first officer accepted, and Bahrain Tower instructed the crew to, “fly heading 300, climb (to) 2,500
feet.” The first officer acknowledged the transmission. During this time, the flaps were moved to position “three”
and the gear was selected up. FDR data showed that the gear remained retracted until the end of the recording.
At 1929:41, with the airplane at 1054 feet AGL, at an airspeed of 191 knots, and having just crossed over the
runway, the CVR recorded the beginning of a 14-second interval of the aural Master Warning 11 (consistent with a
flap-overspeed condition), followed by the statement from the first officer, “speed, overspeed limit…”
Approximately two seconds after the beginning of the Master Warning, FDR data indicated a forward movement of
the captain’s side stick. The captain’s side stick was held forward of the neutral position for approximately 11
seconds, with a maximum forward deflection of 9.7 degrees reached. During this time, the airplane’s pitch attitude
decreased from 5 degrees nose-up to 15.5 degrees nose-down, the recorded vertical acceleration decreased from
+1.0 “G” to +0.5 G’s, and the airspeed increased from 193 knots to 234 knots.
At 1929:51, with the airplane descending through 1004 feet AGL at an airspeed of 221 knots, the CVR recorded a
single aural warning of “sink rate” from the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), followed by the repetitive
GPWS aural warning “whoop whoop, pull up”, which continued until the end of the recording.
At 1929:52, the captain requested, “flaps up.”
At 1929:54, the CVR indicated that the Master Warning ceased for about 1 second, but then began again and lasted
about 3 seconds. Approximately 2 seconds after the GPWS warnings began, FDR data indicated movement of the
captain’s side stick aft of the neutral position, with a maximum aft deflection of approximately 11.7 degrees
reached. However, the FDR data showed that this nose-up command was not maintained and that subsequent
movements never exceeded 50% of full-aft availability. FDR data indicated no movement from the first officer’s
side stick throughout the approach and accident sequence.
At 1929:59, the captain requests, “flaps all the way” and the first officer responded, “zero.” This was the last
comment from the crew recorded on the CVR, which stopped recording at 1930:02. The FDR data showed
continuous movement of the flap position toward the zero position after the captain’s “flaps up” command. The last
flap position recorded on the FDR was 2 degrees of extension. The last recorded pitch attitude was 6 degrees nose-
down and last recorded airspeed was 282 knots. FDR data indicated that TOGA selection and corresponding
maximum engine thrust remained until the end of the recording. FDR data indicated that during the go-around after
selection of TOGA thrust, GF-072 was initially at a 9 degree nose-up pitch attitude. However, the pitch attitude
gradually decreased to 5 degrees nose-up over the next 25 seconds, where it remained until the captain’s forward
sidestick commands resulted in nose-down pitch changes.
Note: All information collated from, official accident investigation findings on the Bahrain Airport Official Website
American Airlines Flight 1420 crashed after it overran the end of the runway at Little Rock, Arkansas, during a
breaking thunderstorm on the night of June 1999. Many of the 139 passengers and 6 crew on the flight where
injured and the Captain and 10 passengers died in the accident.
The weather conditions were appalling. The official investigation’s review of the meteorological data showed 46
lightning strikes occurred within five miles of the centre of the airport in the five-minute period leading up to the
crash.
Witnesses reported torrential rain, strong gusty winds and intermittent golf ball-sized hail.
Flight 1420’s departure was more than two hours late from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport in Texas,
because bad weather had delayed the arrival of the aircraft intended for the flight.
The first officer was concerned. He notified gate agents that the flight would need to depart by 2316 because of
duty time limitations. He then telephoned the flight dispatcher to suggest he get another aircraft for the flight, or
cancel it.
Another aircraft was substituted, and the flight departed at 2240.
Shortly after departure, the flight crew received a warning indicating that the weather around Little Rock might be a
factor during the arrival. The dispatcher suggested the flight crew expedite the arrival to beat the thunderstorms if
possible.
At 2304, another weather advisory (SIGMET) was issued for an area of severe thunderstorms that included the
Little Rock airport area.
The cockpit voice recorder indicated that the flight crew discussed the weather and the need to “expedite the
approach”.
About 2325 the captain (flying) said, “we got to get over there quick’. Five seconds later, the first officer said, “I
don’t like that lightning’.
The flight crew had the city of Little Rock airport area in sight about 2327. When the crew contacted Little Rock air
traffic control seven minutes later, the controller advised that a thunderstorm northwest of the airport was moving
through the area and that the wind was gusting to 44kts.
About 2339 the controller notified flight 1420 of a windshear alert. The flight crew then asked for a change of
runway to ensure a headwind during landing.
After the crew advised the controller that they had lost visual contact with the airport, they were cleared for an
instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 04R.
At 2347:53, seconds after the captain called for “landing gear down”, the controller issued a second windshear alert.
The flight crew did not acknowledge this transmission.
According to the cockpit voice recorder, at 2350 the first officer said, “We’re way off”. One second later the captain
said, “I can’t see it”. Three seconds afterward, the first officer asked, “got it?” to which the captain replied, “Yeah, I
got it”. Flight data indicated the aircraft touched down on the runway about 2350:20.
Four seconds after touchdown the first officer stated, “We’re sliding”. Flight data indicates that over a seven-second
period after touchdown, both thrust reversers were deployed. The spoilers did not deploy symmetrically at
touchdown, but a momentary eight degree deflection of the left outboard flight spoiler concurrent with a left aileron
deflection was recorded.
At 2350:36, flight data indicated a full 60 degree deployment of the right inboard flight spoiler, concurrent with a
full aileron deflection.
The aircraft was swerving out of control as it careered down runway 4R. It crashed through a chain fence and a
metal ILS structure and pitched over an embankment, before coming to rest at the edge of the Arkansas River.
Tragedy: There on the river’s marshy banks, the smoking MD-82 lay broken in pieces, while passengers and crew,
many of them injured, scrambled to safety through exits and fissures in the hull.
From the wrecked cockpit of the aircraft, the co-pilot called American Airlines’ operations centre with his cell
phone. Flight 1420 had crashed. His captain lay dead next to him. Ten passengers had died in the crash and 110
people were injured. In the control tower the controller was making frantic efforts to contact the flight crew. In the
poor conditions, he could not see the aircraft and requested Flight 1420 report that it was clear of the runway. There
was no response. He tried five times over the next two minutes, before alerting rescue and fire fighting units that
Flight 1420 was down on runway 4R.
The delayed emergency response was among several factors investigators examined during a 28-month inquiry into
the crash by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
The NTSB found the delayed emergency response was a result of a communication failure between the tower
controller and the rescue response team. The team was directed by the tower controller to go to the end of runway
4R which they interpreted as going to the “4R” painted on the runway. The misunderstanding took them away from
the crash site.
The Safety Board considered whether a shorter rescue response time could have prevented any fatalities, but
concluded passenger lives would not have been saved if emergency responders had arrived on the scene earlier.
The NTSB report recommended annual briefings between airport tower and fire and rescue personnel, to ensure
they had a common understanding of the local airport emergency plan.
Investigators found the immediate reason the aeroplane roared off the far end of runway 4R was the crew’s failure
to arm the spoilers prior to landing. In the 26 seconds between touchdown and flight data recorder shut-off, there is
no indication that the crew took belated action to manually deploy the spoilers.
Procedures: The investigation also found American Airlines’ procedures regarding spoiler operation at the time of
the accident, differed from other carriers operating DC-9/MD-80/MD-90 series aircraft.
At American, the practice was for the pilot not flying to arm the spoilers by moving the handle on the centre
console to the armed position, and then moving the appropriate switch on the carrier’s mechanical landing checklist
to indicate that the spoilers had been armed.
The process did not require a verbal call-out and read-back between both pilots, the practice at other carriers. Nor
was a positive call-out of spoiler deployment required at American, as it was at other carriers operating the same
type of aircraft.
NTSB investigators found a variance between practices taught during simulator training sessions, and actual
practice “flying the line’. In simulator training, the pilot not flying would arm the spoilers, but during actual flight
operations where the captain was the pilot flying, the captain would often arm the spoilers, as the handle is on the
left side of the console.
The pilot not flying might not notice, due to the absence of a requirement for positive verbal dual-confirmation that
the spoilers were armed. Flight crews should verbally confirm arming of the spoilers, and conduct a call-out of
spoiler deployment after touchdown.
Without spoilers, Flight 1420 was doomed to overrun. The aircraft touched down about 2,000ft from the threshold
of the 7,200ft runway. As the pilot flying, the captain had elected to use manual brakes, but delayed using them
until 11 seconds after touchdown. He made aggressive use of reverse thrust, exceeding the maximum 1.3 engine
pressure ratio (EPR) authorised for landing on wet runways.
Overrun: In a last minute effort to maintain control, as the aeroplane swerved down the runway, the right engine
recorded a maximum 1.9 EPR, and the left hit 1.7 EPR. Because the spoilers were not deployed, the aircraft could
not stop in time.
Computer simulations showed if the spoilers had been used, even with an 11 second delay in braking and the use of
reverse thrust as actually recorded during the incident, the aeroplane could have been stopped with about 700ft to
spare.
Investigators were also concerned that the landing was attempted at all in the face of the severe thunderstorms
moving across the airfield. Flight 1420 flew into a wall of thunderstorms on its final descent to runway 4R
Comments on the cockpit voice recorder indicate that the flight crew was aware of the weather and wanted to
expedite the arrival. However, the cockpit voice recorder did not contain any discussion about the possibility of
holding to allow the storm to pass or diverting to one of the alternative aerodromes.
A Massachusetts Institute of Technology study of airline thunderstorm penetrations published just two days after
the crash at Little Rock, found pilots were more likely to penetrate convective weather when they were:
• Near the destination airport rather than further away.
• Following another aircraft.
• More than 15 minutes behind where they ought to be, based on the nominal flying time scheduled for the
trip.
• Flying after dark.
Factors: Three of these four factors were present in the case of Flight 1420. The flight was more than two hours late
departing, it was dark, and the convective weather “blanketed” the airport and its immediate surroundings.
Investigators believe the final approach to runway 4R should have been aborted. Among the many reasons they
cited, was the aircraft’s unstabilised approach. Twenty seconds before touchdown the first officer (not flying)
remarked, “We’re way off”.
The final flap setting to 40 degrees, which should have been completed as the aeroplane descended through 1,000ft
above ground level (AGL), was not completed until 900ft AGL. Nor was the aeroplane on a proper flight path for
imminent landing, as shown by the computerised reconstruction of the final descent, and by the first officer’s belief
that the aircraft was not stabilised for landing at 400ft AGL. Among its nearly 40 conclusions, the NTSB said, “It is
imperative that air carriers have specific approach criteria’
Fatigue: The crash occurred after the crew had been on duty for 13.5 hours, and awake for more than 16 hours.
Flight 1420 was the end of the first day of a three-day sequence for the flight crew.
As the aeroplane descended for landing at Little Rock, first on Runway 22L, then on Runway 4R, the crew’s
apprehensions about the situation mounted. They became task fixated as a result of fatigue and stress. Despite
having plenty of fuel to abort the landing, they painted themselves into a corner.
Evan Bryne, a human factors expert with the NTSB, cited three examples of fatigue at work in the events leading to
the accident:
Checklist — improper execution of the pre-landing checklist, in which the spoilers were not armed, possibly due to
the forgetfulness, distraction and inattention to detail that are some of the effects of fatigue.
Recall — the momentary confusion of the final flap setting before landing. Twelve seconds after the crew had
descended through 1,000 feet, the first officer said:
“Want 40 flaps?” when the flaps were set to 28 degrees. The captain replied: “Oh yeah, I thought I called it.”
Failure to confirm that the landing gear was down and locked is another indication of forgetfulness aggravated by
fatigue. The captain commanded gear down at 1147:44, but positive confirmation, as required by the carrier’s
procedures, was never given.
At 2142 (est) on December 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965 (AA965), a Boeing 757-223, on a
regularly scheduled passenger flight from Miami to Cali, Colombia, operating under instrument flight rules
(IFR), crashed into mountainous terrain during a descent from cruise altitude in visual meteorological
conditions (VMC). The accident site was near the town of Buga, 33 miles northeast of the Cali VOR
(CLO). The airplane impacted at about 8,900 feet mean sea level (msl), near the summit of El Deluvio
and approximately 10 miles east of Airway W3. Of the 155 passengers, 2 flightcrew members, and 6
cabincrew members on board, 4 passengers survived the accident.
Both the captain and first officer were in his office about 40 minutes before the required check-in time,
and appeared to be in good spirits.
According to the AA flight dispatcher at MIA, AA965 was delayed about 34 minutes, waiting for the arrival
of connecting passengers and baggage. The flight departed the gate at 1714, and then experienced
another ground delay of 1 hour 21 minutes that the flight dispatcher stated was related to gate
congestion due to airport traffic. AA965 departed MIA at 1835, with an estimated time enroute to Cali of 3
hour 12 minutes.
AA965 was cleared to climb to flight level (FL) 370 [3]. The route of flight was from MIA through Cuban
airspace, then through Jamaican airspace, and into Colombian airspace, where the flight was cleared to
fly direct from BUTAL to the Tulua VOR (ULQ)
At 2103, AA965 Bogota Center again cleared the flight from its present position to ULQ, and told the
flight to report when they were ready to descend. At 2110, AA965 communicated via ACARS with AA's
System Operations Control (SOC) center, asking for weather information at Cali. At 2111, Cali weather
was reported as clear, visibility greater than 10 kilometers, and scattered clouds. At 2126:16, AA965
requested descent clearance. The flight was initially cleared to FL 240 and then to FL 200. At 2134:04,
the flight was instructed to contact Cali Approach Control (Approach).
AA965 contacted Approach at 2134:40. The captain, making the radio transmissions said, "Cali
approach, American nine six five." The approach controller replied, "American niner six five, good
evening. go ahead." The captain stated, "ah, buenos noches senor, American nine six five leaving two
three zero, descending to two zero zero. go ahead sir." The controller asked, "the uh, distance DME from
Cali?" The captain replied, "the DME is six three." The controller then stated, "roger, is cleared to Cali
VOR, uh, descend and maintain one, fve thousand feet. altimeter three zero zero two.... no delay expect
for approach. report uh, Tulua VOR." The captain replied, "OK, understood. cleared direct to Cali VOR.
uh, report Tulua and altitude one five, that's fifteen thousand three zero.. zero.. two. is that all correct
sir?" The controller stated, "affirmative." The captain replied at 2135:27, "Thank you. At 2135:28, the
captain informed the first officer that he had "...put direct Cali for you in there."
At 2136:31, Approach asked AA965, "sir the wind is calm. are you able to [execute the] approach [to]
runway one niner? ( "VOR DME Rwy 19" and "ILS RWY 01") The captain responded, "uh yes sir, we'll
need a lower altitude right away though." The approach controller then stated, "roger. American nine six
five is cleared to VOR DME approach runway one niner. Rozo number one, arrival. report Tulua VOR."
The captain, replied, "cleared the VOR DME to one nine, Rozo one arrival. will report the VOR, thank
you sir." The controller stated, "report uh, Tulua VOR." The captain replied, "report Tulua."
At 2137:29, AA965 asked Approach, "can American airlines uh, nine six five go direct to Rozo and then
do the Rozo arrival sir?" The Cali approach controller replied, "affirmative. take the Rozo one and runway
one niner, the wind is calm." The captain responded, "alright Rozo, the Rozo one to one nine, thank you,
American nine six five." The controller stated, "(thank you very much) [8].... report Tulua and e'eh, twenty
one miles ah, five thousand feet." The captain responded, "OK, report Tulua twenty one miles and five
thousand feet, American nine uh, six five."
thirty eight miles north of Cali, and you want us to go Tulua and then do the Rozo uh, to uh, the runway,
right to runway one nine?" The controller answered, "...you can [unintelligible word] landed, runway one
niner, you can use runway one niner. what is (you) altitude and (the) DME from Cali?" The flight
responded, "OK, we're thirty seven DME at ten thousand feet." The controller stated at 2140:25, "roger.
report (uh) five thousand and uh, final to one one, runway one niner."
The CVR recorded the flightcrew's conversations as well as radio transmissions. At 2140:40, the captain
stated, "it's that [expletive] Tulua I'm not getting for some reason. see I can't get. OK now, no. Tulua's
[expletive] up." At 2140:49 the captain said, "but I can put it in the box if you want it." The first officer
replied, "I don't want Tulua. let's just go to the extended centerline of uh...." The captain stated, "which is
Rozo." At 2140:56, the captain stated, "why don't you just go direct to Rozo then, alright?" The first
officer replied, "OK, let's...The captain said, "I'm goin' to put that over you." The first officer replied, "...get
some altimeters, we'er out of uh, ten now."
At 2141:02, Cali Approach requested the flight's altitude. The flight replied, "nine six five, nine thousand
feet." The controller then asked at 2141: 10, "roger, distance now?" The flightcrew did not respond to the
controller. At 2141:15, the CVR recorded from the cockpit area microphone the mechanical voice and
sounds of the airplane's ground proximity warning system (GPWS), "terrain, terrain, whoop, whoop." The
captain stated, "Oh [expletive]," and a sound similar to autopilot disconnect warning began. The captain
said, "...pull up baby." The mechanical voice and sound continued, "...pull up, whoop, whoop, pull up."
The FDR showed that the flightcrew added full power and raised the nose of the airplane, the spoilers
(speedbrakes) that had been extended during the descent were not retracted. The airplane entered into
the regime of stick shaker stall warning, nose up attitude was lowered slightly, the airplane came out of
stick shaker warning, nose up attitude then increased and stick shaker was re-entered. The CVR ended
at 2141 :28.
The wreckage path and FDR data evidenced that the airplane was on a magnetic heading of 223
degrees, nose up, and wings approximately level, as it struck trees at about 8,900 feet msl on the east
side of El Deluvio. The airplane continued over a ridge near the summit and impacted and burned on the
west side of the mountain.
When entering navaid information into the database, the navaid identifier is used as the key identifier.
This means that the letter R is the default value for the Romeo NDB and the Rozo NDB. Since the
Bogota city and airport is larger than Cali, the larger airports are entered sequentially at the beginning to
satisfy the greatest amount of users. The letter R was entered for the Romeo NDB as the "key" to the
navaid. Therefore, when using most FMSs, entering the letter R when in Colombia will call up the Romeo
NDB since it is the identifier for the Romeo NDB.
When the Rozo NDB was entered into the database, the letter R was attempted, but the computer
rejected the letter R since it had already been used for the Romeo NDB. According to the ARINC 424
standards, when a duplicate exists, the name of the NDB can be used as the identifier for entry into the
database. In the case of Rozo, since the name is four letters or less, the complete name of Rozo was
used as the identifier.
Simulations found that when R was entered into the CDU, a white dashed line pointed off the map
display towards the east-northeast. When R was "executed," the airplane turned towards R (in the City of
Bogota) and the white dashed line turned to a solid magenta colored line on the display.
Source Contents
PNF I don't understand why you do not try a zero-five VOR DME after all
PF Because the zero five VOR DME, we've got to arrive here, leave, go to God knows where, and come back
again (*)
PNF Ah, yes, OK
PF If not, it's necessary to go out to 11 STR, that makes eleven, 22 miles means another 10 minutes' flight (*) (*)
PNF Sierra Echo identified
PF I'v set you the return track to STR eh, ... zero-five-zero
PNF OK
PF We'll do the pre-descent procedure
PNF (*)
PF I doesn't matter
PNF I'm ready
PF Pre-descend checklist
PNF ECAM status checked. Speed bugs
PF They are set
PNF Standby altimeter
PF One thousand and twenty-three
PNF One thousand and twenty-three, altimeter (*) checked. Engine anti-ice
PF To OFF
PNF FMGS parameters inserted and the harnesses
PF (*)
PNF Checklist completed. We descend in one minute, it's OK?
PF In one-and-a-half minutes, two minutes, we've enough time
PNF Air Inter one four eight Delta Alpha we'd like to descend in one minute
CTRL Delta Alpha descend level one hundred thrity
PNF To one hundred thrity, we'll descend Delta Alpha
CTRL Delta Alpha heading to ANDLO
PNF Heading to ANDLO correct?
CTRL Affirmative
PF To?
PNF ANDLO
PF ANDLO, oh there, they are a nuisance (*)
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha what's your heading to ANDLO?
PNF Our heading is zero fifty three to ANDLO
CTRL Delta Alpha, maintain heading zero fifty-three until further advised
PNF We'll maintain until further advised. Ah, I say, Reims, their control there (*) that one goes to Epinal
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha continue descent to level seventy
PNF Continuing descent to seventy Delta Alpha
PF There we're of. Idle open
PNF Idle open descent
CA Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our descent. We ask you to please return to your seats. Thank you
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha the level on descent
CRM Course Pre Reading Page 15
PNF (*) one fifty descending to seventy Delta Alpha
CTRL Delta Alpha received, no more restrictions on heading, contact Strasbourg one twenty dot seven. Goodbye
PNF No more restrictions on heading one twenty seven, Strasbourg approach, good day. Air inter one hundred
forty-eight Delta Alpha
CTRL One hundred forty-eight Delta Alpha, good day. Proceed to ANDLO. Your distance?
PF (*)
PNF Yes ANDLO, and we are at twenty-two nautical DME from STR
CTRL Received, continue the descent to five thousand feet QNH one thousand twenty-three call ANDLO five
thousand feet
PNF Five thousand feet, thousand twenty-three, we'll call ANDLO five thousand
PNF There one thousand...
PF And sixty (*).
PF Safety height twenty-two. OK it's alright... five thousand two hundred feet ... twenty one ... OK it's good.
PNF (*)
PF One thousand and five ... we'll do the procedure at two thousand ... initial approach (*) eleven thousand
twohundred feet now.
PNF OK.
PF TOP
PNF No. Eleven thousand feet, one thousand five..one thousand five not one thousand eight
PF Yes it's one thousand eight
PNF One thousand twenty-three that makesone thousand five.
PF One thousand five?
PNF For Delta Alpha, you confirm Fox Echo one thousand five, zero five correct?
CTRL The Fox Echo is one thousand five, zero five and QNH one thousand twenty-three
PNF Thank you Sir. One thousand five. Ten thousand four hundred...
PF Ten thousand four hundred feet ready, now
PNF It's correct. it's OK. Checklist initial approach Baro ref altimeters set compared. Seatbelts ON.
PF It's set
PNF Engine anti-ice OFF for the moment (*)
PF No
PNF Marker selected to listen on righthand side. Engine mode selector set to normal. Checklist completed
PF We're passing ANDLO
PNF We're passing ANDLO, Air Inter Delta Alpha, level ... er! Sorry seven thousand five hundred feet, descending.
CTRL Received one hundred forty-eight Delta Alpha, you are number one for te VOR DME zero five, call passing
the VOR in final
PNF Number one for the VOR DME zero five
PNF We could ask him to confirm the cloud base now... how many miles?
PF Ten miles. It's not going to work, tell him, we'll make a ...
PNF Yes, 'maxi maxi'. Confirm cloud base Strasbourg?
CTRL We have three-eighths at elevenhundred feet and six-eighths at two thousand six hundred feet
PF That's good
PNF Yeah, we planned to proceed Sierra Echo, do an ILS, then an indirect for zero five.
PF [Chime] (*)
CTRL Received Delta Alpha
PF What's the temperature?
PNF The temperature...?
CTRL Delta Alpha, initially maintain five thousand, QNH, one thousand twenty three and as there will be three
takeoffs on zero five, you may have to hold in the stack at five thousand feet.
PF We'll have to go back to doing a VOR DME procedure ... then ...
PNF We'll go back to the VOR DME procedure at this time then
CTRL OK
PF We would not have made an India Mike descent like that of they had told us beforehand, but there we are, we're
arriving flat out
CTRL Delta Alpha ... Strasbourg
PNF I'm listening to you
CTRL If you want I can take you on the radar to bring ou to ANDLO at five thousand
PF Er! Yeah, that's good
PNF Yes
CTRL OK! Then six one zero zero, turn left heading two hundred thirty
PNF Sixty-one zero zero and heading two hundred thirty to the left
CTRL There you are, that will save you time
PF (*)
PNF Thank you
? I'll give you zero five (*)
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CTRL Maintain five thousand on reaching it and until ANDLO, the QNH is one thousand twenty three
PNF QNH one thousand twenty-three, maintaining five thousand.
PF The distances there ... er! ... Ah yes, there (*) overhead the 250 moving out to eleven STR, we repass ANDLO
on the track and we leave at eleven STR .. 4500 feet, nine STR, 3800, seven, three,two hundred. In case of go
around we climb on the centreline
CTRL Delta Alpha, six nautical radial two hundred ninety for Strasbourg
PNF Received Delta Alpha
PF The coud-break is made on zero fifty. It's a slope of 3 point five er! five point five ... That is three (*) three.
PF We'll select anti-ice (*).
PF And the lot, the wings as well.
PNF Yes
PF What's up?
PNF It's nice and new, but that's what's wrong
PF Yes, yes, there is ice on it.
PF It's crazy, eh? When you're not ready the time it takes to get to five thousand feet to ANDLO flat out. It doesn't
work eh? And also at ... what ... ten miles from final.
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha turn left (*) heading ninety, zero nine zero
PNF Heading ninety, zero nine zero to the left Delta Alpha
PF Flaps to one
PNF Flaps to one. (*) One
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha continue left turn to establish yourself on zero fifty one, you are four miles from ANDLO,
passing left of ANDLO
PF OK
PNF Received, we will call established on QDM zero fifty one
CTRL Affirmative sir
PNF We will (*) (*)
PNF Il aurait fallu qu'tu ouvres au zero sept zero
PF Yeah, yeah
PNF At least
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha passing right of ANDLO, authorized (*) final approach VOR DME zero five
PNF Delta Alpha
PF Flaps to two
PNF Flaps to two, (*) two
PF Gear down
PNF I'll prepare the lights without putting them on
CTRL Delta Alpha call the VOR on final
PF OK
PNF Call the VOR on final (*) pass eight hundred feet
PF (*)
PNF On centerline. (*) Half a dot from centerline. There is is, it had been at sixty, it's good, you see here
[Two hundred] - radio altimeter callout
End of Recording
The following is an executive summary of the report by the Transportation Safety Board of
Canada (TSB) into the accident involving Swissair Flight 111 near Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia, on
the night of 2 September 1998. The aircraft, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 with 215 passengers
and 14 crew members on board, was on a scheduled flight from New York to Geneva
Summary of Occurrence
About 53 minutes after departure, while flying at Flight Level 330 (about 33,000 feet), the flight
crew smelled an abnormal odour in the cockpit. A small amount of smoke became visible in the
cockpit; then, it is likely that the smoke stopped entering the cockpit for an undetermined length of
time. The flight crew assessed that there was an anomaly associated with the air conditioning
system.
After conversing with air traffic services, the flight crew decided to divert to the Halifax
International Airport in Nova Scotia, Canada. While the flight crew was preparing for the landing
in Halifax, they were unaware that a fire was spreading above the ceiling in the front area of the
aircraft.
About 13 minutes after the abnormal odour was first detected, the aircraft's flight data recorder
began to record a rapid succession of aircraft systems-related failures. The flight crew declared
an emergency and indicated a need to land immediately. About one minute later, radio
communications and secondary radar contact with the aircraft were lost, and the flight recorders
stopped functioning. About five and one-half minutes later, at 10:31 p.m. Atlantic daylight saving
time (ADT), the aircraft crashed into the ocean about five nautical miles southwest of Peggy's
Cove, Nova Scotia, Canada. The aircraft was destroyed and there were no survivors.
Summary of Findings and Board Recommendations
Approximately 98 per cent of the aircraft, measured by weight, was recovered. From the
examination of the pieces of wreckage, it was determined that a fire had occurred in the forward,
overhead area of the aircraft. Portions of the front section of the aircraft were reconstructed to
allow a thorough analysis of potential ignition sources, and to assess how the fire propagated.
It was determined that the fire most likely started from an electrical arcing event that occurred
above the ceiling on the right side of the cockpit near the cockpit rear wall. The arcing event
ignited the flammable cover material on nearby metallized polyethylene terephthalate (MPET)
covering on the thermal acoustic insulation blankets. As the fire spread across the surface of the
insulation blankets, other flammable materials became involved, including silicone elastomeric
end caps, hook-and-loop fasteners, foams, adhesives, thermal acoustic insulation splicing tapes,
and metallized polyvinyl fluoride (MPVF) insulation blanket cover material. The fire progression
was rapid, and involved a combination of these materials that together sustained and propagated
the fire.
Material Flammability
The Board concluded that aircraft certification standards for material flammability were
inadequate, in that they allowed the use of materials that could be ignited and sustain or
propagate fire
Initial Wire Arcing
Reconstruction of the wreckage indicated that a segment of arced electrical cable associated with
the in-flight entertainment network (IFEN) had been located in the area where the fire most likely
originated. The Board concluded that the arc on this electrical cable was likely associated with the
fire initiation event. The Board also concluded that it is likely that one or more additional wires
were involved in the lead arcing event, and that the additional wire or wires could have been
either IFEN or aircraft wires. Therefore, it could not be concluded that the known arcing event on
the IFEN cable located in the area where the fire most likely originated was by itself the lead
event.
During the course of the investigation, in efforts to find and eliminate potential ignition sources in
MD-11 aircraft, more than 70 Airworthiness Directives have been promulgated by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). These airworthiness directives required various measures to be
taken, such as one-time inspections of wires and electrical components, primarily in the front
ceiling area of the aircraft.
During the lead arcing event, the associated circuit breaker or breakers did not trip. The Board
concluded that, although the type of circuit breakers used in the aircraft, including those used for
the IFEN, were similar to those in general aircraft use, the circuit breakers were not capable of
protecting against all types of wire arcing events. The Board recommended that a certification test
regime be mandated that evaluates aircraft electrical wire failure characteristics under realistic
operating conditions, and against specified performance criteria, with the goal of mitigating
against the risk of igniting nearby flammable material.
There was no information available to indicate that the SR 111 crew reset circuit breakers.
However, during the course of the investigation, it became evident that the circuit breaker
CRM Course Pre Reading Page 18
resetting philosophy and procedures varied considerably among manufacturers, operators, flight
crews, and maintenance personnel throughout the industry. While considerable standardization
has taken place during the course of the investigation, the Board is calling for clearer guidance
from regulators.
Fire Detection and Suppression
Airflow patterns in the aircraft and fire propagation scenarios were analyzed to assess cues that
may have been available to the pilots during the early stages of the fire. It was determined that
the small amount of odour and smoke first noticed by the pilots originated from a small creeping
fire propagating aft from the area of the initial ignition, toward the area above the forward
passenger cabin ceiling.
As the fire propagated aft, it is likely that the associated smoke temporarily stopped migrating
forward into the cockpit. As the aircraft was not required to be equipped with built-in fire detection
in the hidden area where the fire was located, the pilots were not alerted to the presence of the
fire. The Board concluded that the actions by the flight crew in preparing the aircraft for landing,
including their decisions to have the passenger cabin readied for landing and to dump fuel, were
consistent with them being unaware that an on-board fire was under way. A theoretical descent
profile calculation, conducted by the TSB during the investigation, confirmed that, because of the
rapid progression of the fire and its adverse effects on various aircraft systems and the cockpit
environment, they would not have been able to complete a safe landing in Halifax, even if they
had undertaken to do so at the time of the PAN PAN urgency radio communication at 10:14 p.m.
ADT.
The Board issued several recommendations to mitigate against potential fires in hidden areas of
aircraft, including a recommendation that appropriate regulatory authorities, together with the
aviation community, review the methodology for establishing designated fire zones within the
pressurized portion of the aircraft, with a view to providing improved smoke and fire detection and
suppression capability.
Adequacy of In-Flight Firefighting
The available information indicates that, by the time the aircraft crew became aware that there
was an in-flight fire, the fire had developed to a condition where it is unlikely that available
firefighting equipment and methods would have been effective. The Board concluded that
industry-wide changes are necessary to provide aircraft crews with effective means to detect and
suppress fires in hidden areas, including the provision for ready access to hidden areas for the
purpose of firefighting.
There was no integrated in-flight firefighting plan in place for the accident aircraft, nor was such a
plan required by regulation. Therefore, the aircraft crew did not have procedures or training
directing them to aggressively attempt to locate and eliminate the source of the smoke, and to
expedite their preparations for a possible emergency landing. In the absence of such a firefighting
plan, the aircraft crew concentrated on preparing the aircraft for the diversion and landing.
Additional Safety Risks Identified
During the course of this investigation, some additional risks that have the potential to degrade
aviation safety were identified. Although these factors could not be shown to have played a direct
role in this occurrence, the associated deficiencies could potentially lead to other accidents if the
deficiencies are not rectified.
Areas of Concern
- checklists that do not adequately deal with smoke conditions;
- aircraft designs that do not facilitate the rapid de-powering of electrical systems;
- MD-11 map light design and installation;
- lack of clarity in guidance material and regulations regarding wire separation in confined areas;
and
- inadequacy of Supplemental Type Certificate standards to ensure that add-on equipment is
compatible with the aircraft's type certificate
Performance Notes
VMCG
VMCG, assuming that the path of the AC accelerating with all engines
operating is along the centreline of the runway, its path from the point
at which the critical engine is made inoperative to the point at which
recovery to a direction parallel to the centreline is completed, may not
deviate more than 30 ft laterally from the centreline at any point.”
Determination of VMCG:
Lateral deviation under 30 ft
“VMCG must be established, with:
• The AC in each take-off configuration or, at the option of the
applicant, in the most critical take-off configuration;
• Maximum available take-off power or thrust on the operating
engines;
• The most unfavourable centre of gravity;
• The AC trimmed for take-off; and
• The most unfavourable weight in the range of take-off weights.”
VMC[A]
VMCL
VMCL, the minimum control speed during approach and landing with all
engines operating, is the calibrated airspeed at which, when the critical
engine is suddenly made inoperative, it is possible to maintain control of
the AC with that engine still inoperative, and maintain straight flight
with an angle of bank of not more than 5º.
When the takeoff is aborted, brakes must absorb & dissipate the
heat corresponding to the AC kinetic energy at the decision point.
Speed Definitions
Stall Speed
Vs1g: Identified stall speed for the Airbus fly by wire Aircraft (JAR
25) – corresponds to the maximum lift drag (just before the lift starts
decreasing). The load factor is still equal to one.
Upgrade Notes Type- [Information]
[Version1.0] March 2006 Author: R J Capps Page 3 of 18
A330 PERFORMANCE Flight Operations Training
(EK applicable and reference for Weight & Balance, Manual Loadsheet &
Manual Trim)
_________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
Take Off
• N1 Rating – (FCOM 3.05.06 p9)
• With wet RWY, TOR with 1 eng out is always equal to TOD
with 1 eng out (brakes release to 15’). Therefore a Clearway
does not give any performance benefit on a wet RWY, as TOR
ia always more limiting. (TORA less than TODA)
______________________________________________________
Accelerate-Stop Distance
Line Up Corrections
• LPC accounts for line up corrections for 90 deg & 180 deg &
shown depending on which is used
• Take Off flight path begins 35’ above the take off surface at
the end of the Take Off Distance
• Take Off flight path ends at 1,500’ above the take off
surface
Runway Definitions
* FOM Ch 18 p22
Perf Basis for a given RWY state
Operational Limitations
Captain’s Considerations
A330-200 EK AC
5. COURSE LAYOUT
Basically the course will consist of the following phases:
Daily Program
After the successful completion of the above mentioned phases you will congratulated for being a
new Commander on Emirates Airbus Fleet ☺.
Course Details
1. Ground School
Foreword
The Upgrade Ground School forms the initial part of the Upgrade training programme. During
the course a variety of topics will be addressed in the form of lectures, presentations, discussions
and practical application thereof.
Thorough preparation is required by the upgrade candidate. Candidates are required to log on to
the Crew Portal, Training / Generic / Upgrade, as required pre-reading and questionnaires must
be downloaded from the crew portal Topics, summarized below will be presented in a modular
format.
Please refer to the downloadable course footprint and timetable sent by Flight Training Administration
for the exact dates and times.
Objective
Trainees will, through an extensive review of relevant CRM topics and case studies, decide
how effective management, decision making, leadership and communication can be achieved
in a flight deck environment. Topics will be covered with the emphasis place from a human
factors perspective.
Module 2 – Performance
A major component of upgrade training is being fully conversant with a Captains’ duties and
responsibilities. A pre-course questionnaire on policy and procedures and pre-reading on the
subject of aviation law will assist a candidate to gain extensive knowledge and awareness of
international, local (GCAA) and company legal requirements. A thorough understanding of
when and how to apply the procedures provided in company documentation is required to
ensure that both individual and company integrities are maintained.
In-flight normal and abnormal scenarios will be proposed at various stages of flight, requiring,
through role play, practice of all the topics briefed and trained in Module 1 – 3. Candidates
will be required to provide input through review and discussion on various aspects of flight
operations. The topics will include:
Module 4 dealt with small scenarios based on various stages of flight. In this module two full
flights are given as examples requiring the candidates, through group exercise, to plan and
complete a safe and efficient flight in the given circumstances. Through this classroom practice of
LOS training, all aspects of the airlines operation should be fully understood.
Module 6 – Fleet
To enable better understanding of the airlines’ operation, briefings are conducted by representatives
from the flowing departments in Flight Operations, Fleet Planning, Network Control and Flight Safety
representatives.
Foreword
This phase will provide a training forum to prepare the candidate for successful completion of the
PPC and AWOPS/ZFT phases, whilst operating from the LHS.
Objectives
The FFS Training for type-rated First Officers is divided into two phases, i.e. RHS to LHS
conversion and preparation for the LOS/LOE phase.
The first 3 sessions encompass the pre-PPC training. The candidate must display a good
understanding of failure items and the handling of the aircraft during normal and abnormal
operations, before recommendation for the PPC can be made.
F1U: provides a familiarization from the LHS, a review of flight characteristics, and a review
of some Emergency and Abnormal Procedures.
F2U & F3U: provides a review of some additional Emergency and Abnormal procedures.
PPCI: is the Initial Pilot Proficiency Check as per OM-D - Training Manual Vol A33/4 Part 2. On
successful completion of the PPCI the student will proceed to F5U.
F5U: All Weather Operations, Zero Flight Time and CAT C Airport Familiarization (If Required).
Refer to relevant chapters.
Note: FIU / F2U / F3U may be conducted with 2 Upgrade Trainees swapping seat’s or with a Line
F/O in the R.H.S. In the case of a Line F/O in the RHS, Item’s that have been covered in
the 1st half of the session need not be repeated.
F1U
Lesson Summary
This session is conducted in Manchester. The focus of the lesson is on left hand seat
familiarisation, using supplementary techniques, aircraft handling and abnormal/emergency
procedures.
The trainee is introduced to the left seat position, arm rest position, flight controls and general
aspects of the flight deck from a different perspective.
A transit cockpit preparation is carried out and engine 1 is started using the manual engine start
procedure during which there is a hot start After start the aircraft is taxied to the holding point for
runway 24R. Before take off a 180° turn is carried out on the runway.
A TCAS event occurs after takeoff and then IR 1+ 2 fault leads into a low altitude stall
warning and recovery. An emergency descent will be carried out from high altitude.
The final exercise involves a Flap fault after takeoff, the aircraft returns for a non-precision
approach, during which there is a Slat fault.
Training Objectives
• To review normal cockpit procedures from the LHS in accordance with the latest FCOM
and FCTM amendments.
• To review Manual Engine start procedure.
• To review the correct recovery procedure for TCAS events.
• To review the correct procedure for recovery from a stall warning.
• To review the correct procedure for an Emergency Descent.
• To review the correct procedure for Abnormal Slats/Flaps Configuration.
• To review the correct procedure for conducting a 180° turn on the runway.
• To revise the correct procedure for flying a non-precision Approach.
F2U
Lesson Summary
This session is conducted in Zurich. The focus of the lesson is on engine starting supplementary
techniques, aircraft handling and abnormal/emergency procedures.
The APU is unserviceable so the engines are started using external pneumatic power and a cross
bleed start.
Reactive and predictive windshear events are encountered on takeoff and approach.
Selected and Managed non-precision approaches are flown to runways 16 and 28, a circling
approach is flown to RWY 28.
A generator 1 + 2 fault results in flight in electrical emergency configuration and a raw data
approach is flown to runway 16.
The final exercise involves smoke in the cabin/cockpit, a diversion to EDDM with approach and
landing in electrical emergency configuration.
Training Objectives
• To review Engine Start with External Pneumatics and Cross-Bleed Start procedure.
• To review the correct avoidance and recovery procedure for Windshear and Windshear Ahead.
• To review the correct procedure for flying a Non Precision Approach.
• To review the correct procedure for handling the Electrical Emergency Configuration.
• To review the correct procedure for Smoke/Fumes/Avionics Smoke and Smoke Removal.
• To revise the correct procedure for flying a ILS approach Raw Data.
F3U
Lesson Summary
This session is conducted in Johannesburg. The focus of the lesson is on aircraft handling
(heavy weight with high density altitude), engine failure and abnormal/emergency procedures.
Engine failure after V1 results in a return to JNB with fuel jettison due to approach climb limitation.
A VOR/DME approach is flown to runway 21R (single engine) followed by a go- around. After
cleanup from the go-around, the engine and all effected systems are restored.
A Green hydraulic reservoir low level followed by Blue system low pressure (Yellow system for
2nd trainee) leads to a non-precision approach to runway 21R (No Auto pilot).
The aircraft is repositioned to runway 03L and during takeoff suffers unreliable airspeed, resulting
in return to JNB and an ILS approach to runway 03L.
Training Objectives
• To review and practice engine inoperative handling and procedures, including non- precision
approach and go-around.
• To review the correct procedure for fuel jettison.
• To review the correct procedure Single and dual hydraulic Failures.
• To review the correct procedure for handling of unreliable airspeed.
• To review and perform a rejected takeoff and emergency evacuation.
Foreword
This phase consists of 4 FFS sessions, with the emphasis being again on training. The first 3 sessions
will be Line Orientated Simulation (LOS), with the last one being the Line Orientated Evaluation (LOE).
The 4 simulator sessions will be interspersed with normal upgrade line training sectors, during which
time the line training syllabus will be completed to a satisfactory standard. These sectors have been
inserted between the 3 LOS and the 1 LOE session to further enhance the overall training value, and to
generally assist in building the confidence and ability of the upgrade candidate. The allotted amount of
sectors, as per FTPM, will be completed before the LOE, followed by the Final Line Check (FLC).
Training rostering will endeavor to produce a roster, whereby the candidate will fly between 4 to 8 line
sectors from the LHS, between each simulator session.
Objectives
To observe and develop the ability of the candidate to handle various emergencies and abnormalities
in (real time), and realistic operational conditions.
To observe and develop the candidates knowledge in technical and procedural matters.
To observe CRM behaviours and task management when subjected to potentially demanding scenarios.
To develop the skills, knowledge and the application of knowledge so that upgrade candidates will have
the tools to:
• Use sound judgment and make sensible decisions in accordance with Company
Policies upon promotion to Captain.
Training Guidelines
During the LOS phase, the emphasis is on training. The scenarios will be run as realistically as
possible, however the TC is encouraged to intervene and discuss pertinent issues as required to assist
in developing the candidate. If necessary the use of the simulator (freeze) facility is acceptable for the
TC to stress an important point of instruction. During this phase the candidate must demonstrate a good
standard, or show signs of improving towards this, before being recommended for the LOE. Should the
standard not be achieved within the allocated sessions, then extra training may be scheduled at the
discretion of VPFT and/or CFI/CFE.
During the LOS and LOE sessions, the TC will act as engineer, purser, ATC and any other
character as may be required. The emphasis on training must be maintained during the LOS
phase.
The final LOS is conducted as a Progress Review without any instructor intervention. On
successful completion of this exercise, the candidate will be recommended for the LOE. The LOE
will be run as a normal flight in all aspects.
All LOS and LOE forms consist of 2 pages, filling in and signing of these forms is as per standard
Emirates practise.
Use Of Video
It is recommended that the video equipment be used to record the entire Loft as this gives
increased value to the debriefing. It clearly highlights CRM aspects and in many cases will greatly
assist in getting across an important teaching point. The student should provide a blank 180
minute video tape for each session, if he wishes he can use the same tape and record over it.
The tape must be erased after each session and the student must not be allowed to take it home.
During the simulator session the instructor should note the times at which items of interest occur
and use this as a guide during replay. Debriefing in this manner may increase the debriefing time
however this method has been well received by the crews that have undergone upgrade training.
LOS Rules
• Only 1 MEL prior to pushback. This may or may not be combined with further
failures to affect the outcome of the flight.
• Only 1 Failure allowed during taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above.
• After takeoff, only 1 x Recoverable Failure, and 1 x Unrecoverable Failure may be given.
These failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure, eg. Hydraulic system failure
due to engine shutdown.
• Weather conditions are to be realistic with changes as indicated on the forecast The content
and failure scenarios of each LOS will be at the discretion of the TC in accordance with the
prescribed guidelines in OM-D.
LOS/LOE Guidelines
LOEU: is the Line Orientated Evaluation. The content will be at the discretion of the
TRE in keeping with the above rules.
If a particular LOFT does not take up the entire simulator session, then a second mini-loft may
be introduced and conducted by the TC.
Sanaa Familiarisation
Overview
This is an airport familiarisation of a category C airfield, with a great deal of emphasis on training.
As this training takes place after a LOS session there is little time available for a formal briefing.
The instructor is required to ensure that the student has had a complete review of the route
manual briefing for the destination.
During the simulator session the instructor is to highlight important aspects and
considerations required to operate at Sanaa.
Seychelles Familiarisation
Overview
This is an airport familiarisation of a category C airfield, with a great deal of emphasis on training.
As this training takes place after a LOS session there is little time available for a formal briefing.
The instructor is required to ensure that the student has had a complete review of the route
manual briefing for the destination.
During the simulator session the instructor is to highlight important aspects and considerations
required to operate at Seychelles.
General
The Line Training Syllabus presented has been developed from the Airbus recommended listing
of Line Training subjects.
Line Training is intended to familiarise new entry, upgraded pilots, and pilots who are transferring fleets,
with the operation of their new aircraft type, their respective crew duties, and the characteristics of our
route network environment. It must highlight the duties, and the characteristics of our route network
environment. It must highlight the difficulties and traps that could affect the safety and the efficiency of
the flight, and provide comprehensive guidance regarding the use of all the resources that are available
to support the Company’s flying operations.
Line Training will also include the technical items on the syllabus, which can not be taught in the
simulator. These may include: weather radar, ETOPS and comprehensive use of the FMS.
The main objective of Line Training is to consolidate the training received on the ground in order
to deliver to the Fleet highly competent, safe and standardised pilots. At the completion of their
Line Training, these pilots must have demonstrated that they have reached a high level of technical and
operational knowledge, as well as good flying skills, and that they are capable and efficient cockpit
resource managers.
The Briefings are listed in flight phase order until parking. The topics are then listed in procedural order.
This guide is to help prepare you for the transition from Simulator Training (Aircraft Type
Rating) to Line Training (operating on the line according to Emirates procedures.)
Preparation is key: Before each flight thorough route study is essential. OM-C RAIG (Route and
Aerodrome Information Guide) is a good starting point. You can obtain old LIDO en-route charts
and Aerodrome charts from Nav Services, located in the Emirates Operations Centre (EOC).
These charts will be out dated but are still useful for route study.
We recommend you buy an ATLAS. You are bound to be flying over unfamiliar territory and
a ‘geographical awareness’ is essential. When you get transferred to “LVIV Control” it would be
nice to know which country you are over, not to mention the pronunciation.
A day or two before your flight you can ask the operations clerks at the CBC to print off a CFP
and NOTAMS for that particular sector. It will not be exactly as per the flight you will be doing but
it will be a great aid in preparation, especially when covering NOTAMS. It will also help with time
management, as you will know which items are need-to-know and which can be covered later, in
flight. A good time to get these is immediately following a duty when signing off, obtain the
CFP/NOTAMS for your next flight, so you can study at home.
Study: Line Training will require an in-depth knowledge of the FOM and the FCOM’s.
Thorough knowledge of all chapters is expected and required. For study purposes we
recommend you give particular emphasis to FOM chapters 11-15 and chapter 20.
Your Training File contains a Line Training Syllabus. Each subject will be covered by your various
Training Captains you must arrive for you flight well prepared. The Line Training Study Guide and
Completion standard is designed to help you study, please use this document to your advantage.
Time Management: Your pick-up will be approximately 2hrs15mins prior to flight (depending on
location – check FOM). Arrival time at CBC will vary, however, cabin crew are instructed to depart
CBC for the aircraft at STD -75 mins. The bus ride from CBC to the aircraft can take 15- 20mins
depending on the parking bay. Time Management at the briefing stage is critical.
Prioritisation is essential, make sure you know the minimum requirements FOM 12.2.
“INSTRUCTOR NOTES”
FFS Instructor Notes
Foreword
This phase consists of 4 FFS sessions, with the emphasis being again on training. The first 3 sessions
will be Line Orientated Simulation (LOS), with the last one being the Line Orientated Evaluation (LOE).
The 4 simulator sessions will be interspersed with normal upgrade line training sectors, during which
time the line training syllabus will be completed to a satisfactory standard. These sectors have been
inserted between the 3 LOS and the 1 LOE session to further enhance the overall training value, and to
generally assist in building the confidence and ability of the upgrade candidate. The allotted amount of
sectors, as per FTPM, will be completed before the LOE, followed by the Final Line Check (FLC).
Training rostering will endeavor to produce a roster, whereby the candidate will fly between 4 to 8 line
sectors from the LHS, between each simulator session.
Objectives
To observe and develop the ability of the candidate to handle various emergencies and abnormalities
in (real time), and realistic operational conditions.
To observe and develop the candidates knowledge in technical and procedural matters.
To observe CRM behaviours and task management when subjected to potentially demanding scenarios.
To develop the skills, knowledge and the application of knowledge so that upgrade candidates will have
the tools to:
• Use sound judgment and make sensible decisions in accordance with Company
Policies upon promotion to Captain.
Training Guidelines
During the LOS phase, the emphasis is on training. The scenarios will be run as realistically as
possible, however the TC is encouraged to intervene and discuss pertinent issues as required to assist
in developing the candidate. If necessary the use of the simulator (freeze) facility is acceptable for the
TC to stress an important point of instruction. During this phase the candidate must demonstrate a good
standard, or show signs of improving towards this, before being recommended for the LOE. Should the
standard not be achieved within the allocated sessions, then extra training may be scheduled at the
discretion of VPFT and/or CFI/CFE.
During the LOS and LOE sessions, the TC will act as engineer, purser, ATC and any other
character as may be required. The emphasis on training must be maintained during the LOS
phase.
The final LOS is conducted as a Progress Review without any instructor intervention. On
successful completion of this exercise, the candidate will be recommended for the LOE. The LOE
will be run as a normal flight in all aspects.
All LOS and LOE forms consist of 2 pages, filling in and signing of these forms is as per standard
Emirates practise.
Use Of Video
It is recommended that the video equipment be used to record the entire Loft as this gives
increased value to the debriefing. It clearly highlights CRM aspects and in many cases will greatly
assist in getting across an important teaching point. The student should provide a blank 180
minute video tape for each session, if he wishes he can use the same tape and record over it.
The tape must be erased after each session and the student must not be allowed to take it home.
During the simulator session the instructor should note the times at which items of interest occur
and use this as a guide during replay. Debriefing in this manner may increase the debriefing time
however this method has been well received by the crews that have undergone upgrade training.
LOS Rules
• Only 1 MEL prior to pushback. This may or may not be combined with further
failures to affect the outcome of the flight.
• Only 1 Failure allowed during taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above.
• After takeoff, only 1 x Recoverable Failure, and 1 x Unrecoverable Failure may be given.
These failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure, eg. Hydraulic system failure
due to engine shutdown.
• Weather conditions are to be realistic with changes as indicated on the forecast The content
and failure scenarios of each LOS will be at the discretion of the TC in accordance with the
prescribed guidelines in OM-D.
1. LOS/LOE Guidelines
LOEU: is the Line Orientated Evaluation. The content will be at the discretion of the
TRE in keeping with the above rules.
If a particular LOFT does not take up the entire simulator session, then a second mini-loft may
be introduced and conducted by the TC.
LOFT FORMAT:
All of the LOFT’s followed a similar format:
• 1 MEL requirement. If not already in the tech log would get a problem on taxi / start
requiring you to check MEL (especially if ETOPS).
• Usually a start problem or an abnormal start (on bat / ground cart etc)
• Either, Passenger problems / Boarding problems, ATC slot or VIP movements to put
pressure on you. Remember not to try and fix everything yourself. Make it the station
managers problem.
No sudden changes in weather or any bullshit like the old days. If the forecast was good it would
be good.
Upgrade Trainees and Direct Entry Captains will be rostered for three LOS sessions and one
LOE session.
After LOS1 the line training will commence. Approximately 4 sectors will be flown before returning
to the Simulator for LOS2.
Approximately 2 sectors will be flown before returning to the Simulator for LOS3.
Approximately 4 sectors will be flown before returning to the Simulator for the LOE.
Instructors and students should make contact approximately one day prior to the event and
discuss the upcoming session. This will allow the trainee sufficient time to prepare for the
session.
Trainee Preparation
Emirates expects’ trainees to be prepared for their training sessions. It is assumed that the trainee
must be familiar with Emirates procedures and policies, basic technical knowledge as well as the
network structure. Instructor input is encouraged to assist trainees in the development of the various
skills required for the successful completion of LOS exercises. Instructors, however, will not
compensate for a lack of preparation by the trainee. The instructor will assess areas of weakness
and focus training where required.
Focused Training
Environment
The LOS will take place in a line operational environment with a complete crew. A complete crew
will always be scheduled and every effort will be made to maintain crew integrity. During a LOS,
each crewmember performs both as an individual and as a member of a team, as is normal
during line operations.
LOS scenarios are to be conducted in real time and in real-world line operational situations.
The Instructor will endeavour to check the progress of the trainee to date with regards to:
Using the above information, a LOS scenario can be constructed based on the Emirates rules. A
trainee is normally required to cover Monsoon, Cold Weather and ETOPS conditions during
upgrade training. This is usually achieved by assigning a different topic for each LOS session.
The following are Emirates’ LOS training/evaluation rules (Ref: OM-D 5.19), which
instructors are to follow when creating and conducting any LOS/LOE session:
• Only one MEL item active before pushback. This may or may not be combined with further
failures to affect the outcome of the flight.
• A start malfunction or alternative start procedure.
• Only one failure allowed during taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above.
• After takeoff, only one recoverable failure and one unrecoverable failure may be given. These
failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure e.g. hydraulic system failure due to an
engine shutdown.
Additional Guidelines
Realism
Scenarios will contain realistic circumstances e.g. messages from ATC, cabin crew or operations.
Just as crewmembers cannot anticipate all flight operational situations, instructors will try to
prevent crewmembers from anticipating the entire content of the scenarios.
ATC
Air traffic control actions will be reasonable. If radar vectors would normally be available, and the
local system is not affected by NOTAM, then radar vectors will be available. If the crew requests
help from ATC, and help would normally be available at a chosen destination, then that help will
be available.
Weather
All weather parameters will be realistic. The actual weather experienced in the simulator will
reflect the weather in the forecast. Airfield conditions will reflect the NOTAM.
Time Management
The instructor will not use “Speedx2” or “Speedx4” and will allow the flight to proceed in real time.
The instructor will not use, position freeze to give the crew extra time to get through an exercise.
The trainee must learn to create time for himself, perhaps by slowing down, or holding. In the
same sense, fuel freeze will not be used to give the crew extra time. Fuel management is an
essential part of normal operations.
Distractions
These may be used to good effect. This could be an unruly passenger, a failure that requires
ECAM action but does not affect the overall flight e.g. loss of a fuel pump or generator or ATC
instructions to report abeam, or track DIR to a specific WPT, etc.
Weather avoidance or TCAS TA events are other suitable examples of distractions.
Role Playing
Instructors will brief First Officers to act normally. They are not to “play a role”. If the trainee is
losing situational awareness because of overload, or perhaps poor cooperation from his First
Officer, the instructor may wish to allow the trainee to regroup to better assess the problem and to
provide necessary guidance without distraction.
When this situation occurs, and instructor guidance is required, it is acceptable to freeze the flight
or the position. This is not the same as freezing the position just to complete preparation for an
approach, or something similar. Freezing in these situations is counter-productive. Time
management is part of the training, and the trainee has to learn to manage the time normally
available to him.
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 1 MXP-DXB
WX: 6km OVC 1500’ (Or at TC’s discretion) MAN-DXB
MEL - PRIM 1 INOP LGW-DXB
Non-standard Fuel distribution (if short route used, use Normal Distribution) BOM-DXB
Low Oil pressure ENG #2, or high oil temp S/E diversion & landing. NPA app (Choose from
Other possibilities, Eng Stall, Eng high Vibration. available CFP’s)
LOS 2 LGW-DXB
Wx: 6km BKN 1000’ (Or at TC’s discretion) ZRH-DXB
MEL: APU U/S MXP-DXB
TR 1 FAIL (Choose from
AVIONICS SMOKE with Loss of CM1 probe icing. CM2 as PF available CFP’s)
LOS 4 DAR-NBO
Wx – Rain and cross winds SAH-DXB
Red BOMB warning, EIU Fault (Man Thrust) Flaps Jam ZRH-DXB
(Choose from
available CFP’s)
LOS 5 SAH-DXB
Wx – Fair JNB-DXB
MEL – EPR indication fault – N1 Rated Mode NBO-DXB
Avionics Smoke (AC BUS 2) – Emerg Descent, High Altitude airport THR-DXB
(Choose from
available CFP’s)
LOS 6 MXP-DXB
Wx: Winter Ops LGW-DXB
TCAS MAN-DXB
GREEN HYD LOW LEVEL (Choose from
PAX heart attach available CFP’s)
BLUE HYD LOW AIR PRESS – recoverable at low level
LOS 7 FCO-DXB
WX: Fair KHI-DXB
MEL – APU BLEED INOP (Choose from
After Start – STANDBY ATTITUDE FAIL (MEL) available CFP’s)
FUEL LEAK – decision making
LOS 8 CMB-DXB
WX: Fair JNB-DXB
MEL – Nil MRU-DXB
ETOPS Procedures
ENG STALL ON START (ETOPS)
ENG VIBRATION If Non ETOPS
ENG OIL LEAK (Choose from
ENG SHUTDOWN available CFP’s)
NPA,
LOS 9 SAH-DXB
WX; Fair JNB-DXB
TAXI: RAD ALT 1 FAULT (MEL) NBO-DXB
TAKEOFF: RH MLG ABNORMAL ZRH-DXB
Return to land – management, APP CLB, jettison
LOS 10 SAH-DXB
WX: Monsoon NBO-DXB
On takeoff FLAPS JAM NBO-DAR
Runway closed due crashed aircraft (Choose from
Divert to another AD with FLAPS JAM available CFP’s)
Diversion AD requires a NPA approach
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 11 MXP-DXB
WX: Rain and low cloud FCO-DXB
MEL - ENG 2 BLD INOP ZRH-DXB
R INR TK FUEL LEAK finally causing ENG 2 FLAMEOUT LGW-DXB
Diversion and landing (Choose from
available CFP’s)
LOS 12 DAR-NBO
WX: Good with HZ NBO-DAR
Pre-Departure – Pax wanting to carry gun on board (Choose from
TCAS available CFP’s)
TOD – ATTITUDE DISCREPANCY
F/O becomes sick – incapacitation
Runway lighting failure – missed approach
Return for landing
LOS 13 DXB-MCT
Wx Low Cloud DXB-KWI
MEL – SLAT SYS 2 INOP (GREEN) FCO-MXP
After T/O – SLAT SYS 1 FAULT, Slats stuck in extended position (Choose from
Sick PAX available CFP’s)
Return for Ldg – unable due wx
Diversion and landing
LOS 14 ETOPS?
Wx above circling minima. MRU-DXB
MEL - APU u/s CMB-DXB
GPU failure, requiring a START ON BATTERY POWER NBO-DXB
TAXI - FMGS 1 FAIL, RESET OF COMPUTERS checklist & reset OK JNB-DXB
CRUISE – Gen 1 Over Voltage (single gen ops) Considerations. (Possibly
Lightning strike causing EMERG ELEC CONFIG. OR Non ETOPS
ENG 2 HIGH VIBRATION (Within limits at Idle Thrust) (Choose from
single GEN ops available CFP’s)
Diversion airports require circling or have high crosswinds.
LOS 15 DAR-NBO
WX: CBs Any short route
MEL: SATCOM U/S (Choose from
Enroute – LIGHTNING STRIKE causing AC BUS 2 FAIL and total loss of available CFP’s)
comms
Approach NBO, heavy rain causes go-around and diversion to Alternate(fuel
state)
LOS 16 SAH-DXB
Wx: Monsoon OR Winter Ops. KHI-DXB
MEL: APU INOP BOM-DXBq
GEN 1 FAULT
DC ESS BUS FAULT Or can use this as
Engine shutdown required via Fire Handle a Winter Ops
scenario using:
LGW-DXB
ZRH-DXB
MAN-DXB
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 17 (ETOPS)
WX: CBs MRU-DXB
MEL – APU INOP NBO-DXB
LIGHTNING STRIKE causing GEN 1 FAULT – single GEN operations JNB-DXB
If no diversion (no Galleys/PES etc), then IDG OVHT ADVISORY CMB-DXB
Return, jettison, and landing (Refer to Los. #15)
If Non ETOPS, considerations, Part Galley, PES, Length of flight, Routing, etc (NON-ETOPS)
LGW-DXB
MAN-DXB
ZRH-DXB
FCO-DXB
MXP-DXB
LOS 18 LGW-DXB
WX: TC’s Discretion. MAN-DXB
MEL – Nil ZRH-DXB
Tire burst on T/O causing BLUE HYD LO LEVEL FCO-DXB
ENG 2 LO OIL PRESS causing ENG 2 shutdown – DUAL HYD LO PR JNB-DXB
If used on a short route (due time) consider ENG 2 HIGH VIB or ENG STALL (Choose from
Eng Ops OK at Idle Thrust available CFP’s)
LOS 19 JNB-DXB
WX: Good for return. NBO-DXB
LH MLG STUCK DOWN MAN-DXB
Diversion considerations, depending on Airfield. Landing, NPA App. ZRH-DXB
SAH-DXB
ROUTES: AIRPORTS:
FCO-DXB FCO
MAN-DXB MAN
DXB-MAN DXB
NBO-DXB NBO
ZRH-DXB ZRH
DXB-KWI LGW
BOM-DXB KHI
DXB-MCT JNB
NBO-DAR SAH
DAR-NBO MRU (new AD)
KHI-DXB DAR
JNB-DXB BOM
SAH-DXB
MRU-DXB (new route)
THR-DXB
FCO-MXP
MXP-DXB
CMB-DXB
LGW-DXB
ETOPS CONSIDERATIONS:
ETOPS scenarios:
• Smoke - Cargo smoke caused by Dangerous Goods?
• EMERG ELEC
• Engine Fail with full driftdown and diversions considerations
• Depressurisation
ETOPS routes:
• CMB-DXB
• JNB-DXB
• MRU-DXB
WINTER OPERATIONS:
Routes:
• ZRH-DXB
• LGW-DXB
• MAN-DXB
• THR-DXB
All the scenarios below are designed as basic guides to allow TCEs to develop the general chronology and
flow of the LOS. It should be stressed that the TCE is permitted to deviate from the planned scenario if he
considers circumstances warrant. TCEs should also be mindful that trainees may become aware of the
planned scenario at an early stage and may begin to use a planned response. Under these circumstances
changes to the planned scenario may be appropriate.
Any changes to the planned scenario should try to keep the general objectives of the LOS in mind, and in
any case must conform to the LOS requirements contained in the ETPM 13-2.
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 1 FCO-DXB
WX: At TC’s discretion, depending if a diversion or return to departure airfield is required, MXP-DXB
MAN-DXB
MEL – PRIM 1 INOP (Check MEL as a recent Mod allows certain of our aircraft, dispatch) LGW-DXB
Non-standard Fuel distribution BOM-DXB
Low Oil pressure ENG #2, S/E diversion & landing (Choose from
available CFP’s)
OBJECTIVES:
1. To observe the trainee correctly interpret the MEL and correctly carryout the necessary If using a short
actions. route, ignore NON
2. To Observe the trainee use the non-standard fuel distribution chart and work out a new trim STD FUEL
sheet. Distribution
3. To Observe the trainee manage an ENG Low oil pressure, correctly diagnosing the problem.
4. To Observe the trainee conduct a single engine diversion and landing.
DETAILS:
1. MEL – PRIM 1 INOP. Consider MEL dispatch requirements. MEL is quite involved with an
extensive flight control check required prior to start.
2. Ensure that after refuelling, no fuel is present in the Trim tank (or approx 600Kgs) by
manually inserting each tank quantity. Engineer’s advise they have been unable to sort out
the problem. This should cause the TOMAC to be outside the 2% limit. This will require a
non-standard Fuel distribution calculation and a new Trim sheet. Ensure CG inserted in IOS
3. Approaching TOC or in cruise reduce ENG 2 OIL QTY and increase ENG 2 OIL TEMP.
Reduce OIL QTY until 4 qts, at which time the ECAM advisory will activate. ECAM OIL
TEMP HI warning occurs at 190°C. Observe troubleshooting and decisions. Reduce OIL
QTY to zero, or reduce Oil Press to 0.
4. ENG 2 will need to be shutdown. Diversion required for an overweight landing. Jettison
may not be necessary. Arrange for an NPA to be required at diversion airport.
COMMON ERRORS
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 2 MAN-DXB
Wx: 6km BKN 1000’ or at TC’s discretion. LGW-DXB
MEL: APU U/S ZRH-DXB
TR 1 FAIL MXP-DXB
AVIONICS SMOKE with Loss of CM1 probe icing. CM2 as PF. (Choose from
available CFP’s)
OBJECTIVES:
1. To observe the trainee correctly interpret the MEL.
2. To observe the trainee deal with TR1 Failure.
3. To observe the trainee manage the avionics Smoke and Removal procedure.
DETAILS:
To be truly effective this LOS should be conducted in WINTER enroute weather conditions that contain
icing. It is not necessary for full winter weather operations to be present at departure airport. If using a short
route, have Rain and CB’s
1. MEL – APU INOP. GPU and External Pneumatics required for departure.
2. Provide Slot time to give pushback requirement of 1 hour after entering simulator.
3. FCOM procedure of ENG START WITH EXTERNAL PNUEMATICS required. If one engine is
started on stand and the GPU disconnected, the PES is lost and cannot be rebooted until after 2nd engine
start. This reboot may take up to 20 mins. This means that Safety video cannot be used after the 1st
engine is started. Purser to advise Captain by Interphone of this problem if it occurs. Options:
• Start both engines on stand using GPU.
• Ask Purser for crew to conduct a Manual Safety demonstration for Pax.
7. In cruise, insert AVIONIC SMOKE with cockpit smoke until AC BUS 1 is isolated. Regulate the
amount of smoke in the cockpit by selecting the failure on and off. This will allow the crews to go for
bus isolation as opposed to directly jumping into Emerg Elec Config. Crews to divert and conduct and
Emergency Descent.
8. A lot of systems are affected, including the anti-icing of CM1 and STANDBY probes. On descent
introduce a blockage of these probes due to icing. CM2 should become PF.
9. If diverting to an airport in the JEPP “Other Airports” Manual, there is only one set of approach plates,
so good crew co-ordination required.
Common Errors
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 3 Any short sector.
Wx: At TC’s discretion
R.OUTER INLET VALVE stuck closed during refuelling Choose from
Non-standard Fuel Distribution available CFP’s
PRIM 2 Fault
IR ROLL DRIFT
Birds reported on final of one of the runways
Possible ENG SEVERE DAMAGE on final app.
OBJECTIVES:
• To Observe the trainee make use of the non standard fuel distribution table and Trim Sheet.
• To Observe the trainee use the reset computers checklist.
• To Observe the trainee correctly deal with a CHECK ATT problem.
• To Observe the trainee deal with a multiple bird strike, leading to a Dual Hyd Failure
DETAILS:
1. During refuelling R. OUTER INLET VALVE reported stuck closed by engineer. No reset
possible. Not possible to get fuel into R.OUTER TANK. There is 1.0T of fuel in L.OUTER
TANK at that stage. Engineer asks Captain “what to do?”
• Check limitations – do not allow more than 1.7T in L.OUTER TANK.
• Obtain T/O CG and STAB using Non-Standard Fuel distribution table.
• MEL (28-25-04d) states Flt Ops performance section to calculate new CG, but Captain is
to be asked to do this manually using the A330 Fuel Index Table for Individual tanks, the
manual Loadsheet, and the CFP computer loadsheet for LIZFW.
2. During taxi after the checklist has been completed, insert PRIM 2 FAULT. After a RESET
OF COMPUTERS checklist, the fault clears, but a new FLT CTL check is required. If the
QRH is not referenced, a flight control check may not be done as required.
3. ATC to give revised T/O clearance “immediate left turn after takeoff to intercept a radial or
Hdg. Pre-set failure “IR ROLL DRIFT – variable of 60 deg/sec at 120 kts for PF IRS.
• Revert initially to STBY HORIZON, determining which IR is at fault, and then handing
over control when flight path is safe.
• ATT HDG switching will resolve problem.
Common Errors
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 4 BOM-DXB
Wx – Heavy rain and crosswinds at the departure airport. DAR-NBO
EIU FAULT – A/THR LOST ZRH-DXB
RED BOMB warning THR-DXB
FLAPS JAMMED KHI-DXB
(Choose from
OBJECTIVES: available CFP’s)
• To Observe trainee deal with complicated procedures while flying with MAN THR
• To Observe handling of SLATS/FLAPS JAM procedures while under time pressure
• To Observe task management and CRM during high workload and time pressure
• To Observe communication and handling of Cabin Crew and Pax with regard to sensitive information
and panic control.
• To Observe leadership and decision making capability
DETAILS:
CM1 to be PF.
High terrain considerations. On certain routes.
No MEL items.
2. Normal takeoff. During climb passing approx. FL200 ENG EIU FAULT leading to loss of A/THR.
Operational considerations, and flight should continue.
3. Just before TOC or in cruise (depending if diversion to another airfield) ACARS message from
company advising RED BOMB WARNING.
• No specific information on type of bomb or location.
• If a bomb search is conducted, a suspicious article is found in the forward toilet behind the waste bin.
4. Diversion considerations:
• Contaminated runway at departure airport
• Emergency facilities available in case bomb explodes
• Time/distance considerations in case bomb explodes
• Performance requirements at high altitude airports
• High speed or CONF 1 diversion considerations
6. About 20 mins from landing further information provided by ACARS that device is probably a time-
activated device and is due to explode at his ETA + 10 mins.
7. After CONFIG 1 has been set, insert FLAPS JAM.(use more criteria on IOS) This will become
apparent when CONF 2 is selected for landing.
• Landing performance considerations, which may involve Fuel Jettison.
• Use of the SLATS/FLAPS JAM checklist and procedures
• Prioritisation considerations due to time pressures.
8. After landing consider Pax evacuation using slides or waiting for steps. Slides are the preferred
alternative, due time constraints.
Common Errors:
• Trainee not familiar with Bomb on Board Checklist/ FOM policy
• Incorrect handling of cabin pressure controls
• Incorrect speed management due to MAN THR
• Insufficient considerations of contaminated runway operations
• Ineffective leadership style and lack of prioritisation
• Ineffective communication with cabin crew and passengers.
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 5 NBO-DXB
Wx – TC’s discretion SAH-DXB
JNB-DXB
MEL – EPR indication fault – N1 Rated Mode (control mode MEL 2.73.3) THR-DXB
AVIONICS SMOKE (AC BUS 2)
(Choose from
OBJECTIVES: available CFP’s)
1. To Observe the trainee deal with the operational and performance considerations with thrust
control in N1 mode.
2. To Observe the handling of the Smoke drill and subsequent emergency descent.
3. To Observe the considerations of high terrain and high altitude operations.
4. To Observe task management and CRM in a high workload situation.
DETAILS:
1. During cockpit preparation insert ENG EPR INDICATION FAULT.
• This requires a takeoff procedure with A/THR re-engaged at LVR CLB in N1 rated
Mode.
• Performance penalties for takeoff, and approach climb performance penalties for a
possible return, need to be considered prior to takeoff, especially due to the high altitude
of the airport.
2. Depending on choice of diversion airports, insert AVIONICS VENT SMOKE with small
amounts of visible smoke in the cockpit.(control this by modulating the failure on the IOS
panel)
• Arrange with sim technicians prior to the session to ensure smoke is available and that
they isolate the smoke warning for the building.
• Do not insert too much Smoke as crew may be tempted to revert directly to EMER ELEC
CONF. The intent is to isolate only AC BUS 2.
5. High altitude, overweight landing, and performance requirements will need to be considered.
Go Around weight penalty due to N1 Rated mode.
6. Evacuation requirements and options to be considered after landing. If normal landing has
occurred an evacuation should not be required.
Common Errors:
• Trainee not familiar with N1 Thrust tables
• Incorrect handling of Smoke Drill – refer to FCTM.
• Not commencing a diversion when smoke drill presented on ECAM.
• If initiated, not conducting Emergency Descent correctly
• Not appreciating the performance aspects of high altitude operations and it’s affect on aircraft
speeds
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 6 ZRH-DXB
Wx: Winter Ops MXP-DXB
LGW-DXB
TCAS MAN-DXB
GREEN HYD LOW LEVEL
PAX heart attack (Choose from
BLUE HYD LOW AIR PRESS available CFP’s)
OBJECTIVES:
• To Observe the trainee prepare the aircraft in cold weather following the correct procedures.
• To Observe decision making process and task management with the single hydraulic failure.
• To Observe how the trainee manages the diversion, particularly planning, delegation, and
communication.
• To Observe how the trainee copes with a deteriorating situation after the second hydraulic system Low
Air Press.
DETAILS:
This flight involves cold weather operations with low cloud, snow, and low visibility at the departure airport..
1. Full cold weather operations are required for departure, with instructor adding pressures regarding de-
icing, hold over times, and slot times.
2. After takeoff, introduce some FMGS exercises followed by a TCAS RA ( Aircraft must be in level
flight). Approaching TOC insert a SLOW GREEN HYD SYSTEM LEAK ( approx 3 lts/min)leading to
a complete loss of green hydraulic fluid (no RAT available).
• Operation considerations include whether a diversion is required.
• Dubai Engineering should be consulted as part of decision making process for information and
recommendations.
• Best option is to continue flights as remaining two systems are operational.
3. After a further 10-15 min of cruise, Purser advises of a sick passenger (suspected heart attack).
MEDILINK and any on-board doctor should be consulted. They recommend a diversion ASAP.
5. Once diversion has been initiated a BLUE HYD LO AIR PR leads to a loss of Blue Hydraulics
• Blue Hydraulic system is recoverable at low altitude.
• If trainee does NOT recover Blue Hydraulics then landing with GREEN + BLUE HYD LO PR will
occur.
• If Blue Hydraulics are recovered, then landing with GREEN HYD inop. will occur
• Operational and performance considerations of DUAL HYD or loss of Green Hydraulics to be
considered.
Common Errors:
• Trainee unfamiliar with cold weather operations and fails to delegate.
• Trainee diverting with the single hydraulic failure rather than obtaining more information and
continuing.
• Poor workload management when handling the sick passenger options.
• Poor workload management when handling the diversion.
• Failing to restore the Blue Hydraulic system at low altitude.
• Incorrect TCAS manuever.
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 7 DXB-KWI
WX: TC’s discretion FCO-DXB
KHI-DXB
MEL – APU BLEED INOP SAA-DXB
After Start – STANDBY ATTITUDE FAIL (MEL)
FUEL LEAK – decision making (Choose from
available CFP’s)
OBJECTIVES: A short sector
• To Observe the management of engine start with external pneumatic power. works well.
• To Observe the trainee’s correct use of the fuel leak procedure.
• To Observe how the trainee manages the diversion, particularly planning, delegation and
communication.
DETAIL
COMMON ERRORS
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 8 (ETOPS)
WX – Tc’s Discretion (NPA) CMB-DXB
NOTAMS – ILS at most likely diversion airport is u/s JNB-DXB
MRU-DXB
ETOPS procedures
ENG STALL ON ENG START
ENG VIBRATION
ENG OIL LEAK
ENG SHUTDOWN
NPA
OBJECTIVES:
• To observe the trainees understanding of ETOPS – planning, pre-flight, & enroute procedures
and considerations.
• To Observe the trainees handling of an engine vibration and oil leak – communication,
contingency planning.
• To observe the trainees workload and task management and prioritisation with regard to a
single-engine diversion.
• To observe the correct execution of a non-precision approach.
DETAILS:
The flight involves full use of all normal ETOPS procedures during flight planning and aircraft
preparation.
1. During pre-flight preparation, introduce a distraction of an FOM related item (pregnant Pax,
firearms etc.)
2. During engine start introduce an ENG 1 STALL that clears during the subsequent engine auto
start. Normal taxi and takeoff
3. In cruise after 20-30 mins (consider using SPEED x 2 and FUEL FLOW x 2), introduce a
VIBRATION ADVISORY for ENG 1. This in turn results in a SLOW LEAK of ENG 1 OIL
QUANTITY.
• Crew should consider operational options and also contact Engineering on SATCOM,
whilst making contingency plans for a possible diversion
• Engine should not be shutdown while sufficient oil remains.(this needs to be set through
the IOS panel)
• Eventually ENG 1 OIL QTY reduces sufficiently to require an ENG SHUTDOWN and a
diversion.
• Observe workload management and communication techniques in handling diversion.
4. NOTAMs indicate a NPA is required at the diversion airport. If another airport is selected for
diversion, ATC advice ILS is temporarily unserviceable.
Common Errors:
• Trainee not being familiar with ETOPS procedures and planning considerations.
• Poor flight management techniques and workload management when implementing the
diversion.
• NPA approach procedures conducted incorrectly.
• Shutting down of engine on advisory condition only.
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 9 LGW-DXB
WX; TC’s discretion SAH-DXB
TAXI: RAD ALT 1 FAULT (MEL) JNB-DXB
TAKEOFF: RH MLG ABNORMAL NBO-DXB
Return to land – management, APP CLB, jettison MAN-DXB
ZRH-DXB
OBJECTIVES
(Choose from
• To observe the trainee deal with all the precautions required for an emergency landing and available CFP’s)
evacuation.
• To allow the trainee to deal with the problem in real time and complete the full drill.
• To observe the trainees knowledge of approach climb limits.
Observe handling of the fuel jettison system.
DETAIL
On taxi out, RAD ALT 1 fault for MEL discussion. GPWS, High terrain Airfields.
On gear retraction, RH main landing gear shows abnormal indication, does not recycle and shows
unsafe. Crew must prepare for landing with abnormal gear, however in this instance it is a false
warning and gear locks on touchdown.
COMMON ERRORS
• Failure to hand over control of the aircraft and effectively manage the situation.
• Incorrect calculation of the approach climb limits.
• Not using all available resources, under the circumstances.
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 10 BOM-DXB
WX: Monsoon. SAH-DXB
On takeoff FLAPS JAM. NBO-DXB
Runway closed due crashed aircraft. NBO-DAR
Divert to another AD with FLAPS JAM.
Diversion AD requires a NPA approach. (Choose from
available CFP’s)
OBJECTIVE
• To observe the trainee deal with the ‘’Flap locked ‘’ problem during the acceleration phases
and manage for another approach.
• To observe the decision making process and task management when the runway closes and
diversion implemented.
• To check trainees knowledge of limitations and performance restrictions in this configuration.
• To observe the trainee demonstrate use of QRH tables and FCOM references as above to
deduce new burn off and alternate decision.
• To observe FMGS reprogramming and execution of diversion.
• To observe a NPA approach with uneventful landing.
DETAIL
This exercise is a flight during the monsoon season. The weather is typical with heavy rain, storms
in the area and associated turbulence. Normal pre-flight, engine start, taxi and takeoff. Flap2 or 3
config for takeoff. On flap retraction, flap stuck between 3 and 1. Slats are still operative.
Whilst aircraft is manoeuvring for holding or an approach, a B747 has a runway excursion on
landing and closes airport for an indefinite period.
Diversion to available alternates. NPA approach to be flown. ILS is notamed inop.The weather is
around NPA minima. Fuel is critical due to cruise now at FL200 (flap limit) and increased fuel
burn. The CM 1 needs to analyse all the information before arriving at an alternate decision.
COMMON ERRORS
• Trainee failing to fly the aircraft accurately and getting a VFE exceedence
• Not flying a selected speed as soon as the problem occurs
• Incorrect task management when implementing diversion. Someone must always fly the
aircraft
• Incorrect use of FCOM and QRH to solve performance considerations.
• Poor alternate chosen, as being fuel critical.
• Incorrect programming of FMGS for diversion.
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 11 MXP-DXB
WX: Rain and low cloud, cross winds FCO-DXB
MEL - ENG 2 BLD INOP ZRH-DXB
R INR TK FUEL LEAK finally causing ENG 2 FLAMEOUT LGW-DXB
Diversion and landing
(Choose from
OBJECTIVES available CFP’s)
• To Observe use of MEL and considerations.
• To Considerations for wet Runway with cross winds, and limits
• To Observe the use of the weather Radar.
• To Observe task management of FUEL LEAK, Eng Fail and diversion
• To Observe Single Eng Ops, Approach and Landing, on WET Rwy with 15 kt Xwind.
DETAILS
Rain and low clouds with crosswinds of 15kts. Rwy wet. Braking action MED
MEL- ENG Bleed 2 Inop.
During climb, Fuel Leak from Right Inner tank.
1. MEL Bleed Inop. 36-11 Requires APU to be left running for the entire flight. Fuel
considerations!
5. During climb or in cruise, depending on diversion airfields available. Fuel Leak form right
inner tank. Crew may notice this, if not, then during ECAM advisory, or Pax report of white
vapour from Rt. wing. This should draw the crew’s attention to the fuel leak procedure.
10. Landing on a wet Rwy, with a crosswind of 15 kts. Reverses not usable as per fuel leak C/L
Common Errors
• Not allowing enough fuel for APU use due Bleed Inop.
• Not using the weather radar correctly.
• Trainee not familiar with the fuel leak proc.
• Trainee not descending to correct altitude for fuel gravity feeding.
• Insufficient considerations given to fuel imbalance and limitations.
• Using reverse after touch down
• Ineffective communication with crew and Pax
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 12 DXB-MCT
WX: Good with HZ DAR-NBO
Pre-Departure – Pax wanting to carry gun on board NBO-DAR
TCAS
TOD – ATTITUDE DISCREPANCY Use a short sector
F/O becomes sick – incapacitation flight.
Runway lighting failure – missed approach
Return for landing (Choose from
available CFP’s)
OBJECTIVE
• To observe the trainee handle the attitude discrepancy and deal with it accordingly without
losing control of the aircraft.
• To conduct a lightweight, low level missed approach.
• To successfully fly and land aircraft safely as single pilot with incapacitated F/O
DETAIL
This exercise is based on a short flight at night. In this exercise the trainee actually completes the
flight without diverting.
Prior to departure FOM related problem ( body guard carrying gun etc )
All ops normal with FMGS or TCAS exercises at instructor’s discretion. At top of descent, when
the A/C pitches down for descent, insert attitude discrepancy on IRS flying autopilot.
Descending through 7000ft F/O complains of severe abdominal pains ( appendix ) and dashes to
the toilet immediately. Does not come back !
Approach to minima where the runway lights fail ( wayward driver smashes into relay station )
resulting in a missed approach.
Trainee to conduct another approach as single pilot IFR with slight improvement in the weather
and lights back on standby generator . Runway lights strength 3 to allow landing.
COMMON ERRORS:
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 13 NBO-DAR
WX: Low cloud and visibility at minimum for NPA DXB-MCT
MEL – SLAT SYS 2 INOP (GREEN) 27-81 DXB-KWI
After T/O – SLAT SYS 1 FAULT, Slats stuck in extended position FCO-MXP
Sick PAX
ILS U/S at Departure and Destination Airfield (Choose from
Return to Departure,G/A - due wx available CFP’s)
Diversion and landing, NPA
A short route will highlight the fuel problems.
OBJECTIVES:
DETAILS
After takeoff and at Flap retraction,Slat Sys 1 fault, causing the Slats to be stuck.(insert this fault
using the more criteria on IOS)
• Initially speed management is important. This fault will manifest itself with the flap lever in
the ‘0’ position, with the slats actually stuck at position 1. Thus having a speed limit.
• After ECAM and reference to QRH with C/L completed, Purser advises of a passenger
suffering from severe stomach pains.
• Normally a decision to return would be made and a NPA flown. The Visibility being on the
low side will necessitate a Go Around.
• A diversion to a suitable airfield is to be made, before fuel becomes a problem.
• Considerations, Max Altitude with Slats out (200000 Ft.). Fuel burns (3.02.27 pg 4. 1.5
times) Sick passenger?
• ILS inop at diversion, requiring a NPA (At the instructors discretion. If the first one went
well, then continue for an ILS, or a selected if the first was managed)
Common Errors
• The trainee is not familiar with the S/F jam procedure and as per ECAM Status reads it from
Go Around.
• NPA procedures not being followed correctly.
• Overspeed with Slats stuck out.
• Not observing the 20000-ft altitude limit with Slats stuck out.
• Poor fuel management.
• Poor workload management when handling the sick passenger options.
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 14
WX - above EK circling minimas at departure airport ETOPS
ETOPS diversion airports have high crosswinds that approach the 80% limit for ETOPS planning purposes.
MRU-DXB
ETOPS procedures
CMB-DXB
MEL – APU GEN INOP
NBO-DXB
GPU failure, START ON BATTERY POWER
JNB-DXB
GEN 1 OVERVOLTAGE
EMERG ELEC CONFIG considerations, Or Eng 2 high Vibration (OK at idle thrust)
Diversion & landing
OBJECTIVES:
• To observe the trainees understanding of ETOPS – planning, pre-flight, & enroute procedures and
considerations.
• To observe the trainee handle the associated ground problems on a battery start and running one engine
on the ground during boarding etc..
• To observe the crew demonstrate FMGS knowledge during exercises on climb.
• To observe the trainees workload and task management and prioritisation with regard to a diversion to a
non-ETOPS routing..
• To observe the correct execution of a circling approach.
DETAILS:
The flight involves full use of all normal ETOPS procedures during flight planning and aircraft preparation.
1. During pre-flight planning the ETOPS diversion airport should have crosswinds approaching the 80%
limit for planning pruposes. The crew should detect this and note that the airports are still available.
5. Introduce a GEN 2 OVERVOLTAGE causing a loss of GEN 2 before entering the ETOPS sector.
• Crew should consider operational options and also contact Engineering on SATCOM, whilst
making contingency plans for a re-routing or diversion.(1 Gen. means no PES and part Galley)
• Observe workload management and communication techniques in handling re-routing or diversion.
• Does crew have enough fuel for non-ETOPS routing? If not, then a diversion is required.
6. During the diversion, Lightning strike takes away Gen. 1 leaving the Aircraft with EMERG
ELEC CONFIG. OR Eng. 1 High Vibration or Eng Stall (Both OK at Idle Thrust)
7. If diversion does occur the crew arrange for a circle-to-land to be required at the diversion airport.
Common Errors:
• Trainee not being familiar with ETOPS procedures and planning considerations.
• Poor flight management techniques and workload management when considering and implementing re-
routing or diversion.
• Circling approach procedures conducted incorrectly.
• Not ascertaining that the electrical status of the aircraft is getting critical – single generator ops.
• Not considering best diversion options in case EMERG ELEC CONFIG becomes required.
• Poor communication and resource management during failures.
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 15 DAR-NBO
WX: CBs FCO-MXP
MEL: SATCOM U/S
Enroute – LIGHTNING STRIKE causing AC BUS 2 FAIL and total loss of comms (Choose from
Approach Destination, heavy rain causes go-around and diversion to Alternate available CFP’s)
OBJECTIVES
• To observe the trainee take the necessary precautions with regard turbulence and
thunderstorm avoidance.
• To observe the trainee carry out the correct actions associated with an AC BUS 2 fault.
• To observe the trainee conduct the promulgated ICAO loss comms procedure
• To observe the trainee correctly manage a low fuel state.
• To observe the trainee execute a safe go around and diversion to an alternate.
DETAIL
The flight is short sector, The aircraft has a Tech log MEL SATCOM u/s.
The weather is typical rainy season, with thunderstorms (with associated problems of heavy rain
and low vis). There are CB’s to avoid en route and the weather at alternates fair, but reducing to
2000m in rain.
After reaching top of climb CB avoidance. During this phase the aircraft experiences a lightning
strike causing an AC BUS 2 fault. The flight continues but now they have lost comms completely.
No responses from any radio call.
The LOS continues to develop with the crew having to carry out the proper procedure for total
loss of comms. The correct course of action is continuing the flight.
On arrival at Dest heavy rain is experienced and a PWS is activated, resulting in a go around and
subsequent diversion due marginal WX and fuel state.
They should execute a diversion without delay otherwise a low fuel situation will develop.
COMMON ERRORS
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 16 BOM-DXB
Wx: Monsoon SAH-DXB
MEL: APU INOP KHI-DXB
GEN 1 FAULT
DC ESS BUS FAULT Or can use this as
Engine shutdown required via Fire Handle. a Winter Ops
scenario using:
LGW-DXB
OBJECTIVES ZRH-DXB
MAN-DXB
• To Observe the trainee correctly interpret the MEL.
• To Observe the trainee correctly manage the aircraft with a severely degraded electrical
system.
• To Observe the trainee manage a diversion
DETAIL
The A/C has an MEL item APU u/s. This necessitates an external pneumatic start with all relevant
Precautions being taken.
Once in the cruise introduce GEN 1 fail. Observe comms and decision to continue or divert. Pax
comfort, Part galley and no PES.
Some time later when well established en route introduce DC Ess Bus Fail. AP 2 is still available
The A/c has a severely degraded electrical system and a decision must be made on whether a
diversion should be made.
ACP 1 & 2 are u/s and the a/c has no wing A/I no L WINDOW heat so a winter scenario can
prove interesting.
Common Errors
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 17 (ETOPS)
WX: CBs JNB-DXB
MEL – APU INOP MRU-DXB
LIGHTNING STRIKE causing GEN 1 FAULT – single GEN operations CMB-DXB
If no diversion back to JNB (no Galleys/PES etc) then IDG OVHT ADVISORY
Return to JNB, jettison, landing (NON-ETOPS)
LGW-DXB
MAN-DXB
OBJECTIVES ZRH-DXB
FCO-DXB
• To observe the trainee carry out the correct procedures associated for an ETOPS flight MXP-DXB
• To observe the trainee accomplish an external pneumatic start.
• To observe the trainee manage a departure in thunderstorms and rain.
• To observe the trainee handle a GEN problem and manage a diversion with all the necessary
procedures being followed.
DETAIL
If used on an ETOPS sector the trainee should carry out the extra pre flight duties. (Refer to LOS
14)
APU is inop, so a start with external sources is required.
Numerous CB’s are encountered on departure and all the relevant precautions with regard weather
avoidance and turbulence must be undertaken.
Once established in the cruise the aircraft experiences a lightning strike which results in a GEN 1
FAULT. The trainee must decide whether to continue or return to departure airfield. The purser
will complain about lack of galley power and the fact that a number of passengers are angry
because their IFE is not working.
Once a decision has been reached, as to whether to continue or return
• An IDG OVHT ADVISORY on GEN 2 could also be introduced leading to Emerg Elec
Config
• Or an Eng problem eg. High Vib, Eng Stall, that requires no Eng shutdown and the thrust to
remain at Idle.
The trainee must now return to departure airport with all the considerations of performance,
weather, runway state, fuel jettison etc.
COMMON ERRORS
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 18 LGW-DXB
WX: TC’s Discretion MAN-DXB
MEL – Nil ZRH-DXB
Tire burst on T/O causing BLUE HYD LO LEVEL FCO-DXB
ENG 2 LO OIL PRESS causing ENG 2 shutdown – DUAL HYD LO PR JNB-DXB
OBJECTIVES
(Choose from
• To observe the trainee prioritise his actions in the event of a tire burst. available CFP’s)
• To observe the trainee manage a Blue Hydraulic low level.
• To observe the trainee carry out the correct actions for an ENG LOW OIL PRESS.
• To observe the trainee manage a DUAL HYD LO PR
DETAILS
On the T/O run (20kts below V1) a tire burst on the LH MLG. The decision should be GO.
Possible consideration is leaving the MLG down (FOM ch 25-13) performance permitting.
As the tyre burst is very subtle most trainees will probably retract the MLG.
The damaged tyre causes a leak in the blue hydraulic system and during the climb out the A/C
experiences a BLUE HYD LOW LEVEL.
If the MLG is down the trainee will have to decide whether to return to point of departure or
divert, but continuing en route would probably not be a good option. All issues should be
considered, fuel, landing weight, performance, unsafe gear, etc.
If the MLG has been retracted the trainee should gather as much information as possible as to
whether he should divert or continue. It is a single failure so continuing is a consideration but as
much information about possible further damage caused by the tyre should be sought i.e. ATC
should be asked about Tyre deposits on the runway. Engineering asked about likely further
damage – engineering response should be that if there is no vibration and that if all other system
parameters are normal, then the a/c should continue.
Only when a decision on whether to divert or continue has been made ENG 2 LO OIL PR should
be introduced. This will result in Engine being shut down with the ensuing loss of the yellow
hydraulic system
DUAL HYD LO PR – Despite this being LAND ASAP the trainee must consider ,landing weight,
Performance, fuel jettison, etc before deciding where to go. The procedure for DUAL HYD LOW
PR must be methodically run through handing over control where necessary.
As this is a very demanding situation, radar vectors to an ILS should be made available.
If the LOS is used as a short exercise, the Low Oil Press can be replaced by Eng High Vib or Eng
Stall, leaving the aircraft with one Eng in Idle Thr. and a single HYD Sys Lo Press.
Common Errors
SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
SAA-DXB
LOS19 ZRH-DXB
JNB-DXB
Wx : Variable
MEL Nil
LH MLG Stuck Down
Diversion consideration and landing, NPA approach
OBJECTIVES
• To observe the trainee initially concentrate on flying the a/c during climb out and not be
distracted by MLG problem.
• To observe the trainee gather information prior to either Landing or diverting
• To observe a NPA being flown.
DETAIL
On T/O LH MLG will not retract. Trainee should “fly the a/c” making sure all altitude constraints
for the SID are met.
Once at a safe height ECAM actions can be completed the outcome being the MLG is stuck down.
With the excessive vibration a quick PA to the Pax should be made to reassure them.
This scenario is not time critical and the trainee should “ stay below the line” whilst making a
decision on where to divert.
This scenario works best at airfield with large performance penalties: Go around & landing
distance.(SAH RWY 18)
The trainee will have to calculate whether he can achieve go around climb gradient with the gear
down, whether he should use higher minima, circling app, divert with gear down etc.
Common Errors
• Failing to fly the A/c and getting too preoccupied with the gear problem.
• Failing to establish all the facts (particularly) performance, before committing to a diversion
or return.
• NPA approach procedures not being adhered to.
BOM – DXB
RAK is the alternate on the flight plan, there are no charts for RAK in the sim so change alternate to
OOMS, gives excuse for extra fuel.
Route manual company NOTAM’s cannot use Ahmedabad as an alternate on A330. Remember, in an
abnormal situation can disregard. If airborne and want to divert there, then call the company and find out
why can’t use it. Maybe just no handling agreement.
Thunderstorm activity whilst boarding. Briefed for windshear and checked to see if rwy contaminated.
Passenger trouble. Ask CSD if wants to off load passenger or not? Involve station Manager. Make it
someone else’s problem.
BMC Fault at holding point. Drunk passenger, over assertive SFS wanting to Man handle pax. Get purser
involved.
Lots of very bad weather around. Divert L and R. Keep ridiculously clear or get severe turbulence! Don’t
get flight level, start running tight on Fuel. Review fuel policy.
BMC 1 + 2 Fault. Now have no bleed monitoring so won’t know if have an overheat until the pack auto
shuts down! Sent ACARS to engineering to warn them, decided to continue to DXB.
Sick passenger, establish if genuine or Indian sick. If genuine call Medlink on Sat phone before calling for
doctor on board. Prepare secondary incase divert to KHI or MCT.
Lightning strike and lose radome. Resulting in unreliable airspeed. Establish flight path hand over to F/O,
so can run QRH (obscure location 5.05) and monitor. Elect to divert to KHI. Fully configure in level flight
on a very long final.
Can only use FPV if altitude info is ok. Get block Altitude clearance.
Check Altitude on GPS monitor page (Data / GPS monitor). Or with Radar.
BOM-DXB
Weather TS and rain over the field although Vis > Cat 1
Notams 14/32 closed for works
MEL ENG 1 EPR Mode fault (rated mode)
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Diverted to VAAH with slats flaps out as not the gas for anywhere else, landed via NPA to 23 (notam
effecting ILS).
BOM - DXB
Weather Thunderstorms
Notams
MEL Pack 1 u/s Restricted to Fl310, took extra gas
Failure 1 GPS 1 and 2 Failure 3 Eng flame out
Failure 2 FMGEC independent operation Failure 4 HYD G&B
Problems
Fuel
BOM – DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Slats or Flaps don’t retract on T/O. Run ECAM, do checklist, return. Traffic ahead blows tyres on runway.
ATC says 1 hr to clear. Don’t trust them. Check status of cross runway. Immediately start heading towards
KHI, (AMD is basically on the way). On the way calculate divert fuel (KHI 455nm away, AMD is 240nm)
with slats or flaps out. Refer 2.05.50. Corrections from FCOM3.02.10 p8., QRH 4.13 gives the same.
BOM – DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Double IRS failure on take off. Return, runway blocked, Go-around divert to KHI.
BOM - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
De-Brief
BOM - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
- ON GROUND DURING COCKPIT PREP "APU BLEED LEAK" (ECAM, THEN FCOM 3)
- MAN ENG START WITH EXTERNAL BLEED (DUE PRESSURE <25PSI ), START
MALFUNCTION WITH HIGH EGT, MANUAL SHUT DOWN (REMEMBER, ONCE ABOVE
700°C, MAINT. REQ)
- DURING TAXI, PRIM 1 FAULT, USE QRH RESET OF COMPUTERS
- ATIS STATED RVR OF 550M IN MOD RA (T/O MINIMA FOR F/O 2 KM, ALSO CHECK MIN
T/O VIS IN BOM ON JEPP PLATES)
- LOTS OF WX ON DEPT SECTOR (MONSOON COND), ND SETTING FOR WX CHECK MIN 40
NM
- CONF 3 T/O, AFTER COMMAND "FLAPS 1", ECAM "F/CTL FLAPS LOCKED"
- ENTERED THE HOLD OVERHEAD BBB, ASKED FOR WX, RVR WAS LESS THAN REQ FOR
CAT 1 LANDING, NO IMPROVEMENT, WX KHI AND AMD NOT BRILLIANT, BUT OK
- USED SEC FLIGHT PLAN TO FIGURE OUT DISTANCE ALONG AWY'S TO OPKC (~465NM),
VAAH(~230NM), I WAS WESTBOUND MINDED, FORGOT TO CONSIDER VOHY(~334NM),
(TURNED OUT THAT HYD RWY LENGTH SIGN. LESS THAN AMD AND WX WAS WORSE)
- USED THE TABLE FCOM 3.02.27 P4 AND THE ALTN FLIGHT PLANNING TABLES
INITIALLY, KHI WAS TO TIGHT, DECIDED TO PROCEED TO AHMEDABAD
- CLIMB TO FL 200, THEN AGAIN COMPUTATION OF FUEL REQ ACCORDING ACTUAL FF
- INFORMED PUR, PAX AND COMPANY
- UNEVENTFUL LANDING IN AMD
TOTAL TIME CA 3 HRS, THEREAFTER TWO MINI LOFTS (1. UNRELIABLE SPEED DURING
ROTATION AND 2. ELEC EMER CONFIG DURING INITIAL CLIMB)
BOM-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Wx: TS and rain over the field although Vis > Cat 1
Notams 14/32 closed for works
MEL: ENG 1 EPR Mode fault (rated mode)
Diverted to VAAH with slats flaps out as not the gas for anywhere else, landed via NPA to 23 (notam
effecting ILS).
BOM – DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 SLATS / FLAPS JAM ON Failure 3
RETRACTION
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Bomb Threat – must descend aircraft immediately as per the checklist to get the cabin within 1
PSI of the outside air pressure. Minimizes explosive damage.
- do not jettison fuel, explosion could ignite fuel that is being dumped
Bomb Threat – (or avionics smoke) go direct to nearest suitable airport, immediately and
declare an emergency, then follow the checklist.
Rudder Jam – use FCOM 3 as there is a reset procedure that should fix the problem
Dual Engine Failure – the AFM states that relight is not possible until aircraft is below FL300,
but continue to follow the procedure on ECAM or the QRH if necessary.
- if you get one of the engines back (ie) #2 , even though you have green hydraulics, still
use the Gravity extension for the gear.
- Reason is that the green system could be overloaded by the excess demand and the
Emergency generator (in the green system) is still powering the essential buses at this
stage. An over demand on the green system could stall the emergency generator.
African airspace – use the 1NM offset to the right in African airspace
- utilize the blind broadcast procedures ( 126.7)
- have all approach plates ready for Harare, Dar and JNB
- need both HFs so test them both
High Altitude Airport – calculate your return weight for emergency landing
- calculate runway distance needed for emergency (remember Press Alt correction)
- S/E Climb Gradient for Go-Around
- Maximum true airspeed for tires Vr + 2KTS per 1000’ ASL ?????????
- Max tire speed is 195 knots
These are my LOFTS, there were a number of minor things along the way in each of them but I
have just included the main items. (That’s all I can remember anyway…!)
• APU dropped off line just before Start check the FMGEC again use the Hat
• Cabin in dark, make PA to Pax
• Had to get ground Elec cart start one on stand then push
• Pax problem new the Sheikh wanted to carry his hunting rifle on board no way in the cabin
• Normal T/O after airborne lost FCU Red Alt and Spd on PFD A/P and A/thr gone you get the Bird
so fly this set manual thrust say 85% N1 10 deg pitch up
• Get clearance from ATC for heading and block clearance cancel Sid
• Restore using QRH reset Computers
• Thunderstorms avoidance
• In cruise smoke, Descend and carry out drill mask on etc
• Smoke would not go away so you get to the Smoke removal checklist we did not want to slow
down so elected not to do the checklist till near JNB but you can get Ram air to help so do the
checklist to Ram air ie packs off and carry out to Ram air on
• Remember that you also have Harare as and airport use ETP page to keep aware of Alternates
• Keep O2 cover area clear
Call a May Day
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Had APU Gen U/S in brfg>> no effect on ETOPS capability. Given max ZFW of 168 T for
departure. Wx in DXB was not good. Elected to take reduced reserve to carry the load as Muscat
wx was good.
After takeoff & following gear retraction, had low tire press. Got tower to check out runway and
indeed had left shredded rubber on runway>>> burst tire. No problem. kept on going to DXB &
consulted with MCC on SATCOM. MCC suggested review low tire press limits in FCOM 3.01-
good info.
Through FL 200, had blue hyd fail. Kept going to DXB & called MCC again to advise/consult.
Around 250 mi N of JNB had severe eng vibrations & eng shutdown leading to dual hyd failure
& Land ASAP in amber. Driftdown proc. Although I was closer to Harare (by about 75mi) and
the wx was good in both places I elected to turn back to JNB rather than go to Harare. Was good
decision as I needed lots of time to dump fuel anyway. Advised Purs, Pax, Company etc.
Continued to JNB dumping fuel. Use ETOPS diversion procedure from FCOM 2. Yes, I said FCOM 2 !
Could not dump below 180T because of hvy ZFW so elected to land slightly O/W (183 T)
Vectors back for ILS 03L (better than 03R)
Landed & stopped on Runway due to burst tire. Engineers inspected & shutdown on rwy due lack
of NWS (gravity gear ext).
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
MEL R/H Landing Light U/S (Etops restriction) concession granted by MCC
Pregnant passenger FOM
During Taxi, Spoiler Fault, OEB, reset procedure PRIM 1
Tire Burst at rotation
Blue Hydraulic Loss
Oil Leak #2 Engine TOC
Returned to JNB using high speed strategy
S/E ILS 21L (one engine at idle thrust)
De-Brief
- read the MEL carefully, the R/H Landing light issue could possibly apply to either light
- tire blown after takeoff, discussed possible damage to aircraft…good
- at TOC check, FO missed the low oil quantity and I missed it 5 minutes later. MCC
advised that they could see the problem and advised us to retard the thrust lever in an
attempt to save the engine, it did.
- Utilized high speed profile single engine back to JNB. Harare and Lilongwe were closed
at night and Biera was too short to help us.
- CAREFUL, if Biera were unuseable, then the first leg out of JNB would have to be
considered an ETOPS sector. More than 420 nm from a suitable airport.
- Continue to use the diversion checklist in the QRH, helped a lot.
- Fuel dumped enroute down to 180 tonnes. Enough for alternate and a few circuits at JNB
and under max landing weight.
- Considered the possibility of losing the low oil engine, effects on approach, further
diversion to Gabarone, Dual Hydraulics failure, etc.
- Discussions about landing and the sister tire blows, land on the right side of the runway,
idle reverse on good engine.
- Taxi with blown tire procedures 7 knots for 1 tire blown, 3 knots for 2 tires blown
JNB-DXB
SCENARIO: ESTIMATED ZFW 168T, FUEL LOAD REQD WITH 2800 ALL-WX ADDITION
WAS VERY HIGH---60T. UNABLE TO LIFT THAT WT AT 20*C, TOLD LOAD TO
STANDBY, REQUESTED REDUCED RESERVE FLT PLAN. NO COMMS WITH
DUBAI---NEW FLIGHT PLAN NOT FORTHCOMING. DECIDE TO REDUCE FUEL
BY 3T, TO TAKE AS MUCH LOAD AS POSSIBLE. (STILL LEFT 1 CONTAINER
BEHIND).
PNEUMATIC GND AIR AND ELECTRICS USED FOR STARTING 1, THEN X-
BLEED START ON 2 DURING PUSHBACK. DURING THE PUSHBACK, ECAM
PRIM 2 AND SEC 2 FAULT. RESET OK.
TOGA TAKE-OFF UNEVENTFUL, DURING CLIMB OUT THE YELLOW
HYDRAULIC LEVEL SLOWLY REDUCED UNTIL ECAM HYD YELLOW LO
PRESS.
APPROACHING OVANA, HEAVY VIBRATION---ENGINE 2, N3 WELL ABOVE 4
UNITS. THROTTLE REDUCED, EVENTUALLY TO IDLE THRUST. RETURN TO
JNB, DUMPING ALL THE WAY IN. LANDS VIA ILS 03L.
MINI-LOFTS
1. ENGINE FAILIURE ON TAKE-OFF, CANNOT LAND BACK DUE WX, DIVERT TO CLOSE
ALTERNATE, LOC APPROACH AND LANDING.
JNB – DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
JNB-DXB
Weather JNB- WIND ACROSS THE RUNWAY WITH POSSIBLE RAIN SHOWERS.
DXB- AWO FORECAST, ALTERNATE MCT.
Notams
MEL APU U/S.
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
AFTER START FMS 2 FAULT, THE COMPUTER WAS RESET FOLLOWING QRH, SUCCESSFUL.
TAKE OFF ON 21R.
WHEN IN MAPUTO AIR SPACE GEN 1 IDG OIL LOW PRESS, AFTER FOLLOWING ECAM GEN 1
U/S.
DECIDED TO CONTINUE USING A NON ETOPS ROUTE. ABOUT 15 MINUTES LATER GEN 2
WENT OFF LINE. EMERG ELEC CONFIG. AFTER FOLLOWING ECAM, GEN 2 WAS
RECOVERED.
DECIDED TO RETURN TO JNB, WE JETTISON FUEL DOWN TO 180 T AND LANDED IN JNB.
KHI – DXB.
Weather
Notams
MEL APU power cart failure
Failure 1 FM1 Failure 3 Eng 2 Low oil pressure
Failure 2 Eng 1 Thrust lever Fault Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
APU power cart failure. Start on Batteries. Hand signals only available for start. Can’t see the bottom
ECAM screen. Can check it by switching. Pressing ALL key. Would have been better to call the bridge
back and ask the engineer how long to get another cart. Company preference is to take the delay rather than
start on batteries. No Communications with engineer so use hand signals. PA to PAX about the lights
flickering on / off etc.
On taxi out FM1 failed, carried out switching. Forgot to try reset procedure as per QRH. Would have got it
back if had!
Depart KHI from rwy 07L. Weather avoidance / direct to Enroute etc.
Eng 1 Thrust lever Fault. The “MN” note in the FCOM is mach number. Effectively when the slats are
extended the engine will be commanded to idle (like a simulated engine failure except cannot get the thrust
back when cleaned up) inform ATC purser and company.
Eng 2 Low oil pressure. Unable to shut down engine as would become a glider at slats extend. Diagnosed
the fault as being a faulty oil press transmitter so elected not to go to Muscat. Which had a NPA and
Xwind. Continued to DXB.
Failed to keep ATC adequately in the loop so they blocked the runway to force a go-around. Went around
stayed in the circuit kept Flap 1 1500’ and landed.
Weather KHI 070/15-20 kts vis 5000m, DXB Cavok, MCT 350/20 gusting 25 kts Cavok
Notams KHI Rwy 25R/07L closed.Taxiways F+B closed
MCT G/S rwy 26 u/s
AUH Aerodrome closed until 1400hrs due VIP movements (ie still
closed at the time we would need it if we had to divert there from Dubai)
MEL APU Gen u/s
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel Took Extra 3 tons
At planning stage Cfp had OMRK as primary alternate. No charts in sim for OMRK. Second alternate was
OMAA but closed at expected time of arrival due VIP movements. No other alternates listed on Cfp. Had
wx and Notams for OOMS, fuel difference was roughly 3 tons between OMRK as an alternate and OOMS.
Told KHI Atc to change our filed alternate to OOMS and briefed F.O that our first option would be to
check with ATC to see if OMAA had re-opened should we need it. Ordered CFP fuel plus 3 tons.
On board, confirmed GPU available and that DXB had been advised we would need a GPU on arrival.
Normal set up. Problem with a family who had not been seated together, Purser asked me what she should
do, I asked her and the F.O what they thought was the best idea, between them they came up with the
solution.(Which was to move our engineer from Business into First and then bring the 2 kids seated down
the back to join their folks in business)
On start, eng #1 start pressure initially good (30psi) but rapidly decayed to around 8psi.Confirmed no N1
Rotation with engineer.
Apu air had given up the ghost. Refer to Mel and dispatch without APU.
Request ground air.
Start eng #1 on gate with GPU and Gnd pneumatic air, push back and x-bleed start the other engine.
Normal taxi.
On line up IRS#3 fault.
Request to hold position. Run ecam. Not really enough info. Refer to Vol3 3.02.34 pg4a. Attempt the reset
procedure mentioned in the note on the page but no success. Refer to MEL and off we go.
Advise Ek engineering via ACARS of IRS fault.
Airborne and wx radar picks up large cell on track at about 60nm.Ask ATC about it and they report new
met info indicates a tropical storm enroute. (Not on wx briefing)
Divert Left of track by approx 50nm to clear wx by approx 40nm.Talk to purser and advise her that will
release the crew (light turb only at this point) but keep pax seat belts on. Passing approx FL150, moderate
turbulence. Sit the crew down. PA to pax advising I have instructed the crew to take their seats and may be
a while before the service starts.
FMS!/FMS2 position mis match picked up by F.O on MCDU screen.
Ran accuracy check on KHI VOR…both FMGC’s check o.k.
Held down to FL310 due traffic. (Requested level 390).Fuel still o.k at 310 but only just for OOMS by
approx 200kg.
Another FMS!/FMS2 pos mis match. Confirmed GPS still primary, ran another accuracy check on MCT
Vor and asked Muscat to confirm our radial and distance…all checked o.k.
Pushing for higher level but no go by ATC
AC Bus 2 fault. All goes blank on F.O’s side. Shortly after, #2 eng gen u/s.
Down to one eng gen and emer gen only with AC bus 2 lost.
Approx 100nm from OOMS and 220nm from OMDB
Sort out failure which basically is just a very long list of minor inop systems and nothing left on the F.O’s
side (no screens or FM),overhead switch internal light failures but the switches are still working, reverse 2
U/S and in manual thrust due N1 mode reversion.
Quick discussion with F.O, get OOMS weather and OMDB weather. Same conds as when left KHI. Decide
to continue to OMDB but if we lose another gen source will divert to either OOMS or OMDB whichever is
the closest.
Cant handover of course so instruct F.O to advise Purser of situation and that she has lost partial galley
systems and continuing to DXB etc. Get F.O to do P.A and advise Dubai. Discussion on what to say to
ATC. We decide to tell them we have a technical difficulty but not to declare an emergency or raise a Pan.
Ask F.O to review Vol3 for both AC2 Bus fault and also EPR mode fault to obtain N1 values for Toga and
MCT in the event we are reverted back to N1 unrated mode for any eason.
Rest of cruise is just setting up for arrival etc.
Passing through 4000 feet and cleared to intercept LLZ 30R (for the ILS) and lose IRS#2.
Altn Law, no AP, no F.D, no A.thrust.
Got F.O to stop ecam and ask ATC for hold in current position at 3000’. Confirmed that Atc had us under
radar and clear of terrain.
Ran the Ecam. Very quick procedure and only change was now for a config 3 landing. Fuel had just gone
under CMR for OOMS so got F.O to check if OMAA had re-opened and it had so re-nominated OMAA,
got F.O to change alternate in MCDU 3 .
Radar heading from ATC to manually flown ILS and Landing 30 R.
No reverse 2 , selected idle reverse only on 1 and low auto brake.
Multiple glasses of bubbly later ☺
Debrief points:
Nil
Weather FINE.
Notams
MEL APU GEN INOP.
Failure 1 FUEL LEAK Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
ALL WENT SMOOTHLY THEN JUST AFTER DOORS CLOSED WE HAD GPU FAILURE. NO
OTHER GPU’S HANDY SO HAD TO DO BATTERY START. FOLLOW BATTERY START
CHECKLIST AND MANUAL START CHECKLIST.
ON THE CLIMB OUT GOT AN ENGINE BLEED LEAK. ECAM DONE, DECIDED TO STOP CLIMB
AT 350.
APPROACHING ALPOR CSD REPORTS VAPOUR COMING OFF THE LEFT WING. CHECKED
FUEL AND SURE ENOUGH FUEL FROM THE LEFT SIDE DIMINISHING RAPIDLY. GOT THE
CHECKLIST OUT. UNABLE TO CONFIRM ENGINE LEAK SO DESCENDED TO GRAVITY FUEL
FEEDING CEILING. (YOU HAVE TO GO TO GRAVITY FUEL FEEDING PROCEDURE QRH 2:08).
IN THE MEANTIME STARTED DIVERSION TO OOMS, AND DECLARED AN EMERGENCY.
WHEN GRAVITY FUEL FEEDING CEILING WAS REACHED SWITCHED OFF ALL LEFT FUEL
PUMPS. QRH THEN STATES THAT IF ENGINE FLAMES OUT WHEN THERE IS STILL FUEL IN
THE TANK, GO BACK TO THE LEAK FROM ENGINE PROCEDURE. ENGINE CARRIED ON SO
ASSUMED WING DAMAGE AND CONTINUED THE DIVERSION. ACCORDING TO THE
INSTRUCTOR, IT WAS ACTUALLY AN ENGINE LEAK AND IT DOESN’T ALWAYS FLAME
OUT? WHILST BUSY WITH THE CHECKLIST GOT AN ECAM WARNING, WING TANK LO LVL.
BE CAREFUL AS THIS IS ONE CASE WHERE ECAM LEADS YOU UP THE GARDEN PATH. IT
TELLS YOU TO SWITCH ON FUEL X-FEED WHICH IS THE LAST THING YOU WANT WITH
FUEL POURING OUT OF THE WING.
ABOUT 5MINS OUT OF MUSCAT, LEFT ENGINE FLAMED OUT, NO MORE FUEL IN LEFT
WING TANKS. SORTED IT OUT, WENT IN AND LANDED ON 08, 3.5 TONS OF FUEL LEFT IN
THE RIGHT SIDE. STOPPED ON THE RUNWAY SO THAT AIRCRAFT COULD BE CHECKED
OUT BY FIRECREW.
MY MISTAKES.
CONSIDER SWITCHING IRS’S OFF BEFORE BATTERY START AS THEY USE A LOT OF BATT
POWER.
COULD HAVE TROUBLESHOOTED MORE WITH REGARDS TO ESTABLISHING WHETHER IT
WAS AN ENGINE OR WING LEAK.
KHI-DXB
GPU Tripped off line at engine start, no others available so battery start.
FM 2 failed on taxi, reset OK via QRH
T/O normal.
ENG 2 vibes in cruise, reduced at idle. LO OIL PRESS 2 a few minutes later so shut down, diverted to
OOMS LOC 26. SIM placed the R/W in the wrong place so stayed vis at 1000 and circled back onto 26 for
land.
KHI - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
- DURING COCKPIT PREP, PUR CAME AND SAID, FIVE MEN ARE CARRYING 10 FALCONS
IN FIRST CLASS, ARE WE ALLOWED? (GAVE F/O FOM TO LOOK FOR APPROP. PAGE AND
CLARIFIED)
- CHECK ATT MESSAGE CAME ONTO PFD'S, AFTER EVAL RESETTED IRS 1, PROBLEM
CURED
- AFTER T/O: HYD Y RSVR LO LVL, AFTER HYD ECAM, ANOTHER ECAM WARNING
STATED WHEEL TIRE LO PR (ON THE WHEEL PAGE TWO TIRES HAD LO PR)
- ATC CONFIRMED TIRE DEBRIS ON THE RWY, WE DIDN'T NOTICE ANYTHING LEADING
US TO TIRE BURSTS (SIM ), SO GEAR WAS ALREADY UP, CONTINUED TO DXB
- A MINUTE LATER HYD G RSVR LO LYL CAME UP
- STOPPED CLIMB AT 8000FT, DECLARED EMERGENCY, RETURNED TO KHI.
- IT IS A TRICKY THING TO DETERMINE THE LDG DISTANCE, G+Y HYD = X 1.7, NO TIRE
PROBLEMS INDICATED IN CHART QRH 2.26
- CHOSE BRK RELEASE FAULT, WHICH IS X 1.4, SO TOTAL LDG DIST REQ IS FOR 2 FLAT
TIRES: 1,4X1,4X 1,7=3,332
- ZWF WAS 168TO AND EVEN WITH E.G. 170TO LW THE REQ LDG DISTANCE WITH THIS
FACTOR WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE THAN THE AVAILABLE 25R 3200M(25L CLOSED)
- SO DIDN'T JETT FUEL, LW CA 180TO, BRIEFED F/O THAT I WILL FLY BELOW THE GS
WHEN VISUAL AND ALMOST ON TOP OF THE RWY IN ORDER TO LAND ON THRESHOLD
TO GAIN MORE DISTANCE
- LANDING AND BREAKING WITH ACCUMULATOR WAS NO PROBLEM, STOPPED AFTER
2/3RD OF THE RWY, ACC TCE SIM DOESN'T REFLECT THE LDG DIST PROBLEM
PROPERLY
- ONE ENG FAILURE AFTER T/O MINI LOFT
KHI – DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL APU GEN INOP
Failure 1 FM2 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems GPU FAILS
Fuel
KHI-DXB
GPU Tripped off line at engine start, no others available so battery start.
FM 2 failed on taxi, reset OK via QRH
T/O normal.
ENG 2 vibes in cruise, reduced at idle. LO OIL PRESS 2 a few minutes later so shut down, diverted to
OOMS LOC 26. SIM placed the R/W in the wrong place so stayed vis at 1000 and circled back onto 26 for
land.
LGW – DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
- when you decide on final fuel be sure to advise mechanic downstairs, check fuel page at
this time. You may catch a trim tank problem at that time
- some discussion about what altitude to set in the FCU for the SID. I briefed the final
altitude FL 60 and using the managed climb, the enroute constraints would be respected.
Further investigation in the FCOM , SOPs and FCTM does not give guidance about this
procedure. Peter agreed with our selection.
- RVSM discussion enroute. Are we at the right altitude? Usually, the CFP Is correct and
the charts can confirm the altitude. Be careful in Africa, instructor may give wrong
altitude for direction of flight. You have to correct it.
- anytime you have a problem at altitude, consider, Belts ON and Eng A/I ON!
- STATUS page, give it a quick review even though it is flashing. It may help you decide
where to divert. The status page may be interrupted during the descent because of the
higher airspeed and resulting windmilling. The hydraulics page will cycle because of
pressure fluctuations in the descent.
- if PNF has control, plan to take control back at a better time. Not at a high workload
point, (ie) crossing the FAF. As long as it is done by 1000’ AGL.
LGW-DXB
Weather LGW OVERCAST AT 400’, RAIN, TEMP 4*. MOST OF LONDON AIRPORTS ARE
FORECASTING MUCH THE SAME.
Notams NORMAL LOADS OF INFO, BUT NOTHING TO DIRECTLY INFLUENCE THE
FLIGHT.
MEL NIL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
SCENARIO: SLOW BOARDING, DIFFICULT PAX, SLOT TIME. CHECK FOR ICE, WORK WET
FIGURES. ON TAXI, RA 1 FAILS---NOT RECOVERED.
DURING CLIMB, LANDING GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. RECYCLED, NOW
WOULD NOT EXTEND. (RIGHT MAIN JAMMED IN INTERMEDIATE POSITION).
REQUESTED HOLD AT MAYFIELD VOR, ASSESSED THAT WOULD NEED TO
DUMP ABOUT 40 TONS OF FUEL AND ALSO REDUCE FUEL LOAD IN RIGHT
WING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. REQUESTED VECTORS TO JETTISON AREA,
HELD FOR ABOUT 45 MINS, DUMPING FUEL. USED TIME FOR COMMS WITH
EK AND TO BRIEF PURSER ON REQUIREMENTS FOR LANDING WITH
ABNORMAL GEAR. GATWICK ADVISED WE COULD LAND ON 26 R, AFTER
APPROACH ON LEFT. BURNT AS MUCH FUEL AS POSSIBLE FROM RIGHT
WING, THEN BRIEFED FOR AND FLEW APPROACH, WITH LAST MINUTE SIDE
STEP. EVACUATED ON SIDE OF RUNWAY, (WE HAD “GROUND LOOPED” OFF
THE RUNWAY).
LGW – DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
- when you decide on final fuel be sure to advise mechanic downstairs, check fuel page at this time.
You may catch a trim tank problem at that time
- some discussion about what altitude to set in the FCU for the SID. I briefed the final altitude FL
60 and using the managed climb, the enroute constraints would be respected. Further investigation
in the FCOM , SOPs and FCTM does not give guidance about this procedure. Peter agreed with
our selection.
- RVSM discussion enroute. Are we at the right altitude? Usually, the CFP Is correct and the charts
can confirm the altitude. Be careful in Africa, instructor may give wrong altitude for direction of
flight. You have to correct it.
- anytime you have a problem at altitude, consider, Belts ON and Eng A/I ON!
- STATUS page, give it a quick review even though it is flashing. It may help you decide where to
divert. The status page may be interrupted during the descent because of the higher airspeed and
resulting windmilling. The hydraulics page will cycle because of pressure fluctuations in the
descent.
- if PNF has control, plan to take control back at a better time. Not at a high workload point, (ie)
crossing the FAF. As long as it is done by 1000’ AGL.
These are my LOFTS, there were a number of minor things along the way in each of them but I have
just included the main items. (That’s all I can remember anyway…!)
LGW – DXB:
Weather Ice
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Unreliable Airspeed/Alt Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Take Off, company calls and asks you to divert to LHR to pick up passengers because of a broken B777.
Get authorisation from them to dump fuel as we are way over weight. Co-ordinate with ATC and go and
dump to Max ldg weight. Go to LHR, have to hold due traffic. Ice starts to build rapidly. In close
succession lose airspeed and altitude info. Run the unreliable airspeed QRH.
Can’t control pitch when visual due to ice. Try other stick i.e. F/O. Conduct a very gentle go-around incase
can’t control pitch. Inc speed to get more control. (VLS +15kts FCOM 3.04.91).
Confirmed with engineer that the aircraft had no ice on arrival so therefore no deice required.
Eng a.ice on for T.Off.
Slot time given, asked F.O to load FMGS to speed things up.
Normal start up, after start “Blue electric hyd pump” u/s
Checked MEL and continued.
During taxi, “Rad Alt #1” fault. Stopped on taxiway to sort out. MEL checked and o.k to go but also
implicates to GPWS. Checked MEL for this also and it states that you should not leave either DXB or any
place that the GPWS can be repaired at. We had already dispatched so MEL did not apply. Quick chat with
the F.O and we checked with engineering in LGW to ensure they were happy for us to continue or would
they prefer to repair it. We continued.
On departure “Land gear retraction fault” (Right main L.Gear), briefed to continue on track hoping we
could sort it out initially. Limited speed to 230 kts (250 max) and altitude to FL210.
F.O ran ecam and after recycling still no good so ecam says put gear down.
Now we end up with “Land gear not downlocked fault”. Ecam says to recycle for this fault also, ran the
recycle and still not locked down. Stopped the ecam procedure at this point,handed over control to F.O,
discussion with F.O…obviously not going to be able to continue to DXB stacks of fuel on board so no
hurry to do anything, got weather for LHR,MAN and LGW. Only one with good wx was LGW (improved
to 1000’ base) Requested vectors to a suitable hold and asked ATC to liase with other control centers to
establish who would be most likely to accept an aircraft with the possibility of an abnormal landing gear
problem.They cleared us to LYD holding position and said they would get back to us.
Chat to Purser to tell not sure of nature gear status yet but definitely not continuing to Dxb, released her and
the crew but said don’t start service yet. PA to pax telling them of technical difficulty and to reamin seated.
Advised LGW station manager of problem and asked him to contact Dubai and to liase with our engineers
there and we would keep a listening watch on the frequency.
Returned to ecam procedure.
Lower ecam screen now fails (S.D).Switched Ecam N.D to Capt postn and it did not recover S.D on my
N.D. Reset the switch. Located QRH and ran QRH2.10 (which said to do exactly what I had just done) and
this time it did recover the screen on my N.D.
Quite confusing and difficult to monitor the F.O’s flying and run the ecam via screen switching. Decided to
wait until safely established in hold before continuing ecam actions. Atc advise that LGW would be in a
position to accept us if we end up with a gear problem. Entering hold ( had stopped climb at FL150) realize
that we are above the freezing level and with gear hanging out that’s not a good thing so ask for descent to
6000’ as are probably going to have to burn a lot of fuel off anyway. Started descent to FL60 in hold.
Finally return to ecam and after the second manual gear extension procedure (ecam says to do twice) gear
is still not locked down.
Dragged out Vol3 and find a note saying that if second attempt unsuccessful refer to “Landing with
abnormal gear procedure”
Located this in Vol3 and briefed that although it is also in the QRH Vol3 has more notes and so will read it
from Vol 3 and then do the actions when required from the QRH for the approach.
Now that we knew we for sure had a gear that we couldn’t get down we declared an emergency and
requested emergency services. Asked which runway to expect, ATC advise 26R , quick talk to F.O and
refuse as don’t want to side step to smaller rwy near buildings etc. Cleared to use 26L.
Returned to Vol3.Worked out we needed to dump around 30tons of fuel. Asked ATC for vectors to an area
to dump fuel, held at FL60 in 5 min race pattern dumping fuel. Used time to brief Purser and Pax and
company etc programme FMGS and finish Vol3.
Reset the fuel dump at 8 tons, opened up X-feed and started fuel imbalance procedure as per Vol3.
When finished, took control again, transferred S.D to F.O’s side got clearance for radar vectored ILS and
got F.O to run the QRH 2.13 from where it says “Approach”. “Attention crew at stations” at 2000’ and
“Brace Brace” at 1000’.
Landed on 26L stopped ,completed the QRH procedure and evacuated on the rwy.☺
Debrief points:
Have a very good look after landing at the state the aircraft may be in.
In my case I followed the QRH all the way which automatically lead to an evacuation being announced.
I must admit that I was surprised we had remained on the runway as I was expecting quite a vicious ground
loop. In actual fact the gear didn’t collapse and when the right hand Mlgear finally came down (as I had
been holding up the right wing on touchdown) I thought that the ‘thump’ was the engine pod touching the
runway. It was just because I had finally run out of airspeed holding the wing up and the MLGear came
down harder than normal.
Therefore an evacuation was probably not necessary.(I am sure you would notice this if it happened for
real)
Miniloft
Debrief point:
Discussion on downgrade to Pan Call. Probably a fair comment, should have left it at a Mayday.
Weather WINTER 3000 RASN OVC 005 3/-5 ALL OVER EUROPE
DEST/ENROUTE: GOOD
Notams NIL.
MEL #2 BLEED AIR (MAX FL370…..APU RUNNING…..XBLEED OPEN)
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel CFP + 1T (APU) +2T (FL370)
• NO DE-ICE.
• SLOT TIME….15 MINS TO DO SET-UP…..GOT FO TO DO PANEL WHILE I DID FMS.
• NORMAL START AND PUSH THEN CONFIG FOR MEL.
• NOISE ABATEMENT CLIMB 3000 AND ‘S’ SPEED FOR TURN.
• TOC ‘ADV’ FUEL IMBALANCE.
• CALCULATIONS INDICATE LOSS OF 6T FUEL. RECHECKED, PURSER TO INVESTIGATE.
• FUEL LEAK CHECKLIST…….RETURN TO LGW.
• COULDN’T PINPOINT ENG/WING LEAK LEFT SIDE SO KEPT ENGINE SO AS NOT TO
DEPRESSURIZE DUE MEL.
• OVERWEIGHT LANDING @187T
• HAD TO CONVINCE FO NOT TO RUN FUEL IMBALANCE CHECKLIST AND NOT TO SHUT
DOWN THE ENGINE.
• VECTORS ILS 26L FULL STOP.
• SHUTDOWN #1 ON RWY…..CLEARED ON TAXIWAY….SHUTDOWN STAIRS FOR PAX.
• TOTAL TIME 2 HRS….DEBRIEF IN SIM……☺
LHR - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL NIL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
WX, AS ABOVE.
Cold Weather ops out of MAN. Weather not that bad. De-iced on stand. Co-ordinate with Station manager /
engineer / purser / ATC / loaders / deicers. Don’t rush and don’t multi-task, do one checklist at a time.
Don’t start deicing one wing thinking the door will be closed by the time they get there etc… No, no, no.
Set S speed on the climb page for the departure to make aircraft fly the noise abatement SID out of MAN.
Otherwise accelerates at 1,000’ and the turning circle is too big.
Just prior to V1, ENG2 EPR Mode fault. RH EPR goes blank and left goes automatically into N1 mode.
Looked across and saw it was rated. So delayed ECAM actions until after the after T/O checklist. Could
have perhaps done them earlier, as the ECAM didn’t inhibit the warning until 1,500’ therefore it must be
reasonably serious.
Remember to powered back to set 1.10 EPR before selecting N1 Mode so as not to over boost.
Check QRH, Check FCOM, confirmed that the N1 was rated and looked at the charts to do manual
calculations should the rated function fail. Advised Ops via Speed bird Manchester and continued. FADEC
restored the system later on.
At FL370 got ECAM cold fuel which calls to increase TAT. Fuel Temp was exactly the same as TAT.
Figured if the TAT didn’t get any lower then nor would the fuel temp. Decided that we would stay at
FL370 and monitor the Temp. Should have checked QRH and FCOM 3 and limitations to confirm this
decision.
Turbulence got bad sat down crew and descended to FL 330. Turbulence better but got Smoke. Masks on,
ECAM actions down to Avionics smoke procedure. Called for QRH, signs on sat down crew, MAYDAY
and high dive into FRA. Isolated the Smoke to AC bus 2. Determined that the cockpit window did not need
opening so stopped the checklist. Note Vol3, the RAM AIR does nothing to remove smoke from the
aircraft but it allows you to turn the Packs off so can open cockpit window. Kept high speed and flew a
short circuit into FRA. Very brief approach brief, quick review of the overweight landing checklist. Didn’t
dump fuel with fire. CSD said sick passenger when on finals. Landed in FRA stopped on runway.
Confirmed no fire from cabin or external, continue to gate, didn’t switch on APU or take ground power as
wanted to keep AC BUS 2 isolated. Shut down, told pax’s to remain seated as ambulance people coming on
board, as was engineer to check Fire status. Spoke to station manager and sent pax to terminal area.
MAN-DXB
Weather RAIN SHOWERS WITH SNOW, TEMP +2C, 220/10 OVC 500’.
Notams
MEL L4 DOOR, DEVICE FOR KEEPING IT OPEN U/S. DOOR CAN’T BE USED
FOR PAX, EMERGENCY LIGHTING MUST BE MASKED, RED NO EXIT
SIGN POSTED BY THE DOOR, CABIN CREW BRIEFED, PAX BRIEFED.
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
AT AIRCRAFT, TIGHT SLOT, TRY AND GET A NEW SLOT AT LEAST 20MIN BEFORE OLD
SLOT EXPIRES. DE-ICING NOT REQUIRED. ON AUTO START, NO LIGHT UP ON NO2, FADEC
SORTED IT OUT AND SECOND START SUCCESSFUL. TAXIED WITH EAI DUE TO ICING
CONDITIONS, BE CAREFUL AS SPEED PICKS UP VERY QUICKLY.
MY MISTAKES.
TERMINOLOGY, “STANDARD LEFT/RIGHT SEAT TAKE-OFF” IS NOT RECOGNIZED ON A330
FLEET.
CHECK X-WIND LIMITS FOR WET RUNWAY TAKE-OFF.
ENTERED THE HOLD AT LOGAN AT 230KTS, F/O FLYING BUT I SHOULD HAVE PICKED IT
UP. TAKE SLATS TO SLOW DOWN AS O SPEED AT THAT WEIGHT WAS 230.
ADDED SPEED INCREMENT FOR FLAPS PROCEDURE TO VAPP INSTEAD OF VLS.
LEFT IT TOO LATE TO ASK FOR REVISED SLOT.
Weather Most of UK was just hazy , Western EUR was below cat 1 clearing to the west.
Notams NPA only at LGW, one r/w at LHR, 16/34 closed at LSZH
MEL AP 2 u/s (Cat III single)
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems Pax probs with school football team (UMs)
Fuel
MAN – DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Weather most of UK was just hazy , Western EUR was below cat 1 clearing to the west.
Notams NPA only at LGW, one r/w at LHR, 16/34 closed at LSZH
MEL AP 2 u/s (Cat III single)
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems Pax probs with school football team (UMs)
Fuel
NBO-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL APU shut down on start
Failure 1 ACP 2 fails Failure 3 Gen 2 fault
Failure 2 Blue HYD overheat Failure 4 DC ESS BUS
Problems
Fuel
APU shut down on start. Start on Ground cart. Check MEL. Depart MEL inop.
Just before line up. ACP 2 fails (F/O can’t transmit and no lights). Switching carried out. Again forgot to
check QRH reset procedure. Would have got it back! Check MEL as not allowed ETOPS?
Blue HYD overheat on departure. Pumps switched off. ECAM doesn’t call for Blue elec pump off, whereas
VOL 3 does. This is because the ECAM knows that the Blue elec pump is not on, Vol 3 does not!
Gen 2 fault. Tried reset no joy so now single Gen ops. Could have tried one more reset, certainly no more
though. Decided not to continue all the way to DXB on one Gen and over Africa. Returned to NBO. Forgot
to check Vol 3 Gen Fault.
On return. Lost DC ESS BUS. Loads of important stuff in Vol 3, such as no gear indications, no brake
indications (stop on taxi way, apply power to check brakes ok), no shut down with MSW so use Fire
handles, plus no interphone to speak to engineer / purser this combined with losing VHF1 and ACP 1 and
ACP 2, made life difficult. Had to call engineer via radio to organise ground cart so could shut down (no
APU – MEL, and no APU because of DC problem).
PAN call as had a serious electrical problem. Got F/O to fly so could monitor and do checklist. Didn’t
adequately explain to the F/O why I wanted him to fly, causing confusion.
Restored Blue HYD. So got the Slats back for landing. Non standard switched Blue pumps off again so
would not get an overheat in the go around which would mean divert to Mombassa with Slats extended.
Ended out going around because of confusion over whether the gear was extended. (Lack of system
knowledge again). Pulled out Vol 1 to check whilst downwind. Gear was safe returned to land.
NBO - DXB
ONLY PROBLEM ON THE STAND WAS AN IRATE FEMALE PAX, CAUSED LOTS OF
PROBLEMS AND EVENTUALLY THREW A TANTRUM. (VERY REALISTICALLY DONE BY
ROD!!!). TOLD GROUNDSTAFF TO SORT IT OUT AND EVENTUALLY OFF-LOADED HER WITH
HER BAGGAGE.
AFTER T/O AT LVR CLIMB, GOT A MASTER CAUTION WITH A THRUST LOCK WARNING.
EPR INDICATION FAULT (NO2). FAILED IN N1 RATED MODE. ECAM TELLS YOU TO PUT N1
MODE 1 AND 2 ON BUT DOES NOT TELL YOU TO BRING THE POWER BACK TO 1.1 EPR TO
AVOID AN OVERBOOST. QUITE STRAIGHTFORWARD, EXCEPT THAT YOU HAVE TO GO
INTO THE IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE TABLES TO GET YOUR N1 THRUST SETTINGS. ALSO
YOU DON’T GET AUTO-THRUST BACK, SO MONITOR SPEED.
MY MISTAKES.
EVEN THO’ NOT ACTUALLY REFUELING, L4 SHOULD STILL BE ARMED WHEN THE BOWSER
IS CONNECTED.
LOADSHEET WASN’T SIGNED.
LOOKOUT FOR WINDCHANGES BEFORE TAKE-OFF – MAY NEED TO GO BACK INTO RTOW
CHARTS.
ENSURE BRIGHTNESS ON ND TO SEE THE CB’S BETTER.
MAYDAY – GIVE CALLSIGN, POSITION AND INTENTIONS. MORE INFO TO ATC.
RATHER NOT INTERRUPT ECAM ON THE SMOKE PROCEDURE. NEED TO GET TO THE
SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM ASAP.
DOWNGRADE THE EMERGENCY TO PAN.
CALL COMPANY REGARDING THE DIVERSION. ASK ATC IF NECESSARY.
MUST DO ACCURACY CHECK WHENEVER GPS PRIMARY IS LOST.
NBO – DXB
Weather All the usual diverts were hovering around NPA minimas, NBO was at minimas for VOR 06.
Notams Heaps, check all the available aids at NBO and ALTS and how they effect approaches, I
made a list which helped.
MEL MMR 1 and 2 U/S
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems DEPO pax problem B4 start (FOM for guidance)
Fuel
NBO to DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
HDAM weather not suitable, no other available or useable, ETOPS, new Flt Pln
TRW +, contaminated runway
MEL Inner Fuel Tank Unreliable indications
APU failed during pushback, halfway through #1 Start
Return to gate for Ground Air Start
Weather avoidance after takeoff
At Cruise, intermittent high vibrations N3
Vibration worsened, engine back to Idle
Returned to NBO, weather improving
45 minute transit, planned on Mombassa as alternate (9000’MEA)
ILS 06 via NV
CB to the west of approach course causing large wind variations
Autopilot could not hold the LOC, Go-Around
Second attempt, same problem
Asked for radar vectors, did a hand flown ILS and landed
Rolled to a stop , check ride done
De-Brief
- Read the MEL operational requirements carefully, Trim Tank forward switch was not
selected Forward before departure
- If APU fails during engine start, cockpit goes black and the first priority is the Eng
Master selected to OFF, then save the battery, IRS off, etc. Good.
- Take time to ensure everyone is aware of how the start on pneumatics will be done, good
brief, have the Engine Start faults FCOM ready, elected to do a Manual start, NBO, high
altitude, low pressure cart etc.
- No refuel needed because I took lots to start with due to TRW, +1500KG
- Normal departure, weather avoidance, try to tell ATC but no answer, did a few avoidance
vectors anyway but did a blind broadcast
- After AVITU, IFBP for African airspace, 1nm right of track
- Some high vibrations, called MCC on SAT, got worse during the conversation and told
MCC to stay on the line, used QRH to retard thrust lever, in cruise shutdown procedures
but engine was running at idle
- Mayday declared routing direct NV
- Asked MCC if they see any more damage to engine, should we shut it down, NO was the
reply.
- 3 approaches to get in to NBO, remember to mention FOM limit of 2 approaches
talk to passengers
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 APU AUTO SHUTDOWN Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems NO GROUND PROBLEMS
Fuel
- GPWS RECOVERY, BUT CLIMBED ONLY 1000FT, KEPT (WITH TERR BUTTON ON) THE
TERRAIN IN THE GREEN, LINE-UP ONTO THE LOC AND INTERCEPTED THE GS,
LANDING
- I SUSPECTED THE GPWS WAS A FALSE WARNING AS I DON'T THINK THE GPS ALT IN
GPS PRIMARY IS 3500FT WRONG, SWITCHED OFF THE GPWS ONCE EST. ON ILS AND
VISUAL
- ACC TCE IT WASN'T HIS SELECTED FAILURE, THE SIM SOFTWARE MADE A 70°C
TEMPERATURE JUMP AND CORRUPTED ALL STATIC PRESSURE INSTR.
- BREAK, I THOUGHT, NICE THAT'S IT, BUT TCE SAID NOW WE WILL DO HIS LOFT
SCENARIO, SO BACK INTO THE TUBE
- SAME DEPARTURE, HYD B OVHT, ECAM, INTENTION WAS TO LEAVE THE PUMP
OFF UNTIL LDG IN DXB ALTHOUGH OVHT DISAPPEARED
- THEN IDG OIL LO PR, DID ECAM , NOW IN SINGLE GEN CONDITION, DECIDED NOT TO
CONTINUE TO DXB DURING NIGHT OVER AFRICA
- CONTACTED SMNC AND ENGINEERING AND STATED INTENTIONS, THEY TRIED TO
CONVINCE ME THAT THEY NEED THE A/C URGENTLY IN DXB, DIDN'T CHANGE PLANS
- PUR, PA BLA BLA BLA
- ILS NBO IN THE MEANTIME ON MAINTANANCE, BRIEFED FOR A VOR DME APPR 06, 100
NM OUT NO DME INDICATION, QUERIED ATC, ANSWER: VOR+DME OK, THE LOC WILL
BE AVAILABLE SOON
- DIDN'T CHANGE PLANS (NO FAITH IN LOC), TOLD F/O THAT WE PLAN FOR VOR/DME
AND IF THE DME IS NOT AVAIL AT 50 NM, SWAP TO LOC APPR (LOC SERV IN THE
MEANTIME)
- EXACTLY THAT HAPPENED, PROCEDURAL LOC OUT OF NV (NO DME AGAIN SIM
PROBLEM)
- 5 NM BEFORE VOR ECAM ELEC DC ESS BUS FAULT, (NASTY FAILURE)
- LOST ND ON MY SIDE, BUT DDRMI STILL AVAIL, F/O STILL HAD HIS ND, BUT I
CHOSE NOT TO HANDOVER CTRL + MADE THE F/O TO SELECT NV ON STBY NAV,
- THEN F/O STARTED ECAM AND I ENTERED A RAW DATA HOLD WITH F/O ND BACK UP
AT NV
- AP AND A/THR GREEN LIGHT ARE NOT WORKING ON FCU, STATUS OF BOTH ONLY
AVAIL ON PFD
- COMMS IS A BIG PROBLEM, ECAM SAYS "USE VHF 2 OR 3", RMP 1 +2 AND ACP 1+2 U/S,
NBO TRIED TO CALL US SEVERAL TIMES, TOOK SOME TIME TO FIGURE OUT THAT
ONLY RMP/ACP 3 ARE WORKING
- AFTER ECAM COMPLETED, HANDED OVER TO F/O TO FLY THE APPR BECAUSE HE HAD
THE ND AVAIL AND TOOK HIS HAND-MIKE TO COMMUNICATE WITH ATC
- AFTER WE BECAME VISUAL, TOOK OVER CONTROL AND LANDED
- TAXIED ONTO STAND, CONNECTED GROUND POWER AND SHUT THE ENG DOWN W/O
CHECKING THE SPOOLING DOWN
- PUR TO COCKPIT:"CLEARED TO OPEN DOORS?" INITIALLY SAID "YES", BUT CALLED
HER IMMEDIATLY BACK TO STOP OPENING THE DOORS (SOMETHING STROKE MY
MIND JUST IN TIME),
- BIG MISTAKE NOT TO READ THE FCOM 3 DC ESS BUS FAULT, A LITTLE NOTE SYAS
:"TO SHUTDOWN THE ENG ON GROUND YOU HAVE TO USE THE FIRE PB"
NBO – DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Wx: All the usual diverts were hovering around NPA minimas, NBO was at minimas for VOR 06.
Notams: Heaps, check all the available aids at NBO and ALTS and how they effect approaches, I made a
list which helped.
MEL: MMR 1 and 2 U/S
NBO - EBB
During refueling the engineer advised that the right outer tank refuel valve had failed closed and he is
unable to place any fuel in the rt outer.(Tank showing zero fuel) Checked Vol 3 limits for Max allowable
fuel imbalance on takeoff in outer tanks and asked for left left outer to be filled to 1500kg.Suspected that
might mean that the load sheet would be incorrect with non std fuel distribution. Referred to Mel and Mel
tells you to do a manual trim sheet with non std fuel distribution anyway. Obtained the trim sheet and fuel
index tables from the blank forms folder and waited for the load sheet.
Load sheet arrives, sure enough >2% discrepancy so re did a manual trim sheet to find new ZFWMAC and
TOWMAC and trim position, entered all in MCDU and back within limits. Got engineer to complete tech
log with Mel.
On push back ATC advise a new departure clearance. Re-entered and re-briefed.
After second start PRIM fault, reset and continued.
On line up left Outboard aileron (Yellow) fault. Aircraft at 10nm final. Asked to hold position. Reset fault
via QRH5.03 Flt Ctl Architecture diagram and Prim 3 and then QRH 2.29 Prim reset procedure and
subsequent Flt ctl and pitch trim check.
On rotate my PFD “Check Att”. Used Standby A.H until rotate complete and then handed over to F.O and I
took the radio’s. Yet another departure clearance change onto a radial for an intercept, set that up. Ensured
well away from the ground and ran Ecam actions ending up with Att and Hdg switch Capt on 3.
After T.Off chks.
Couldn’t find any reason for the fault, all IR’s indicating O.K, left switch where it was and continued. Re
took control.
Normal climb.
Changeover to Ebb in cruise wind favouring VOR for 35 (rwy 35 in use) but less than 10 kt tailwind if we
needed the ILS onto 17 for any reason. Briefed for full Managed VOR from overhead for 35. Cleared for
the descent early…queried them re the 100nm notam and remained at cruise level until normal descent
point. Ebb advise “bird activity” reported around 35 approach area, asked if the ILS17 was available and it
was, so reset up and briefed for ILS17, tailwind less than 10kts still. At TOD wind swings and increases to
20 kt northerlies, reset up for VOR35 and rebrief again. Crossing overhead the VOR at 7000 we broke
visual with excellent visibility, elected to fly the full procedure as I had never been to Ebb even though
could have asked for a vis app.
Managed Vor app to 35 (codes accurately) visual with the runway from 10 nm out and wind now less than
5 kts.
Approx 700 feet and multiple heavy bird strikes, lose engine #1 and Blue and Green hyd systems
instantaneously.(No NWS and max1000psi brakes)
Hand fly, selected man thrust for good control, kept it straight and decided to land as unsure as to how
badly damaged the remaining engine#2 may have been in the event of going round and aircraft nicely
stable and handling well.
Landed on 35. ☺
Debrief points:
Might have considered the option of going round to fully ascertain all services lost.
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
NBO-DAR
SCENARIO: START NORMAL, TAXI NORMAL. IN THE CLIMB, DURING CLEAN-UP, SLAT#1
FAULT, SLATS STUCK. ENTERED HOLD, TRIED TO RECONFIGURE, SET UP
FOR VOR APPROACH ONTO 06 AND BRIEFED. SHOT SELECTED APPROACH---
DUE CODING ABNORMALITY, NOT VISUAL AT MINIMA, GO AROUND TO
NON-STANDARD VOR HOLD. ELECT TO DIVERT TO MOMBASSA (CLOSER
THAN DAR AND MORA ACCEPTABLE, UNLIKE DAR ROUTE). LEVEL
RESTRICTED TO FL 200, SPEED TO 205 KTS. CHECKED FUEL CONSUMPTION
IN QRH 4.13. SICK PAX, REQUIRING IMMEDIATE OPERATION ACCORDING
TO MEDLINK.
MOMBASSA ILS U/S, BRIEFED FOR AND LANDED VIA MANAGED VOR APP. (+-
2800KGS FUEL REMAINING).
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Filed alternate Entebbe however no ‘sim’ pubs for Entebbe – fuel for Mombasa on flight plan so
advised station staff to changed alternate to Mombasa with DAR ATC
Weather package indicated tempo 800m +R in Nairobi, NOTAMs indicated possible ATC
disruptions due to labor unrest
Kenya has special Jepp procedures for lost comm following a missed approach
After departure FM1 fault – QRH reset unsuccessful – “Re enter Weight/CG” message on scratch
pad – the weight/CG will be displayed on the FUEL PRED page in small font – just overwrite
with the same data
Moments later DC Bus 2 fault resulting in FM1+2 Fault – no AP, A/THR, FD – use B/U NAV
Once ECAM all sorted out – still no contact with Nairobi – contacted another EK 761 enroute to
JNB and they had no contact with Nairobi either – decided that with possibly no ATC, weather
forecast, minimal automation and potentially insufficient fuel to reach alternate considering the
lost comm procedure that an immediate diversion to Mombasa was prudent
Used back up nav only to proceed direct Mombasa VOR and climbed 1000 feet for appropriate
direction – could have climbed much higher but considered it unnecessary as fuel state excellent,
had fuel state been a problem or enroute weather been an issue would have climbed higher
Able to contact Mombasa once in range and received descent clearance for full procedure
VOR/DME approach – flew a selected approach using the NPA 10 to eyeball the descent profile
– broke out at 1000’ and followed VASIS to uneventful landing
ECAM required us to manually set cabin altitude for Nairobi – don’t forget to change it to
Mombasa – we almost did
NCE – DXB
RH bleed inop. Photocopy procedure from MEL. Quite a lengthy procedure make a list of the items that
will require you to close the x-feed valve.(list in Abnormal bleed config). Restrict FL to 370, as per the
MEL, take extra fuel for APU use (FCOM 2). Raining, check contamination. Went Contaminated. TOGA.
Check if ZFW limited.
Passengers drunk. ATC Slot. Make it the station managers problem. Not your aircraft until the doors are
closed.
Had RMP preset with the VOR freq and course incase of FM failure. Got exactly that on departure. Just
select Rose VOR and continue no probs. Did switching after the checklists. At safe alt ran the reset
procedure from the QRH and got FM 1 back.
Flashing fuel advisory in cruise. Fuel imbalance, added fuel up and confirmed leak from left hand side. Ran
the checklist started descent towards Rome. At gravity feed alt, pumps off. Left hand engine flamed out
(know no bleed), APU bleed on. Finished checks. Called Aeroma advised were on our way, told pax,
purser etc.
16L closed, 16R LOC approach. Did 2 laps of CMP hold then approach. Elected to land overweight as
didn’t want to dump fuel with a leak. Plus there were CB’s around. Landed ok. Forgot to stop on rwy to get
Fire services over to check if was large fuel leak / fire hazard.
NCE - DXB
Weather Nice Wet and windy (not contaminated) 04R in use. Rome O.K South easterly
winds. TS and Turb forecast in Nice and Rome Fir’s
Notams Nice 04L/22R closed.
MEL Eng #2 bleed valve u/s
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel Extra 2 tons (1200kg for Mel and 800kg one level below)
Photocopied the operational procedure and took that with us into the sim so that if we had a problem we
weren’t diving around trying to remember what to do.
The operational procedure also refers you to FCOM Vol 3.02.36 page 2 once you are on board and the
upshot of that is that from the Fcom you also have to set the Pack flow to low for the flight.
In a nutshell, some non standard air switching on the overhead panel, the APU running for the whole flight
and a procedure to follow should you lose the other bleed.
We were flight planned at FL370 and with the potential for a mask drop problem I elected to fly at FL330
hence the fuel for one level below and the fuel for the Apu running.(Conservative 6 hours @ 200kg /hr)
During refueling the engineer advised that the refuel truck had broken down and cant pump any more fuel.
Asked for another refuel truck , none available. Checked the fuel quantity and 1500 kg less than what we
asked for on board at the time of the truck failure. Discussion with F.O. Decided to go with fuel as it was
after rebriefing that APU burn at altitude is really only about 60kg/hr (Vol 2.05.10 pg3) which allowed
approx 800kg less and the rest could be covered by the route reserve. Briefed to still use FL330 with the
option of the climb to FL370 if we needed to for fuel.
Normal start and taxi and met the slot time in the last minute.
At TOC ran the Ecam scan. Checked the fuel on arrival at Dxb and at FL330 still had CMR. Just as I was
advising that to the F.O the fuel on arrival dropped from 6.7 tons to 5.9 tons. Asked for him to check the
fuel page and discovered a fuel imbalance with approx 1 ton less in the right inner tank. Retained control
and asked him to check the fuel used vs on board etc, then to add each tank individually and re-check.
Handed over control and I also did the same to ensure our figures agreed.2 ton difference by now. Let F.O
keep control and I checked QRH 2.08 fuel imbalance which leads to Fuel leak procedure.
Contacted Purser and asked her to observe both wings/engines and be very particular about describing what
she saw in terms of possible spray/ smell etc.
While she was off doing this got weather from Rome and Nice, Rome o.k with ILS16R and Nice crappy.
Slightly closer to Nice but elected to go to Rome.
Quick discussion with F.O and diversion to Nice let him continue flying, declared a Pan as still had plenty
of fuel. Purser returns with news that spray observed from RHS but unsure from where. Brief her while she
is there re the diversion. Run the leak not located fuel procedure.
Descend to gravity feed ceiling of 15000 feet (had been airborne for 26 mins) and turn pumps off.
Finish procedure, brief for Config 3 landing in case engine flames out ,that way already set up, plenty of
runway length, brief no reverse on landing and selected med a.brake.
PA to pax.
Over wt landing checklist and all other checks etc. Advise Rome to contact our ground handling agents in
Rome and advise Dub of our situation.
Talk to purser about possible steps disembarkation of pax on rwy.”Cabin crew revert to normal operations.”
P.A to pax to remain seated.
Request tug to tow us off rwy to a taxi way, Fire service advise leak totally stopped now and are happy to
tow us to gate.
MiniLoft
NCE-DXB
THR - DXB
- ATC TRIED TO KEEP ME LOW AFTER T/O DUE INB TRAFFIC, BEWARE OF TERRAIN (MSA)
- HAD TO LEVEL-OFF LATER AT FL 260 (AGAIN TRAFFIC), INB TRAFFIC WAS ACC TCAS
ONLY 600 FT ABOVE AND MASKED BY ANOTHER TRAFFIC 6000FT ABOVE , DIV IMMED
TO THE RIGHT AND AVOIDED TCAS RA
- EST IN FL 370, PASSED IFN (AIRFIELD CLOSED), THEN DISCOVERED THAT ARR FUEL
DROPPED FROM 5,5 TO 4.2TO (CMR 4.5TO), STARTED FUEL LEAK PROC
- LEFT INNER TANK HAD ALREADY 2TO LESS, UNABLE TO RECTIFY WHERE THE LEAK
IS (LEAK NOT LOCATED PROC)
- STARTED TO DO A HIGH SPEED DESCEND TO GRAVITY CEILING (FLIGHT TIME >30MIN)
AND DIVERTED TO SHIRAZ, NO WAY TO MAKE DXB OR KWI
- DURING DESC INFORMED PUR AND PAX, COMPANY
- ENG 1 FLAMED OUT DURING SHORT HOLDING OVERHEAD SYZ
ALTHOUGH SYZ MISSED APPR CLIMB GRADIENT IS 6%, LACK OF FUEL COMMITTED US TO
LAND, SELECTED ILS WITH THE VOR DME MINIMUM (VOR APPR CL GRAD 5%), CEILING
WAS 800FT IN SNOW, FUEL WAS ONLY AVAIL FOR A SECOND SHORT APPROACH, WOULD
HAVE CONTINUED DOWN TO 50FT BUT GOT VISUAL AT 700FT, LANDING TOTAL TIME
AGAIN ~3HRS, THEREAFTER 1 MINI LOFT (I ASKED FOR ANOTHER UNRELIABLE SPEED)
ZURICH TO DUBAI.
Weather BAD ALL OVER EUROPE. ZRH WAS DRIFTING SNOW AND FOG
PATCHES, TEMP –1C, LOTS OF ICE ON THE AIRCRAFT.
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
RUNWAY IN USE 28. HAD TO GO INTO THE CONTAMINATED RUNWAY CHARTS AND
DECIDED TO TAKE A TAILWIND OF 5KTS FOR RWY16 AS WE WERE LESS LIMITED FOR
MTOW STILL HAD TO OFFLOAD 5 TONS OF FREIGHT IN ORDER TO GO. HAD A 28 MIN
HOLDOVER TIMEFOR THE ANTI-ICE AND WITH A TAXI SPEED OF 10KTS, MADE IT BY
2MINS.
SWITCHED OFF BLUE PUMPS AND DID ECAM ACTIONS FOR DUAL HYD FAILURE. BRIEFED
THE APP FOR THE WORST CASE SCENARIO, LANDING WITH DUAL HYD FAILURE. AT THE
SAME TIME, A LOT OF PRESSURE PUT ON ME BY CSD REGARDING THE URGENCY OF THE
CONDITION OF THE SICK PAX. MUCH OF THIS INVOLVED FOM KNOWLEDGE. THE IDEA IS
NOT TO LET THEM RUSH YOU AND THEREFORE JEOPARDIZE THE WHOLE AIRCRAFT FOR
ONE PAX.
COMMENCED THE APP FROM MIQ, GOT BLUE HYD BACK, DOWNGRADED EMERGENCY TO
PAN, AND CONTINUED FOR ILS 08L. DUMB FIRE ENGINE DRIVER GOT STUCK ON THE
RUNWAY, SO HAD TO GO AROUND AT MINIMA, GEAR STUCK DOWN BECAUSE OF
GRAVITY EXTENSION, SO GOT VECTORS FOR ANOTHER GO AND THIS TIME LANDED
SUCCESSFULLY. PARKED ON THE RUNWAY, ADVISED PAX TO REMAIN SEATED WHILST
THE MEDICS BOARDED AND REMOVED THE SICK CASE, THEN ASKED FOR THE TOW TO
THE STAND.
ALL DECISIONS WERE MARKED DOWN AS CORRECT, BUT COULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE
FOLLOWING:
ASK DUBAI TO REROUTE US FOR A REFUELING STOP IN ISTANBUL SO THAT WE CAN TAKE
THE ENTIRE LOAD OUT OF ZRH.
WITH NO GREEN HYDRAULICS YOU HAVE NO EMER GEN. A POINT TO CONSIDER FOR
ETOPS.
THERE ARE NO FUEL TABLES FOR A DIVERSION WITH GEAR DOWN AFTER A GRAVITY
EXTENSION.
ZRH - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Started up with external AC & External air. Elected not to de-ice on stand, rather do it out by
runway at the de-icing pad. Had slot time. I was not too concerned about slot, rather doing
everything correctly & not rushing. If could not get revised slot, elected to wait for new one &
stop enroute if I had to. Took a hit for that in the de-brief - that’s OK though.
At around 30,000 ft had ESS DC Bus fail with AC Ess Bus shed. Lots of systems U/S, including
ACP 1&2 & FCU plus numerous display losses. This means you have to use ACP 3 and the
microphone from the Jumpseat. PA system U/S as well as cabin call. If you want to talk to Purser,
got to get out of seat to grab him. With this malf, tell Purser to come back every 10 mins so you
don’t have to get out of your seat!
Fuel in trim tank is unusable unless it will gravity feed & it would not for me. You are now time
limited as your CG will keep moving aft the more fuel you burn. Watch your lateral fuel imbalance
limits & follow ECAM to transfer outer tanks to inners. This helps move CG fwd.
Diverted to MUN for O/W ldg. Watch rate of descent at touchdown. Ask F/O to read out V/S at
100 ft & 50 ft, it helps.
ZRH –DXB
Weather 200/15 1700m SNSH +0/-4 1022, runway recently cleared and reported DRY?
Notams
MEL
Failure 1 HYD Green system fluid loss Failure 3
Failure 2 AVIONICS SMOKE Failure 4
Problems Carriage of Pregnant passenger problem at the gate, Remote de-icing bays closed,
de-ice on the gate, Tight slot time given, airborne 40 minutes after arrival at aircraft
Fuel
De-Brief points
- Departing ZRH, 10,000’ checks on climb out are AGL. Should have done it at 11,400.
- Consider RWY 28 for shorter taxi time
- Remember to ask for NOTAMS affecting landing runway when deciding to divert or review
NOTAM from briefing folder
- LOFT stuff, have all possible diversion plates in the mini folder ready (cheating!)
- Briefed all the approach climb gradient items including gear down penalty and then realized after
that we were 2 engines. Aircraft is never limited on 2 engines.
- Consider fuel dumping enroute to EDDM
- Be sure to use the new de-icing form every time you de-ice
- Remember the big ones
o Delay flaps until runway
o Consider Wing Anti-ice airborne
o Take-off within 5 minutes of the PCI
o Run up engine to 50% N1 for 10 seconds then idle before takeoff
ZUH-DXB
Weather cold ops with snow weather in Europe pretty shitty only Munich not to bad.
DXB/LHR EK5
Weather Enroute TURB forecast weather in UK becoming misty, Windshear reported on T/O
Notams
MEL LH eng bleed U/S
Failure 1 FMGEC exercises Failure 3
Failure 2 Flame out on the RH engine Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
• Remember to liaise with the CSD re turb and the service consult F/O for opinion
• Normal start and push back had AIR Abnormal Bleed which had us selecting low flow on the
packs concern re long flight and lots of Pax the AIR abnormal bleed check list could be reviewed
prior to push back and get confirmation that this is OK
• + Windshear reported on T/O elected to go TOGA remember + is an increase of speed
• Some FMGEC exercises remember that you can get the expected height from the FPLAN page as
long as the track is correct so use DIR to and keep it on heading if you need to climb then selected
spd 260kts and the FMGEC will work out the expected height remember that wind play a part as
you have probable not put in the winds yet
• Remember to set the weather radar T/S around normal around 10,000ft
• We then had flame out on the RH engine so no bleed except APU so rather then green dot speed
should desend as quick as possible to get down to stop cabin climbing,
( NB: keep aware that with only one bleed it will always be a quick desent and get the
APU bleed on below FL230.).
• Always chech the PFD as to what is going on and read the ECAM AUTO FLT A/thr
• Is not the autopilot only the A/thr has dropped out.( Sim fault) BE sure to FLY the Aircraft and
that you are flying what you want delay the ECAM actions get the F/O to help to confirm the you
our flying safely
• With this problem it happened just short of Shriaz so desend quickly and once a/c is safely flying
turn back to Shiraz do not fly away as in be a little more postive with you intial plan (important in
cruise to keep a plan in your mind of what airport you our going to go to so you can intiate this
early in the case of an emergency)
• Once you are safely on the way consider manual control of cabin as some pax medical situation
could be improved by a lower cabin Alt the diff is very low but cabin at about 5000ft
• Tried eng relight but no fuel flow do not leave the master on too long as it use the bleed air not
enough for the cabin. So it will start climbing
• CB’s and poor weather in Shriaz opted to go to DXB as no engine anti icing and no ILS in Shiraz
weather on NPA Min
• Overweight landing into DXB use full length once the stopping is assured so as to help brake
temps
• If on one eng then configure a little later so as to not have high power settings.
Weather
Notams
MEL NIL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
NO MEL
MAX TAKE OFF WEIGHT.
OVER IRAN TCAS RA AND WX AVOIDANCE.
NEAR ZAJ OIL LOW QTY ENG 2.
DIVERTED TO THR, DURING DESCEND ENG 2 SHUT DOWN.
NO JETTISON DUE TO THUNDERSTORMS IN THE AREA.
LANDING IN THR MARGINAL WX, WET RUNWAY IN LIGHT SNOW.
ONLY TABRIZ AND TEHERAN AVAILABLE AS ENROUTE ALTERNATES.
DXB-MCT
Weather
Notams
MEL NIL
Failure 1 Failure 3
Failure 2 Failure 4
Problems
Fuel
Minor problem after T/O, run ECAM, advise Ops. Enroute to MCT. F/O goes back to toilet, doesn’t return.
Get Purser to find him, he says he can’t return as has crook guts. Do the descent and approach by yourself.
Have ambulance if necessary. Check for other crew etc. Easy loft.
This section includes the FOM study notes done by some colleagues during their upgrade
time, although its very brief but it highlights the important operational stuff that you
might need in your day to day operation, Having said so, these note are out dated as it
returns to the year 2005, So please, Its your responsibility to review and update your
self with any changes that have happened on the FOM including any applicable and valid
FCI’s, FCN’s through the preceding years and up till now (October 2008).
I hope you will find this section a good help to refresh your FOM knowledge.
Note:
The Pilot in Command is under the authority of SVP-FO, all other Flight & Cabin Crew are
under the PIC
Company Publications
SECTION A SECTION B
- Certificate of Registration - Fuel Carnets
- Certificate of Airworthiness - Air Operators Certificate
- A/C radio licence - DG Operators Certificate
- Noise Certificate - Certificate of Competency
- Certificate Approval of Radio Installation - Ops Specs
- Certificate of insurance (worldwide and A/C specific) - Approval for RNP 5 and B-
RNAV ops
- Transit check - Approval for RVSM
- Pre-Flight check - Approval for MNPS
- Daily check - GCAA waivers not included in FOM
- ETOPS Supp. Check
- Emergency Equip. checklist and Captains Authorisation
- Tool bag Contents
- “NO EXIT” sign
- On Board loadable software list
In Addition
- Ops Flight Plan
- Load and Trim Sheet
- AFM
- FOM, FCOM Vol 1 / 2A / 2B, QRH, Cabin Crew Emergency Manual, Ops FCI’s and RTOW
charts
- Jepps and RM
- MEL
- ERG and DG Regs, Document
- 4 Security Checklists: Pre-flight, Aircraft search on ground, In flight and LRBL (least risk
bomb location)
Above documents will be updated within 10 days of effective date of revision except
FCI’s
Bold docs. Are required departing Dubai, not outstations. Any other missing doc does not
restrict Ops
Medical Regulations
- Valid passport
- Company ID
- Crew License
- Medical Certificate
- copy of most recent PPC/IR or Certificate of Test signed by TRE (FCI 2005-071)
- Certificate of Vaccination
- Flight and Cabin Crew members may train or do Supp flights with temp validation
certificates but once released to the line they must have a valid UAE GCAA licence
- Loss of FOB/Captains Company Credit Card must be reported to fleet office (CBC) + e-
mail FAS Airbus
- Loss of Captains Company Mobile Phone must be reported to fleet office (CBC), if after
hours contact ETISILAT to cancel sim card
- Loss of Company ID requires a police report
Consecutive sickness/absence longer than 20 days, notify GCAA. More than 30 days,
licence suspended
If a crew member reports sick less than four hours before starting duty will explain reason
to fleet Chief Pilot.
Sickness in excess of 48 hours must be approved by a Company Doctor.
If sickness is self-certified, it is assumed the pilot is fit after 48 hours subject to min report
time of 3 hrs.
If sickness is declared by a Company Doctor, the Doctor must notify Scheduling when he
deems the pilot fit.
Overseas the following, in order, is who to consult: Company Doctor, hotel Doc, Foreign
airline doc then any other doctor
Layovers
While at layovers the crew should be contactable at all times (e.g. by the hotel).
Captain must give permission for ALL crew wishing to stay away overnight (should be in
same city as hotel).
Crewmembers shall be back at the hotel FROM TRIPS OUTSIDE THE TOWN at least 12 hrs
before takeoff.
During the 12 hrs the hotel should not be left for extended periods without leaving a
telephone nr with hotel.
Moves: Flight Crew shall advise the secretary of the concerned Fleet Manager of new
home-details.
Crew baggage: the Captain must be informed when an additional piece of checked-in
or hand baggage is carried by a crewmember. The Captain will then notify Load
Control.
Upgrade training:
Newly promoted captains will for the first 20 sectors as PIC be limited to: (FCI 2005-029)
● Always be the PF
At the Planning stage:
● Add 200m & 100’ to the more limiting Company, Jeppesen or State minima
(takeoff and approach)
● Only CAT A airfields can be used (CAT B/C for diversion)
FO Restrictions:
A Line Captain may allow a FO to carry out a take-off or landing provided:
- Runway not contaminated
- Crosswind max 20 kts
- 2.000 m vis for takeoff
- Cloud-base 500’ for ILS
- Cloud-base 1.000’ for non-ILS
Command requirements:
- 6000 Total time
- 4000 Hard time
- Valid UAE ATPL
- 3 years in Emirates
- 4 PPC’s
- 12 months on type
- Full Route and Aerodrome recency
CSR (Captains Special Report) must be written in BLOCK CAPITALS and filed for:
- Any deviations from SOP’s
- Details of an event not falling within the scope of an ASR
- Irregularities which could adversely affect the Company’s operation or reputation
- Any other matter the Captain feels warrants a formal report
- Comments to improve companies reputation or operation
VR (Voyage Report)
- Missing documents; AFM, QRH, FCOM and other various documents (FOM 2.9)
- Any significant event occurring during a flight
- Autolands
- Amount and reasons for delay (if a delay exceeds 3 minutes, the reason for delay shall
be reported)
- If a CSR has been raised.
Preservation of evidence:
- If a Captain deems in necessary to preserve info he can do the following
o FDR and DFDR(25 hrs), tech log entry “Remove FDR for investigation
o CVR (30 – 120 min), “Remove CVR for investigation”. If the CVR circuit breaker
is accessible from the flight deck, it may be pulled as a last resort
- An ASR can be filed by any crew member but must be filed by the Capt for the
following reasons in an expeditious manner, FOM 10-6
- (FCI 2005-092) – ASR requirement for low fuel status
- A CHFR (Confidential Human Factors Report) is the means by which an individual
may report sensitive human factors that have influenced an incident or may have
been a “near miss” in almost causing an incident.
- Must be delivered to Flight Safety by the most expeditious means possible
- Ops / Capt may restrict or suspend operations to an A/Field they/he feels is unsafe.
Capt may not continue to that airport unless he feels that the problems will be
corrected before arrival or in an emergency
Crime on board.
- Between “doors closed” and “doors open”, the Captain is responsible for protecting
lives, aircraft & cargo +
safeguarding of necessary evidence.
- He may order a search of belongings (with owners consent) to preserve evidence
- The Captain must notify the next landing place, and a CSR or ASR be filed if a crime
was committed on board or pax was detained. He/she must be handed over to the
law enforcement at the destination.
On turnaround stops and during transit stops one flight deck crewmember must remain
on board.
At some outstations, local authorities might try to gain access to the aircraft WITHOUT valid
ID’s. Be alert!
The following have access to the flight deck (subject to the Captains discretion, but
never in UK airspace):
- His Highness the Chairman
- Vice Chairman
- Group President
- President Emirates Airline
- Executive Vice President Engineering & Operations
- Senior Vice President Flight Operations
If a request to open ANY aircraft door is received outside the parking area, the aircraft
shall return to the parking position and the door only be opened in the presence of
Emirates/Handling Agent staff.
Sabotage/Bomb Threats
- RED at gate:
PA: Purser to flight deck immediately
Notify ATC & ramp agent
Shut down engines, if running, but maintain electrical power (APU)
Brief Purser (who will brief Cabin Crew)
Make Captains PA
Offload pax with hand baggage
- RED in flight:
PA: Purser to flight deck immediately
Brief purser on NITS
Make Captains PA
Follow QRH/FCOM procedure
If time permits carry out FD and Cabin search
Keep ATC fully informed; keep away from heavily populated areas if possible
Prepare for use of Oxygen masks
Request details on remote parking, steps and busses available
If time allows, make PA regarding B.D. or E.O.D experienced passengers
Land as soon as possible
Hijacking.
- Crew will use the word “DEMAND”
- At no time shall a hijacker be allowed access to the flight deck.
- Squawk 7500
- Advice ATC
- Plan to land as soon as possible, at a suitable airport of choice
- Advice SMNC, preferably use SATCOM
- When on ground, unless Captain decides it is better, do not leave crew and pax
behind.
Isolated Destination
TAXI, TRIP, CONTINGENCY + 2 Hrs HOLDING AT CRUISE SPEED OVERHEAD DESTINATION.
For in-flight planning – The last possible en-route alternate point will be determined and
at that point the 2 hrs holding fuel and trip fuel to destination must be in tact. At this point
you can continue if 2 runways are available and the wx complies with, FC ETA to ETA + 2
hrs, Circling (1200’/5000m) + 300’/1km = 1500’6000m. If not met, proceed to en-route
alternate
Fuel tankering:
Up to 1% below MLW
Not to be performed if runway for takeoff is contaminated or expected to be so.
For a non-tankering sector, the landing weight is to be planned to 1% below MLW
If uplift to MLW, planning to this weight should only be in coordination with Commander /
Load Control.
2) If a delay is NOT known, the flight must be able to reach at least two airports
(Destination & Alternate) and landing assured with at least Final Reserve Fuel remaining
at touchdown.
Exception: Within 2 hours of destination and destination having at least two separate &
independent runways,
the second runway can be nominated as alternate.
A landing is “assured” if it can be completed in the event of any forecast weather
deterioration AND plausible single failures of ground and airborne facilities (ex: ILS failure
on ground or NO LAND 3 on board).
Forecast weather is used when more than 2 hours from relevant airport.
Actual weather reports and trend information is used when closer than 2 hours from
relevant airport.
Flight crew should make a quick scan of relevant info, then brief the Cabin Crew, then
conduct the remainder of the briefing.
The minimum requirements for Pre-flight Planning and Briefing are:
- Check OFP for accuracy and validity (date, aircraft to be used and route)
- NOTAMS and WX for departure, destination and alternates
- Enroute NOTAMS for the first hour of flight
Company Briefing
- Flight Doc folders contents
- Check CFP for accuracy and validity (date, aircraft to be used and route)
- Fuel (gross error check x7 for the -200 and x8 for the -300)
- RM, company NOTAMS, fuel requirements, tankering and degradation value
- FCI’s
Unofficial Document Page 17 of 42
Preparing For Your Emirates Upgrade Section 8
FOM Study Notes
- Decrease of fitness under mental stress can occur and the crew member is responsible
to decide whether he is fit for duty or not
- If a crewmember needs to be removed (doubt about fitness to operate), the problem
will be discussed mutually by the Captain, First Officer and Purser. SMNC should be
contacted if a crewmember is to be removed.
- The Captain/FO/Purser should brief the remaining crew that the crewmember has stood
down from the flight.
- Crew transport in Dubai. Contact Central Services if car has not arrived 10 minutes after
expected time.
- After 20 minutes, make your own way to the CBC. Flight Ops Department will reimburse
this expense.
- On positioning flights with EK crew must wear uniform and be on GD, report ETD -0130 at
briefing, where positioning was decided within 72 hours, a Captain may be downgraded
to Y class.
- An FO traveling with a Captain travels in the same class.
- Minimum Cabin Crew for service: -200 = 8 crew (one for each door) and on a -300 = 10
crew
- One cabin crew less is acceptable if that door is considered inoperable and therefore
the max number of pax is limited, 1 cabin crew per 50 pax.
- A cabin crew may operate one grade higher or lower than their normal position
Augmented Crew:
Where Crew Scheduling has not nominated a particular pilot as Augmenting, this will be
done by the PIC.
The Second in Command must hold a valid UAE ATPL.
Augmenting FO’s will be trained in - Rapid Decompression & rapid descent
- Engine Failure with drift down
- TCAS RA’s
When the Captain is resting with a 2 FO crew, the FO in the right seat (qualified operating
seat) will be PF.
The PIC should contact his operating crew the day before the flight to draft an in-flight
rest plan.
T/O crew must be in their seat prior to “Pre-flight Checklist”
Before changing seats the incoming crew must be fully briefed on A/C, Destination, Alt,
ATC, WX status
When changing seats, A/P engaged, speaker on and docs ready
PIC must brief crew on severity of situation for his disturbance before retiring
Admission to Flightdeck
- The following people are allowed to the F/D
Sheik Ahmed
Flanagan
Clark
Al Redha
Stealy
They are however not allowed while in UK airspace
- The Capt decides on who gets vacant crew seats
- Only 1 flight deck jumpseat may be occupied by a non-crewmember
- Vacant crew jump seats are not to be used for T/O and landing
- Flight crew resting should be no more than 40 min, then 10 min to regather
- Ground staff must keep Capt aware of any delay longer than 5 min.
(FCI 2005-076)
Captains welcome aboard PA:
- Introduce yourself & crew (Capt, FO, Pur, and SFS’s)
- Flight plan routing, mention map display on screens
- Enroute weather
- Destination weather
- Expected flight time
- Use of seat belts whilst seated (legally important)
If time permits – if boarding was delayed get announcements made in terminal to pax. If
not pushing back by ETD, give pax reason. Use professional and calm voice, simple facts
and known places, do not mention safety videos, avoid technical terms, do not use
“bad wx, turb, going down or final approach” and use Arabian Gulf.
- Flight delays of more than 20 min, crew may request connection info for pax from
Company
Ground crew thumbs and by-pass pin held up means all is clear around A/C
During pushback if you need to attract the engineer or tug drivers attention, flash A/C
wing lights
The aircraft is considered dispatched when the engineer has been released, prior to taxi
(EK).
The aircraft is considered dispatched when take-off power is set (Boeing MEL).
After dispatch the MEL should only be used for reference if:
an ECAM/EICAS message appears after dispatch and before T/O
- Accomplish non-normal/normal procedure
- Communicate with maintenance (LM or MCC) with reference to MEL, FCI, Bulletins
etc and decide on course of action. After comms return to stand if, unsafe to
continue flight, MEL maintenance procedure needs to be completed before flight or
continuing with the problem, even if allowed under MEL, is not appropriate
- If you cannot establish comms with maintenance, FC must establish if flight can
continue using all the available sources taking the above into account. If they
determine maintenance action is required then return to stand.
If a fault occurs with no EICAS message, the MEL need not be referenced.
Concessions:
- For handling of defects not specifically covered in the MEL, a Concession to Operate is
needed
- The concession must be in written form only, unless special authorization from GCAA
received
- Capt must receive a copy for the Tech log as well as entries for nature of problem,
concession been received and WX for certain conditions if required
Technical fault reporting in the Tech Log: (Both pilots must review Tech log together)
“Y” for a new defect
“N” for no defect (& “Nil Defects” written), or if the defect is a known defect already in
the ADD. Brief description
“AUTOLAND” in Tech log only if unsatisfactory, downgraded or requested by technical
section
Before Take-off
Cannot dispatch if maintenance check expires before the planned time of arrival at next
station
Daily Check, valid 48 hours (cannot expire during flight)
Transit checks, can be performed by a Captain on a contingency basis
Taxi
- Max 30 KIAS, Max 10 KIAS on slippery surfaces
- When A/C is brought to a complete stop, Park Brake must be set
- CM1 must taxi A/C when Final turn onto stand until parked
180 deg turn required
No published Taxi guidance available
Take-off and Climb
GCAA Ops Specifications states minima for take off as
Ceiling = Zero and minimum RVR as follows:
Facilities RVR/Visibility (Note 3)
Nil (day only) 500M
Runway Edge Lighting and/or Runway Centre Line Marking 250/300M (Notes 1&2)
Runway Edge Lighting and Runway Centre Line Lighting 200/250M
(Note 1)
REL and Runway Centre Line lighting RVR Information 150/200M
(Note 1&4)
◊ Notes:
1. The higher values apply to Category D aircraft.
2. For night operations at least runway edge and stop end lights are required.
3. The required RVR/visibility value representative of the initial part of the takeoff run can
be replaced by pilot assessment when no reported RVR or visibility is available. The
takeoff run shall not be commenced unless it can be determined that the actual
conditions satisfy the applicable minima.
4. The required RVR value must be achieved for all relevant RVR reporting points with the
exception in note 3
- AWO are below the values above, down to the values on the 10-AWO chart (typically
RVR 125/150m)
- When no RVR or visibility is reported, a Captains assessment based on 60m runway
edge lights is OK.
- Turns shall normally not be initiated below 500’ AGL unless mandated by a SID or noise
abatement.
- Max bank for all phases of flight is 30 deg
- Comms with the company if not AUTO by ACARS should be done above 20 000’at
Capt’s discretion
Cruise
A 1-mile offset is not approved: In European B-RNAV or in RNP5 or better airspace
Below MSA
On SID’s or STARS
If Nav accuracy is not assured
Unless approved by ATC if appropriate
- A 1-mile offset should be considered in areas with In-Flight Broadcast Procedures
(Africa, Yangon) and while climbing and descending in areas with known bi-directional
traffic exists.
- If ETA changes by more than 30 min, advise MCC via ACARS
- Any A/C unservicebility that might affect dispatch at next station must be sent to EK Eng
by ACARS ASAP
Note: An approach that becomes unstabilised below 1,000 feet above airport elevation
in IMC, or below 500 feet above airport elevation in VMC, requires an immediate go-
around.
- When an approach chart minima is labeled “JAR OPS” and ONLY reported VIS is given
(no RVR), the FACTORED VIS table can be used.
- This conversion cannot be used for T/O, AWOPS or where RVR is available and RVR
reported for a runway does not qualify it for an alternate runway
- PF must take control at latest leaving FAF, turning base leg with radar vectors or 1000’
AGL
- On a coupled approach with manual landing, AP must be disengaged by 80’ AGL
- AUTOLAND can only be performed on runways approved for CAT II / III approaches
- Manual approaches may only be flown down to minima with WX above CAT I
- Each crew member will try and do 1 NPA approach to MDA, once a month, note it on
VR
- If a visual circuit (3 legs at / above 1500’) is to be flown, brief the following
MA procedure in conjunction with ATC
Possible GPWS GS warning
Terrain clearance and airport characteristics
- Orbits/360° turns are only authorised with Autopilot engaged and are not authorised
below 1500’AGL
- Pilots can only request orbits in daylight VMC and it must be reported on the VR
- If a missed approach is conducted, it is Emirates policy to limit the number of
approaches to 2, unless
there is a good possibility to land off a third approach.
Diversion
- If a diversion is required, the Captain should lease with SMNC & Ops Control, and inform
the passengers on the PA (PA may be delegated to the Purser)
- Alternate Weather – If alternate WX deteriorates it may continue to be used if the latest
forecasts, including TRENDS, indicate it will be above JEPP minima at applicable landing
time
- Ensure that the diversion A/Field has the required equipment for pushback before
accepting a parked in bay
- The availability of equipment has no bearing on adequacy of airport.
Landing
- AUTOBRAKES should be used for CAT II / III landings
- Recommended for
o Wet or Contaminated RWYS
o One engine inop landings
o Crosswind above 15 kts
- If the A/C has a Tech fault, the Engineer or mechanic should be briefed, if NIL DEFECTS,
there is no need to handover to the engineer / mechanic
If 14 or more UM’s are traveling, IFS will provide a Supy to look after them.
UM’s are the responsibility of the Purser, even in the case of a flight disruption.
PIL (Passengers Information List) will include all Wheel Chair requests. If additional WC’s
are needed, the Flight Deck Crew will request this, stating the passengers name.
WCHR - for pax that can walk to cabin seat, can ascend steps.
WCHS - for pax that can walk to cabin seats, can not ascend steps.
WCHC - pax completely immobile. Must have escort. (But p 10 states a Non-ambulatory
passenger can travel unescorted except if he/she can not manage own bodily functions
in the toilet!)
If the Seat Belt Sign is ON, hot liquids shall not be served to passengers.
- If smoking in the cabin is noted, an instruction to stop will be issued by a Cabin Crew
member.
- If the instruction is not followed, the Purser & PIC must be informed, and the Purser must
raise a VR.
- If a passenger is caught smoking in the toilet the PIC must be informed, and the Purser
must raise a VR.
- If a passenger has tampered with the Smoke Detector in the toilet, the PIC must be
notified. The PIC will then call SMNC to request Police meet the aircraft on arrival.
- Life vest DEMO must be done if flight over water, 50 nm from off-shore and over water
beyond gliding dist.
- 2 Therapeutic O2 bottles can be carried but NO xtra portable O2 bottles may be
carried
- Diplomatic bags (max 75 kg) will not be screened and must be placed on the seat
cushion & fully secured.
- It is the PIC’s responsibility to ensure that a DEPO does not disembark within the country
of refusal. DEPO and INAD pax may however disembark at other countries with approval
from the concerned authorities
Passenger misconduct.
Can be of many types, abusive/suggestive language, refusal to comply with instructions,
indecent exposure, drunkenness, drugs, threatening with physical violence, etc.
Cabin Crew will warn passenger, ending in a Formal Warning from the Captain.
PIC is responsible that appropriate written reports from the crew are submitted.
The authority to use Passenger Restraining Devices rests solely with the PIC.
DEFECT RAISED
- If a competent (non authorized) engineer or crew is able to rectify the defect and the
PIC is satisfied the A/C is airworthy, he may accept the A/C without CRS being raised but
must report it to UAE GCAA within 10 days.
- The CRS should contain the following
Type of defect and its circumstances
Action taken to rectify defect including people / organization and parts names
Comms with EK Engineering
DEFECT RAISED AND MEL APPLIES
- If the defect is allowable under the MEL:
PIC must make appropriate entry in the “Action Taken” column
Item transferred to ADD section
PIC has authorization to issue CRS, no GCAA notification required
- Captains credit card is for use at off-route unscheduled airports where Credit facilities are
not in place
- If it is needed however SMNC must be contacted to increase the limit
- Use the Fuel Carnet for Fuel, handling etc and only the credit card if Credit cannot be
arranged
- Be aware of what document copies need to be left behind if you diverted and are now
returning.
- For night operations, at least runway edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights
must be on.
- If both high & low intensity approach lights are unserviceable, minimum visibility must be
increased by 900 m to a minimum of at least 1500 m visibility.
Oxygen:
- Emirates O2 is:
o Supply all pax for 10 mins or entire time above 15000’cabin alt
o 30% of the pax for time between 14 and 15000’cabin alt
o 10% of the pax after 30 mins between 10 and 14000’cabin alt
- Passengers must use oxygen when cabin altitude is above 15000’ (not at or below
15000’)
- Flight Crew must use oxygen above 10000’ (FCI)
- If the crew O2 becomes inop in flight, you can descend to FL250 with portable O2
bottles for each flight crew on duty. Above FL250, quick donning masks must be
serviceable
All flight crewmembers must be secured during moderate or heavy turbulence.
Radio two, set on 121.5 can be switch to a Volmet frequency when needed.
ACARS should only be used for weather information when it is not readily available from
Volmet/Atis.
- Satvoice is expensive and should only be used when it is the most appropriate means of
communication.
- Flight deck loudspeakers may be used during cruise, but only for VHF communication.
- When a headset/boom mike is used, the corresponding loudspeaker will be turned OFF.
- Headset must be used when radio other than primary VHF is used and when below
10000
- The PNF should not use the PTT-switch on the control wheel when the PF is flying
manually.
- If surface mean winds are => 60 kts, the airport must be considered closed.
- On approach, 4 nautical miles between heavy aircrafts are acceptable.
- Avoid cells by more than 10 miles above 20 000
AWOPS
- AWOPS refers to T/O below T/O minima 150/200 and Landing below CAT I minima
- LVP’s come into force when RVR falls below 550 m and ceiling below 200’
- AWO pilot qualifications remain valid between PPC’s.
- CAT II / III new Capt limits are 50 hrs or 20 sectors, add 100m to RVR minima
TAKE-OFF:
AWO qualified crews may reduce take-off minima to 125m (C) / 150 (D) provided:
- LVP in force
- Rwy Centre Line Lights spaced 15m or less and High Intensity Edge Lights spaced 60m or
less.
- 90m visual segment available from the flight deck at the take-off point
- Required RVR for all reporting points as shown on the 10-AWO chart
APPROACH:
- For an AWO approach, the 10-AWO must be used.
- Aircraft must be stabilised at the latest by 1500’ AGL during an AWO approach.
- RVR for the Stop end (Roll Out RVR) is at Captains discretion, but never below 75m
Typically for an airport with a CAT I approach is Circling Approach minima (5000m &
1100’ ceiling).
After dispatch: Once the aircraft is dispatched, the weather needs only to be above
landing minima (no planning penalties).
If WX minima deteriorates below landing minima before or while inside the ETOPS
segment, another alternate must be nominated with required WX
If not possible, do not enter ETOPS area, if already in, Capt must decide whether to
continue or fly non-ETOPS routing
Before an ETOPS flight, an ETOPS SUPPL check must be signed in the Tech Log.
If an ETOPS verification flight is needed after maintenance, a 90 minutes segment before
entering ETOPS is needed without the failure of an ETOPS critical item. This must be noted
in the Tech Log as “ETOPS Verification Flight satisfactory”. The ADD raised will be cleared
at the next station.
Consider carrying extra fuel to continue the flight non-ETOPS if the verification flight
should fail.
ETOPS Flight Watch will notify EK flight crew if an enroute alternate goes below minima,
and will re-plan.
Remote Destinations:
A geographically isolated airport with no suitable alternates.
Must be authorised by DFO, and listed in the Route Manual.
Weather forecast must indicate at least Circling Minima from ETA-1 to ETA+2 hrs.
Additional fuel will be not less than 2 hrs. flying at cruise level using LRC at the calc.
weight and ISA at arrival.
An ETP (Equitime Point) will be calculated between destination and last suitable
alternate, and fuel at ETP must indicate at least Holding Reserve at destination OR unless
two separate rwy’s are available at the isolated airport AND expected weather
conditions comply with Remote Dest planning minima. 1400’/6000m vis.
B-RNAV - R on ICAO flightplan. GCAA approves RNP4/BRNAV for EK. RNP1 for terminal.
(FCI 2005-096)
RVSM - W on the ICAO flightplan. When approaching a cleared level, vs should be 500-
1000 fpm, max 1500.
FANS - Pilots should complete FANS 1/A Problem Report form (spare forms folder) if
unable to log on etc.
In the following cases, a landing must be affected at the nearest Suitable Airfield:
- if the Non-Normal Checklist include the words “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”
- Any fire on board (incl. engines) if fire fighting is not possible or not effective (QRH states
“Plan to land...”)
- Persistent smoke of unknown origin (QRH states “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”)
- Failure of an engine (QRH states “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”)
- Dual hydraulic failure (QRH states “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”)
- Red Bomb Threat (QRH states “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”)
- One power source remaining (both backup generators are considered ONE power source)
- Structural damage
If two or more Suitable Airports exist, consider;
- Glide path assistance
- At least Circling Minima (5 km & 1.000’ ceiling)
- Flight time
There should be no reluctance to declare an emergency, it can always be cancelled later on.
Aviate - Navigate - Communicate. If Captain is PF, consider handing over control to the
First Officer.
Rejected Take-off
During a Rejected Take-off, by calling “STOP” the Captain automatically takes control,
and FO becomes PNF.
Evacuation:
Read the latest (FCI 2005-073)
Incapacitation:
- 2 verbal comms above 1000’, 1 verbal comm. Below 1000’, any verbal comm.
Associated with significant deviation from flight path or a system malfunction.
- Declare an emergency, land ASAP, preferable WX above CAT I and get towed in,
cannot park.
Acclimatised;
Crew member has spent 3 consecutive local nights within a timezone +/- 2 hours wide
Local Night; a period of 8 hours falling between 22:00 and 08:00 local time
Flying Duty Period (FDP); 60 min before ETOB (Estimated Time Off Blocks) until On Chocks
at destination Duty period; any period the crew member is required to carry out any task
associated with company business
Night Duty; if any part of the duty falls within the period 02:00 - 04:59
A crew can have max 3 consecutive LATE FINISH, EARLY START or NIGHT DUTY (01:00 -
06:59), 34 hours of rest interrupts this sequence.
Positioning; transferring of crew in surface or air transport, is considered a Duty, but not
considered a Sector.
Day Off; a single day off shall include two local nights
If a delay of more than 4 hours is informed the crew before leaving the place of rest, the
maximum FDP shall be based on the more limiting of the planned & actual reporting
time, and the actual FDP shall start 4 hours after the original report time.
If a delay of more than 10 hours is informed the crew before leaving the place of rest,
and the crew is not further disturbed by the company, then the elapsed time is classified
as rest.
Standby:
If a crew member is called out from standby before completing 6 hours of standby duty,
then the total duty period allowed is the SUM of the time spent on Standby + the FDP
from Table A or B (page 25).
If a crew member is called out from standby after completing 6 hours or more of standby
duty, then the total duty period allowed is the SUM of the time spent on Standby + the
FDP from Table A or B minus amount of Standby in excess of 6 hours.
If crew are at home on Standby duty between 22:00 - 08:00 and called out within 2 hours
of reporting time, the allowable FDP will start at the reporting time.
Maximum FDP:
Standard reporting times for Flight Deck Crew in Dubai & outstations is STD -1:00
Standard reporting times for Cabin Crew in Dubai is STD -1:30, and at outstations STD -0:45
For Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 1 sector, Max FDP is 11-13 hrs, depending on start-
time.
For Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 2 sectors, Max FDP is 10:15 -12:15 hrs, depending on
start-time.
For Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 3 sectors, Max FDP is 9:30 -11:15 hrs, depending on
start-time.
For Non-Acclimat. Flight Deck Crew on 2 sectors, Max FDP is 11:00 -12:15 hrs, depending on
preceding rest.
For Non-Acclimat. Flight Deck Crew on 3 sectors, Max FDP is 10:30 -11:15 hrs, depending
on preceding rest.
For 2 Flight Deck Crew on a sector scheduled for more than 7:00 hours, it is considered a
multi-sector flight.
A table on p. 27 then defines how many sectors this flight will be considered as, generally
2-4 sectors.
Variations Dubai (page 49) deals with reducing additional sectors for flights over 7:30
hours leaving Dubai, and is a bit confusing. It makes a DXB - MNL flight of FDP 10:05 legal,
since it reduces the 4-sector limit to a 3-sector limit.
Extension of Duty:
Commanders discretion can be used if he is satisfied that the flight can be made safely,
and up to max 3 hrs.
If a Flying Duty Period involving 2 or more sectors, a max of 2 hrs discretion can be used
prior to first sector.
Immediately prior to the last sector (or first sector on a 1 sector flight), full 3 hrs. discretion
may be used.
A Commander may only exceptionally extend a FDP after a reduced rest period, and
then GCAA will be informed as well as the Company.
If the Commander extended a FDP up to 2:00 hours, he must inform the Company via a
Discretion Report.
If the Commander extended a FDP from 2:01 - 3:00 hrs, he must inform the Company via
a Discretion Report, and the Company will inform the GCAA within 14 days of the aircraft
returning to base.
If rest is taken in a bunk: 1/2 of the rest time (min. 3:00 hrs) extension up to a max FDP of
18 hrs (19 C/C).
Commanders normal Discretion to extend a FDP is reduced to 2:30 with no more than
1:30 being exercised prior to departure.
(answ d)
(answ c)
(answ b)
(answ b)
(answ c)
8. Who is responsible for the timely renewal of medical and keeping caccinations up to date ?
a. medical
b. flight ops
c. the individual
d. HR
(answ c)
(answ d)
11. What is the min legal number of cabin crew on an aircraft that has 434 seats with
401 passengers and 10 emergency exits ?
a. 8
b. 9
c. 10
d. 11
(answ c)
12. Diagram of pfd with speed just below Vls at the orange = but above alpha prot, high
roc. What is acft doing ?
a. alpha floor
b. hi aoa prot
c. nothing
d. load ctl
(answ c)
(answ b)
(answ d)
(answ c)
19. What happens when you momentarily push the thrust levers forward of the cl
detent below 100ft
a you go to toga
b the a/thr drops out
c. you get cl thrust
d. nothing
(answ b)
(answ d)
(answ b)
(answ b)
(answ a true)
(answ c)
25. When must you disengage the autopilot if carrying out a vis landing off an approach ?
a. 400ft
b. 80ft
c. 100ft
d. 200ft
(answ b)
(answ b)
(answ b)
(answ a)
(answ c)
30. Above what terrain altitude is used in determining drift down start ?
a. 10,000ft
b. 8000ft
c. 15,000ft
d. some other one
(answ b)
I looked at it this way, I could afford to get 9 wrong which is a lot and I was pretty happy I could Jag 21.
3. What are the factoring figures to be used....they give you different options so just know the numbers.
6. What is min fuel for landing with commitment to destination, destination and alternate
.....they gave me two of these options, can't remember which.
7. They gave me 3 different questions with pictures of a PFD and asked me what law we were
operating under.....didn't like those at all, just couldn't remember that stuff.
8. Picture of ECAM fuel page with jettison showing on left wing and in Amber....what is
happening here?
10. What is initial attitude for double engine flameout and is it weight dependant?
11. ECAM fuel page with aft transfer occurring and upper ECAM showing "trim tank transfer"....why?
14. When can you dispatch without contingency fuel, never or when using decision point procedure?
15. What's true about destination alternate, need one navaid if weather is CAVOK, weather below
CAVOK you need 2 navaids or both of the above?
16. For taxi you have toe brake pressure applied and you release the park brake. The triple
indicator drops to zero...is this normal?
TECHNICAL QUESTIONS
3- What are the factoring figures to be used....they give you different options so just
know the numbers.
6 -What is min fuel for landing with commitment to destination, destination and
alternate.....they gave me two of these options, can't remember which.
7- They gave me 3 different questions with pictures of a PFD and asked me what law
we were operating under.....didn't like those at all, just couldn't remember that stuff.
8- Picture of ECAM fuel page with jettison showing on left wing and in Amber....what is
happening here?
10- What is initial attitude for double engine flameout and is it weight dependant?
11- ECAM fuel page with aft transfer occurring and upper ECAM showing "trim tank
transfer"....why?
14- When can you dispatch without contingency fuel, never or when using decision
point procedure?
15- What's true about dest alternate, need one navaid if weather is Cavok, weather
below Cavok you need 2 navaids or both of the above?
16- For taxi you have toe brake pressure applied and you release the park brake. The
triple indicator drops to zero...is this normal?
Whilst answering the following questions, you will explore various performance
sections contained in Company and Aircraft documentation and manuals.
1. Calculate the percentage TOMAC and the corresponding Stabilizer Trim Setting for
the following two situations using A6- EKS (three class configuration):
Answer …………………………
Answer …………………………
2. Where can the performance decrements if a winglet is missing be found, and what
are those decrements?
Answer ……………………………………………………………………………
3.
a) What is the optimum all engine holding altitude for an A330 at 180 tonnes?
Answer ………………
Answer ……………..
Answer ……………..
d} Above what Altitude will the all engine holding efficiency generally decrease? Why is
this?
Answer ………………………………………………………………………………………
Answer …………………………………………………………….
Answer ……………………………………………………………
Answer …………
Answer ……………………………………………………………..
7. What would be the Density Altitude, in DXB, in summer with a QNH of 998 and a
temp. of 45°C?
Answer …………………………..
8. At 200 tonnes over Iran, ISA +20, What is the Net ceiling of the A330 on one engine?
Answer …………………………..
Answer …………………………………………………………
10.
a) What is the approach climb capability at 5000ft Pressure altitude, ISA + 15°C at
MLW ?
Answer ……………………………………
b) What is the minimum Jeppersen missed approach gradient if not specified on the
chart?
Answer ……………………………………
c) Why is the SAH Missed Approach Climb Gradient limiting weight calculated on a
3.9% climb gradient.
Answer ……………………………………
11. What would the Flap Setting, Flex Temp and Take Off speeds be in the following
situation. Technical Fault, MEL Eng 1 REV U/S, locked out.
TOW 195,000Kg’s
Answer ……………………………………
SNOWTAM 0041
A) UUEE
B) 0010311435 - 0011011435
Answer:
12. What is the decode of the following codes at the end of a METAR (SA)?
a) 75490394
b) 25590592
Answer:
1. Calculate the percentage TOMAC and the corresponding Stabiliser Trim Setting for
the following two situations using A6- EKS (three class configuration):
Answer …………………………
Answer …………………………
2. Where can the performance decrements if a winglet is missing be found, and what
are those decrements?
Answer ……………………………………………………………………………
3.
a) What is the optimum all engine holding altitude for an A330 at 180 tonnes?
Answer ………………
Answer ……………..
Answer ……………..
Answer ………………………………………………………………………………………
Answer …………………………………………………………….
Answer ……………………………………………………………..
Answer ……………………………………………………………
Answer ………………..
7. What would be the Density Altitude in DXB in summer with a QNH of 998 and a temp.
of 45°C?
Answer …………………………..
8. At 200 tonnes over Iran, ISA +20, What is the Net ceiling of the A330 on one engine?
Answer …………………………..
Answer …………………………………………………………
C:\To be deleted\A330 Performance Questionnaire.doc
A330 Upg Crs
[1.0] 30/07/03 Author: D. Granter Page 2 of 4
A330 Performance Flight Operations Training
Questionnaire
10.
a) What is the approach climb capability at 5000ft Pressure altitude, ISA + 15°C at
MLW ?
Answer ……………………………………
b) What is the minimum Jepp missed approach gradient if not specified on the
chart?
Answer ……………………………………
c) Why is the SAH Missed Approach Climb Gradient limiting weight calculated on a
3.9% climb gradient.
Answer ……………………………………
11. What would the Flap setting, Flex Temp and Take Off speeds be in the following
situation.
TOW 195,000Kg’s
Answer ……………………………………
12. In the following situation what is the flap setting, associated speeds and Flex Temp.
TOW 230T
Answer ……………………………………
SNOWTAM 0041
A) UUEE
C:\To be deleted\A330 Performance Questionnaire.doc
A330 Upg Crs
[1.0] 30/07/03 Author: D. Granter Page 3 of 4
A330 Performance Flight Operations Training
Questionnaire
B) 0010311435 - 0011011435
Answer:
14. What is the decode of the following codes at the end of a METAR (SA)?
a) 75490394
b) 25590592
Answer:
While answering the following questions, you will need to explore various
sections of the Company Documentation and manuals pertaining to Policy and
Procedures.
General
1. What are the objectives of the Flight Operations Mission Statement?
2. When do the Captain’s Duties and responsibilities begin and end in
relation to a flight, the crew and passengers?
3. What is stated in the FOM / OM-A relating to compliance with
regulations and orders?
4. What is stated in FOM Chap 2 with regard to what the OM constitutes?
5. What does the Flight Operating Manual section of the FOM / OM-A state
in regard to more conservative operations?
6. Where is the Emergency Authority of the Captain stated in the FOM /
OM-A?
Destinations
7. How do you know if a particular destination is authorized for EK
operations?
8. What are the forecast requirements for a destination?
9. Is a cloud ceiling required to be considered for landing minima?
10. For what type of approach does the company require higher landing
minima than that charted?
11. What are the flight planning fuel requirements, if the destination
forecast is below minima?
Alternates
12. What are the different types of alternate airports?
13. When do you require a takeoff alternate?
14. Within what distance must it be situated?
15. For what period must the takeoff alternate be available?
16. What must the minimum forecast weather be for the T/O alternate?
17. What are the forecast weather requirements for a Destination Alternate?
18. What are the forecast weather requirements for an ETOPS Alternate?
19. Is ETOPS Alternate minima required if the departure or destination are
used as ETOPS Alternates?
20. What minima are required for these airfields in question 19?
21. When does TEMPO and PROB apply?
22. Do TEMPO and PROB apply to ETOPS Alternates?
Take Off
23. Where are takeoff minima specified?
24. Could you still take off if there is no reported meteorological visibility or
RVR is available?
25. What will you use to assess the RVR?
Approach
26. Is an approach allowed to be commenced if the weather is less than
approach minima?
27. Is the cloud ceiling required to be considered for an approach?
28. If intending to carry out the landing manually when must the autopilot
be disconnected?
29. There are three targets for stabilization, when do they apply?
30. What are the stabilization requirements?
31. What is the minimum visibility for radar assisted visual contact
approaches?
32. When can a visual approach be conducted?
33. What are the requirements for a visual approach?
34. Is an orbit during a visual approach or instrument approach allowed?
35. If an orbit is required, what criteria must be met?
Go Around
45. How many approaches may be attempted?
46. Are there any exceptions?
Taxiing
47. What is the maximum speed on a high speed taxi way after landing?
48. What is the maximum Company permitted taxing speed.
Restrictions
49. What are the F/O restrictions?
50. What restrictions are applicable to a new Commander in Emirates?
The final LOE is conducted as a normal flight without instructor intervention, focusing on evaluating candidates' overall competencies. Unlike LOS sessions, which emphasize training with potential instructor interventions, the LOE assesses the pilot's ability to apply the skills and knowledge acquired during the LOS phase in a realistic, uninterrupted flight scenario. This approach determines readiness for promotion and ensures proficiency in real-world operations .
In the case of a dual engine flameout, pilots must attempt to restart engines using available systems such as APU assistance while assessing the situation. Weather conditions can significantly affect decision-making, necessitating considerations for alternate routes or landing sites with favorable weather for emergency landings. Effective communication with ATC for guidance and prioritizing passenger safety are critical components .
Under UAE International Aviation Law, the Pilot-in-Command is responsible for ensuring safety and maintaining order aboard the aircraft. They are empowered to take necessary measures, including restraining passengers, if there is a threat to safety or good order. The Pilot-in-Command also has the authority to disembark passengers suspected of committing offenses in the territory of a contracting state .
In a medical emergency scenario with concurrent fuel and operational constraints, pilots must efficiently evaluate and manage resources while ensuring passenger safety. Decision-making involves rapidly prioritizing actions such as diverting to the nearest suitable airport, managing the available fuel effectively, and coordinating medical assistance upon landing. Effective communication with emergency services and CRM are critical to managing the situation under these constraints .
In the event of an emergency descent and engine fire during takeoff, the initial steps include requesting vectors back to the takeoff runway. Should the engine fire persist and cause further complications like the engine burning off and a dual hydraulic emergency, pilots must manage control difficulties and coordinate with emergency services for landing assistance. Thorough communication with ATC and adherence to emergency checklists are critical during this scenario .
The LOS phase consists of four Full Flight Simulator sessions, where the first three are focused on training, and the fourth is an Evaluation. The LOS sessions are designed to develop candidates' skills in handling real-time emergencies, understanding technical and procedural knowledge, and improving CRM behaviors and task management in demanding scenarios. This phase enhances overall training value and builds candidates' confidence and decision-making skills for seamless transition upon promotion to Captain .
Fuel planning and dispatch decisions are influenced by several factors including aircraft system failures and operational restrictions. In case of system failures such as a fuel leak or flight control failure, effective management and awareness of emergency procedures are critical . Operational restrictions related to all-weather operations and ETOPS (Extended Range Twin Operations) affect flight planning, particularly when failures impact safe operations . Additionally, diversion and the selection of suitable airports are planned using resources from aircraft manuals, taking into account available guidance when deciding between continuing or terminating a flight . Weather conditions, alternate airport availability, and specific fuel requirements for landing with consideration to safety and legal compliance also play a role .
The Tokyo Convention grants aircraft commanders significant legal authority to maintain order and safety on board, including restraint and disembarkation of disruptive passengers. Commanders can seek assistance from crew and passengers if necessary. They must assess and justify their actions, as these responsibilities entail legal obligations, including potential civil actions if restraint leads to passenger injury or death, highlighting the importance of adhering to duty-of-care standards .
Constraints on the discretion of flight duty limitations during unexpected delays or aircraft issues are managed by allowing Commanders limited discretion to extend Flying Duty Periods (FDP). Commanders can extend an FDP prior to departure, with a maximum extension of 2 hours for multiple sectors or a full 3 hours for a single sector . In cases where this extension occurs after a reduced rest period, a Discretion Report must be filed, and if the extension exceeds 2 hours, the Company must notify the General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) within 14 days . Furthermore, if a delay of over 4 hours is informed before the crew leaves their place of rest, the FDP will start 4 hours after the original report time, unless it impacts maximum duty time . This management ensures safety while adapting to operational demands.
Simulator exercises at SANAA and SEYCHELLES airports are conducted for Emirates upgrade candidates to familiarize them with the specific characteristics of Category C aerodromes, emphasizing safe operations. These exercises focus on handling various operational conditions and help develop the candidates' knowledge and competence in technical and procedural matters, Crew Resource Management (CRM), and task management under demanding scenarios .