History as Bridge or Wall? Emotions vs. Pragmatism in Polish-Ukrainian Relations

Michał Kujawski: How did it happen that within just three and a half years from declared brotherhood, disputes and worsening moods appeared in Polish-Ukrainian relations?

Łukasz Adamski: There’s no simple answer – it requires broader context. Certainly, it’s hard to expect that such intense sympathy between nations, as we saw at the war’s outset, could last long. Mutual goodwill was the result of strong emotions – Ukraine was brutally attacked, and the threat of war loomed over all of Europe.

For many Poles, this evoked memories of World War II, known from older generations’ stories. Naturally, there arose a need for solidarity and aid. However, over time the war became commonplace, and emotions weakened.

MK: The burst of positive emotions was momentary, but moods didn’t just fade to neutral – they are often distinctly anti-Ukrainian today.

ŁK: We need calm, well-conducted surveys to realistically assess this. Currently, mood surveys are often initiated by the media immediately after controversial events, like Max Korzh’s concert at the National Stadium, where Ukrainian nationalist symbols caused a big stir.

At such moments, emotions are too fresh to draw lasting conclusions. Looking long-term, Polish-Ukrainian relations have undergone a huge change. Three decades ago, over 60% of Poles had a negative attitude toward Ukrainians, and only about 15% a positive one.

Other Topics of Interest

Culture as Resistance: Georgian Violinist Performs in Lviv

Renowned Georgian violinist Lisa Batiashvili performs “Herio Bichebo” at Lviv Military Cemetery in an enduring arc of solidarity. Batiashvili’s advocacy for Ukraine goes back 12 years to 2014, when she performed a moving Requiem on Kyiv’s Maidan during the Revolution of Dignity. In the years since, she has organized and performed in numerous benefit concerts across Europe and the United States, rallying colleagues to raise substantial funds for medical supplies and financial aid for Ukrainian musicians.

Since then – despite ups and downs – the trend has generally been upward. The outbreak of war caused a sudden spike in sympathy, followed by a decline. But that’s not the end – everything indicates that over the longer term, the upward trend will return.

MK:: Despite today’s negative moods, can we say that Poles’ attitude toward Ukrainians is better now than before 2022?

ŁK: Certainly not worse. The difference is that both supporters and opponents of Ukraine today hold more firmly rooted views. Ukrainophiles emphasize that Ukraine fights for values dear to Poles too – freedom and regional security. They add that Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression is also in Poland’s interest, and the presence of Ukrainians supports our economy.

On the other hand, Ukraino-skeptics point to threats to Polish identity, violations of cultural norms, risks of Poland being drawn into war, and the lack of transactional policy from successive governments toward Kyiv.

MK: One can understand the culture shock. For someone visiting Warsaw every two years, who was there in 2021 and then again in 2023, the change could be striking – in tourist areas, Ukrainian and Russian were commonly heard. This experience was neither positively nor neutrally processed. Negatively – it was. And yet Ukrainians in Poland work, they are not over-represented in crime statistics. What mechanisms underlie this?

ŁK: That’s a logical view, but emotions govern social moods – not cold calculation. Politics is essentially managing emotions.

MK: So the current wave of negative opinions doesn’t stem from facts, but from emotions and politics?

ŁK: Yes, and this also applies to Poland’s image in Ukraine. Information about Poland is shaped by journalists – also under emotional influence.

Information bubbles form, and reality becomes distorted. From my observations, the general attitude of Poles toward Ukrainians hasn’t changed drastically.

However, there’s a growing feeling that there are too many Ukrainians in Poland and that something in the 2022 opening went too far. Even then I had doubts – gestures of solidarity, like Ukrainian flags, made sense for a few weeks, but not necessarily for many months.

Supporting Ukraine is one thing, but it’s not necessary to change the norms of the Polish language because of the expectations of Ukrainian refugees.

MK: Can we say the situation was simply overheated?

ŁK: Yes. Both Poles and Ukrainians today lack a calm, pragmatic view of reality. Both nations are very sensitive about history and identity, and reactions are often too emotional. I believe the real moods are somewhat better than polls show, but the direction of change is dangerous – and not only in Poland.

Across Europe, political elites increasingly only react to social moods instead of shaping them. And these moods are influenced by bots, Russian disinformation, and other primitive mechanisms.

MK: The dictatorship of polls? Leaders who don’t lead but follow?

ŁK: That’s one flaw of modern democracy – the lack of filters protecting public debate from simplifications. This applies to Poland, Ukraine, and the West. Ukrainian politicians also avoid openly discussing controversies around the UPA because it would cost them in polls.

[Note: In both Ukraine and Poland, UPA stands for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia), a Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement that operated during and after World War II. – Ed.]

What pains me most is that Poland – with its safer environment, higher level of development, and long tradition of critical reflection on its own past – should demand from itself a model attitude toward history: not only defending itself against unfair accusations, but also clearly condemning what was evil and unjust.

After all, the shameful aspects of our history are relatively few. Yet in recent years, I see in Poland a decline of critical history and a growing popularity of historical myths. I say this as a Pole, not as an outsider.

MK: Doesn’t the negative turn in moods after 2022 stem from a lack of debate about integration? There was no serious reflection on refugees’ future, no social programs proposed on an appropriate scale. Was there a conviction that “everything will fix itself”?

ŁK: That’s an accurate observation. Such a discussion was missing. I understand that in the first weeks of the war it was too soon, but later it should have happened. Debate and thoughtful actions could have eased tensions. A good example is the school obligation for Ukrainian children – it was introduced only after a long time.

Meanwhile, youth integration is fundamental. Many political elites, regardless of side, understand that a culturally homogeneous state is easier to manage. It’s not said openly, but in the long run, refugees – or at least their children and grandchildren – are expected simply to become fully integrated citizens, “100% Poles,” maybe of a different faith but part of the community. Openly discussing this conflicts with the liberal Western European affirmation of multiculturalism and diversity.

Interestingly, according to the Mieroszewski Center’s research, the Ukrainian language evokes less negative emotion than Russian – which, paradoxically, is heard more often in Poland. Many Poles see this as contradictory: refugees flee the “Russian world” yet speak Russian, which causes misunderstanding.

The political mainstream is silent on this, and nationalist and far-right groups exploit this space, tapping into social emotions. From the Ukrainian perspective, it looks like rising nationalism in Poland. And so a closed circle of mutual grievances and misunderstandings emerges.

MK: Observing Ukrainian correspondents in Poland, I noticed they are closely linked to left-liberal circles. They’re almost absent in right-wing groups.

As a result, their narrative largely overlaps with the Polish liberal press – not necessarily intentionally but because they naturally adopt it. This leads to losing contact with social reality and feeding into Poland’s internal political disputes.

ŁK: I agree. Ukrainian elites are often secular, liberal, from Russian-speaking families, and admire the Western European liberal model. They find it hard to understand the conservative sensitivity of much of Polish society.

This problem is usually absent among Ukrainians from Western Ukraine. An example was the recent case of a student rejected by the Ukrainian Catholic University for publicly displaying LGBT symbols. Regardless of the case’s assessment, in Poland it would be natural for a Catholic university to react this way – it’s simply consistent with its identity.

Some Polish publicists in Ukrainian media, instead of cold analysis of Poland, transfer emotions from internal Polish political disputes into their texts – often without realizing they influence public opinion in Ukraine.

On the other hand, we have the Polish right, some of whom adopt nationalist and anti-Ukrainian stances. Ukrainians find no space for dialogue there because they don’t feel invited. The result is a situation where both sides partially miss each other, and the message about Poland and Poles is incomplete or distorted.

MK: The topic of Ukraine in Poland increasingly becomes part of political divides. Positive attitudes toward Ukrainians often align with certain party sympathies. Doesn’t this risk making the Ukraine issue another hostage of current politics – like abortion, the Green Deal, or migration?

ŁK: In an ideal world, attitudes toward Ukraine shouldn’t be politicized. But reality is different.

MK: Look at Lithuania – we also have a difficult history with it. After regaining independence, relations with Poland were tough, yet today Lithuania is not a subject of political disputes. Attitudes toward it don’t depend on party sympathies.

ŁK: Today they don’t, but years ago it was different. We remember disputes about Polish surname spellings in Lithuania. Yet emotions around Lithuania were never as strong as those around Ukraine. The scale of crimes from 1943–45 – Volhynia, Galicia, and eastern regions of today’s Poland – was much larger.

In an ideal world, emotions shouldn’t influence politics, but we must accept that some parties reflect fundamental differences in perceptions of history, identity, and the state’s future.

It’s not a matter of judgment but fact – like weather: sometimes sunny, sometimes rainy.

MK: But in relations with Ukraine, don’t we rather see extremes? Either drought or flood?

ŁK: I wouldn’t dramatize that much. I’d say it’s more like cloudy with occasional, sometimes heavy rains – but I believe it will clear up eventually. It seems Ukrainians often don’t understand the essence of Polish internal disputes.

Ukrainians today are a society united around clear goals: victory over Russia, stabilization, integration with the EU and NATO, fighting corruption. Poland, as a safe country already in the EU, conducts an internal debate on identity, values, and future direction. Many also carry tragic family memories from Ukraine – especially descendants of Volhynian massacre victims. These emotions are also exploited politically.

I don’t know any European country where migration isn’t a source of tension. Polish-Ukrainian relations will always be charged with emotions – positive or negative.

In Lithuania’s case, a positive, symbolic image dominates – shared cultural elements. Ukraine evokes both positive and negative feelings.

MK: Once in Kyiv, an American interlocutor asked me why Poland has such an obsession with history. When I tried to explain the importance of historical memory, he shrugged: “We’ll make a great deal, and you’ll have the monument.”

What role should history play in international relations?

ŁK: I recently wrote about this in Rzeczpospolita, quoting Prof. Roman Szporluk: “Graves must be cared for, but they cannot be signposts.” Memory is important for generational continuity – especially for nations like Poland with a long history. This is hard to grasp for societies with much shorter histories, like the US. At the same time, truth must be protected from distortion.

In my opinion, the Ukrainian approach to the Volhynia massacre bears traits of attempts to reinterpret history. Calling these events “local conflicts” is negationism for many Poles. Emotions were also stirred by long delays in exhumations of victims.

On the other hand, there are purely pragmatic arguments: Poland’s security, economic development, future contracts for Polish companies in Ukraine.

However, democracies – including Poland – are increasingly unable to find a balance between emotions and pragmatism. There is a lack of filters – opinion-forming elites, intellectuals, journalists.

Emotions tied to history are stronger than economic data. And these emotions today shape the social climate.

MK: How can this situation be improved?

ŁK: I’d like to convince society to move toward pragmatism, for example by showing numbers: that the presence of Ukrainians benefits Poland’s economy and social system.

But evoking emotions based on data is very difficult. That’s why great responsibility lies with politicians, intellectuals, and journalists – both in Poland and Ukraine.

History must be handled carefully. It cannot be left solely to historians, who often see themselves as custodians of one “historical truth.”

Yet understanding complex relations requires not only historical knowledge but also political, psychological, even religious insight – but above all empathy and awareness that truth is not owned by any side. Only God knows the truth.

We can only attempt to reconstruct the past and evaluate it according to values that – contrary to appearances – may be shared by Poles and Ukrainians.

MK: Among Polish elites, there are many historians – the president, prime minister, former prime ministers…

ŁK: Yes, but they are politicians with historical education. It’s worse when only historians without political experience have the decisive voice on historical matters.

Solving Polish-Ukrainian relations problems requires more than knowledge of facts. Understanding social dynamics, empathy, and awareness that the goal is not “convincing the other side of your version,” but a joint attempt at an honest look at the past are needed.