Virtue theory

This chapter elaborates on a model of virtuous leadership aiming to change management in a post-Covid-19 organizational environment. The Covid-19 pandemic underscored the crucial role of leaders’ dispositions and driving forces in overcoming unprecedented challenges during turbulent times. Based on virtues and character development, and grounded in virtue ethics as a robust philosophical foundation, virtuous leadership advocates for the practice and enactment of virtues, fostering character strengths and innate dispositions in leaders’ personalities. Virtuous leadership’s comprehensive approach, entrenched in Aristotelian premises, simultaneously considers relationship-oriented competences, generating beneficial outcomes centered on leader’s excellence. Consequently, it promotes high-quality relationships with followers and society.
Virtuous leadership supports personal and organizational transformation, resulting in sustainable, equitable and socially responsible business practices. Through encouraging virtuous leadership, business organizations are in position to maintain a socially desirable balance between economic development and environmental issues, enhancing sustainability and social justice.

In the history of philosophy there have been many attempts to define virtues and answer the fa-mous question if virtue can be taught or not. The ancient Greek philosophers struggled with this question in the same manner as we struggle with it today. The problem is the definition of virtues and their complex development. Nonetheless is there an importance to the ability to teach vir-tues, even though nobody can define what a school of virtues could look like. In this essay we are going to look at the different arguments and try to get as near as possible to an answer to the question “Can virtue be taught?”.

Aquinói Szent Tamás „nézete szerint a természetes törvény előírásai szabályokként igazolódnak” – foglalja össze Tamás és egyúttal saját nézetét is Alasdair MacIntyre. Ugyanakkor felmerülhet az a kérdés, hogy ezeket az etikai elveket, szabályokat vajon hogyan is kellene alkalmaznunk a gyakorlatban? Ha kiderülne, hogy ezek vagy teljesen alkalmazhatatlanok, vagy nem nyújtanak számunkra semmilyen gyakorlati útmutatást (mert továbbra is bármilyen cselekvés következhet belőlük), úgy voltaképp feleslegesek volnának, hiszen sem a birtokukban, sem nélkülük nem tudnánk többet arról, hogy miként is kellene cselekednünk.
A szabályoknak általában is van egy olyan problémája, hogy még ha ismerjük is őket, nem feltétlenül tudjuk őket alkalmazni. Továbbá a szabályok konkrét esetekre történő applikálása során jellemzően nem további, explicit szabályokra támaszkodunk.
Ám emiatt felvethető, hogy az a fajta, nem szabályvezérelt döntési képesség, amelyet a szabályok alkalmazásakor igénybe veszünk (és igénybe is kell vennünk), voltaképp alapvetőbb a szabályoknál, ugyanis ez határozza meg, hogy mely helyzetben alkalmazható relevánsan egyáltalán ez a szabály, és azt is eldönti elvileg, hogy egy szabály kivételével van-e dolgunk. Így úgy tűnhet, a szabályok másodlagosak ezzel a képességgel összevetve. Tehát törvényekként, előírásokként, szabályokként hangsúlyozni a természetes erkölcsi törvény előírásait talán eleve elhibázott, hiszen olyasmit állít a középpontba, ami valójában
marginális a gyakorlati eligazodásunkat illetően.
Ez a problémakör továbbvezet az elmélet és gyakorlat viszonyának tágabb
kérdéséhez is, hiszen úgy tűnik, elméletben megállapított törvények praktikus relevanciáját veti fel. Ezzel kapcsolatosan is többfajta potenciális kritika fogalmazható meg, többek közt az elméleti megközelítések szegényességét felvetve azzal kapcsolatosan, hogy a teoretikus megközelítés intellektualizmusa képtelen megragadni a gyakorlati cselekvés gazdag dimenzióit.
Az alábbiakban ezeket a problémákat fogom megvizsgálni: előbb azzal öszszefüggő kérdéseket, hogy erkölcsi gondolkodásunkban és megismerésünkben a szabályoknak lehet-e kiemeltebb, akár elsődleges szerepe, majd azzal összefüggő kritikákat, miszerint a szabálykövetés erkölcse egy alacsonyabbrendű, leegyszerűsítő attitűd az erényeken alapuló felfogáshoz képest.

Alasdair MacIntyre több művében is egy olyan erkölcsfilozófiai koncepció mellett érvelt, amelyet „a vizsgálódás etikájának”, illetve az „eszmecsere és a diskurzus etikájának” nevezett. Ez egyfajta dialogikus etikai megközelítés, melynek pilléreit az igazság keresése, az egymástól tanulás és általában a párbeszéd általi megismerés alkotják. Alapgondolata, hogy a racionális dialógus fenntartásához szükséges normák (értékek, erények, kötelességek) etikailag érvényesek, vagyis az etikai normák egy része belátható azáltal, hogy a dialógus követelményeire reflektálunk. Milyen érvek hozhatók fel e megközelítés mellett? Az alábbiakban ennek a
kérdésnek a megválaszolása lesz a célom.

The paper presents an extended scheme for the inference to the best explanation (IBE). The scheme precisely treats the epistemic modifiers (“hypothetically,” “plausibly,” “presumably”) of the inference, acknowledges its contrastive nature, clarifies the logical support between premises and conclusions (linked, convergent, and serial support), and introduces additional premises essential for inferring justified conclusions (especially those related to causal explanations and more demanding standards of proof). Overall, it advances the existing schemes for IBE in argumentation theory and treats IBE as a par excellence argumentative, rather than explanatory, form of reasoning.

The paper presents an extended scheme for the inference to the best explanation (IBE). The scheme precisely treats the epistemic modifiers (“hypothetically,” “plausibly,” “presumably”) of the inference, acknowledges its contrastive nature, clarifies the logical support between premises and conclusions (linked, convergent, and serial support), and introduces additional premises essential for inferring justified conclusions (especially those related to causal explanations and more demanding standards of proof). Overall, it advances the existing schemes for IBE in argumentation theory and treats IBE as a par excellence argumentative, rather than explanatory, form of reasoning.

Much has recently been written on the inevitable demise of liberalism because of a lack of virtue forming intermediary institutions. Liberalism, in its nearly three-century history, has always relied on a certain set of virtues within its citizenry. The absence of virtue forming institutions within liberalism suggests that liberals should look elsewhere for virtue. Adopting this line of thinking, this article suggests a lost virtue that might rescue liberalism from itself: what the Stoic philosopher Epictetus identifies as gnômê. Gnômê refers to our rational activity that according to the Stoics ought to be conformed to nature and, when practiced properly, aligns the basic reality of nature to the moral and ethical choices people make. “Gnomic education,” I argue, will teach citizens how to think in accordance with nature without institutional aid.

Many philosophers have recently defended the epistemic value of imagination. In this paper, we expand these discussions into the realm of virtue epistemology by proposing and defending a virtue-theoretic conception of imagination. On this account, the intellectual virtue of imagination is a character trait consisting of dispositions to engage skilfully in activities characteristic of imagining, with good judgement and from appropriate epistemic motivations. We argue that this approach helps to explain important connections between related, but distinct, intellectual virtues, including creativity and empathy, and reveals avenues for future work on how best to develop intellectually virtuous imagination.

Josef Pieper aprovechó las ideas de santo Tomás y las hizo brillar con destellos nuevos. El libro "Las virtudes fundamentales", enriqueció la teología del siglo XX porque presentó lúcidamente las virtudes en un momento en que la moral cristiana necesitaba renovarse.

Makalah ini menyajikan tinjauan komprehensif tentang biografi, prinsip filosofis, dan temuan utama sepuluh filsuf dan ilmuwan berpengaruh sepanjang sejarah: Socrates, Plato, Aristoteles, René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Albert Einstein, Marie Curie, Stephen Hawking, dan Noam Chomsky. Kontribusi masing-masing tokoh di bidangnya masing-masing dieksplorasi, menyoroti dampaknya terhadap filsafat, sains, dan masyarakat. Prinsip-prinsip filsafat yang dibahas meliputi pencarian kebenaran, pertimbangan etis, hubungan antara pengetahuan dan keberadaan, serta peran bahasa dalam kognisi manusia. Temuan utama berkisar dari dialog Socrates yang mendorong pemikiran kritis hingga teori Chomsky tentang tata bahasa generatif dan bahasa universal. Makalah ini menekankan keterhubungan ide-ide para pemikir dan pengaruh abadi mereka terhadap pemikiran kontemporer, menggambarkan bagaimana warisan mereka terus membentuk diskusi dalam filsafat, sains, dan aktivisme sosial. Melalui eksplorasi ini, makalah ini bertujuan untuk menggarisbawahi pentingnya penyelidikan kritis dan pencarian pengetahuan dalam memahami kompleksitas keberadaan manusia dan alam.

Debates about Chinese interests in Africa that have emerged in the wake of unprecedented financial investments are often peppered with tales of postcolonial narratives. In communication scholarship, such debates are often characterized by a schism among African scholars who believe that China is there to uplift the African media through “constructively reporting” Africa, versus those who argue that China’s purported generosity is a “soft-power” strategy, as Caruso (2020) alluded (p. 55). In their studies, for example, Wasserman and Madrid-Morales (2018) and Benabdallah (2020) were able to demonstrate that China’s impact in the African media, and especially on journalistic values, is still questionable. These conclusions are mostly based on the study conducted in South Africa. There is still a dearth of scientific communication research documenting negative results, despite the underpinning theoretical assumptions. However, some dissertation work conducted in Zambia, where China now ...

Drawing on Anscombe, in this essay I argue that we should not take Aristotle to be a moral philosopher, nor a virtue ethicist. This is because contemporary virtue ethics has little to do with Aristotelian ethics. While contemporary virtue ethics (or aretaic moral theory, as one may call it) operates on the level of moral and thus categorical norms, Aristotelian ethics-an aretaic life ethics-is primarily concerned with pragmatic norms. The main question for Aristotle is what a good general conduct of life is. The major concern of aretaic moral theory, on the other hand, is to provide a criterion of morally right action and hence to define the concepts of the morally right, the impermissible and moral duty in aretaic terms. This shows that contemporary authors assume a primacy of virtue, while Aristotle assumes a primacy of eudaimonia. I illustrate this distinction by addressing the question of how the virtues benefit their possessor.

According to Sosa (2015, 2021), the domain of epistemic normativity divides into gnoseology and intellectual ethics, a boundary that results from the key notion that gnoseological assessments are telic. We share this view here and highlight the implications that the telic claim has for different debates in contemporary epistemology. However, we also raise the complaint that Sosa's analogy of the archer has suggested that this boundary aligns with those of the instant of cognitive performance and its attributability to an individual, as featured in the Cartesian fundamental epistemic question: What should I believe now? Against this Cartesian imprint, we claim that temporality and sociality may be constitutive features of gnoseology. In order to show this, we introduce alternative analogies of belief formation processes that illustrate how cognitive achievements may be collectively attained across time, features that may manifest as an epistemology of conversation.

This chapter develops a working analysis of the trait and virtue of epistemic care. It canvasses several accounts of epistemic care that are exclusively other-regarding (Byerly 2021, Kidd 2023, Broncano-Berrocal 2020), and raises two problems for these otherwise insightful accounts. It argues that they: (1) neglect epistemic care for oneself—epistemic self-care; and (2) struggle to explain why excessive care for the epistemic goods of others—epistemic subservience—isn’t virtuous. Building on insights from the feminist views proposed by Slote (2001), Dalmiya (2016), and Johnson (2023), the chapter develops an analysis of the trait of epistemic care that features epistemic care for oneself—epistemic self-care—in addition to epistemic care for others, thus addressing the first problem. Finally, it argues that for one’s trait of epistemic care to be an intellectual virtue, one must: know which things are epistemically good for others and for oneself; strike a balance in one’s proximate motivations, and exercise good judgment in weighing the value of others’ epistemic goods against the value of one’s own; and be driven by an ulterior motivation that is itself epistemically good. Balanced proximate motivations and good judgment are needed to avoid excessive care for the epistemic goods of others—epistemic subservience—thus addressing the second problem above. Ultimately, my hope is that this analysis of epistemic care might be a resource for marginalized educators.

This article is concerned with the normative power of cultural values within Chinese-European relations. It proposes that dialogue between European and Chinese stakeholders within educational, cultural, sociological, and philosophical institutions is of the utmost importance in paving a possible way for overcoming the current political crisis. European engagement with Chinese thought in early modernity and the recent reception of early Western liberalism in China both show that there is potential for a non-exclusionary assessment of the "other" in both political cultures. European policy should be aware of its historic potential for critical engagement with Chinese political history.

If responsibility for character requires (among other things) having knowledge of the quality of one's character, and this knowledge requires having at least some good aspects of character, we come to startling conclusions. First, Neil Levy argues that the worse one is morally speaking, the less one is responsible for being morally bad. Second, the truly bad are excused for their bad characters. I present several arguments against Levy's view. First, I argue that the initial conclusion does not follow. It is not the case that the worse a person is, the less responsible she is for her character. A person may still have other aspects of character that enable her to fulfill this part of the epistemic condition. Further, both Aristotle and empirical research on character indicate that most people have such aspects. Second, I consider the truly morally bad. I show that most people voluntarily develop their characters and so-aside from rare cases of abuse, neglect, or congenital disorders-the vicious become so voluntarily. In this vein, I thirdly show that partial moral understanding is sufficient to meet the epistemic condition for character responsibility and most people have this.

The following dictionary documents a selected subset (~250) of perfect pentagrammatons in various languages. This dictionary lists the ancient and probably qualified categorized words, such as ancient royal names (Theut, Minos, Jason) or peoples (Iones), states (Spain), months (april, S ī van), animals (bison, swine), body parts (brain, tongue), virtues (fidēs, Metis, Themis), freedom (libre, frank), royal signs (crown). divine names (Diaus, dives, Mitra), rivers (Euphrates, Karun), parents (Faðir, Móðir), bread (panis), runes (Tiwaz), stars or planets (sauil), water (watir).....

Dado que en teoría de la argumentación es común aceptar que las disputas se pueden resolver argumentativamente, se espera que los desacuerdos hallen una resolución argumentativa, por lo general, a partir de creencias de fondo que se comparten. El problema es cómo resolverlos cuando éstos involucran proposiciones constitutivas de marcos teóricos o conceptuales diversos que dificultan y, a veces, imposibilitan una convergencia racional. A partir de un caso, como el del 'naturalismo filosófico', se argumenta que hay discusiones que se presentan como negociaciones metalingüísticas pero que involucran desacuerdos profundos, que no tienen por qué ser desacuerdos racionalmente irresolubles e, incluso, pueden llegar a ser beneficiosos. Los filósofos en una disputa pueden mejorar sus teorías incluso si están en desacuerdo, sin que, por ello, necesariamente se obstaculice el diálogo. Se podría considerar que en estos casos se trata de desacuerdos profundos virtuosos. RIA. (Monográfico 4), 94–105.

Alastair MacIntyre’s haunting image of a post-apocalyptic world in which our knowledge of ethics has been fragmented poses a contrast between modern morality and ancient ethics. The two stand divided along the fault line of the nature of the good, whether absolute or relative. Modern morality has placed its stake in the absolute good, while ancient ethics rests upon the foundation of the relative good. Agent Relative Ethics asks what the world would look like if we adopted agent relativity wholeheartedly, clinging to no shred of absolute morality.

From this perspective, the modern understanding of morality has been marred through a focus upon intrinsic or absolute goods, which conflict with attributive or relative goods. On account of absolute goods, morality has an alienating influence upon our human relations. Relative goods avoid this alienation, but they appear to have a flaw of their own: they leave each agent isolated, with his or her particular relative good. This isolation can be overcome, however, by recognizing that some agents are the union of many agents; some relative goods, then, are achieved only in union with others.

Investigating these shared relative goods reveals a series of parallels with morality. A shared good, for instance, prohibits any harmful using of those with whom we share the good. On the other hand, foreseeing harm is sometimes consistent with the shared good. Even something like double effect reasoning can be applied to our efforts to possess a good as shared. Furthermore, within the limited community of a shared good, we sometimes seek what looks like punishment. Partiality and impartiality each have their role in the pursuit of shared good. Finally, those pursuing a shared good appear to be bound by something like agent centered restrictions.

These parallels remain at the parochial level of particular shared goods and do not rise to the universal scope of ethics. Nevertheless, Agent Relative Ethics closes by suggesting a shared good that could apply universally to all human beings. This universal good might provide a manner of overcoming the fragmentation of our ethical knowledge and a possible path toward the restoration of ethics.

아우구스티누스의 『요한 서간 강해』의 열 번째 강론에 나타나는 끝(finis)의 개념은 고대 그리스-로마의 행복주의 및 덕론과 유사점과 차이점을 동시에 보여준다. 유사점은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 고대 행복주의 윤리와 마찬가지로 아우구스티누스의 윤리도 역시 목적론적 관점을 강하게 지닌다. 둘째, 고대 행복주의와 마찬가지로 아우구스티누스의 윤리도 역시 행복과 최고선을 추구한다. 셋째, 고대 행복주의처럼 아우구스티누스의 윤리도 역시 인간 본성에 관심을 가지고, 인간의 완성을 지향한다. 하지만, 아우구스티누스의 끝(finis) 개념은 그의 윤리가 고대 행복주의 윤리와 여러 지점에서 분명한 차이를 갖고 있음을 드러내준다. 첫째, 고대 행복주의 윤리에서 최종 목표(finis ultimus)는 행복이다. 하지만 아우구스티누스에게 있어서 끝은 행복이 아니라, 사랑이며, 그리스도이며, 삼위 하나님이며, 하나님처럼 되는 것이며, 하나님을 뵙는 것이다. 행복은 오히려 이러한 참된 끝에 종속된다고 볼 수 있다. 둘째, 고대 행복주의 윤리에서 인간의 완성은 덕스러운 삶에 있다고 본다. 반면에 아우구스티누스에게 인생의 최종 목표는 덕이 아니라, 하나님을 향유하는 것이다. 이처럼 아우구스티누스의 윤리학은 목적론적 성격을 지니면서도, 철저하게 하나님 중심적이며 종말론적인 특성을 지닌다. 그의 윤리학이 지니는 이러한 특징은 현대인의 개인적이고 공적인 삶에 다양한 적용점을 제공한다.
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The concept of finis, as it appears in the tenth homily of Augustine’s Homilies on the First Epistle of John, exhibits both similarities and differences with ancient Greco-Roman eudaimonism and virtue ethics. Augustine’s ethical framework shares commonalities with ancient eudaimonism in three main aspects: first, like ancient eudaimonism, Augustine’s ethics is strongly teleological; second, akin to ancient eudaimonism, it seeks happiness and the ultimate good; and third, mirroring ancient eudaimonism, Augustine’s ethical theory is concerned with human essence and strives for human perfection. Augustine’s concept of finis, however, indicates that his ethics differs from ancient eudaimonism at several points. First, in ancient eudaimonism, the ultimate end (finis ultimus) is happiness. For Augustine, however, the end is not happiness but love, Christ, the Trinity, becoming like God, and seeing God. Happiness is instead subordinate to these true ends. Second, in ancient eudaimonism, human fulfillment lies in the virtuous life. For Augustine, on the other hand, the final goal of life is not virtue but the enjoyment of God. Thus, Augustine’s ethics is not only teleological but also thoroughly God-centered and eschatological. This characteristic of his ethics has many applications to our personal and public lives today.

English is said to be the world's most important language having communicative and educative value. A very important reason for regarding English as a world language is that the world's knowledge is enshrined in English. It is a progressive language. Over and above English is universally renowned for its power of expression and its varied literature. Language learning is a natural process for the natives. But for the students of other languages, deliberate efforts are required to learn a foreign language. The students in India face such problems because English is not their mother-tongue. It is neither instinctive nor intuitive. To solve these problems, a systematic approach should be followed. This paper does a comparative study between traditional teaching methods and contemporary teaching techniques. The emerging contribution of online resources and tools to classroom learning is discussed here. We also try to share some innovative and effective tools that could be used for language learning in class room. Discussion:-English Language Teaching (ELT) has enormously changed over the decades. When English was entered in the curriculum, it was a challenge for the English language teachers to teach English to the foreign learners. The teachers taught English as a 'Knowledge' subject, not as a 'Skill' subject because their main aim was to equip them to pass the examinations. 'Grammar-Translation Method' was adopted by the teacher. In this method the teacher shall translate each and every single word to their native language to make the students learn English. By doing so the development of oral proficiency of the learners becomes nil. Other than lecture method many other methods were also used to teach English in an effective manner. They are audio-lingual method, direct method, bilingual method, communicative language teaching, the structural teaching, the structural approach etc. Present Trends in English Language Teaching In the 21 st century, people are occupied with new opportunities, challenges and choices. Technology has spread into all spheres of life. In this period, the educational institutions can not remain mere venues for the transmission of a prescribed set of information from teacher to student over a fixed period of time rather the

I first summarize the central issues in the debate about the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics, and then examine the role that social psychologists claim positive and negative mood have in influencing compassionate helping behavior. I argue that this psychological research is compatible with the claim that many people might instantiate certain character traits after all which allow them to help others in a wide variety of circumstances. Unfortunately for the virtue ethicist, however, it turns out that these helping traits fall well short of exhibiting certain central features of compassion.

Çağdaş erdem etiğine bir başlangıç tayin etme noktasında literatürde iki farklı yaklaşım söz konusudur. Bu yaklaşımlardan birincisi, çağdaş erdem etiğini Anscombe’u anarak Aristoteles’e dayandırırken, ikincisi Anscombe’u anmadan Aristoteles dışı kaynaklara referans vermektedir. Bu çalışma, öncelikle çağdaş erdem etiğinin Anscombe ile başladığını savunmakta, Anscombe’un temel kaynağının ise Aristoteles olduğunu belirgin kılmakta ve çağdaş erdem etiğini Aristoteles’e dayandıranların tarafında yer almaktadır. İkinci olarak çalışmada, Aristoteles’i referans olarak gösteren çağdaş erdem etiği temsilcilerinin ortaya koydukları farklı yaklaşımların Anscombecu karakteri tespit edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Anscombe’un “Modern Moral Philosophy” makalesinin, çağdaş erdem etiği için Aristoteles’in klasik erdem etiğini referans olarak gösterme noktasında bir “köprü” ve yeniden canlanan bir etik teori olarak kendini sunmasında da bir “kaynak” olduğu savunulmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Aristoteles, Anscombe, Eleştirel Etik, Erdem Etiği, Doğru Eylem, Karakter.

Why Does Contemporary Virtue Ethics Genesis With Elizabeth Anscombe?
Abstract
There are two different approaches in the literature in terms of assigning a genesis to contemporary virtue ethics. While the first of these approaches bases contemporary virtue ethics on Aristotle by referencing Anscombe, the second one refers to non-Aristotelian sources without mentioning Anscombe. This study, firstly, argues that contemporary virtue ethics dates back to Anscombe, makes it clear that Anscombe’s main source is Aristotle, and takes the side of those who base contemporary virtue ethics on Aristotle. Secondly, the study tries to identify the Anscombecian character of the different approaches put forward by contemporary virtue ethicists who take Aristotle as a reference. In this framework, it is argued that Anscombe’s article “Modern Moral Philosophy” is a “bridge” for contemporary virtue ethics to refer to Aristotle's classical virtue ethics and a “source” for it to present itself as a revitalised ethical theory.
Keywords: Aristotle, Anscombe, Critical Ethics, Virtue Ethics, Right Action, Character.

Debates about Chinese interests in Africa that have emerged in the wake of unprecedented financial investments are often peppered with tales of postcolonial narratives. In communication scholarship, such debates are often characterized by a schism among African scholars who believe that China is there to uplift the African media through “constructively reporting” Africa, versus those who argue that China’s purported generosity is a “soft-power” strategy, as Caruso (2020) alluded (p. 55). In their studies, for example, Wasserman and Madrid-Morales (2018) and Benabdallah (2020) were able to demonstrate that China’s impact in the African media, and especially on journalistic values, is still questionable. These conclusions are mostly based on the study conducted in South Africa. There is still a dearth of scientific communication research documenting negative results, despite the underpinning theoretical assumptions. However, some dissertation work conducted in Zambia, where China now ...

Political polarization is on the rise, undermining the shared space of public reason necessary for a thriving democracy and making voters more willing than ever to dismiss the perspectives of their political opponents. This destructive tendency is especially problematic when it comes to issues of race and gender, as informed views on these topics necessarily require engaging with those whose experiences may differ from our own. In order to help our students combat further polarization, we created a course on "The Philosophy of Race, Class, and Gender" that incorporated intergroup dialogues - small, diverse, semester-long discussion groups-that focused on building the civic virtues of toleration, egalitarianism, and solidarity. In this article, we describe our approach, including the evidence that intergroup dialogue can act as a catalyst for democratic dialogue. We hope that the practice of intergroup dialogue can help other instructors cultivate the civic virtues in their philosophy classrooms as well.

This article concerns the concept of judicial resistance understood in connection with the individual, on-bench decisions undertaken by judges in view of upholding the rule of law and in defiance of measures introduced by authoritarian, semi-authoritarian, "illiberal", or otherwise oppressive regimes. The point of focus is the normative dimension of acts of judicial resistance and the contention that they constitute the rightful obligation of judges. The article claims that judicial resistance interpreted as a right or duty is objectionable. As it will be argued, the key reason is the inadequacy of the rule-oriented models (deontic and consequentialist) on which the categories of right and duty rest to address the descriptively and evaluatively thick notion of judicial resistance. Instead, the article will argue for a virtue-centred model which explains judicial resistance through the character strengths of a virtuous judge. After expounding the conception of judicial virtue and the approach of a virtuous judge, the analysis will argue how perceiving the capacity to resist in terms of virtue allows for overcoming difficulties connected with the claim that a judge has a right or duty to resist. In the last part, the analysis will propose a list of three virtues that may be especially adequate for judicial resistance based on selected examples.

The aim of philosophy is to give a thorough account of virtue as a guide to living a virtuous life.  Western philosophy does not include the nonrational in these considerations; nevertheless, virtue requires a combination of rational and nonrational thought.  Using “comparative” as a synonym for “rational,” “experiential” as a synonym for “non-rational,” and “compassion” as a synonym for “virtue,” one may arrive at a useful account by examining where the comparative and experiential meet and what their relationship is in generating virtue.  One finds that although direct, first-order experience of receiving or extending compassion is beyond the scope of Western philosophy, rational analysis of experience is not, and is a helpful aid in learning and teaching virtue.

A scenario exists that is almost exclusively specific to university life. We are driven by the supposition that our work is focused on the most elevated epistemic goals— pursued not only by each of us individually, but also by society—and that our task is a cognitively collective enterprise that involves the mind and an infinite number of performances by other people. Further, we accept from the outset that the people with whom we live are, at least in principle, as epistemically competent as we are, capable of observing, thinking, and achieving epistemic performances with us. In most cases, we secure our jobs because of our skills and achievements. When we start working at university, our goals are public, and we have access to the same techniques and instruments, methodological resources, and sources of information. In other words, it is a necessary condition for us to live in the midst of epistemic peers. But the fact is that these people are not always in agreement with us, and we frequently find ourselves in situations in which somebody demands explanations from us, better reasons and justifications, proof, and arguments.

For this reason, our life at the university is marked by epistemic disagreements in practically all subjects. And the absence of such disagreements should cause us a certain amount of discomfort because it may mean that academic power is excessively concentrated in the hands of someone arrogant and oppressive.

The public intellectual shaped by a university is somebody prepared to converse, to dialogue. They are trained to recognize that there are disagreements, and that this recognition is not trivial. Recognizing that the person we disagree with is an epistemic peer (is, at least ideally, as able and competent as we are in producing good epistemic achievements) is the central pillar of epistemic cooperation and one of the principles of democracy. In daily life, this type of recognition is rarer: in day-to-day situations when we enter into a disagreement, we almost always assume that our divergence is only a matter of viewpoint and taste; at other times we assume that our interlocutor is an opponent and must be less capable and rational than we are. In these cases, we doubt the competence, taste, honesty, and reasonableness of our opponent. But in epistemic disagreements between virtuous epistemic agents, our challenger must be someone who has good reason to believe things that are different from the things we believe.

Questo numero monografico è dedicato all’Etica delle Virtù. La prima sezione è presentata dai principali esponenti delle correnti in cui oggi l’etica della virtù si articola, successivamente discussa da studiosi che si misurano con alcuni dei suoi snodi più problematici. La seconda sezione del fascicolo tratta temi centrali dell’Etica delle virtù e della tradizione che la sottende. Nella terza parte ci si sofferma su alcune critiche rivolte ad essa o ad alcune sue correnti.

Purpose: Cyber security threats emanating from employees’ incorrect behavior have escalated in the banking sector. Yet formal policies and technical solutions have failed to solve the problem. Virtue ethics may be a method that can handle this concern. This research aimed at enhancing Cyber security by confirming through statistical analysis the applicability of cardinal virtues related to cyber security ethical behavior. Methodology: The quantitative survey method utilizing an online questionnaire was used. Confirmatory factor analysis determined causal patterns in the variables and assessed them for validity and reliability. Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling was then used to test casual relations between the study’s constructs.   Findings: The results reveal that there is a positive but an insignificant effect of prudence Beta 0.094. p = 0.277 on cyber security ethical behavioral Intentions; there is a positive and significant influence of Temperance; Beta 0.255, ...

The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) delineates dialectical partners behavior toward one another given the adversariality thesis. Phyllis Rooney holds that the DSS, as a bridge between the formal and pragmatic elements of adversariality, leads to epistemic dysfunction. This connection commits the Adversarialist to defending the DSS. My modest version of this defense will be to show that the dysfunction in Rooney's going case, the Penaluna-Leiter exchange, is not attributable to argument's skeptical norms.

This article is an overview and introduction of the current issue of Filosofija. Sociologija, thematically divided into five chapters. The topics cover various aspects of contemporary world: from the challenges related to technology and democracy to researches on youth values and worldview. What seems to unite all these articles (in spite of their plurality of themes, views and approaches) is the idea of an ever-changing world in which philosophy is interconnected with other sciences and disciplines, in order to provide more consistent and perhaps universal interpretations to the challenges that human beings must face in the contemporary world.

'Genius, cannot be taught, ' Ralph Waldo Emerson reports, reiterating Socrates's conclusion in Plato's Meno. This article considers this claim and its significance for moral education, specifically in modern science, by focusing on Emerson's account of genius and the virtue of self-trust that perfects it. Genius, for Emerson, does not refer only to extraordinary works or persons. It is also the creative action of the soul to be cultivated by all. Self-trust, in which all the virtues are realized, is its chief virtue. Emerson knows that virtue begins but does not end in imitation. The goal of moral education is not simply to ape the virtues of those we love and admire, but to cultivate the virtues needed to innovate on received models, to excel by pressing beyond exemplars who have gone before. Can genius, then, be taught? Emerson's answer is not so simple as it may appear at first blush. In this country we are fond of results and of short ways to them … In our experiences, learning is not learned, nor is genius wise. The name of the Scholar is taken in vain. Emerson, "The Scholar" 2010, 90 'Genius, cannot be taught, ' Emerson reports, reiterating Socrates's conclusion in Plato's Meno. 1 This is a theme that Emerson had developed since his early lecture 'The American Scholar' (1837) and more explicitly and thoroughly in 'Genius' (1839). But what can it mean? How can it be that 'the whole must come … by education, ' and yet this 'power of thought, Genius, cannot be taught. ' 2 At the very least, it does not mean that genius cannot be nurtured, received and inspired. Emerson's work provides an extended commentary on the term meant to inspire its cultivation among fellow Americans. Crucially, by genius Emerson does not only mean, as did most of his eighteenth-century predecessors and nineteenth-century contemporaries, extraordinary works or persons of elevated capacities. 3 Genius is the creative action of the soul, specifically of the intellect, that can be fostered by all. Self-trust, in which all the virtues are realized, is its chief virtue. Emerson knows that virtues begin but do not end in imitation. The goal of intellectual and moral formation is not simply to ape the habits of those we love and admire, but to cultivate the virtues needed to innovate on

Penulisan skripsi ini membahas tentang studi tokoh dengan metode library research (kepustakaan). Kajiannya dilatarbelakangi atas problematika akhlak, gejala kemerosotan moral zaman sekarang. Maka sangat tepat jika perlu memunculkan kembali pemikiran Ki Ageng Suryomentaram tentang konsep pendidikan akhlak. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjawab permasalahan akhlak saat ini, kajiannya terdapat dalam buku Puncak Makrifat Jawa (Pengembaraan Batin Ki Ageng Suryomentaram) dan buku-buku relevan yang masih terkait dengan tokoh. Berdasarkan data dalam bentuk deskripsi, maka penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif, dimana peneliti mengkaji pemikiran Ki Ageng Suryomentaram baik itu latar belakang pendidikan, budaya, situasi dan kondisi sosial-politik yang memengaruhi pemikirannya. Peneliti menggunakan metode kepustakaan (dokumentasi) digunakan untuk mengumpulkan data berupa buku-buku sebagai bahan informasi (data sekunder). Kemudian dianalisis dengan metode analisis interpretasi dan ...

In their "Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance" Kotzee, Carter and Siegel (2019) argue against what they call the intellectual virtues (IV) approach to the primary epistemic aim of education and in favor of what they call the critical thinking (CT) approach. The IV approach says that educating for intellectual virtue is the primary epistemic aim of education. The CT approach says that it is educating for critical thinking. They argue that the exemplarist/role-modeling pedagogy of the IV approach is not sufficiently action-guiding, because it does not teach students the know-how needed to think well. This they call the pedagogical challenge to the IV approach. We argue that their criticism of the IV approach fails. In general, possessing an intellectual virtue requires having a corresponding critical-thinking skill set. Also, for one to exercise critical-thinking skills well it is necessary that they possess dispositional components of corresponding intellectual virtues. Accordingly, intellectual virtues can be groomed in nonexemplarist ways that seem sufficiently action-guiding. Furthermore, the pedagogical challenge for the IV approach is a challenge for the CT approach as teaching for critical-thinking dispositions seems heavily reliant on an exemplarist pedagogy and so to this extent is non-action-guiding.