Bacani vs NACOCO Political Law Two-fold Function of the Government Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers assigned

d in the CFI of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO, Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. On January 19, 1953, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the DOJ it was expressed that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. Petitioners counter that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Defendants set up as a defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: WON NACOCO is a government entity HELD: GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO. While it was organized with the purpose of adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the pro per utilization of coconut by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. ** President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:

(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery. (2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children. (3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime. (4) The determination of contract rights between individuals. (5) The definition and punishment of crime. (6) The administration of justice in civil cases. (7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens. (8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs Marcos Date: September 11, 1996 Petitioner: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority Respondents: Hon. Ferdinand Marcos, City of Cebu, et al Facts: Petitioner was created by virtue of RA6958, mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Under Section 1: The authority shall be exempt from realty

taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. However, the Officer of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on parcels of land belonging to petitioner. Petitioner objected invoking its tax exemption. It also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the LGC which puts limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. The city refused insisting that petitioner is a GOCC performing proprietary functions whose tax exemption was withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC. Petitioner filed a declaratory relief before the RTC. The trial court dismissed the petitioner ruling that the LGC withdrew the tax exemption granted the GOCCs. Issue: WON the City of Cebu has the power to impose taxes on petitioner Held: Yes Ratio: As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay it. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. There can be no question that under Section 14 RA 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The LGC, enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article X of the constitution provides for the exercise by LGUs of their power to tax, the scope thereof or its limitations, and the exemption from taxation. Section133 of the LGC prescribes the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs: (o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities and LGUs. Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real property tax. Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of GOCCs, except as provided therein. On the other hand, the LGC authorizes LGUs to grant tax exemption privileges. Reading together Section 133, 232 and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in Secs 133 the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of inter alia, "taxes, fees, and charges of any kind of the National Government,

its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs"; however, pursuant to Sec 232, provinces, cities, municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial used thereof has been granted to a taxable person."As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the genera l rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234, which enumerates the properties exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption in so far as the real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated there-in; all others not included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as the real property is owned by the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its political subdivisions covered by item (a)of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has been granted to taxable person for consideration or otherwise. Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No. 6958,has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. In short, the petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133.It must show that the parcels of land in question, which are real property, are any one of those enumerated in Section 234, either by virtue of ownership, character, or use of the property. Most likely, it could only be the first, but not under any explicit provision of the said section, for one exists. In light of the petitioner's theory that it is an "instrumentality of the Government", it could only be within be first item of the first paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of the terms Republic of the Philippines" to embrace ."instrumentalities" and "agencies." This view does not persuade us. In the first place, the petitioner's claim that it is an instrumentalityof the Government is based on Section 133(o), which expressly mentions the word "instrumentalities"; and in the second place it fails to consider the fact that the legislature used the phrase "National Government, its agencies and

instrumentalities" "in Section 133(o),but only the phrase "Republic of the Philippines orany of its political subdivision "in Section 234(a). The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not interchangeable. The former is boarder and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the1987 defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which the functions of the government are exercised through at the Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous reason, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivision or other forms of local government." These autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions" are the political subdivision. On the other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local Governments." The National Government then is composed of the three great departments the executive, the legislative and the judicial. An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;" while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy; usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations". If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal of the exemption from payment of real property taxes under the last sentence of the said section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government mentioned in Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the latter. Yet, it did not Moreover, that Congress did not wish to expand the scope of the exemption in Section 234(a) to include real property owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations is further borne out by the fact that the source of this exemption is Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 646, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "and any government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt by its charter" was excluded. The justification for this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax exemption privileges, specially in light of the general provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of property taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234. These policy considerations are consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments 33 and the objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant

communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals. The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was a need for this entities to share in the requirements of the development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes and other charges due from them. The crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether the parcels of land in question belong to the Republic of the Philippines whose beneficial use has been granted to the petitioner, and (b) whether the petitioner is a "taxable person". It may be reasonable to assume that the term "lands" refer to "lands" in Cebu City then administered by the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of land the respondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real property taxes. This section involves a "transfer" of the "lands" among other things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained by the Republic of the Philippines. This "transfer" is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because the petitioner's authorized capital stock consists of "the value of such real estate owned and/or administered by the airports." Hence, the petitioner is now the owner of the land in question and the exception in Sec 234(c) of the LGC is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a "taxable person" under its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light of the forgoing disquisitions, it had already become even if it be conceded to be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to the petitioner. Accordingly, the position taken by the petitioner is untenable. Reliance on Basco vs. Pagcor is unavailing since it was decided before the effectivity of the LGC. Besides, nothing can prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the government performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom. Manila International Airport Authority vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No 155650, July 20, 2006.

Doctrine: The term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Complex in Paraaque City. As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways and buildings (Airport Lands and Buildings) then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel issued Opinion No. 061, in which it said that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption for real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA charter. Therefore, MIAA was held to be delinquent in paying its taxes. The City of Paraaque levied upon the properties of MIAA, and posted invitations for public biddings of MIAAs properties. The City of Paraaque averred that Section 193 of the Local Government code expressly withdrew tax exemptions from government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs). Issue: Whether properties of the MIAA are subject to real estate taxes. Held: No. In the first place, MIAA is not a GOCC, it is an instrumentality of the government. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways and buildings (Airport Lands and Buildings) then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines. Furthermore, Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 419 of the Civil Code provides, The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied) ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property. ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, are owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The operation by the government of a tollway does not change the character of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of the road, either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those among the public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road. The tollway system is even a more efficient and equitable manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of public roads.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one int ended for public use. Even if the government collects toll fees, the road is still intended for public use if anyone can use the road under the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public. The charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the speed restrictions and other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public character of the road.

The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed users tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. A users tax is more equitable a principle of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter calls the principal airport of the Philippines for both international and domestic air traffic, are properties of public dominion because they are intended for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

Being a property of public dominion, the properties of MIAA are beyond the commerce of man.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and Acting Director Antonio T. Castro, Jr.of the Dept. of Commercial and Savings Bank, in his capacity as statutoryreceiver of Island Savings Bank, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SulpicioM. Tolentino, respondents [1985] Facts: Apr 28, 1965: Tolentinos loan application of P80k w/the Island Savings Bank (ISB)was approved. As security, he executed a real estate mortgage over his 100-hec landin Cubo, Las Nievas, Agusan. Terms of the loan:1.lump sum loan of P80k2.repayable in semi-annual installments for 3 yrs w/12% annual interest3.loan to be used solely as an additional capital to develop his other property into a subdivision May 22, 1965: P17k partial release. Tolentino & his wife signed a promissory note for such amount at 12% annual interest payable in 3yrs from date of execution of contract at semi-annual installments of P3,459.00. Advance 6-month interest for theP80k loan was deducted from the P17k amounting to P4,800.00. But such amount was refunded to Tolentino on July 23, 1965. No fund available yet for the P63kbalance. Aug. 13, 1965: Monetary Board of Central Bank issued Resolution No. 1049 finding ISB suffering liquidity problems. Bank was prohibited making new loans & investments except in govt securities & loans already approved subject to the review of the Supt of Banks who may impose certain limitations.

June 14, 1968: Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 967 finding that ISB failed to put up required capital to restore its solvency. Bank prohibited from doing business in RP & Acting Supt of Banks to take charge of ISBs assets. Aug. 1, 1968: due to Tolentinos failure to pay P17k covered by promissory note, ISB filed for extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. Sheriff scheduled auction for Jan. 22, 1969. Jan. 20, 1969: Tolentino filed a petition for injunction, specific performance or recission & damages w/prelim injunction alleging that since ISB failed to deliver P63kbalance, hes entitled to specific performance by ordering delivery of balance w/12%per annum interest from Apr. 28, 1965 & if such cant be done, to rescind mortgage.Court issued TRO. CFI: ordered Tolentino to pay ISB P17k + legal interest & charges due and TRO lifted so foreclosure may proceed. CA: Affirmed dismissal of Tolentinos petition but ruled that ISB can neither foreclose mortgage nor collect P17k loan. Issues & Ratio: 1.WN ISBs defenses in its failure to fulfill its obligation are acceptable NO In reciprocal obligations such as in this case, obligation/promise of each party is the consideration for that of the other. When one party has performed or is ready & willing to perform his part, the other party who has not yet performed or is not ready& willing incurs in delay (CC Art. 1169). Thus, consideration for Tolentinos promise to pay was ISBs obligation to furnish P80k loan. Oblig began when Tolentino executed real estate mortgage and it lasted until Central Bank issued Resolution No.967 w/c made it legally impossible for ISB to furnish the balance. Resolution No.1049 cant interrupt ISBs default in complying w/its oblig since it did not prohibit bank from releasing the loan balance of loan agreements previously contracted. Mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge the oblig of the contract nor does it constitute any defense to a decree of specific performance(Gutierrez Repide v. Afzelius) and mere fact of insolvency of a debtor is never anexcuse for the non-fulfillment of an oblig but instead its taken as a breach of contract by him (CJS).

Fact that Tolentino demanded & accepted the refund of pre-deducted 6-monthinterest of P4,800 cant be taken as a waiver of his rt to collect balance. In fact,collection of the pre-deducted interest was improper considering that only P17k wasreleased. A person cant be legally charged interest for a non -existing debt. In accepting the refund, Tolentino was only exercising his rt. ISB claims that there was an overvaluation of the loan collateral. But such does not exempt it from complying w/its reciprocal oblig. Bank officials should exercise caution& prudence in the discharge of their functions by investigating existence & valuation of properties being offered as loan security. They cant rely merely on the customers representation. Besides, lower court prevented petitioner from presenting proof on alleged over-valuation because of their failure to raise the same in their pleadings in effect waiving their right to do so (ROC Sec. 9, Rule 9). Thus, such cant be raised in the SC. 2.WON a an action for specific performance can prosper NO ISB is now prohibited from doing further business by Monetary Board Resolution No.967. 3.WON recission is proper YES But only for the P63k balance w/c ISB failed to deliver. Tolentino is bound by the promissory note he released WRT the P17k loan. He has a reciprocal oblig to pay such when it falls due. So WRT to this amount, hes not entitled to recission since hes also a party in default (CC Art. 1191). As a matter of fact, rt to rescind belongs to the aggrieved party, ISB. Had he not signed a promissory note, Tolentino would be entitled to ask for recission of entire loan there being no date for him to perform his reciprocal oblig to pay. Since both parties were in default, theyre both liable for damages. CC Art. 1192: In case both parties committed a breach of their reciprocal obligations, the liability of the first in fractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. Thus, ISBs liability for damages is offset by Tolentinos liability for damages in the form of penalties & surcharges. The liability of Tolentino for the interest of the P17k debt shall not be included in offsetting the liabilities of both parties since he derived some benefit for his use of said amount. But Tolentinos real estate mortgage cant be entirely foreclosed to satisfy his P17k debt. Note that the consideration of the accessory contract of the real estate mortgage is the same as that of the principal contract. In both instances, the

consideration of the debtors oblig to pay is the existence of a valid, voidable or unenforceable debt (CC Art. 2086 in relation to Art. 2052). The consideration in executing a mortgage may either be a prior or subsequent matter. But when the consideration is subsequent, the mortgage can only take effect when the debt secured by it is created as a binding contract to pay. And when theres partial failure of consideration, the mortgage becomes unenforceable to the extent of such failure.The mortgage cant be enforced for more than the actual sum due (Metropolitan Life Ins. v Peterson). Since ISB failed to furnish the P63k balance, the mortgage is unenforceable to such extent w/c is 78.75% of the total loan. Thus, 78.75 of the100-hec mortgage is unenforceable. The remaining 21.25 hec is more than sufficient to secure the P17k debt. CC Art. 2089s rule on indivisibility of real estate mortgage is not applicable since such rule presupposes several heirs of the debtor/creditor w/c is not the case here. Holding: 1.Tolentino to pay ISB P17k + P41,210.00 as 12% interest per annum from May 22,1965 to Aug. 22, 1985 and 12% interest on total amount counted from Aug. 22,1985 until paid.

2.In case Tolentino fails to pay, his real estate mortgage of 21.25 hec shall be foreclosed to satisfy his total indebtedness.

3.78.75 hec real estate mortgage is unenforceable & ordered released in favor of Tolentino.

Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 538 FACTS: Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry. PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August 9, 1973. When ISAs original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31, 1979. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an

expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The construction of such steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC. Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land. Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed. ISSUE: WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISAs term. RULING: Yes Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic. We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as legal personality. When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of

such powers, duties and functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic. In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272. The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved. From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISAs statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DETORRES VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONPANGANIBAN, J.: FACTS: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB whowent on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific(CIRDAP).When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave ,but was denied. He was advised to report for duty and that if he failed to report within 30 days he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. Dr. De Torres did not report to work. After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was reporting back to duty. However De Torres was informed that in the absence of any approved application for leave of absence, he was considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to

re-apply with UPLB. Dr. De Torres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision. Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did not show that he had been officially dropped from the rolls he may report for duty. Members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres. The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 stating that De Torres was already on AWOL beginning September 1, 1989since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year was denied. De Torres' absence from work was not duly authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should report for duty on or before September 5, 1989, De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation from the service. The CA upheld the decision of the CSC. ISSUE: WON the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo de Torres from the civil service due to his prolonged absence without official leave is valid. HELD: The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which was in effect at the time. The provision states: "Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated from the service; Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in writing of the expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date, he will be dropped from the service." UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of being dropped from the service, if he failed to return and report for duty. This action constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue herein, however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from theservice by the University. In the case at bar, however, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show Private petitioner was not only retained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even

increased three times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest governing body of UP. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ. Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting him despite his absence without leave, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have done so without trampling upon the latter's constitutionally enshrined academic freedom. Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission, the Court stressed that "the CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law." In short, on its own, the CSC does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls. Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres. His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at CIRDAP. SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental functions. ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver. HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their employees. Board of Commissioners vs Dela Rosa Facts:

Processual Presumption On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children. On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed among which was that of William Gatchalian. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine law. HELD: The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known as Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen. Go, Sr. v Ramos Facts: Three cases arose from the same factual milieu. These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimm ys citizenship as FChinese.

Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. He alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950. Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog. With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is FChinese, he maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrars Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his fathers citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the employees of that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino. As regards the entry in his siblings certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his father. In a Resolution dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. She affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of

Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmys father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well. On March 8, 2001, the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his fathers questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy. On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating provisions of The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings. In the interim, the Board issued a Decision ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition before the trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision. Later, however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a Decision dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence of the dismissal of the petition. Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied. Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail. Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.

The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition. It did not find merit in their argument that the issue of citizenship should proceed only before the proper court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens. Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been denied, Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation which resulted in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China. On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance. In an Order, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by the trial court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court. Issue/s: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed? Held: Yes. Bureau of Immigration maintains that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was proper. A petition for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmys apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board dated April 17, 2002 that ordered Jimmys deportation has already attained finality by reason of the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004 before the Office of the President,

or after almost two years from the time the decision was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmys apprehension and detention. They also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he was previously granted to question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the Board. Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis. Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is no longer proper once the applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy. Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no longer being detained. On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this case is his cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners in ordering his arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of the extraordinary writ. Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the availability of various remedies, one of which is an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due process. He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective until the final determination of his citizenship before the proper courts. Moreover, he maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee. Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead therein his father, and that he should have been given a full blown trial before a regular court where he can prove his citizenship. Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition meritorious. We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error.

The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court in this context includes quasi -judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Courts pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. G.R. No. 88550 April 18, 1990 INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIALCORPORATION, THE HON. GERONIMO

VELASCO in his capacity as Minister of Energy and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents. Facts:

Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development(BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy for another coal operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal blocks which, together with the original two blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area."IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal supply-demand balance . . . the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC),which was already developing the coal deposit in another area (BagacayArea) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to MMIC(Rollo, p. 37). Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150,2 alleging that MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks even before the Memorandum of Agreement was finalized and approved by the BED; that MMIC discontinued work thereon; that MMIC failed to apply for a coal operating contract for the adjacent coal blocks; and that MMIC failed and refused to pay the reimbursements agreed upon and to assume IEI's loan obligation as provided in the Memorandum of Agreement (Rollo, p. 38). IEI also prayed that the Energy Minister be ordered to approve the return of the coal operating contract from MMIC to petitioner, with a written confirmation that said contract is valid and effective, and, in due course, to convert said contract from an exploration agreement to a development/production or exploitation contract in IEI's favor. Respondent, Philippine National Bank (PNB), was later impleaded as co-defendant in an Amended Complaint when the latter with the Development Bank of the Philippines effected extra-judicial foreclosures on certain mortgages, particularly the Mortgage Trust Agreement, dated 13 July 1981,constituted in its favor by MMIC after the latter defaulted in its obligation totalling around P22 million as of 15 July 1984 ISSUES 1. Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks? 2. Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that it is the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) which has jurisdiction over said action and not the civil court? HELD:

No, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide. For the BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board (abolished by Sec. 11, P.D. No. 1206, dated 6 October 1977) is tasked with the function of establishing a comprehensive and integrated national program for the exploration, exploitation, and development and extraction of fossil fuels, such as the country's coal resources; adopting a coal development program; regulating all activities relative thereto; and undertaking by itself or through service contracts such exploitation and development, all in the interest of an effective and coordinated development of extracted resources. Thus, the pertinent sections of P.D. No. 1206 provide: Sec. 6. Bureau of Energy Development. There is created in the Department a Bureau of Energy Development, hereinafter referred to in this Section as the Bureau, which shall have the following powers and functions, among others: a. Administer a national program for the encouragement, guidance, and whenever necessary, regulation of such business activity relative to the exploration, exploitation, development, and extraction of fossil fuels such as petroleum, coal , . . . The decisions, orders, resolutions or actions of the Bureau may be appealed to the Secretary whose decisions are final and executory unless appealed to the President. (Emphasis supplied.) That law further provides that the powers and functions of the defunct Energy Development Board relative to the implementation of P.D. No. 972 on coal exploration and development have been transferred to the BED, provided that coal operating contracts including the transfer or assignment of interest in said contracts, shall require the approval of the Secretary (Minister) of Energy(Sec. 12, P.D. No. 1206). Sec. 12. . . . the powers and functions transferred to the Bureau of Energy Development are: xxx xxx xxxii. The following powers and functions of the Energy Development Board under PD No. 910 . . .

(1) Undertake by itself or through other arrangements, such as service contracts, the active exploration, exploitation, development, and extraction of energy resources . . .(2)

Regulate all activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development, and extraction of fossil and nuclear fuels . . .(P.D. No. 1206) (Emphasis supplied.) P.D. No. 972 also provides: Sec. 8. Each coal operating contract herein authorized shall . . . be executed by the Energy Development Board. Considering the foregoing statutory provisions, the jurisdiction of the BED, in the first instance, to pass upon any question involving the Memorandum of Agreement between IEI and MMIC, revolving as its does around a coal operating contract, should be sustained. 2nd issue: NO. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts eventhough the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, Emphasis supplied).Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. QUALITRANS V. ROYAL CLASS FACTS:

1. Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc., was the grantee of a certificate of public convenience issued by the defunct Board of Transportation to operate a "garage (tourist) air-conditioned service" from Manila t any point in Luzon 2. A decision by the BOT amended the certificate for garage service into one for limousine tourist service for the transportation of all outgoing passengers of the Manila International Airport 3. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by private respondent with Transcare, Inc., a duly licensed limousine service operator and likewise, a holder of a certificate of public convenience. 4. By virtue of said sale, the franchise granted to Transcare, Inc. for the use of 40 units of tourist cars was sold to private respondent. 5. On December 27, 1985, upon application filed for the approval of aforementioned sale, an Order was issued by the Land Transportation Commission granting a provisional permit in favor of private respondent (Annexes C and 3, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049); Annexes B and 3 CA-G.R. No. 10370-SP). The prefatory portion thereof states: The application filed in this case is for the approval of sale made by TRANSCARE, INC., in favor of ROYAL CLASS LIMOUSINE SERVICE of the Certificate of Public Convenience issued in Case Nos. 81-4405 and 82-415 authorizing the operation of a TOURIST CAR (AIR-CONDITIONED) SERVICE within the New Manila International Airport and from said place to any point in the Island of Luzon accessible to motor vehicle traffic and vice-versa, involving the right to operate forty (40) units authorized therein. ... (Emphasis supplied). 6. Petitioner argues that the application filed by private respondent was for the route from the "New Manila International Airport to hotels and from said hotels to any point in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic and vice-versa", and not from the "New Manila International Airport ... to any point in the Island of Luzon. 7. Petitioner claims that respondent has been soliciting passengers from the New Manila International Airport to transport them to any point in Luzon to the prejudice of petitioner's business. 8. Essentially, petitioners main contention is that they should be the only business to be offering that particular service. Issue: Is petitioners contention correct? HELD: NO, it is not.

RATIO: > Under the constitution, it is to the best interest of the public to have two or more companies in the field to stimulate business and prevent monopolies pursuant to the constitutional mandate of equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth, and regulation of competition and prohibition of monopolies. > the Court finds it "hard to conceive how it would be for the best interests of the public" 17, to have one line only, "and how the public would be injured by the granting of the certificate in question, for it must be conceded that two companies in the field would stimulate the business > It is simply bellyaching to say that Royal Class had transcended the bounds of the certificate of public convenience granted to it. What Qualitrans is plainly carping about is the threat the Royal Class' certificate of public convenience poses on its foothold in the "limo" service business. This is monopolism, plainly and simply, and we cannot tolerate it. > There is no merit in the claims that Royal Class has been guilty of unfair competition. For starters, its Certificate of Public Convenience has been duly issued. The CPC cannot therefore be said to have been acquired through duress or deceit to warrant such a charge. > Accordingly, Petitioners petition must be dismissed. Paat vs CA FACTS The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugans action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their

motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings. ISSUE Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine. HELD The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Dagudag v Judge Paderanga FACTS:

Illegal forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. were seized by the DENR. The items were found to be lacking the required legal documents and were consequently abandoned by the unknown owner. Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of replevin for the release of said confiscated products. Respondent Judge issued the writ despite the fact that an administrative case was already pending before the DENR. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct unbecoming a judge. HELD: Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws. The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright.

Solid Homes vs Payawal Payawal bought a house from Solid Homes. Although she already paid the price, Solid Homes failed to deliver the Certificate of Title. Thus, Payawal filed a case before the court. Solid Homes argued that NHA has jurisdiction instead. Ruling: RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court sustained the competence of the National Housing Authority(NHA) in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction vested in its by PD 957 and PD 1344 to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot. Under PD 1344, the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:1) Unsound real estate business practices;2) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and3) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. Marina Properties Corp. vs. CA, (294 SCRA 273) Facts: Marina constructed a condo and hired Carlos as a principal contractor. As anincentive, it allowed Carlos to buy one unit. Now, Marina refused to accept Carlos Constructions payment for its balance for the condo unit it bought. Carlos filed damages before the RTC and an action for specific performance before the HLURB. Held: The issue of forum shopping raised by MARINA deserves scant consideration. H.L. CARLOS was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued MARINA before the HLURB to enforce their Contract To Purchase and To Sell. Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two (2) or more actions or

proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court might look with favor upon the party. Contrary to MARINA's, assertion, H.L. CARLOS' complaint was hardly a duplication of Civil Case. No. 89-5870 which was filed to collect the sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from their Construction Contract. The cause of action in the civil case was, therefore, totally distinct from the cause of action in the complaint before the HLURB. For this reason, neither could there have been splitting of a cause of action. Carlos is not guilty of forum shopping since the cause of action is differentThere is no forum shopping where a party sues another before the HLURB to enforce their Contract to Purchase and to Sell and files another suit in court to collect sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from their Construction Contract. C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268 Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville DevelopmentCorporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent EfrenDiongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demandedthe delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When neither thepetitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them forspecific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of NegrosOccidental. The case was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T. TorresEnterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that thecompetent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land UseRegulatory Board. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court contendingthat it had jurisdiction over the matter.Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as "TheSubdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides that theNational Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate the realestate trade and business.P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered theNational Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of itsdecisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of theagency as follows: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade andbusiness and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No.957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear anddecide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot orcondominium unit buyer against the project owner developer, dealer, broker orsalesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed bybuyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,broker or salesman. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justifiedby expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly andcompetently to the pressing problems of the modem world. Arranza vs. BF Homes FACTS: Respondent BF Homes, Inc (BFHI) , is a domestic corporation engaged in developing subdivision and selling residential lots. One of the subdivisions that respondent developed was the BF Homes Paranaque Subdivision. With the withdrawal of substantial investments in BFHI , respondent filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation. Atty Florencio Orendain was appointed as receiver. He was later relieved by the SEC of his duties as a Receiver. The new Board of Receivers revoked the authority given by Orendain to use the open spaces at Concha Cruz Drive and to collect community assessment funds; deferred the purchase of new pumps ; recognized BF Paranaque Homeowners Association (BFPHAI) as the representative of all homeowners; took over the management of the Clubhouse and deployed its own guards. Petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit for and in behalf of the more than 7,000 homeowners against respondent BFHI et al to enforce the rights of purchasers of lots in BF Homes Paranaque 3. Respondents asserts that the SEC, not the HLURB, has jurisdiction arguing that the SEC, being the appointing authority should be the one to take cognizance of controversies arising from the performance of the receivers duties. ISSUE: Does HLURB has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint for specific perfor mance to enforce their rights as purchasers of subdivision lots ? HELD: Yes. Petitioners complaint for specific performance to enforce their rights as purchasers of subdivision lots as regards right of way, water, open spaces, road and perimeter wall repairs, and security falls within the jurisdiction of HLURB, not SEC. What petitioners seek to enforce are respondents obligations as a subdivision developer. Petitioners do not aim to enforce a pecuniary demand. The claim for respondent should be viewed in the light of respondents failure its statutory and contractual obligations to provide petitioners a decent human settlement and ample opportunities for improving

the quality of their life. The HLURB, not the SEC, is equipped with the expertise to deal with that matter. The HLURB should view the issue of whether the Board of Receivers correctly revoked the agreements entered into between the previous receiver and the petitioners from the perspective of the homeowners interest which PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree) aims to protect. Fabia vs. CA. 363 SCRA 433 Although the doctrine of primary jurisdiction exhorts the referral of the instant case to the SEC for its resolution, however, RA 8799 (30 May 2000), The Securities Regulation Code, has amended PD 902-A, and transferred the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate cases (all those enumerated under Sec. 5 of PD902-A) to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Courts. PAL vs. Kurangking, 389 SCRA 588 Note that on 15 December 2000, the Court, in A.M. No 00-8-10-SC, adopted theInterim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation and directed the transfer from the SEC to RTCs, all petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations,partnerships and associations under PD 902-A in accordance with the amendatory provisions of RA 8799. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision, dated 20 August 1998, rendered by the Court of Appeals inC.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036, enjoining petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) from taking cognizance of or initiating any action against the respondentcorporation Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) and members of its board of directors, respondents Manuel S. Recto, Rene S. Villarica, Pelagio Ricalde, AntonioReina, Francisco Anonuevo, Joseph Sy and Santiago Tanchan, Jr., with respect toSections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Doctrine : The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law where a reasonable construction that will support the law may begiven. It is well established that administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to confirm to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its general policies.The insider's misuse of

nonpublic and undisclosed information is the gravamen of illegal conduct. The intent of the law is the protection of investors against fraud,committed when an insider, using secret information, takes advantage of anuninformed investor. Insiders are obligated to disclose material information to theother party or abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. This duty todisclose or abstain is based n 2 factors: 1) the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly to information intended to be available only for acorporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone and 2) the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such information knowing it isunavailable to those with whom he is dealing. Facts: - The Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with GHB(Ganda Holdings Berhad). Under said memorandum of agreement, IRC acquired100% of the entire capital stock of GEHI (Ganda Energy Holdings Inc.) whichwould own and operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine power generating barge. Inexchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC. Onthe side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital of PRCI (Philippine RacingClub).- It is alleged herein that a press release announcing the approval of the agreementwas sent to the Philippine Stock Exchange through facsimile and the SEC, but thefacsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. However, the SEC receivedreports that the IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiationswith GHB and that some of its directors, heavily traded IRC shares utilizingthis material insider information. For this reason, the SEC required the directorsto appear before the SEC to explain the alleged failure to disclose materialinformation as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. Unsatisfiedwith the explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the IRC violated theRules in connection with the then Old Securities Act when it failed to maketimely disclosures of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC foundthat the directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares inviolation of the Revised Securities Act. - Respondents, however, questioned the authority of the SEC to investigate on saidmatter since according to PD 902-A, jurisdiction upon the matter was conferred uponthe PED (Prosecution and Enforcement Department) of the SEC however, thisissue is already moot since pending the disposition of the case,

the SecuritiesRegulation Code was passed thereby effectively repealing PD 902-A and abolishingthe PED. They also contended that their right to due process was violated when theSEC required them to appear before the SEC to show cause why sanctions shouldnot be imposed upon them since such requirement shifted the burden of proof torespondents.The case reached the CA and said court ruled in favor of the respondents andeffectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative casesagainst respondents. In its resolution, the CA stated that since there are no rulesand regulations implementing the rules regarding DISCLOSURE, INSIDERTRADING OR ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT, the SEC has no statutory authority to file any suit against respondents. The CA,therefore, prohibited the SEC from taking cognizance or initiating any action againstthe respondents for the alleged violations of the Revised Securities Act. Issue: 1.) Whether or not the SEC has authority to file suit against respondents for violations of the RSA.2.) Whether or not their right to due process was violated when the SEC denied theparties of their right to cross examination. Ratio:- The Revised Securities Act does not require the enactment of implementingrules to make it binding and effective. The provisions of the RSA aresufficiently clear and complete by themselves. The requirements arespecifically set out and the acts which are enjoined are determinable. To rule that absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress wouldempower administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying theimplementing rules. Where the statute contains sufficient standards and anunmistakable intent (as in this case, the RSA) there should be no impediment as toits implementation.- The court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in the RSA such that theacts proscribed and/or required would not be understood by a person of ordinaryintelligence. The provision explains in simple terms that the insider's misuse of nonpublic and undisclosed information is the gravamen of illegal conduct and that the intent of the law is the protection of investors against fraud committedwhen an insider, using secret information, takes advantage of an uninformedinvestor. Insiders are obligatd to disclose material information to the other party or abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. This duty to disclose or abstain isbased n 2 factors: 1) the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose andnot for the personal benefit of anyone and 2) the inherent unfairness involved whena party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those withwhom he is dealing.- This

obligation to disclose is imposed upon "insiders" which are particularlyofficers, directors or controlling stockholders but that definition has already beenexpanded and not includes those persons whose relationship of former relationshipto the issuer or the security that is not generally available and the one who learnssuch a fact from an insider knowing that the person from whom he learns such factis an insider. In some case, however, there may be valid corporate reasons for thenondisclosure of material information but it should not be used for non-corporatepurposes.- Respondent contends that the terms "material fact", "reasonable person","nature and reliability" and "generally available" are vaguely used in the RSAbecause under the provision of the said law what is required to be disclosed is a factof special significance, meaning: 1.a material factwhich would be likely to affect the market price of a securityor; 2.one which a reasonable person would consider especially important indetermining his course of action with regard to the shares of stock.- But the court dismissed said contention and stated that material fact is alreadydefined and explained as one which induces or tends to induce or otherwiseaffect the sale or purchase of securities. On the other hand, "reasonableperson" has already been used many times in jurisprudence and in law since it is astandard on which most of legal doctrines stand (even the doctrine on negligenceuses such standard) and it has been held to mean " a man who relies on thecalculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have in abundance"- As to "nature and reliability" the proper adjudicative body would be able todetermine if facts of a certain nature and reliability can influence a reasonableperson's decision to retain, buy or sell securities and thereafter explain and justify itsfactual findings in its decision since the same must be viewed in connection with theparticular circumstances of a case. As to "generally available", the court held also that such is a matter which may beadjudged given the particular circumstances of the case. The standards of whichcannot remain at a standstill. - There is no violation of due process in this case since the proceedingsbefore the PED are summary in nature. The hearing officer may require theparties to submit their respective verified position papers together will all supportingdocuments and affidavits of witnesses. A formal hearing is not mandatory and it iswithin the discretion of the hearing officer to determine whether or not there is aneed for a formal hearing.-

Moreover, the law creating the PED empowers it to investigate violations of therules and regulations and to file and prosecute such cases. It does not have anadjudicatory powers. Thus, the PED need not comply with the provisions of the Administrative Code on adjudication.- The SEC retained jurisdiction to investigate violations of the RSA, reenactedin the Securities Regulations Code despite the abolition of the PED. In thiscase, the SEC already commenced investigating the respondents for violations of the RSA but during the pendency of the case the Securities and Regulations Codewas passed thereby repealing the RSA. However, the repeal cannot deprive theSEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating the case. - Investigations by the SEC is a requisite before a criminal case may be referred tothe DOJ since the SEC is an administrative agency with the special competence todo so. According to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts will notdetermine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of anadministrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of soundadministrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. Padua vs. Ranada (390 SCRA 664) The laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure have provided the remedies of an interested Expressway user, that is, to file a petition for review of the adjusted toll rates with the Toll Regulatory Board(TRB). The TRB is the agency assigned to supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities. Petitioner Zialcita's argument that the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant, oppressive, onerous and unconscionable is a question of fact requiring knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in determining the assailed rates. This task is within the province of the TRB. Further, PD 1112 explicitly provides that "the decisions of the Toll Regulatory Board on petitions for the increase of toll rate shall be appeasable to the Office of the President within 10 days from the promulgation thereof. Republic v. Migrino (189 S 300) Facts: PCGG chair Jovito Salonga created an Anti-Graft Board to investigate the unexplained wealth of AFP personnel. He ordered an investigation on Lt. Col. Tecson who argued that PCGG has no jurisdiction over him since there was no allegation of his association with Marcos.

Held: PCGG has no jurisdiction since its authority is only limited to investigating the Marcoses wealth. The issuance of the order creating the Anti-Graft Board as applied to the members of the AFP no longer has relation to the law because the law intends only the PCGG to look into the alleged ill-gotten wealth involving the Marcoses and their cronies. And if the respondent before the PCGG is facing a charge which has nothing to do with alleged association with the Marcoses, then it does not fall within the ambit of the law creating the PCGG. Generally, administrative bodies can only exercise those powers which are either conferred by the Constitution or statute or those which are necessarily implied from their exercise.Administrative bodies commonly exercise two (2) basic powers:1. quasi legislative or rule-making = enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations2. quasi judicial or adjudicatory= enables them to interpret and apply such regulations ON RATE FIXING Legislative Quasi-Judicial Extent of applicability Rate applies to all Rate directed only at 1 entity Notice & hearing May be dispensed with unless the law provides otherwise Absolutely necessary To be able to present evidence and prove the possible adverse effects on its financial viability. * This is the power of administrative agencies to resolve questions of fact and questions of law involved in a case brought to their determination and adjudication, provided, that its determination on question of law is subject to judicial review. * The exercise of this power is incidental to their main function. Their main function is to enforce the law entrusted to them for implementation * Procedural due process should be complied with * For an administrative body to be considered and to act as quasi-judicial, there must be an express empowerment by law. Absent express empowerment, jurisdiction should be construed to mean mere regulatory and supervisory, not judicial powers. * Adjudicative power must always be read and exercised as being in aid of the principal function of an administrative body.

In other words, the grant of quasi-judicial power should not be the only power conferred but should instead be only incidental to the administrative agency's main task of implementing the law in the specific fields of its expertise. Otherwise, the agency becomes a specialized court of justice under the judicial branch. REPUBLIC V MIGRINO AUGUST 30, 1990 FACTS: AFP-Anti Graft Board under PCGG Chairman then Jovito Salonga order to investigate cases on alleged violations of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended).On October 31, 1987, private respondent Ret. Lt. Col. Tecson was required by the Board to submit his explanation on the alleged acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income and with supporting documents. Private respondent requested to the board and granted several postponement due to he was unable to produce his supporting evidence because his bookkeeper who was gone abroad. On June 30, 1988, the board submit a resolution to PCGG that the private respondent for the violation of RA3019and RA1379 an Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property, but private respondent move to dismiss the case due to the following reasons: 1. That the PCGG has no jurisdiction. 2. That the RA1379 the prescription was inapplicable to his case. 3. That he was already retired in May 9, 1994.On February 8, 1989, PCGG deemed the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, and private respondent directed to submit his counter-affidavit on March 20, 1989.On March 143, 1989, private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the RTC Pasig docketed as Civil Case No. 57092 under Judge Migrino. Petitioner files a motion to dismiss the application for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the board. Judge Migrino dismiss the motion. PCGG elevated the case to Supreme Court on August 29, 1989 the court issued a temporary restraining order from processing the civil case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Migrino has no jurisdiction and interfere with the order of PCGG on the pending case filed against to respondent Tecson.

RULING: 1. The Civil Case No. 57092 is NULLIFIED and set aside. 2. Respondent Judge Migrino is ordered to DISMISS the case. 3. The temporary restraining order was made PERMANENT. 4. The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding the investigation and prosecution of the private respondent Tecson.