Theories Of Truth

Alfred Tarski’s semantic conception of truth is arguably the most influential – certainly, most discussed - modern conception of truth. It has provoked many different interpretations and reactions, some thinkers celebrating it for successfully explicating the notion of truth, whereas others have argued that it is no good as a philosophical account of truth. The aim of this work is to offer a systematic and critical investigation of its nature and significance, based on the thorough explanation of its conceptual, technical as well as historical underpinnings.

The methodological strategy adopted in the thesis reflects the author’s belief that in order to evaluate the import of Tarski’s conception we need to understand what logical, mathematical and philosophical aspects it has, what role they play in his project of theoretical semantics, which of them hang in together, and which should be kept separate. Chapter 2 therefore starts with a detailed exposition of the conceptual and historical background of Tarski’s semantic conception of truth and his method of truth definition for formalized languages, situating it within his project of theoretical semantics, and Chapter 3 explains the formal machinery of Tarski’s truth definitions for increasingly more complex languages. Chapters 4 - 7 form the core of the thesis, all being concerned with the problem of significance of Tarski’s conception. Chapter 4 explains its logico-mathematical import, connecting it to the related works of Gödel and Carnap. Having explained the seminal ideas of the model-theoretic approach to semantics, Chapter 5 tackles the question to what extent Tarski’s ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’ (and related articles from the 1930s) anticipates this approach, and what elements might be missing from it. Chapter 6 then deals with the vexed question of its philosophical import and value as a theory of truth, reviewing a number of objections and arguments that purport to show that the method fails as an explanation (explication) of the ordinary notion of truth, and, in particular, that it is a confusion to think that Tarski’s truth definitions have semantic import. Finally, Chapter 7 is devoted to the question whether Tarski’s theory of truth is a robust or rather a deflationary theory of truth.

On the basis of a careful analysis, the thesis aims to substantiate the following view. [A] Tarski’s theory with its associated method of truth definition was primarily designed to serve logico-mathematical purposes. [B] It can be regarded a deflationary theory of a sort, since it completely abstracts from meta- semantical issues concerning the metaphysical or epistemological basis or status of semantic properties. Indeed, [C] this can be interpreted as its laudable feature, since by separating formal (or logico-mathematical) from meta-semantical (or foundational) aspects it usefully divides the theoretical labour to be done in the area of meaning and semantic properties in general. [D] In spite of the fact that Tarski’s conception of truth has this deflationary flavour, the formal structure of its method of truth-definition is quite neutral in that it can be interpreted and employed in several different ways, some of them deflationary, others more robust.

Published in: Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge University Press, 217–232.

The concept of truth and competing philosophical theories on what truth amounts to have an important place in contemporary philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to give a synopsis of different theories of truth and the particular philosophical issues related to the concept of truth. The literature on this topic is vast, and we must necessarily be rather selective and very brief about complex questions of interpretation of various philosophers. The focus of the chapter is mainly on selected systematic issues and the most influential and well-established philosophical theories and key concepts.

This paper serves both to summarize Haack's arguments against the various forms of postmodernist cynicism in MANIFESTO OF A PASSIONATE MODERATE (1998) and to introduce ideas on philosophy of science she will develop in detail in DEFENDING SCIENCE---WITHIN REASON (2003).

Susan Haack, “The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth.”

Abstract: “Much truth is spoken, that more may be concealed,” wrote Mr. Justice Darling in 1879. Opening with an articulation of the distinction between truth (the concept) and truths (particular true propositions), this paper is largely devoted to: developing an account of the dual meaning of “partially true” – “true-in-part” vs. “part of the truth”; and (ii) understanding the reasons for, and the dangers of, the very common tendency to tell only part of the relevant truth. 


Keywords: truth, truths, partial truth, Ramsey, laconicism, vagueness, deception

—ABSTRACT— Since the publication of Truth, Paul Horwich's 'Minimalism' has become the paradigm of what goes under the label 'the deflationary conception of truth'. Despite the many theoretical virtues of Horwich's minimalism, it is usually contended that it cannot fully account for the normative role that truth plays in enquiry. As I see it, this concern amounts to several challenges. One such challenge—call it the axiological challenge—is about whether deflationists have the theoretical resources to explain the value of truth. Some philosophers (e.g. Michael Lynch and Bernard Williams) have argued that they do not. The thought is that by being valuable in the way it is, truth plays a non-trivial explanatory role with respect to core phenomena of enquiry. In order to account for this aspect of truth, the challenge goes, we need to inflate truth's nature to an extent incompatible with core tenets of the minimalist conception. In this paper, I first provide some clarifications of what we mean exactly when we say that truth is valuable. By borrowing important distinction from the current debate in axiology, I elaborate a framework within which to conduct investigations into the value of truth. With reference to Horwich's discussion of the issue, I then discuss the link between questions concerning the explanatory role of truth and the issue of its metaphysical inflation. I conclude by briefly exploring a few strategies on behalf of minimalists to address the axiological challenge. 2

This paper serves both as a kind of summary of Haack's arguments against the various styles of postmodernism cynicism about inquiry, evidence. truth, and reality, and as an anticipate=ion of the ideas developed in detail in her DEFENDING SCIENCE---WITHIN REASON (2003).

Revision sequences were introduced in 1982 by Herzberger and Gupta (independently) as a mathematical tool in  formalising their respective theories of truth. Since then, revision has developed in a method of analysis of  theoretical concepts with several applications in other areas of logic and philosophy. Revision sequences are usually formalised as ordinal-length sequences of objects of some sort. A common idea of revision process is shared by all revision theories but specific proposals can differ in the so called limit rule, namely the way they handle the limit stages of the process. The limit rules proposed by Herzberger and by Belnap show different mathematical properties, called periodicity and reflexivity, respectively. In this paper we isolate a notion of cofinally dependent limit rule, encompassing both Herzberger’s and Belnap’s ones, to study periodicity and reflexivity in a common framework and to contrast them both from a philosophical and from a mathematical point of view. We establish the equivalence of weak versions of these properties with the revision-theoretic notion of recurrent hypothesis and draw from this
fact some observations about the problem of chosing the "right” limit rule when performing a revision-theoretic analysis.

There are many variants of deflationism about truth, but one of them, Paul Horwich's minimalism, stands out because it accepts as axiomatic practical variants of the equivalence schema: ⟨p⟩ is true if and only if p. The equivalence schema is epistemologically fundamental. In this paper, I call upon empirical studies to show that practical variants of the equivalence schema are widely accepted by non-philosophers. While in the empirical data there is variation in how non-philosophers and philosophers talk about truth and how they judge that a sentence is true, a significant amount of data collected over the years reveal that the ordinary or folk view of truth is compatible with the epistemological fundamentality of alethic minimalism. This, I take it, suggests that people share in the same intuitions that form the bedrock of Horwich's minimalism.

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Toute l’anthropologie, aussi ouverte, large et interdisciplinaire soit-elle, partage un commun : l’enquête de terrain la plus minutieuse, l’implication personnelle la plus poussée, la saisie subjective des subjectivités, et la formation inductive des concepts (du terrain vers la théorie). Mais l’importance grandissante et l’hétérogénéité de la demande de connaissances issues du terrain questionnent cette charte. Elles m’obligent à aller au-delà de l’affirmation convenue de la « vérité du terrain » (qui serait en quelque sorte la vitrine publique des chercheurs) pour m’interroger sur l’enquête elle-même et sur le rapport entre ce que j’observe dans le temps de la rencontre ethnographique d’une part, la compréhension que je peux établir de ce qui s’est passé sur le moment de cette observation d’autre part, et enfin ce que je pourrai dire publiquement de ce que j’ai appris.

Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar que 1) la teoría de la evolución es ontológicamente neutral en el debate entre naturalismo metafísico y teísmo y 2) que es consistente sostener en conjunto el naturalismo metodológico y el teísmo. Para ello, examinaré en primer lugar el argumento de Plantinga que intenta mostrar que hay consistencia entre teísmo y evolución y que, por el contrario, hay inconsistencia entre la teoría de la evolución y el naturalismo (tanto metodológico como metafísico). Me interesa aceptar la primera parte del argumento de Plantinga, pero rechazar la segunda. Defiendo que el argumento de Plantinga es válido si y sólo si se supone una teoría de la verdad por correspondencia. A continuación, argumento que si se reemplaza dicha noción por la concepción pragmatista de la verdad de James, es posible concluir 1 y 2.

Abstract: This paper aims to show that: 1) theory of evolution is ontologically neutral inside debate about metaphysical naturalism and theism; and 2) that it is consistent to hold simultaneously methodological naturalism and theism. In order to achieve this, I will first examine Plantinga's argument that tries to show that there is consistency between theism and evolution, but, on the contrary, there is inconsistency between theory of evolution and (methodological and metaphysical) naturalism. I accept the first part of this argument, but I reject the second part. I will defend that Plantiga's argument is valid if and only if it is supposed a theory of truth by correspondence. Finally, I will argue that if such notion is replaced by James's pragmatist conception of truth, it is possible conclude 1 and 2.

Аннотация: В докладе предложена формализованная процедура тре-компонентной оценки аргументов на основе многозначных логик аргументации Д.Бочвара – В. Финна. Процедура обоснована при помощи понятия пост-правды и трех концепций истины, корреспондентной, когерентной и прагматической, и проиллюстрирована на примере судебных вердиктов в делах Дмитрия Карамазова и Родиона Раскольникова из романов Ф. Достоевского «Братья Карамазовы» и «Преступление и наказание». Abstract: In the paper, I propose a three-component algorithm of arguments' evaluation, which is constructed on the basis of D. Bochvar's and V. Finn's many-valued logic. The algorithm contrasts the notion of post-truth and employs three different truth conceptions, the correspondent, the coherent and the pragmatic. The algorithm is applied to legal argumentation in Dmitry Karamazov and Rodion Raskolnikov cases in F. Dostoyevsky's The Karamazov's brothers and Crime and Punishment. Ключевые слова: пост-правда, концепции истины, судебная аргументация, многозначная логика, Д. Бочвар, В. Финн.

As we know, the pharmaceutical industry´s main purposes are 1) ceaseless sales growth, 2) profitability maximization and 3) shareholders´value creation. To achieve these aims, in 1997, for the first time in history, it won over the U.S. federal government and the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) to authorize direct-to-consumer prescription pharmaceuticals advertising (DTCPA) on TV and on the other mass media, that certainly these days, includes mobile devices, such as smart-phones. During these 21 years, Big Pharma´s DTCPA investment exhibited an unprecedented exponential growth curve and is showing a continuous upward sloping, surpassing the annual rate of increment of both direct-to-physicians promotion (DTPP) and R&D expenditures. The positive relationship between DTCPA and demand stimulation (" pull strategy ") led the industry to currently invest a total of more than u$s 6 billion per year in DTCPA in the U.S. media market, and, in the age of digital communication, it´s expected to pursue its expansion path. As a result, sensual brands of brand-name prescription drugs are so ubiquitous in today´s American urban and media landscape that they are clearly encouraging self-diagnosis, self-misdiagnosis and an upsurge of ads-based drug requests from patients to doctors that are ―in our view― distorting the indispensable characteristics of the physician-patient relationship. This resource-rich industry´s apparatus of symbolic legitimation´s discourse maintains that DTCPA is helping to: 1) enhance disease awareness, 2) educate consumers about new therapeutic options, and 3) prevent under-treatment of conditions that could receive pharmacotherapy. On the contrary, public health´s main reason of being is population health. From a public health ethics perspective, not only is the US " health " system the world´s most expensive and wasteful but, also, we observe that it´s suffering from a list of severe drawbacks that DTCPA is aggravating, such as: 1) disease mongering, 2) over-medicalization, 3) pharmaceuticalization, 4) over-use and over-utilization of resources, 5) over-testing, 6) over-diagnosis, 7) over-treatment, 8) over-prescription, 9) unnecessary care, 10) high incidence of FDA-approved post-marketing prescription drugs-induced dangerous adverse effects (Content analyses highlight that advertisers do not disclose drug risks in the same way they accentuate drug benefits, e.g.: the Vioxx case), 11) sky-high, staggeringly

Romano Guardini was highly valued by Joseph Ratzinger as a lecturer and author of inspiring books. They shared the zealous pursuit for truth, the courage to ask fundamental questions, the boldness to confront the Christian faith with the challenges of contemporary culture, the conviction that the human mind has high cognitive capacities, and the emphasis on the primate of truth in theology. Both authors highlight the reasonable aspect of the Christian faith. After all, faith relies on the fact that God is Truth. Faith and reason are not contradictory. They can complement one another in the process of in-depth cognition. Naturally, as the human mind tries to understand God, it struggles with its own limitations in the face of the mystery which exceeds the capacities of the creation.

[THE PAPER IS IN FINNISH] This essay discusses three things, all of which are connected by a particular notion of relativity. In language, meaning is formed through relations between different concepts and other meanings in a semantic field, and in a particular context. Truth is based on arguments and theories, whose "truthfulness" is weighed in relation to other arguments and theories. Analogous reasoning emphasizes the importance of understanding the internal relations within the cases in question. In these three things under investigation, the notion of relativity is not synonymous with relativism, namely that for instance any "truth" is as "truthful" as any other "truth." Language, truth, or analogous reasoning is neither subjective nor objective but intersubjective.

This paper takes Patrick Heron’s assertion as to the abstract nature of painting as a starting point for a phenomenological investigation into the way in which abstract works comport themselves. How do abstract paintings attain meaningfulness, and along which communicative channels is meaning attainable? Perhaps in opposition to Picasso’s denial of the possibility of abstract art, and affirmation of the vitality of figurative painting (and restatement of: ‘the power of the object’), Heron presented an alternative idea; declaring all painting to be, in effect, of the abstract. In positing an abstract primacy to one’s experience of the world in painting – Heron’s thesis, I will argue, opens more doors than it closes. In support of his hypothesis, Heron drew together the terms: ‘space’, ‘colour’ and ‘form’ – the bedrock of countless claims regarding abstraction’s truth – and invoked an: ‘abstract reality’, which painting (including that which is usually taken to be figurative painting) is seen to embody.

The relationship of abstract painting to the world has proven to be a problematic one. To revisit it is to wrestle with the notion of resemblance, and therefore to speculate as to how it is that one thing is able to point to another. In this work I will examine the degree to which abstraction – as idea – is compatible with an understanding of the serviceability of pictures, and, in so doing, shed light on the extent to which pictures might operate within painting as both language and something else. Central to this is a consideration of the limits of that which is deemed communicable; the method of comprehending abstract painting’s truth(s); what it is that the spectator is able to bring to the table; and how this bringing to can be woven into a fuller conception of abstract painting’s particular operability…from which colour, form and space might be made sense of. I will position abstract painting as an involvement: a form of engagement from which the spectator might come to better understand an engagement with form.

Susan Haack, “Justice, Truth, and Proof: Not So Simple, After All”

Background: This paper was written for a conference in Girona, Spain, on the work of Italian legal scholar Michele Taruffo—who is celebrated by the evidence group at the University of Girona for his defense of the so-called “rationalist conception of proof.” My paper is in part an attempt to disentangle the many elements that seem to be run together in that conception, and figure out which are defensible, and which not; and at the same time to suggest that his broad comparisons of common-law vs. civil-law evidentiary procedures require much closer attention to the details of how these work in practice. So it is a kind of conversation with Taruffo (and with other legal theorists in Spain, Colombia, Brazil, etc. who share these ideas).

Abstract: Preamble: Substantive justice requires factual truth. So if legal proof-procedures are to be more than judicial theater, they must be capable of arriving, often enough, at factually correct verdicts. 

§1. The very possibility of substantive justice requires:
• that there be such a thing as factual truth;
• which is objective (not a matter of what anyone, or everyone, believes;
• that it is often enough possible for us to figure out, at least fallibly, what the truth of a disputed factual matter in is;
• which in turn requires that there be objective standards of stronger and weaker evidence;
• and that the fact that evidence is, by these standards, good, be at least a fallible indication that it is likely true.

The truth of these presuppositions is defended by reference to the laconicist understanding of truth, and the foundherentist account of the structure and quality of evidence.

§2: It remains an open question, however, whether these or those evidentiary procedures are capable arriving, often enough, at true verdicts. 

POWERPOINTS TO ACCOMPANY THIS PAPER ARE AVAILABLE IN THE SECTION LABELED “SELECTED PRESENTATIONS” BELOW (UNDER “MORE”). A LINK TO A YOUTUBE VIDEO OF HAACK GIVING THIS PRESENTATION CAN BE FOUND UNDER “LINKS” IN THAT SECTION

Both Plato and Aristotle appear to have an unclear view of free will. Although Plato set conditions on the ability of choice, some may argue his belief in free will for the enlightened to be an example of libertarianism. He seemed to think it an ability of only a few individuals, those who had achieved inner justice. In fact, In Plato's Gorgias, he goes as far as to say that nobody does wrong willingly. This seems to indicate that Plato believed to act with poor intent is to act without intent at all, rather one who acts in such as way is a slave to their base desires, void of the enlightenment that spawns an individual's ability to choose.

This article approaches the relation between art and truth (can art express truth?) on how it was first set up in the Western world by Plato, who sketches a possible horizon to the development of the question. Aim to highlight his relevance to the early theoretical discussion regarding what art is, its function, concept and how can it be understood. It should be noted that this approach is built in a hermeneutic-phenomenological perspective starting with the contributions from Martin Heidegger's thinking.

O presente estudo tem como objetivo geral analisar se a decisão jurídica tem compromisso com a verdade – ou se contenta com algo diverso, diante da impossibilidade de apreendê-la em sua inteireza e perfeição. Vale-se do método de abordagem hipotético-dedutivo e das técnicas de pesquisa documental indireta, principalmente a pesquisa bibliográfica de autores nacionais e estrangeiros tradicionais do estudo da retórica. Para enfrentar os objetivos específicos de avaliar a relevância da “verdade” na produção da decisão jurídica, conecta essa análise ao ressurgimento da retórica vivenciado no século XX, delineando suas novas características, com vistas a aferir sua verdadeira importância para a elaboração da decisão jurídica dos tempos atuais e avaliar se tal decisão pode prescindir do apego dogmático a uma “verdade” ontológica, uníssona e inquestionável. Conclui, ao final, que a busca pela verdade como correspondência ou vínculo com a realidade não gozou sempre de prestígio nos modelos de resolução institucionalizada dos conflitos ao longo da história da civilização ocidental. A decisão jurídica se mostra muito mais comprometida com a gnosiologia retórica, que ordena os discursos segundo linguagem que possibilite a fundamentação de tal decisão e, por conseguinte, o convencimento das partes envolvidas, pois, sem a intersubjetividade discursiva, os diferentes observadores não podem relatar aos demais o que percebem – portanto, a análise jurídica da verdade não pode prescindir da dialética da retórica.
ABSTRACT: This study has the general aim to analyze whether the juridical decision is committed to the truth – or it is satisfied with something else, given the impossibility of grasping it in its entirety and perfection. From the hypothetical-deductive method of approach and techniques of indirect documentary research, especially literature, among national and foreign authors of the study of rhetoric, we seek to meet the specific objectives of assessing the relevance of “truth” in production of juridical decision, connect this analysis to the resurgence of Rhetoric experienced in the twentieth century, and evaluate whether such a decision may waive the dogmatic attachment to an ontological, unisonous and unquestionable truth.
It concludes in the end that the search for truth as correspondence or link to reality does not always deserve prestige in models of institutionalized conflict resolution throughout the history of Western civilization. The juridical decision appears much more committed to the rhetoric gnosiology, ordering the speeches according to a language that enables the basis on which such a decision is built and therefore the persuasion of those involved, as without the discursive intersubjectivity, different observers may not report to other what they perceive - thus the legal analysis of the truth cannot ignore the dialectic of Rhetoric.

Como se sabe, a partir del surgimiento de la corriente pragmatista -a raíz de la formulación por parte de Charles S. Peirce de la máxima pragmática- la noción de “verdad” ha ocupado un lugar central en su modo peculiar de pensar. Tal es el peso que esta cuestión tiene desde el origen del pragmatismo que el más reconocido de sus representantes, William James, llegó a decir que el pragmatismo debe entenderse como una teoría de la verdad. En este sentido, me resulta desmesurada la postura rortiana en tanto que pretende interpretar al espíritu pragmatista como una actitud filosófica que considera que respecto de la verdad, como así también de otras nociones epistemológicas, no hay algo interesante para decir más allá de lo que pueda pensarse dentro de determinadas prácticas sociales. Más que una interpretación del movimiento pragmatista, Rorty efectúa una relectura forzada llevando agua para su molino neopragmatista. Es cierto que Dewey y James no son Peirce, pero lejos están de encarnar claros antecedentes del espíritu rortiano, el cual explica el conocimiento en términos de solidaridad y la verdad en términos de un acuerdo no forzado de un grupo particular. Tales nociones rortianas de verdad y conocimiento enclavadas en el culturalismo permiten ubicar tanto a James como a Dewey fuera de la jurisdicción del neopragmatismo radical y, consecuentemente, acercarlos al reformismo tal y como pretende Haack. En efecto, la fundadora del fundherentismo distingue entre un pragmatismo reformista y un pragmatismo radical. El primero, a cuya cabeza se ubica Peirce, va a reconocer la validez de las problemáticas tradicionales sobre la verdad, el conocimiento y la realidad, aceptando cierta objetividad en torno a ellas. En cambio, el segundo, llamado también pragmatismo revolucionario o vulgar, no reconoce legitimidad alguna a las cuestiones epistemológicas fuera de las prácticas sociales, y rechazan todo tipo de objetividad en relación al conocimiento, a la verdad y a la realidad. A partir de esta distinción Haack coloca a Dewey y a James a medio camino entre el reformismo y el radicalismo, por lo que pasarían a integrar un pragmatismo intermedio en donde algunos de sus miembros se acercarían más al reformismo, otros al radicalismo. Sin embargo, Del Castillo considera vanos los esfuerzos por parte de Haack para acercar a James y a Dewey al reformismo peirceano. Por el contrario, sostiene que ambos filósofos integran las filas del radicalismo, aunque un radicalismo distinto del de Rorty. Sin ánimos de participar de la polémica, al menos en esta oportunidad, encuentro más acertada la propuesta de Susan Haack pues, sencillamente, entiendo que para ambos filósofos sí tiene cierta legitimidad e importancia la reflexión en torno a las tópicas epistemológicas, especialmente, en torno a la noción de verdad.
Dejando de lado tales disputas, deseo señalar que es opinión de muchos considerar la teoría pragmática de la verdad como aquella que identifica la verdad con lo útil, con lo que funciona, o bien con lo que nos provoca satisfacción. Como corolario, quienes así entienden la teoría pragmatista de la verdad, ven en el pragmatismo una corriente de pensamiento oportunista, inescrupulosa y relativista, en la que todo vale en tanto se satisfaga nuestros intereses personales o de una determinada comunidad, y esto –sostienen– acarrea nefastas consecuencias ético-políticas como la legitimación del uso de la fuerza, la aceptación de la supervivencia del más fuerte, la justificación del imperialismo o del totalitarismo, entre otras.  Tal cuestión interpretativa no carece de relevancia, prueba de ello es que filósofos de gran talla como Russell y Moore interpretaron la teoría de la verdad pragmática en modo semejante. En este sentido, y a fin de zanjar esta cuestión, el objeto del presente trabajo será explicitar la concepción acerca de la verdad que sostiene el filósofo John Dewey y sus réplicas a este impropio modo de interpretar al pragmatismo.

Resumen El propósito de este artículo es mostrar el modo en que Borges, en su relato Tigres azules, desarrolla varias ideas interesantes en torno a la lógica, el lenguaje y las matemáticas. El punto de partida es el escepti-cismo borgeano sobre la capacidad de la lógica clásica para abordar el problema de la verdad y los mundos imposibles. Se defiende que ob-jetos inconsistentes e, incluso, autocontradictorios no necesariamente dan lugar a mundos física o lógicamente imposibles. Se sugiere que las paradojas que Borges construye en el cuento no son paradojas de autorreferencia, sino variantes de la paradoja de Moore y de las para-dojas de implicación material, por lo que para superarlas se requiere un enfoque no-clásico que neutralice ECQ, esto es, un sistema de lógica paraconsistente. Abstract Tigres azules of J. L. Borges. Logic, Truth and Impossible Worlds. The aim of this text is show how Borges, in his story Tigres azules, develops several interesting ideas about logic, language and mathematics. The starting point is Borgesian skepticism about the ability of classical logic to take the problem of truth and impossible worlds. It is defended that inconsistent and even self-contradictory objects do not necessarily give rise to physically or logically impossible worlds. It is suggested that the paradoxes that Borges constructs in the story

ABSTRACT: Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a 'reversal of explanatory direction'. Once reversed, they purport that their own minimal theory adequately explains all of the facts involving truth. But minimalists' main objection to inflationism seems to misfire, and the subsequent reversal of explanatory direction, if it can be made sense of, leaves minimalism in no better explanatory position; and even if the objection were serviceable and the reversal legitimate, minimalists' adequacy thesis is still implausible.

The article presents an attempt to use the logical theory of Dignāga (ca 480 - ca 540) to address the critique levelled against the treatment of “truth” as an unattainable ideal in postmodern/poststructuralist philosophy. Dignāga has famously endorsed the Buddhist critique of language as an imperfect tool to articulate valid statements about reality, but he has also shown how double negation can be used to make limited positive statements by denying their opposites. In practice, this method can be used for the development of ethical concepts that can be shared between parties who would not agree, for example, on a positive definition of “justice”, but would nonetheless all consent to characterize certain practices as unjust.

In this essay, I pesent a new argument for the imposszbility of definmg truth by speafyzng the underlyzng structural property ali and only true proposttions have in common The set of consulerations I use to support this clazm take as thar inspiration Alston's recent argument that tt is trn possible to define truth epistemically-in terms of justification or warrant Accordmg to what Alston calls the "mtensional argument", epistenuc def =tons are inconststent with the Tschema or the principie that tt is true that p if, and only tf, p Smce the T-schema has great intuitive appeal, tias is a powerful zndictment of episterruc theones But the basic argument that Alston employs, and the constellatian of considerations whzch pros ecute that argument, work agamst a much broader range of views than he considers Whtle this implies that a traditional conceptual analysts of truth rnay be impossible, it opens the door to a piurahst approach to truth

This thesis examines the concept of the true voice as a method for the exploration of identity. A revised Delphi approach was used to facilitate the open discussion of this concept amongst a group of specialists from various areas of voicework and singing.

The primary objective of the study was to provide a framework of understanding from which to view a holistic approach to vocal development, with particular relevance to the singing voice, as well as lay the foundations for further study in this area through presenting a range of opinions on the true voice.

The study gave definition to the concept of the true voice and revealed that it could be used as both a framework of understanding as well as an application to voicework.

What does it mean, the king is naked? The earlier version of this essay, which discusses the political implications of the concept of truth by Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, and Alain Badiou with reference to Plato’s allegory of the cave and its interpretation by Heidegger, appeared in the European Messenger (Europski glasnik, 26/2021), published by the Croatian Writers Society (HDP). It is a bit stretched but I hope still feasible experiment of a political truth game attempting to play with Arendt and Foucault against Badiou. On the one side, we see the picture of a tiny voice of truth and, ultimately, the big rage of facts against the violence of ideology; on the other, we face a fervor of the revolutionary truth i.e. ideology against the offensive world of facts which are handled with Jacobin methods. The game is, needless to say, a liberal one, that is a bit reactionary from the vantage point of the revolutionary political thought. There is some Ancient Greek and some French in the essay, but most of it is, alas, in Croatian; the only parts in English appear at the very end: most of the bibliography, and the translations of the title and the abstract.

This is chapter 6 of my book on Rorty, an attempt to understand and defend to an extent his account of the uses of 'truth'. I'm posting it because I'm revisiting the topic and having reread it recently thought some might find it interesting. Any comments welcome!

By examining the question of truth, the article examines whether Christian existence may be interpreted as an ironic way of life. The biblical basis for this is the Pauline understanding of truth, whereby Christ appears as the living truth and the community opened up by him functions beyond binary categories. The linkage to philosophy results from the return to Kierkegaard's conception of irony, the parrhesia according to Foucault, and Agamben's examination of the oath. As a result, the investigation presents truth as an existential horizon for the subjective stance, with the Christian life being conceived of as an ironic form of existence and the church as an ironic society.

Der Artikel untersucht anhand der Wahrheitsfrage, ob die christliche Existenz als eine ironische Lebensform verstanden werden kann. Die biblische Grundlage liefert hierbei das paulinische Wahrheitsverständnis, wobei Christus als lebendige Wahrheit vorgestellt wird und die von ihm eröffnete Gemeinschaft jenseits binärer Kategorien funktioniert. Der Anschluss an die Philosophie erfolgt durch die Rückbindung an die Ironiekonzeption Kierkegaards, die Parrhesia nach Foucault und Agambens Untersuchung zum Eid. Als Ergebnis präsentiert die Untersuchung die Wahrheit als existenziellen Horizont für das jeweilige Subjekt, wobei das christliche Leben als ironische Existenzform und die Kirche als ironische Gesellschaft aufgefasst werden können.

In this essay, I analyse the ideological relationship between Tim O’Brien’s short story “How to Tell a True War Story” (1990) and Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy. I argue that the postmodern message of O’Brien’s story revindicates Nietzsche’s late nineteenth century view that Truth can never be obtained, because people are unable to interpret things, actions or thoughts objectively.

For Nietzsche, killing God would improve the quality of life considerably.  Contrary to the nihilistic interpretations of Nietzsche, which hold that he dispenses with God in order to sanction an anything-goes philosophy, Nietzsche holds that belief in God is degrading and destroying the human.  If God exists, then we have a nature that God created and knows, which means that all we can do is passively discover the God-created laws of our being.  To liberate the 'human' from the tyranny of a predetermined nature and discourse, atheism is a first and necessary step.  Should humans do this, they would be in a better position to create a more life-affirming relationship with the self, the world, and others.  For Nietzsche, killing God does not lead to nihilistic despair, as many would have you believe.  Rather, killing God could lead to psychological wholeness and more productive human friendships.

Twenty-first Theoretical Physics is undergoing a profound "Paradigmatic-Shift" from the Old "Material-Causal" Paradigm underlying both Relativity Theory (RT) and Quantum Mechanics (QM) to the New "G-d's Physics" ("Computational Unified Field Theory", CUFT) Paradigm; The New 'G-d's Physics' Paradigm has been shown capable of resolving the apparent "theoretical inconsistency" between Relativity Theory (RT) and Quantum Mechanics (QM) and offer an alternative theoretical explanation for the accelerated expansion of the physical universe (which cannot be explained by the purely hypothetical and undetectable "dark-matter" and "dark-energy" concepts); Based on the discovery of a singular higher-ordered "Universal Computational/Consciousness
Principle" (UCP) which simultaneously computes every exhaustive spatial pixel in the universe at the incredible rate of "c2/h" = 1.36-50 sec'(!) this New 21st Century Physics Paradigm challenged and revised the basic "MaterialCausal" assumption of the Old 20th century Old RT & QM Models: challenging the "Big-Bang" Model, Einstein's Equations, QM's assumed "collapse" of the target's probability wave function (following its assumed direct physical interaction with the corresponding subatomic probe element) etc. Instead, due to the New 'G-d's Physics'
additional "Computational Invariance Principle" and "Universal Consciousness Reality" theoretical postulates indicating that only the "computationally invariant" UCP may be considered as "constant" and "real", whereas the "computationally variant" four basic physical features of "space", "energy", "mass" and "time" may only be regarded as "phenomenal" and "transient" – i.e., existing only "during" each consecutive "Universal Frame" (UF) being solely computed by the singular UCP, but "dissolving" back into this singular UCP "in-between" any two consecutive UF's frames; forces us to regard the whole existence of the entire physical universe (and its associated
apparent "physical laws") as existing only "transiently" and "phenomenally" – as "manifestations" of this singular higher-ordered "Universal Computational/Consciousness Reality" (UCR)!