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Figure from:Narratives and Sources of Russian Disinformation on EU Sanctions – An Analysis of the Disinformation Database

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demand the lifting or report on a lifting of sanctions and further research on this phenomenon the disinformation related to the EU as unitary actor will lift the sanctions. The frequen

Figure 2 demand the lifting or report on a lifting of sanctions and further research on this phenomenon the disinformation related to the EU as unitary actor will lift the sanctions. The frequen

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sanctions and disinformation. rmed in accordance with existing theory on sanctions and disinformation to provide a certai ope to analyze the data. The paraphrasing of the individual cases basically provides immary of the material an ; to digest a vast volu ocedure of content s terpretation and a ce e literature and used ep to guarantee confi me of d makes it easie data and shape i ring was chosen rtain amount of selecti t into a more compact stru ng criteria. Coding guide 43). Finally, the em ility and explain tl r to structure (Mayring 2014: p.67). Thus helpin cture. Therefore a mixe ibid. p.104). Qualitative research involves alway ines were set up throug tructuring. The qualitative researcher always has to document eac he reader what he did to tl he primary material (Ibi pirical result have been once more analyzed with Excel and diagram ere produced. The last step included a contextual embedding with other relevant studies o pga pe ae: pee phe a Ek pe of all cases was that the EU is an instrument of the US. Although the EU is an independent
sanctions and disinformation. rmed in accordance with existing theory on sanctions and disinformation to provide a certai ope to analyze the data. The paraphrasing of the individual cases basically provides immary of the material an ; to digest a vast volu ocedure of content s terpretation and a ce e literature and used ep to guarantee confi me of d makes it easie data and shape i ring was chosen rtain amount of selecti t into a more compact stru ng criteria. Coding guide 43). Finally, the em ility and explain tl r to structure (Mayring 2014: p.67). Thus helpin cture. Therefore a mixe ibid. p.104). Qualitative research involves alway ines were set up throug tructuring. The qualitative researcher always has to document eac he reader what he did to tl he primary material (Ibi pirical result have been once more analyzed with Excel and diagram ere produced. The last step included a contextual embedding with other relevant studies o pga pe ae: pee phe a Ek pe of all cases was that the EU is an instrument of the US. Although the EU is an independent
Interestingly only 29% of disinformation cases on sanctions were published in EU member Interestingly only 29% of disinformation cases on sanctions were published in EU member states. 71% were published in Russia, Ukraine, Serbia or in the United States. This shows that while I expected that the EU was chosen as a deliberate target for disinformation, this has not been the case. However, in a transnational and globalized world with (social) media crossing borders it is difficult to trace disinformation to its original publisher (Richey 2018). While disinformation is frequently shared and framed by a variety of actors after its first publication, harming the Ukrainian economy and no one else (Doc67). disinformation is frequently shared and framed by a variety of actors after its first publication,
Interestingly only 29% of disinformation cases on sanctions were published in EU member Interestingly only 29% of disinformation cases on sanctions were published in EU member states. 71% were published in Russia, Ukraine, Serbia or in the United States. This shows that while I expected that the EU was chosen as a deliberate target for disinformation, this has not been the case. However, in a transnational and globalized world with (social) media crossing borders it is difficult to trace disinformation to its original publisher (Richey 2018). While disinformation is frequently shared and framed by a variety of actors after its first publication, harming the Ukrainian economy and no one else (Doc67). disinformation is frequently shared and framed by a variety of actors after its first publication,
making it difficult to trace back (Kalensky 2018). Since I am relying on data from the East Stratcom archive, further research with other disinformation databases could be fruitful. 1018). While the Czech Republic’s media landscape is less centralized, the Czech’s trust in
making it difficult to trace back (Kalensky 2018). Since I am relying on data from the East Stratcom archive, further research with other disinformation databases could be fruitful. 1018). While the Czech Republic’s media landscape is less centralized, the Czech’s trust in