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Figure from:Trust and Security in RFID-Based Product Authentication Systems

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Fig. 1. Level of confidence and verification steps in product authenticatior process. Zero-level of confidence means that a product is not what it claims.

Figure 1 Level of confidence and verification steps in product authenticatior process. Zero-level of confidence means that a product is not what it claims.

Related Figures (8)

Fig. 2. Chain of trust (rectangles) and threats against (ovals) RFID-based product authentication system. The arrows indicate the different information flows that take place within product authentication process. The product under study is illustrated by a black question mark.
Fig. 2. Chain of trust (rectangles) and threats against (ovals) RFID-based product authentication system. The arrows indicate the different information flows that take place within product authentication process. The product under study is illustrated by a black question mark.
Consequence denotes how many counterfeit products can fool authentication after a successful attack: 1 = one; N = multiple, but limited number; co = unlimited number. RISK ASSESSMENT
Consequence denotes how many counterfeit products can fool authentication after a successful attack: 1 = one; N = multiple, but limited number; co = unlimited number. RISK ASSESSMENT
Fig. 3. Use/misuse-case diagram of functional security requirements of RFID-based product authentication. The white ovals are the security goals of the system and the black ovals present the threats. The overall requirement is to mitigate all applicable threats with security goals. In particular, the diagram shows that security officers of product authentication systems have much more than the tag cloning attack to worry about.
Fig. 3. Use/misuse-case diagram of functional security requirements of RFID-based product authentication. The white ovals are the security goals of the system and the black ovals present the threats. The overall requirement is to mitigate all applicable threats with security goals. In particular, the diagram shows that security officers of product authentication systems have much more than the tag cloning attack to worry about.
1NB: This approach is completely secure if Pr(detect clone) = 1 ? Assuming tag authentication together with weak location-based authentication, which means here that a maximum of two copies of a prod can be injected into a secured channel without the risk of clone detection SECURITY IN DIFFERENT PRODUCT AUTHENTICATION APPROACHES TABLE II
1NB: This approach is completely secure if Pr(detect clone) = 1 ? Assuming tag authentication together with weak location-based authentication, which means here that a maximum of two copies of a prod can be injected into a secured channel without the risk of clone detection SECURITY IN DIFFERENT PRODUCT AUTHENTICATION APPROACHES TABLE II
Fig. 5. Illustration of product authentication in the EPC network. (*Planned but not yet defined service; ** Proposed new service)
Fig. 5. Illustration of product authentication in the EPC network. (*Planned but not yet defined service; ** Proposed new service)
Mikko O. Lehtonen (M’07) was born in Helsinki, Finland, in 1981. He received the B.S. and the MLS. degrees (in communications engineering and telecommunications management) from Helsinki University of Technology, Helsinki, Finland, in 2006, and the diploma in multimedia communica- tions from the Eurecom Institute, Sophia-Antipolis, France. He is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETH Ziirich, Ziirich, Switzerland.
Mikko O. Lehtonen (M’07) was born in Helsinki, Finland, in 1981. He received the B.S. and the MLS. degrees (in communications engineering and telecommunications management) from Helsinki University of Technology, Helsinki, Finland, in 2006, and the diploma in multimedia communica- tions from the Eurecom Institute, Sophia-Antipolis, France. He is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETH Ziirich, Ziirich, Switzerland.