Virtues (Moral Psychology)

Objectives: The Flourishing Scale (FS) was developed to measure psychological well-being from the eudaimonic perspective, highlighting the flourishing of human functioning. This article evaluated the psychometric characteristics of the simplified Chinese version of FS among a Chinese community population.
Method: A total of 433 participants from 17 different communities in southwest China completed a questionnaire package that included FS, Chinese Virtues Questionnaire, and Brief Symptom Inventory-18.
Results: The results demonstrated excellent internal consistency, solid one-factor structure, strong convergent and discriminant validity, and incremental validity. Flourishing was found to play a mediating role in the relationship between total virtue and psychological distress.
Conclusions: FS was proved to be appropriate for use in assessing psychological well-being among a Chinese community population, which may be recognized as a promising tool to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions for evidence-based social work practice.

An other-directed moral judgment is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behavior; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgments is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the self-directed evaluations. Our readiness to evaluate the behaviour of others measures the level of our commitment to a system of morality. Consistent nonjudgementalism subverts the interpersonal nature of moral values and points to a deeper issue – an unwillingness of a nonjudgementalist to apply moral categories to her own choices.

This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from 4 paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (1973), Isen and Levin (1972), and Milgram (1963). It then presents 10 problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian moral psychology. After challenging the situationists on these grounds, the article then proceeds to challenge the situationist presentation of the Aristotelian conception, showing that situationists have provided an oversimplified caricature of it that goes against the grain of much Aristotelian text. In evaluating the situationist challenge against the actual results from empirical research as well as primary Aristotelian text, it will be shown that the situationist debate has advanced both an extreme, untenable view about the nature of characteristics and situations, as well as an inaccurate presentation of the Aristotelian view.

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The public image of gossip is often confused and includes features that are not typical of gossip--in particular, the maliciousness that is commonly attributed to gossip seems to be wrong. The vindication of gossip offered in this paper uses two conceptual tools: the prototypical category, and the distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically valuable actions.

The structure of studies of moral education is basically interdisciplinary; it includes moral philosophy, psychology, and educational research. This essay systematically analyses the structure of studies of moral educational from the vantage points of philosophy of science. Among the various theoretical frameworks in the field of philosophy of science, this essay mainly utilizes the perspectives of Lakatos’s research programme. In particular, this essay considers the relations and interactions between different fields, including moral philosophy, psychology, and educational research. Finally, the potential impacts of the new trends emerging from natural sciences that seem to be challenging to existing theoretical frameworks of moral education are examined using the vantage points of philosophy of science.

Theorists have recently been exploring the prospects for a virtue-centred approach to aesthetics. Virtue aesthetics encourages a re-focusing of philosophical attention onto the aesthetic character traits of agents, in the same way that virtue ethics and virtue epistemology have encouraged us to focus on moral and intellectual traits. In this paper, I aim to contribute to the development of virtue aesthetics by discussing aesthetic courage, the aesthetic analogue of one of the most widely acknowledged moral virtues. In addition to proposing an account of the nature of this trait, I also argue that aesthetic courage is vital for any sort of aesthetically virtuous life. It is not possible to possess any aesthetic virtue without possessing aesthetic courage. It is important, therefore, for any future development of virtue aesthetics to acknowledge the central importance of aesthetic courage.

The three main ethical theories in Western philosophy can be used as a framework from which to bring out the features of Buddhist ethics; hermeneutical questions regarding the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of comparison; a consideration of Buddhist ethics as virtue ethics, centring around the notions of practices, narratives, and traditions, as proposed by
MacIntyre, including a discussion of relativism in the context of naturalism, the fact/value gap, and cognitivism/non-cognitivism; a critique of consequentialism including a discussion of Goodman and Singer on altruism and compassion, agent-neutrality, and personhood, especially the bodhisattva-ideal; a critique of deontology that argues that there are no moral absolutes, and that only the wise can establish in a particular situation what is right, that is, what leads to a more awakened state. Conclusion: a discussion of why it is fruitful to see Buddhist ethics as a member of the family of (neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethical theories.

While it is essential that we live as self-defined individuals, independently negotiating with an independent reality, this experience is not exhaustive of our reality. Such experience is importantly contextualized by two other kinds of experience, each an experience of intimacy. First, independent individuality depends upon a process of childhood development in which identity is formed through a familial intimacy in which the child lives from a non-reflective, bodily sense of a sharedness of identity with another (typically, but not necessarily, the mother). Second, independent individuality finds its healthy development in the establishment of new intimate bonds; these adult intimacies, unlike childhood intimacy, are bonds between persons who themselves have developed the sense of independent individuality and thus have experiential characteristics significantly different from those of childhood intimacy. From a developmental perspective, each of these two forms of intimacy is something good in itself but also something whose good resides in its enabling of something else, childhood intimacy facilitating the transformation into independent individuality and adult intimacy facilitating a transformative engagement with one's own limitations.

In the second volume of Rinrigaku, Watsuji Tetsurō focuses on developing his notion of betweenness (aidagara 間柄) through the ethical organisations (jinrinteki soshiki 人倫的組織) of family, local community, economics, cultural community, and the state. Although those who have commentated on the later volumes have focused on the controversy which surrounds Watsuji’s account of the state, very little attention has been paid to the role of virtues within his thought. It is precisely this academic lacuna which this enquiry is intended to address. In this paper, there are two particular aims which I hope to achieve: firstly, I will seek to explicate the role which virtues play within Watsuji’s ethical system, and secondly, I will attempt to evaluate how the virtues inform Watsuji’s normative approach.

The recent emergence of positive psychology gave rise to the idea to conceptualize humor from a “good character” perspective (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Present constructs, however, show a “virtue gap”, and the two concepts of benevolent and corrective humor were developed to fill this gap. The former describes a humorous outlook on life that entails the realistic observations and understanding of human weaknesses (and the imperfection of the world) but also their benevolent humorous treatment. By contrast, corrective humor involves moral based ridicule; that is, the use of mockery to fight badness and mediocrity. Corrective humor, akin to satire, uses wit to ridicule vices, follies, abuses, and shortcomings with the intent of shaming individuals and groups into improvement. Participants (N = 340) filled in statements assessing the two virtue-related humor concepts, general sense of humor (subsample of n = 144), mockery, and 24 character strengths. As expected, benevolent humor showed positive correlations with most of the 24 character strengths, and uniquely related to the strengths of several virtues (justice, temperance, and transcendence) beyond general sense of humor. Corrective humor related most strongly to strengths of the virtues wisdom, courage, and justice, especially once mockery was controlled for. Thus, both constructs capture important virtue-related humor aspects over and above the sense of humor and mockery and are thus suitable for–at least partially–filling the “virtue gap” in humor research. They have the potential to pave the way for developing and investigating further humor constructs that meaningfully relate to strengths and virtues.

As the financial crisis of 2008-9 has continued to affect the global economy, many wonder whether the proposed solutions contribute to a more stable financial system as well as to better human behaviour. While the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) Report (2011) identified the factors essential to explaining the causes of the financial crisis as having included credit and housing bubbles, nontraditional mortgages, credit ratings and securitization, financial institutions concentrated correlated risk, leverage and liquidity risk, contagion risk, shock and panic, failure in virtue has also been very patent in the crisis, foremost of them being: excessive leverage and imprudent risk-taking, failure in fiduciary duties and in stewardship, as well as greed, lack of moderation, and fraud. The lens of virtue theory is, thus, necessary to analyze and explore the financial crisis' origins and remedies. There exist ways of measuring such virtuousness or lack thereof among managers and finance industry participants, one of them being the creation of a virtue ethics scale. This paper presents the results of a survey of 141 Philippine managers, which sought to elicit from the respondents which of the virtues listed they considered desirable traits. The major responses were: (1) Honesty and competence, (2) Kind-heartedness, (3) Self-confidence, (4) Innovativeness, (5) Ambition, and (6) Security. The study's results can give practitioners an idea of the virtues or character traits that employees in Philippine companies expect or find desirable in their superiors. In addition, they can inform the crisis debate from a virtue theory perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to exemplify the outstanding potential of literary narrations, and particularly the fairy tales, to foster resilience among primary school students. The starting point of these reflections is the mimetic-cathartic vision of a literary narration proposed already by Aristotle and then developed by such contemporary authors as Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre, David Carr, etc. The specific application of the general idea, according to which great literary stories have a powerful intrinsic pedagogical potential, is depicted with the use of the example of a classic tale by the Grimm brothers, The Girl Without Hands, which is a clear mimesis in both textual and figurative sense of a resilient character. Moreover, the traumatizing circumstances against which the resilient attitude develops in the protagonist are related to family background, which makes the story particularly up-to-date at present times in which we observe an outstandingly high divorce rate as well as many other types of problems affecting large numbers of children in relation with their families. A variety of “pillars” or “factors” of resilience are easily observable in the behaviour of the “girl without hands,” which converts the story into a remarkable and encouraging example of overcoming all sort of difficulties and obstacles which our students encounter on their own way towards a more complete integration and happiness.

Although it does not appear on many traditional lists of the virtues, respect for human dignity is an important virtue in its own right that is characterized as much by emotions as by other mental states and actions. The virtue of respect for human dignity essentially involves the dispositions to feel the emotion of respect for the dignity of others and an emotional sense of one's own dignity. As exemplified by Nelson Mandela, this virtue also involves a keen perceptual sensitivity to humiliating and degrading treatment, along with dispositions to protest, correct, and prevent such treatment. The person with the virtue of respect for human dignity also will be disposed to feel indignation toward willful violations of human dignity, compassion for their victims, and various positive emotions in response to victories for human dignity. Although this virtue closely resembles other, more widely recognized, virtues, such as justice and love, it nevertheless is appropriate to treat respect for human dignity as a distinct virtue, as well as an emotion.

This article is part of a roundtable discussion on Sharing the Burden: Rabbi Simḥah Zissel Ziv and the Path of Musar.  Responding to Christian Miller, I consider the tensions found in Simḥah Zissel Ziv's view of the soul, how Simḥah Zissel sees human beings as inclining toward evil, and how he tends to recommend measures that are more demanding than those typically tested by psychological researchers. Responding to Andrea Dara Cooper, I pay particular attention to Cooper's question regarding the tension between Simḥah Zissel's expansive view of fellowship and his lack of support for his family, and focuses on the constructions of gender that produce this tension. Responding to Jeffrey Pugh, I explore the clear limits to Simḥah Zissel's tolerance for criticism, questions, and disobedience. Responding to Rebecca Todd Peters, I consider various ways in which Simḥah Zissel's legacy has been appropriated, and I give particular attention to ways that his thought has been used to support critical thinking about structural injustices and social change.

Resumen El carácter de desempeño constituye un pilar de la educación del carácter imprescindible para la eficacia en cualquier contexto que implique rendimiento. Su reciente inclusión en modelos de educación del carácter, en consonancia con enfoques ecológicos como el desarrollo positivo adolescente, persigue dotar de competencias clave en procesos de adaptación al medio. La aplicación de la educación de carácter en general y del carácter de desempeño en particular al currículo educativo supone un auténtico reto, que encierra en sí mismo importantes beneficios en el aspecto académico y en el desenvolvimiento de la persona en las múltiples facetas de su vida. A este efecto, abogamos por la introducción de la educación del carácter en el currículo académico, especialmente en la etapa adolescente. En la línea con el enfoque de desarrollo positivo adolescente, ello contribuiría a la prevención y a la promoción de múltiples competencias necesarias para desenvolverse en distintas situaciones, con la finalidad de explotar los talentos personales y servir mejor a la sociedad. Abstract The performance character constitutes a pillar of character education for effectiveness in any context that implies performance. Its recent inclusion in character education models, in line with ecological approaches such as positive youth development, seeks to provide key competencies in adaptation processes to the context. The application of character education and particularly performance character to the educational curriculum is a challenge, which contains in itself important benefits in the academic aspect and in the development of the person in the multiple facets of their life. For this purpose, we advocate for the introduction of character education in academic curricula, especially in the adolescent stage. In line with the positive youth development approach, this would contribute to the prevention and promotion of diverse competences. They are necessary to success in different situations, in order to exploit personal talents and better serve society. Palabras clave: educación del carácter; carácter de desempeño; desarrollo positivo adolescente. INTRODUCCIÓN Los modelos tradicionales de desarrollo del carácter concebían el carácter como un conjunto de características psicológicas que motivaban o capacitaban a los individuos a funcionar como agentes morales competentes (Berkowitz, 2012; Fleeson, Furr, Jayawickreme, Meindl y Helzer, 2014). Una definición tan amplia de carácter ha significado que las cualidades incluidas en esta definición abarcan un diverso paraguas de virtudes o fortalezas del carácter. Como resultado, el

For some time now moral psychologists and philosophers have ganged up on Aristotelians, arguing that results from psychological studies on the role of character-based and situation-based influences on human behavior have convincingly shown that situations rather than personal characteristics determine human behavior. In the literature on moral psychology and philosophy this challenge is commonly called the “situationist challenge,” and as Prinz (2009) has previously explained, it has largely been based on results from four salient studies in social psychology, including the studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Milgram (1963), Isen and Levin (1972), and Darley and Batson (1973). The situationist challenge maintains that each of these studies seriously challenges the plausibility of virtuous personal characteristics by challenging the plausibility of personal characteristics more generally. In this article I undermine the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology by carefully considering major problems with the conclusions that situationists have drawn from the empirical data, and by further challenging the accuracy of their characterization of the Aristotelian view. In fact I show that when properly understood the Aristotelian view is not only consistent with empirical data from developmental science but can also offer important insights for integrating moral psychology with its biological roots in our natural and social life.

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Although it does not appear on many traditional lists of the virtues, respect for human dignity is an important virtue in its own right that is characterized as much by emotions as by other mental states and actions. The virtue of respect for human dignity essentially involves the dispositions to feel the emotion of respect for the dignity of others and an emotional sense of one's own dignity. As exemplified by Nelson Mandela, this virtue also involves a keen perceptual sensitivity to humiliating and degrading treatment, along with dispositions to protest, correct, and prevent such treatment. The person with the virtue of respect for human dignity also will be disposed to feel indignation toward willful violations of human dignity, compassion for their victims, and various positive emotions in response to victories for human dignity. Although this virtue closely resembles other, more widely recognized, virtues, such as justice and love, it nevertheless is appropriate to treat respect for human dignity as a distinct virtue, as well as an emotion.

While the teaching of intellectual virtue is receiving growing attention, little research exists on how to assess the development of intellectual virtue in students. This is not without reason. Some may think that the development of intellectual virtue should not (or perhaps cannot) be assessed. Furthermore, standard forms of assessment – especially as we encounter them in the high stakes graded exams common in schools and universities – seem to encourage an instrumental rather than a virtuous orientation towards the value of knowledge. In this paper, I review the challenges that exist for teachers in assessing intellectual virtue. I review attempts that have been made to assess something like intellectual virtue in (1) research on moral development, (2) research on ‘personal epistemology’ and (3) research into critical thinking. I conclude that while it is possible to assess the development of intellectual virtue with enough precision to demonstrate the effectiveness of teaching for intellectual character, this does not imply that virtue must be graded.

On the Quest for the Holy Grail the questers encounter several wise hermits from the Cistercian Order, commonly known in the text as White Monks, who provide insights into the meaning of the Quest for the Holy Grail; these illuminations provide insight on what it means to be more virtuous and how to attain the grail in the ever-illusive quest for inner meaning. Lancelot, who was the greatest of all earthly knights, is heavily admonished on the quest by the white monks because of his treacherous mortal sin, which was his adultery with Queen Guinevere who is King Arthur's wife. This inconsiderable act is most disloyal to both his earthly king and liege lord, whom he is a vassal of, and reflects more deeply on the state of his soul before God, which is afflicted by mortal sin. One hermit relinquishes intricate details and insights into the virtues of knighthood in their utmost perfection, and it is made clear that those virtues were embodied by Lancelot as an early knight before the time of his mortal sin. It is in later years that the sin manifests as lustful desires and leads to treachery. It is briefly pointed out that it is his pride, after the conquering of the Dolores Guard, that leads him into a violent cycle of mortal sin which inhibits him from accomplishing the Holy Grail and ultimately destroys the Arthurian kingdom when that sin is revealed. In the earliest adventures of Lancelot, before this mortal sin, he is acclaimed and praised for holding the four essential virtues of perfect knighthood. The first of which is natural virginity. The knight who protects his maidenhood is truly united as a soldier of God and free from vice. At the center of all virtue, this is equated as most vital to maintaining honor, prowess and all good works. In addition to the central attainment of chastity and maidenhood there are other virtues that are embodied by the early Lancelot. He maintains a consistent state of humility. The hermit who counsels Lancelot states that he once "walked softly with his head lowered" and "dared not look at the divine image for fear that God might be angry with him." (Burns) Lancelot even emulated patience and the hermits says that "nothing can defeat the enemy as effectively as patience." (Burns) He had a sense of justice by which he administered with a deep sense of equality. Rather than showing partiality to a lover or family member he did what was right, in accordance with the law, even if that meant condemnation of his closest kin. The white monk identifies true justice as one who "gives nothing for the sake of love and takes nothing for the

According to Aristotle, ethical virtues like justice and courage are not part of our inborn natural endowment but have to be acquired. The mode of their acquisition seems to be epitomized by the following quotation: "Again, in all the cases where something arises in us by nature, we first acquire the capacities and later exhibit the activities. (...) Virtues, how ever, we acquire by first exercising them. The same is true with skills, since what we need to leam before doing, we learn by doing; for example, we become builders by building, and lyre-players by playing the lyre. So too we become just by doing just actions, temperate by temperate actions, and courageous by courageous actions. " 1 The idea that acquiring the ethical virtues follows the well-known edu cational principle of 'leaming by doing', as Aristotle coins it here, is prom inent in the Nicomachean as weil as in the Eudemian Ethics. 2 As the quoted passage already suggests, this idea is fmnly rooted in at least two funda mental Aristotelian convictions. 1) Moral character is acquired by a process of habituation, an ethismos. To put it in Greek terms: ethos is ultimately brought about by ethos. This idea is already present in Plato 3 , and Aristotle nails down this connection with an etymological pun: "Character (Moc;) exists, as the name signifies, because it develops from habit (s0oc;), and a thing gets habituated as a result of a pattern of conduct that is not innate, by repeated movement of one sort or another, so that it is eventually 7 Aristotle, De mem. II, 452a30 (tr. J.I Beare). 8 Aristotle never states this explicitly or verbally but has been taken to rnean sornething Iike lt by rnany later cornrnentators and scholars; the usual reference for this idea is EN VII 10, 1152a30-33, where Aristotle quotes approvingly from the poet Euenos. 9 For "learning by doing" as the principle of learning an art see, e.g., Aristotle, Met. IX 8, 1049b29-32. The parallel between virtue and craft acquisition is stressed by Aristotle in Pol. VIII 1, 1337a18-21. 10 A cornprehensive analysis of the different passages in which Aristotle compares virtues and crafts is provided by Angier 2010, esp. eh. 5. j 101091_Linden_Artstote_09_Müller.indd 178

Thomas Aquinas holds that acquired and infused moral virtues are compatible. They can be had and used together by a Christian. More than that, they should be. For Thomas, Christians ought to pursue and use the acquired virtues. To fail to do so is a failure of discipleship. It is a failure of love. This view has recently come under attack. This article seeks to resolve that debate by defending and elucidating the compatibility of acquired and infused virtue and answering key objections raised by critics of this interpretation. I especially hope to show how the compatibilist interpretation actually honors many of the very commitments that motivate these critics. As it turns out, their best reasons for endorsing incompatibilism are really reasons to embrace the compatibilist interpretation. Moreover, the textual and theological case against incompatibilism seems compelling. I move in three steps: first, elucidating the grammar of habit specification; then filling out my argument and addressing objections; and finally, illustrating Thomas's vision and explaining why he would think Christians should pursue acquired virtue.

The separation between empiric and rational psychology of the 19th century has boosted an increasing opposition between psychology and ethics, which presently has brought an authentic repulse. Psychology then has analyzed neurosis mainly from a clinical perspective. From its origin it was understood only as a general affection of the nervous system and it represented a variety of mental disorders in which emotional distress is expressed through various physical and psychological symptoms. The rupture between psychology and ethics and the rejection of the transcendental way of the happening of this relation has resulted in a psychological solipsism of very little depth. However, authors like I. Caruso specified that "neurosis is impossible to resolve unless based on metaphysical and moral presuppositions". This abstract offers the contribution of psychologists and psychiatrists who underline the need of a theory of neurosis that obligatory includes a metaphysical vision of reality and an ethical consideration.

Dans le Phédon et le Gorgias, Socrate entreprend un long discours argumenté, afin de démontrer l'immortalité de l'âme dans le premier, et de défendre la justice dans le second. Mais dans chacun d'eux, un mythe succède au raisonnement. En vertu de quoi ce récit est-il employé ? Qu'est-ce qui fait obstacle aux arguments pour pouvoir penser la supériorité de l'âme sur le corps dans le Gorgias et la survie de l'âme hors du corps dans le Phédon ? Quelle est la fonction du mythe par rapport aux différents destinataires et sa pertinence est-elle liée à ces derniers ou à l'objet en question ?

"Purpose: Our research fulfills three purposes: 1) introduce practitioners to the appropriate use of measures of unethical behavior; 2) evaluate the use of integrity related assessments for use in personnel selection; and 3) determine the validity of the MCI instrument using standard validation procedures.

Methodology: Content, construct, convergent and discriminant approaches are applied to establish the relative validity of the assessment tool.

Findings: The results of the MCI purport to align with one’s moral values and behaviors. We establish face validity of the MCI measure, but fail to establish: 1) an appropriate simple factor structure, 2) convergent validity, 3) discriminant validity, and 4) support for the lack of impact of demographic factors on the purported measure of Moral intelligence.

Research limitations: An acceptable but constrained (working students) sample was used in the validation.

Practical implications: Researchers and practitioners should be familiar with psychometric principles to ensure the use of valid tools in a predictive and defensible manner. New measures can be developed, but should be validated before used for developmental or personnel decision making purposes.

Originality/value: 1) The lack of validity associated with the MCI instrument is established; 2) Researchers and practitioners are exposed to considerations in the appropriate use of measures of unethical behavior, and 3) exposed to several previously validated integrity related assessments for use in personnel decision making."

Multiculturalism has led to rethinking the problem of social consistency, which is the cohesion between the various members of society. Psychological and pedagogic conditions linked to the family context can be studied to address the problem of education. It is conditions within the family – family styles and dynamics – that enable a harmonious development of personality that allows for sociability. There are also family ties, which are a condition to develop what are known as “social” virtues. The purpose of this study is to describe the ties that link family education to the two variables in question: personality development and acquisition of the virtues that
promote social consistency. Observations are included that point to the real link
that exists between personality and the development of virtues.

Each of the degenerating constitutions in Book VIII of Plato's Republic is the result of the disappearance of one of the four cardinal virtues. The failure of wisdom creates a timocracy; the failure of courage, an oligarchy; the failure of moderation, a democracy; the failure of justice, a tyranny. The degeneration shows that the disunited virtues are imperfect, though they have some power to stave off vice. Thus Book VIII implies a unity of the virtues thesis according to which perfect virtues can only exist in a united state, but imperfect simulacra of virtue can exist in a disunited state.

This paper compares two basic concepts of two outstanding players of philosophical world: Plato's moderation and Aristotle's temperance. Comparing occurs in two terms: the positions that both of them place their own concepts in human nature and among other virtues and the meaning of concepts according to them are different.

He writes mainly interdisciplinary work utilizing philosophy, and political and social theory to explore cultural/political practices such as social work. His current research is on 'boredom' and on 'complexity and social flows'. In the past he has done DH research on the implementation of the Children Act. Other writing on social work ethics has appeared in BJSW. Stephen A. Webb is Lecturer in Social Work at the University of Sussex. He is currently writing a book for Palgrave-Macmillan entitled Social Work in Risk Society: Social and Cultural Perspectives. Here he analyses the development and practice of social work as part of the root condition of modern risk society. His other research interests include evidence-based briefings in children and family work; new information technologies and the caring professions; and social work theory and ethics.

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The aim of the present study was to examine to what degree different mechanisms of moral disengagement were related to age, gender, bullying, and defending among school children. Three hundred and seventy-two Swedish children ranging in age from 10 to 14 years completed a questionnaire. Findings revealed that boys expressed significantly higher levels of moral justification, euphemistic labeling, diffusion of responsibility, distorting consequences, and victim attribution, as compared with girls. Whereas boys bullied others significantly more often than girls, age was unrelated to bullying. Moral justification and victim attribution were the only dimensions of moral disengagement that significantly related to bullying. Furthermore, younger children and girls were more likely to defend victims. Diffusion of responsibility and victim attribution were significantly and negatively related to defending, while the other dimensions of moral disengagement were unrelated to defending.

Democracies, Dewey and others have argued, are ideally spaces of reasons—they allow for an exchange of reasons both practical and epistemic by those willing to engage in that discourse.  That requires that citizens have convictions they believe in, but it also requires that they be willing to listen to each other. This paper examines how a particular psychological attitude, “epistemic arrogance”, can undermine the achievement of these goals. The paper presents an analysis of this attitude and then examines four arguments for how its adoption—especially by the powerful—undermines the ideal of democracy as a space of reasons.

In recent years, a growing body of work has connected Kierkegaard with discussions of the virtues. But how do these virtue terms hang together, for Kierkegaard? Part of the answer is obvious, insofar as most such ‘Kierkegaardian virtues’ are either expressions of, or in some other way related to, faith. But can we say more than this? In this paper, inspired by an approach taken by Robert C. Roberts in his Spiritual Emotions, I explore the prospects for understanding three such notions - contentment, patience and hope - as rooted in underlying attitudes of humility and gratitude. I explore what kind of humility and gratitude is in play, before going on to consider how these attitudes might support that species of contentment that seems integral to Kierkegaard’s discourses on the lilies and the birds. How, in turn, might this give rise to patience and hope, and of what sort? The paper thus seeks to sketch something of the internal dynamics of the relations between several virtue-terms including how, for Kierkegaard, they are all rooted in an image of God as He who forgives.

Michael Zuckert's dismissal of Burlamaqui and Hutcheson as inspiration for the Declaration of Independence is fatally flawed.  Burlamaqui said exactly what Zuckert doubts that Burlamaqui could have said regarding the purpose of government (to secure rights).  Zuckert's attempt to explain the "pursuit of happiness" in terms of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding fails, because Zuckert's two chosen examples of parallel documents both echo Hutcheson and Burlamaqui (but not Locke) on obtaining happiness; and the 1776 congressional definition of happiness includes virtue, in common with the Ciceronian tradition of Hutcheson and Burlamaqui, in opposition to Locke.  In this Ciceronian tradition, rights are derived from duties, and virtue is the "perfection" of human nature, with happiness as the result.  This view is prominently expressed by Burlamaqui's student Vattel, whose "The Law of Nations" was carefully followed by the Continental Congress as it went through the procedure of establishing and then declaring independence.

This paper explores and contrasts Williams's views and Aristotle's views, and Williams's views of Aristotle's views, on a number of issues about the nature and the unity of the virtues and the conception of human flourishing that underlies them. It argues that Williams could have found Aristotle congenial in two ways. First, Aristotle supposes that most men have some natural inclination to act virtuously, which could ground internal reasons for ethical action. Secondly, he does not assume that human values are readily compatible, as emerges in his uncertainty about the relation of theoretical contemplation to the practical demands of life. However, there is a real disagreement between Aristotle and Williams about the unity of the virtues: can an act be really courageous if it is also wrong, and can an agent be really brave if he is unjust? Here, the paper finds more plausibility in Aristotle's views that Williams was able to grant. If it has a single conclusion, it is this: Williams is always illuminating about the issues of Aristotelian ethics, but not always right. At least, when he is wrong he is wrong about things that matter.

There has been increased interest in character strengths or virtues in recent years in social research and in various policy domains. However, while the notion of virtue has gained credibility in the fields of positive psychology and moral philosophy, it has yet to be satisfactorily considered from the perspective of social theory – in spite of the ongoing calls of researchers who have identified the need for further investigation into the role of culture and social context in the development of individuals' characters. In order to consider how good character and excellence in specific virtues are formed and sustained in social context, this article gives a theoretical account of character and virtue using well-known microsociological concepts. It is argued that whereas virtues are often understood as psychological 'traits' or 'dispositions', they are also socially practiced and represented. Analyses of their related social processes are therefore appropriate and empirically promising, particularly in institutional settings, and can complement other theoretical and methodological approaches.

The purpose of this essay is to explore, and clarify, some key features in Aquinas’ account of the virtue of temperance, with an eye to answering some common objections raised against a positive evaluation of temperance. In particular, I consider three features of Aquinas’ understanding of temperance: First, the role of the rational mean in temperance; second, the role of rightly ordered passions in temperance; and third, the ‘despotic’ control of reason over the passions in temperance. Along the way I consider three common objections to Aquinas’ account of temperance: the objection that temperance can be misused for evil, the objection that temperance devalues effort, and the objection that temperance devalues strong passions and thereby implicitly devalues the goodness of sexuality. In responding to these objections on behalf of Aquinas, I take the opportunity to clarify and slightly extend Aquinas’ account of temperance.

This paper is a discussion of the emotion of compassion or pity, and the corresponding virtue. It begins by placing the emotion of compassion in the moral conceptual landscape, and then moves to reject the currently dominant view, a version of Aristotelianism developed by Martha Nussbaum, in favour of a non-cognitive conception of compassion as a feeling. An alternative neo-Aristotelian account is then outlined. The relation of the virtue of compassion to other virtues is plotted, and some doubts sown about its practical significance.