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Figure from:Comparison of Hash Function Algorithms Against Attacks: A Review

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Among the most useful primitives that are crucial for data security is the cryptographic hash function, which offers message authentication, data integrity, and d [1]-[3]. Additionally, it is employed as a c cryptographic protocols, secure transaction currencies. Fig. 1 presents an output of a fixed igital signature ore element of s and crypto- length (termed as a message digest or hash code) that uses a one-way function (known as a hash function) with an input of arbitrary length (also termed as a “message” or “plain text”) [4]. The mathematical definition of a hash function (H) is defined as follows:

Figure 1 Among the most useful primitives that are crucial for data security is the cryptographic hash function, which offers message authentication, data integrity, and d [1]-[3]. Additionally, it is employed as a c cryptographic protocols, secure transaction currencies. Fig. 1 presents an output of a fixed igital signature ore element of s and crypto- length (termed as a message digest or hash code) that uses a one-way function (known as a hash function) with an input of arbitrary length (also termed as a “message” or “plain text”) [4]. The mathematical definition of a hash function (H) is defined as follows:

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It would be impossible for the attacker to find the same hash value or H(M) for two messages (M, M’). A collision attack happens when a pair of distinct messages having the same hash as shown in Fig. 2. The hash function must have the property of not producing same hash value for different messages. B. Resistance to Pre-Image Attacks
It would be impossible for the attacker to find the same hash value or H(M) for two messages (M, M’). A collision attack happens when a pair of distinct messages having the same hash as shown in Fig. 2. The hash function must have the property of not producing same hash value for different messages. B. Resistance to Pre-Image Attacks
Fig. 4 shows that the hash value H(M) could change with the slightest change in message (M). In summary, it should be impossible for an attacker—which has been given a message to obtain the original digest after manipulating it. Besides these properties, the hash function should also be able to work and calculate the digest for any input message of any size; the hash calculation process must be efficient.
Fig. 4 shows that the hash value H(M) could change with the slightest change in message (M). In summary, it should be impossible for an attacker—which has been given a message to obtain the original digest after manipulating it. Besides these properties, the hash function should also be able to work and calculate the digest for any input message of any size; the hash calculation process must be efficient.
A. Digital Signature Fig. 3. Therefore, to be resistance to pre-image attacks, one often says that the adversary (also called the attacker) is given y = H(M) for some (randomly chosen) message M, which the attacker does not know. In other words, the attacker should find it is not possible to gain original data (or message (M)) from a given hash value H(M). A second preimage is a message that hashes to the same value as a given (randomly chosen) message, called the first preimage. Obviously, the second preimage must be different from the first. Here, we assume that the attacker is also given the hash value of the first preimage. If not, then the attacker can compute it himself. In the latter case the cost of hashing the first preimage is placed on the attacker, which we do not assume here. A brute force preimage attack can also be used to find a second preimage.
A. Digital Signature Fig. 3. Therefore, to be resistance to pre-image attacks, one often says that the adversary (also called the attacker) is given y = H(M) for some (randomly chosen) message M, which the attacker does not know. In other words, the attacker should find it is not possible to gain original data (or message (M)) from a given hash value H(M). A second preimage is a message that hashes to the same value as a given (randomly chosen) message, called the first preimage. Obviously, the second preimage must be different from the first. Here, we assume that the attacker is also given the hash value of the first preimage. If not, then the attacker can compute it himself. In the latter case the cost of hashing the first preimage is placed on the attacker, which we do not assume here. A brute force preimage attack can also be used to find a second preimage.
\BLE I. COMPARISON BETWEEN STANDARD HASH FUNCTION ALGORITHMS BASED ON PROPERTIES The comparison of the standard hash algorithm based on the general properties, including block size, word size, output size, logical operation, and the number of rounds as shown in Table I. And also common attacks on these algorithms are summarized as illustrated in Table II.
\BLE I. COMPARISON BETWEEN STANDARD HASH FUNCTION ALGORITHMS BASED ON PROPERTIES The comparison of the standard hash algorithm based on the general properties, including block size, word size, output size, logical operation, and the number of rounds as shown in Table I. And also common attacks on these algorithms are summarized as illustrated in Table II.
TABLE III. COMPARISON OF VARIATIONS OF HASH FUNCTION ALGORITHMS
TABLE III. COMPARISON OF VARIATIONS OF HASH FUNCTION ALGORITHMS
flexibility lent via the S-box. One major drawback of this proposed algorithm is that the length of the hash code is not enough to guarantee security against collision or second pre- image attacks. From the above discussion, it is found that most of the popular hash functions from different families suffer from collision attacks and also are not time efficient. As a solution to this problem, researchers proposed other algorithms. ‘ABLE II. COMMON ATTACKS ON STANDARD HASH FUNCTION ALGORITHMS
flexibility lent via the S-box. One major drawback of this proposed algorithm is that the length of the hash code is not enough to guarantee security against collision or second pre- image attacks. From the above discussion, it is found that most of the popular hash functions from different families suffer from collision attacks and also are not time efficient. As a solution to this problem, researchers proposed other algorithms. ‘ABLE II. COMMON ATTACKS ON STANDARD HASH FUNCTION ALGORITHMS