The Existence of God

A layman's attempt to discuss Occam's razor in the context of discussions about the existene of God. In short, I claim that the principle of parsimony does not trump the principle of justice (giving praise to whom praise is due). Therefore, Occam's razor is not suitable as a tool for critical thinking where personal actors are possibly involved, outside the domain of scientific methodology.

GRAHAM GREENE’S CATHOLICISM: FIRST, AN INTELLECTUAL BELIEF IN GOD
THE POWER AND THE GLORY II

In this second bulletin, I outline the first two of three forms of Greene’s religion: 1) the Erastian public school Anglicanism undergirding state morality in which Greene was raised, 2) the intellectual Catholicism he adopted on the basis of argument. In the third bulletin, I shall deal with 3) in distinction from that, “conversion.”.
The Power and the Glory explains Greene’s conversion to the Catholicism he saw in Mexican peasants and described in The Lawless Roads (1939), the travelogue which gave the background, places, and many of the characters and situations for The Power and the Glory (1940). In Mexico he lived briefly, but determinatively, with a religion which embraces pain and martyrdom as ways into God, and intuits the indestructibility both of  the human need for the priestly sacrifice, and God’s provision for it. So The Power and the Glory concludes: “‘My name is Father –’ But the boy had already swung the door open and put his lips to the hand before the other could give himself a name.” 
In contrast, after descriptions of the ugliness and violence of Mexico suggesting that he is putting what he found there behind him, The Lawless Roads describes Mass back in Chelsea (London):

Mass in Chelsea seemed curiously fictitious: no peon knelt with his arms out in the attitude of the cross, no woman dragged herself up the aisle on her knees. It would have seemed shocking, like the Agony itself. We do not mortify ourselves. Perhaps we need violence. 

Greene then lists the institutionalized and unnoticed violence of daily life at the time in London, from the ugliness to the airplanes and motor vehicles. When seeing this ordinary violence in our way of life, Greene anticipated our recent change of consciousness. What we now recognize as world destructive violence, we previously took as the benign advances of rationality.
This kind of reversal of our normal evaluations is typical of Greene. So for example, The Ministry of Fear (1943) centers on the deep evil of pity “Pity is the worst passion of all.”  Just so The Quiet American exposed the murderous destructiveness of innocence. Greene’s transvaluation of values is of Nietzschean dimensions. His novels are a substitute for the metaphysical theology the English mostly lack (Charles Williams, a poetic theologian, is an exception) and his metaphysics, the novels, and his mind operate by the union of extremes. The coincidence of opposites is fundamental to Hellenic and Catholic theology. Thus,  in The Power and the Glory, and many other works (e.g. , The Quiet American,  The Comedians, The Human Factor, The Honorary Consul, Getting to Know the General, Monsignor Quixote), there is an equal concern with Marxist Communism and Catholicism. Like Williams, he regarded dogmatic Catholicism and Communism as the two defining contemporary phenomena.

Explicit atheism is a philosophical position according to which belief in God is irrational, and thus it should be rejected. In this paper, I revisit, extend, and defend against the most telling counter arguments the Kalām Cosmological Argument in order to show that explicit atheism must be deemed as a positively irrational position.

Abstract
To what extent can a natural theology be derived from general revelation? Discuss the implications of your answer for the fate of the ‘unevangelised’.
This essay answers the question of what we can know about God through general revelation, and in particular what that means for those people who have not had the opportunity to ever hear the gospel message.  The essay begins by looking at the different knowledge that a person can attain about God through general revelation, but before delving into the different arguments it starts by outlining a case against the argument that there is no general revelation of God.  From this the essay delves into what can be known about God through what is revealed in history, what can be known by considering the origins of the universe, what knowledge of God can be seen by the evidence of intelligent design of the world, and also what our own moral conscience tells us about God.  The essay argues that although significant knowledge about God may be determined through His general revelation, the knowledge of who He is or a more intimate knowledge of Him cannot be attained apart from special revelation.  It shows how without the special revelation of God through Jesus, salvation is not possible, then it cites various different Biblical examples to show how, regardless of whether people have been “evangelised” or not, they are still able to receive God’s special revelation that leads unto salvation.  The conclusion of the essay is that general revelation is what gives a person faith to believe that God exists, and therefore pursue Him further, but that a special revelation of Jesus is needed through scriptures, visions, messengers, angels etc., for them to be saved.

This course examines the religious dimension of human experience; that is, some of the "big questions" that many do not want or even dare to ask before they absolutely have to. It focuses on the issues of God's existence, possibility of knowing and saying anything about God, compatibility of the notions of a loving God and evil in the world, and the understanding of God in major world religions. Course Goals: By the end of this course students should be motivated to think about the God-question with the seriousness it deserves, express their convictions clearly, fairly, and astutely, and respect those who have a different understanding of God.

Concept of God, Arguments for the Existence of God and Experience of God in Spinoza’s Ethics

This is an introductory paper on Spinoza’s metaphysical concept of God as presented in his Ethics. In the first part I develop a reading of his definition of God by presenting first his definition of substance and then his definition of infinity. Concerning the definition of substance, following Della Rocca’s reading, I problematize the connection between the relationships of ‘being in,’ ‘conceived through’ and ‘caused by.’ After that, I link these relations to the notion of freedom. Concerning the definition of infinity, following Haserot and Shein, I problematize the ontological status of attributes and their relations. After that, I revisit the question of causation in the context of the different attributes. In the second part, following Lin and Garrett, I present Spinoza’s four arguments for the existence of God and show how the metaphysical foundations of his system allow Spinoza to develop a valid, but not necessarily sound argument. In the third part, I discuss the role of the experience of God in the latter parts of Spinoza’s system, first, by explaining the relationship between his substance monism expressed in the dictum Deus sive natura and his alleged pantheism, and second, by presenting the way in which his metaphysical views on causation and his substance monism allow him to de- velop what Melamed calls anti-humanist ethics. Finally, I discuss the relation of the finite human mind and the infinite divine intellect, and link Spinoza’s anti- humanist understanding of ethics to his metaphysical understanding of causation.

... pro-vides general information on Islam, corrects some misconceptions about it, and answers some commonly asked questions, such as: § What does Islam say about terrorism? § What is the status of women in Islam? A Brief Illustrated Guide To Understanding Islam 4 Contents ...

It was common for Medieval thinkers to bring forth divers arguments, or "ways", for the existence of God-from motion, from efficient, formal and final causality, as well as eminence, truth and-and conclude each distinct "way" with a rather unsatisfying (for some) "and this everyone calls God." Scotus does not attempt to show that God exists by a series of arguments that can be used in a cumulative case, but by a single argument that contains several steps, each concluding to something that some might have added the tag, "and this we call God."1 Scotus does something a little different, pressing into service an argument from metaphysical (rather than physical) efficient causality as he begins his single (and rather long) proof for the actual existence of an infinite being. In the Lectura, Scotus explains why he intends to take the metaphysical route. Now efficiency can be considered either as a metaphysical or as a physical property. The metaphysical property is more extensive than the physical for "to give existence to another" is of broader scope than "to give existence by way of movement or change." And even if all existence were given in the latter fashion, the notion of the one is still not that of the other. It is not efficiency as a physical attribute, however, but efficiency as the metaphysician considers it that provides a more effective way of proving God's existence, for there are more attributes in metaphysics than in physics whereby the existence of God can be established. It can be shown, for example, from "composition and simplicity," from "act and potency," from "one and many," from those features which are properties of being. Wherefore, if you find one extreme of the disjunction imperfectly realized in a creature, you conclude that the alternate, the perfect extreme exists in God. Averroës, therefore, in attacking Avicenna at the end of Bk. I of the Physics, 14 is incorrect when he claims that to prove that God exists is the job of the physicist alone, because this can be established only by way of motion, and in no other way-as if metaphysics began with a conclusion which was not evident in itself, but needed to be proved in physics (For Averroës asserts this falsehood at the end of the first book of the Physics). In point of fact, however, [God's existence] can be shown more truly and in a greater variety of ways by means of those. As Wolter says in his discussion about Scotus' Triple Primacy argument: What is interesting to note is that Scotus, unlike Henry of Ghent, or for that matter St. Thomas, does not pause here to tell us that this first cause, or this ultimate end, or this supreme nature is God. In fact, he almost seems loath to use this term until he believes he has established the existence of a being so different and unique among existing things that we can attribute this name to it in a meaningful fashion.

Regardless of who you are, what your religious or spiritual conviction if any, you are invited to join us in this book's adventures. Before COVID-19's global pandemic engulfed the world, if you lived in the United States you may remember the "good old days," as January 2020, started? We had such hope and energy, yes, retrospectively life was good. How did we miss the catastrophic chaotic premonitions? There were warnings, we ignored them. Sometimes catastrophic change surreptitiously shows up: unassumingly, inoffensively, and then ferociously and permanently alters our existence.

The Kierkegaardian account of becoming a Christian has come to be perceived in radically egocentric terms. This study serves to challenge this perception by demonstrating that Kierkegaard was devoted to expounding Christian conversion as a transformative process of becoming that is grounded in an active relationship initiated through the agency of the eternal God who has established kinship with us in time.
At the same time, this study will also explore the way that Kierkegaard confronts some of the key errors that arise in overly systematic accounts of Christian conversion: (1) the inherent weakness of approaches that seek to dichotomise, and then quantify separately, the contributions of God’s grace and human freedom; (2) the inclination to objectify God and human beings in ways that neglect their existence as living agents; (3) the overemphasis on conversion as a monadic event of individual transformation rather than an event of reconciliation; (4) the tendency to prioritise epistemology over ontology in discussions of becoming a Christian; and (5) the propensity to lose sight of God’s all-embracing purpose of reconciling persons into their one true form of existence ‘before God’.
Finally, this study will also consider how Kierkegaard was able to negotiate his emphasis on the God-relationship with his emphasis on the importance of individual reflection, decision and action in the Christian life. It will conclude that, for Kierkegaard, the freedom to become a Christian is not the freedom to awaken ourselves into the Christian life but a decision to embrace the Christian life into which God awakens us.

Contents

Introduction
I. Listening to Kierkegaard Alongside his Pseudonyms
a. Kierkegaard and Climacus
b. Anti-Climacus and Kierkegaard

Chapter One: The Communication of the Christian Truth
I. Can the Truth Be Learned?
II. The Relationship or Non-Relationship between Subjectivity and Objectivity
III. The Revelation of Sin
a. Despair
b. The infinite qualitative difference and sin-consciousness
IV. Being in the Truth
V. Passion in Kierkegaard’s Thought
a. The Passion of Thought
b. Passionate Responsibility
c. The Passion of Faith
VI. Conclusion

Chapter Two: The Possibility of Reconciliation
I. The Tale of the King and the Maiden
II. Drawing Another to Oneself
III. The Possibility of Reciprocity
IV. The Possibility of Offense
V. Encountering God in Time
VI. Conclusion

Chapter Three: The Orientation of a Life Lived in Relationship with God
I. The Religious Category of Existence
II. Søren Kierkegaard’s Christian Realism
III. Immanent Religiousness and Christianity
IV. Sin-consciousness and Guilt-consciousness
V. Repentance
VI. Conclusion

Chapter Four: The Orientation of a Life Lived in Relationship with God
I. Following Scripture Faithfully
a. Reading a Letter from a Beloved
b. The Perspicuity of Scripture
c. The Uncertainty of Scripture
II. The Single Individual
III. Christ is the Way
a. Following Christ
b. Following Christ Voluntarily
c. Christ as Prototype and Redeemer
IV. Becoming a Christian in the World
V. Conclusion

Chapter Five: The Freedom to Become a Christian in Relationship with God
I. Approaching Christianity
II. The Passionate Transition
a. Venturing the Leap
b. Preparing to become a Christian?
c. Relationship with “the paradox”
III. Faith in the Presence of God
IV. The Choice to Become a Christian
a. The Freedom of the Individual to Relate to God
b. Willing Beliefs
c. Human Responsibility for Sin
d. Transforming the Will
V. The Freedom to Love
VI. Conclusion

Closing Reflection
I. Kierkegaard’s Low Pneumatology
II. Communion with the One Who Establishes Kinship with Us in Time
III. Conclusion

This paper analyzes the antitheistic argument of Ivan Karamazov in the context of theodicy. We focus on the chapter The Grand Inquisitor, which, as we demonstrate, represents the ultimate argumentative point of Ivan's "rebellion" against God. The logical impossibility of justifying evil in the world leads Ivan not only to the conclusion that evil is an unerasable mark of God's mistake appearing while making his creation (man and the world), but also that the basis of that evil is one of the most appreciated human virtues: freedom. After Alyosha introduces Christ (thesis) into an argument on theodicy, as an instance that can and has the right to forgive evil and thus cancel its effects, Ivan responds with his dialectical counterpart (antithesis): The Grand inquisitor. Synthesis in this dialectical struggle, as we demonstrate, does not lead to any logically acceptable solution. On the contrary. We are left with the paradox: freedom has, at the same time, led to theodicy and to an accusation against Christ.

Proofs of God in Early Modern Europe offers a fascinating window into early modern efforts to prove God's existence. Assembled here are twenty-two key texts, many translated into English for the first time, which illustrate the variety of arguments that philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries offered for God. These selections feature traditional proofs - such as various ontological, cosmological, and design arguments - but also introduce more exotic proofs, such as the argument from eternal truths, the argument from universal aseity, and the argument ex consensu gentium. Drawn from the work of eighteen philosophers, this book includes both canonical figures (such as Descartes, Spinoza, Newton, Leibniz, Locke, and Berkeley) and noncanonical thinkers (such as Norris, Fontenelle, Voltaire, Wolff, Du Châtelet, and Maupertuis).

Lloyd Strickland provides fresh translations of all selections not originally written in English and updates the spelling and grammar of those that were. Each selection is prefaced by a lengthy headnote, giving a biographical account of its author, an analysis of the main argument(s), and important details about the historical context. Strickland's introductory essay provides further context, focusing on the various reasons that led so many thinkers of early modernity to develop proofs of God's existence.

In the opening chapter of his Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, Dumitru Stăniloae proposes a close connection between the intelligibility of the cosmos and the existence of a transcen-dent Intelligence which brings it into being. The object of this essay is to investigate this proposed connection-more specifically, whether the inference from intelligible being to intelligent cause is valid-and to note its significance for Stăniloae's natural theology more generally as well as for the problem of "irreligious experience ." The intelligibility of the cosmos and the existence of God in Dumitru Stăniloae's Orthodox Dogmatic Theology.

If we were seeking a label for Anselm’s intellectual mode, we might call him an extremist. For him, the logic of any subject emerges only by passing through the extremities. Thus, it will always involve arriving at contradictions, not as the conclusion of the argument but as its mediating (middle) terms. Inherent in such mediation is despair as necessary to the movement forward. Despair is essential to the ultimate requirement which is also the goal, namely, overcoming the difference of the divine and the human, an overcoming which must occur on the human side but by the divine action.

Din felsefesinde en çok tartışılan konulardan biri olan kötülük problemini ele almamızın sebebi, bu probleme mutlak manada bir çözüm getirmek değil –kötülük mefhumu bir problemden öte problematik olarak karşımızda durarak sınırlarımızı aştığından– bu konu hakkında din felsefesi nezdinde ne gibi yaklaşımların bulunduğu, kötülük problemi ile kast edilen sorunun ne olduğu ile ilgili özet bir şekilde bilgi vererek muhatabın bu konu hakkında aşağı yukarı zihninde bir tablo oluşturmaktır. Bu amacı güttüğümüz için giriş ile birinci bölümü bu çerçevede oluşturduk.

İkinci bölümde ise Said Nursi’nin kötülük problemine olan yaklaşımını ele aldık. Her ne kadar Said Nursi’nin kelamcı kimliği ve bugün bir kısım insanların zihninde siyasi gerekçeler sebebiyle olumsuz izlenim bırakan Nurculuk hareketinin kurucusu olması hasebiyle din felsefesi açısından kötülük problemine olan yaklaşımını ele almanın çok da yerinde bir çalışma olmayacağı şeklinde görüşler olsa da biz buna katılmamaktayız. Çünkü bugün gerek ulusal gerek uluslararası arenada Müellif adına birçok yüksek lisans ve doktora tezleri yazılmakta ve adına kürsüler kurulmaktadır. Ayrıca küçümsenmeyecek derecede hem yetkinlik hem de kemiyet açısından birçok konuyu –özellikle iman meselelerini– ele alan yaklaşık 6000 sayfalık bir külliyata sahiptir. Bunun yanı sıra kötülük problemine yaklaşımında sadece kelamcı kimliğiyle ya da Kuran’ı referans alarak çözüm getirme yoluna başvurmamış, felsefî diyebileceğimiz çözümleri de probleme olan itirazlara karşı öne sürmüştür.

İkinci bölüm Müellifin yaklaşımı üzerine kurulu olduğu için külliyattan alıntılar ile düşüncelerini vermeye çalıştık. Fakat külliyat dili bugünün Türkçesi ile anlaşılamamaktadır. Hatta külliyat içindeki eserler arasında bile dil farkı bulunmaktadır. Mesela, Muhakemat, 1911 Osmanlı Türkçesi ile yazılmışken Lem’alar, 1934 Osmanlı Türkçesi ile yazılmıştır ki bu yıllar arasında dilde büyük ölçüde bir değişim olmuştur. Bu sebeple yapılan alıntılarda bazen sırf pasajı bugünün Türkçesine çevirmekle yetindik, bazen verilmek istenilen mana pasajdan anlaşılamayacağından pasajdan çıkan anlamı yansıtmaya gayret gösterdik. Bu yöntem bütünüyle manayı aksettirmek üzere kurulduğundan bazı yerlerde kendi cümle ya da kelimelerimiz için parantez kullanmak mümkün olmamıştır. Fakat çok nadir de olsa bütünüyle manayı aksettirme ihtiyacı hissetmediğimiz pasajlarda parantez ile eklemelerimizi belirttik.

Şunu da özellikle belirtmek isterim ki bir şahsiyeti beğenmek veya o şahsiyetin düşüncelerinden istifade etmek veya merak insiyakıyla o şahsiyetin belli bir konu hakkında ne gibi düşüncelere sahip olduğunu araştırmak, o şahsiyete nispet edilen bir ekol, akım, mezhep, tarikat veya harekete mensup olmayı gerektirmez. Nitekim Whitehead hakkında yapılan bir çalışma o kişiyi bir Süreç Teolojisi taraftarı, Mevlâna Celalettin Rumî’yi araştırmak ya da düşüncelerinin taraftarı olmak o kişiyi Mevlevî tarikatı mensubu yapmayacağı gibi Said Nursî’yi araştırmak ve düşüncelerinden yararlanmak da o kişiyi Nurcu yapmaması gerekir. Fakat ülkemizde böyle bir ön yargı oluşmuştur. Bunun kırılmasını temenni ederiz.

Herkesin az veya çok, önceden, şimdi veya daha sonra evrende kötülüğün neden var olduğu ile ilgili birtakım soruları olmuş, oluyor ve olacaktır. Bu açıdan, bu çalışmamızın ufak da olsa bir fayda vermesi bizi gerçekten mutlu edecektir.

Kısa bir süre zarfında ve birçok meşguliyet ile birlikte yürütülmesi sebebiyle çalışmamızın içinde barındırdığı eksiklikler ve hatalardan dolayı okuyucularımızın bunu mazur görmesini talep ederiz.

Risaleleri daha iyi anlamada benden sonsuz yardımlarını esirgemeyen babam Bahaeddin Sağlam’a teşekkür ederim.

Questo articolo semplice riprende il testo di una conferenza tenuta a Tuscania (Lazio), il 22 maggio 2014. Non pretende altro che abbozzare la struttura fondamentale della soluzione che la metafisica dell'essere intensivo offre all'enigma della quarta via.

William Lane Craig’s defence of kalam cosmological arguments has generated a large amount of discussion in the years since the publication of his book on that topic. John Mackie, Quentin Smith, Adolf Grunbaum and I are just some of the philosophers who have engaged in prolonged debates in the journals with Craig on issues which arise in connection with his defence of those arguments. Given the amount of discussion which has already taken place, one might be given to wonder whether there are any important points which remain to be made. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I think that it is clear that there are important issues which have not been taken up in the previous discussion; I propose to take up one such set of issues in this paper.

The main question I want to address here is this: Given that someone presents you with an argument for a given conclusion, under what conditions should the person who presents the argument be prepared to agree that the argument is unsuccessful? Ultimately, my aim is to argue that, in light of some of the criticisms which have been made in the literature, Craig ought to be prepared to concede that what he calls “the kalam cosmological argument” is plainly an unsuccessful argument. However, much of the paper is taken up with consideration of preliminary matters which need to be addressed in order to provide a satisfactory answer to the main question.

In a full discussion of this main question, one would need to provide: (a) an account of rationality and rational belief revision; (b) an account of arguments; (c) an account of rational argumentation among rational agents; and (d) a discussion of the problems which arise as a result of the fact that we are not perfectly rational agents. I shall say a little about each of these topics, though I recognise that what I have to say will not amount to a thorough discussion of any of them. I shall then go on to apply the results from this part of the paper to the on-going debate about kalam cosmological arguments. Finally, I shall discuss two cases—one from Craig’s criticisms of Grunbaum (2000) and one from Craig’s criticisms of Oppy (1995b)—which it seems to me that those criticisms turn on misunderstandings of the proper framework within which rational argument takes place.

The problem of the hiddenness of God “… ranks alongside the problem of evil as one of the two most important and widely discussed reasons … for disbelieving in God” (Rea).  William Lane Craig, probably the foremost Christian apologist today, has called it the most compelling argument against the existence of God.  I shall examine this topic in this paper.

In this paper, I inspect the grounds for the mature Spinozist argument for substance monism. The argument is succinctly stated at Ethics Part 1, Proposition 14. The argument appeals to two explicit premises: (1) that there must be a substance with all attributes; (2) that substances cannot share their attributes. In conjunction with a third implicit premise, that a substance cannot not have any attribute whatsoever, Spinoza infers that there can be no more than one substance. I begin the inspection with the analysis of the first premise, which is provided in the form of the four proofs of God’s existence in Ethics Part 1, Proposition 11. While demonstrating how Spinoza adopts a progressive approach, where the fourth proof of God’s existence is more successful and persuasive than the third, which is more successful than the second, etc., I also unpack concepts central to Spinoza’s thinking here, including the concepts of reason (ratio) and power (potesta or potentia). I then analyze the second premise of the Spinozist argument for substance monism, as established by Ethics Part 1, Proposition 4 in conjunction with Ethics Part 1, Proposition 5. I take up and respond to the objection attributed to Leibniz that a substance p can have the attributes x and y and a substance q can have the attributes y and z, and thus that substances can share some attributes while remaining distinct. Throughout the study, my attention is focused on the argumentative procedures Spinoza adopts. This yields a close, internalist reading of the text where Spinoza effectively embraces substance monism. In conclusion to this study, I underscore to the originality of Spinoza’s argument for seventeenth century theories of substance.

Keywords: Spinoza; substance monism; proofs of God’s existence; individuation.

https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/seiscentos/issue/view/1813

Christian spirituality is often "activist." It consists in the performance of various actions through which a faithful person attempts to secure the presence of God. The argument of the present essay is that spiritual "activism" cannot actually accomplish this goal. For this reason, it is necessary to seek a foundation for all spiritual activism in spiritual "inactivism." This means that all Christian spiritual activity must be reconceived as a response to and celebration of a prior presence of God that comes before any performance. The phenomenological philosophy of Michel Henry makes it possible to appreciate how God is so present in the very fact of being alive. This can make the whole of Christian spiritual practice a Eucharist – a perpetual thanksgiving.

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of certain entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I assume the cogency of Swinburne’s explanatory framework and seek to resituate it within a new philosophical context-that of the field of contemporary metaphysics-which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the various levels of the layered structure of reality. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have one more good reason to believe in the existence of God.

'Kitaab at-Tawheed' (‘The Book of Monotheism’) is the famous Sunni theologian Abu Mansoor al-Maturidi’s (d. 333/944) magnum opus: both the work and its author became the foundation of Sunni theological and philosophical thought until the present day. Its early provenance and originality as well as wide and enduring influence make this book essential for students of theology, philosophy, and the history of ideas. Yet despite the wide purported influence of and devotion to his ideas, Maturidi’s work has however been strangely neglected by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars alike. This book is the first of two volumes comprising the first ever English translation - with commentary - of ‘Kitaab at-Tawheed’.

This work is unique in that it provides a detailed and holistic approach to Islamic theology whilst also being its earliest extant comprehensive source. Maturidi presents the epistemological foundations of his teaching, provides detailed arguments in defence of monotheism - including his cosmological doctrines such as proofs that the universe is created and its ontological, temporal or infinite nature. He also focuses on God, his existence, the differences between God and created entities, and the names and attributes of God, analysing issues related to anthropomorphism and the speech and the vision of God.

Regardless of theological affiliation, this is an indispensable work for academics and laymen alike.

The author analyses the validity of a certain variation of Anselm's "ontological argument", namely the modal-logical version from Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000). He firstly studies the origin of Hartshome's arguments, whose
starting point is an interpretation of Anselm; secondly, the modal-logical argument from Hartshorne will be presented together with its presuppositions and implications. Finally, the author proposes an evaluation of Hartshorne's approach.

„Denken? [Gott]? – Sauve qui peut! Rette sich, wer kann!“  Ein Philosoph, der sich in unseren Tagen ernsthaft zum Ziel setzt, den irrationalen Glauben im Terrain der Philosophie zu rehabilitieren, setzt sich vor seinen Kollegen nicht nur, im Geiste Camus‘, dem Vorwurf des philosophischen Selbstmordes aus, ein solcher Buchtitel dürfte bei radikalen Verfechtern des Bilderverbots darüber hinaus für einen heftigen Affront sorgen. Und dennoch wagt Holm Tetens den Versuch, den Monotheismus zu „rationalisieren“, indem er die Erklärungsnöte, welchen sich die gegenwärtige Philosophie ausgesetzt sieht, zu seinen Gunsten auszudeuten bemüht.
Der vorliegende Essay macht es sich zum Anspruch, Tetens‘ Argumentationslinie zu rekonstruieren und sie im Anschluss hieran anhand weniger kurzer Bemerkungen kritisch zu diskutieren.

Another Compilation of Informations in which the overall objective is to carefully draw attention to our ever-changing universe in which we exist in, and how to make notice of these astronomical observations in changes as how they relate to subsequent changes made at the quantum or even nuclear level.

Thank you to the internet for the very real informations being transgressed allowing me to learn, create, and transmit such informations.

The purpose of the present essay is to present a version of the evidential argument from evil and to propose a 'skeptical theistic' response from a phenomenological point of view. In a word, the problem with the evidential argument from evil is that it attempts to put forth as justified an interpretation of the moral significance of historical events which actually exceeds the limits of human knowledge and which is based on a misinterpretation of experience. The essay also corrects certain analytic-philosophical notions regarding the nature of appearance, terminating with a discussion of the familiar critiques of analytic skeptical theism and the question of whether the belief in the existence of God might not be affected by the apparent skepticism implied by the phenomenological approach to knowledge in general.

The proofs of God's existence have had an adventurous history and have evolved over time; but few can be found that have made many innovations and, based on historical discussions in this field, have been able to give a good insight into the validity or discretion of historical arguments. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli has shown all these philosophical innovations in the valuable book "Explaining the Proofs of God's existence" and their other books. This paper intends to examine their powerful philosophical views, which are full of accuracy and innovation. These views are not just about the proofs of God's existence, but reflect their philosophical dedication in Western philosophy and the ability of Islamic philosophy in this field. In this article, various philosophical gestures are shown.

براهین اثبات خداوند تاریخ پر ماجرایی داشته است و به مرور تطور پیدا کرده است. اما کمتر کسی را می توان یافت که در
آن نوآوری های بسیاری داشته باشد و با تکیه بر بحثهای تاریخی در این زمینه توانسته باشد بخوبی دیدگاههای بدیعی را درباره اعتبار یا بی اعتباری برهانهای تاریخی داشته باشد. اما آیت الله جوادی آملی در کتاب ارزشمند تبیین براهین اثبات خدا و سایر کتابهایشان تمامی این نوآوری های فلسفی را نشان داده اند. در این مقاله درنظر است این دیدگاههای قدرتمند فلسفی ایشان که مشحون از دقت و نوآوری است نشان داده شود. این دیدگاههای ایشان فقط درباره برهانهای اثبات خداوند نیست بلکه نشانگر تعمق فلسفی ایشان در فلسفه غرب و به رخ کشیدن توانایی های فلسفه اسلامی در این زمینه است. در این مقاله انواع درسهای فلسفی که می توان از دیدگاههای ایشان اخذ کرد نشان داده می شود
این مقاله در مجله حکمت اسراء سال نهم شماره اول بهار و تابستان 1396 منتشر شده است.
حکمت اسراء، مجله علمی پژوهشی بنیاد وحیانی اسراء، سال نهم، دوره ۹،شماره ۱، شماره پیاپی ۲۹ بهار و تابستان 1396، صص41-5.

When initiating a conversation with someone about the Shroud of Turin, often I discover the person knows little if anything about it.  This is especially true among Protestants.  Many of those who do know something have dismissed it as a fake due to the widely published results of a radiocarbon experiment in 1988 which dated the cloth to be medieval (1290-1360 AD).  However, due to evidence that has surfaced from forensic science and historical research over the past forty years, more and more people are arriving at a spectacularly different conclusion.  This paper will present evidence for authenticity.  It will explain why the Shroud of Turin is most likely the actual burial cloth that once covered the corpse of Jesus and, remarkably, why the cloth provides us with visual, physical evidence for life after death!

One can discern passages in the writings of the Scholastic doctor Thomas Aquinas and the contemporary French phenomenologist Michel Henry which can be interpreted as putting forth very similar ways for grasping the existence of God. These "ways to God" can be fruitfully compared from the point of view of their philosophical starting points as well as of their consequences for theological epistemology. The purpose of the present essay is to pursue this comparative work and to see what philosophicaltheological fruit it can yield.

Abstract: Using simple probability theory, this article explores 76 subatomic, cosmological, terrestrial and biological events/phenomena which must have occurred in precise order which led to the development of our species according to the known laws of physics. The ineluctable conclusion of the mathematics involved is that God invariably exists.

Аннотация. В статье характеризуется философское и богословское наследие В.И. Несмелова (1863–1937), которого Н.А. Бердяев рассматривал как одного из крупнейших представителей русской религиозной философии. Особое внимание уделяется проблеме счастья как отчуждающего духовную природу человека состояния, вопросу о гетерономности человеческого сознания, в связи с несмеловским доказательством бытия Бога. Автор обращает внимание на то, что вопреки отказу самого Несмелова от космологической интерпретации своего доказательства, оно по своей логической и гносеологической конструкции имеет и очевидное космологическое значение. Отмечается критический подход Несмелова в философии культуры, рассматривающий культурное творчество человека исключительно как приспособительную деятельность, и, исходя из базовых несмеловских предпосылок, предлагается другая интерпретация культуры как сочетания адаптивной и теургической деятельности. Обращается внимание на особенности плавного перехода философской системы Несмелова в богословскую с оригинальной интерпретацией происхождения зла, грехопадения, искупления, воскресения мертвых и Страшного Суда, отмечается, что этот переход происходит в рамках одной системы без всякого логического сбоя. Делается вывод о значении фигуры Несмелова для русской и мировой философии.

Non-refuted Proof. The Concepts of Happiness, Death, God and Man in V.I. Nesmelov’s Philosophy
Abstract. The article is devoted to the analysis of the philosophic and theological heritage of V.I. Nesmelov (1863 – 1937), who was according to N.A. Berdyaev one of the most prominent representatives of Russian religious philosophy. Special attention is paid to the concept of happiness as the state estranging the spiritual nature of Man, and to the heteronomous nature of human consciousness in connection with Nesmelov’s proof of the God’s existence. The author pays attention to the fact that though Nesmelov himself rejected the cosmological interpretation of his proof, it still has evident cosmologic signifi cance due to its logical and gnoseological construction. The author notes Nesmelov’s critical approach to the philosophy of culture that viewed the man’s cultural creative work only as adaptive activity. Drawing on the basic Nesmelo’s pre-suppositions the author offers an alternative interpretation of culture as the combination of adaptive and theurgical activities. The author points out the peculiarities of the smooth transition of Nesmelov’s philosophic system into theology while suggesting novel interpretation of the origin of Evil, the Fall, expiation, resurrection, Judgment Day, and notes that this transition happens in the framework of the single system without any logical interruption. According to the author Nesmelov’s concepts have great importance for the development of Russian and world philosophy.

Keywords: Nesmelov, Berdyaev, Philosophy, Theology, Dogmatics, the Proof of God’s Existence, Selfconsciousness, Philosophy of Culture, Religious Philosophy, Perception, Activity, Happiness, Death, Resurrection

مع الفلسفة الوجوديّة تحوّل الاهتمام من نظريّة المعرفة والبحث الفلسفي المعرفيّ، إلى الاهتمام بحاقّ الوجود؛ أي الاهتمام بالوجود ذاته.  وقد أدّى هذا التحوّل إلى دخول الفلسفة الغربيّة في مسار مختلفٍ وترك بصماتٍ عظيمة الأثر على هذه الفلسفة.  كما إن الفلسفة الإسامية طرأ عليها أمرٌ مشابهٌ مع التحوّل الذي أحدثته مدرسة الحكمة المتعالية؛ حيث تحوّل مركز الاهتمام إلى الوجود بعد ما كان الهمّ الفلسفيّ هماًّ ماهويًّا يحصر اهتمامه بالتفسر الماهويّ للوجود. وتكمن أهميّة هذا التحوّل في الأثر الذي تركه على مسائل الفلسفة كلهّا.
ويبدو في النظرة الأوليّة أنّ المسارين متشابهين، بل ربّما يحسب الناظر أنّ ثمة مسارًا واحدًا اعتُمد في الفلسفتين، ينبغي أن يؤدّي إلى نتائج مشركة بينها. وفي هذه المقالة بحثُ مسهبٌ عن مفهوم الوجود عند المدرستين بغاية المقارنة بينها، لاكتشاف نقاط الالتقاء ونقاط الافراق بينها يجري ذلك على صعيد المفهوم، وكذلك على مستوى خلفيات التحوّل، فضلاً عن النتائج التي أفضى إليها هذا التحوّل.

Resumen: Analiza la argumentación a posteriori de la existencia de Dios que se encuentra en el Monologion de Anselmo, y sostiene que los argumentos de los capítulos I-IV son partes complementarias de una única vía argumentativa comparable con la cuarta vía del Aquinate. Se afirma que el único punto de partida de toda la argumentación es la evidencia de los grados de perfección trascendental (bondad y grandeza) que encontramos en las cosas. Se sostiene que, conforme a este único punto de partida, la argumentación cuenta también con una única formulación del principio de causalidad dada en el capítulo I. Por este principio Anselmo infiere la existencia de un único primer principio (lo que es por sí) a partir de sus efectos (lo que es por otro). Contrariamente a lo que sostienen al parecer todos los estudiosos, se demuestra que los capítulos III y IV no contienen argumentos propiamente demostrativos de la existencia de Dios, sino argumentos con los que Anselmo refuerza lo establecido por el mencionado principio de causalidad, del cual no pueden desvincularse para ser concluyentes. El capítulo III demuestra la imposibilidad de que lo que es por sí sea algo múltiple, mientras que el capítulo IV demuestra la imposibilidad de que la naturaleza suprema de la que proceden todas las cosas pueda ser superada o igualada en dignidad por otro.

The kalām cosmological argument proceeds from the claims that everything with a beginning has a cause of its existence, and that the universe has a beginning. It follows that the universe has a cause of its existence. Presumably, this is God. Some defenders of the argument contend that, since we don't see things randomly coming into existence, we know from experience that everything with a beginning has a cause of its existence. Against this, some critics argue that we may not, in this context, legitimately move from observations of material things within the universe to conclusions about the universe itself. I argue that these critics are mistaken. Plausibly we can, after all, draw cosmic conclusions from everyday experiences in support of the kalām argument.

Chapter One: What is Neoplatonism? What Does Aquinas Take from Neoplatonism?
Neoplatonism
Aquinas’s Neoplatonic Doctrines
Chapter Two: Aquinas’s History of Philosophy. Is Aquinas a Neoplatonist?
Aquinas as Student of the History of Philosophy
Is Aquinas a Neoplatonist?
Chapter Three: Sacred Teaching. Preliminary Considerations in the First Question of the Summa Theologiae
Whether besides the Philosophical Disciplines Another Teaching is Necessary
A Theologian in the “City of Philosophers”
From the Divine Names of Dionysius to the Summa Theologiae
Chapter Four: From Impassibility to Self-Affectivity. The Trinitarian Metaphysics of Esse in Thomas’s Summa Theologiae
The Moving Circles of Theology
The Scholarship and Thomas’s Method
Chapter Five: The Metaphysics of Pure Being
The Structure
From Motion to Its End
1. What the quinque viae show
2. The circle described by the names of the divine essence
From the Circle of the Essential Names to the Divine Operations
1. How God is known by us, and how God is named by us
2. The operations of the essence
3. Widening and strengthening of internal difference
4. The determining principles in respect to knowledge and will in the First
5. The operations of the essence of intellect and will together (simul intellectum et voluntatem)
From the Self-Reflexivity of Knowing and Willing to Motionless Motion
1. God as other to himself
2. Motionless motion: reconciling Plato and Aristotle
3. From motionless motion to the self-affectivity of real relations, persons, in God
4. Concerning God’s power and happiness: three breaks, a summation, and a transition
Chapter Six: From the Relations of Giving and Reception in the Essence to the Creature
The Trinitarian Processions of Ipsum Esse Subsistens
Real Relation and Opposition in the Essence
The Bond of the Ecstatic Spirit
Conclusion: Thomas’s Trinitarian Metaphysics of Esse and His Neoplatonism

This study examines a number of different answers to the question: where does Avicenna demonstrate the existence of God within the Metaphysics of the Healing? Many interpreters have contended that there is an argument for God’s existence in Metaphysics of the Healing I.6–7. In this study I show that such views are incorrect and that the only argument for God’s existence in the Metaphysics of the Healing is found in VIII.1–3. My own interpretation relies upon a careful consideration of the scientific order and first principles of the Metaphysics of the Healing, paying attention to Avicenna’s own explicit statements concerning the goals and intentions of different books and chapters, and a close analysis of the structure of the different arguments found in the relevant texts of the Metaphysics of the Healing. I conclude that Avicenna’s explicit goal in I.6–7 is to establish the properties that belong to necessary existence and possible existence, which consists, not in a demonstration of God’s existence, but in a dialectical treatment of the first principles of metaphysics.

I present and defend several formulations of the Aristotelian argument from motion, according to which the reality of change in the physical world ultimately requires the existence of a sustaining source of all change, a reality which can impart to all things the power to change and to undergo change, but which cannot itself be subject to change or undergo change. Second, I defend the Aristotelian project from a number of objections, including the viability of Aristotle's argument in light of challenges from modern physics, such as the challenge of inertial motion and special relativity. Finally, I show that an unchanging cause of all change must be such as to possess the attributes definitive of the God of classical theism.