ASHOK AKLUJKAR

CAN THE GRAMMARIANS DHARMA BE A DHARMA FOR ALL?w

N.B.: The present article draws its evidence mainly from Patan jalis and. It situates that Vy akarana-mah abh asya and Bhartrharis Trik  __ evidence,_ its analysis _and its implications in the larger context (a) of the sociolinguistics of ancient India and (b) of the assumptions and predilections of current Indology. Readers interested only in knowing what Patan jali and Bhartrhari have to say on dharma should move  from 1.1 to 2.23.11 and from 5.15.2 to 6.16.10. I attempt to explain the probable thinking behind the little-discussed dharma bhivyakti view in 3.73.9.

BACKGROUND, WHICH CAN ALSO BE VIEWED AS RAMIFICATIONS

1.1. It is generally known to students of the Sanskrit grammatical tradition that the authors belonging to the most inuential tradition of Sanskrit grammar (Vy akarana),1 namely that of P anini, show con2 _ , distinctively and organically, _ when cern with the notion of dharma they wish to establish the usefulness of P aninis work, the _ a. The position akaran Ast adhy ay, and thereby of the discipline of Vy _ _ P of_ the aninian authors in this regard can briey be stated thus: One _ can use Ast adhy ay-derivable expressions as well as expressions __
w My thanks to professors Akihiko Akamatsu, zMuneo Tokunaga, Hideyo Ogawa and Toru Yagi for making available to me several books that I needed to make my references precise after I began to nalize in Kyoto the draft of this paper that I had brought from Vancouver. Professor Patrick Olivelle attended promptly to my request to be the second pair of eyes for the seminal version and helped in identifying instances of oversight, obscure phrasing and unnecessary elaboration. I am grateful to him and to Professor Albrecht Wezler who later helped similarly. I have not italicized in the following pages common Sanskrit names of branches of literature and the titles of texts; the latter are italicized only in the References section at the end.

Journal of Indian Philosophy 32: 687732, 2004. 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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that appear related but cannot be said to have the backing of the Ast adhy ay.3 In fact, there are persons who do exactly that. _ _ Communication, which is the chief function of language, takes place with either kind of expression. Is there then any dierence in the way in which it takes place? Some theoreticians would be inclined to say the following: In the case of those who are accustomed to grammatical expressions, the meanings of ungrammatical expressions are understood through a recollection of the corresponding grammatical expressions. In the case of those who are used to ungrammatical expressions, comprehension is similarly intervened but in the reverse direction. When they hear grammatical expressions, their memory is triggered in the direction of related ungrammatical expressions. We, P aninyas, however, are of the view that in the case of both groups, _ if communication takes place, it takes place with equal directness.4 However, although there is no dierence in directness, whether a sentence contains grammatical forms or ungrammatical forms, that is, although the practical ecacy is the same, it is better to use grammatical forms because one can gain5 dharma by using them. 1.2. The preceding statement, despite its brevity, has the potential to indicate how the grammarians position touches upon matters, such as linguistic cognition, that interest philosophers and matters such as religio-spiritual merit that engage the minds of students of religion. Some historians of Indian society, religion, culture etc., on the other hand, may see in the statement another piece of evidence to the eect that ancient Indian thinkers could almost never think secularly that considerations such as dharma (and adharma) that would determine ones existence in another world or ones ability to escape this word for ever were always around the corner in the thinking of most theoreticians of ancient India. Why the historians are likely to ask could the grammarians not think like modern linguists and be simple observers of the various linguistic phenomena, eschewing value judgments? Why this privileging of one linguistic form over another and that too without advancing some kind of secular worldly benet as the primary reason? Could the grammarians not have made a case for their branch of knowledge, say, for example, by pointing out that the speakers of standard languages nd easier or wider acceptance in inuential social groups and get better jobs? If the representatives of a

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science in which ancient India is thought to have excelled all other parts of the world could not keep apart the descriptive and the prescriptive, mixed the is with the ought and listed something otherworldly or spiritual as the basis of the ought, can we realistically expect any unalloyed objectivity or true rationality from the traditional Indian thinkers? 1.3. Upon coming to know the nature of the grammarians recommendation, several historians working in the present academic climate may get on a dierent but equally negative tangent. In the discouragement to use un-P aninian forms, which to a great extent are _ the same as non-Sanskritic forms, they may see a disparagement of the Prakrit and Apabhrams a forms used by the general populace and _ society on the part of Brahmins.6 The thus an attempt to control more charitable among them may not go so far as seeing a linguistic conspiracy, dictatorship or exploitation of the credulous masses in the grammarians position. They may stop at observations such as the following: The attempts to stick to a particular form of Sanskrit led to the death of the language as a truly living language. Such attempts came in the way of genuinely inspired literary creation in the later centuries and resulted in a convention-bound literature meant largely to excite the brains of a small minority. P aninis grammar, however _ impressive it may be in its technique and coverage, proved to be a stranglehold for Sanskrit. It became an invitation to waddle in stagnant waters. 1.4. The volume edited in 1996 by Houben and the volumes of wellknown histories of Sanskrit literature contain several pieces of evidence suggesting that there was considerable vitality and variety in the Sanskrit tradition. The regrettable aspect of some of the histories is that their authors, under the inuence of the 19th and 20th century Western ideas of literature and language use, do not realize that they have missed this evidence and do not try to explore the phenomenon of loss or reduction of creativity on the larger background of the changed political and economic circumstances, primarily in the second millenium A.D. But one can, if one wishes, use the material painstakingly collected by them, to determine the extent of verve and free spirit present in classical Sanskrit literature.

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The charge that rationality, truly secular theorization etc. do not exist in the pre-modern Indian tradition is by now an old canard. It is more a matter of failure to recognize that one and the same phenomenon (or what is essentially the same phenomenon) can take place in dierent contexts and consequently with dierent idioms in the cultures we have than of any real absence (cf. the scrutiny by Bimal Krishna Matilal, Karl H. Potter, J.N. Mohanty etc. of the view that there is no genuine philosophy, as distinct from religious or spiritual thinking, in India; see, for example, the passage translated in 2.3 below). In exploring such issues, one needs to bear in mind also the possibility that some cultures might have realized the limitations of a particular approach (or what is essentially the same approach) at an early time in their history and consequently not spoken of it frequently or as something universally useful. In particular, I nd the thesis in Bronkhorst (1999, 2001), namely that rationality originated only once in human history and that the rational component in early Indian thought is a result of Indias contact with the Greeks, quite untenable. In the case of the other issues to which 1.21.3 refer, the following sections will only indirectly respond. Anyone reading them should be able to decide, with a little reection, which of the historians conclusions, charges, etc. should be accepted or should be accepted as stated.

SCOPE AND APPROACH OF THIS PAPER

2.1. It may be asked if what I have stated in 1.1 above was the position of all the grammarians in the Sanskrit tradition whose works are available to us. As is to be expected given the cultural and regional diversity of India and the loss of ancient texts that has occurred, we do not know with certainty in each case. The statements of the position that have come down to us are not many. Even fewer among them contain new details. The earliest ones are found in Patan jalis Vy akarana-mah abh asya (not later than second century B.C.) and _ Trik _ (not later than early fth century A.D.). Only and Bhartrharis  _ _ the latter has an extensive discussion, and that too mainly because it gets into the related epistemological issues. The commentators of Patan jali, of course, elaborate upon his statements, but the elabora-

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tions do not essentially go beyond the indirect comment that is available in the Trik and. An overview of P a_ n_ inian grammar and the other traditional or _ pre-modern grammars of Sanskrit is given in Aklujkar (2004a, forthcoming). Most of the grammars in the latter category, which also happen to be later in their surviving forms, can be thought of as recasts of the Ast adhy ay (or its similar predecessors) guided by this _ _ or that pragmatic or sectarian consideration. Their coverage of word forms and closeness to the Vedic tradition dier, reecting the needs of the times, the communities in which and for which they were composed and the composers intention (whether pedagogical or purely scholarly). But their overall perception of why and how grammars should be composed remains the same. True, most of them do not overtly speak of the relation between grammar and dharma. Further, the Jain and Buddhist grammars, having been composed in times when the policy of not accepting the Veda as an infallible authority had been formulated in some Jain and Buddhist circles, had no particular need to make their determination of acceptable usage dependent on the Veda. Consequently, in their treatment, dharma was not as closely tied to forms closer to the Vedic tradition as in the Brahmanical treatment. One may also detect in them a slightly greater emphasis on meaning or import than on accurate pronunciation. But the absence of statements explicitly  stating that grammars help one in preserving the Agamas and are thus instrumental in dharma acquisition need not imply that the connection between grammars and dharma was rejected or was not implicitly maintained in practice. Recent research has been increasingly (and rightly) indicating that in dharma praxis and management the Jains and the Buddhists were far closer to the Vedic or Brahmanical tradition than has so far been realized by the scholarly community at large. In many areas, they had parallel norms and procedures, if not exactly the same. It is, therefore, possible that no explicit statement on the relationship between grammaticality and dharma was made because it was not deemed necessary that it was a commonly accepted relationship in the contemporary Indian intellectual culture. Besides, it is not the case that the importance of  proper pronounciation and preservation of the Agamas has not been articulated in the two surviving Sramana traditions. The Jain _ a bha to the copying of practice, in particular, of attaching dharma-l  Agama texts (and to knowledge preservation in general through the copying of manuscripts) makes it likely that a value beyond mere

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practicality was seen in keeping alive the tradition of acceptable rsa speech similarly suggests word forms. The Buddhist notion of a _ commitment to perserving acceptable word forms.7 A tradition of referring to the Trthamkaras or Jinas as rsis and to Ardha_ _ language, as a rsa is found also among m agadh, the Jain canonical _ some linguistic forms the Jains. Thus, as far as the perception that are related to dharma is concerned, one does not need to conne it adhy ay-derivable forms as distinct from the forms that to the Ast _ _ were considered proper in other grammars. 2.2. Subsequent to the preceding explanation of why this paper restricts itself mainly to two sources, I would like to specify how I will refer to those sources. I use P and MB as abbreviations in referring to Patan jalis work and BH, TK, TK V and MBT as abbreviations in referring to and, TK V for Trik and Bhartrharis works. TK stands for Trik  _ _ __    Vrttiand MBT for Mahabhasya-tka. The last, BHs commentary  _ _ on the MB, carries the historically inaccurate title Mah abh asya_ a in the more commonly cited editions. dpik The title more commonly used at present for the TK is  Vakyapadya. In my view, the original situation was like this:  Book 1: Agama-samuccaya or Brahma-k anda __ akya-k anda Book 2: V akyapadya or V _ _ anda, divided into chapters called Book 3: Prakrna(ka) or Pada-k _ __ samuddes as nd may not have been the title used by the author. Its attesTrika tation _ is_ not older than that of V akyapadya as a title for the second book or for the rst two books. It is to be preferred mainly because it does not go against the evidence establishing that in the earlier times V akyapadya did not refer to all three books taken collectively. The available ancient commentaries of the TK, tentatively understood as a text consisting of k arik as only, not as a composite of k arik a and Vrtti, are:


Book 1: (a) Vrtti, authored by BH, according to a well-attested tradition which has as yet not been  proven to be wrong despite the attempts of certain modern researchers. Even if one were to ascribe only the k arik as to BH and take the Vrtti as someone elses work,  the temporal distance, as research is increasingly establishing, between the two texts would be very short at the most a student of BH would be eligible for the credit of

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Vrtti authorship. There would be no grounds for reading a signicant transformation inthought, including the follow-up of Ps statements by BH. r-vrsabha aksar a, by Vrsabha, Vrsabha-deva or S (b) tk a, called Paddhati or Sphut _ _ _ _ on both the k arik as and Vrtti. _ _


Book 2: (a) Vrtti, authored by BH; see above. (b) t  k a, possibly called V akya-pradpa by its author, who really seems to be Hel a_ despite the attribution of the work to Punya-r r aja, aja in some manuscripts and _ of the k published editions. This oers an explanation only arik as. Its surviving form is probably an abridgement made from a damaged original. Book 3: tk a, called Prakrna(ka)-prak as a, explaining only the k arik as, authored by Hel a_ _ r aja, in which two gaps are lled by words taken from the work of Phulla-r aja, who may be the same person as Punya-r aja. _

I follow Wilhelm Raus enumeration of the TK k arik as. The numbers for the same k arik as in other published editions are not likely to be o by more than two or three numbers. Where my readings are dierent from those in the published editions, they should be understood as coming from my TK edition under preparation.

2.3. Below, I will not attempt a comprehensive philological or historicalsemantic study of the use of the word dharma in the writings of P and BH.8 As far as I can determine, the range of this use is covered by three meanings: a stra (a) what an individual person is expected to do or what the s gama advises one to do, or a (b) a positive and unseen, that is, non-mundane eect generated by sticking to a norm and (c) an attribute, property or quality.9 None of these is distinctive to grammar. One encounters the third usage particularly frequently, which is not unexpected, given the nature of the major concerns of the works. A grammarian needs to refer to qualities frequently, since he must appeal to notions such as adjectives and adverbs on many occasions. Similarly, a philosophers discussion can hardly proceed without notions such as substance and quality or qualicand and qualier. For our present purpose, however, it is meanings (a) and (b) that are especially relevant.

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In two passages, I suspect that meaning (a), taken in a collective a stra or a gama prescriptions, can be read. sense, that is, as a set of all s This meaning is close to at least one aspect of the current Western notion of religion. The passages, in Kielhorns edition, are: atika ni va rsas ni va rsasahasrikMB p. I.9 lines 1517: drgha-sattra _ _kevalam rsi-sam _ prada cid api vyavaharati. yo ni ca. na ca dyatve kas a _ _ _  ya jn h   ika s a stren a nuvidadhate . The long sacricial dharma iti krtva .  _ sessions (mentioned in the V arttika) are the ones which extend to hundreds of years or thousands of years. No one performs (them) _ ) the seers have given is nowadays. Only because whatever (sam dharma, the ritualists follow (it) up with instruction. gamah hmanena niska rano MB p. I.1 lines 1819: a . khalv api. bra _ _ _ _ vedo dhyeyo jn dharmah eya iti. Moreover, the inherited . sadango _ _ (authoritative) teaching is that a Brahmin should study (and) come to know the Veda with its six ancillary (texts), which is a causeless (or motiveless) dharma. A detailed consideration of this issue, which will need much space, must await another occasion. The translators and commentators have explained the passages variously. The syntax of the second passage is not clear. The translations I have given are at least not less plausible than the ones available in print. They should suce to indicate how dharma could have the sense a complex formed by teachings meant to direct human behavior in a certain way out of concern with the after-life a sense close to that of religion. 2.4. Meanings specied under (a) and (b) above, are closely related. One may interpret their relationship in one of the following two ways: (i) a stra or a gama knows that a certain eect is good for Because the s a stra human beings, it advises the way it does. (ii) Because the s advises something, ones following of that advice must produce a positive eect for oneself. Pursuing the consideration of either relationship logically leads to two fundamental problems of religion and philosophy: (i) From where is scriptural or person-centered authority derived? How can one defend ones acceptance of that authority logically? (ii) What are the limits of rationality? How can one delimit reliance on faith? That BH was aware of the problems to which dharma understood in sense (a) or sense (b) leads is revealed well by the following passage, which also seems to be historically precious, as I have not come

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across its content elsewhere in the Sanskrit literature I have managed to read. TK V 1.172, Subramania Iyer edition pp. 224225, runs thus:
ca rya  manyante. na prakrtya  kimcit karma dustam adustam va . tatra kecid a _ .s __ __ _ a a a stra tikram c ca pratyav yastra nustha na d eva, na tu kevala d, dharma  a bhivyaktih s . __ a m eva hi bra hmana-vadha dna m eva m visaya ntare pa takatvam, tesa yogah . . yes _ _ prakrsta _ a vidh _ yata iti. _ _ ntare bhyudaya-hetutvam a stren visaya s  __ _ _ _ aktim eva pratiniyata-visaya a stram anuvadati. ko hi va-s m s anye tu manyante. bha _a _ a a strasya, krdata iva ka ranasya, purusa nugrahopagh ta bhy m arthah a stra-svas .. s _ a _ _ yate. tatha va bhyupagam d dravya-sva-bh va bhyupagama  hi. bha a eva yuktataro drs  rtha su cikitsa disu smrtisu visausadha dna m [/ sadhya dna m] rtha-kriyasu  drsta eva  _ _ _ _s _stra a nm. tasma c _cha stra-sva-bha va iva paksa  na _ s a marthyam upalabhyate, na smrti _ di-sva-bha vo yam na a strena_ para nudyate. tare, dravya s _ _ _

ruti and Smrti and the latters deThere (in the context of S  termination of what is conducive to human good and what is not), some teachers hold (the following) view: no action is awed or una stra (scriptural teaching) awed in itself. Only from doing what the s is, not from doing alone, results dharma manifestation (see 3.7) and a stra, the association with impediments (to from going beyond the s ones elevation). Take, for example, actions such as the slaying of a Brahmin. In one context, they produce (or are said to produce) ruinous sin; in another, they are (or are spoken of as) bases for excellent a stra which brings both (power to lead to ruinous sin elevation. It is s and power to lead to excellent elevation) about. a stra Other (teachers), however, hold (the following) view: The s only conrms the powers of things as they are contextually cona stra have to gain by favoring and dastrained. What would the s maging human beings as if it were a cause sporting about (a force using human beings merely as playthings)? It seems more logical to accept (in this matter) specic natures of substances than a specic a stra. To elaborate: in the case of Smrtis with attested nature of the s  outcomes, e.g. medicine, it is the capability only of (substances), such as poisons and herbs, with respective to (various) purposive actions a stras (in that one notices, not (the capability) of Smrtis, which are s  the present context). Therefore, just as in the other (i.e., the rst) view a stra is not nudged away, the nature of substance etc. the nature of s present (in our view) is not nudged away (i.e., is not opened to a stra. compromise or allowed to be questioned) by s The message implicit in this passage is that excessive credulousness should not be allowed, healthy circumspection should be maintained, and the bond with what actual experience indicates should not be severed. It is noteworthy that the position appearing in the second place is left uncontroverted.

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A contextually aected case of the meaning (c), attribute, property, quality, for example, would be the notion of purusa-dharma. Here, _ the compound, when dharma unites with purusa as the rst member of _ it continues to express the specied common meaning as can be seen from the occurrences of the compound in TK V 1.30 and TK V 1.130 (cf. Vrsabhas explanations at both occurrences). But it comes close to _ playing a technical role especially suitable for grammar when BHs commentators use it to speak of the mental state, mood or stance of a speaker or hearer that can be related to the category of the form which he or she uses or to which he or she is subjected.
a strasya tu s abda rtha-purusa-dharmesv adPunya-r aja/Hel a-r aja 2.772.83: s _ purusa-dharma _ _ rah  vaktrtva-pratipattrtva-prabhrtayah  hika -dharm a . . . tatra vaktr   _ ceti. pratipattr-dharma ba dha su -sammati-kopa-kutsana-bhartsan daya  a ya a s s tu kut _ taya eva. natva-prabhr syama

a stra (of grammar) is concerned with words, meanings and The s attributes of human beings Attributes of human beings are being a speaker, being a hearer etc. The attributes of the speaker, further (ca), are (mental stances like) aiction, envy, agreement, anger, censure, scolding etc. The attributes of the hearer are the same (eva) being censured etc. (i.e., the suitable counter-parts from what has been listed for the speaker). abda rthe s abdair Hel a-r aja 3.9.105, where prayoktr-dharmah . s  nusajyate (The attribute of the speaker is attached to word eva _ meaning by the words themselves) is the k arik a wording: abdasya abbhidheye s ropyate prayoktr-dharmah adhya . prayojyasya s  ti gamyam denaiva. tasmin hi prayukte gamyate sa dharmah prayoktar . abda-samska natva d a ba dha divad yuktam s ra-nimittatvam asya. a _ adhikrtam iti _ vica a stram ritam va kyapadye. purusa-dharmesv api hi s  _ _ _ By the word itself, the attribute of the speaker is superimposed on (or is transferred to) what the word to be employed expresses, for after that (word) is used we come to know that the particular attribute exists in the speaker. It is tting that this (attribute) should be a cause in deriving the word because it is like aiction etc. in being a stra (of grammar) is consomething that is gured out. That the s cerned with the attributes of human beings was taken into consideration (by me) in the V akyapadya (=the preceding part or second book of the TK). Passages such as these are relevant to philosophy of language, philosophy of grammar, epistemological and ontological issues approached linguistically, and psychology of emotions and literary

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sentiments. They inform us about the wider relationships and consequences of what we understand from words. However, in studying them in the context of our present topic, we should note that the purusa-dharmas or qualities of persons of which they speak are not _ the grammarians concern at the same level as dharma is in defending the enterprise of grammar. They concern the grammarian to the extent the derivation of grammatical forms is determined or explained by attributing, at least temporarily, qualities such as a censuring mood or entertaining of hope to the speaker of a sentence. Thus, they are internal to the derivation of the object language and do not pertain to the non-mundane eect etc. of the derived forms, with which we are at present concerned.
THE EVIDENCE FROM P AND BH

3.1. The passages in the MB and TK which are directly relevant to the focus of this essay, because they make dharma a concern of the grammarian through the notion of grammaticality, are the following: MB: Kielhorns edition p. I.2 line 18 p. 3 line 5; p. I.8 line 3 p. 11 line 14. TK: 1.1114, 1.25d, 1.2743, 1.144147, 1.155158, 1.171183; 3.3.30, 3.13.2110 These are, mostly, not dicult to understand in terms of translation (understanding the reasoning contained in them precisely may not be so easy). Besides being worded in a relatively simple language, they are generally well-preserved. A few textual problems do arise in the major section in the rst book of the TK (verses 1.2842 and the V thereto) in which BH addresses the issue primarily. But these problems pertain to indirectly relevant statements such as the ones pointing out the instability and limited validity of inference as a na). They do not make the main lines of means of knowing (prama _ in 3.3 below, obscure. The text of the argumentation, summarized corresponding statements in BHs MBT has not faired as well, but it too is fairly understandable as to its general import. Given this state of aairs, I will not, in what follows, cite all the relevant passages from P or BH and explain them individually. My mention here of the publications in European languages in which the passages and their

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translations can be found should suce: for P, such publications would be Abhyankar-Shukla (1969, 1975), Joshi-Roodbergen (1986), and for BH, they would be Biardeau (1964), Subramania Iyer (1964, 1965), Deshpande (1993a, b), Bronkhorst (1987), Houben (1995). 3.2. As can be inferred from 3.1, Ps direct statements on the topic with which we are concerned are few.11 They are found only in the opening hnika) of his work. When the lines he devotes to issues of chapter (a interpretation, examples, analogies and incidental exchanges with the assumed interlocutor are set aside, only three statements that can justiably be said to express his own view (albeit historically derived from the V arttikas) remain: abdena ca abdena ca, dharmana ya m artha-gatau s pas (a) sama abdeneti. evam  pas niyamah kriyate, s abdenaiv a rtho bhidheyah , . . na nam abhyudayaka ri bhavati iti. Although the access to kriyama meaning_ through a grammatical word and that which deviates from a stra) such a word is alike, a dharma restriction is instituted (by the s that one should express meaning only through the grammatical word, not through that which deviates from such a word. (The communication) which is done thus, leads to elevation (i.e., brings benet to the speaker; more on abhyudaya in 3.6 and 3.9 below). abda a strapu n prayunkte _ rvakam yah so bhyudayena yujyate. (b) s . s _ backed by (preparation in) the s a stra comes to He who uses words be associated with elevation (i.e., brings benet to himself).  punar astu jn ne dharmah (c) atha va a . Or, let there again be (the position that) dharma exists in (i.e., is to be located in, is to be understood as resulting from) knowledge (of the grammatical words). In the last, P, in eect, reverts to an earlier part of his work in which the question of whether one should view dharma as resulting na) grammatical words or from the use (prayoga) from knowing (jn a of such words is discussed. He removes the objections to the former view and takes leave of the discussion. He can thus be understood as na view and diering from presenting himself to be in favor of the jn a a stra-pu rvaka prayoga view, but it still remains the V arttikak aras s unclear if he diers from the V arttikak ara only in the matter of na meant here, unlike the jn na in wording or in substance. The jn a a some other elds, could come from just being born in a family or community that speaks grammatically; it may not need any special eort that would deserve the reward that dharma is. Ones inter-

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pretation thus may hinge on whether one is willing to accept grammar-independent use of Sanskrit, close to the Ast adhy ay-derivable __ Sanskrit, in Ps time. However, the type of arguments with which P ne dharmah defends the jn a . view and, indirectly, the evidence we have ne for the state of Sanskrit in his time indicate that even in the jn a dharmah view considerable discrimination, implying existence of . special eort, is involved.12 Thus, Ps nal position would be one that a tra-pu ne view and the s s rvake prayoge essentially integrates the jn a view, suggesting that, although there is a dierence in wording, there is no benet under either without special eort: Dharma results from knowing (the grammatical words) or from the use (of such words) a stra. This is also that is preceded by the (users) knowledge of the s how his direct and indirect commentators have understood him.13 3.3. Ps colloquially worded assertions do not get into larger philosophical issues. Even if one were to assume that P was aware of these issues, it would be unfair to expect him to engage in a largely philosophical discussion, given what his immediate concern and his anticipated readership obviously were. The situation in the case of BH is dierent. An outline of how he defends the linkage of dharma with grammar would be as follows:14 One cannot establish an items capability to generate dharma gama inherited through perception and inference alone. Ultimately, a knowledge, which can be expressed in specic words or in the behavior of certain spiritual elite (sistas),15 must be accepted as the arbiter _ _teachers claim to have seen, that is, in non-mundane matters. Some to have thought or realized, something extraordinary entirely with their own eort; some are credited by others with that sort of achievement. However, the achievement, being extraordinary, must have some extraordinary cause something that is not present in or is not attainable by most worldly personalities. It must presuppose a preparation to transcend average human limitations to such an extent as is not successfully undertaken by a majority of ordinary people. Now, how is it determined that preparation X will succeed and not preparation Y? The determination must be based on some past experience, that is, some inherited knowledge. (If it is deprived of such a basis or test, the attribution of seerhood etc. to someone will simply be a matter of personal preference or belief, worthy of no rational inquiry as is presupposed in the present discussion. There will be no means to

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ensure that something extraordinary has in fact been achieved.) This being the situation, the proposition that some linguistic usage leads to dharma (and, by implication, some does not) should not come across as outlandish, as long as the usage in question is recommended or exemplied by individuals who are thought to have cognitively or spiritually elevated themselves by following the practices approved by gama (regardless of whether these individuals make a claim of elea vation and regardless of whether average human beings can personally ascertain that they are elevated). The needed recommendations and attestations do, indeed, come from such individuals (as earlier authors or texts show). An ordinary person following them will benet in terms of abhyudaya (elevation) and later, perhaps, even in terms of pti attainment of the ultimate reality. brahma-pra 3.4. The following propositions are clearly at the core of what BH is saying abda or grammatical expression is something supdhu s (a) A sa gama or testimony. In consonance with this, the same ported by a source advises us not to saturate our lives with those expressions abda. dhu s which deviate from the sa gama are prompted by a consideration (b) Both evaluations in the a of what is good for the acquisition of dharma and thereby for spiritual progress. ista is the adviser, explicitly or implicitly through his prac(c) A s __ dhu and, by implication, what is asa dhu. He tice, regarding what is sa is also a repository, in words or in behavior, of testimony. These details, among possibly others, should immediately make a philosophical mind wonder if BH situates the discussion of the usefulness of his discipline in a larger epistemological context. As the above outline indicates, he in fact does, especially by getting into the question of whether the validity of perception and inference is limited. To a mind conversant with the specic concepts of Indian culture, the details should further issue an invitation to wonder if BH has related his immediate and particular concern with concepts such as ruti and Veda that are applicable beyond grammar. Smrti, rsi, S  _ ista Again, as the above outline indicates through its reference to s _ gama, this second set of anticipated relationships is also to _be and a found in BHs writings. He explicitly speaks of Vy akarana as a Smrti,  _ gama. He further makes statements just as he speaks of it as an a to

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the eect that the munis or sages of the P aninian tradition, namely _ gamaP anini, the V arttika author(s) and P were s istas. The Smrti-a  _ __ ruti ista complex of concepts is logically related s to the rsi-S _ _ _ Veda complex. BH does not fail to make use of the latter as well. 3.5. Now, a few more specic clarications, largely of philological and historical nature, are in order. It has been hinted, especially in 2.2 3, that in the present context dharma must mean some kind of positive eect created by the user of the language with which P and BH were concerned; it must mean a good quality acquired by the user for himself (or herself) at least for a certain time. Can we throw any more light on this dharma ? In the present context, dharma is spoken of as directly leading to some kind of elevation and, indirectly, to attainment of brahman or spiritual liberation (moksa). It clearly then has the ability, probably dependent on how much_ of it is acquired and for how long, to aect ones surroundings and ones own personality or being. It seems to be a force or an unseen item resembling energy or potency that is conducive to ones welfare, particularly spiritual welfare. It is physical in nature but not in the sense in which an inert object is physical. It is not someones count in favor of a person or a credit bestowed by one person (even if that person be God) on another person. It is a force like the one denoted by karman and adrsta that  _ can aect what it comes into contact with without needing an_agents initiative or permission to aect, although the agent, through the freewill aspect of his personality, may direct the course of how it will aect. The latter possibility suggests that the nature of the agents interest whether that interest has self as the basis or is devoid of selsh considerations may determine how dharma aects, for the agents interest is also another form of energy or potency. If one is careful not to lose awareness of the preceding considerations, one may translate dharma with religious merit or religiospiritual merit in the present context.16 Further clarication in this regard will indirectly come from what I observe in the next few sections. 3.6. The elevation (abhyudaya) spoken of as a consequence of dharma may either be a general term inclusive of brahma-attainment or may

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refer to a kind of benet (or benet-complex) that is other than brahma-attainment.17 The latter is more likely to be the case for the following reasons: (a) The earlier Upanisadic tradition distinguishes between preyas _ reyas. The association and s of abhyudaya with the former and of pti with the latter seems justiable. An inherited distincbrahma-pra tion is not likely to be lost in the grammarians conception of the good eects of dharma. (b) P talks of spiritual union in passages that are dierent from the passages in which he refers to abhyudaya. His idiom in those passages is varied, whereas in the passages specied above the employment of abhyudaya remains constant.18 (c) BHs statements (TK V 1.1422, 1.144147, 1.159170) move pti notion (sometimes from the abhyudaya notion to the brahma-pra the latter is denoted by other words). The sequence in them sugpti would be a higher gests that, in worldly terms, brahma-pra achievement. (d) The later Indian philosophical tradition distinguishes be reyasa. In this pairing of terms, nih tween abhyudaya and nih .s .s pti. Vrsabha, the reyasa would be a synonym for BHs brahma-pra _ earliest commentator of BH whose work is available to us, utilizes the abhyudaya : nih s reyasa distinction in explaining BHs thinking . in TK V 1.5. The word abhyudaya, understood as denoting a lower-level benet of grammatical usage, can be rendered with rise in the world, going ahead in terms of what is usually valued in the world or, to be short, with worldly benet. It should be noted, however, that this benet has a range and that the world implicit in its employment is not this world only. In fact, it may principally stand for any world that is better than our own.19 It is also worth noting that nowhere in the explanations of abhyudaya do the commentators of P or BH make such observations as we would in stating the benets of proper speech or excellent writing habits. Remarks like one gets better employment opportunities if one speaks like a university graduate or one impresses people favorably if one can communicate in the standard dialect are not found. Ancient Indians were certainly aware of the benets of what we may call cultured speech, display of good compositional skills etc. But those benets are not mentioned in the context of abhyudaya at least as far as the currently available statements in the tradition of P and BH are concerned.20

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3.7. Up to this point in the discussion, I have assumed, for the sake of simplicity of presentation, that dharma is something acquired or generated in the view of our authors. It is now time to note that the words actually used by BH express manifestation or revelation. They vis + bhu , very comare forms of the roots abhi + vi + an j or a monly employed in Sanskrit to speak of appearing, coming to the view, as distinct from being newly brought into existence. The following passages bear this out: abda  ana mna ta  MBT (Abhyankar-Limaye edition) p. 1: ye ca s bhivyaktau vya priyante And those words, which rvasya apu (though) not in traditional transmission, are employed in the manifestation of a rites potency anam. avasthita msaka-dars MBT p. 8: dharma-prayojano veti mma _  eva dharmah . sa tv agnihotr a dibhir abhivyajyate. tat-preritas tu phalado . ya m preryate phalam prati 21  sva m bhrtyaih bhavati. yatha . seva  _ _ (The MBs explanation of dharma-niyama with the phrase) dharma refers to the view of the Mm amsakas (which goes as prayojano va _ manifested (made follows): dharma is already in place.22 It is only operational) by such (rites) as the agni-hotra. Set in motion by them, it bestows the fruit, just as, in service, a master is moved by the servants (through the excellence of their service etc.) toward a reward. esah dhu-prayoga c ca bhivyakta-dharma-vis TK V 1.14: sa . And _ (the person) in whom a distinction (i.e., excellence) of dharma appears, as a result of (his) employment of grammatical expressions (preceded by the knowledge of grammar) dhor yah TK V 1.25d: tatra sa . sambandho rthena sa _   _ dharmabhivyaktav angatvam pratipadyate. There (in the context of _ signication or communication), the relationship which a grammatical expression has with (its) meaning becomes a part in manifesting (i.e., activating) dharma. ese niyato bhyudayah virbhu te dharma-vis TK V 1.144: a . . When _ a distinction (i.e., excellence) of dharma appears, worldly elevation is certain. Vrsabha on TK V 1.12 (in addition to his glosses on the TK V _ d iti dharma bhivyakteh passages specied earlier): abhyudaya-hetutva . t stands for dharma bhivyakteh (The expression) abhyudaya-hetutva . because of the manifestation of dharma. The implication, as the second MBT passage quoted above conrms, is that dharma is something that already or always exists. All

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that a particular human action or mode of behavior does is to activate it bring it to the forefront or bring it into action. The problem with such a predication regarding dharma is that scholars have been unable to make much sense of it. The diculty in making a satisfactory sense is, in turn, due to the fact that we do not bhivyakti view in the comnd sustained discussions of the dharma monly studied Sanskrit texts. The most comprehensive collection of the references to the view known to date would be Kataoka (2000), augmented by some of the references I have specied above which escaped Kataokas attention.23 No reference, unfortunately, gets into the logic of the view. It may seem that an exception to the assertion I just made is ya m preryate phalam prati on  sva m bhrtyaih furnished by yatha . seva  _ a _ rye ka ranopaca ra d agni-hotr bhivyangyo _ MBT p. 8 and ka gni-hotram _ ri-ganins commentary on Malla-v iti in Simha-su adins Dv adas  ara_ -vijayas edition, p. 141, lines 79).24 naya-cakra (Muni _Jambu However, the former contains only an explanatory analogy, and the latter appeals to metaphorical usage to explain what the meaning of a t svarga-ka mah sentence like agni-hotram juhuya . under the abhi-vyakti _ the air of warding o objections. They do view would be. Both have not amount to an explanation of how the view was arrived at in the rst place. Similarly, two references in Uddyotakara and one reference in ri-ganin (passages 3a, 3d and 6a in Kataoka, 2000) amount Simha-su _ _ only to suggesting two preventive observations: (a) The abhivyakti view does not suer from the same diculty as rva would. The latter faces a the creationist view of dharma or apu hurdle in the fact that a ritual act is performed at time t but its result is said to occur at time t n, even when n does not follow t immediately.25 (b) There is a way in which the abhivyakti view can accommodate the fact that performers of recommended acts get dierent results that a philosophers acceptance of dharma manifestation need not imply that every one is rewarded the same way.

3.8. Since, thus, we have no real ancient guidance on what the rationale bhivyakti view was, we have no alternative but to behind the dharma speculate about it within the frame formed by the other specics of

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BHs thought. We may not be able to determine the precise nature of the rationale but we may be able to sketch the world view it presupposes. It is knowledge (probably backed by restraint and concentration), speech (of a particular sort) and actions (incorporating a certain discipline in the form of xed sequence, accurate pronunciation of scripture passages etc.) that are said to bring dharma to a stage in which it becomes manifest. Dharma meant here then must ultimately be in the same medium as these modes of human liveliness are. Otherwise, it would be impossible for them to connect with it and aect it so that it takes a specic form leading to a reward for the actor. Now, knowledge, speech and actions are manifestations of energy or na, sentience, consciousness). the life-force (cit, citi, caitanya, pra Dharma too then should belong to the _energy arena or sphere.26 In 3.5 above, we arrived at the same hypothesis on the basis of independent considerations. This should bolster our condence in our approach. So also Kum arilas thesis (cf. Yoshimizu 2000: 154 rva, which is dharma revealed by a properly performed 157) that apu tman (which is identical with brahman, the universal ritual act, has a sentience) as its seat. Further, given the other things that have been said about dharma, it should be a positive energy or force, one that can be productive and, if properly handled, add to what is already there and lead to prosperity in that sense. If such a dharma is said to be always there like a potential waiting to be used, the theoretical model which goes with it and which I am trying to reconstruct must contain a source of information about it (i.e., about dharma) right from the beginning of the cosmos. The information sources primary role must be to advise us on how to dip into the potential called dharma and ensure the furtherance and prosperity of cosmic creation. This guess is conrmed by what BH says about the Veda. It is evident from his remarks in passages such a stra and/or a gama is the as TK V 1.5 that in his view the premier s Veda, which is (or which, in theory, must be thought of as something) as old as creation itself. Further, this Veda, in the form in which it has come down to us, is (or is, in theory, to be thought of as) a composition of the seers who witnessed the dharma or dharmas/dharmans (existing benecial or detrimental properties of things that ordinary people do not see; the non-mundane extensions of the objects that t-krtaksa constitute the physical world) directly who were sa  _ nah dharma (Aklujkar, 1991, 2004b, forthcoming). . _

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In the present state of our knowledge, the preceding seems to be bhivyakti view. I am aware the best way to make sense of the dharma that in sketching this way I have taken recourse to concepts such as energy, force, non-mundane extension and model, to which the Sanskrit philosophers do not give direct expression and to concepts such as make operational, set in motion, and move, which are not raised to the level of technical or philosophical terms. except, perhaps, in isolation in a system or two. I am also aware that the outline involves some metaphorical usage (medium, connect, arena, sphere) and occasionally may sound like sectarian mystic talk. However, it is not dicult to see that, even in the absence of a word like model, most traditions of philosophy in Sanskrit are exercises in model building. Also, metaphorical language cannot be avoided at all levels of rigorous logical thinking, especially when one is dealing with cosmogony. As for the possible impression of sectarian mystic talk, we should not allow it to be formed simply because entities like dharma and Veda are mentioned. Although these entities gure in religio-spiritual discussions, it behooves us to explore them for the function they serve in the world of philosophers who otherwise appear to be as much given to logic, reasoning, rationality etc., as we or the philosophers from any other tradition. The dharma to which the preceding sketch points is the force for sustenance and regularity of the cosmos, implicit in brahman, the rst cause, itself and a kin of what rta etc. of the Vedic ideology convey. It  is probably also viewed as apportioned in or distributed over the objects of the world when the world comes into being. A particular recommended action is said to activate it and to deliver through it a particular outcome to the actor.27 It is, however, also possible to use the word dharma secondarily to speak of the entities that are conceptually related to this central or original dharma. In these secondary usages, dharma would refer to the recommendation in a Vedic text, the action urged by the recommendation, the individual impelling force the action creates, or the end result the action produces.28 As the process of spiritual liberation is also basically a revelation process (a phenomenon of going back to the roots by taking o the bhivyakti can lead obscuring layers), constantly accomplished dharma pti. to brahma-pra Not doing the recommended actions primarily creates an impediya) in the operation of the universe. As a result of nonment (pratyava observance, activations cease or become less frequent, and the course of the universe is halted or does not go on to the desirable extent. The

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non-observer becomes a culprit to the common cause. For that reason, his or her failure to help in the full realization of dharma and cosmic continuity may be thought of as demerit or sin, but the failure is primarily thought in terms of obstacle creation, unless the intended actor deliberately decides to work against the common good misuses his or her freewill. 3.9. We are now back to the role of intention briey touched upon in 3.5. We noted above that a distinction is made between abhyudaya and pti. The former is said to be a worldly attainment, albrahma-pra though not conned to the earthly world or the present world of ours. However, in certain passages there is also the suggestion that the cause of abhyudaya, namely the manifestation of dharma, can be instrumental toward spiritual liberation.29 A conceptual link or parallelism between dharma manifestation and spiritual liberation as revelation was mentioned above in 3.8. But such a link does not amount to an explanation of the mechanism. How should we account for this double role of dharma? What are the stages or steps between the initial manifestation(s) and the nal na)? manifestation (moksa or nirva _ an answer _ to this question in the writings of BH My eorts to nd or his commentators have so far not been entirely successful. One reason for my inability to advance toward an answer has been that the relevant segments of BHs texts seem to have suered damage in abda-pu rva yoga, literally meaning transmission. The key notion of s discipline or contact (or union) preceded by (grammatical) expression(s), which probably did not need elucidation in his time, has few, if any, leads left in the later tradition. The attempts to elucidate the notion that are found in Subramania Iyer (1964a), and Bronkhorst (1996) are helpful but not adequate.30 On the background of the preceding admission, I would put forward two mutually non-exclusive answers as possibilities: amkaras Ved (a) As in the tradition of S anta, BH could have _ punya or practice of s ama, dama thought of dharma, in the sense of _ gradually preparing the mind etc., as performing a cleansing role and for the ultimate redeeming insight. (b) If dharma is a potency or power, and selsh engagement with oneself, being a series or set of thoughts, is also a potency or power, the latter could be coming in the way of the former and restricting its

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usefulness. Thus, dharma, prevented from realizing its full spread, could lead to abhyudaya, the worldly kind of benet whose range may include improvement in the quality of ones mind or change in ones worldly personality. When, on the other hand, dharma does not have to share the minds stage with selsh interest, it may occupy the whole being of the agent, transforming that being thoroughly from within. 3.10. Subsequent to the clarication that the talk of dharma acquisition or generation should be replaced by the talk of dharma manifestation, I should alert my readers about the use of grammatical in the ren abda (or of s abda when it is contrasted with apas abda dhu s dering of sa a). I have followed and will follow my predecessors in or apabhrams _ retaining the renderings such as grammatical or the eld in abdas are dhu s proper. These are justiable in the sense that sa grammar-approved, directly or indirectly, and generally receive social endorsement, just as grammar-approved usage is acceptable and respectable in our own times. However, it is important to note that the abdas is dhu s capability for dharma manifestation that is ascribed to sa time-sensitive and is not ascribed to them primarily because they are found in grammars, in the usage of the grammarians or in the usage of the social elite. The ultimate judges of the presence or absence of istas, and the s istas are not given this judgeship the capability are the s _ _ _ almost always speak gramonly or mainly because they always _or matically or because they can determine the standard dialect because of their knowledge of the dialects. The main basis for their being entrusted with the judgeship is their spiritual standing, more specically, their ability to determine the benecial and harmful qualities of things and actions at the non-mundane level. The determination they carry out (or are said to have carried out) can change according to the time in which it is made. Thus, although, as dhu : asa dhu distinction has an important role to we will see, the sa play in social management, in particular, in managing the linguistic aspect of social life, the distinction is more a Dharma-s  astra notion than a linguistic notion. Its acceptance may prevent the pre-modern Indian grammarians from becoming the exact equivalents of our linguists, but that should not bother us as long as we do not hold that everything more recent is necessarily better than its predecessor or if we notice that linguists too, especially as practitioners of sociolinguistics or as authors of grammars, engage in nding out which

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expression elicits a favorable reaction and which does not, but leave things there, suggesting at the most that a person looking for worldly advancement or social acceptance should stay with what elicits favorable reaction. Must we think of it as a deciency in the ancient Indian grammarians that they try to provide a reason, not just a abdas? Must we think negadhu s purpose, for knowing and using sa tively of their integration of the linguistic phenomenon of acceptability with what takes place, is recommended or is required in certain other areas of life? Could at least economy in the theory of social management, if not the virtue of displaying a broader or holistic vision of the human condition, not be counted in their favor? 3.11. abda with the terms apadhu s P and BH refer to the opposites of sa abda and apabhrams a. Do both terms mean exactly the same thing? s _ there is a dierence of meaning; apas abda was a As one would expect, term with a wider meaning. Any slip in pronunciation etc. could abda, regardless of whether that slip led to a variant make a word apas a seems to be form gaining currency.31 On the other hand, apabhrams _ It connotes reserved for deviants and variants that came to stay. greater distance from the assumed standard (=what we may call /bhrams signifying Sanskrit). In accordance with its component bhras _ a falling o, slipping, it refers to a vertical development, while abda has no such historical dimension, that is, it includes a verapas tical as well as a horizontal deviation. This determination of meaning a to refer to dierence is conrmed by the later usage of apabhrams _ source.32 new dialects and languages that emerged from an earlier
SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF THE GRAMMARIANS DHARMA

4.1. The preceding collection and explication of the evidence found in the works of P and BH should enable us to proceed toward a study of how the evidence has been used. In the present context, the most germane use is the one made in reconstructing the sociolinguistic history of India. Our examination of that use will not only answer the charges and apprehensions in 1.3, it will pave the way for a proper exploration of the larger relationships in the intellectual history of India. My good friend Professor Madhav M. Deshpande (henceforth D in abbreviation) has discussed the MB and TK-MBT statements

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ista etc. in a number of publications. He has about grammaticality, s _ _ decades, the most prominent scholar, been, over the last three forming almost a one-member class, in the area of sociolinguistics of early India. No other scholar, as far as I know, has given so much attention to the role played by P aninian grammar in Indias religious and social history. While I have _ learned much from his sustained work and while I agree with him on many other issues in the study of Sanskrit and P aninian grammar, I think that we need a dierent reconstruction of_ the sociolinguistic and cultural history of India from the one he has given or presupposed. D (1979a: 711) says: By the time of K aty ayana (about 300 B.C.) and Patan jali (about 100 B.C.), even Brahmins have begun using Prakrits as their rst languages, while Sanskrit is retained in the ritual and scholastic contexts. K aty ayana concedes that one can indeed communicate in a Prakrit language as well as in Sanskrit, but he insists that only the use of Sanskrit leads to religious merit (dharma). in terms of their social oce and historical traditions, they [= the Brahmins] emotionally identied with the preserved Sanskrit language Another signicant factor involved in this Brahmanical view is that Buddhism and Jainism were not only opposed to Vedic religion, but they were also opposed to the Sanskrit language in an attempt to undermine the authority of the Brahmins and to align themselves with the non-Brahmanical masses. Only on this hypothesis can we fully understand why K aty ayana claims that only the use of Sanskrit leads to Dharma, while the subnormal languages lead to Adharma.33 A part of the preceding is conrmed by D 1993a: 25: From even a casual reading of the Mah abh asya, a fact clearly emerges, namely _ between Sanskrit and Prakrit, and that there was a erce competition that in this competition the Prakrit had already surpassed Sanskrit as the language of the world (loka). Under these circumstances, the Sanskrit grammarians defended Sanskrit as the language of dharma, rather than as a language of worldly communication. 4.2. I will point out on another occasion that the following suppositions of D, as far as he makes them with respect to the period with which we are concerned, are questionable or stand in need of signicant qualication: (a) Buddhism and Jainism were opposed to Vedic religion. (b) Buddhism and Jainism were opposed to Sanskrit. (c) Buddhism and Jainism were attempting to undermine the authority

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of the Brahmins and to align themselves with the non-Brahmanical masses. To come to the rest of Ds assertions, is it really likely that Brahmins would use Prakrit languages and still look upon them as substandard? This crucial question seems to have occurred to D, since he (1979a: 9) remarks: Though even Brahmins used these substandard languages, they did not, at this stage, identify themselves with these languages. He sees the Brahmins as emotionally identifying themselves with Sanskrit. If this emotional identication is understood as comprising (a) special aection for Sanskrit as a language of Brahmanical religious texts, (b) insistence on using only Sanskrit as an accompaniment of ritual activity, (c) interest in preserving Sanskrits purity and (d) cultivating Sanskrit for various elds, I would go along with Ds reconstruction. However, if it is to include dislike of Prakrit languages and literatures and of certain individuals and communities simply because they spoke Prakrit (note 33), then I dier from him. One also needs to ask the following questions in this regard: Could a community, spread over a large area at a time in which oering mutual support was not easy, have maintained emotional attachment to a language for a long period? If Sanskrit was no longer the communitys mother tongue and was primarily learned as a father tongue or school language, is an emotional bond to it likely without an exceptionally high degree of indoctrination? Do we have any clear evidence of such an indoctrination? Would sustained indoctrination not have required a heavy commitment of resources? Are Brahmins likely to have commanded those resources during most of the period concerned, if not throughout?34 Are there examples in ancient world history of a language having been sustained over three to ve centuries (note 34) and over a large area mainly for emotional reasons against economic and practical odds? Would it not be more reasonable to assume that Sanskrit enjoyed in the period concerned considerable state support as a language which a signicant number in the populace spoke in various dialects, which most people of (north) India understood (and probably liked) and which was found most convenient for ocial business and cultural communication? 4.3. More cogently, the evidence mentioned by D does not add up to prove that the Brahmins looked down upon the Prakrits in the time

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of (K aty ayana and) P and thought of Prakrit expressions as leading to adharma or religio-spiritual demerit. as, his statements are phrased in When P speaks of apabhrams _ , v, gon, gota terms of individual words and speech sounds (helayo, ga _ other , . gopotalika ltaka). Even a juxtaposition of Sanskrit and any Indo-Aryan language is not found in those statements, let alone an explicit contrasting or comparison as languages. There is no suggestion in the contexts that it is languages which are in Ps purview. If his intent was to speak of distinctions in languages, should there not be  and va c at least once? Also, given the sa employment of terms like bha _ fact that he considered expressions in the non-Sanskrit forms of IndoAryan to be developments coming out of Sanskrit, is it not more probable that he would view the non-Sanskrit Indo-Aryan languages as forming a continuum with Sanskrit rather than as truly separate entities that, in the passages used as evidence by D, P (and K aty ayana) were not thinking of related but dierent languages?35 4.4. as of D (1979: 10) informs us that the very words cited as apabhrams _  go are found in the Jaina Ardha-magadh texts and some can be traced in the P ali canon. He refers to Gandhi (1927: Intro. p. 72) and Pischel (1965: 6) [=Jha, 1965: 6; Jha, 1981: 6] as his sources for this v and information. However, Gandhi records occurrences of only ga agadh literature. Pischels gon, with gona as a variant, from Ardha-m _ _ remark, in Jhas translation, reads: Of these [forms cited by P], in v; of JM [=Jaina M ah ar astr]. gon, Pr akrit, the most usual form is ga _ _ nothing _ the masculine is gono (393). Thus, Gandhi and Pischel have _ to say on the remaining words. As far as their guidance to us goes, as cited by P are relatable to known only about half of the apabhrams _ Nor do Gandhi and Pischel bring or imaginable Prakrit languages. P ali into the realm of attestation.36 Further, the most telling feature of Prakrit proper, namely the loss of intervocalic consonants, is missing in the forms (as Bhandarkar, 1877 noted). A form like  even comes across like a linguistic item resulting from gopotalika compounding typical of (what we call) Sanskrit. As P has given them to us, the forms in question look more like variants in dialects close to Sanskrit. The occurrence of some of them in the Prakrits is more likely to be a case of fossil preservation or deliberate retention in the process of creating partly articial and widely intelligible languages that could be used in texts that would form the canon.37

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4.5. Two further facts supportive of the view that adharma was not associated with the use of Prakrit languages in the mind of P are these: abda, which is very closely related to that of (a) The notion of apas a, is not conned in its applicability to Prakrit or Prakritapabhrams _ (3.11). Ps successors have cited even such Sanskrit words like words nkava _ _ as nya and naiyankava as lacking the capacity to generate or reveal merit in certain times38 and thus being amenable to the label abda, albeit in a temporally restricted way. apas (b) Ps discussion does not conclude by saying that the so-called nas-tarva nah Prakrit words necessarily produce adharma. The yarva . _ _ passage (MB p. I.11) does not nd anything wrong with the use of prakritisms in ordinary life as D (1979a: 8) himself notes.39 The as or so-called Prakrit words ga v etc. were also likely to apabhrams _ used in ordinary life. have been 4.6. In short, unless we decide to impute our perspective to the past and to impose our current terminology on authors who did not use it, K aty ayana and P cannot be said to have declared Prakrit languages as such substandard. They did declare some words that would be p ali-isms and, perhaps, prakritisms according to our terminology to be substandard, but they viewed these as parts of the same continuum as Sanskrit, and their declaration was made with an eye on nonmundane results, not as a social judgment. What was really looked down upon was the absence of potential for dharma, not linguistic features in themselves, and this absence was seen in some Sanskrit words as it was seen in what we identify as non-Sanskrit words in the family of languages to which Sanskrit belongs. The main criterion for abdatva or apas abdatva was theological or spiritual in nadhu) s (sa ture, if one may use a terminology alien to the thinking of Indian authors.
ISTA PS AND BHS UNDERSTANDING OF S __

5.1. The preceding discussion brings us to the question of who the proper informant of dharma-worthiness of linguistic usage should be on

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whose authority we should accept a particular expression to be capable of producing religio-spiritual merit. This question is briey addressed by P in his discussion of an aphorism of P anini with some _ short sentences that have more an air of asserting well-known truths than of providing a step-by-step justication. BHs treatment of the same issue, on the other hand, is scattered through the available parts of the MBT and TK as far as the identication of the informant (as ista) goes. As to the explanation of why the choice must be the s ista, s _ _ __ however, it is concentrated in fairly continuous sections in the rst book of the TK. My presentation in 3.311 above, being based on these sections, species them. The dierence in Ps treatment and BHs treatment is due largely to the fact that P was commenting on someone elses largely non-philosophical work and had to follow the order of that work, whereas BH was writing an independent work, the rst part of which was to be specically devoted to stating the philosophical or theoretical underpinnings of the P aninian tradition; he had the freedom to in_ the area of a specic grammar (ideas over troduce ideas not falling in , grammatical derivation) and above those which emerged in prakriya wherever he wanted and to any length that was necessary. The dierence could also be due to the time dierence between P and BH. The relevant socio-religious ideas could have evolved further in the centuries that passed after the time of P and before the birth of BH. However, given the similarity of central parts of Ps and BHs tra [Link], statements with a statement in Baudh ayana-dharma-su it is unlikely that a major change of essence took place.40

5.2. nini 6.3.109 ( prsodara d ni Patan jalis remarks are prompted by Pa _ forms to theacceptable _ tra which adds a set of yathopadistam), a su _ _ from P tra, however, does this usage derived aninis other rules. The su _ without specifying any grammatical or semantic features that would limit the sets members. The natural concern then is to ensure that the set does not become uncontrollably open-ended. This concern, furthermore, is to be addressed by taking into consideration the fact that tra makes an oblique reference to an agent or a group of agents the su a instruction, teaching. Ps remarks thus, of the activity of upades appropriately, seek to identify the individuals, an acceptance by whom or a matching with whose usage would make a form, under-

GRAMMARIANS DHARMA

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ninis other rules, eligible for inclusion in the prsodara di ived by Pa _ _ group and thereby for inclusion in acceptable usage. istas. They are to be looked upon as These individuals are the s __ arbiters or sources of guidance in those cases for which the Ast adhy ay does not oer guidance or does not oer precise gui__ dance. That this is Ps intention is evinced by his employment of anya n api (s abda n) ja na ti appearing toward the other, additional in anya end of his comment. istas resemble the s istas mentioned in other tradiPs linguistic s _ _ knowledge in India _ _ in that their status is not tional branches of derived only from having a thoroughly imbibed body of knowledge. They are expected to maintain a particular kind of behavior and to live in a community that facilitates the maintenance of that behavior ca ca). They are not exempt from the requirements satas ca ratas (niva that the judges of dharma must meet according to the Dharmas  astras and Smrtis. It, therefore, makes sense to hold that they would  be viewed as embodying something over and above what is found in books containing traditionally handed down instruction and that istas serving as guides for other activities of their testimony, as of the s _ life, would be invoked as _complementation of the Smrti as con abda-nibandhana ) as distinct from stituting an unwritten Smrti (as  abdavat; cf. TK V 1.158). The distinction P makes between the s Vaiy akaranas, who learn standard usage from texts such as the istas, who do not study or are not studying the adhy ay_ , and the s Ast 41 _ _ _   employ expressions derived by the Ast adhy ay, Astadhyay but who _ _ _ _ _ istas, then, indirectly supports such a reading of his statement. His s __ are primarily those who meet certain spiritual and behavioral readhy ay usage and quirements and who have internalized the Ast __ adhy ay usage to such an extent that they can be usage close to the Ast __ said to have an instinct for what would agree with that usage and adhy ay what would not. Given Ps obviously high regard for the Ast _ _ of the (and the V arttikas associated with it), we may speak adhy ay usage as what he viewed as standard usage. Ast __ 5.3. D (1993a: 31) is right in suggesting that, for the age in which P lived, ista Sanskrit. HowP aninian Sanskrit should not be identied with s _ I cannot go along with him when he suggests_ _that s ista Sanskrit ever, _ had a status comparable to what a modern linguist may _view as the standard dialect, or when he leaves the impression that, up to Ps time,

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adhy ay against the eorts were made to test the outputs of the Ast ista) Sanskrit dialect and_ _ usage in one specic (s to modify and inter_ _ a way as to make the outputs agree with pret the Ast adhy ay in such _ _ that dialect. The eorts actually seem to be eclectic and the usage in functional in their orientation, as bets the conditions of the time and adhy ay itself (although, as in the the approach revealed in the Ast __ coverage and sophistication Ast adhy ay, the eorts led to impressive _ _  ay as a grammar concerned of technique). While P viewed the Astadhy __ ista usage (cf. MB [Link]) only with the s and as a means of identi_ istas _(MB adhy ay as a fying the s 6.3.109), he did not view the Ast _ _ be modied, generally and exclusively, in _ _ light of congrammar to ista Sanskrit. One can attribute such a procedure to temporary s __ modern linguists, but it would be alien to Ps thinking42 and almost istas impossible to implement in his time. In his view, the usage of the s __ was to be compared, and perhaps they were to be asked if they would use a particular form in those cases in which the guidance available in di for adhy ay was insucient (e.g., in the case of the prsodara the Ast _ which_ _ taught/uttered/employed by whom is not specied). Also, in adhy ay through the inclusion of new extending the coverage of the Ast __ ista usage and view was krti-ganas etc.), agreement with s items (in a  _ _ _ not one of comparing probably to be sought. But the procedure was ista dialect with the Ast adhy ay-derived dialect the contemporary s _ the body or interpretation __ and making changes _ in of Ast adhy ay rules _ _ P, like his only in the light of dierences that might emerge. Rather, V arttikak ara predecessors, proceeded on a case-by-case basis, with the cases being taken from a variety of (what we would call) dialects. The istas as persons are more central to his perspective than their gens __ istas are eralized or categorized speech as such. Also, the decisions the s _ _ for expected to make are based on a consideration of potential dharma, not on a consideration of social acceptability etc. as a modern sociolinguist or a native speaker professor specializing in the study of a language would make.43 5.4. What does the preceding reconsideration of evidence indicate that would have a bearing on the possibilities entertained in 1.3? There is no evidence of a negative attitude toward languages like P ali and Ardha-m agadh or toward Prakrit languages in the broad sense (non-Sanskritic but relatable to Sanskrit) in the works of the early Sanskrit grammarians. Consequently, the Brahmins or, more

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broadly, the followers of the Vedic tradition, cannot be said to have looked down upon the Jains and Buddhists on that score (although they may have other reasons for not liking the Jains and Buddhists).44 adhy ay does not seem to have been used as any kind of The Ast _ _ rigid or coercive control, and there appear to be no grounds that would allow us to infer that it became an instrument in stiing creativity. The manner in which it was allowed to exercise control was dierent, but the extent to which it exercised control does not appear to be signicantly or categorically dierent from what our standard grammars and dictionaries do.
GRAMMARIANS AND THE LARGER INDIAN CONCERN WITH DHARMA

6.1. abdas, in their historical perspective, primarily dhu s Ps and BHs sa belong to the same stream as the one which went back to the language of the Veda. The Veda language was, in turn, a reection or the most direct descendent imaginable of the ultimate reality or the speech principle. The stream was changing, and it was considered desirable that it should not change or that it should not change too much.45 The means employed to control the change do not seem to be essentially dierent or more severe than we would see employed in our times. Just as, along with standard grammars and dictionaries, we may appeal to an Oxford University professors usage or the usage istas (sometimes of a good local speaker, P and BH appeal to the s _ _ the Ary   even to the Oxford professors of their times, namely avarta istas) and smart charioteers, in addition to grammars like the s _ _t adhy ay (and whatever lexicons existed in their times). As _ Just _ as, despite giving an impression to the contrary from time to time, our linguists do not compare the output of an entire grammar with the usage of an entire group or community, the grammarians of the P-BH family tested only certain usages or output possibilities by asking or studying a few members of the community.46 They presupposed the existence of a standard form of language just as the modern linguists do in recording the peculiarities of local dialects, although their language notion was muted and the dialect notion does not seem to have existed in their conceptual universe. Another similarity that is not so easy to notice is that there is probably an anticipation of our language family view and an acknowledgement of the necessity to restrict the investigation to kin-

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dred languages in what we nd in the works of P and BH. The former as words which could not be related to does not cite as apabhrams _ that s abdena va cyam, one should express Sanskrit. The latter tells us oneself with grammatical words, should not be interpreted to mean milakena bhavati vaktavyam, One should express oneself with dra Dr avida words (TK V 1.153154). There very likely was an _ awareness on their part of the linguistic variety to be taken into abda : apas abda distinction. Even to imagine that P account for the s and BH were smugly absorbed in their little Vedic universe and did not give a hoot about what happened outside of it, they would have to know where the outside began (apart from the fact that their works furnish no evidence of looking down upon the rest of humanity). 6.2. Are we coming to a point where we could say The more things looked dierent initially, the more similar they are turning out to be at the end of our analysis? Not quite. The important dierence of manner in which the interface between grammar-derived language and linguistic diversity (here, including historical change) is handled remains. A modern grammarian or linguist is unlikely to invoke the notion of dharma as something capable of aecting an important concern of his or her discipline. We have our dierences regarding whether grammar should be taught in our schools. But it is extremely unlikely that either party to the debate would take the position that it should be taught because it would increase our students prospects of gaining religio-spiritual merit. What does the dierence tell us about how the intellectuals of ancient India, particularly the Brahmins, thought? Were the Brahmins trying to control society by raising the phantom of dharma? If so, were they doing this for selsh communal reasons or did they have some sort of big-hearted or farsighted philosophy of social management behind it? In particular, were they playing up Sanskrit by invoking the consideration of dharma because they could no longer make a case for it as a language having popular support (and, without its widespread use their livelihood would be threatened) or because that was one of the ways in which they could ensure that the Jains and the Buddhists did not get an upperhand through their popular Prakrit languages? As I have demonstrated above, there is neither textual evidence nor probability in favor of the latter. Whatever other battles the Brah-

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mins and other followers of the Vedic path might have fought with the so-called heretics, linguistic battles are not a part of them. And, if at all any tension was felt, it has led to the adoption of an inclusivistic continuum strategy on the part Brahmins which makes it unlikely that in the preceding period anything that would leave a bitter divisive memory took place. 6.3. In the following, I will try to demonstrate that the Sanskrit grammarians engagement with dharma is of a piece with what we see elsewhere in Brahmanical social theory and practice. The similarity ista and the Dharma-s  between Ps or BHs understanding of a s astra _ _ understanding of the same is not merely a case of an interesting borrowing or historical coincidence. The grammarians use of con ruti (or Veda) gama, which, in turn, lead to S cepts such as Smrti and a  and rsi, already suggests that some deeper or organic relationship _ may be at work. It may be rewarding to ascertain if such indeed is the case. 6.4. Ultimately, what the grammarians claim is not that one gains dharma through grammatical usage simply because the usage is grammatical because one succeeds in imitating someone whose usage happens to be deemed correct, faithful to the authorities or respectable. The a stra usage must be backed or preceded by a knowledge of the s behind it (note 13). This requires special eort, staying away from at least some of the pleasures that attract common men. In other words, it presupposes restraint of the senses and concentration of the mind to the extent one is capable of such things.47 Acceptance of a similar na and allied features have mode of living, in which samyama, dhya some place, is elsewhere said _in ancient Indian literature to make one a better person. 6.5. In most other strands of Indian thinking, (e.g., Ved anta), it is not claimed that a life of restraint and concentration will, by itself, lead to nal release from the cycle of life and death, that is, to moksa or na. While its importance is acknowledged through the_ emnirva _

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phasis placed on it or through the frequent mention made of it, its limitation is also acknowledged. It is presented primarily as a tool, one that cleanses the mind and makes it capable of seeing or realizing the higher truth, just as the wiping of a dusty mirror restores its ability to reect objects. The life of restraint and concentration that is presupposed in the grammarians championing of the cause of grammatical usage also initially leads only to abhyudaya. (3.9) 6.6. There is a propensity in Brahmanical thinking to turn every act into some kind of yoga or yajn a. It sees much scope for turning even the ordinary socially expected acts into acts of spiritual cultivation or worship (the latter taken in a larger, metaphorical sense). What is deemed necessary for this to occur is change in the way in which one approaches the acts. The pure physicality or socio-biological necessity of acts should be accompanied by an informed mind that is aware of the need to sacrice to give up a little bit of ones selsh interest and to expand thereby. The grammarians dharma-throughgrammar thinking could be but one part of the larger intellectual landscape that resists division between the religio-spiritual and the secular. Like the other manifestations of dharma, this manifestation too does not need a particular time or place to practice. 6.7. While it places a great store by the observance of ways that would eventually lead to a cleaner or purer mind (just as it places a great store by the observance of duties suitable to each social class and rank), Brahmanism associates no guilt or sin with what people must do naturally or biologically. It is not a crime to refuse to be elevated ha raas we can deduce, among other indications, from the saying: a ubhir nara m / pravrttir -bhaya-maithunam ca sama nam etat pas na nidra  _ tu maha _ fear, sexual -phala  // Eating, sleep,  bhu na m. nirvrttis ta esa  _ _ human intercourse beings share these with animals. These (acts and states) are what living beings naturally turn to. But turning away from them brings great benets. In consonance with this is the fact that while the grammarian recommends grammatical usage, he does not say that one incurs sin or demerit through non-grammatical usage. Ps discussion does not end in a statement asserting that words

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v, coming in the place of go, produce adharma (4.5).48 The like ga term used, at least by the earlier authors, while speaking, in their preferred version of the dharma through grammaticality thesis, in the case of persons who fail to practice the grammar yoga is praya hindrance, not pa pa. Given the context that the other tyava ya may mean that, related ideas (3.79, 6.46) form, pratyava as, one develops a mind that through a constant use of apabhrams comes in the way of realizing higher_ truths one makes ones mind dense, as it were, and creates an obstacle for oneself. 6.8. ista and Smrti were notions of pivotal importance to early Brahs  __ manic social management. To use our contemporary idiom, implicit in the former is the principle that decisions aecting a large number of individuals in the society be made by individuals who are informed or learned enough and who have the potential to arrive at judgments unaected by vested interests. Such a potential does not generally arise naturally or all of a sudden, simply because the individual is assigned to a task requiring separation of selsh motives. It must be preceded by a long period of training or trying (and even then not all individuals will succeed in developing it). It is a matter of individual eort plus social facilitating. (The society must accord the requisite protection and physical facilities to the group from which the knowledgeable and dispassionate individuals are expected to come). It does not materialize only through constant preaching or mere intellectual understanding of what is expected. The prospects for its realization to any signicant extent realistically exist only if the individual goes, or is made to go, through a particular life-style in which non-attachment is practiced to the highest possible degree and an attitude of reaching for mastery in a particular eld with no worldly gain in sight it is inculcated. Ps words, also echoed in the words of rya-niva se ye Dharma-s  astra texts, are quite unambiguous: etasminn a h nya  alolupa  agrhyama na-ka rana h hmana bra . kimcid . kumbh-dha  _ _ _ista _ kasya cit vidya h s ya h   antarena p a rag a h , tatra-bhavantah s . . The . . . _ _ _ istas are those Brahmins who in this dwelling place of the honorable s _ _possess more than a potful of grain, who are not greedy,  Aryas do not who have no motivating factors that can be discerned (and) who have reached the end of some branch of knowledge for no (ordinarily found) reason. One may, then, read in the grammarians prescription, just as in the comparable prescriptions of the Dharma-s  astrak aras, a realistic

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awareness of the need to practice socially useful virtues for a long time and in as many activities as possible before they become second natures of the individuals to whom positions of great responsibility are to be rya) society. oered to create a civil (a 6.9. ista notion, partiThe other principle implicitly recognized in the s _ _average, natural cularly as it is articulated by BH, is that the normal, or god-given human capabilities of cognition can be enhanced. What is required for such an enhancement is not essentially dierent from what is required to develop a specialists skills.49 A jewellers son can acquire, through constant guidance and practice, the ability to see the distinctions and defects of precious stone which common people cannot see (assuming that the son did not possess such an ability innately.) With enough self-application and focused guidance, a person who had no musical ear can learn to distinguish as etherial and subtle a thing as musical notes. The possibility, therefore, that a life dedicated to a particular pursuit and a particular way of living should enable a person to come to know those properties of things which escape an average man can logically be entertained. 6.10. istas and Smrtis is close. The former The relationship between the s  _ _ Sometimes preserve and/or compose the latter. the latter are not actually composed but can be inferred from how the former behave. istas become the embodiment of Smrtis, and Smrtis become the nons   __ istas. The great convenience the Smrtis personal representatives of the s  _ _ oer is that, under certain constraints, they can be changed to suit the times. They are the vehicles for accommodating change and managing the dynamic aspect of societies in such a way as not to cause great upheavals. The grammarians avail themselves of a similar strategy when they make the dharma-generating capabilities of linguistic expressions relative to the times in which they were or are used (4.7). 6.11. To return to the question in 6.2 which I left unanswered, it seems unlikely that with so many signs of agreement with what we notice elsewhere in the Brahmanical ideas on the management of individual and social life, the Sanskrit grammarians invoking of dharma could

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be an improvised, spur-of-the-moment response to the danger posed to Brahmin or Vedic dominance by the rise of Jainism and Buddhism (assuming for the moment that the nature of Brahmin dominance was what many modern historians take it to be and that the Brahmins really perceived a danger). Nor has it been proved that the points of agreement appear in Brahmanical thinking only after the rise of Jainism and Buddhism, so that the whole complex of the Brahmanical ideas to which I have referred, not just the grammarians complex, could be considered a strategy for survival. The point I am making is not that there could not have been cunning, selsh or sectarian Brahmins. Obviously, like any other community, the Brahmins must have had their share of ideal Brahmins, not-so-ideal Brahmins, those Brahmins who could not rise beyond the level of the most ordinary persons and those Brahmins who were outright bigots. My point rather is that, until we have good evidence to stand on, we should not think only in terms of self-serving strategies on the part of groups of characters populating ancient Indian history. Being hardnosed about the evidence or reading between the lines of the evidence are procedures that a good historian should always practice, but these procedures should not be applied only to one group or tradition or by going beyond the contextually supportable meanings of the words in our evidence. The P aninians _ not as conception of the relationship between grammar and dharma is outlandish or self-servingly brahmanical as it may seem at rst. The conception ts quite well the other features of the dominant mode of ancient Indian intellectual life. This mode is dierent. It is quite out of fashion in our own times. But it cannot be inferior just for those reasons. It has not been proved that it lacks validity, and it may in fact be the case that we can learn something valuable from it.
NOTES

Since Vy akarana is fairly co-extensive with what we understand by grammar in _ grammar as its English equivalent, without worrying about the our times, I will use dierences of detail and cultural associations (such as acceptance as Smrti, which will  be noticed in the following pages). In keeping with this, I will use grammarian as a synonym of Vaiy akarana. It may be suggested that the rst letters of grammar and _ grammarian be capitalized, on the pattern of Ved anta, Naiy ayika etc., to indicate that works and authors of a particular tradition or school are intented. However, since in this essay the context can enable the reader to distinguish the general noun usage from the singular noun usage, I have not followed the path of capitalization except at sentence beginning. 2 I add the qualication organically to exclude the occurrences of dharma in grammatical examples and in discussions of a general nature in which what is being

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said does not have any direct or specic bearing on what is expected of the grammarian. 3 Here, the grammarian is not concerned with sentences which the hearer would not recognize as belonging to any language that he can understand. The number of words ungrammatical or unfamiliar to the hearer is presumed to be manageable. Also, their nature is presumed to be such as would come close to that of the words the hearer knows. 4 Deshpande 1979a: 1218 contains the following statement: Bhartr-hari  a) word is one which lacks the proper believes that a substandard (apabhrams _ grammatical process, and that such words signify their meaning only by reminding one of the proper Sanskrit word. He nally concedes that through centuries of incorrect usage by the decient speakers, these substandard expressions acquire direct signicance. This is a grudging admission. A more nuanced statement on the matter is needed. I cannot nd any words in the relevant passages of BH, specied at the beginning of 3.1 below, suggesting that he reluctantly agrees to attribute capability of direct signication to substandard speech. (One may read regret in the passages that an age of pristine purity has gone by or the wish that people would be more diligent, although even to do so the usual meanings of words must be stretched). In fact, in TK 3.3.30, BH speaks of those who cit, which would attribute only indirect signication to substandard speech with kais indicates that he distances himself from the view. Also, the view would go against his theses of unitary sentence and sentence meaning, since having a two-step linguistic communication implies segmentation. Where a triggering of memory is invoked, one would expect BH to take the position that the sentence heard has simply failed in its intended mission and an ontologically dierent sentence had to carry out that mission. In his view, the rst sentence may lead to this dierent sentence, directly or through other sentences comprising the recollection process and it may even be very similar to the second sentence, but it does not incorporate the second sentence or its distinctive part (the recollected grammatical or ungrammatical expression, depending on whether the hearer is used to grammatical speech). He would say that if one were to think of the sentence as something whose parts can be replaced when it is in the process of delivering its meaning, that would be a theory which is not borne out when we analyze linguistic communication comprehensively and properly. Furdhu s abdas (approximately thermore, all the statements to the eect that only sa synonymous with our :proper word, standard speech or grammatical expression) caka) are made in the narrow context of P are direct signiers (va aninian grammar or with respect to those who are accustomed to the language derived _by grammars such as P aninis. Note also the implication of TK 2.326-339 and the V thereto. 5 _ used gain and will stick to that expression and its synonyms for the sake of I have convenience. See, however, 3.7 for an important corrective. 6 Some readers may think that historians will probably not argue along the lines I have indicated. The discussion I will carry out below of a set of implications drawn in writing a sociolinguistic history of India should establish that an argument with the indicated sequence is not improbable at this time when much writing on Indias history reveals more about the historians than history. (Some of the authors, especially the ones writing about history in newspapers and pamphlets, do not even deserve the designation historian. This is all the more true in the case of politically motivated websites.) The rightly respectable scholar whose conclusions I scrutinize in 4.16 does not take his logic so far as I have indicated, but it is not unlikely that some less careful and/or doctrinaire historian will turn his suggestion that Brahmins were attaching dharma to Sanskrit to preserve that language into an assertion to the eect that Brahmins kept tight control over Sanskrit to ensure that other social groups could not wield the power that comes with knowledge. In fact, the assertion

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has already been made more than once. It has, as far as I can recall, just not been linked to the position of the P aiinian authors that we are discussing. 7 rsa here has its literal sense coming from the rsi adjusted to mean The word a _ Buddha(s). References to the Buddha as  coming from the a _rsi are found in the _ Buddhist tradition. 8 Even when we conne ourselves to dharma as something resulting from the use of grammatical expressions (and possibly adharma as a consequence of the employment of ungrammatical expressions) or, in a more general way, dharma as resulting from proper action (and adharma as resulting from improper action), it would be a risky method to try to determine what P and BH have to say about dharma only on the basis of occurrences of dharma (and adharma ) in their works. Other words such as ya, pa takatva, abhyudaya, anugraha and upagha ta must also be taken adrsta, pratyava  __ into account if our overall philological study is not to be misled. 9 The words like adharma then have corresponding contrary senses. For simplicity and brevity of statement, I will avoid referring to these contraries wherever I can in the following pages. They should be understood as implied, if the context is suitable. 10 In all these cases, the corresponding MBT and TK V parts are to be understood as included. The same applies to the commentaries of Vrsabha and Hel a-r aja. That _ some of the specied TK k arik a and V parts deal with indirectly related matters is to abdesu s a strena dharmabe overlooked. TK V 2.59 (loke 0py arthena prayuktesu s _ echo of a tram eva kriyate), which could be added to_ the list,_ is but an niyama-ma statement found in the MB. 11 An indirectly relevant but important statement, P on P anini 6.3.109, is discussed _ below in 5.14. 12 a stra-pu rvakarvam under Varttika 9, where the s (a) Ps use of the word niyama-pu prayoga alternative is discussed, primarily applies to the analogy study of Veda abdas, but it strengthens the possibility that he had a similar association in mind s with the item to which the analogy was being applied. abda dayah rtha(b) Cf. TK 1.176 (asva-gonya . .) and the V thereto; also the verse s _ quoted sambandha-nimitta-tattvam in TK V 1.12. 13 _ _a ne s stra-pu  prayoge 0 bhyudayah rvake va Cf. TK V 1.155: jn a sabha TK V 1.6: . Vr _ d jn n d va  . natah  s abha TK V 1.14: prayoga a a jn a prayogato v a Vr . _ 14 This outline is in eect a summary of the passages specied in 3.1, particularly of TK 1.2842, and, to some extent, of TK 1.148152. 15 gama is discussed in Aklujkar 1989. BHs multi-layered understanding of a 16 (a) These translations are in fact common even in the context of the grammarians dharma as a perusal of the books of Joshi-Roodbergen,Deshpande etc. will bear out. (b) adharma should, correspondingly, be understood as standing for the opposite of dharma or for the absence of dharma (and its eects). 17 It can be misleading to speak of brahma-attainment as a benet or even to use pti etc. in conveying the concept. It has been stated in many Indian attainment, pra na etc., the talk of attainment, movement etc. sources that, in discussing moksa, nirva is only metaphorical. One must_ indulge _in it and give the impression of progress from point p-1 to point p-2, because one cannot otherwise convey the goal associated with moksa etc. Further, anything like brahma-attainment comes as a benet when all _ concern with benets (or lack of them) on the part of the attainer has ceased. 18  devena nah myam yatha  sya d ity adhyeyam vya karanam. P p. I.3 line 22: mahata . sa _ _ _ _ So that we will be the same as the Great God, we should study grammar. n _ no vivrnuya d a tma nam ity adhyeyam vya karanam. So that Page I.4 lines 78: va _ _ the (Goddess) Speech should reveal herself to us, we should_ study grammar. yah     nate. kutah Page I.4 lines 1417: atra sakha sakhy a ni j a nate. s a yujy a ni j a . .. m laksmr nihita dhi va ci. esa m va ci bhadra  laksmr nihita  bhavati. The bhadraisa _ of _ the phrase _ _ in_ the Vedic line atra _ sakha ni ja nate  yah ni ja nate meaning sakhya . sakhya

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(Here companions come to know companionship is) they come to know that they are connected (at the source). How so? (the other line in the same Vedic passage, m laksmr nihita dhi va ci gives the reason.) The auspicious Exnamely bhadraisa _ _ to be found) in the speech of these (persons). _ (i.e., cellence is placed is . mety adhyeyam vya karanam. So that we should Page I.5 lines 34; satya-deva h sya _ _ _ be Truth-gods, we should study grammar. 19 bhyudayasya iti svargasya. The word abhyudaya Cf. Vrsabha on Vrtti 1.5: yatha  _  in the V pharse yatha bhyudayasya stands for a better other world, heaven., 20 (a) Deshpande 1993: 99100, referring to Palsules translation of the MBT line abda . ya as (Correct) words are taught for worldly prosperity s h smaryante abhyudaya in the Smrtis, remarks: I would suggest that we not render the word abhyudaya by  worldly prosperity. Such a rendering brings in the contrast between the notions of reyasa spiritual prosperity as seen in the abhyudaya worldly prosperity versus nih .s ankara, _ sya. This is a very late works of S such as the introduction to his Gta-bha _ works of K contrast and is intended neither in Bhartr-haris work, nor in the aty ayana  and Patan the word abhyudaya should be rendered. jali. Here, D does not tell us how reyasa contrast is unlikely to be As my discussion above shows, the abhyudaya : nih .s very late. I agree with D, however, that worldly prosperity does not capture the range of abhyudaya. (b) Akamatsu 2000: 246, like D, puts forward the view that BH did not see a reyasa) that, pti (or nih categorical separation between abhyudaya and brahma-pra .s pti. My response to this can for BH, abhyudaya was a stage on the way to brahma-pra be inferred from xx3.89. 21 rthah This sentence is echoed in Vrsabha on V 1.25d: avasthita eva dharma-pada ., _ nena prayogena ca bhivyajyate. kevalam jn a The dharma entity is already there. It is _ _ only manifested by knowledge and use (of grammatical expressions). 22 The eva of the original, which usually signals emphasis or exclusion and is commonly rendered with words such as denitely, to be sure or only, alone, is best rendered in the present context with already. Besides implying exclusion of newness or adventitious association, it captures the suggestion of being well-rooted or being rm that ava in avasthita has. 23 Kataokas important article became accessible to me through the kindness of Professors Ogawa and Tokunaga and Ms. Yoshie Kobayashi. As can be seen from what I write below, my approach to solving the issue is signicantly dierent from his. In my view, it would have been better if he had left out the passages 3b, 3c and 6b, which he studies on pp. 170171 and 175176. His perception (p. 175, p. 177) that ma nya : the structure behind the abhivyakti view could be parallel to the structure 0sa esa : vyakti seems problematic to me. vis 24 _ In the rest of the present section, my bibliographic particulars should be understood as identical with the ones in Kataoka, 2000. The only exception to this would be the BH texts. 25 Vrsabha on TK 1.30, p. 85, speaks of the same problem in another but parallel _ aktih vad artha na m abhyudaya-nispadana-s , tasya . context: na ta a-gamya h . pratyaks _ api ca _ pi na gamyatva t. ka ryam sya . la ntare, ity anumeyata  sti. To be h k_a pratyaksa _ ability of things to bring about elevation is not a matter of perception, for sure, the (the sheer or obvious fact) that it is not perceptible. Its eect also takes place at another time. Therefore, it is not a matter of inference either. 26 (a) Such a linking would be compatible with BHs acceptance of the view that mantras can aect physical reality. There is unlikely to be a total separation in his world view of dharma as a physical force on the one hand and thoughts, sounds and actions as physical but non-inert entities on the other. dibhir (b) For the view ascribed to BH in (a), see: TK V 1.33: mantrausadhi-rasa ha dikam pratibadhyate. Even in the case of_ things that are yogyesv api dravyesu da _ _ _

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amenable (to burning etc.), the actions such as burning are not allowed to take place through the employment of mantra, herbal extracts etc. Also, TK V 1.174: disu ca dosa-pratka ra-sa marthyam , and TK 2.323 and its V. mantrausadha 27 _ _ tu phalado _ _ passage cited above and the pasCf. tat-preritas bhavati in the MBT ri-ganin cited in Kataoka, 2000: sages 3a, 3d and 6a from Uddyotakara and Simha-su _ _ 170171. 28 (a) A suggestion of my remark here is that the passage from Jayanta-bhattas __ Ny aya-man jar, which has been used to determine the relative priority of the abhi (production, new creation) view should not ` -vis the nirvartyata vyakti view vis-a have been used for that purpose. First of all, Jayanta does not use any form of abhi + vi + an j. Secondly, he gives us only the meanings dierent thinkers have assigned to dharma in the context of individual ritual acts. His intention is not to dins and nirvartyata -va dins but to argue divide the Mm amsakas into abhivyakti-va _ of dharma are unjustiable or problematic. that certain referents (b) It follows from (a) that the Ny aya-man jar passage should not be used to guess abara and BH either. the relative chronology of S 29 eso maha dhu-prayoga c ca bhivyakta-dharma-vis ntam Note TK V 1.1422: sa _ excellence of _ abda tma nam abhisambhavan . (The spiritual aspirant) in whom an s _ due to grammatical usage, becoming one with the Great dharma is manifested abd S atman sa t in TK V 1.144147 which can grammatically stand only Note also, tad-abhya esa bhya sa t or abhyudaya bhya sa t. As the latter depends on dharmafor dharma-vis _ would, in eect, come to mean essentially the same thing as dharmamanifestation, it esa bhya sa t. Cf. Vrsabha: evam svarga ngat _ a m a khya ya moksa ngat _ a m a ha vis _ _ _ a dharma _ sa c ceti. punah    tadabhy a punah prayogen bhy a s a t. Thus, having stated that . . _ dharma contributes to (the attainment/realization) of a better/heavenly world, (the V sa t. (What he means by this expression is) because of author or BH) says tad-abhya the constant application of oneself to dharma through the employment (of grammatical expressions) again and again. 30 As I am not aware of any evidence in Ps MB that would enable us to determine if bhivyakti view or the dharma-nirvartyata  view, I he would have favored the dharma have left him out of consideration in 3.79. 31 abdam prayujya pra cittyam sa vatm istim hita gnir apas yas ras P. I.4 lines 1920: a _ _ _gni _ ) hita  nirvapet. A person who has taken the vow to maintain the sacred re (a should oer a relatively less elaborate rite (isti), having Sarasvat as its deity and _ _ an ungrammatical expression. The meant as a means of expiation, if he employs abda meant here must be a Vedic or sa dhu Sanskrit word that was misapas pronounced. 32 as. On v etc. apabhrams In a passage repeated three times (p. I.2, 5, 10), P calls ga p. 5, if the reading found in the present editions is genuine, he speaks of the_ same as abda. apas 33 In the part I have not quoted at this point, D asserts that the Brahmin evaluation of Prakrit languages was so negative that it led even to a negative evaluation (a) of the speakers of Prakrits, (b) of the scriptures written in Prakrits and (c) of the religions practiced by the speakers of Prakrits. 34 The period presumed here starts from P anni (not later than 54th century B.C.). It _ unga _ (not later than 2nd century B.C.), is not conned to the time of Pusya-mitra S who could be presumed to have_ provided sucient resources to Brahmanism and Sanskrit. In the case of other powerful rulers of India belonging to the B.C. centuries we do not have even prima facie evidence of strong support to Brahmanism at the expense of Buddhism etc. In the case of Pusya-mitra too, as far as I could determine, _ there is no evidence of any particular support for Sanskrit. The currently dominant

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scholarly view, accepted by D too, is that the rst Sanskrit inscriptions come from the early centuries of the Christian era, that is, long after Pusya-mitras rule. 35 _ If my point is granted, coming out of Sanskrit in this sentence should be replaced by existing or situated within a language continuum called Sanskrit. Similarly, the qualication what we call should be understood before non-Sanskrit, Indo-Aryan and Sanskrit. Since the transcendence of duality, implicit in what I take to be Ps way of looking at his contemporary linguistic situation, can be convyed only by using the products of duality, we must continue to use here designations such as Sanskrit and Indo-Aryan. 36 napayati, va ttati, vaddhati and Pischel refers to P ali in the same section only for a _ of the last _three _ __ supati cited in the MB (following Kielhorn in the case forms). It is Bhandarkar (1877) who, on the basis of the go-variants and the forms cited just now, (rightly) concludes that P shows an awareness of a language like P ali. It is worth noting that Bhandarkar, Kielhorn and Pischel do not assert that the language is P ali. Nor does Bhandarkar attribute an awareness of Prakrits to P. An explicit statement to that eect is missing in Pischel too, although one may read such a statement in his v, gona (the masculine counterpart of gon) and a napayati to Prakrit attribution of ga _ _ the language _  (not specically to Ardha-m agadh ), Jaina M ah ar astr and of As okas __ inscriptions, respectively. 37 In Aklujkar, 2003, I point out that the process of creating a semi-natural canonical language through grafting seems to have taken place in the case of Sanskrit, Ardha-m agadh and P ali. 38 Cf. BH, MBT, Abhyankar-Limaye 1967: 4142 = Bronkhorst 1987: 34, 101, 139, Abhyankar-Limaye 1967: 108 = Palsule 1985: 12, 35, 126127; Vrsabha on TK V _ 1.43 p. 100, TK V 1.171 p. 223; D 1993b:99. 39 dau. One should not speak like a Mleccha in sacriCf. na mlecchitavyam yajn a _ cial worship etc., appearing in a quotation found in S ahitya-mm ams a prakarana _ _ 6, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series edition p. 94. 40 ista was D (1993b: 113114) seeks to establish that BHs understanding of s _ _ case. substantially dierent from that of P. I am not convinced that such indeed is the    istas. His list of s istas BH clearly thought of P (and Katyayana and Panini) as s _ __ s __ ista notion is more would, therefore, be probably longer than Ps. His interest in the _ _ sustained and wider than Ps. To this extent, I agree with D. However, I do not think ista from that that this implies a substantial or essential dierence in BHs notion of s _ _ presence of of P. One can argue for less mythication in P only if one plays down the istas. I see such nugraha divine favor that he has used in reference to the s daiva _ _ of it. down-playing taking place in Ds discussion, without his being aware 41 nam, but D D 1993b: 97 has who has never studied as the translation of anadhya 1993: 28 has the correct translation who is not studying. 42 As indicated in 4.3 and as I will point out in a later study, P probably did not think in terms of dialects. Given his awareness of the Ast adhy ays concern with _ _ of the Ast Chandas, Bh as a etc., he is unlikely to have viewed the purpose adhy ay as _ single dialect. __ derivation of a 43 Related to what I have discussed so far is the question of whether P was viewed by the later P aninyas as being the last author in (the surviving part of) their tradition _ access to standard Sanskrit or to Sanskrit as a truly living language who had direct for the purpose of testing or expanding the coverage of the Ast adhy ay whether _ ista for _Sanskrit. they considered P to be the last accessible linguistic s I have dealt with this question in Aklujkar, 2004b, forthcoming. _ _ 44 The reasons and the extent of the dislike, if any, remain unspecied for the early period. Because practically any guess would be as good as any other guess, a historian should proceed cautiously.

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Let us leave the reasons out for the present, just as I have left out the possibility of there being dierences in Ps perspective and BHs perspective for convenience in taking the discussion ahead. 46 The grammarians of Sanskrit in Ps or BHs time clearly did not have as many means and facilities as modern linguists. Therefore, even if they had thought of ambitious projects like the one I mention here, they would not been able to carry them out. 47 na charity, tapas austerities and brahmacarya celibacy are said In TK V 1.5, da to be the means of abhyudaya. The self-sacrice which characterizes all these must have been associated with the other cause of abhyudaya with which we are dealing here, namely, cultivating grammatical speech. One could make the same deduction dhya yas from the inclusion of the study of grammar in the best of austerities and sva Vedic learning in TK V 1.11. 48 On p. I.11, P shows three ways in which one can account for the fact that testi abda-jn na while associating dharma with mony does not associate adharma with apas a abda-jn na. The rst way here is very much like the position taken in the a ha ra-nidra  s a verse I have quoted in 6.7. The natural actions of coughing, laughing and scratching are said not to lead to any deciency just as they do not lead to abhyudaya ista pratisddha ni ca hikkita-s vasita-kandu d ni Coughing, yita (cf. TK V 1.27: as __ _ etc. are neither recommended _ _ prohibited.). Then, (heavy?) breathing, scratching nor abdas to using apas abdas, he unhesitatingly states that moving from knowing apas jne karmani). their use leads to adharma only in a sacricial context (ya 49 That the skills which come with better technology or devices _ external to the individual are not meant here is implied by the context. We are concerned here with a humans cognitive development, not just with ability to operate machines etc.
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bha sya-dpika  of Bhartr-hari. Other editor: Abhyankar, K.V. (ed.) (1967). Maha  _ Visnu Prabh akar Limaye. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. _ _ karana-maha bha sya (Nava hniki); with Abhyankar, K.V. (1969). Patan jalis Vya _ English Translation and Notes. Other author: _Jayadev Mohanlal Shukla. [Poona Cultural Research and Publication Dept. of Sanskrit Vidya Parisamstha]. Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar Publication Series, serial no. 15. karana-maha bha sya u Abhyankar, K.V. (1975). Patan jalis Vya hnikas 1-3 with English _ _ Shukla. Pune: BhandarTranslation and Notes. Other author: Jayadev Mohanlal kar Oriental Research Institute. Research Unit Publications, no. 1. Akamatsu, A. (2000). Abhyudaya and nihsreyasa in Bhartr-hari. In Mayeda 2000, _ _ pp. 235247. Aklujkar, A. (1989). Pr am anya in the philosophy of the grammarians. In A. Kumar, _ et al. (eds), Studies in Indology: Professor Rasik Vihari Joshi Felicitation Volume (pp.1528). New Delhi: Shree Publishing House. Aklujkar, A. (1991). Bhartrharis concept of the Veda. In J. Bronkhorst (ed.), Panels  of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference. Vol. IVV (pp. 1-18). Leiden: E.J. Brill. Aklujkar, A. (1996). The Early History of Sanskrit as Supreme Language. In Houben 1996a, pp. 6985. Aklujkar, A. (2003). A dierent sociolinguistics for Brahmins, Buddhists and Jains. In BhuDev Sharma (ed.), Contemporary Views on Indian Civilization. (pp. 5469). India and USA: World Association for Vedic Studies. Aklujkar, A. (2004a, forthcoming). Traditions of language study in South Asia. In Language in South Asia, being edited for Cambridge University Press by Professors Braj B. Kachru and S. Sridhar.

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Aklujkar, A. (2004b, forthcoming). Where do laksanaika-caksuska and laksyaika_ _ _ _Research Institute. _ caksuska apply? Bulletin of the Deccan College Post-Graduate _ _ Professor A.R. Kelkar Felicitation Volume. Aklujkar, A. (2004c, forthcoming). Veda revelation according to Bhartr-hari. In  Proceedings of the International Seminar on Language, Thought and Reality in Bhartr-hari. Being edited by Professor V.N. Jha for Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.  Bhandarkar, R.G. (1877). Wilson Philological Lectures (on Sanskrit and the Derived Languages). Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1929. The Collected Works of R.G. Bhandarkar, vol. IV. Reprint 1: Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1974. Reprint 2: New Delhi : Asian Educational Services, 1991. kyapadya Brahmaka nda avec la Vrtti de HariBiardeau, M. (1964). (ed, tr.). Va  _ _ lInstitut de ditions E. de Boccard. Publications de vrsabha. Paris: E Civilisation _ rie IN-8. Fascicule 24. Indienne. Se  bha sya-dpika  [= MBT]. Ahnika Bronkhorst, J. (1987). (ed., tr.) Maha I. Pune: _ Post-Graduate and Research DepartBhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, ment Series n. 28, Fascicule IV. Bronkhorst, J. (1996). Studies on Bhartr-hari 7: Grammar as the door to liberation.  Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 76, 97106. Bronkhorst, J. (1999). Why is there Philosophy in India? 1998 [Sixth] Gonda Lecture. Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. Bronkhorst, J. (2001). Pourquoi la philosophie existe-te-elle en Inde? In J. Bronkhorst (ed.), La Rationalite en Asie. Rationality in Asia. Originally published in Etudes de Lettres 2001/3. Deshpande, M.M. (1993a). Sanskrit & Prakrit: Sociolinguistic Issues. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. ista from Patan Deshpande, M.M. (1993b). The changing notion of s jali to Bhartr _ _ Reprinted with the same tudes Asiatiques 37.1, 95115. hari. Asiatische Studien / E pagination in the book Bhartr-hari: Philosopher and Grammarian. Proceedings of  the First International Conference on Bhartr-hari. Edited by Saroja Bhate and  Johannes Bronkhorst. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994. a-ka vya-tray [by Jina-datta-su ri]. Baroda: Gandhi, L.B. (ed.) (1927). Apabhrams _ Gaekwads Oriental Series no. 37. Reprinted by the same publisher in 1967. Hel a-r aja. See Subramania Iyer (1963) and (1973). a (Chapter on Relation) and Houben, J.E.M. (1995).The Sambandha-samuddes _ Bhartr-haris Philosophy of Language. A Study of Bhartr-haris Sambandha-sa  a in the Context of the Va -ra jas kyapadya, with a Translation of_ Hela mudde s  Commentary Prakrna-prakasa. Groningen: Egbert Forsten. Gonda Indological Studies, volume II. _ Houben, J.E.M. (1996a). (ed.) Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit Language. Leiden, New York, Ko ln: E.J. Brill. Houben, J.E.M. (1996b). Sociolinguistic attitudes reected in the work of Bhartr hari and some later grammarians. In Houben, 1996a, pp. 157193. Jha, S. See Pischel. a hnika. Introduction, karana-maha bha sya Paspas Joshi, S.D. (1986). Patan jalis Vya _ _ Roodbergen. Pune: University Text, Translation and Notes. Other author: J.A.F. of Poona. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, class C, no. 15. Kahrs, E.G. (1992). What is a tad-bhava word? Indo-Iranian Journal, 35, 225249. da. In S. Mayeda, Kataoka, K. (2000). Reconstructing the Dharma-abhivyakti-va 2000, pp. 170177. Mayeda, Sengaku. 2000. (ed.) The Way to Liberation., Delhi: Manohar. Vol. 1 of Indological Studies in Japan and vol. 3 of Japanese Studies on South Asia.

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_ _ _  rva from Sabara Yoshimizu, K. 2000. Change of view on apu   . In Mayeda, 2000, pp. 149165. svamin to Kumarila

ABBREVIATION

D Deshpande, Madhav M. karana-Maha bha sya. See P. MB Vya _ sya-tka _ bha  , published bha sya-d pika . See MBT Maha under the title Maha _ _ _ Abhyankar-Limaye 1967, Bronkhorst 1987, Palsule 1985.

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karana-maha bha sya. Ed. F. Kielhorn. 19801985. Patan jali. Vya _ _ Revised third ed. K.V. Abhyankar. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. nd Trika i. See Rau, Subramania Iyer. _ Subramania Iyer (1966) and (1983). Vrtti. _See


Department of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. Canada V6T 1Z2 E-mail: aklujkar@[Link]