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Figure from:Advanced Mission Planning: Plan of Action Against the Iranian Nuclear Capabilities - Part 1 Mission Design Components, Challenges and Dynamics

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Figure 13—As we have already depicted in figure 9. —Israel is surrounded by the AMD of its neighboring countries (Jordanian and Saudi Positions are not depicted in. This figure)—Plotted by Adib Enayati, Ph.D. Furthermore, committing entry to the Iranian territory from a more direct route increases friction anc complexity of the mission not to mention exposing the mission critical elements to the Iranian proxies. Los: of the aerial refueling tankers is an absolute catastrophe to this mission because entry and return from Irar are highly dependable on them. However, this does not make the planning impossible. As I have statec earlier, a more complex approach to this issue is needed which we will discuss in the actual attack scenaric planning in part (II) of this series where we will utilize all the information from part (1) to further plan the most possible and successful plan of action. Take your time to digest all the issues surrounding this mission further on we will discuss the conflict escalation and the issues with the HOT targets.

Figure 13 —As we have already depicted in figure 9. —Israel is surrounded by the AMD of its neighboring countries (Jordanian and Saudi Positions are not depicted in. This figure)—Plotted by Adib Enayati, Ph.D. Furthermore, committing entry to the Iranian territory from a more direct route increases friction anc complexity of the mission not to mention exposing the mission critical elements to the Iranian proxies. Los: of the aerial refueling tankers is an absolute catastrophe to this mission because entry and return from Irar are highly dependable on them. However, this does not make the planning impossible. As I have statec earlier, a more complex approach to this issue is needed which we will discuss in the actual attack scenaric planning in part (II) of this series where we will utilize all the information from part (1) to further plan the most possible and successful plan of action. Take your time to digest all the issues surrounding this mission further on we will discuss the conflict escalation and the issues with the HOT targets.

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A copy of the aforementioned clearance has been attached to this document for your reference with the permission of the U.S. DoD DOPSR (Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review at 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155).
A copy of the aforementioned clearance has been attached to this document for your reference with the permission of the U.S. DoD DOPSR (Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review at 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155).
quation). Turkey ot even counting jority Shiite. The Strategic View 1— The position of the Israel with the Near and Far threats surrounding it. This has been note after the OCT 7 massacre by the Hamas barbaric terrorists—This figure is to portray the reality surroundin Israel. The Red symbols show the hostile entities. Certain portions are deliberately misplaced. (Simplifie Strategic View Only) ee: ce fe a: | All the Muslim States of the Middle East with the exception of some minorities, are supportive of the Palestinian Terrorist Organization’s cause against the state of Israel, the very idea of accepting a Jewish state is difficult to comprehend and digest for many in this region. I wish to say a few words in regards to the Abraham Accord and to clarify it the way I see it for everyone and to clarify my narrative when I say Israel has no friends or allies in this region; any and all peace treaties such as the Abraham accord should be only interpreted as just a “Temporary Mutual Beneficial Agreement” and nothing more. Regardless of what the government of these nations want, their people and the way they see the Israeli—Palestinian issues are very much different.
quation). Turkey ot even counting jority Shiite. The Strategic View 1— The position of the Israel with the Near and Far threats surrounding it. This has been note after the OCT 7 massacre by the Hamas barbaric terrorists—This figure is to portray the reality surroundin Israel. The Red symbols show the hostile entities. Certain portions are deliberately misplaced. (Simplifie Strategic View Only) ee: ce fe a: | All the Muslim States of the Middle East with the exception of some minorities, are supportive of the Palestinian Terrorist Organization’s cause against the state of Israel, the very idea of accepting a Jewish state is difficult to comprehend and digest for many in this region. I wish to say a few words in regards to the Abraham Accord and to clarify it the way I see it for everyone and to clarify my narrative when I say Israel has no friends or allies in this region; any and all peace treaties such as the Abraham accord should be only interpreted as just a “Temporary Mutual Beneficial Agreement” and nothing more. Regardless of what the government of these nations want, their people and the way they see the Israeli—Palestinian issues are very much different.
Figure 1— The radar and missile defense systems in service in Iran (the list is not complete). The high presence of the mobile systems in the defenders’ inventory allows the quick shifting of the air defense posture which Iran does regularly. The type of the systems above also proves the Iranian strategy to invest in their AMD capacities as Russia did (as we have established earlier), in order to deter the foreign aerial threats. The defender has invested heavily in early warning and long-range systems. Another factor that I should educate you about is the view of the arms trade between IRAN-RUSSIA and IRAN-CHINA. The Iranians have built their entire modern military based on reverse engineering. Their entire missile defense program started from the reverse engineering and they are good at it. Their approach when making a deal with the foreign countries (Russia and China) is a demand to be a partner in their programs. Meaning they wish to know how the system’s works in order
Figure 1— The radar and missile defense systems in service in Iran (the list is not complete). The high presence of the mobile systems in the defenders’ inventory allows the quick shifting of the air defense posture which Iran does regularly. The type of the systems above also proves the Iranian strategy to invest in their AMD capacities as Russia did (as we have established earlier), in order to deter the foreign aerial threats. The defender has invested heavily in early warning and long-range systems. Another factor that I should educate you about is the view of the arms trade between IRAN-RUSSIA and IRAN-CHINA. The Iranians have built their entire modern military based on reverse engineering. Their entire missile defense program started from the reverse engineering and they are good at it. Their approach when making a deal with the foreign countries (Russia and China) is a demand to be a partner in their programs. Meaning they wish to know how the system’s works in order
Terrain: The most unforgiving yet useful aspect of the mission planning. Understanding the geography and the proper use of the geological features of the enemy territory is a gift that must be utilized and it i also a very important factor in planning an aerial mission as it limits or enhances your maneuverin: capacities to avoid radar or the enemy sorties. Iran has high mountains to its west stretched from north t south. This generates a natural shield for the country against the aerial missions. There are several tactic that are used in order to penetrate the airspace a country without detection. The most common and widel used is LAF (Low Altitude Flight—Using Ridge lines as cover). This, however, presents certain difficulties Not only you need to avoid the early warning detection of the defender, you are also required to surveil hig] altitude mountains to locate possible radar sites. Remember, the defender is utilizing the terrain the sam: way the attacker wishes to take advantage of it. The other issue is that flying close to the ground consume almost two times more fuel than flying at high altitudes and this means there is far less room to maneuver This also demands midair refueling upon returning which demand further resources to be deployed in th: region. Let us discuss the subject of the terrain and mountains to the west of Iran.
Terrain: The most unforgiving yet useful aspect of the mission planning. Understanding the geography and the proper use of the geological features of the enemy territory is a gift that must be utilized and it i also a very important factor in planning an aerial mission as it limits or enhances your maneuverin: capacities to avoid radar or the enemy sorties. Iran has high mountains to its west stretched from north t south. This generates a natural shield for the country against the aerial missions. There are several tactic that are used in order to penetrate the airspace a country without detection. The most common and widel used is LAF (Low Altitude Flight—Using Ridge lines as cover). This, however, presents certain difficulties Not only you need to avoid the early warning detection of the defender, you are also required to surveil hig] altitude mountains to locate possible radar sites. Remember, the defender is utilizing the terrain the sam: way the attacker wishes to take advantage of it. The other issue is that flying close to the ground consume almost two times more fuel than flying at high altitudes and this means there is far less room to maneuver This also demands midair refueling upon returning which demand further resources to be deployed in th: region. Let us discuss the subject of the terrain and mountains to the west of Iran.
The above strategic map will give you an overview and understanding with regards to the objectives of this mission planning. Iraq and Syria (Places that Israel successfully carried out airstrikes against their nuclear infrastructures) have had different terrain properties. If you look at the western border of the Islamic republic, you will see a tall and high peak mountain forming a wall from the north to the south of the target country.
The above strategic map will give you an overview and understanding with regards to the objectives of this mission planning. Iraq and Syria (Places that Israel successfully carried out airstrikes against their nuclear infrastructures) have had different terrain properties. If you look at the western border of the Islamic republic, you will see a tall and high peak mountain forming a wall from the north to the south of the target country.
Figure 2—Elevation Profile from Jordan to the Iranian Border the Line Represents the Border and the elevation profile to the right of the line is within the Iranian territory. (NORTHWEST)-Graph Source: Google Earth Data
Figure 2—Elevation Profile from Jordan to the Iranian Border the Line Represents the Border and the elevation profile to the right of the line is within the Iranian territory. (NORTHWEST)-Graph Source: Google Earth Data
Figure 3—Elevation Profile from Jordan to the Iranian Border. The Line Represents the Border and the elevation profile to the right of the line are within the Iranian territory. (ABSOLUTE WEST)-Graph Source: Google Earth Data
Figure 3—Elevation Profile from Jordan to the Iranian Border. The Line Represents the Border and the elevation profile to the right of the line are within the Iranian territory. (ABSOLUTE WEST)-Graph Source: Google Earth Data
Figure 4—Elevation Profile from Jordan to the Iranian Border. The Line Represents the Border and the elevation profile to the right of the line are within the Iranian territory. (SOUTHWEST)-Graph Source: Google Earth Data
Figure 4—Elevation Profile from Jordan to the Iranian Border. The Line Represents the Border and the elevation profile to the right of the line are within the Iranian territory. (SOUTHWEST)-Graph Source: Google Earth Data
Figure 5—Elevation Profiles from north to south of Iran at the entire western border (20-60 KM DEPTH)-Graph Source: Google Earth Data
Figure 5—Elevation Profiles from north to south of Iran at the entire western border (20-60 KM DEPTH)-Graph Source: Google Earth Data
Figure6— The proposed targets and_ their spread (Scattering/Force Distribution) across central Iran—Plotted by Adib Enayati, Ph.D.
Figure6— The proposed targets and_ their spread (Scattering/Force Distribution) across central Iran—Plotted by Adib Enayati, Ph.D.
Figure7 Map: Crude Example of the ADF (Air Defense Flux) Around Tehran, Isfahan and other parts of the country—Source: GlobalSecurity.org
Figure7 Map: Crude Example of the ADF (Air Defense Flux) Around Tehran, Isfahan and other parts of the country—Source: GlobalSecurity.org
Logistical limitations: The mission planning depends on the attacker’s inventory and the force allocation with respect to the EOF (Economy of Force). This present limitations as a certain vital capability and equipment might not be available at the time of the mission planning. Let us dissect some of the facts. The Direct Distance from the Israeli border to the Iranian border is approximately 600 Miles (the most direct absolute path). This without question demands the presence of the aerial refueling tankers. As a result, the tankers are defenseless and in need of protection as they are vital to the mission. This demands the deployment of additional support elements which as a result will increase the mission signature. We have not discussed the geopolitical issues yet but do not forget that Iran commands a large number of proxy groups in the region especially in Iraq and arming them with man pads can have catastrophic results for this mission. Should a more direct path be chosen, furthermore, given the fact that the majority of the ranian complexes are well built underground; The need for special munitions limits the mission reediness and effectiveness. Without having the required munitions, the mission cannot continue. However, there is another costly scenario that can be examined. Another important logistical issue is the SAR (search and Rescue) operations in the event that a friendly aircraft is shutdown. As we have already discussed and established the intelligence elements on the ground can act as the SAR elements should the necessity arises.
Logistical limitations: The mission planning depends on the attacker’s inventory and the force allocation with respect to the EOF (Economy of Force). This present limitations as a certain vital capability and equipment might not be available at the time of the mission planning. Let us dissect some of the facts. The Direct Distance from the Israeli border to the Iranian border is approximately 600 Miles (the most direct absolute path). This without question demands the presence of the aerial refueling tankers. As a result, the tankers are defenseless and in need of protection as they are vital to the mission. This demands the deployment of additional support elements which as a result will increase the mission signature. We have not discussed the geopolitical issues yet but do not forget that Iran commands a large number of proxy groups in the region especially in Iraq and arming them with man pads can have catastrophic results for this mission. Should a more direct path be chosen, furthermore, given the fact that the majority of the ranian complexes are well built underground; The need for special munitions limits the mission reediness and effectiveness. Without having the required munitions, the mission cannot continue. However, there is another costly scenario that can be examined. Another important logistical issue is the SAR (search and Rescue) operations in the event that a friendly aircraft is shutdown. As we have already discussed and established the intelligence elements on the ground can act as the SAR elements should the necessity arises.
Figure 9—Israel is surrounded by the AMD of its neighboring countries (Jordanian and Saudi Positions are not depicted in. This figure)—To think Israel has any friends or allies in the Middle East is a grave mistake. Plotted by Adib Enayati, Ph.D.
Figure 9—Israel is surrounded by the AMD of its neighboring countries (Jordanian and Saudi Positions are not depicted in. This figure)—To think Israel has any friends or allies in the Middle East is a grave mistake. Plotted by Adib Enayati, Ph.D.
This considerable travel route demands aerial refueling to be present at the mission IP (initiation point) in northern Iraq prior to entering the Iranian territory. The refueling planes are not small nor are stealth to Figure 12—Same as figure 11 with slight deviation to commit entry from the western border—projected risk is too high for this entry as the mission critical elements can be easily targeted from the ground by the Iranian proxies. —Plotted by Adib Enayati, Ph.D.
This considerable travel route demands aerial refueling to be present at the mission IP (initiation point) in northern Iraq prior to entering the Iranian territory. The refueling planes are not small nor are stealth to Figure 12—Same as figure 11 with slight deviation to commit entry from the western border—projected risk is too high for this entry as the mission critical elements can be easily targeted from the ground by the Iranian proxies. —Plotted by Adib Enayati, Ph.D.
Figure 11—Possible Route to the Iranian border (Mission IP)—Plotted by Adil Enayati, Ph.D.
Figure 11—Possible Route to the Iranian border (Mission IP)—Plotted by Adil Enayati, Ph.D.
Figure 14— The spread of the Iranian interceptor bases across Iran (this figure is not complete). —Plotted by Adib Enayati, Ph.D.
Figure 14— The spread of the Iranian interceptor bases across Iran (this figure is not complete). —Plotted by Adib Enayati, Ph.D.