FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 86695. September 3, 1992.]

MARIA ELENA MALAGA, doing business under the name B.E.
CONSTRUCTION; JOSIELEEN NAJARRO, doing business under
the name BEST BUILT CONSTRUCTION; JOSE N. OCCEA,
doing business under the name THE FIRM OF JOSE N. OCCEA;
and the ILOILO BUILDERS CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR., ALFREDO MATANGGA, ENRICO
TICAR AND TERESITA VILLANUEVA, in their respective
capacities as Chairman and Members of the Pre-qualification Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC)-BENIGNO PANISTANTE, in his
capacity as President of Iloilo State College of Fisheries, as well as in
their respective personal capacities; and HON. LODRIGIO L.
LEBAQUIN, respondents.
Salas, Villareal & Velasco for petitioners.
Virgilio A. Sindico for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY, DEFINED.
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5)
Introductory Provisions).
2. ID.; CHARTERED INSTITUTION; DEFINED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.
The 1987 Administrative Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered
institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This
term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state.
(Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is
a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. There are also indications in
its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance

of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with
its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the
state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an
additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National
Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state
college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law. (Presidential
Decree No. 1523)
3. ID.; PROHIBITION OF ANY COURT FROM ISSUING INJUNCTION IN CASES
INVOLVING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS OF GOVERNMENT (P.D. 1818);
POWER OF THE COURTS TO RESTRAIN APPLICATION. In the case of Datiles
and Co. vs. Sucaldito, (186 SCRA 704) this Court interpreted a similar prohibition
contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared
that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts
against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla
made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving
questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. We see no reason why the above ruling
should not apply to P.D. 1818. There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC
that justified injunction of the bidding and the award of the project.
4. ID.; POLICIES AND GUIDELINES PRESCRIBED FOR GOVERNMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE (PD 1594); RULES IMPLEMENTING THEREOF, NOT
SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. Under the Rules
Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing policies and guidelines for government
infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders with the Notice to Prequalification and other relevant information regarding the proposed work. Prospective
contractors shall be required to file their ARC-Contractors Confidential Application for
Registration & Classifications & the PRE-C2 Confidential Pre-qualification Statement
for the Project (prior to the amendment of the rules, this was referred to as Pre-C1) not
later than the deadline set in the published Invitation to Bid, after which date no PRE-C2
shall be submitted and received. Invitations to Bid shall be advertised for at least three
times within a reasonable period but in no case less than two weeks in at least two
newspapers of general circulations. (IB 13 1.2-19, Implementing Rules and Regulations
of P.D. 1594 as amended) PBAC advertised the pre-qualification deadline as December
2, 1988, without stating the hour thereof, and announced that the opening of bids would

be at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. This scheduled was changed and a
notice of such change was merely posted at the ISCOF bulletin board. The notice
advanced the cut-off time for the submission of pre-qualification documents to 10 o'clock
in the morning of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids to 1 o'clock in the afternoon
of December 12, 1988. The new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of the
petitioners as recorded in the minutes of the PBAC meeting held on December 6, 1988.
While it may be true that there were fourteen contractors who were pre-qualified despite
the change in schedule, this fact did not cure the defect of the irregular notice. Notably,
the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet the new deadline and not
because of their expired licenses. (B.E. & Best Built's licenses were valid until June 30,
1989. [Ex. P & O respectively: both were marked on December 28, 1988]) We have held
that where the law requires a previous advertisement before government contracts can be
awarded, non-compliance with the requirement will, as a general rule, render the same
void and of no effect. (Caltex Phil. v. Delgado Bros., 96 Phil. 368) The fact that an
invitation for bids has been communicated to a number of possible bidders is not
necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with the requirements of the law if it is
shown that other possible bidders have not been similarly notified.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. The purpose of the rules
implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism,
collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the public. This
purpose was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC. It has been held that the
three principles in public bidding are the offer to the public, an opportunity for
competition and a basis for exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which
excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and thwarts
the purpose of its adoption. (Hannan v. Board of Education, 25 Okla. 372) In the case at
bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the pre-qualification requirement and the
bidding that caused the elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best Built. It was not because
of their expired licenses, as private respondents now claim. Moreover, the plans and
specifications which are the contractors' guide to an intelligent bid, were not issued on
time, thus defeating the guaranty that contractors be placed on equal footing when they
submit their bids. The purpose of competitive bidding is negated if some contractors are
informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and specifications that are to be the subject of
their bids.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE THEREOF. It has been held in a
long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law
is void, and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it. It has not been shown
that the irregularities committed by PBAC were induced by or participated in by any of
the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the private respondents for the
prejudice sustained by the petitioners as a result of the anomalies described above.

7. CIVIL LAW; NOMINAL DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF, WHEN AVAILABLE.

As there is no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the petitioners, compensatory
damage may not be awarded to them. Moral damages do not appear to be due either.
Even so, the Court cannot close its eyes to the evident bad faith that characterized the
conduct of the private respondents, including the irregularities in the announcement of
the bidding and their efforts to persuade the ISCOF president to award the project after
two days from receipt of the restraining order and before they moved to lift such order.
For such questionable acts, they are liable in nominal damages at least in accordance with
Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 2221. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant may be vindicated or, recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. These damages are to be assessed against the
private respondents in the amount of P10,000.00 each, to be paid separately for each of
petitioners B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction.

DECISION

CRUZ, J :
p

This controversy involves the extent and applicability of P.D. 1818, which prohibits any
court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the
government.
prLL

The facts are not disputed.

The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification,
Bids and Awards Committee (henceforth PBAC) caused the publication in the November
25, 26, 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of the Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the
last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements (PRE C-1) ** was
December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12,
1988, 3 o'clock in the afternoon. 1
Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro, respectively doing business under
the name of the B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their prequalification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner
Jose Occea submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were
not allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late,
having been submitted after the cut-off time of ten o'clock in the morning of December 2,
1988.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo against the chairman and members of PBAC in their official and personal
capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that although they had submitted their PRE-C1 on time,
the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. As a result, they were not included
in the list of pre-qualified bidders, could not secure the needed plans and other
documents, and were unable to participate in the scheduled bidding.
In their prayer, they sought the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the
acceptance of their PRE-C1 documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already
been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of
their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting
PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. 2
On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the
ground that the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.
cdll

The decree reads pertinently as follows:

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary infrastructure project,
or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the
government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among
others public utilities for the transport of the goods and commodities,
stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or
government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or
pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or
operation.

The movants also contended that the question of the propriety of a preliminary injunction
had become moot and academic because the restraining order was received late, at 2
o'clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988, after the bidding had been conducted and
closed at eleven thirty in the morning of that date.
In their opposition of the motion, the plaintiffs argued against the applicability of P.D.
1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and
separate existence and was not part of the national government or of any local political
subdivision. Even if P.D. 1818 were applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and
legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like the project at bar.

They also cited Filipinas Marble Corp. vs. IAC, 3 where the Court allowed the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction despite a similar prohibition found in P.D. 385. The
Court therein stated that:
The government, however, is bound by basic principles of fairness and decency
under the due process clauses of the Bill of Rights. P.D. 385 was never meant to
protect officials of government-lending institutions who take over the
management of a borrower corporation, lead that corporation to bankruptcy
through mismanagement or misappropriation of its funds, and who, after
ruining it, use the mandatory provisions of the decree to avoid the consequences
of their misleads (p. 188, emphasis supplied).

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be construed at the ISCOF
was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of P.D. 1818.
Even if it were not, the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction would
still fail because the sheriff's return showed that PBAC was served a copy of the
restraining order after the bidding sought to be restrained had already been held.
Furthermore, the members of the PBAC could not be restrained from awarding the
project because the authority to do so was lodged in the President of the ISCOF, who was
not a party to the case. 4
In the petition now before us, it is reiterated that P.D. 1818 does not cover the ISCOF
because of its separate and distinct corporate personality. It is also stressed again that the
prohibition under P.D. 1818 could not apply to the present controversy because the
project was vitiated with irregularities, to wit:
prcd

1. The invitation to bid as published fixed the deadline of submission of prequalification document on December 2, 1988 without indicating any time, yet
after 10:00 o'clock of the given late, the PBAC already refused to accept
petitioners' documents.
2. The time and date of bidding was published as December 12, 1988 at 3:00
p.m. yet it was held at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
3. Private respondents, for the purpose of inviting bidders to participate, issued a
mimeographed "Invitation to Bid" form, which by law (P.D. 1594 and
Implementing Rules, Exh. B-1) is to contain the particulars of the project
subject of bidding for the purpose of.
(i) enabling bidders to make an intelligent and accurate bids;
(ii) for PBAC to have a uniform basis for evaluating the bids;

(iii) to prevent collusion between a bidder and the PBAC, by

opening to all the particulars of a project.

Additionally, the Invitation to Bid prepared by the respondents and the Itemized Bill of
Quantities therein were left blank. 5 And although the project in question was a
"Construction," the private respondents used an Invitation to Bid form for "Materials." 6
The petitioners also point out that the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction had
not yet become moot and academic because even if the bids had been opened before the
restraining order was issued, the project itself had not yet been awarded. The ISCOF
president was not an indispensable party because the signing of the award was merely a
ministerial function which he could perform only upon the recommendation of the Award
Committee. At any rate, the complaint had already been duly amended to include him as
a party defendant.
In their Comment, the private respondents maintain that since the members of the board
of trustees of the ISCOF are all government officials under Section 7 of P.D. 1523 and
since the operations and maintenance of the ISCOF are provided for in the General
Appropriations Law, it is should be considered a government institution whose
infrastructure project is covered by P.D. 1818.
Regarding the schedule for pre-qualification, the private respondents insist that PBAC
posted on the ISCOF bulletin board an announcement that the deadline for the
submission of pre-qualifications documents was at 10 o'clock of December 2, 1988, and
the opening of bids would be held at 1 o'clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. As
of ten o'clock in the morning of December 2, 1988, B.E. construction and Best Built
construction had filed only their letters of intent. At two o'clock in the afternoon, B.E.,
and Best Built filed through their common representative, Nenette Garuello, their prequalification documents which were admitted but stamped "submitted late." The
petitioners were informed of their disqualification on the same date, and the
disqualification became final on December 6, 1988. Having failed to take immediate
action to compel PBAC to pre-qualify them despite their notice of disqualification, they
cannot now come to this Court to question the binding proper in which they had not
participated.
In the petitioners' Reply, they raise as an additional irregularity the violation of the rule
that where the estimate project cost is from P1M to P5M, the issuance of plans,
specifications and proposal book forms should made thirty days before the date of
bidding. 7 They point out that these forms were issued only on December 2, 1988, and
not at the latest on November 12, 1988, the beginning of the 30-day period prior to the
scheduled bidding.

In their Rejoinder, the private respondents aver that the documents of B.E. and Best Built
were received although filed late and were reviewed by the Award Committee, which
discovered that the contractors had expired licenses. B.E.'s temporary certificate of
Renewal of Contractor's License was valid only until September 30, 1988, while Best
Built's license was valid only up to June 30, 1988.
llcd

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties in light of their testimonial and
documentary evidence and the applicable laws and jurisprudence. It finds for the
petitioners.
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a
special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First,
it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a
priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation.
Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines also be the ex-officio Treasurer
of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on
Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the
National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president
of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an
additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National
Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state
college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law. 8

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in
the said decree.
In the case of Datiles and Co. vs. Sucaldito, 9 this Court interpreted a similar prohibition
contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared
that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts
against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters would
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla
made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving
questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
We see no reason why the above ruling should not apply to P.D. 1818.
There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the
bidding and the award of the project.
LLjur

First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then
changed these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants.
Under the Rules Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing policies and guidelines for
government infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders with the
Notice of Pre-qualification and other relevant information regarding the proposed work.
Prospective contractors shall be required to file their ARC-Contractors Confidential
Application for Registration & Classifications & the PRE-C2 Confidential Prequalification Statement for the Project (prior to the amendment of the rules, this was
referred to as PRE-C1) not later than the deadline set in the published Invitation to Bid,
after which date no PRE-C2 shall be submitted and received. Invitations to Bid shall be
advertised for at least three times within a reasonable period but in no case less than two
weeks in at least two newspapers of general circulations. 10
PBAC advertised the pre-qualification deadline as December 2, 1988, without stating the
hour thereof, and announced that the opening of bids would be at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon of December 12, 1988. This schedule was changed and a notice of such change
was merely posted at the ISCOF bulletin board. The notice advanced the cut-off time for
the submission of pre-qualification documents to 10 o'clock in the morning of December
2, 1988, and the opening of bids to 1 o'clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988.
The new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of the petitioners as recorded in the
minutes of the PBAC meeting held on December 6, 1988. While it may be true that there
were fourteen contractors who were pre-qualified despite the change in schedule, this fact
did not cure the defect of the irregular notice. Notably, the petitioners were disqualified

because they failed to meet the new deadline and not because of their expired licenses.
***
We have held that where the law requires a previous advertisement before government
contracts can be awarded, non-compliance with the requirement will, as a general rule,
render the same void and of no effect. 11 The facts that an invitation for bids has been
communicated to a number of possible bidders is not necessarily sufficient to establish
compliance with the requirements of the law if it is shown that other public bidders have
not been similarly notified. 12
Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications
and proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if
the estimate project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these
forms were issued only on December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding
scheduled for December 12, 1988. At the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on
November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding.
It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the
administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is
non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance.
The purpose of the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to
prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of
the public. This purpose was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC.
LLpr

It has been held that the three principles in public bidding are the offer to the public, an
opportunity for competition and a basis for exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the
matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the
system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption. 13
In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the pre-qualification
requirement and the bidding that caused the elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best
Built. It was not because of their expired licenses, as private respondents now claim.
Moreover, the plans and specifications which are the contractors' guide to an intelligent
bid, were not issued on time, thus defeating the guaranty that contractors be placed on
equal footing when they submit their bids. The purpose of competitive bidding is negated
if some contractors are informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and specifications that
are to be the subject of their bids.
P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by
administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged
restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of
preliminary injunction should not have been denied. We note from Annex Q of the
private respondent's memorandum, however, that the subject project has already been

"100% completed as to the Engineering Standard." This fait accompli has made the
petition for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and academic.
We come now to the liabilities of the private respondents.
It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive
bidding required by law is void, and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from
it. 14 It has not been shown that the irregularities committed by PBAC were induced by
or participated in by any of the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the
private respondents for the prejudice sustained by the petitioners as a result of the
anomalies described above.
As there is no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the petitioners, compensatory
damage may not be awarded to them. Moral damages do not appear to be due either.
Even so, the Court cannot close its eyes to the evident bad faith that characterized the
conduct of the private respondents, including the irregularities in the announcement of
the bidding and their efforts to persuade the ISCOF president to award the project after
two days from receipt of the restraining order and before they moved to lift such order.
For such questionable acts, they are liable in nominal damages at least in accordance with
Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which states:
"Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant may be
vindicated or, recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.

These damages are to assessed against the private respondents in the amount of
P10,000.00 each, to be paid separately for each of petitioners B.E. Construction and Best
Built Construction. The other petitioner, Occea Builders, is not entitled to relief because
it admittedly submitted its pre-qualification documents on December 5, 1988, or three
days after the deadline.
Cdpr

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a) upholding the restraining order dated

December 12, 1988, as not covered by the prohibition in P.D. 1818; b) ordering the
chairman and the members of the PBAC board of trustees, namely Manuel R. Penachos,
Jr., Alfredo Matangga, Enrico Ticar, and Teresita Villanueva, to each pay separately to
petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro nominal damages P10,000.00 each;
and c) removing the said chairman and members from the PBAC board of trustees, or
whoever among them is still incumbent therein, for their malfeasance in office. Costs
against PBAC.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Office of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
|||

(Malaga v. Penachos, Jr., G.R. No. 86695, September 03, 1992)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 57883. March 12, 1982.]
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the
City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y.
VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA,
MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO,
and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners, vs. MANUEL
ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUITCO, Chairman,
Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice,
respondents.
Fidela Vargas, Leonardo S. Gonzales and Raul Gonzales for petitioners.
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for
respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other Purposes," the
same being contrary to the security of tenure provision of the Constitution as it separates
from the judiciary Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act. They likewise
impute lack of good faith in its enactment and characterize as undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. The Solicitor General maintains that there is
no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of the statute, it being a
legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the
judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the
independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law.
After an intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case, the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 not having been shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in answer to a
pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the judiciary; that the attendant
abolition of the inferior courts which shall cause their incumbents to cease from
holding office does not impair the independence of the judiciary and the security of

tenure guarantee as incumbent justices and judges with good performance and clean
records can be named anew in legal contemplation without interruption in the
continuity of their service; that the provision granting the President authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges survives the test of undue
delegation of legislative power, a standard having been clearly adopted therefor; that
the reorganization provided by the challenged Act will be carried out in accordance
with the President's constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, and the judiciary's commitment to guard constitutional rights.
The petition was dismissed. Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee dissented in
a separate opinion; Justices Felix V. Makasiar and Venicio Escolin concurred with the
main opinion; Justice Hermogenes Concepcion concurred in the result; Justices
Antonio P. Barredo, Ramon C. Aquino, Ramon C. Fernandez, Juvenal K Guerrero,
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera and Vicente G. Ericta concurred in separate opinions;
Justices Vicente Abad-Santos and Efren I. Plana submitted separate concurring and
dissenting opinions.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; PARTIES; CAPACITY TO
SUE; PETITIONERS' LEGAL STANDING DEMONSTRATED. The argument as to
the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de Ia Llana is
concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937). Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."
The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered
as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to
this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, L-40004,
Jan. 31, 1975; "Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at
most what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This
is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma at an inhibition to parties intent on
keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by
Jaffe: `The protection of private right is an essential constituent of public interest and,
conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights.
Private and public interests are, both in a substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the
totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their
capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT
OF 1980; ENACTMENT THEREOF IN ANSWER TO A PRESSING AND URGENT
NEED; GOOD FAITH OBSERVED IN ITS ENACTMENT. The enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 would firstly, result in the attainment "of more efficiency in the

disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the
courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets.
Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of
jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court
system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the
foreseeable future." It may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the
proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its
discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as
exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With
such a background, it become quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation
that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the
affixing of the Presidential signature.
cdasia

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTING ABOLITION OF COURTS IN GOOD FAITH, WITH

DUE RECOGNITION OF THE SECURITY OF TENURE GUARANTEE; VALIDITY
OF ABOLITION OF AN OFFICE, SETTLED RULE. Nothing is better settled in our
law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done
in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v.
Primicias, Jr., L-28573, June 13, 1968, reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point
urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from
the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a
legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition
of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. . . . And, of course, if the
abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The
preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the
rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent
is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." The
above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. vs. Provincial Governor, L28614, Jan. 17, 1974, two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it.
As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the Judiciary.
The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously
present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this
petition becomes even more apparent.
4. ID.; ID; ID.; ENACTMENT THEREOF MAINTAINS UNIMPAIRED
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY; TERMINATION BY VIRTUE OF
THE ABOLITION OF THE OFFICE DOES NOT IMPAIR SECURITY OF
TENURE; SUPREME COURT TO BE CONSULTED IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY.
Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing Inferior Courts collides with the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section
7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision the 1935 Constitution. It did not,

however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise

administratively inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is empowered "to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal. "Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary
Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to
be, distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of 'Inferior Courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the
Judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view
be accorded, the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a
failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory
opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court
could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even
then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to
whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested
ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the Inferior Courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged
Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily
discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle
that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any
unconstitutional taint must be applied.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO FIX THE COMPENSATION

AND ALLOWANCES OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES NOT AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; EXISTENCE OF A STANDARD TO
AVOID THE TAINT OF UNDUE DELEGATION CLEAR. Petitioners would
characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of
authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to

have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite
clear. The questioned provision reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation and allowances as may be
authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No.
93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1597." (Chapter IV, Sec. 41 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) The existence of a standard is
thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the
legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and
repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions
when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, "To avoid the
taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repeal. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried
out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be
either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO AMBIGUITY EXISTS IN THE EXECUTION OF THE
REORGANIZATION LAW. Another objection based on the absence in the statute of
what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit.
They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit
to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this Act, a
staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of
the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." (Sec. 43, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) The first sentence of the next
Section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried
out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President." (Sec. 44, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129) Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is
insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. In
the meanwhile, the existing Inferior Courts affected continue functioning as before, "until
the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President.
Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. "There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of
the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be
entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean
record justify their being named anew, in legal contemplation without any interruption in
the continuity of their service. It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of

lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come
the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the
appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their
standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will
characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation
of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should
not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle
that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against using common sense
in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." (Cf, Roschen v. Ward, 279 US
337, 339 [1929])
LLjur

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL JUSTICES IN THE PREPARATION

OF AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION NOT OBJECTIONABLE;
SUPREME COURT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH JUDICIAL REFORM. On the
morning of the hearing of the petition, petitioners sought to disqualify the Chief Justice
and Associate Justices Ramon Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera because the first
named was the Chairman and the other two, members of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. The motion was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of
the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged
legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. Their work was
limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for
reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. Ever since 1973, this
Tribunal has had administrative supervision over inferior courts. It has had the
opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may
be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, either the then Chairman or members
of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines consulted members of
the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to
cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the Twentieth
century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform.
A variety of conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and
foremost among them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to
facilitate reform." Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct
involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial
federalism arise, at the state level as well." (Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evan
Hughes, 1975 Supreme Court Review 123)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OBSERVED. It is
a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does
through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers.
Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution
does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." (Art.

XIII, Sec. I) That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may
vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions
and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security
of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added
guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of
reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be
inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free
from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which
they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal
right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation was
thus subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and
circumspection, it allows the erosion of that ideal so firmly embedded in the national
consciousness.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE PRESERVED DESPITE THE
REORGANIZATION OF INFERIOR COURTS. At emphasized by former Chief
Justice Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 57 O.G. 147(1955) "there is no surer
guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those
appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during
good behaviour, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one
administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the
independence of the Judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or any empty ideal. Our
judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the
power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised to reorganize
inferior courts."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY THEREOF WILL NOT
RESULT IN DELETERIOUS CONSEQUENCES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE. There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the
administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition In good faith of the existing
inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation
of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence
its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that
less than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing power vested in the
Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient Judiciary is something to
the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental
principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments
are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill the
hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. Justice Malcolm in
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 57 Phil. 600 (1932) said: "Just as
the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its

own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the

Organic Act." To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court
remains committed.

BARREDO, J ., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT
OF 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129); JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION NOT
CONTRARY TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY PRINCIPLE. It
being conceded that the power to create or establish carries with it the power to abolish,
and it is a legal axiom, or at least a pragmatic reality, that the tenure of the holder of an
office must of necessity end when his office no longer exists, We have no alternative than
to hold that petitioners' invocation of the independence-of-the-judiciary principle of the
Constitution is unavailing in the cases at bar. To insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is
doing is just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the
present judicial structure or system, assuming a close scrutiny might somehow support
such a conclusion, is pure wishful thinking, it being explicitly and unequivocally
provided in the Section in question that said courts "are deemed abolished" and further,
as if to make it most unmistakably emphatic, that "incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
office." Dura lex, sed lex.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION, AN URGENT NEED; TWO-FOLD
OBJECTIVES OF THE LAW ALIGNED WITH THE FOUNDATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THe JUDICIARY. Judicial reorganization
becomes urgent and inevitable not alone because of structural inadequacies of the system
or of the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in
force, but also when it becomes evident that a good number of those occupying positions
in the judiciary, make a mockery of justice and take advantage of their office for selfish
personal ends and yet, those in authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation
under existing laws and rules. It is my personal assessment of the present situation in our
judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-pronged, for the most ideal
judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the
interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character,
competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute
impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations of graft and corruption, including the
usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the powers that be. I
am certain that Filipino people feel happy that Batas Pambansa 129 encompasses both of
these objectives which indeed are aligned with the foundation of the principle of
independence of the judiciary.
LLphil

3. ID.; CONSTITUTION; CHARTER TIMELESS EXCEPT FOR ADOPTION OF

MEASURES DURING VERY UNUSUAL INSTANCES; INTEGRITY OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAW UNDIMINISHED THEREBY. The Constitution is not just a
cluster of high sounding verbiages spelling purely idealism and nobility in the recognition
of human dignity, protection of individual liberties and providing security and promotion
of the general welfare under a government of laws. The fundamental law of the land is a
living instrument which translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining
circumstances. It is written for all seasons, except for very unusual instances that human
ratiocination cannot justify to be contemplated by its language even if read in its broadest
sense and in the most liberal way. Verily, it is paramount and supreme in peace and in
war, but even in peace grave critical situations arise demanding recourse to extraordinary
solutions. Paraphrasing the Spanish adage, "Grandes males, grandes remedios," such
inordinary problems justify exceptional remedies. And so, history records that in the face
of grave crises and emergencies, the most constitutionally idealistic countries have, at one
time or another, under the pressure of pragmatic considerations, adopted corresponding
realistic measures, which perilously tether along the periphery of their Charters, to the
extent of creating impressions, of course erroneous, that the same had been transgressed,
although in truth their integrity and imperiousness remained undiminished and
unimpaired.
4. ID.; JUDICIARY; JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION; Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE
OBJECTS IT SEEKS TO PURSUE. If indeed there could be some doubt as to the
correctness of this Court's judgment that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional,
particularly its Sec. 44, I am convinced that the critical situation of our judiciary today
calls for solutions that may not in the eyes of some conform strictly with the letter of the
Constitution but indubitably justified by its spirit and intent. The Charter is not just a
construction of words to whose literal ironclad meanings we must feel hidebound,
without regard to every Constitution's desirable inherent nature of adjustability and
adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and fundamental intent and
objectives of the framers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such adaptation
that comes handy for the attainment of the transcendental objectives it seeks to pursue.
While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out some justices and judges before
the end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative
investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light of the prevailing
conditions, is constitutionally permissible.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; Batas Pambansa 129 DOES NOT RENDER MEANINGLESS THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY; ABOLITION OF EXISTING COURTS
ALLOWED BY THE CONSTITUTION. Notwithstanding this decision, the
independence of the judiciary in the Philippines is far from being insubstantial, much less
meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely opened our eyes to how,
despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so construed as to make it possible

for those in authority to answer the clamor of the people for an upright judiciary and
overcome constitutional roadblocks more apparent than real.
LibLex

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES TO THE BENCH WILL BE

CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. By this decision, the Court has in factual effect albeit
not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the Batasang Pambansa, and more
specifically to the President, its own constitutionally conferred power of removal of
judges. Section 44 of the Batasan Act declares that all of them shall be deemed to have
ceased to hold office, leaving it to the President to appoint those whom he may see fit to
occupy the new courts. Thus, those who will not be appointed can be considered as
"ceasing to hold their respective offices," or, as others would say they would be in fact
removed. How the President will make his choice is beyond Our power to control. But
even if some may be eased out even without being duly informed of the reason therefor,
much less being given the opportunity to be heard, the past actuations of the President on
all matters of deep public interest should serve as sufficient assurance that when he
ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn oath "to do justice to every man,"
hence, he will equip himself first with the fullest reliable information before he acts.
AQUINO, J ., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF
AND PROHIBITION NOT THE PROPER REMEDY TO TEST THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW; NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY IN CASE
AT BAR. The petition should have been dismissed outright because this Court has no
jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the
constitutionality of the law. The petition is premature. No jurisdictional question is
involved. There is no justiciable controversy wherein the constitutionality of the law is in
issue. It is presumed to be constitutional. The lawmaking body before enacting it looked
into the constitutional angle.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTIES; PETITIONERS WITHOUT PERSONALITY TO ASSAIL
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW.
Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail
the constitutionality of the law even as taxpayers. The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la
Llana, a city judge, has no cause of action for prohibition. He is not being removed from
his position.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION; Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129; ENACTMENT THEREOF IN GOOD FAITH. The Judiciary
Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good faith and not "to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose." In enacting the said law, the lawmaking body acted
within the scope of its constitutional powers and prerogatives.

GUERRERO, J ., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT
OF 1980; OBJECTIVES. The institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the law
are clearly conducive to the promotion of national interests. The objectives of the
legislation, namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by the creation of an Intermediate
Appellate Court, thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (b) A re-apportionment of
jurisdiction geared towards greater efficiency; (c) A simplification of procedures; and (d)
The abolition of the inferior courts created by the Judiciary Act of 1948 and other
statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines are undoubtedly intended to
improve the regime of justice and thereby enhance public good and order. Indeed, the
purpose of the Act as further stated in the Explanatory Note, which is "to embody
reforms in the structure, organization and composition of the Judiciary, with the aim of
improving the administration of justice, of decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with
the more complex problems on the present and foreseeable future" cannot but "promote
the welfare of society, since that is the final cause of law." (Cardozo, the Nature of the
Judicial Process, p. 66)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAW CONSTITUTIONAL FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GENERAL

UTILITY AND FUNCTIONAL VALUE. From the standpoint of the general utility
and functional value of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, there should be no difficulty,
doubt or disbelief in its legality and constitutionality. That there are ills and evils
plaguing the judicial system is undeniable. The notorious and scandalous congestion of
court dockets is too well-known to be ignored as are the causes which create and produce
such anomaly. Evident is the need to look for devices and measures that are more
practical, workable and economical.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENACTMENT THEREOF PRESUMED REGULAR AND DONE IN
GOOD FAITH. In the light of the known evils and infirmities of the judicial system, it
would be absurd and unreasonable to claim that the legislators did not act upon them in
good faith and honesty of purpose and with legitimate ends. It is presumed that official
duty has been regularly performed. The presumption of regularity is not confined to the
acts of the individual officers but also applies to the acts of boards, such as administrative
board or bodies, and to acts of legislative bodies. Good faith is always to be presumed in
the absence of proof to the contrary, of which there is none in the case at bar. It could not
be otherwise if We are to accord as We must, full faith and credit to the lawmakers' deep
sense of public service and the judicious exercise of their high office as the duly-elected
representatives of the people.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTANT ABOLITION OF COURTS; SUPREME COURT

CANNOT INQUIRE INTO THE WISDOM OF THE LAW. In Morfe vs. Mutuc, L20387, Jan. 31, 1968, the Supreme Court held: "It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That
is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern. The Courts are not supposed to
override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." Chief
Justice Fernando who penned the Morfe decision writes in The Constitution of the
Philippines that while "(i)t is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not
the wisdom of action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid," he adds that
it is "useful to recall what was so clearly stated by Laurel that 'the Judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.'" In any case, petitioners have not shown an iota of proof
of bad faith. There is no factual foundation of bad faith on record. I do not consider the
statement in the sponsorship speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of Minister of Justice
Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a more efficient vehicle of "eliminating
incompetent and unfit Judges" as indicative of impermissible legislative motive.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECURITY OF TENURE; NATURE AND CONCEPT OF A PUBLIC
OFFICE. The Justices and judges directly affected by the law, being lawyers, should
know or are expected to know the nature and concept of a public office. It is created for
the purpose of effecting the ends for which government has been instituted, which are for
the common good, and not the profit, honor or private interest of any one man, family or
class of men. In our form of government, it is fundamental that public offices are public
trust, and that the person to be appointed should be selected solely with a view to the
public welfare. In the last analysis, a public office is a privilege in the gift of the State.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO VESTED INTEREST EXISTS IN AN OFFICE;
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT TERMINATES WITH THE ABOLITION OF THE
COURT. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even
an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an
office or its salary. When an office is created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished
by the legislature, but when created by the State under the authority of the Constitution, it
may be abolished by statute and the incumbent deprived of his office. Acceptance of a
judicial appointment must be deemed as adherence to the rule that "when the court is
abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge of such a court takes office
with that encumbrance and knowledge. The Judge's right to his full term and his full
salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the contingency that
the legislature may for the public good, in ordaining and establishing the courts, from
time to time consider his office unnecessary and abolish it.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMOVAL AND RE-APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES UNDER THE

JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT, A PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND
PREROGATIVE. The removal from office of an incumbent is merely incidental to the
valid act of abolition of the office as demanded by the superior and paramount interest of
the people. The bad and the crooked judges must be removed. The good and the straight,
sober judges should be reappointed but that is the sole power and prerogative of the
President who, I am certain, will act according to the best interest of the nation and in
accordance with his solemn oath of office "to preserve and defend its Constitution,
execute its laws, do justice to everyone." There and then the proper balance between the
desire to preserve private interest and the desideratum of promoting the public good shall
have been struck.
cdtai

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

THE LAW TO BE ADOPTED. The Supreme Court has been called the conscience of
the Constitution. It may be the last bulwark of constitutional government. It must,
however, be remembered "that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as courts." (Missouri, K. & T. Co. vs.
May, 194 U.S. 267, 270) The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the
courts alone but on the legislatures as well. It adheres, therefore, to the well-settled
principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of
a statute" for which reason it will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution
"except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera [1937], 65 Phil. 56).
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE FUNCTIONAL UTILITY OF
THE LAW SUFFICIENT TO UPHOLD ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY. I view the
controversy presented as a conflict of opinions on judicial independence, whether
impaired or strengthened by the law; on reorganization of the courts, whether abolition of
office or removal therefrom; and on delegation of legislative power, whether authorized
or unauthorized. Without detracting from the merits, the force and brilliance of their
advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to stand on the social
justification and the functional utility of the law to uphold its constitutionality. In the
light of contemporaneous events from which the New Republic emerged and evolved
new ideals of national growth and development, particularly in law and government, a
kind or form of judicial activism, perhaps similar to it, is necessary to justify as the ratio
decidendi of Our judgment.
DE CASTRO, J ., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; CREATION AND ORGANIZATION OF
COURTS, A CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE LEGISLATURE. A
creation and organization of courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the
power to reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish them to give way to new or

substantially different ones. To contend otherwise would be to forget a basic doctrine of

constitutional law that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.
dctai

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO CREATE STATUTORY COURTS INCLUDES THE

POWER TO ABOLISH THEM; JUDICIAL SECURITY OF TENURE NOT A LEGAL
IMPEDIMENT TO THE EXERCISE THEREOF. The power to create courts and
organize them is necessarily the primary authority from which would thereafter arise the
security of tenure of those appointed to perform the functions of said courts. In the
natural order of things, therefore, since the occasion to speak of security of tenure of
judges arises only after the courts have first been brought into being, the right to security
of tenure takes a secondary position to the basic and primary power of creating the courts
to provide for a fair and strong judicial system. If the legislature, in the exercise of its
authority, deems it wise and urgent to provide for a new set of courts, and in doing so, it
feels the abolition of the old courts would conduce more to its objective of improving the
judiciary and raising its standard, the matter involved is one of policy and wisdom into
which the courts, not even the Supreme Court, cannot inquire, much less interfere with.
By this secondary position it has to the primary power of the legislature to create courts,
the security of tenure given to the incumbents should not be a legal impediment to the
exercise of that basic power of creating the statutory courts which, by necessary
implication, includes the power to abolish them in order to create new ones. This primary
legislative power is a continuing one, and the resultant right of security of tenure of those
appointed to said courts could not bring about the exhaustion of that power.
Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its own laws, and that power can never be
exhausted without, as a consequence, violating a fundamental precept of constitutional
and representative government that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980; AN EFFECTIVE AND
EFFICIENT SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE MORE IMPORTANT
THAN THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF JUDGES. The passage of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 is no more than the exercise of the power vested by the
Constitution on the legislative body of the Republic. That power carries with it the duty
and responsibility of providing the people with the most effective and efficient system of
administration of justice. This is by far of more imperative and transcendental importance
than the security of tenure of judges which, admittedly, is one of the factors that would
conduce to independence of the judiciary but first of all, a good, efficient and effective
judiciary. A judiciary wanting in these basic qualities does not deserve the independence
that is meant only for a judiciary that can serve best the interest and welfare of the people
which is the most primordial and paramount consideration, not a judiciary in which the
people's faith has been eroded, a condition which the security of tenure, in some
instances, may even be contributory.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF SECURITY OF TENURE

JUSTIFIED BY THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. When two interests conflict
as what had given rise to the present controversy the duty of the legislature to provide
society with a fair, efficient and effective judicial system, on one hand, and the right of
judges to security of tenure, on the other, the latter must of necessity yield to the former.
One involves public welfare and interest more directly and on a greater magnitude than
the right of security of tenure of the judges which is, as is easily discernible, more of a
personal benefit to just a few, as only the judge affected could seek judicial redress of
what he conceives to be its violation. Herein lies the propriety of the exercise of "police
power" of the State, if this concept which underlies even the Constitution, has to be
invoked as a constitutional justification of the passage of the Act in question. That is, if a
conflict between the primary power of the legislature to create courts, and mere
consequential benefit accorded to judges and justices after the creation of the courts is
indeed perceivable, which the writer falls to see, or, at least, would disappear upon a
reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting interests which, from the above
disquisition, is not hard to find. It is, without doubt, in the essence of the exercise of
police power that a right assessable by individuals may be infringed in the greater interest
of the public good and general welfare. This is demonstrated in how the rights and
freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights enjoyable by the entire people, not just be a
handful in comparison, are made subject to the lawful exercise of the police power of the
State.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTANT ABOLITION OF COURTS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO
UNLAWFUL REMOVAL OF JUDGES. The provision of Article XVII, Section 10 of
the Constitution gives to judicial officials no more than a guarantee that their retirement
age as fixed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at mere legislative pleasure. The
equivalent provision in the 1935 Constitution was inserted for the first time because the
retirement age before then was provided merely by statute not by the Constitution. If it
comes to their removal or suspension, what gives them constitutional protection is the
aforequoted provision which does not contemplate abolition of office when done in good
faith, for removal implies the existence of the office, not when it is abolished. As has
been held, abolition of office for no reason related to public welfare or for the good of the
service, let alone when done in bad faith, amounts to an unlawful removal. The abolition
of the courts as declared in the Act as a result of a reorganization of the judiciary, as the
title of the law curtly but impressively announces, can by no means, from any viewpoint,
be so branded. And whether by said reorganization, the present courts would be deemed
abolished, as the law expresses such an unmistakable intent, the matter is one for the sole
and exclusive determination of the legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion whether
by the nature and extent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider
them abolished. To give the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature
of the changes as to their structure, distribution and jurisdiction, before the clear intent to
abolish them, or to declare them so abolished, is given effect, would be to allow undue
interference in the function of legislation. This would be contrary to the primary duty of

courts precisely to give effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the law or as may
be discovered therefrom.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE ABOLITION OF COURTS NOT
PROPER. The abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which no
judicial inquiry is proper, except perhaps if that intent is so palpably tainted with
constitutional repugnancy, which is not so in the instant case. We have, therefore, no
occasion to speak of removal of judges when the reorganization of the judiciary would
result in the abolition of the courts other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Tax
Appeals. Hence, the provision of the Constitution giving to the Supreme Court power to
dismiss a judge by a vote of eight justices does not come into the vortex of the instant
controversy. Its possible violation by the assalied statute cannot happen, and may,
therefore, not constitute an argument against the constitutionality of the law.
cda

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARBITRARINESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW

SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REDRESS. Only in the implementation of the law may
there possibly be a taint of constitutional repugnancy, as when a judge of acknowledged
honesty, industry and competence is separated, because an act of arbitrariness would
thereby be committed, but the abolition of the courts as declared by the law it not by itself
or per se unconstitutional. Consequently, the law, the result of serious and concerned
study by a highly competent committee, deserves to be given a chance to prove its worth
in the way of improving the judiciary. If in its implementation any one, if at all, feels
aggrieved, he can always seek judicial redress, if he can make out a case of violation of
his right of security of tenure with uncontrovestible clarity, as when the separation is very
arbitrary in the peculiar circumstances of his case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any
constitution, is unpardonable.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; DISMISSAL OF A
PREMATURE PETITION. The petition should be dismissed for being premature. It
asks this Court to exercise its power of judicial inquiry, the power to declare a law
unconstitutional when it conflicts with the fundamental law (People vs. Vera, 63 Phil.
36). This power has well-defmed limits, for it can be exercised only when the following
requisites are present, to wit: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) He should do so at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) The determination of the constitutionality of the statute must
be necessary to a final determination of the case. The petition does not present as actual
controversy nor was it filed by the proper parties.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS WITHOUT LEGAL PERSONALITY TO
QUESTION
THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF
THE
JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION LAW. The main ground for which the constitutionality of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is assailed is that it is violative of the security of
tenure of justices and judges. The only persons who could raise the question of

constitutionality of the law, therefore, are the actual incumbents of the courts who would
be separated from the service upon the abolition of the courts affected by the law, on the
theory as advanced by petitioners that their judicial security of tenure would be violated.
Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, the only judge among the petitioners, has not been
separated from the service. Nor is his separation already a certainty, for he may be
appointed to the court equivalent to his present court, or even promoted to a higher court.
Only when it has become certain that his tenure has been terminated will an actual
controversy arise on his allegation of a fact that has become actual, not merely probable
or hypothetical. The present petition may neither be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A
taxpayer may bring an action to raise the question of constitutionality of a statute only
when no one else can more appropriately bring the suit to defend a right exclusively
belonging to him, and, therefore, would localize the actual injury to his person, and to no
other. For a "proper" party to invoke the power of judicial inquiry, as one of the requisites
in the exercise of such power, does not mean one having no better right, one more
personalized, than what he has as a member of the public in general. With the incumbent
judges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners' theory, who would suffer direct and
actual injury, they should exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to suffer as "direct"
and "actual" an injury as the judges and justices by the enforcement of the assailed
statute, from the right to bring the suit.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW OF 1980 NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It would not be proper to declare the law void at this stage,
before it has even been given a chance to prove its worth, as the legislature itself and all
those who helped by their exhaustive and scholarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity,
and before any of the proper parties who could assail its constitutionality would know for
a fact, certain and actual, not merely probable or hypothetical, that they have a right
violated by what they could possibly contend to be unconstitutional enforcement of the
law, not by a law that is unconstitutional unto itself. The writer is for giving the law a
chance to be put into application so as not to douse great popular expectations for the
count to regain their highest level of efficiency and reputation for probity. Inevitably, this
is to be so since only when the law is fully implemented will all the courts affected be
declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an interregnum when the country is without any
court, except the Supreme Court, the Court of Tax Appeals and the Sandigan. Only then
will it be known whether an actual controversy would arise because any of the
incumbents have been left out in the restructured judiciary.
cdphil

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.;

INTERPRETATION THAT UPHOLDS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW SHOULD PREVAIL. A law should, by all
reasonable intendment and feasible means, be saved from the doom of
unconstitutionality, the rule corollary thereto being that if a law is susceptible to two
interpretations, one of which would make it constitutional, that interpretation should be
adopted that will not kill the law.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ADEQUATE REMEDY IN LAW AVAILABLE TO THOSE
WHO MAY BE INJURED THEREBY. While in the implementation of the law,
constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a categorical ruling hereon not
being necessary or desirable at the moment, the law itself is definitely not
unconstitutional. Any of the incumbent judges who feel injured after the law shall have
been implemented has adequate remedy in law, with full relief as would be proper. But
surely, the benefits envisioned by the law in the discharge of one of the basic duties of
government to the people the administration of justice should not be sacrificed, as
it would be, if the law is, as sought in the present petition, declared void right now, on the
claim of a few of being allegedly denied a right, at best of doubtful character, for the
claim would seem to rest on an unsupportable theory that they have a vested right to a
public office.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 NOT SELF-EXECUTORY;
REORGANIZATION LAW DISTINGUISHED FROM Republic Act 1186. The law
in question is not self-executing in the sense that upon its effectivity, certain judges and
justices cease to be so by direct action of the law. This is what distinguishes the Act in
question from R.A. No. 1186 involved in the case of Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 50
O.G. 147 which by its direct action, no act of implementation being necessary, all the
judges whose positions were abolished, automatically ceased as such. The Act in
question, therefore, is not as exposed to the same vulnerability to constitutional attack as
R.A. No. 1186 was. Yet by the operation of the Constitution with its wise provision on
how a law may be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. 1186 stood the test for it to be
enforced to the fullness of its intent, which was, as in the law under consideration,
identified with public interest and general welfare, through a more efficient and effective
judicial system as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 seeks to establish.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF
IMPROVING THE JUDICIARY TIlE PREVAILING FACTOR IN UPHOLDING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW. The question before this Court is a simple
matter of choosing between protecting some judges from possible separation, as the
implementation of the law to achieve its primary purpose of improving the judiciary may
have to result in, or serving the interest of the entire society through an honest, efficient
and effective judiciary. For, it is unthinkable that what is for the good of the people as a
whole could have been meant by the Constitution to be sacrificed for the sake of only a
few. The greatest good for the greatest number is an unwritten rule, more firm and
enduring than any of the postulates spread in our written Constitution.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW

OF 1980; LEGISLATIVE POWER TO ABOLISH COURTS CO-EXTENSIVE WITH
THE POWER TO CREATE THEM. It is a fundamental proposition that the
legislative power to create courts ordinarily includes the power to organize and to
reorganize them, and that the power to abolish courts is generally co-extensive with the
power to create them. The power to abolish was not intended to be qualified by the
permanence of tenure. (Opinion of Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary
of Justice, 51 O.G. 147 [1955], citing McCulley vs. State, 53 SW 134 Halsey vs. Gaines,
2 Lea 316). The right of Judges to hold office during good behavior until they reach the
age of 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not
deprive Congress of its power to abolish, organize or reorganize inferior courts. (Brillo
vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735, citing Zandueta vs. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur.,
Pub. Officer, 904-5). Judges of those courts take office with that encumbrance and
knowledge.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TENURE OF JUDGES AND TENURE OF COURTS
DISTINGUISHED. Section 1, Article X refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental
department of Government, Section 7 of the same Article refers to the tenure of office of
"individual" Judges (inclusive of Justices of inferior Courts); that is to say, tenure of
office is a matter concerning the individual Judge. This "individuality" character of
Section 7 is supported by the clause that the Supreme Court has the power to discipline
individual judges of inferior courts.
3. ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO REORGANIZE
COURTS NOT HAMPERED BY THE SECURITY OF TENURE GUARANTEE;
JUDGES ARE ENTAILED TO THEIR COURTS BUT COURTS ARE NOT
ENTAILED TO THEIR JUDGES. A legislature is not bound to give security of
tenure to courts. Courts can be abolished. In fact, the entire judicial system can be
changed. If that system can no longer admit of change, woe to the wheels of progress and
the imperatives of growth in the development of the Judiciary. To hold that tenure of
judges is superior to the legislative power to reorganize is to render impotent the exercise
of that power. Under Section 7, Article X, Judges are entailed to their count, from which
they cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action for bad
behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their judges, because the power of
the legislative to establish inferior court presupposes the power to abolish those courts. If
an inferior court is abolished, the judge presiding that court will necessarily have to lose
his position because the abolished court is not entailed to him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF TENURE OF JUDGES
APPLIES ONLY AS THEIR COURTS EXIST. The constitutional guarantee of tenure
of Judges applies only as their Courts exist. As long as those Courts exist, the Judges
cannot be ousted without just cause; that is the client of the constitutional provision
relative to security of tenure of Judges. Upon declaration of the completion of the

reorganization as provided for in the Reorganization Act, the affected Courts "shall be
deemed automatically abolished." There being no Courts, there are no offices for which
tenure of Judges may be claimed. By the abolition of those offices, the rights to them are
necessarily extinguished (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 [(1954)].
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 AN ANSWER TO AN URGENT PUBLIC
NEED; GOOD FAITH IN THE ENACTMENT THEREOF PRESUMED. The
challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in response to an urgent and
pressing public need and not for the purpose of affecting adversely the security of tenure
of all Judges or legislating them out to the detriment of judicial independence. It should
not be said of the Batasang Pambansa that its power of abolition of Courts has been used
to disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to defeat the security of tenure of Judges.
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 sufficiently complies with the bona fide rule in
the abolition of public office. Besides, every presumption of good faith in its actuations
must be accorded a coordinate and co-equal branch of government, supreme within the
limits of its own sphere, until that presumption is clearly overcome. There is no showing
that the Reorganization Act was motivated for personal or political reasons as to justify
the interference by the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 109 Mass. 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127 A.S.R.
468; State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pat. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo,
16 5CRA 599 [[1966]). Public interest and public good, as the legislative body views it,
must be balanced with tenure of Judges, which is an individual right. Reverting to Section
1 and Section 7 of Article X, the former is the weightier, because the "Judiciary" is of
more importance to the welfare of the country than the tenure of office of an individual
Judge. If a Judge is removed without cause, there can be damage to the public welfare to
some extent, but maintenance of a Court that does not meet the requirement of
progressive Government, can cause incalculable prejudice to the people.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM DOES NOT
CONFLICT WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO DISCIPLINE JUDGES.
Where the legislature has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to discipline
cannot post an obstacle to the abolition. The power to discipline can come into play only
when there is removal from an existing judicial office, but not when that office is
abolished. The reorganization of the judicial system with the abolition of certain courts is
not an exercise of the power to discipline the Judges of the abolished courts.
prLL

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABOLITION OF COURTS NOT A DEPRIVATION OF DUE

PROCESS OF LAW. The abolition would be no deprivation either of due process of
law. A public office cannot be regarded as the "property" of the incumbent. A pubily
office is not a contract (Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [[1925]). A public office is a
public trust (Section 1, Article XIII, 1973 Constitution). It is a privilege in the gift of the
State (Brown vs. Russel, 166 Mast. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA 253 cited also in Taada &
Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 537). The officers are the servants of
the people and not their rulers (22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin, Administrative Law,

Law on Public officers and Election Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing
that there is no removal from office but abolition of the office itself.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ENACTED IN THE PURSUIT OF
DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS WITHIN THE JUDICIARY. The questioned statute is
in keeping with major reforms in other departments of government. "The thrust is on
development." It is "the first major reorganization after four generations." It does not
provide for a piecemeal change, which could be ineffective. It goes to the roots and does
not just scratch the surface of our judicial system. Its main objectives are an improved
administration of justice, the "attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not send to the proper
meting out of justice." These aims are policy matters of necessity in the pursuit of
developmental goals within the judiciary.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; INNOVATIVE FEATURES CONTAINED IN THE

REORGANIZATION LAW. There are innovative features in the Act that commend
themselves: (a) the confusing and illogical areas of concurrent jurisdiction between trial
Courts have been entirely eliminated; (b) Under Section 39, there is a uniform period for
appeal of fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from; a record on appeal is no longer required to take an
appeal. The entire original record is now to be transasitted; (c) Under Section 40, in
deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference of findings of fact and conclusions of law
as set forth in the decision, order, or resolution of decisions in appealed cases; (d) Section
42 provides for a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for
Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous,
efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary, Provided that, in no case shall
the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added,
exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. Thus, Justices and Judges who may
not reach the top, where unfortunately there is not enough room for all, may have the
satisfaction of at least approximating the salary scale of those above him depending on
his length of service.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; SAFEGUARDS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW. While the law itself as written is constitutional,
the manner in which it will be administered should not be tainted with unconstitutionality
(Myles Salt Co. vs. Board of Commrs., 239 US 478, 60 L. Ed. 392, 36 Sct 204). To
obviate the possibility of an unconstitutional exercise of power the following safeguards
are recommended and/or expected to be undertaken: (a) the President can be expected to
indicate a reasonable time frame for the completion of the reorganization provided for in
the Act and the issuance of the corresponding implementing order; (b) appointments and
their effectivity should be simultaneous with, or as close as possible, to the declaration by

the President of the completion of the reorganization under Section 44 to avoid any
detriment to the smooth and continuous functioning of the judicial machinery; and (c) the
services of those not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as recommended by the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; STAFFING PATTERN; NAMES OF JUDGES TO BE EXCLUDED
THEREFROM; EXECUTIVE CHOICE TO BE RESPECTED. Justice Herrera
disagrees with the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the staffing pattern be made
to include the names of Judges. The staffing pattern for Judges it already clearly and
explicitly provided in the law itself which enumerates the various Judges and Justices in
their hierarchical order. Furthermore, to include she superior positions of Judges would
depart from the traditional concept of a staffing pattern, which refers more to personnel
organization and corresponding salaries of inferior employees. It is also constitutionally
objectionable in that it would interfere with the prerogative of appointment intrinsically
executive in nature (Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 [1966]; Government of the
Philippines vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The President may not be deprived of, nor
be limited in, the full use of his discretion in the appointment of persons to any public
office. Nothing should so trench upon executive choice as to be, in effect, judicial
designation.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW APPOINTMENTS TO STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIAL
SYSTEM. Reliance can be placed on the good faith of the President that all the
deserving, upon considerations of "efficiency, integrity, length of service and other
relevant factors," shall be appointed to a strengthened and revitalized judicial system in
the interest of public service; that appointments will not be unduly delayed, and that
appointees will be evaluated thoroughly to ensure quality and impartiality in the men and
women who will keep vigil over our judicial ramparts.
cdasia

ERICTA, J ., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW;
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO CREATE COURTS INCLUDES THE POWER TO
ABOLISH THE SAME. The constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power
to create courts inferior to the Supreme Court (Article X, Section 1). All existing inferior
courts were created by law. No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office includes
the power to abolish the same. (Urgelio vs. Osmea, 9 SCRA 317; Maca vs. Ochave, 20
SCRA 142)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND ABOLITION OF OFFICE,
DISTINGUISHED. Security of tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal of
a public officer or employee but an abolition of his office. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94
Phil. 903; Cruz vs. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998; Baldoz vs. Office of the President, 78
SCRA 334, 362). A distinction should be made between removal from office and

abolition of an office. Removal implies that the office subsists after ouster, while, in
abolition, the office no longer exists thereby terminating the right of the incumbent to
exercise the rights and duties of the office. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTANT ABOLITION OF COURTS PASSES THE TEST OF
GOOD FAITH. The power of the legislative branch of the government to abolish
courts inferior to the Supreme Court has long been established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary of
Justice, 31 O.G. 147) What is only needed is that the abolition passes the test of good
faith. It need only be shown that said abolition of the courts is merely incidental to a bona
fide reorganization. (Urgelio vs. Osmea, 9 SCRA 317)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC WELFARE TO PREVAIL OVER THE INDIVIDUAL
INTEREST OF JUDGES. In the implementation of the law, some Judges and Justices
may be adversely affected. But in a conflict between public interest and the individual
interest of some Judges and Justices, the public weal must prevail. The welfare of the
people is the supreme law.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENTS TO THE NEW COURTS, A PRESIDENTIAL
PREROGATIVE. The implementation of the law will entail appointments to the new
courts. The power of appointment is the exclusive prerogative of the President. The
implementation of the law should be left exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and
statesmanship of the President.
ABAD SANTOS, J ., concurring and dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW
OF 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129); LAW NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. I agree
with the learned Chief Justice of the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not
unconstitutional.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE LAW. It has already been ruled that the statute does not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity because the abolition of certain judicial offices was done in good
faith. This being the case, I believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise its
constitutional power to fill the newly created judicial positions without any obligation to
consult with this Court and to accord its views the fullest consideration. To require
consultation will constitute an invasion of executive territory which can be resented and
even repelled. The implicit suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional
implementation of the questioned legislation is not congruent with the basic conclusion
that it is not unconstitutional.
PLANA, J ., concurring and dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW; POWER TO

CREATE COURTS INCLUDES THE POWER TO ABOLISH OR REPLACE THEM;
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ENACTED IN GOOD FAITH. As the lawmaking body has
the power to create inferior courts and define, prescribe and apportion their jurisdiction,
so it has the power to abolish or replace them with other courts at long as the act is done
in good faith and not for the purpose of attaining an unconstitutional end. Good faith has
thus become the crucial issue in the case at bar.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESIDENT NOT OBLIGED TO CONSULT WITH THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW. The President is under no
obligation to consult with the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not
called upon to give legal advice to the President. Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself has
said, it cannot give advisory opinions (Bacolod-Murcia Planters' Assoc., Inc. vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., 30 SCRA 67; NWSA vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 90
SCRA 629) even to the President.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FIXING OF COMPENSATION AND ALLOWANCES FOR
MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNDUE
DELEGATION UNTO THE PRESIDENT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; PRINCIPLE
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER THE 1973 Constitution. Under the Old
Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation of legislative and executive powers,
there was good reason to maintain the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.
Otherwise, the principle of separation of governmental powers could be negated via
unbridled delegation of legislative power. The 1973 Constitution has however radically
changed the constitutional set-up. There is now a commingling or fusion of executive and
legislative powers in the hands of the same group of officials. Cabinet members play a
leading role in the legislative process, and members of the Batasan actively discharge
executive functions. The Prime Minister indeed must come from its ranks. Under the
circumstances, there is really not much sense in rigidly insisting on the principle of nondelegation of legislative power, at least vis-a-vis the Executive Department. In a very real
sense, the present Constitution has significantly eroded the hoary doctrine of nondelegation of legislative power, although it has retained some provisions of the old
Constitution which were predicated on the principle of non-delegation, this time perhaps
not so much to authorize shifting of power and thereby correspondingly reduce the
incidence of "undue" delegation of legislative power, as to avert the abdication thereof.

TEEHANKEE, J ., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW
OF 1980 (BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.129); RESULTANT ABOLITION OF COURTS;
EXPRESS GUARANTY OF SECURITY OF TENURE OVERRIDES THE IMPLIED

AUTHORITY OF REMOVING JUDGES BY LEGISLATION. The reasoning that

the express guaranty of tenure protecting incumbent judges during good behaviour unless
removed from office after hearing and due process or upon reaching the compulsory
retirement age of seventy years must override the implied authority of removing by
legislation the judges has been further strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the new
provisions of the 1973 Constitution that transferred the administrative supervision over
all courts and their personnel from the Chief Executive through the then Secretary of
Justice to the Supreme Court (Art. X, Sec. 6, 1973 Constitution) and vested in the
Supreme Court exclusively the power to discipline judges of inferior courts, and, by a
vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal, which power was formerly lodged
by the Judiciary Act in the Chief Executive.
cdasia

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; 1973 Constitution RULES OUT OUSTER OF JUDGES BY
LEGISLATION BY VESTING IN THE SUPREME COURT THE POWER TO
REMOVE AND DISCIPLINE JUDGES. If the framers of the 1973 Constitution
wished to dispel the strong doubts against the removal of incumbent judges through
legislative action by abolition of their courts, then they would have so clearly provided
for such form of removal in the 1973 Constitution, but on the contrary as already stated
they ruled out such removal or ouster of judges by legislative action by vesting
exclusively in the Supreme Court the power of discipline and removal of judges of all
inferior courts.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REORGANIZATION ACT DOES NOT CHANGE THE BASIC
STRUCTURE OF EXISTING COURTS. The questioned Act effects certain changes
and procedural reforms with more specific delineation of jurisdiction but they do not
change the basic structure of the existing courts. The present Municipal Courts,
Municipal Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and redesignated as Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the
challenged Act. The Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Courts and Courts of Agrarian Relations are all restructured and
redesigned to be known by the common name of Regional Trial Courts with provision for
certain branches thereof "to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic
relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases and/or such other special cases as
the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration
of justice" (Sec. 23, B.P. Blg. 129) and the Court of Appeals is restructured and
redesignated as the Intermediate Appellate Court with an increase in the number of
Appellate Justices from the present 43 to 30 but with a reduction of the number of
divisions from 13 (composed of 3 Justices each) to 10 (composed of 3 members each)
such that it is feared that there is created a bottleneck at the appellate level in the
important task discharged by such appellate courts as reviewers of facts.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "NEWCOURTS" SUBSTANTIALLY THE "OLD COURTS"
WITH ONLY A CHANGE OF NAME. Justice Teehankee views that the candid

admission by the Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court "that he entertained doubts as
to whether the intermediate court of appeals provided for is a new tribunal" is equally
applicable to all the other mentioned courts provided for in the challenged Act as "new
courts." And the best proof of this is the plain and simple transitory provision in Section
44 thereof that upon the President's declaration of completion of the reorganization
(whereby the "old courts" shall "be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold office"), "(T)he cases pending in the old Courts shall be
transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the
pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel," together
with the "applicable appropriations." This could not have been possible without a
specification and enumeration of what specific cases of the "old courts " would be
transferred to the particular "new courts," had these "new courts" not been manifestly and
substantially the "old courts" with a change of name or as described by Justice
Barredo to have been his first view, now discarded, in his separate opinion; "just a
renaming, and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the present
judicial structure or system" or "a rearrangement or remodelling of the old structure."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABOLITION OF COURTS AND CONSEQUENT OUSTER OF
INCUMBENT JUDGES FROM OFFICE; GUARANTY OF TENURE OF JUDGES
ESSENTIAL FOR A FREE AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY; REORGANIZATION
SHOULD ALLOW THE INCUMBENTS TO REMAIN IN OFFICE UNLESS
REMOVED FOR CAUSE. The good faith in the enactment of the challenged Act
must need be granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power to abolish courts
as implied from the power to establish them with the express constitutional guaranty of
tenure of the judges which is essential for a free and independent judiciary. Adherents of
the Rule of Law are agreed that indispensable for the maintenance of the Rule of Law is
free and independent judiciary, sworn to protect and enforce it without fear or favor
"free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even from the
tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the political powers that be," to quote
again from Justice Barredo's separate opinion. Hence, my adherence to the 7-member
majority opinion of former Chief Justice Bengzon in the case of Ocampo vs. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. L-1790, Jan. 18, 1933, as restated by the Philippine Association of Law
Professors headed by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion that "any reorganization
should at least allow the incumbents of the existing courts to remain in office (the
appropriate counterpart "new courts') unless they are removed for cause."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE EXTENDS TO THE ENTIRE
COURT SYSTEM; VIEWS OF AMICI CURIAE THEREON. Former U.P. Law Dean
Irene Cortes in her memorandum as amicus curiae stated "for the judiciary whose
independence is not only eroded but is in grave danger of being completely destroyed,
judicial independence is not a guarantee intended for the Supreme Court alone, it extends
to the entire court system and is even more vital to the courts at the lowest levels because
there are more of them and they operate closest to the people," and "particularly under the

present form of modified parliamentary government with legislative and executive

functions overlapping and in certain areas merging, the judiciary is left to perform the
checking function in the performance of which its independence assumes an even more
vital importance." The extensive memoranda filed by Dean Cortes and other amici curiae
such as former Senator Jose W. Diokno who strongly urges the Court to strike down the
Act "to prevent further destruction of judicial independence," former Senator Lorenzo
Sumulong, President of the Philippine Constitution Association who advocates for the
Court's adoption of the Bengzon majority opinion in the Ocampo case so as to abide by
"the elementary rule in the interpretation of constitutions that effect should be given to all
parts of the Constitution" and that the judges' security of tenure guaranty should not be
"rendered meaningless and inoperative" former Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
president of the Philippine Lawyers' Association who submits that the total abolition of
all courts below the Supreme Court (except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals) and the removal of the incumbent Justices and Judges violates the independence
of the judiciary, their security of tenure and right to due process guaranteed them by the
Constitution" and Atty. Raul M. Gonzales, president of the National Bar Association of
the Philippines who invokes the Declaration of Delhi at the ICJ Conference in 1939, that
"The principles of unremovability of the Judiciary and their Security of Tenure until
death or until a retiring age fluted by statute is reached, is an important safeguard of the
Rule of Law" have greatly helped in fortifying my views.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSITORY PROVISIONS OF THE 1973 Constitution
RENDERED NUGATORY JUDGES' SECURITY OF TENURE; RESTORATION OF
GUARANTY; AN URGENT NEED FOR A FREE AND INDEPENDENT
JUDICIARY. The judges' security of tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory
Provisions of the 1973 Constitution which granted the incumbent President the unlimited
power to remove and replace all judges and officials (as against the limited one-year
period for the exercise of such power granted President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution
upon establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth). Upon the declaration of martial
law in September, 1972, justices and judges of all courts, except the Supreme Court, had
been required to hand in their resignation. There is listed a total of 33 judges who were
replaced or whose resignations were accepted by the President during the period from
September, 1972 to April, 1976. The power to replace even the judges appointed after the
effectivity on January 17, 1973 Constitution is yet invoked on behalf of the President in
the pending case of Tapucar vs. Famador, G.R. No. 53467 filed on March 27, 1980
notwithstanding the held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed judges are not
subject to the Replacement Clause of the cited Transitory Provision, . . . . And now
comes this total abolition of 1,663 judicial positions (and thousands of personnel
positions) unprecedented in its sweep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the
judiciary with the restoration of the security of tenure of judges, which is essential for a
free and independent judiciary as mandated by the Constitution, not to make more
enfeebled an already feeble judiciary, possessed neither of the power of the sword nor the
purse, as decried by former Chief Justice Bengzon in his Ocampo majority opinion.
cdasia

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE TO BE PRESERVED

ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE EXISTING STRONG TIES BETWEEN THE
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENTS. In Fortun vs. Labang, 104
SCRA 607 (May 27, 1981), it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the
Supreme Court administrative supervision.over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to
preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to
all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative
branches," with the further observation that "many are the ways by which such
independence could be eroded."
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MOVE TO RID THE JUDICIARY OF INCOMPETENT AND
CORRUPT JUDGES; DUE PROCESS MUST BE OBSERVED IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PURGE. Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum
anticipates the argument that "great ills demand drastic cures" thus; "Drastic, yes but
not unfair nor unconstitutional. One does not improve courts by abolishing them, any
more than a doctor cures a patient by killing him. The ills the judiciary suffers from were
caused by impairing its independence; they will not be cured by totally destroying that
independence. To adopt such a course could only breed more perversity in the
administration of justice, just as the abuses of martial rule have bred more subversion."
Finally, as stated by the 1975 Integrated Bar of the Philippines 2nd House of Delegates,
"It would, indeed, be most ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due process
cannot count it on themselves. Observance of procedural due process in the separation of
misfits from the Judiciary is the right way to attain a laudible objective."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGES TO BE REMOVED ONLY AFTER A
FAIR HEARING. As stressed by the Chief Justice in the Fortun case, judges are
entitled to the cardinal principles of fairness and due process and the opportunity to be
heard and defend themselves against the accusations made against them and not to be
subjected to harassment and humiliation, and the Court will repudiate the "oppressive
exercise of legal authority." More so, are judges entitled to such due process when what
is at stake is their constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure and non-impairment of
the independence of the judiciary and the proper exercise of the constitutional power
exclusively vested in the Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges after fair
hearing.
11. .ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT TO EXERCISE ITS
POWER OF DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSAL OF ALL JUDGES OF INFERIOR
COURTS. Judges of inferior courts should not be summarily removed and branded for
life in such reorganization on the basis of confidential adverse reports as to their
performance, competence or integrity, save those who may voluntarily resign from office
upon being confronted with such reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte
reports, without due process or hearing, has been proven from our past experience where

a number of honest and competent judges were summarily removed while others who
were generally believed to be basket cases have remained in the service. The power of
discipline and dismissal of judges of all inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals down,
has been vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the judiciary is to
be strengthened, it should be left to clean its own house upon complaint and with the
cooperation of the aggrieved parties and after due process and hearing.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCUMBENT JUDGES TO BE RETAINED IN
THE "NEW COURTS". The constitutional confrontation and conflict may well be
avoided by holding that since the changes and provisions of the challenged Act do not
substantially change the nature and functions of the "new courts" therein provided as
compared to the "abolished old court" but provide for procedural changes fixed
delineation of jurisdiction and increases in the number of courts for a more effective and
efficient disposition of court cases, the incumbent judges' guaranteed security of tenure
require that they be retained in the corresponding "new courts."

DECISION

FERNANDO, C .J :
p

This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any
executive or legislative act in an appropriate case, has to resolve the crucial issue of the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial
review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a
conceded legislative power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with
the time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and
safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote
of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates
that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit
courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated
from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a
suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
cdphil

That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for

prohibition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of

the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by
imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly
Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no
valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a
legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the
judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the
Independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. A
Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of
petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15,
in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the
amici curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate
on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of
all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the
exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it
is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as
Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice
Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9
The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered
as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to
this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then
there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider
a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter
of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials
staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of
private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a wellordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests
are, both in a substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.'
Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their
standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal
approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very
decision of People vs. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act
differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however,

would hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham,
with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by
other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and
assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a
bygone era, even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in
the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been
lowered." 11

2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts.
Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its
antecedents. They have laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for
the truth. On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was
organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A,
dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be
submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President
sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all
lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and
Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandiganbayan." 13 On
October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization
has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation
for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what today is a basic and
urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are
problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of
the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and
at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the
administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater
efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means
much more so, the poorest and the humblest can vindicate their rights in an
expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts
operate must be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those
whose interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the
Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point
for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme
Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court
of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court
management as well as training of judges for more efficient administration does not
suffice. Hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial system. It is
worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective

on June 16, 1901." 14 It went on to say: "It does not admit of doubt that the last two
decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater
complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts.
Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal
spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judiciary has
not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist
is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likely to be quite novel. The need for
an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known, has
been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and
satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national progress." 15 After which comes:
"To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly stressed
and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization." Nor, unlike in the past, was it to
be "considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured
in terms of sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP)."
16 For the New Society, its implication goes further than economic advance, extending to
"the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and economic
opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of
modernization and change compels the government to extend its field of activity and its
scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the
poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social
justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively
implemented" 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by
interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if
the question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and
application. . . . There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success
of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in
the execution of the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is
not conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally
of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the
utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme
Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the
late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in
it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has continued." 20
It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the growth of
population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called
upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a
crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to
act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not
hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the
Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed

out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most
thorough after four generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act enacted
in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the
Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935,
originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly." 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two
divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two
divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of
independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was
passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of
Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts,
and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal
Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased. 28
Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a Presiding Justice
and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise
created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of
Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of two
other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts
were established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation,
and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background as above
narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this
proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report
with particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment
of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of
procedures which do not tend to the proper meting out of justice. In consultation with,
and upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was
felt that some options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to
confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate
adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than diminish its
jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference
has been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance
with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred.
Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang
Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship
speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee
on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on
Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the

'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted
substantially in accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options
set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon
consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments
to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government, to which the bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill held
in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished
members of the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and
position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government." 36 The sponsor stressed that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill
would result in the attainment "of more efficiency in the disposal of cases [and] the
improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts" expected to follow from
the dockets being less clogged, with the structural changes introduced in the bill, together
with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, [being]
designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society,
and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 It may be observed that the volume
containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages
were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort
as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14,
1981. With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is
the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears
undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its
inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.

5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The
ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine:
"We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation
of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their
offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that
valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. . . . And, of
course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold
office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As wellsettled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of
its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in
good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v.
Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded
it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the
judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is
conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of
merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice

Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. In this quo warranto

proceeding, petitioner claimed that he, and not respondent, was entitled to the office of
judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Judicial
Reorganization Act of 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth,
amended the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction likewise
called, as was the case before, Courts of First Instance. Prior to such statute, petitioner
was the incumbent of one such court. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment,
this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him,
the Commission on Appointments of the then National Assembly disapproved the same,
with respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act insofar
as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position. This Court did not rule squarely
on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the
separate concurrence in the result of Justice Laurel, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain
terms the standard of good faith as the test of the validity of an act abolishing an inferior
court, and this too with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: "I am
of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other
judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district
comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional.
This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish
courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or
otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article
VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the
case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that Section 9 of the same Article of the
Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied
in these two sections of the same Article of the Constitution must be coordinated and
harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and
controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49
Law. ed., 937)" 44 Justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the
National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the
constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges. But, is this the case?
One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion
of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or
constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of
principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically,
however, that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision
regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of
reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case
of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until
then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the
fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative department and
that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure
of judges or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the

power of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater
necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government
than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine
Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision
providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of
Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be
resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the abovecited opinion of Justice
Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the
Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of
the government, including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of
First Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel
pointed out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical
as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first instance
was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of
an entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional, such conclusion
flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior
to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise
thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute
creates an intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial
courts of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal
trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts.
55 There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were
abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was
the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution.
Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice,
however, was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the
question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Enage 56 this Court, in a
unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa,
ruled: "La segunda cuestion que el recurrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha
abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado
extinguido el derecho de recurrente a acuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspondiente.
McCulley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70
aos de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o
reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established
principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban
City creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace of court. Thus: "Pero
en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el
nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but
that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged statute was not within the
bounds of legislative authority.
cdasia

7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise,
however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all
embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Court of
Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to
misgivings as to its effect on such cherished ideal. The first paragraph of the section on
the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried
out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of
Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as
presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided
in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be
deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office."
60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further
into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a
judiciary free from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words.
The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of
a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former ViceGovernor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the 1934
Constitutional Convention stressed such a concept in his closing address. The 1935
Constitution, he stated, provided for "an Executive power which, subject to the
fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to govern,
but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious
interferences by other departments, by unholy alliances with this and that social group."
61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 The
1981 Amendments embody the same philosophy, this notwithstanding that once again the
principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by actual division."
64 The President, under Article VII, "shall be the head of state and chief executive of the
Republic of the Philippines." 65 Moreover, all the powers he possessed under the 1935
Constitution are vested in him anew "unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise."
66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive power shall
be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973
Constitution created the position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In
addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government to
exercise the executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet. 69 Clearly, a modified
parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this
Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 7 0 could state: "The
adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does
not alter its essentially presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of the position
of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall come

from the regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an
Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than
fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang
Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now
operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and
legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its
full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy
as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in
Fortun v. Labang, 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve
unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all
intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative
branches." 74

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior
courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges
Under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935
Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to
supervise administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is empowered "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary
Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to
be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court
does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to
the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and
tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal

interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would
thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to
those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which
would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. 78
There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and
forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied. Nuez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that
other Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional
objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in
the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the
Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to
preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution.
That is a proposition too plain to be contested. It commends itself for approval." 80 Nor
would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal
Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall
carry out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders, on a province-toprovince basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that
informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section
44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of
constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly
vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish
existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their
occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from
the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of
the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting
within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been wellsettled under the constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever
appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the
previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government, the overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard
to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another
classic utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a
view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous:
"The classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the light of the
political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or of the postulations of

Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more truism

and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as
observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments' not only
because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white' but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate
in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from
Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation
or balancing is well-nigh unavoidable under the fundamental principle of separation of
powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of
governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of
governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted the existence
in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of
them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could
be a case of power against power. That we should avoid.
LLjur

10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would
characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of
authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to
have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite
clear. The questioned provision reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such
compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines
set forth in letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus clear.
The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative
body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them,
the test being the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when enacted.
As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must
be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters
of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by
which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative
office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental
rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the
non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled
out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as
a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative
departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as
their implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There

is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision:
"There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive
agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative
purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early
as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He
warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to muchneeded legislation." 91 Further on this point from the same opinion: "The spectre of the
non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or
legislative chambers." 92 Another objection based on the absence in the statute of what
petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They
ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the
President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing
pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the
implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next Section is even more categorical:
"The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an
Executive Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly, petitioners cannot be heard
to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue
functioning as before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as
declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There
is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease
to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service,
quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in legal
contemplation, without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is equally
reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service,
private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in
certain cases, a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain
incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it
would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the
Executive. There is pertinence of this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance
to the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a
generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could
be done, "there is no canon against using common sense in consuming laws as saying
what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw?

11. In the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought
to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was the Chairman and the other
two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion

was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the
Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They
were not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product
of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work was limited, as set forth in the
Executive Order, to submitting alternative plans for reorganization. That is more in the
nature of scholarly studies. That they undertook. There could be no possible objection to
such activity. Even since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over
inferior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business
is conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the
recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the
Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted members of the
Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite
this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century
the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A
variety of conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost
among them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate
reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct
involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial
federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does
through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers.
Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution
does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That
is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public
official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his
responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure
provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that
justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward
consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their
knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting
influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is
impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus
viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation was thus subjected to
the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it
allows the erosion of that ideal so firmly embedded in the national consciousness. There
is this further thought to consider. Independence in thought and action necessarily is
rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo
v. Secretary of Justice, 105 "there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the
God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be
guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as
allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes

of one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than
a myth or an empty ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke,
regardless or in spite of the power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein
exercised to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest
Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just
blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was
pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo
v. Mariano. 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm identified good judges with "men who
have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with
law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside
influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system
equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government." 108 There is no
reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be
attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow
that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan
and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary
unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the
trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the
exercise of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well
and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes,
and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue
the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in
the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice
Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision
promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic
postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been
shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
cdasia

Makasiar and Escolin, JJ ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J ., concurs in the result, the abolition being in good faith.
Fernandez, J ., concurs provided that in the task of implementation by the Executive as
far as the present Justices and judges who may be separated from their service, it would
be in accordance with the tenets of constitutionalism if this Court be consulted and that
its view be respected.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J ., concurring:
I join the majority of my brethren in voting that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is not unconstitutional as a whole nor in any of its part.
The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 of
the Act which reads as follows:
"SEC. 44. Transitory provisions. The provisions of this Act shall be
immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by
the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit
Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of
Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue
to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the
reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such
declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. The cases pending in the old
Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this
Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the
necessary personnel.
"The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate
courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary
from the funds for organizational changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
80. Said funding shall thereafter be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act."

It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that
"upon the declaration (by the President that the reorganization contemplated in the Act
has been completed), the said courts (meaning, the Court of Appeals and all other lower
courts, except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) shall be deemed
abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office" trenches on all the
constitutional safeguards and guarantees of the independence of the judiciary, such as the
security of tenure of its members (Section 7, Article X of the Philippine Constitution of
1973), the prerogative of the Supreme Court to administratively supervise all courts and
the personnel thereof (Section 6, Id.) and principally, the power of the Supreme Court "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their
dismissal." (Section 7, Id.)
On the other hand, respondents maintain that thru the above-quoted Section 44, the
Batasan did nothing more than to exercise the authority conferred upon it by Section 1 of
the same Article of the Constitution which provides that "(T)he Judicial power shall be

vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law."
In other words, since all inferior courts are, constitutionally speaking, mere creatures of
the law (of the legislature), it follows that it is within the legislature's power to abolish or
reorganize them even if in so doing, it might result in the cessation from office of the
incumbents thereof before the expiration of their respective constitutionally-fixed tenures.
Respondents emphasize that the legislative power in this respect is broad and indeed
plenary.

Viewing the problem before Us from the above perspectives, it would appear that our
task is either (1) to reconcile, on the one hand, the parliament's power of abolition and
reorganization with, on the other, the security of tenure of members of the judiciary and
the Supreme Court's authority to discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare that either
the power of the Supreme Court or of the Batasan is more paramount than that of the
other. I believe, however, that such a manner of looking at the issue that confronts Us
only confuses and compounds the task We are called upon to perform. For how can there
be a satisfactory and rational reconciliation of the pretended right of a judge to continue
as such, when the position occupied by him no longer exists? To suggest, as some do,
that the solution is for the court he is sitting in not to be deemed abolished or that he
should in some way be allowed to continue to function as judge until his constitutional
tenure expires is obviously impractical, if only because we would then have the absurd
spectacle of a judiciary with old and new courts functioning under distinct set-ups, such
as a district court continuing as such in a region where the other judges are regional
judges or of judges exercising powers not purely judicial which is offensive to the
Constitution. The other suggestion that the incumbent of the abolished court should be
deemed appointed to the corresponding new court is even worse, since it would deprive
the appointing authority, the President, of the power to make his own choices and would,
furthermore, amount to an appointment by legislation, which is a constitutional
anachronism. More on this point later.
cdasia

Inasmuch as pursuant to the analysis of the majority of the Members of this Court, in fact
and in law, the structure of judicial system created by Batas Pambansa 129 is
substantially different from that under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, hence the
courts now existing are actually being abolished, why do We have to indulge in any
reconciliation or feel bound to determine whose power, that of the Batasang Pambansa or
that of this Court, should be considered more imperious? It being conceded that the
power to create or establish carries with it the power to abolish, and it is a legal axiom, or
at least a pragmatic reality, that the tenure of the holder of an office must of necessity end
when his office no longer exists, as I see it, We have no alternative than to hold that
petitioners' invocation of the independence-of-the-judiciary principle of the Constitution
is unavailing in the cases at bar. It is as simple as that. I might hasten to add, in this
connection, that to insist that what Batas Pambansa 129 is doing is just a renaming, and

not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the present judicial structure or
system, assuming a close scrutiny might somehow support such a conclusion, is pure
wishful thinking, it being explicitly and unequivocally provided in the section in question
that said courts "are deemed abolished" and further, as if to make it most unmistakably
emphatic, that "the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." Dura lex, sed lex. As a
matter of fact, I cannot conceive of a more emphatic way of manifesting and conveying
the determined legislative intent about it.
Now, why am I yielding to the above reasoning and conclusion? Why don't I insist on
championing the cause of the independence of the judiciary by maintaining that the
constitutional safeguards thereof I have already enumerated earlier must be respected in
any reorganization ordained by the parliament? My answer is simple. Practically all the
Members of the Court concede that what is contemplated is not only general
reorganization but abolition in other words, not only a rearrangement or remodelling
of the old structure but a total demolition thereof to be followed by the building of a new
and different one. I am practically alone in contemplating a different view. True, even if I
should appear as shouting in the wilderness, I would still make myself a hero in the eyes
of many justices and judges, members of the bar and concerned discerning citizens, all
lovers of the judicial independence, but understandably, I should not be, as I am not,
disposed to play such a role virtually at the expense not only of my distinguished
colleagues but of the Batasang Pambansa that framed the law and, most of all, the
President who signed and, therefore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless I am absolutely
sure that my position is formidable, unassailable and beyond all possible contrary
ratiocination, which I am not certain of, as I shall demonstrate anon.
To start with, the jurisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the question now before Us
cannot be said to be clear and consistent, much less unshakable and indubitably definite
either way. None of the local cases 1 relied upon and discussed by the parties and by the
Members of the Court during the deliberations, such as Borromeo, 2 Ocampo, 3
Zandueta, 4 Brillo, 5 etc. can, to my mind, really serve as reliable pole stars that could
lead me to certainty of correctness.
Of course, my instinct and passion for an independent judiciary are uncompromising and
beyond diminution. Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly known, about Batas Pambansa
129 explaining academically its apparent tendency to invade the areas of authority of the
Supreme Court, not to speak of its dangerously impairing the independence of the
judiciary, must have, I imagine, created the impression that I would vote to declare the
law unconstitutional. But, during the deliberations of the Court, the combined wisdom of
my learned colleagues was something I could not discount or just brush aside. Pondering
and thinking deeper about all relevant factors, I have come to the conviction that at least
on this day and hour there are justifiable grounds to uphold the Act, if only to try how it
will operate so that thereby the people may see that We are one with the President and the

Batasan in taking what appear to be immediate steps needed to relieve the people from a
fast spreading cancer in the judiciary of our country.
Besides, the Philippines has somehow not yet returned to complete normalcy. The
improved national discipline, so evident during the earlier days of martial law, has
declined at a quite discernible degree. Different sectors of society are demanding urgent
reforms in their respective fields. And about the most vehement and persistent, loud and
clear, among their gripes, which as a matter of fact is common to all of them, is that about
the deterioration in the quality of performance of the judges manning our courts and the
slow and dragging pace of pending judicial proceedings. Strictly speaking, this is, to be
sure, something that may not necessarily be related to lack of independence of the
judiciary. It has more to do with the ineptness and/or corruption among and corruptibility
of the men sitting in the courts in some parts of the country. And what is worse, while in
the communities concerned, the malady is known to factually exist and is actually graver
and widespread, very few, if any, individuals or even associations and organized groups,
truly incensed and anxious to be of help, have the courage and possess the requisite legal
evidence to come out and file the corresponding charges with the Supreme Court. And I
am not yet referring to similar situations that are not quite openly known but nevertheless
just as deleterious. On the other hand, if all these intolerable instances should actually be
formally brought to the Supreme Court, it would be humanly impossible for the Court to
dispose of them with desirable dispatch, what with the thousands of other cases it has to
attend to and the rather cumbersome strict requirements of procedural due process it has
to observe in each and every such administrative case, all of which are time consuming.
Verily, under the foregoing circumstances, it may be said that there is justification for the
patience of the people about the possibility of early eradication of this disease or evil in
our judiciary pictured above to be nearing the breaking point.
Withal, we must bear in mind that judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitable
not alone because of structural inadequacies of the system or of the cumbersomeness and
technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force, but also when it becomes
evident that a good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary, make a
mockery of justice and take advantage of their office for selfish personal ends and yet, as
already explained, those in authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under
existing laws and rules. It is my personal assessment of the present situation in our
judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-pronged, as I have just
indicated, for the most ideal judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules cannot
satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein
possess the character, competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion
to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations of graft and
corruption, including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures
of the powers that be. I am certain that the Filipino people feel happy that Batas
Pambansa 129 encompasses both of these objectives, which indeed are aligned with the
foundation of the principle of independence of the judiciary.
LLphil

The above premises considered, I have decided to tackle our problem from the viewpoint
of the unusual situation in which our judiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless
to say, to all of us, the Members of the Court, the constitutional guarantees of security of
tenure and removal-only-by the Supreme Court, among others, against impairment of the
independence of the judiciary, which is one of the bedrocks and, therefore, of the essence
in any "democracy under a regime of justice, peace, liberty and equality," (Preamble of
the 1973 Constitution), are priceless and should be defended, most of all by the Supreme
Court, with all the wisdom and courage God has individually endowed to each of Us.
Withal, we are all conscious of the fact that those safeguards have never been intended to
place the person of the judge in a singular position of privilege and untouchability, but
rather, that they are essentially part and parcel of what is required of an independent
judiciary where judges can decide cases and do justice to everyone before them ruat
caelum. However, We find Ourselves face to face with a situation in our judiciary which
is of emergency proportions and to insist on rationalizing how those guarantees should be
enforced under such circumstance seem to be difficult, aside from being controversial.
And so, in a real sense, We have to make a choice between adhering to the strictly
legalistic reasoning pursued by petitioners, on the one hand, and the broader and more
practical approach, which as I have said is within the spirit at least of the Constitution.

My concept of the Constitution is that it is not just a cluster of high sounding verbiages
spelling purely idealism and nobility in the recognition of human dignity, protection of
individual liberties and providing security and promotion of the general welfare under a
government of laws. With all emphasis and vehemence, I say that the fundamental law of
the land is a living instrument which translates and adapts itself to the demands of
obtaining circumstances. It is written for all seasons, except for very unusual instances
that human ratiocination cannot justify to be contemplated by its language even if read in
its broadest sense and in the most liberal way. Verily, it is paramount and supreme in
peace and in war, but even in peace grave critical situations arise demanding recourse to
extraordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the Spanish adage, "Grandes males, grandes
remedios," such in ordinary problems justify exceptional remedies. And so, history
records that in the face of grave crises and emergencies, the most constitutionally
idealistic countries have, at one time or another, under the pressure of pragmatic
considerations, adopted corresponding realistic measures, which perilously tether along
the periphery of their Charters, to the extent of creating impressions, of course erroneous,
that the same had been transgressed, although in truth their integrity and imperiousness
remained undiminished and unimpaired.
The Philippines has but recently had its own experience of such constitutional approach.
When martial law was proclaimed here in 1972, there were those who vociferously
shouted not only that the President had acted arbitrarily and without the required factual
bases contemplated in the Commander-in-Chief clause of the 1935 Constitution, but

more, that he had gone beyond the traditional and universally recognized intent of said
clause by utilizing his martial law powers not only to maintain peace and tranquility and
preserve and defend the integrity and security of the state but to establish a New Society.
The critics contended that martial law is only for national security, not for the imposition
of national discipline under a New Society.
Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well for everyone to bear in mind that
in this jurisdiction, this concept of martial law has already been upheld several times by
this Court. I, for one, accepted such a construction because I firmly believe that to impose
martial law for the sole end of suppressing an insurrection or rebellion without
coincidentally taking corresponding measures to eradicate the root causes of the uprising
is utter folly, for the country would still continue to lay open to its recurrence.
I have made the foregoing discourse, for it is fundamentally in the light of this Court's
doctrines about the imposition of martial law as I have stated that I prefer to base this
concurrence. To put it differently, if indeed there could be some doubt as to the
correctness of this Court's judgment that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional,
particularly its Section 44, I am convinced that the critical situation of our judiciary today
calls for solutions that may not in the eyes of some conform strictly with the letter of the
Constitution but indubitably justified by its spirit and intent. As I have earlier indicated,
the Charter is not just a construction, of words to whose literal ironclad meanings we
must feel hidebound, without regard to every Constitution's desirable inherent nature of
adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and fundamental
intent and objectives of the framers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such
adaptation that comes handy for the attainment of the transcendental objectives it seeks to
pursue. While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out some justices and judges
before the end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative
investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light of the prevailing
conditions, is constitutionally permissible.
LLpr

Before closing, it may not be amiss for me to point out that Batas Pambansa 129, aside
from what has been discussed about its effect on the guarantees of judicial independence,
also preempts, in some of its provisions, the primary rule-making power of the Supreme
Court in respect to procedure, practice and evidence. With the pardon of my colleagues, I
would just like to say that the Court should not decry this development too much. After
all, the legislature is expressly empowered by the Charter to do so, (Section 5(5), Article
X of the Constitution of 1973) so much so, that I doubt if the Court has any authority to
alter or modify any rule the Batasang Pambansa enunciates. Truth to tell, as Chairman of
the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, for one reason or another,
principally the lack of a clear consensus as to what some of my colleagues consider very
radical proposals voiced by me or my committee, We have regrettably procrastinated
long enough in making our procedural rules more practical and more conducive to

speedier disposal and termination of controversies by dealing more with substantial

justice.
So also have We, it must be confessed, failed to come up to expectations of the framers
of the Constitution in our ways of disposing of administrative complaints against erring
and misconducting judges. Of course, We can excuse Ourselves with the explanation that
not only are We overloaded with work beyond human capability of its being performed
expeditiously, but that the strict requisites of due process which are time consuming have
precluded Us from being more expeditious and speedy.
I feel I must say all of these, because if the above-discussed circumstances have not
combined to create a very critical situation in our judiciary that is making the people lose
its faith and confidence in the administration of justice by the existing courts, perhaps the
Court could look with more sympathy at the stand of petitioners. I want all and sundry to
know, however, that notwithstanding this decision, the independence of the judiciary in
the Philippines is far from being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas
Pambansa 129 has precisely opened our eyes to how, despite doubts and misgivings, the
Constitution can be so construed as to make it possible for those in authority to answer
the clamor of the people for an upright judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks
more apparent than real.
To those justices, judges, members of the bar and concerned citizens whose eyes may be
dimming with tears of disappointment and disenchantment because of the stand I have
chosen to adopt in these cases, may I try to assuage them by joining their fervent prayers
that some other day, hopefully in the near future, Divine Providence may dictate to
another constitutional convention to write the guarantees of judicial independence with
ink of deeper hue and words that are definite, clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, in
drawing the line of demarcation between the Parliament and the Judiciary in the manner
that in His Infinite wisdom would most promote genuine and impartial justice for our
people, free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even from
the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the political powers that be.
Presently, I am constrained from going along with any other view than that the
Constitution allows abolition of existing courts even if the effect has to be the elimination
of any incumbent judge and the consequent cutting of his constitutional tenure of office.
cdasia

I cannot close this concurrence without referring to the apprehensions in some quarters
about the choice that will ultimately be made of those who will be eased out of the
judiciary in the course of the implementation of Batas Pambansa 129. By this decision,
the Court has in factual effect albeit not in constitutional conception yielded generally to
the Batasang Pambansa, and more specifically to the President, its own constitutionally
conferred power of removal of judges. Section 44 of the Batasan's Act declares that all of
them shall be deemed to have ceased to hold office, leaving it to the President to appoint
those whom he may see fit to occupy the new courts. Thus, those who will not be

appointed can be considered as "ceasing to hold their respective offices," or, as others
would say they would be in fact removed. How the President will make his choices is
beyond Our power to control. But even if some may be eased out even without being
duly informed of the reason therefor, much less being given the opportunity to be heard,
the past actuations of the President on all matters of deep public interest should serve as
sufficient assurance that when he ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn
oath "to do justice to every man," hence, he will equip himself first with the fullest
reliable information before he acts. This is not only my individual faith founded on my
personal acquaintances with the character and sterling qualities of President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. I dare say this is the faith of the nation in a man who has led it successfully
through crises and emergencies, with justice to all, with malice towards none. I am
certain, the President will deal with each and every individual to be affected by this
reorganization with the best light that God will give him every moment he acts in each
individual case as it comes for his decision.
AQUINO, J ., concurring:
I concur in the result. The petitioners filed this petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition "to declare the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg.
129) unconstitutional."
The petition should have been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to
grant declaratory relief and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the
constitutionality of the law. The petition is premature. No jurisdictional question is
involved.

There is no justiciable controversy wherein the constitutionality of the said law is in

issue. It is presumed to be constitutional. The lawmaking body before enacting it looked
into the constitutional angle.
Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail
the constitutionality of the said law even as taxpayers.
The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 filed a petition
for declaratory relief assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called for a
referendum, De la Llana vs. Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), has no cause of action for
prohibition. He is not being removed from his position.
The Judiciary Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good faith and not "to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose." As ably expounded by the Chief Justice, in enacting

the said law, the lawmaking body acted within the scope of its constitutional powers and
prerogatives.
GUERRERO, J ., concurring:
I concur with my distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality
of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. For the record, however, I would like to
state my personal convictions and observations on this case, a veritable landmark case,
for whatever they may be worth.
llcd

The legal basis of the Court's opinion rendered by our esteemed Chief Justice having
been exhaustively discussed and decisively justified by him, a highly-respected expert
and authority on constitutional law, it would be an exercise in duplication to reiterate the
same cases and precedents. I am then constrained to approach the problem quite
differently, not through the classic methods of philosophy, history and tradition, but
following what the well-known jurist, Dean Pound, said that "the most significant
advance in the modern science of law is the change from the analytical to the functional
attitude." 1 And in pursuing this direction, I must also reckon with and rely on the ruling
that "another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to
remedy, and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as
it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body." 2
I have no doubt in my mind that the institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the
law are clearly conducive to the promotion of national interests. The objectives of the
legislation, namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by the creation of an Intermediate
Appellate Court, thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (b) A re-apportionment of
jurisdiction geared towards greater efficiency; (c) a Simplification of procedures; and (d)
The abolition of the inferior courts created by the Judiciary Act of 1948 and other
statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines 3 are undoubtedly intended to
improve the regime of justice and thereby enhance public good and order. Indeed, the
purpose of the Act as further stated in the Explanatory Note, which is "to embody
reforms in the structure, organization and composition of the Judiciary, with the aim of
improving the administration of justice, of decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with
the more complex problems on the present and forseeable future" cannot but "promote
the welfare of society, since that is the final cause of law." 4
Hence, from the standpoint of the general utility and functional value of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, there should be no difficulty, doubt or disbelief in its legality and
constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the judicial system is undeniable.
The notorious and scandalous congestion of court dockets is too well-known to be
ignored as are the causes which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the need to
look for devices and measures that are more practical, workable and economical. 5

From the figures alone (301,497 pending cases in 1976; 351,943 in 1977; 404,686 in
1978; 426,911 in 1979; 441,332 in 1980; and 450,063 as of February 3, 1982) 6 the
congested character of court dockets rising year after year is staggering and enormous,
looming like a legal monster.
But greater than the need to dispense justice speedily and promptly is the necessity to
have Justices and Judges who are fair and impartial, honest and incorruptible, competent
and efficient. The general clamor that the prestige of the Judiciary today has deteriorated
and degenerated to the lowest ebb in public estimation is not without factual basis.
Records in the Supreme Court attest to the unfitness and incompetence, corruption and
immorality of many dispensers of justice. According to the compiled data, the total
number of Justices and Judges against whom administrative charges have been filed for
various offenses, misconduct, venalities and other irregularities reaches 322. Of this total,
8 are Justices of the Court of Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2 Criminal Circuit Court Judges,
8 Car Judges, 1 Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Judge, 38 City Judges, and 146
Municipal Judges.
The Supreme Court had found 102 of them guilty and punished them with either
suspension, admonition, reprimand or fine. The number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFI
Judges, 1 CCC Judge, 3 CAR Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City Judges and 53 Municipal
Judges.
cdasia

Seventeen (17) Judges have been ordered dismissed and separated from the service. And
these are 3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.
Going over these administrative proceedings, it took an average of two-year period from
the filing of the charge to the dismissal of the respondent. In one case, the proceedings
were terminated after seven years. How long the pending administrative cases will be
disposed of, only time will tell as an increasing number of administrative cases are being
filed by victims of judicial misconduct, abuse and arbitrariness.
Excepting those who have been punished and dismissed from the service, there are many
who have been castigated and censured in final judgments of the Supreme Court upon
appeal or review of the decisions, orders and other acts of the respondent courts, Justices
and Judges. To cite a few cases, Our decisions have categorically pronounced
respondents' actuations, thus: "deplorable, giving no credit to the Judiciary" 7 ;
"everything was irregular and violative of all pertinent and applicable rules. The whole
proceedings looked no more than a pre-arranged compromise between the accused and
the judge to flaunt the law and every norm of propriety and procedure" 8 ; "there was a
deliberate failure of respondent Judge to respect what is so clearly provided in the Rules
of Court" 9 ; "It is unfortunate that respondent Judge failed to acquaint himself with, or
misinterpreted, those controlling provisions and doctrines" 10 ; "The failure of the
respondent Municipal Judge to yield obedience to authoritative decisions of the Supreme

Court and of respondent Court of First Instance Judge and his deplorable insistence on
procedural technicalities was called down in L-49828, July 25, 1981. For peremptorily
dismissing the third party complaint on the ground that the motion to dismiss was 'welltaken' and respondent Judge did not elaborate, the Court remarked: "May his tribe
vanish." 11 In one case, We noted "There is here something unusual, but far from
palliating the gravity of the error incurred, it merely exacerbated it. . . . it did render the
due process requirement nugatory, for instead of a fair and impartial trial, there was an
idle form, a useless ceremony." 12
It is dishonorable enough to be publicly and officially rebuked but to allow these Judges
and their ilk to remain and continue to preside in their courtrooms is a disgrace to the
Judiciary. It is to be deplored that the Supreme Court has not found time to exercise its
power and authority in the premises, for no charges or proceedings have been instituted
against them. We have a list of these crooked Judges whose actuations have been found
to be patently wrong and manifestly indefensible. There ought to be no objection or
compunction in weeding them out from the service. If they are not booted out now, it will
take from here to eternity to clean this Augean stable.
Candidly, one reason for writing this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils,
abuses and wrongs which are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and faith of
the people in the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Some members of the Court felt that
these revelations would be like washing dirty linen in public. But these facts are of public
and official records, nay court cases, and sooner or later, Truth will come out.
In the light of these known evils and infirmities of the judicial system, it would be absurd
and unreasonable to claim that the legislators did not act upon them in good faith and
honesty of purpose and with legitimate ends. It is presumed that official duty has been
regularly performed. 13 The presumption of regularity is not confined to the acts of the
individual officers but also applies to the acts of boards, such as administrative board or
bodies. and to acts of legislative bodies. 14 Good faith is always to be presumed in the
absence of proof to the contrary, of which there is none in the case at bar. It could not be
otherwise if We are to accord as We must, full faith and credit to the lawmakers' deep
sense of public service and the judicious exercise of their high office as the duly-elected
representatives of the people.
LLjur

It is conceded that the abolition of an office is legal if attendant with good faith. 15 The
question of good faith then is the crux of the conflict at bar. Good faith in the enactment
of the law does not refer to the wisdom of the measure, the propriety of the Act, or to its
expediency. The questions raised by petitioners and amicus curiae for their cause, viz:
Why abolish all the courts? Why legislate out the judges? Why not amend the Rules of
Court only? Is abolition of all courts the proper remedy to weed out corrupt and misfits in
our Judiciary? may not be inquired into by Us. "It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That

is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." 16 The Courts "are not supposed to
override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." 17 Chief
Justice Fernando who penned the Morfe decision, writes that while "(i)t is thus settled, to
paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only
congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid," 18 he adds that it is "useful to recall what was so clearly
stated by Laurel that 'the Judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.'" 19 in
any case, petitioners have not shown an iota of proof of bad faith. There is no factual
foundation of bad faith on record. And I do not consider the statement in the sponsorship
speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of Minister of Justice Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would
be a more efficient vehicle of "eliminating incompetent and unfit Judges" as indicative of
impermissible legislative motive. 20

It may be true that while the remedy or solution formulated by the legislation will
eradicate hopefully or at least minimize the evils and ills that infect and pester the judicial
body, it will result in the actual removal of the Justices of the Court of Appeals and
Judges of the lower courts. It is also true that whether it is termed abolition of office or
removal from office, the end-result is the same termination of the services of these
incumbents. Indeed, the law may be harsh, but that is the law. Dura lex sed lex.
The Justices and Judges directly affected by the law, being lawyers, should know or are
expected to know the nature and concept of a public office. It is created for the purpose of
effecting the ends for which government has been instituted, which are for the common
good, and not the profit, honor or private interest of any one man, family or class of men.
In our form of government, it is fundamental that public offices are public trust, and that
the person to be appointed should be selected solely with a view to the public welfare. 21
In the last analysis, a public office is a privilege in the gift of the State. 22
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute
right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity
as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its
salary. When an office is created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the
legislature, but when created by the State under the authority of the Constitution, it may
be abolished by statute and the incumbent deprived of his office. 23 Acceptance of a
judicial appointment must be deemed as adherence to the rule that "when the court is
abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge of such a court takes office
with that encumbrance and knowledge." 24 "The Judge's right to his full term and his full
salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the contingency that

the legislature may for the public good, in ordaining and establishing the courts, from
time to time consider his office unnecessary and abolish it." 25
The removal from office of the incumbent then is merely incidental to the valid act of
abolition of the office as demanded by the superior and paramount interest of the people.
The bad and the crooked Judges must be removed. The good and the straight, sober
Judges should be reappointed but that is the sole power and prerogative of the President
who, I am certain, will act according to the best interest of the nation and in accordance
with his solemn oath of office "to preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws,
do justice to everyone . . ." There and then the proper balance between the desire to
preserve private interest and the desideratum of promoting the public good shall have
been struck. 26
The Supreme Court has been called the conscience of the Constitution. It may be the last
bulwark of constitutional government. 27 It must, however, be remembered 'that
legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as courts." 28 The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on
the courts alone but on the legislatures as well. It adheres, therefore, to the well-settled
principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of
a statute" for which reason it will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution
"except in a clear case." 29
Finally, I view the controversy presented to Us as a conflict of opinions on judicial
independence, whether impaired or strengthened by the law; on reorganization of the
courts, whether abolition of office or removal therefrom; and on delegation of legislative
power, whether authorized or unauthorized. Without detracting from the merits, the force
and brilliance of their advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to
stand on the social justification and the functional utility of the law to uphold its
constitutionality. In the light of the contemporaneous events from which the New
Republic emerged and evolved new ideals of national growth and development,
particularly in law and government, a kind or form of judicial activism, perhaps similar to
it, is necessary to justify as the ratio decidendi of Our judgment.
cdasia

This is the time and the moment to perform a constitutional duty to affix my imprimatur
and affirmance to the law, hopefully an act of proper judicial statesmanship.
ABAD SANTOS, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is
not unconstitutional. Unlike Oscar Wilde, I choose not to yield to temptation by
embellishing my concurrence lest I be accused of bringing coal to Newcastle.
Accordingly, I will simply vote to dismiss the petition.

However, I cannot agree with the Chief Justice when he says:

". . . In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its
view be accorded the fullest consideration. There would be no plausibility then
to the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the challenged Act.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle
that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another
which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred."

It has already been ruled that the statute does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity
because the abolition of certain judicial offices was done in good faith. This being the
case, I believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to fill the
newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consult with this Court and to
accord its views the fullest consideration. To require consultation will constitute an
invasion of executive territory which can be resented and even repelled. The implicit
suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional implementation of the questioned
legislation is not congruent with the basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.
DE CASTRO, J ., concurring:
I concur in the declaration that the law is not unconstitutional.
May I, however, submit this separate opinion more to avoid being misunderstood by my
brethren in the judiciary as not feeling for them as much concern as I should for their
security of tenure which is raised as the main argument against the constitutionality of the
law, than by way of giving added force or support to the main opinion so well-written by
Our learned Chief Justice in his usual scholarly fashion. I, therefore, limit myself to a
discussion that the assailed statute is not unconstitutional without having to suggest how
it may be implemented in order that it could stand the most rigid test of constitutionality,
for in that area, what is involved is purely an executive act of the President in whose
wisdom, patriotism and sense of justice We should trust in how he would fulfill his sworn
duties to see that the laws are faithfully executed and to do justice to every man.
Moreover, while I also concur in the dismissal of the petition, I do so on the additional
ground that petitioners have not fulfilled all the requisites for the exercise by this Court of
its power of judicial inquiry the power to declare a law unconstitutional.
I
The creation and organization of courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the
power to reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish them to give way to new or

substantially different ones. To contend otherwise would be to forget a basic doctrine of

constitutional law that no irrepealable laws shall be passed. 1
The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the primary authority from
which would thereafter arise the security of tenure of those appointed to perform the
functions of said courts. In the natural order of things, therefore, since the occasion to
speak of security of tenure of judges arises only after the courts have first been brought
into being, the right to security of tenure takes a secondary position to the basic and
primary power of creating the courts to provide for a fair and strong judicial system. If
the legislature, in the exercise of its authority, deems it wise and urgent to provide for a
new set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition of the old courts would conduce
more to its objective of improving the judiciary and raising its standard, the matter
involved is one of policy and wisdom into which the courts, not even the Supreme Court,
cannot inquire, much less interfere with. By this secondary position it has to the primary
power of the legislature to create courts, the security of tenure given to the incumbents
should not be a legal impediment to the exercise of that basic power of creating the
statutory courts which, by necessary implication, includes the power to abolish them in
order to create new ones. This primary legislative power is a continuing one, and the
resultant right of security of tenure of those appointed to said courts could not bring about
the exhaustion of that power. Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its own laws, and
that power can never be exhausted without, as a consequence, violating a fundamental
precept of constitutional and representative government that no irrepealable laws shall be
passed.
If the creation of courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, therefore, a matter of
legislative intent. It involves the exercise of legislative power, an act of legislation which
generally concerns policy in the formation of which the courts have no say. Initially,
when the legislature creates the courts, it suffers from no limitation arising from the
necessity of respecting the security of tenure of judges who are not yet there. This
inherent character of fullness and plenitude of the power to create and abolish courts does
not change when that same power is once more exercised thereafter, as the need therefor
is felt. Which only goes to show that when done in good faith and motivated solely by the
good and the well-being of the people, the exercise of the power is not meant to be
restricted, curtailed, much less exhausted by the so-called judicial security of tenure.

The passage of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is no more than the exercise of
the power vested by the Constitution on the legislative body of the Republic as described
above. That power carries with it the duty and responsibility of providing the people with
the most effective and efficient system of administration of justice. This is by far of more
imperative and transcendental importance than the security of tenure of judges which,
admittedly, is one of the factors that would conduce to independence of the judiciary

but first of all, a good, efficient and effective judiciary. A judiciary wanting in these basic
qualities does not deserve the independence that is meant only for a judiciary that can
serve best the interest and welfare of the people which in the most primordial and
paramount consideration, not a judiciary in which the people's faith has been eroded, a
condition which the security of tenure, in some instances, may even be contributory.
LLphil

In enacting the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the legislature is presumed to have
been motivated by no other objective than to provide the people the kind of judicial
machinery that would best serve their interest and welfare, in its belief that the present
machinery is falling short of that measure of public service. It should, likewise, be
presumed that it has been led to this low estimate of the utility and effectiveness of the
present set-up of the judiciary after informing itself, with the facilities at its command,
such as the power of legislative investigation, of the actual condition of the courts,
particularly as to whether they continue to enjoy the trust, faith and confidence of the
public, and what the cause or causes are of their erosion, if not loss, as is the keenly
perceptible feeling of the people in general. Responsibility for this more or less extensive
slowdown of the delivery of judicial service can be laid on no other than neither of the
two components of a court the procedural laws or rules that govern the workings of
the courts, or the persons executing or applying them or both.
When two interests conflict as what had given rise to the present controversy the duty
of the legislature to provide society with a fair, efficient and effective judicial system, on
one hand, and the right of judges to security of tenure, on the other, the latter must of
necessity yield to the former. One involves public welfare and interest more directly and
on a greater magnitude than the right of security of tenure of the judges which is, as is
easily discernible, more of a personal benefit to just a few, as indeed only the judge
affected could seek judicial redress of what he conceives to be its violation.
Herein lies the propriety of the exercise of "police power" of the State, if this concept
which underlies even the Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional justification
of the passage of the Act in question. That is, if a conflict between the primary power of
the legislature to create courts, and mere consequential benefit accorded to judges and
justices after the creation of the courts is indeed perceivable, which the writer fails to see,
or, at least, would disappear upon a reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting
interests which, from the above disquisition, is not hard to find. It is, without doubt, in the
essence of the exercise of police power that a right assertable by individuals may be
infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general welfare. This is
demonstrated in how the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights enjoyable
by the entire people, not just by a handful in comparison, are made subject to the lawful
exercise of the police power of the State.
Viewed, therefore, from the abovementioned perspective, the general revamp of the
judiciary involving both its components the court as an office or institution, and the

judges and justices that man them should not find any legal obstacle in the security of
tenure of judges. This security, after all, is no more than as provided for all other officials
and employees in the civil service of the government in Section 3, Article XII-B of the
Constitution which provides:
"No officer or employees in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed
except for cause as provided by law."

The provision of Article XVII, Section 10 of the Constitution gives to judicial officials no
more than a guarantee that their retirement age as fixed in the Constitution shall not be
alterable at mere legislative pleasure. The equivalent provision in the 1935 Constitution
was inserted for the first time because the retirement age before then was provided
merely by statute not by the Constitution. If it comes to their removal or suspension, what
gives them constitutional protection is the aforequoted provision which does not
contemplate abolition of office when done in good faith, for removal implies the
existence of the office, not when it is abolished. Admittedly, as has been held, abolition
of office for no reason related to public welfare or for the good of the service, let alone
when done in bad faith, amounts to an unlawful removal. 2 The abolition of the courts as
declared in the Act as a result of a reorganization of the judiciary, as the Title of the law
curtly but impressively announces, can by no means, from any viewpoint, be so branded.
And whether by said reorganization, the present courts would be deemed abolished, as
the law expresses such an unmistakable intent, the matter is one for the sole and exclusive
determination of the legislature. It rests entirely on its discretion whether by the nature
and extent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to consider them
abolished. To give the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature of the
changes as to their structure, distribution and jurisdiction, before the clear intent to
abolish them, or to declare them so abolished, is given effect, would be to allow undue
interference in the function of legislation. This would be contrary to the primary duty of
courts precisely to give effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the law or as may
be discovered therefrom.
LibLex

From the above observation, it would be futile to insist that the present courts would not
effectively be abolished by the Act in question. It might be to arrogate power for Us to
say that the changes the law brings to the present judicial system, do not suffice for this
Court to give effect to the clear intent of the legislative body. Where would the agrarian
courts, the circuit criminal courts, the JDRC's be in the judicial structure as envisioned by
the law? Are they not abolished by merger with the regional trial courts, which by such
merger, and by the other changes introduced by the law, would make said courts different
from the present Courts of First Instance which, as a consequence, may then be
considered abolished? Integrated as the present courts are supposed to be, changes
somewhere in the judicial machinery would necessarily affect the entire system.

The fact that the Supreme Court may specially assign courts to function as the special
courts just mentioned, does not mean that the changes wrought are only superficial or
"cosmetic" as this term has been used so often in the oral argument. Without the new law,
these courts will remain fixed and permanent where they are at present. Yet in the course
of time, the need for their independent existence may disappear, or that by changed
conditions, where they are needed at present at a certain place, the need for them may be
somewhere else in later years, if maximum benefit at the least expense is to be achieved,
as always should be a most desirable goal and objective of government.
Demonstrably then, the abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which
no judicial inquiry, is proper, except perhaps if that intent is so palpably tainted with
constitutional repugnancy, which is not so in the instant case. We have, therefore, no
occasion, as earlier intimated, to speak of removal of judges when the reorganization of
the judiciary would result in the abolition of the courts other than the Supreme Court and
the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence, the provision of the Constitution giving to the Supreme
Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote of eight justices does not come into the vortex
of the instant controversy. Its possible violation by the assailed statute cannot happen,
and may, therefore, not constitute an argument against the constitutionality of the law.
Former Justice Barrera, in a speech before the Philippine Bar Association, 3 impliedly
indorsed the judicial revamp when he enumerated the qualities of a good judge that the
appointing power should consider in making new appointments to the judiciary upon its
reorganization pursuant to the questioned Act. The words of the eminent jurist may well
reflect the favorable reaction of the public in general to what the Act aims to achieve in
the name of good and clean government. The present judicial incumbents, who have not
in any way, by their acts and behavior while in office, tarnished the good image that the
judiciary should have, therefore, have no cause for apprehension that what they are
entitled to under the Constitution by way of security of tenure will be denied them,
considering the publicly known aim and purpose of the massive judicial revamp,
specially as cherished with deep concern by the President who initiated the move when
he created the Judiciary Reorganization Committee to recommend needed and
appropriate judicial reforms.
If the only obstacle to a verdict in favor of constitutionality of the law is its possible
effect of impairing the security of tenure of the incumbents, We may have the following
facts to consider:
1. Under the 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in office
until replaced or reappointed by the President. As to those judicial officials, no security of
tenure, in the traditional concept, attaches to their incumbency which is, in a real sense,
only a hold-over tenure. How the President has exercised this immense power with
admirable restraint should serve as the strongest guarantee of how justice and fairness
will be his sole guide in implementing the law.

2. As to the rest of the incumbents, they are all appointees of Our present President, and
he should feel concerned more than anyone else to protect whatever rights they may
rightfully claim to maintain their official standing and integrity. They need have no fear
of being ignored for no reason at all, much less for mere spirit of vindictiveness or lack of
nobility of heart.
From the foregoing, it would become apparent that only in the implementation of the law
may there possibly be a taint of constitutional repugnancy, as when a judge of
acknowledged honesty, industry and competence is separated, because an act of
arbitrariness would thereby be committed, but the abolition of the courts as decreed by
the law is not by itself or per se unconstitutional.
Consequently, the law, the result of serious and concerned study by a highly competent
committee, deserves to be given a chance to prove its worth in the way of improving the
judiciary. If in its implementation, any one, if at all, feels aggrieved, he can always seek
judicial redress, if he can make out a case of violation of his right of security of tenure
with uncontrovertible clarity, as when the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar
circumstances of his case, for an act of arbitrariness, under any constitution, is
unpardonable.
II
This petition should also be dismissed for being premature, as is the stand of Justice
Aquino. The petition asks this Court to exercise its power of judicial inquiry, the power
to declare a law unconstitutional when it conflicts with the fundamental law (People vs.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This power has well-defined limits, for it can be exercised only when
the following requisites are present, to wit: (1) There must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
He should do so at the earliest opportunity; and (4) The determination of the
constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a final determination of the case.
I am of the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor was it
filed by the proper parties.
LexLib

The main ground for which the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 is assailed is that it is violative of the security of tenure of justices and judges. The
only persons who could raise the question of constitutionality of the law are, therefore,
the actual incumbents of the courts who would be separated from the service upon the
abolition of the courts affected by the law, on the theory as advanced by petitioners that
their judicial security of tenure would be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana, the
only judge among the petitioners, has not been separated from the service. Nor is his

separation already a certainty, for he may be appointed to the court equivalent to his
present court, or even promoted to a higher court. Only when it has become certain that
his tenure has been terminated will an actual controversy arise on his allegation of a fact
that has become actual, not merely probable or hypothetical.
The present petition may neither be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring an
action to raise the question of constitutionality of a statute only when no one else can
more appropriately bring the suit to defend a right exclusively belonging to him, and,
therefore, would localize the actual injury to his person, and to no other. For a "proper
party" to invoke the power of judicial inquiry, as one of the requisites in the exercise of
such power, does not mean one having no better right, one more personalized, than what
he has as a member of the public in general. With the incumbent judges undoubtedly
being the ones under petitioners' theory, who would suffer direct and actual injury, they
should exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to suffer as "direct" and "actual" an
injury as the judges and justices by the enforcement of the assailed statute, from the right
to bring the suit.
The validity of the foregoing observation becomes more evident when We consider that
only after the fate of the present incumbents is known, whether they have been actually
separated or not, would the present courts be declared abolished. For the law clearly
continues their existence until all the new courts have been filled up with new
appointments, or at least such number as would be equal to the number of actual
incumbents, and they are the very courts to which they may lay claim to the right to
continue therein, so that the status of each and everyone of them has thereby been made
certain. Only then, upon the actual abolition of the courts, may there possibly be a
violation of the security of tenure; as contended, that would give rise to an "actual
controversy" in which the "proper party" can be no other than the judges who feel
aggrieved by their non-appointment to the new courts.
It would, therefore, not be proper to declare the law void at this stage, before it has even
been given a chance to prove its worth, as the legislature itself and all those who helped
by their exhaustive and scholarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity, and before any of
the proper parties who could assail its constitutionality would know for a fact, certain and
actual, not merely probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by what they
could possibly contend to be an unconstitutional enforcement of the law, not by a law that
is unconstitutional unto itself.
I am, therefore, for giving the law a chance to be put into application so as not to douse
great popular expectations for the courts to regain their highest level of efficiency had
reputation for probity. Inevitably, this is to be so since only when the law is fully
implemented will all the courts affected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an
interregnum when the country is without any court, except the Supreme Court, the Court
of Tax Appeals and the Sandigan. Only then will it be known whether an actual

controversy would arise because any of the incumbents have been left out in the
restructured judiciary.
There would then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality of the law,
conformably to the conditions requisite for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry
which by their stringent character, together with the constitutional prescription of a
comparatively higher vote to declare a law unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle of
government that a law should, by all reasonable intendment and feasible means, be saved
from the doom of unconstitutionality, the rule corollary thereto being that if a law is
susceptible to two interpretations, one of which would make it constitutional that
interpretation should be adopted that will not kill the law.
It is to adhere to the above principles that the submission is made herein, that while in the
implementation of the law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a
categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable at the moment, the law itself is
definitely not unconstitutional. 4 Any of the incumbent judges who feel injured after the
law shall have been implemented has adequate remedy in law, with full relief as would be
proper. But surely, the benefits envisioned by the law in the discharge of one of the basic
duties of government to the people the administration of justice should not be
sacrificed, as it would be, if the law is, as sought in the present petition, declared void
right now, on the claim of a few being allegedly denied a right, at best of doubtful
character, for the claim would seem to rest on an unsupportable theory that they have a
vested right to a public office.
Just one more point. The law in question is not self-executing in the sense that upon its
effectivity, certain judges and justices cease to be so by direct action of the law. This is
what distinguishes the Act in question from R.A. No. 1186 involved in the Ocampo case,
5 which by its direct action, no act of implementation being necessary, all the judges
whose positions were abolished, automatically ceased as such. The Act in question,
therefore, is not as exposed to the same vulnerability to constitutional attack as R.A. No.
1186 was. Yet by the operation of the Constitution with its wise provision on how a law
may be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. 1186 stood the test for it to be enforced to the
fullness of its intent, which was, as in the law under consideration, identified with public
interest and general welfare, through a more efficient and effective judicial system as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 seeks to establish.
Hence, the constitutionality of the law should not be assailed, and the law itself, striken
down, on the ground that some judges or justices may be removed or separated in
violation of their security of tenure. The law does not directly operate with that effect. It
is in how the law would be implemented that this feared eventuality may or may not
occur. We would then be killing the law on a mere speculation if We do so at this stage.
This would be an injudicious act done in reckless disregard of the safeguards built around
a law to defend it when its constitutionality is attacked; first, the presumption that a law is

constitutional; second, when a law is susceptible to two interpretations one that would
make it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the former should be adopted; and
third, the Constitution itself which ordains that a law may not be declared
unconstitutional except on the vote of at least ten (10) members of the Supreme Court,
more than what is required for an ordinary decision of the Court en banc. This is not to
mention the stringent requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry as
already adverted to, all designed to save the law from the dire fate of unconstitutionality.
cdphil

To the writer, the question before this Court is a simple matter of choosing between
protecting some judges from possible separation, as the implementation of the law to
achieve its primary purpose of improving the judiciary may have to result in, or serving
the interest of the entire society through an honest, efficient and effective judiciary. For,
it is unthinkable that what is for the good of the people as a whole could have been meant
by the Constitution to be sacrificed for the sake of only a few. The greatest good for the
greatest number is an unwritten rule, more firm and enduring than any of the postulates
spread in our written Constitution. This, I might say, is the main theme of this separate
opinion, otherwise expressed in the well-known and a time-honored maxim: "Salus
populi est suprema lex."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., concurring:
There is unqualified adherence on my part to the dismissal of the Petition filed in this
case. If I am writing this separate concurrence, it is merely to state certain views I
entertain in regards to the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The controversy in this case involves two constitutional provisions. Article X, Section 1,
of the Organic law provides that the legislative has the power to establish inferior Courts
by law. Section 7 of the same Article reads:
"SEC. 7. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall
hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court
shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight Members, order their dismissal."

There should be no conflict between the two provisions. Both should be harmonized.
1. a) It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create Courts ordinarily
includes the power to organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to abolish
Courts is generally coextensive with the power to create them. The power to abolish was
not intended to be qualified by the permanence of tenure (Opinion of Chief Justice

Ricardo Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147 [1955], citing McCulley
vs. State, 53 SW 134; Halsey vs. Gaines, 2 Lea 316). The right of Judges to hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office, does not deprive Congress of its power to abolish,
organize or reorganize inferior Courts (Brillo vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735, citing
Zandueta vs. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub. Officer, 904-5). Judges of those
Courts take office with that encumbrance and knowledge.
"The legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to abolish it.
When the court is abolished any unexpired term is abolished also. The judge of
such court takes office with that encumbrance and knowledge. Perkins v.
Corbin, 45 Ala. 103, 6 Am. Rep. 698, State, ex rel. Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala.
165, 54 So 283, et al."

The importance and the imperative of maintaining the independence of the Judiciary is
undisputed. At the same time, the power of Congress under the Constitution cannot be
abridged. For, in the last analysis, it is not the security of tenure per se that is the only
safeguard to the independence of the Judiciary. It is the character and the mettle of the
Judges who sit on the Bench. Has not the impression been created in the public mind that
there are those who have abused the prerogatives of their judicial position knowing that
they are untouchables by virtue of the permanence of their tenure?
b) A distinction should be made between tenure of Judges and tenure of Courts. Section 1
heretofore mentioned refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental department of
Government. Section 7 quoted above refers to the tenure of office of "individual" Judges
(inclusive of Justices of inferior Courts); that is to say, tenure of office is a matter
concerning the individual Judge. This "individuality" character of Section 7 is supported
by the clause that the Supreme Court has the power to discipline individual judges of
inferior Courts.
A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. In
fact, the entire judicial system can be changed. If that system can no longer admit of
change, woe to the wheels of progress and the imperatives of growth in the development
of the Judiciary. To hold that tenure of Judges is superior to the legislative power to
reorganize is to render impotent the exercise of that power.
It may even be stated that, under Section 7, supra, Judges are entailed to their Courts,
from which they cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action
for bad behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their Judges, because the
power of the legislative to establish inferior Courts presupposes the power to abolish
those Courts. If an inferior Court is abolished, the Judge presiding that Court will
necessarily have to lose his position because the abolished Court is not entailed to him.

c) The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as their Courts exist. As
long as those Courts exist, the Judges cannot be ousted without just cause; that is the
extent of the constitutional provision relative to security of tenure of Judges. Upon
declaration of the completion of the reorganization as provided for in the Reorganization
Act, the affected Courts "shall be deemed automatically abolished." There being no
Courts, there are no offices for which tenure of Judges may be claimed. By the abolition
of those offices, the rights to them are necessarily extinguished (Manalang vs.
Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 [1954]).
2. I am satisfied that the challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in
response to an urgent and pressing public need and not for the purpose of affecting
adversely the security of tenure of all Judges or legislating them out to the detriment of
judicial independence. It should not be said of the Batasang Pambansa that its power of
abolition of Courts has been used to disguise an unconstitutional and evil purpose to
defeat the security of tenure of Judges. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981
sufficiently complies with the bona fide rule in the abolition of public office, as clearly
explained in the main opinion. Besides, every presumption of good faith in its actuations
must be accorded a coordinate and coequal branch of government, supreme within the
limits of its own sphere, until that presumption is clearly overcome. There is no showing
that the Reorganization Act was motivated for personal or political reasons as to justify
the interference by the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 199 Mass 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127 A.S.R.
468; State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont. 287; 106 Pac. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo,
16 SCRA 599 [1966]). Public interest and public good, as the legislative body views it,
must be balanced with tenure of Judges, which is an individual right. Reverting to Section
1 and Section 7, supra, the former is the weightier, because the "Judiciary" is of more
importance to the welfare of the country than the tenure of office of an individual Judge.
If a Judge is removed without cause, there can be damage to the public welfare to some
extent, but maintenance of a Court that does not meet the requirements of progressive
Government, can cause incalculable prejudice to the people.
3. Nor does a conflict exist with the power of discipline vested in the Supreme Court by
the present Constitution reading: the Supreme Court shall have the power "to discipline
Judges of inferior Courts, and, by a vote of at least 8 members, order their dismissal."
Absent the Court, it would be futile to speak of the Supreme Court's power to discipline.
Thus, where the legislature has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to
discipline cannot pose an obstacle to the abolition. The power to discipline can come into
play only when there is removal from an existing judicial office, but not when that office
is abolished. The reorganization of the judicial system with the abolition of certain Courts
is not an exercise of the power to discipline the Judges of the abolished Courts.
It is of significance to note that the power of dismissal vested in the Supreme Court by
the 1973 Constitution is delimited by its power to discipline. Absent any need for
discipline and the power to dismiss does not exist. Being circumscribed in scope, it may

well be asked: does the grant of the power of discipline and dismissal in the Supreme
Court deprive the executive of the power of removal? Is it not more in keeping with the
allocation of powers in our government to state that the Supreme Court shares its power
to dismiss with the executive power of removal? For is not the power of removal
basically executive in nature, as an incident to the power of appointment, which is the
prerogative of the Chief Executive alone? As in the case of appointments, Section 5(6),
Article X of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall appoint its officials
and employees. However, is not this power shared with the power of appointment of the
executive who appoints some of the Court officials? These questions could lend
themselves to an in-depth study in the proper case.
4. The abolition would be no deprivation either of due process of law. A public office
cannot be regarded as the "property" of the incumbent. A public office is not a contract
(Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925]). A public office is a public trust (Section 1,
Article XIII, 1973 Constitution). It is a privilege in the gift of the State (Brown vs.
Russel, 166 Mass. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA 253 cited also in Taada & Carreon, Political
Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 537). The officers are the servants of the people and not
their rulers (22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin, Administrative Law, Law on Public
Officers and Election Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing that there is no
removal from office but abolition of the office itself.
5. The questioned statute is in keeping with major reforms in other departments of
government. "The thrust is on development." It is "the first major reorganization after
four generations." It does not provide for a piecemeal change, which could be ineffective.
It goes to the roots and does not just scratch the surface of our judicial system. Its main
objectives are an improved administration of justice, the "attainment of more efficiency
in the disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which
do not tend to the proper meting out of justice." These aims are policy matters of
necessity in the pursuit of developmental goals within the Judiciary.

6. The Reorganization Act reorganizes the entire judicial system excluding the Supreme
Court, which is the only constitutional Court, and the Sandiganbayan. It envisages
institutional reforms in the Philippine judiciary. It does not simply change the names of
the Courts. The facts herein are dissimilar from those in Brillo vs. Enage (94 Phil. 732
[1954]) where the position of Justice of the Peace, although ostensibly abolished, was
merely changed to Municipal Judge after the municipality of Tacloban was converted
into a city with its own charter.
Significant among the institutional changes and procedural reforms are:
The Intermediate Appellate Court

This Court is now constituted into ten (10) divisions instead of fifteen (15), five members
composing each division, and a majority vote of three members being needed for a
decision. This obviates the cumbersome procedure, in case of dissent, of assigning two
other members to compose a "division of five." It also allows flexibility in that any three
members of a division, arriving at unanimity, can promulgate a decision.
LLjur

Now provided for is specialization into four (4) Civil Cases Divisions, two (2) Criminal
Cases Divisions and four (4) Special Cases Divisions. The specialization is expected to
contribute to the expeditious disposal of cases.
The Court has been given original jurisdiction to issue Writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, quo warranto and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This would undoubtedly ease the burden of the Supreme
Court where numerous such cases are filed daily.
It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or award of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution.
The Intermediate Appellate Court would now have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the
power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings (Sec. 9). This does away
with the delays attendant to the remand of cases to the lower trial Courts.
Regional Trial Courts
There are now thirteen (13) Judicial Regions, the same as the present administrative and
Batasang Pambansa Regions, instead of sixteen (16) Judicial Districts.
A Judge is appointed to a region, which is his official station. This ensures mobility since
a Judge may be assigned anywhere within the Region without applying the constitutional
limitation of six months. Additionally, it can remedy temporary inequalities of caseloads
in trial Courts.
Specialized Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial
Courts would try all cases within its jurisdiction unless special cases are assigned to
them, in which case, they remain as Branches of Regional Trial Courts. Special
procedures and technical rules governing special Courts will continue to remain
applicable in Branches assigned those special cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts

There is one Metropolitan Trial Court with several Branches for large urban areas. The
appointment of Judges would be to a Metropolitan Trial Court, although a Judge may be
assigned by the Supreme Court to any Branch of the Metropolitan Trial Court as
demanded by the exigencies of the service.
The Supreme Court may designate certain Branches of said Courts to exercise special
jurisdiction over certain cases, unlike the present set-up where special jurisdiction applies
only to cases of traffic violations.
Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Municipal Trial Courts may now be designated by the Supreme Court to exercise special
jurisdiction over certain cases, thereby resulting in overall flexibility. They can also be
circuitized with those in cities not forming part of metropolitan areas.
One notable change between the old and the new set-up is that Judges of these Courts
will now be Presidential appointees unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are
merely designated by the Supreme Court in an Administrative Order to sit in existing
Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts.
7. There are innovative features in the Act that commend themselves:
a) The confusing and illogical areas of concurrent jurisdiction between the trial Courts
have been entirely eliminated.
b) Under Section 39, there is a uniform period for appeal of fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.
A record on appeal is no longer required to take an appeal. The entire original record is
now to be transmitted.
c) Under Section 40, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference of findings of fact
and conclusions of law as set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed from, is
also provided for. This will expedite the rendition of decisions in appealed cases.
d) Section 42 provides for "a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly
basic pay for Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary, Provided that, in
no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay
is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank." Thus, Justices and
Judges who may not reach the top, where unfortunately there is not enough room for all,
may have the satisfaction of at least approximating the salary scale of those above him
depending on his length of service.

8. But while the law itself as written is constitutional, the manner in which it will be
administered should not be tainted with unconstitutionality (Myles Salt Co. vs. Board of
Commrs., 292 US 478, 60 L. Ed. 392, 36 Sct 204). To obviate the possibility of an
unconstitutional exercise of power the following safeguards are recommended and/or
expected to be undertaken:
a) The President can be expected to indicate a reasonable time frame for the completion
of the reorganization provided for in the Act and the issuance of the corresponding
implementing Order.
b) Appointments and their effectivity should be simultaneous with, or as close as
possible, to the declaration by the President of the completion of the reorganization under
Section 44 to avoid any detriment to the smooth and continuous functioning of the
judicial machinery.
cdasia

c) The services of those not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as recommended

by the Committee on Judicial Reorganization (Article XI of its Report).
9. For the speedy implementation of the law, the Supreme Court can be expected to
submit to the President within thirty (30) days from the date of finality of its Decision the
staffing pattern for all Courts required by Section 43.
I am constrained to disagree with the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the
staffing pattern be made to include the names of Judges. The staffing pattern for Judges is
already clearly and explicitly provided in the law itself which enumerates the various
Judges and Justices in their hierarchical order. Furthermore, to include the superior
positions of Judges would depart from the traditional concept of a staffing pattern, which
refers more to personnel organization and corresponding salaries of inferior employees. It
is also constitutionally objectionable in that it would interfere with the prerogative of
appointment intrinsically executive in nature (Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379
[1966]; Government of the Philippines vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The President
may not be deprived of, nor be limited in, the full use of his discretion in the appointment
of persons to any public office. Nothing should so trench upon executive choice as to be,
in effect, judicial designation.
10. A word of explanation. If I had resolved not to inhibit myself in this case upon
motion filed by petitioners, it was because the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, of
which I was privileged to be a member, confined its work to the recommendation of
options and guidelines in the task of reorganization. The Committee had no part
whatsoever in the drafting of the bill nor in the public hearings conducted. In fact, some
of its recommendations like the circuitization or regionalization of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the appellation of members of the Judiciary, the confinement of the
jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court merely to appellate jurisdiction, the

adoption of the system found in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth countries of
having a Court of general jurisdiction with trial and appellate divisions, were not availed
of in the final Act.
11. Lastly, but by no means the least, I entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed on
the good faith of the President that all the deserving, upon considerations of "efficiency,
integrity, length of service and other relevant factors," shall be appointed to a
strengthened and revitalized judicial system in the interest of public service; that
appointments will not be unduly delayed: and that appointees will be evaluated
thoroughly to ensure quality and impartiality in the men and women who will keep vigil
over our judicial ramparts.
ERICTA, J ., concurring:
I concur in the view that Judiciary reorganization law is not unconstitutional. It does not
violate the principle of security of tenure of Judges.
The constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power to create courts inferior to
the Supreme Court (Article X, Section 1). All existing inferior courts were created by
law. No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office includes the power to abolish
the same. (Urgelio vs. Osmea, 9 SCRA 317; Maza vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142).
prLL

Security of tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal of a public officer or

employee but an abolition of his office. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903; Cruz vs.
Primicias, 23 SCRA 998; Baldoz vs. Office of the President, 78 SCRA 354, 362) A
distinction should be made between removal from office and abolition of an office.
Removal implies that the office subsists after ouster, while, in abolition, the office no
longer exists thereby terminating the right of the incumbent to exercise the rights and
duties of the office. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)

The power of the legislative branch of the government to abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court has long been established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147)
What is only needed is that the abolition passes the test of good faith. It need only be
shown that said abolition of the courts is merely incidental to a bona fide reorganization.
(Urgelio vs. Osmea, supra)
It is unthinkable to impute bad faith to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization composed of four (4) distinguished members of the Supreme Court, the
Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister of Justice, and to the members of the
Batasang Pambansa whose combined efforts after a careful study and deliberation
resulted to the enactment of a bill now signed into law as Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129.

In his sponsorship speech, Justice Ricardo C. Puno declared the objectives of the
Judiciary Reorganization Law to be the following: (1) the attainment of more efficiency
in the disposal of cases; (2) the improvement in the quality of decisions by the courts that
will result from the easing of court dockets; and (3) structural changes to meet the
exigencies of present day Philippine Society and of the foreseeable future.
Admittedly, in the implementation of the law, some Judges and Justices may be adversely
affected. But in a conflict between public interest and the individual interest of some
Judges and Justices, the public weal must prevail. The welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
The implementation of the law will entail appointments to the new courts. The power of
appointment is the exclusive prerogative of the President. The implementation of the law
should be left exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and statesmanship of the President.
llcd

PLANA, J ., concurring and dissenting:

As the lawmaking body has the power to create inferior courts and define, prescribe and
apportion their jurisdiction, so it has the power to abolish or replace them with other
courts as long as the act is done in good faith and not for the purpose of attaining an
unconstitutional end. Good faith has thus become the crucial issue in the case at bar.
Upon an examination of the legislative history of Batas Pambansa 129, as has been done
in the main opinion, it is manifest that actual, not merely presumed good faith attended its
enactment. On this basis, I concur in the opinion penned by the learned Chief Justice,
qualified only by the following observations:
1. Executive consultation with the Supreme Court. I believe the President is under no
obligation to consult with the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not
called upon to give legal advice to the President. Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself has
said, it cannot give advisory opinions (Bacolod-Murcia Planters' Asso., Inc. vs. BacolodMurcia Milling Co., 30 SCRA 67; NWSA vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA
629) even to the President.
In the drafting of the present Constitution, there was an attempt to vest the Supreme
Court with the function of giving advisory opinions. The framers of the Constitution,
however, did not see fit to adopt the proposal.
If the President should consult the Supreme Court on the implementation of Batas
Pambansa 129 and the Supreme Court should give its advice (leaving aside the question
of procedure), I believe the President would be free to follow or disregard the advice; but,
in either case, there would be no guarantee that the implementing action would be upheld
in one case or stricken down in the other.

2. Undue delegation of legislative powers.

The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 129 on the
ground that a provision thereof (regarding fixing of compensation and allowances for
members of the Judiciary) constitutes an undue delegation unto the President of
legislative power.
As pointed out in the main opinion, the legislature has provided ample standards or
guidelines for the implementation of the delegated power, which makes the delegation
inoffensive. I would like to add however some observations on the doctrine of undue
delegation of legislative power.
Under the old Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation of legislative and
executive powers, there was good reason to maintain the doctrine of non-delegation of
legislative power. Otherwise, the principle of separation of governmental powers could
be negated via unbridled delegation of legislative power. The 1973 Constitution has
however radically changed the constitutional set-up. There is now a commingling or
fusion of executive and legislative powers in the hands of the same group of officials.
Cabinet members play a leading role in the legislative process, and members of the
Batasan actively discharge executive functions. The Prime Minister indeed must come
from its ranks. Under the circumstances, there is really not much sense in rigidly
upholding the principle of non-delegation of legislative power, at least vis-a-vis the
Executive Department. In a very real sense, the present Constitution has significantly
eroded the hoary doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power, although it has retained
some provisions of the old Constitution which were predicated on the principle of nondelegation, this time perhaps not so much to authorize shifting of power and thereby
correspondingly reduce the incidence of "undue" delegation of legislative power, as to
avert the abdication thereof.
"In times of war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by
law authorize the President for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Batasang
Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment." (Art. VIII, Sec.
15.)
"The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts." [Ibid., Sec. 17(2).]

TEEHANKEE, J ., dissenting:

Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue of such magnitude has confronted
the Philippine judiciary than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 by its title would reorganize all existing courts (except the nine-member
Sandiganbayan 1 and the three-member Court of Tax Appeals) and upon declaration by
the President of the completion of the reorganization would unprecedentedly deem all the
said courts "automatically abolished" en masse and "the incumbents thereof shall cease to
hold office." 2 The total abolition involves a total of 1,663 judicial positions with 1,180
incumbent judges (and 483 vacancies) as of January 26, 1982 and the Act would effect an
increase of 230 judicial positions raising the total of judicial positions to be filled by new
appointments to 1,893. Notwithstanding the great deference due to enactments of the
Batasan, I regretably find myself unable to join the ranks of my esteemed colleagues in
the majority who uphold the constitutionality of the Act and have voted to dismiss the
petition, for the following main considerations and reasons:
1. I go by the ruling of the numerical majority of seven Justices (namely, Pablo, Cesar
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the
leading 1955 case of Ocampo 3 who fell short by one vote to reach the constitutionally
required 2/3 majority (at the time 8 out of an 11-member Supreme Court) to declare
unconstitutional and invalid Section 3 of Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions of
18 judges-at-large and 15 cadastral judges and removing or legislating out the incumbent
judges from office as against the contrary vote of a minority of 4 Justices (namely, then
Chief Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and Labrador, JJ.) with the paradoxical
situation that the last three named Justices voted for the validity of the Act as a remedial
measure that abolished said positions without permanent station which subjected them to
a rigodon de jueces without the consent of the Supreme Court, which they considered as
"repulsive to an independent judiciary" and violative of an express prohibitory provision
of the 1935 Constitution while Justice Alex Reyes conceded that otherwise he would
go with the majority that "Congress may not, as a general rule, abolish a judicial post
without allowing the incumbent to finish his term of office."
2. As then Associate, later Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon remarked in his separate opinion
"(T)he [adverse] outcome of this litigation [sanctioning the ouster from office of the
ten petitioners who were presiding different Courts of First Instance, some as judges-atlarge, others as cadastral judges, upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 of R.A. 1186
abolishing the positions of judges-at-large and cadastral judges] is apt to revive the
speculation whether wittingly or unwittingly the Constitution has further weakened the
usually weak judicial department because of its 'innovative' requirement of a 2/3 majority
vote of the Supreme Court to declare a statute unconstitutional, and 'never in our history
has such a number of judges of first instance [totalling 33 positions] been ousted through
judicial reorganization.'"
His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges
"during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated

to discharge the duties of their office" 4 must prevail over the implied constitutional
authority to abolish courts and to oust the judges despite their constitutionally-secured
tenure bears repeating, thus:
"A careful analysis will perceive that whereas petitioners invoke an express
guaranty or positive definition of their term of office, the respondents rely on
implied authority to abolish courts and the positions of the respective judges.
Accurately stated, respondents' defense rests on a second inference deduced
from such implied power, because they reason out thusly: Congress has express
power to establish courts; therefore it has implicit power to abolish courts and
the positions of judges of such abolished courts (first inference); and therefore
(second inference) Congress likewise has power to eject the judges holding such
positions.

"Resultant juridical situation: The implied authority invoked by respondents

collides with the express guaranty of tenure protecting the petitioners. Which
shall prevail? Obviously the express guaranty must override the implied
authority. 'Implications can never be permitted to contradict the expressed intent
or to defeat its purpose.'. . .
xxx xxx xxx
"But the collision may be-should be-avoided, and both sections given validity, if
one be considered a proviso or exception to the other. In other words, under the
Constitution the Congress may abolish existing courts, provided it does not
thereby remove the incumbent judges; such abolition to take effect upon
termination of their incumbency. The fundamental provisions on the matter are
thereby 'coordinated and harmonized' as Justice Laurel suggested in his
concurring opinion in Zandueta v. De la Costa. To bring about the
reconciliations is the great work of jurists. (Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal
Science, p. 6)" 5

3. This reasoning that the express guaranty of tenure protecting incumbent judges during
good behavior unless removed from office after hearing and due process or upon
reaching the compulsory retirement age of seventy years must override the implied
authority of removing by legislation the judges has been further strengthened and placed
beyond doubt by the new provisions of the 1973 Constitution that transferred the
administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel from the Chief Executive
through the then Secretary of Justice to the Supreme Court 6 and vested in the Supreme
Court exclusively "the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight members, order their dismissa l," 7 which power was formerly lodged by the
Judiciary Act in the Chief Executive.

As former Chief Justice Bengzon stressed in his opinion in Ocampo, the 1934
Constitutional Convention "frowned on removal of judges of first instance through
abolition of their offices or reorganization," citing Professor Jose Aruego's observation
that the security of judges' tenure provision was intended to "help secure the
independence of the judiciary" in that "during good behaviour, they may not be legislated
out of office by the lawmaking body nor removed by the Chief Executive for any reason
and under the guise of any pretense whatsoever; they may stay in office until they reach
the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
(Aruego, the Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, pp. 718-719)" He further
cited Aruego's report that a proposed amendment to the effect that the prohibition against
transfers of judges to another district without the approval of the Supreme Court 8
"should not be applicable to a reorganization of tribunals of justice or of districts, but the
amendment was defeated easily without debate" 9 and logically concluded that "(N)ow,
therefore, having vetoed the transfer of judges thru a reorganization, the Convention
evidently could not have permitted the removal of judges thru re-organization."
cdasia

Now, if the framers of the 1973 Constitution wished to dispel the strong doubts, to say
the least in the light of the 7 to 4 vote in the Ocampo case against removal of incumbent
judges through legislative action by abolition of their courts, then they would have so
clearly provided for such form of removal in the 1973 Constitution, but on the contrary as
already stated they ruled out such removal or ouster of judges by legislative action by
vesting exclusively in the Supreme Court the power of discipline and removal of judges
of all inferior courts.
4. This being so, the fundamental point emphasized by former Chief Justice Bengzon that
abolition of the 33 judicial positions in the Ocampo case was "merely an indirect manner
of removing the petitioners-judges" while the "positions [that] were eliminated . . . were
in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of judges" applies with greater force in
the case at bar which involves an unprecendented total "abolition," thus: "(C)all it
reorganization, or legislation or removal or abolition, this law disregards the
constitutional assurance that these judges, once appointed, shall hold office during good
behaviour . . . unless incapacitated and until retirement].
"The abolition of their offices was merely an indirect manner of removing these
petitioners. Remember that on June 19, 1954, there were 107 judges of first
instance, district judges, judges-at-large and cadastral judges (Rep. Act 296).
After the passage of Republic Act No. 1186 there were 114 positions of judges
of first instance. There was no reduction-there was increase-in the number of
judges, nor in the number of courts. The positions of Judges-at-Large and
Cadastral Judges were eliminated; but they were in fact substituted or replaced
by other positions of judges; or if you please, there was a mere change of
designation from 'Cadastral Judge or Judge-at-Large' to 'district judge.' Hence it
should be ruled that as their positions had not been 'abolished' de facto, but
actually retained with another name, these petitioners are entitled to remain in

the service. (Brillo v. Enage, G.R. No. L-7115, March 30, 1954.) For it is not
permissible to effect the removal of one judge thru the expediency of abolishing
his-office even as the office with same power is created with another name.
(Brillo v. Enage, Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 391, Gibbe's Case 4 A.L.R., p.
211) in this view of the picture, we believe, Congress could have, and should
have-as suggested by Secretary Tuazon during the hearings in Congressdirected in said Republic Act No. 1186 that 'the present judges-at-large and
cadastral judges shall become district judges presiding such districts as may be
fixed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments;' or
by the Secretary of Justice, as originally proposed by Senator Laurel in
connection with the same bill. Something similar was done before, and it would
not be objectionable as an encroachment on the President's prerogative of
appointment, because such judges had already been appointed to the judiciary
before the passage of the act, and the provision may be construed in the light of
mere change of official designation plus increase in salary."

5. Concededly, the questioned Act effects certain changes and procedural reforms with
more specific delineation of jurisdiction as mentioned particularly in the majority
opinion, but they do not change the basic structure of the existing courts. The present
Municipal Courts, Municipal Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and
redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and
Metropolitan Trial Courts in the challenged Act. The Courts of First Instance, Circuit
Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts and Courts of Agrarian
Relations are all restructured and redesignated to be known by the common name of
Regional Trial Courts with provision for certain branches thereof "to handle exclusively
criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform
cases .. and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the
interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice" 10 and the Court of Appeals is
restructured and redesignated as the Intermediate Appellate Court with an increase in the
number of Appellate Justices from the present 45 to 50 but with a reduction of the
number of divisions from 15 (composed of 3 Justices each) to 10 (composed of 5
members each) such that it is feared that there is created a bottleneck at the appellate
level in the important task discharged by such appellate courts as reviewers of facts.
Cdpr

In my view, the "candid admission" by the Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court "that
he entertained doubts as to whether the intermediate court of appeals provided for is a
new tribunal" 10a is equally applicable to all the other abovementioned courts provided
for in the challenged Act as "new courts." And the best proof of this is the plain and
simple transitory provision in Section 44 thereof that upon the President's declaration of
completion of the reorganization (whereby the "old courts" shall "be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office"). "(T)he
cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted
pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property
and the necessary personnel," together with the "applicable appropriations." This could

not have been possible without a specification and enumeration of what specific cases of
the "old courts" would be transferred to the particular "new courts," had these "new
courts" not been manifestly and substantially the "old courts" with a change of name-or
as described by Justice Barredo to have been his first view, now discarded, in his separate
opinion: "just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of
the present judicial structure or system" or "a rearrangement or remodeling of the old
structure." 11
6. I do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the abolition of the courts and
consequent ouster of the incumbent judges from office as expounded by the late eminent
Justice Jose P. Laurel in his separate concurring opinion in the pre-war case of Zandueta
12 wherein the Court dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the ground of petitioner
Zandueta's estoppel and abandonment of office. 13 Realistically viewed from the basis of
the established legal presumptions of validity and constitutionality of statutes (unless set
aside by a 2/3 majority of 10 members of the Supreme Court) and of good faith in their
enactment, one is hard put to conjure a case where the Court could speculate on the good
or bad motives behind the enactment of the Act without appearing to be imprudent and
improper and declare that "the legislative power of reorganization (is) sought to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose." The good faith in the enactment of the challenged Act
must needs be granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power to abolish courts
as implied from the power to establish them with the express constitutional guaranty of
tenure of the judges which is essential for a free and independent judiciary. Adherents of
the Rule of Law are agreed that indispensable for the maintenance of the Rule of Law is a
free and independent judiciary, sworn to protect and enforce it without fear or favor
"free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even from the
tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the political powers that be," to quote
again from Justice Barredo's separate concurring opinion. 14 Hence, my adherence to the
7-member majority opinion of former Chief Justice Bengzon in the Ocampo case, supra,
as restated by the Philippine Association of Law Professors headed by former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion that "any reorganization should at least allow the incumbents
of the existing courts to remain in office [the appropriate counterpart 'new courts'] unless
they are removed for cause."

7. The "judges' broader and stronger guarantees of tenure than ordinary civil servants" as
stressed by former Chief Justice Bengzon in his majority opinion in Ocampo is based on
the judiciary's status as a co-equal and coordinate branch of government, whereas the
long line of Philippine cases upholding the legislative power to abolish offices refers to
officers or employees in the executive branch of government and "the underlying
consideration must be borne in mind that Manalang [the aggrieved petitioner] belonged to
the Executive Department and because the President approved the law, no question or
encroachment by one branch on the other could be apprehended or alleged." 15 This is

not a matter of personal privilege for the incumbent judges but as aptly stated by former
U.P. Law Dean Irene Cortez in her memorandum as amicus curiae, "for the judiciary
whose independence is not only eroded but is in grave danger of being completely
destroyed." Dean Cortez aptly stressed that "judicial independence is not a guarantee
intended for the Supreme Court alone, it extends to the entire court system and is even
more vital to the courts at the lowest levels because there are more of them and they
operate closest to the people, "and" (P)articularly under the present form of modified
parliamentary government with legislative and executive functions overlapping and in
certain areas merging, the judiciary is left to perform the checking function in the
performance of which its independence assumes an even more vital importance."
cdasia

The extensive memoranda filed by Dean Cortez and other amici curiae, such as former
Senator Jose W. Diokno who strongly urges the Court to strike down the Act "to prevent
further destruction of judicial independence," former Senator Lorenzo Sumulong,
president of the Philippine Constitution Association who advocates for the Court's
adoption of the Bengzon majority opinion in the Ocampo case so as to abide by "the
elementary rule in the interpretation of constitutions that effect should be given to all
parts of the Constitution" and that the judges' security of tenure guaranty should not be
"rendered meaningless and inoperative" former Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
president of the Philippine Lawyers' Association who submit that the total abolition of all
courts below the Supreme Court (except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals) and the removal of the incumbent Justices and Judges "violates the
independence of the judiciary, their security of tenure and right to due process guaranteed
them by the Constitution" and Atty. Raul M. Gonzales, president of the National Bar
Association of the Philippines who invokes the Declaration of Delhi at the ICJ
Conference in 1959, that "The principles of unremovability of the Judiciary and their
Security of Tenure until death or until a retiring age fixed by statute is reached, is an
important safeguard of the Rule of Law" have greatly helped in fortifying my views.
8. I had submitted in my memo of September 4, 1980 to the Presidential Committee on
Judicial Reorganization that "(W)hatever reorganization plans the committee may
recommend to meet the worldwide problem of congested court dockets, and to improve
judicial services in the public interest, it should be borne in mind that the members of the
judiciary as the weakest branch of government, yet called upon to safeguard the people's
rights and protect them from oppression, official and otherwise, are entitled to security of
tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even though the lower courts may be reshuffled
or abolished in the process, the mandate and spirit of the Constitution guaranteeing their
security of tenure and maintaining the independence of the judiciary should be respected,
and they should be retained in the new courts."
In the same vein, Dean Cortez warned of the dire consequences of giving the questioned
provisions of the Act the "absolutist sense which they appear to have at first blush" thus:
"(T)o accept legislative power to abolish courts asserted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129

which sweeps through practically the entire judiciary would be to open the door to future
court abolitions in the guise of reorganization. At this stage of our political development,
the process of embarking upon a modified parliamentary system may well usher in a
situation where despite guarantees of judicial tenure, each ruling party in the legislature
or any alliance that can command a majority vote may periodically undertake complete
reorganization and remove judges, thus making of the judiciary a veritable straw in the
political wind," and "(F)uthermore, what can result in the modified parliamentary system
from the close working relationship between executive and legislature is made manifest
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. If the sweeping revamp provided were to be carried out the
President would appoint all of the justices and judges of the courts affected and the whole
membership in the judiciary from the highest to the lowest courts would be his
appointees. It is relevant to point out that it is precisely a situation like this that the
Constitution seeks to avoid when it provides staggered terms for the chairman and
members of the constitutional commissions which like the judiciary are guaranteed
independence."
9. The judges' security of tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions of
the 1973 Constitution which granted the incumbent President the unlimited power to
remove and replace all judges and officials 16 (as against the limited one-year period for
the exercise of such power granted President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon
establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth). Upon the declaration of martial law in
September, 1972, justices and judges of all courts, except the Supreme Court, had been
required to hand in their resignations. There is listed a total of 53 judges who were
replaced or whose resignations were accepted by the President during the period from
September, 1972 to April, 1976. The power to replace even the judges appointed after the
effectivity on January 17, 1973 of the 1973 Constitution is yet invoked on behalf of the
President in the pending case of Tapucar vs. Famador 17 notwithstanding the generally
held view that such post-1973 Constitution appointed judges are not subject to the
Replacement Clause of the cited Transitory Provision. (In this case, petitioner judge
appointed on January 30, 1976 as judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City, Branch I, invoked his constitutional security of tenure and
questioned the appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent to replace him,
although he had not been removed or otherwise dismissed from his position nor had he
resigned thereform. The Court per its March 27, 1980 resolution ordered both to refrain
from discharging the functions of the questioned office.) And now comes this total
abolition of 1,663 judicial positions (and thousands of personnel positions)
unprecedented in its sweep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the judiciary with
the restoration of the security of tenure of judges, which is essential for a free and
independent judiciary as mandated by the Constitution, not to make more enfeebled an
already feeble judiciary, possessed neither of the power of the sword nor the purse, as
decried by former Chief Justice Bengzon in his Ocampo majority opinion:

"Shall we have judges of the type of Lord Coke? Or judges, who, in his place,
would have answered 'I'll do what his majesty pleases,' judges who, afraid of
ouster thru a judiciary reshuffle, would rather serve the interest of the party in
power or of the political boss, than the interests of justice?
"As it is, the Judicial Department is feeble enough. Shall we render it feebler
with judges precariously occupying their official seats? Judges performing their
duties under the sword of Damocles of future judicial reorganizations?"

10. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, equally stressed that "what is equally
apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is
likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact
whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated
in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun vs. Labang 18 it
was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need 'to preserve unimpaired the
independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes,
there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches,'" 19 with the further
observation that "many are the ways by which such independence could be eroded." In
the cited case of Judge Fortun (likewise penned by the Chief Justice for the Court), the
Court issued a writ of prohibition and certiorari ordering the dismissal of the criminal
complaint filed with respondent fiscal Labang by "disgruntled members of the bar with a
record of losing cases" in the judge's court and imposed the penalty of censure on each
and everyone of the private respondents-lawyers for the "unseemly haste" with which
they filed the criminal complaint, abetted by "the appearance of sheer vindictiveness or
oppressive exercise of state authority." The Court marked the "violation of the cardinal
principles of fairness and due process that underlie the Rule of Law. Petitioner-Judge was
not heard; he was denied the opportunity to defend himself against the accusation. There
was, on the part of private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of the
Integrated Bar stressing that precisely integration could shield 'the judiciary which
traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that
politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality
and independence,'" and that such subjection of a judge to public "harassment and
humiliation . . . can diminish public confidence in the courts."
LLjur

11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg. 129 discussed in the
course of committee hearings of Cabinet Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second
reading in the Batasang Pambansa to rid the judiciary of incompetent and corrupt judges
and to restore confidence in the integrity of the courts. The purge has been the constant
subject of headlines and editorials, with the Ministry of Justice's Integrity Council
reportedly screening and conducting "integrity tests" as to new applicants and the
incumbent judges 20 and seeking "confidential information on corrupt and incompetent

judges to help the government purge the judiciary." 21 Prime Minister Cesar Virata was
quoted as saying that "'there will be a purge of the corrupt and the misfits' when the
Judiciary Reorganization Act is signed into law by President Marcos and implemented in
coordination with the Supreme Court." 22 The public respondents' answer sidesteps the
issue of such purge contravening the rudiments of a fair hearing and due process and
submits that "no term of office is sacrosanct when demanded before the altar of the public
good." The metropolitan papers reported the "anxiety gripping the judiciary as the
Ministry of Justice has reportedly been asked to collate information 'on the performance
of the judges and on the qualifications of those slated to take over the positions of the
incompetent, the inefficient or those involved in irregularities.' As stated in an editorial,
'Somehow, the uncertainty that now hovers over the judiciary has unduly subjected the
judges to mental torture since they do not know when or whether the axe will fall on
them. Worse, the sword of Damocles hanging over their heads could provoke them into
seeking the help of people claiming to have influence with the powers that be." 23
But Dean Cortez in her memorandum states that "However, nowhere on public record is
there hard evidence on this. The only figures given in the course of the committee
hearings were to the effect that out of some 1,700 members of the judiciary, between 10
to 15 were of the undesirable category, i.e. misfit, incompetent or corrupt. (Barredo, J.,
before the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, December 4,
1980)," and that "(I)f this be the case, the unprecedented, sweeping and wholesale
abolition of judicial offices becomes an arbitrary act, the effect of which is to assert the
power to remove all the incumbents guilty or innocent without due process of law." Nor
would it be of any avail to beg the question and assert that due process is not available in
mass abolitions of courts.
Justice Barredo, however, without citing any hard evidence, refers in his separate
concurrence to twin objectives of getting rid of "structural inadequacies of the system or
of the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force"
and of "a good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary (who) make a
mockery of justice and take advantage of their office for personal ends." He adds that "it
is my personal assessment of the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization
has to be of necessity two-pronged, as I have just indicated, for the most ideal judicial
system with the most perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests
of justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the character, competence
and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality,
nay, impregnability to all temptations of graft and corruption, including the usual
importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the powers that be," 24 and
invokes the adage of "grandes males, grandes remedios" to now uphold the validity of
the Act.
Cdphil

Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum anticipates the argument that "great ills
demand drastic cures" thus: "Drastic, yes but not unfair nor unconstitutional. One does

not improve courts by abolishing them, any more than a doctor cures a patient by killing
him. The ills the judiciary suffers from were caused by impairing its independence; they
will not be cured by totally destroying that independence. To adopt such a course could
only breed more perversity in the administration of justice, just as the abuses of martial
rule have bred more subversion."
12. Finally, as stated by the 1975 Integrated Bar of the Philippines 2nd House of
Delegates, "It would, indeed, be most ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due
process cannot count it on themselves. Observance of procedural due process in the
separation of misfits from the Judiciary is the right way to attain a laudable objective."
As stressed by the Chief Justice in the Fortun case, judges are entitled to the cardinal
principles of fairness and due process and the opportunity to be heard and defend
themselves against the accusations made against them and not to be subjected to
harassment and humiliation, and the Court will repudiate the "oppressive exercise of legal
authority." More so, are judges entitled to such due process when what is at stake is their
constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure and non-impairment of the independence of
the judiciary and the proper exercise of the constitutional power exclusively vested in the
Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges after fair hearing.
In sum, I see no reason to change the stand submitted by me to the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization that
Judges of inferior courts should not be summarily removed and branded for life in such
reorganization on the basis of confidential adverse reports as to their performance,
competence or integrity, save those who may voluntarily resign from office upon being
confronted with such reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte reports,
without due process or hearing, has been proven from our past experience where a
number of honest and competent judges were summarily removed while others who were
generally believed to be basket cases have remained in the service; and
The power of discipline and dismissal of judges of all inferior courts, from the Court of
Appeals down, has been vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the
judiciary is to be strengthened, it should be left to clean its own house upon complaint
and with the cooperation of the aggrieved parties and after due process and hearing.
cdasia

The constitutional confrontation and conflict may well be avoided by holding that since
the changes and provisions of the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature
and functions of the "new courts" therein provided as compared to the "abolished old
courts" but provide for procedural changes, fixed delineation of jurisdiction and increases
in the number of courts for a more effective and efficient disposition of court cases, the
incumbent judges' guaranteed security of tenure require that they be retained in the
corresponding "new courts."

|||

(De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. 57883, March 12, 1982)