Syllogisms

WOMEN IN PRAGMATISM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
(University of Barcelona, 28 - 30 January 2020)

The Ladd-Franklin formula is a simple mathematical expression that represents the logical form of syllogisms in a completely general way. The use of symmetrical copulas makes the distinction of syllogistic figures unnecessary (since the positions of subject and predicate are interchangeable). In addition, the distinction of syllogistic moods is also made unnecessary: the choice of E-forms and I-forms reduces the number of possible combinations, and then, by putting the syllogism into the form of an inconsistency (which is again a symmetrical structure), the possibilities are reduced to one.
This formula is very valuable indeed from the perspective of the construction of an abstract calculus, but here I wish to focus on two further aspects of Ladd’s innovation, both related to her decision to take symmetrical structures as canonical forms of expression, and both very much in the spirit of the Peircean conception of logic.
First, I want to stress the visual character of the antilogistic structure. The canonical expression of propositions allows one to detect validity by mere visual inspection, just by checking the arrangement of universal/particular copulas and positive/negative terms. The antilogism is, in some sense, a diagram that exhibits the logical form of syllogisms in a way that makes validity visible (manifest to the trained eye).
Second, I want to join Ladd herself in valuing the non-inferential character of her canonical expression of syllogisms (an inconsistent triad where the idea of a “succession” from premises to conclusion is lost). In spite of its apparent unnaturalness when presented as “the form of syllogisms”, the inconsistency reflects the structure of a very natural way of arguing (rebuttal). Thus the antilogism is offered by Ladd not only as a tool for calculation, but also as a fruitful insight into our actual reasoning process.

Kant and Aristotle reassesses the prevailing understanding of Kant as an anti-Aristotelian philosopher. Taking epistemology, logic, and methodology to be the key disciplines through which Kant’s transcendental philosophy stood as an independent form of philosophy, Marco Sgarbi shows that Kant drew important elements of his logic and metaphysical doctrines from Aristotelian ideas that were absent in other philosophical traditions, such as the distinction of matter and form of knowledge, the division of transcendental logic into analytic and dialectic, the theory of categories and schema, and the methodological issues of the architectonic. Drawing from unpublished documents including lectures, catalogues, academic programs, and the Aristotelian-Scholastic handbooks that were officially adopted at Königsberg University where Kant taught, Sgarbi further demonstrates the historical and philosophical importance of Aristotle and Aristotelianism to these disciplines from the late sixteenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century.

► JOHN CORCORAN, What syllogisms are: three views, eight centuries.
Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA
E-mail: [email protected]
  At issue is the nature of “the syllogisms” in Prior Analytics [1]. For centuries from the 1200s, the dominant view was enshrined in the medieval mnemonic “Barbara-Celarent” [2]: syllogisms are certain valid premise-conclusion arguments commonly mislabeled “inferences”.  In the mid-1900s many modern logicians adopted a contrary view credited to Jan Łukasiewicz [3]: syllogisms are certain true universal propositions informally called “implications”. A fruitful two-sided debate ensued producing evidence weakening the Łukasiewicz case.
  Toward the last quarter of the 1900s, a third contender appeared. Independently, John Corcoran [4] and Timothy Smiley [5] took the class of syllogisms to exclude propositions while including not only the valid arguments recognized as syllogisms in medieval times but also deductions establishing validity. A deduction contains, over and above premises and conclusion of an argument, a chain of reasoning showing that the conclusion’s information is contained in that of the premises. The debate became three-sided for twenty years or more.
  The Łukasiewicz view lacks current defenders leaving the debate to the medieval and Corcoran-Smiley views.
  This study details all three views—emphasizing their differences. For example, the medieval syllogisms are valid but ‘true’ does not apply to them, though their premises and conclusions are all true or false. The Łukasiewicz syllogisms are all true but the term ‘valid’ as applied to arguments is inappropriate. The Corcoran-Smiley syllogisms cannot be said to be true in the sense applicable to propositions but they are all valid in the sense that their conclusions follow from their premises. Moreover, many of them containing chains of reasoning are “cogent” [6] in an epistemic sense not applicable either to the Łukasiewicz or to the medieval syllogisms.
  [1] ROBIN SMITH, Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, Hackett, 1989. 
  [2] JOHN CORCORAN, DANIEL NOVOTNÝ, AND KEVIN TRACY,  Deductions and Reductions Decoding Syllogistic Mnemonics, Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review,  vol.2 (2018), pp. 5–39.
  [3] JAN ŁUKASIEWICZ, Aristotle’s syllogistic, Oxford UP, 1951.
  [4] JOHN CORCORAN, Aristotle’s Prototype Rule-based Underlying Logic, Logica Universalis, vol. 2 (2018) pp. 9-35.
  [5] TIMOTHY SMILEY, What is a Syllogism?, Journal of Philosophical Logic,
vol. 2 (1973) pp. 136–154.
[6] JOHN CORCORAN, Argumentations and logic, Argumentation, vol. 3 (1989), pp. 17–43.

BACKGROUND
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.2014.952947
Existential Import Today: New Metatheorems;
Historical, Philosophical, and Pedagogical
Misconceptions
John Corcoran & Hassan Masoud
To cite this article: John Corcoran & Hassan Masoud (2015) Existential Import Today: New Metatheorems; Historical, Philosophical, and Pedagogical Misconceptions, History and Philosophy of Logic, 36:1, 39-61, DOI: 10.1080/01445340.2014.952947
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2014.952947

https://www.academia.edu/19583415/Bibliography_John_Corcoran_s_Publications_on_Aristotle_1972_2015

IN CONJUNCTION WITH A PROJECT REQUESTED BY JOHN CORCORAN
as follows: PAGE 1: ENGLISH BY JOHN CORCORAN PAGE 2: FRENCH BY HARRIS K NOTTAS PAGE 3: FOOTNOTES in French and English:

What syllogisms are:  Three views, Eight centuries.
Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: [email protected]
At issue is the nature of “the syllogisms” in Prior Analytics [1]. For centuries from the
1200s, the dominant view was enshrined in the medieval mnemonic “Barbara-Celarent” [2]:syllogisms are certain valid premise-conclusion arguments commonly mislabelled “inferences”. In the mid-1900s many modern logicians adopted a contrary view credited to Jan Lukasiewicz [3]: syllogisms are certain true universal propositions informally called “implications”. A fruitful two-sided debate ensued producing evidence weakening the Lukasiewicz case. Toward the last quarter of the 1900s, a third contender appeared. Independently, John Corcoran [4] and Timothy Smiley [5] took the class of syllogisms to exclude propositions while including not only the valid arguments recognized as syllogisms in medieval times but also deductions establishing validity. A deduction contains, over and above premises and conclusion of an argument, a chain of reasoning showing that the conclusion’s information is contained in that of the premises. The debate became three-sided for twenty years or more. The Lukasiewicz view lacks current defenders leaving the debate to the medieval and Corcoran-Smiley views. This study details all three views
—emphasizing their differences. For example, the medieval syllogisms are valid but ‘true’ does not apply to them, though their premises and conclusions are all true or false. The Lukasiewicz syllogisms are all true but the term ‘valid’ as applied to arguments is inappropriate. The Corcoran-Smiley syllogisms cannot be said to be true in the sense applicable to propositions but they are all valid in the sense that their conclusions follow from their premises. Moreover, many of them containing chains of reasoning are “cogent” [6] in an epistemic sense not applicable either to the Lukasiewicz  view nor to the medieval definition of syllogisms.



Qu'’est Ce Que C’est un Syllogisme : Trois Points de Vue, Huit Siècles.
Philosophie, Université de Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: [email protected]
La nature du «syllogisme» dans “”Prior Analytics”” [1] est en cause.
Depuis des siècles commencant en 1200, la vision dominante était enchâssée dans la mnémotechnique médiévale «Barbara-Celarent» [2]: les syllogismes sont certains arguments valables prémisses-conclusions couramment mal étiquetées comme «Inférences». Au milieu des années 1900, de nombreux logiciens modernes ont adopté une vision contraire, attribuée à Jan Lukasiewicz [3]: les syllogismes sont certaines vraies propositions universelles appelées informellement «Implications». Un débat bilatéral fructueux s’en est suivi, qui a produit des preuves affaiblissant l’ Affaire Lukasiewicz.
Vers le dernier quart des années 1900, un troisième candidat est apparu. Indépendamment, John Corcoran [4] et Timothy Smiley [5] ont pris la classe de syllogismes pour exclure les propositions tout en incluant non seulement les arguments valables reconnus comme syllogismes à l’époque médiévale, mais aussi les déductions établissant la validité. Une déduction comprend, outre les prémisses. et les ou la conclusion d’un argument, une chaîne de raisonnement montrant que l’information de la conclusion est contenue dans celui des prémisses. Le débat est devenu trilatéral pendant vingt ans ou plus. Les opinions de Lukasiewicz manquent de défenseurs actuellement, laissant donc le débat entre les opinions du Moyen-Âge et ceux de Corcoran et Smiley. Cette étude détaille les trois points de vue en soulignant leurs différences. Par exemple, les syllogismes médiévaux sont valides mais le mot «vrai» ne s’applique pas à eux, bien que leurs prémisses et leurs conclusions soient toutes vraies ou fausses. Les syllogismes de Lukasiewicz sont tous vrais, mais le terme «valide» appliqué aux arguments n’est pas approprié. On ne peut pas dire que les syllogismes de Corcoran-Smiley soient vrais au sens où ils s'appliquent aux propositions, mais ils sont tous valides en ce sens que leurs conclusions découlent de leurs prémisses. De plus, beaucoup d’entre eux contenant des chaînes de raisonnement sont «convaincants» [6] au sens épistémique, et ne s’appliquent ni a ceux de Lukasiewicz ni aux syllogismes médiévaux.
ENGLISH FOOTNOTES
[1] ROBIN SMITH, Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, Hackett, 1989.
[2] JOHN CORCORAN, DANIEL NOVOTNÝ, AND KEVIN TRACY, Deductions and Reductions Decoding Syllogistic Mnemonics, Entelekya Logico-Metaphysical Review, vol.2 (2018), pp. 5–39.
[3] JAN ŁUKASIEWICZ, Aristotle’s syllogistic, Oxford UP, 1951.
[4] JOHN CORCORAN, Aristotle’s Prototype Rule
-based Underlying Logic, Logica Universalis, vol. 2 (2018) pp. 9-35.
[5] TIMOTHY SMILEY, What is a Syllogism?, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 2 (1973) pp. 136 –154.
[6] JOHN CORCORAN, Argumentations and logic, Argumentation, vol. 3 (1989), pp. 17–43
FRENCH FOOTNOTES
[1] ROBIN SMITH, Prior Analytics d’Aristote, Hackett, 1989.
[2] JOHN CORCORAN, DANIEL NOVOTNÝ ET KEVIN TRACY, Déductions et réductions. Décodage des mnémoniques syllogistiques, Revue Logico-métaphysique Entelekya, vol. 5–39.
[3] JAN ŁUKASIEWICZ, syllogistique d’Aristote, Oxford UP, 1951.
[4] JOHN CORCORAN, Logica Universalis, la logique sous-jacente basée sur des règles du prototype d’Aristote,vol. 2 (2018) p. 9-35.
[5] TIMOTHY SMILEY, Qu'est- ce que c’est un Syllogisme ?, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 2 (1973) pages 136-154.
[6] JOHN CORCORAN, Argumentations et La Logique, Argumentation, vol. 3 (1989), p. 17–43
FURTHER MATERIAL OF GREAT INTEREST
John Corcoran and Hassan Masoud. 2014. “Existential import today: New metatheorems; historical, philosophical, and pedagogical misconceptions”. History and Philosophy of Logic. 36: 39–61.

To hear the paper read aloud while you follow along with the text visit this link.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.2014.952947

Ranked first on the “Most-read list” at History and Philosophy of Logic with over 6500 readers, this demanding but self-contained and widely accessible paper refutes over a century of mistakes about existential import.

All terminology is not only explained but discussed. Many useful examples presented in usable form. It is suitable for classroom use.

Central to our campaign is the fact that first-order logic has limited existential import: the universalized conditional implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction in some but not all cases. We prove Corcoran's Existential-Import Equivalence: In any first-order logic, for a universalized conditional to imply the corresponding existentialized conjunction it is necessary and sufficient for the existentialization of the antecedent predicate to be tautological.

Click to listen to the audio or for a free preview and download.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.2014.952947


WHAT MATHEMATICAL LOGIC IS

Corcoran and Shapiro What Mathematical Logic Is

https://www.academia.edu/12618307/Corcoran_and_Shapiro_review_What_is_Mathematical_Logic_updated_PDF

https://www.academia.edu/s/184e4e0892/corcoran-shapiro-on-what-mathematical-logic-realy-is-philosophia-1978?source=link

1976. Crossley, J. N. What is Mathematical Logic? OxfordUP 1972. Philosophy of Science 43, 301–302 (Co-author: S. Shapiro). J

This chapter discusses the relation between Kant’s views on the foundations of syllogistic inference in ‘The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’, the views of eighteenth-century German authors who wrote on syllogism, and the conception of metaphysics that Kant developed in 1762-1764. Kant’s positions are, on the whole, rather original, even though they are not as independent from the intellectual context as Kant’s later, Critical philosophy. Despite Kant’s polemical tone, his views on syllogism are not primarily motivated by polemical purposes. They are strongly influenced by his views on the method of metaphysics.

Estudio sobre la proposición categórica asertórica, las inferencias inmediatas  y el silogismo categórico.  Texto fundamental para la historia de la lógica.  Tan vigente hoy como cuando fue escrito.  Con abundantes notas del traductor.
Study on categorical assertoric proposition, immediate inferences and categorical syllogism. Fundamental text in history of Logic.  Enriched with notes by the translator.

Dialectical method has certain roots in the Greek philosophical thought before Plato. Such roots may be traced back from Heraclitus and Parmenides to Sophists. There, the first regular uses made of it may be found in Socrates. Though, Aristotle has mistakenly introduced Xenon of Elea as the founder of dialectical method. Plato inherited Socrates' method. But what is clear is the distinction which may be seen between dialectical methods of Socrates and Plato. The doctrine of Ideas gives much importance to this distinction. This distinction may be summarized in this way that the doctrine of Ideas is in conflict with Socratic ignorance. In other words, Socrates employed the dialectical method to show that his logical style prevents him from providing decisive statements based on knowledge; and that his duty is only "to correct", a correction for which no end may be found. Introducing the doctrine of Ideas, Plato made it completely different.
And as this doctrine is introduced, it becomes clear that the end of the dialectical method is revealing the "Idea" of the subject discussed.
The present article tries to show that:
(1) Roots of the dialectical method may be found in the Greek philosophical thought before Plato, and
(2) Probably Xenon of Elea has nothing to do with the dialectical method, and
(3) Doctrine of Ideas is Plato's (and not that of Socrates), and
(4) When this doctrine is added to the dialectical method, it is of a clear impact on the process of finding an end for the logical search; or, to put it more accurately, (5) dialectical method with, and without, the doctrine of Ideas are different from each other.

The analogy of being was introduced by Aristotle, and later thematised by Thomas Aquinas, as a special mode of grammar in which one term may signify two or more meanings, but in which each of the signified meanings derives its primary meaning by participating in one common meaning. The analogy of being thus decisively presupposes this metaphysic of participation. But this very pillar of participation is also the principal source of the aporia of analogy. In the Science of Logic, Hegel outlined how the quantitative ratio and the syllogism of analogy may be successively sublated into the Idea in what I call a ‘speculative analogy’. When Erich Przywara later re-formulated the analogy of being at the apogee of phenomenology, he implicitly opposed Schelling’s rhythmically oscillating opposition of contraries to Hegel’s sublation of contradictions. This conflict over contradiction has produced two competing models of analogy: Hegel’s analogical dialectics in which contradictory differences are meant to be sublated into the ‘absolute middle’ of the Idea; and Przywara’s dialectical analogy in which contrary opposites are meant to participate in the mysterious ‘suspended middle’ of God. Przywara criticizes Hegel for evacuating the mystery into concepts, but Hegel might respond by criticizing Przywara for withholding these mysteries beyond the concept. This comparison illustrates how Hegel’s Science of Logic cannot adequately resolve all contrary opposites in a speculative analogy unless the middle terms the syllogisms are re-read against the letter of Hegel’s text as the absolute middle of Christ in the Trinity.

Aqui será exposto o caminho que faz o pensamento lógico na linguagem hegeliana para se configurar como silogismo racional. Silogismo que é significado por Hegel como o conceito completamente posto, objetivo e racional, e que só aparece mediante as determinações do “Silogismo da necessidade – c. O silogismo disjuntivo”. Nessas determinações estão presentes as relações produzidas na suprassunção da mediação (Aufheben der Vermittlung) de elementos proposicionais na qual cada termo ou elemento está em mediação interna com os outros. O resultado conceitual desta mediação é necessariamente um conceito imediato mediado.

This PhD thesis focuses on two chapters of the Miscellaneorum centuria secunda, a work Politian was composing during his
last years as Philosophy Professor at the Florentine Studio (1493-1494): chapter 53 (Universale) and chapter 55 (Enthymema). They deal with two topical questions of Aristotelian philosophy, i. e. the interpretation of the concept of «universal» in Aristotle’s corpus and the appropriate definition of the «enthymeme», that is the rhetorical syllogism.
By a careful inspection of the manuscript of the second Miscellanea (ms. Venezia, Fondazione Giorgio Cini 1), this thesis
will propose a new kind of critical edition of the two chapters, showing the working method of the humanist through the different composition stages of the chapters. A study of the short Greek passages quoted and translated into Latin by Politian and a deep investigation into the diverse sources (such as the manuscripts of the ancient Aristotle’s exegetes) the humanist could have had in hand at his time will also emphasize the modernity of his conclusions. Anticipating the newest exegesis, in chapter 53 Politian clearly explains that there is no contradiction between the concept of ‘universal’ which Aristotle introduces in the Physics and the ‘universal’
he refers to in the Analytics: the difference is not in the meaning of «universal», but in the way the philosopher refers to it, since in the Physics his focus is on gnoseology, whereas in the Organon he is merely concerned with logic matters. Similarly Politian’s conclusions are in advance of his times in chapter 55, where he states that enthymemes are not characterized by the lack of one of the two syllogistic premises (as Medieval thinkers had claimed, especially under the influence of Quintilian’s interpretation of the
Aristotelian passage), but by the content of their argumentation, which is based on likelihood and signs (σηµεῖα), and not on necessity (as it occurs in logical syllogisms). Nevertheless Politian shows an unequivocal debt to Scholasticism, most especially with regard to the use of philosophical terms. By examining carefully the manuscript of his work (which is, in fact, still a draft) it becomes
clear that his corrections often aim at replacing less common words with synonyms taken from the Scholastic tradition. Furthermore, some textual references prove that Politian had close and continuous ties not only with other famous humanists of the Italian Renaissance, like Pico della Mirandola and Ermolao Barbaro, but also with the Scholastic thinkers of his time (like Francesco di Tommaso, a Dominican friar who lectured in Theology at the Studio, was surely a thomist and taught the young Politian Aristotelianlogic).
In conclusion, this thesis will suggest not only that Aristotelian philosophy was a subject of particular interest to a leading
humanist figure such as Politian, but also that the astonishing modernity of his Humanism, as a reflection of an old and contemporary discussion on the philosophy of Aristotle, comes from a renewed use of traditional methods and languages.

The Equivalence Analogy which was first propounded in Euclid's book of Principles consists of two premises (Φ=Ψ and Ψ=Θ) and a conclusion (Φ=Θ). This form of syllogism is greatly similar to the first form of Aristotelian categorical syllogism because Φ is the primitive term; Ψ is the middle term, and Θ is the final term, and the conclusion is established between the two side terms. Thus it appears that the equivalence analogy must be a part of categorical syllogisms of the first form; however, the important problem here is that the basis of this syllogism does not follow Aristotle's definition of syllogism. In his view, a syllogism is a statement in which nothing is required for arriving at a conclusion except the premises of the syllogism. However, this syllogism requires an external premise which can justify the transfer of the equality relation from the premises to the conclusion. Following different approaches, Arab logicians have tried to establish the validity of the equivalence analogy. Here, the writers evaluate these approaches and, while demonstrating their shortcomings, refer to a new approach in this regard and prove that equality and subsumption (predication) are both of the type of transitive relations. Such relations are transferable from the premises to the conclusion, whereas non-transitive relations, such as a capacity equal to half of something or twice as much as it lacks this feature. Therefore, the correctness of the equivalence analogy and the first form of Aristotelian categorical conjunctive syllogism can be considered to be dependent on type possibility of transition in equality and subsumption relations.

From the mid-1600s to the beginning of the 18 th century, there were two main circles of German scholars which focused extensively on diagrammatic reasoning and representation in logic. The first circle was formed around Erhard Weigel in Jena and consists primarily of Johann Christoph Sturm and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; the second circle developed around Christian Weise in Zittau, with the support of his students, particularly Samuel Grosser and Johann Christian Lange. Each of these scholars developed an original form of using geometric diagrams in logic. In this paper, I will trace the historical notes of John Venn and other modern logicians back to the original works published in the Weigel and Weise circles and describe the development of using geometric figures for logical reasoning and representation in that period of time.

This PhD dissertation explores and suggests ways to ‘unfuzz’ the progress mechanisms of design processes, focussing on ill-defined problems.

Based on empirical studies of 10 Master’s design students’ projects from industrial and fashion design, and by review and revision of existing design theory, the dissertation proposes a new way to conceptualise design as material 'information processing' instead of ‘problem solving’. This perspective holds potential to unify paradigmatic and disciplinary epistemic conflicts in design methodology, and provides a new terminology by which to talk about and comprehend design and its 'fuzziness'.

As a piece of basic research the dissertation contributes knowledge and new perspectives on design processes, which may be of value both within the field of design – in professional design practice and education – and beyond, when design thinking is used as a driver for innovation in other fields.

In his incarnation as 'Morus' in Utopia, Thomas More asserts his profound disagreement with his fictional character, Raphael Hythlodaeus. Whereas Hythlodaeus extols the merits of commonality and the moral value of pleasure, Morus dismisses the whole project as absurdity, or hopeless wishful thinking. This divergence has been variously interpreted, but mostly played down. This paper argues that the civilized, amicable, and yet genuine discord between Raphael Hythlodaeus and Morus is the key to Utopia. We can appreciate its importance only if we understand who Hythlodaeus is, and what the purpose of the dialogue is. We also have to do justice to Thomas More's politics, which were grounded on the authority of the Christian tradition, in the Old and the New Testament. Over the years, Thomas More maintained a very clear and consistent line of thought on the legitimacy of worldly wealth, the responsibilities inherent in its management, the imperative to curb their enjoyment, the temptation of 'business' and greed, the duty of charity, and the value of penance, remorse, prayer, and other kinds of self-inflicted suffering. In A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation, Anthony, the wiser character, conveys Thomas More's relentless praise of pain. Anthony has the last word. So, too, does Morus.

Dans des travaux recents, Marion et Ruckert (2016) ont montre que la conception aristotelicienne des quantificateurs, telle que presentee dans les Topiques (Θ, 2, 157a 34-157b2), est fondee sur un cadre dialectique de meme portee methodologique et ideologique que le cadre dialogique moderne. Plus precisement, la signification aristotelicienne du quantificateur universel est fondee sur la regle socratique (Marion / Ruckert, 2015 1). Les auteurs suggerent meme que le cadre de la Theorie Constructive des Types fournit le moyen d'exprimer et de rendre une reconstruction formelle des syllogismes tres proche des expressions syllogistiques d'origine. Le point de notre discussion ici sera de preciser l'idee de la regle socratique comme expression dynamique de l'identite. I-La these de l'origine dialectique de la syllogistique aristotelicienne. Le point de l'article de Marion & Ruckert est de montrer que la semantique fondamentale de la quantification universelle pres...

In domestic logic textbooks (which are still in use for this high schools ubject, although they are more than fifty years old) from authors Gajo Petrović and Mihajlo Marković, the main focus is on traditional, syllogistic logic. Leaving aside some important problems concerning the adequacy of the textbook that has as the main topic something that is outdated and almost without relevance for contemporary logic, in this paper I point out inconsequentiality and incoherency of the theories of terms (or concepts) presented in these textbooks. I argue that these authors while addressing dfferent issues within the theory (definition of concepts, its intension and extension, and the relations between concepts) commit themselves to different and mutually exclusive theoretical restrictions. In addition to that, the theories in question involve numerous inaccuracies, ambiguities and taxonomies without the clear principle of categorization, which no textbook (and especially not the one dedicated to such precise and exact subject) should contain.

The Uniformity Principle is the notion that relationships between future events will resemble the relationships between similar events in the past. The principle is essential to inductive reasoning. The primary objection to the Principle is that it appears to be circular; its content is the very assumption that the inductive process sets out to prove. This essay proposes that the Principle is not a part of circular reasoning. Three fundamental axioms, titled Existence, Identity, and Continuity, show that the  Principle is noncircular.

In this paper, I aim to understand the position expressed by Locke in the Fourth Book of the Essay concerning Human Understanding about the syllogism and the Aristotelian-Scholastic deductive logic: the use of the syllogism as necessary instrument for the reasoning (ars ratiocinandi or dialectica) and the discovery (ars inveniendi) must be counted amongst the truths considered to be “undisputed”, that is un-disputable de jure, when actually they are only not-disputed de facto. There is a link that unifies Bacon’s project and the criticism to Aristotle’s formal logic: it becomes explicit in Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which begins in fact with the quotation of the criticism against the dialectica made by Bacon in Instauratio Magna. Locke considers the blind faith in the study of the logick as one of the pathological behaviours of the human understanding, which need to be corrected (and, if one wants to be a good educator, it is appropriate not to instil young people). If from the examination of the faculties of the mind and of its contents, too, should arise both a “cure” for the pathologies of the understanding and a new logic, not only would Bacon’s project be fulfilled in the Essay, but also so would be the objective of one of the works that Locke bought during his stay in France (from 1675 to 1679), the Logica vetus et nova (1654) of the Cartesian Johann Clauberg, that is to transform the logic into the «ad vitam rationalem gubernandam […] necessaria» medicine.

Epitteto (50-135 ca.) conta tra i massimi pensatori di scuola stoica. Come Socrate, non ha mai scrit-to niente (il Manuale e le Diatribe sono opera di Arriano, storico e magistrato romano che ne seguì le lezioni a Nicopoli). La versione di Giacomo Leopardi è del 1825.

Bu metinde, Aristoteles'in Organon'una yazmış olduğu telhis bağlamında, İbn Rüşd'ün mantık ve bilgi teorisi ele alınmaktadır. Aristoteles'in mantıkla ilgili tüm eserlerine geniş yorum ve şerhler yazan ilk Müslüman mantıkçının Farabi olduğu herkes tarafından bilinir. Yunan-Arap felsefi geleneğinin mirasçısı olarak İbn Rüşd, sık sık Farabî'yi mantıkta Aristotelesçi yoldan ayrılmakla eleştirmiştir.

The syllogistic mnemonic known by its first two words Barbara Celarent introduced a constellation of terminology still used today. This concatenation of nineteen words in four lines of verse made its stunning and almost unprecedented appearance around the beginning of the thirteenth century—before or during the lifetimes of the logicians William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, both of whom owe it their lasting places of honor in the history of syllogistic. The mnemonic, including the theory or theories it encoded, was prominent if not dominant in syllogistics for the next 700 years until a new paradigm was established in the 1950s by the great polymath Jan Łukasiewicz,

Call the following argument the 'scandal of deduction'. (1) If a deductive argument is valid, then the conclusion is not novel. (2) If the conclusion of an argument is not novel, the argument is not useful. So, (3) if a deductive argument is valid, it is not useful. Recent philosophers have tried to avoid (3) by denying (1) but have assumed . I claim that Aristotle would not have to accept

As with most dichotomies between the world, religions, traditions, beliefs, superstitions, convictions, missions, etc. and our fascination with whatever the truth may be, consistency and objectivity rest not in the power of substitution, of supplanting facts, but in the act of feeding and sustaining a spirit of attention and enquiry whose origin may or may not be beyond our powers of comprehension but which remains available and present to the mind willing it so in the amalgam of facts experienced first-hand.

The purpose of this article is to highlight the rhetorical differences between Aristotle's well-known maxim on suffering and Jesus's words on the same topic.

I specifically address a topic, suffering, that bears distinct resemblance among different societies and is easily identifiable, being universal enough to be examined in an objective, dispassionate manner.

The God of Jesus transcends thought as it does life. Drama however, controls, prescribes, and underwrites Aristotle’s own form of materialism, keenly aware as it is of its spectator God.

This article presents a novel reading of Descartes's critique of the traditional syllogistic. The reading differs from those previously presented by scholars who regard Descartes's critique as a version of a well-known argument: that syllogisms are circular or non-ampliative and thus trivial. It is argued that Descartes did not see syllogisms as defective in themselves. For him the problem was rather that anyone considering a valid and informative syllogism must already know, by an intuition wholly independent of the syllogism, that the conclusion follows from the premises. Moreover, without such an intuition the syllogistic on its own is incapable of determining whether the consequence truly holds. Thus the syllogistic is useless unless accompanied by an intuition that renders it otiose. This reading of Descartes's view is supported and explained by examples drawn from Descartes's writing and from the Port-Royal Logic—one of the first attempts to develop a logical system on Cartesian principles.

Sylogizm retoryczny Arystotelesa -na pograniczu retoryki i teorii argumentacji -Refleksja nad rozmaitymi aspektami budowania skutecznych komunikatów perswazyjnych (psychologicznymi, logicznymi, etycznymi, estetycznymi) rozwijana była i kodyfikowana w ramach antycznej retoryki, którą od samych jej początków pojmowano właśnie jako "sztukę kierowania duszami" czy "sprawczynię perswazji", "mistrzynię nakłaniania" 1 . Argumentacje stanowią szczególny rodzaj tych wszystkich działań dyskursywnych, których intencją jest zmiana przekonań odbiorcy. "W tym szczególnym przypadku, gdy używamy argumentacji, apelujemy do specyficznej potrzeby ludzkiej, jaką jest zachowanie spójności i konsekwencji w obrębie wyznawanego systemu przekonań. Argumentacja sensu stricto zaczyna się więc wtedy, gdy w ramach przedkładanego komunikatu sporny pogląd opatrzony jest dodatkowymi zdaniami, mającymi jawnie stanowić jego uzasadnienie" 2 . Tym, który miał swój znaczący udział w zaprezentowaniu argumentacji jako zagadnienia wspólnego dla refleksji logicznej, dialektycznej i retorycznej, był Arystoteles. W odróżnieniu od innych sobie współczesnych autorów podręczników retorycznych uznał on racjonalne środki uwierzytelniania -zwłaszcza entymemat (ἐνθύμημα) -za esencję (dokładnie: σῶμα; Rhet., 1354a15) retorycznego przekonywania. W ten właśnie sposób Stagiryta, oprócz wniesienia fundamentalnego wkładu w rozwój logiki (sy-1 J. Z. Lichański, Retoryka od średniowiecza do baroku. Teoria i praktyka, PWN, Warszawa 1992, s. 11-55. 2 K. Szymanek, Argument z podobieństwa, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2008, s. 17-18.

El presente artículo trata de llamar la atención sobre ciertos problemas que encuentra el razonamiento jurídico en el manejo de la prueba y que ha soslayado un tanto la llamada teoría estándar de la argumentación jurídica. Busca encarar preguntas tales como: ¿Dónde se ubican los problemas de prueba en el marco de la argumentación jurídica? ¿Qué papel cumple la lógica en la apreciación racional de la prueba? ¿Cuál Lógica es la apropiada en el marco probatorio? ¿Cómo se construyen, se incorporan y usan las reglas de experiencia? ¿Cuáles son y cómo se construyen los silogismos judiciales? ¿Cuál verdad se obtiene en el proceso Judicial?

Rather than reducing original terms and their complements to three terms so traditional rules of the syllogism apply, the paper proposes emended rules to assess the validity of arguments containing original terms and their negative complements. It proposes further that the emended rule approach is superior to the traditional one both practically and theoretically.

Cooijmans summarizes Asperger's definition of what was later called Asperger's syndrome: "It is a narrowing of one's relation to the world outside. It is a disturbance of instinct; an impairment of the ability to relate to or interact with the world in the direct, concrete, instinctive manner inborn to the majority of humans. [In Aspergians] Information is processed in the abstract and logical ways of the intellect, rather than instinctively and concretely. Communication is intellect-driven, rather than through the direct instinctive channels that bypass intellect. Many more symptoms result from or accompany the disturbance”.

La Conciencia Infeliz es el tercer y último momento de la configuración fenoménica y espiritual: " La Libertad de la Autoconsciencia ". Ésta conciencia es esencialmente una conciencia escindida entre lo Singular y lo Universal que en el comienzo de su proceso de apropiación espiritual de sí misma se mueve descubriendo los límites del pensamiento universal interior enseñado a ella por el Estoicismo. De la misma manera, dicha conciencia en el movimiento de su pensar y su obrar también descubre las limitaciones unilaterales del Escepticismo, enseñanza de la negatividad pura en relación a todas las cosas del mundo exterior incluida ella misma. La Conciencia Infeliz subsume estos dos momentos anteriores y parciales del conocimiento de la experiencia y continua con su arduo camino del saberse a sí misma, el cual en su fin es producto de un movimiento de búsqueda de su ser para sí en cuanto autoconciencia libre, que en su primer momento dialéctico-negativo se opone a la conciencia en sí-Inmutable u Esencial-a la que no puede suprimir ni tampoco ser suprimida, pues ambas son momentos necesarios del conocimiento de la Conciencia, y puesto que en su movimiento posterior afirmativo pero no exento de oposiciones y tensiones internas de sus extremos contrapuestos-Universal / Singular-, o,-Inmutable/ Mutable-, los cuales se mueven en una mediación silogística (U- P -S) que reconcilia la unidad de la conciencia infeliz o religiosa a través de un mediador recíproco (-P-), se lo conozca a este con el nombre de padre de una congregación, o ministro religioso, o servidor de Dios. Él cual al ser un recíproco Servidor de ambos lados, les muestra en el mundo efectivo la representación de cada uno en el otro. 
http://demiurgosgt.blogspot.com/2013/

In Essentialität und Notwendigkeit: Avicenna und die Aristotelische Tradition Fedor Benevich presents the key doctrine of Avicenna’s (d. 1037) metaphysics and epistemology: his theory of essence and the scientific determination of essential and necessary attributes. The book studies central notions of Avicenna’s philosophy such as essentiality, necessity, universality, immediacy, primacy, and specificity. It also provides an unprecedented account of how Avicenna’s views on these issues changed throughout his career, in arguing for his revolutionary “conceptual essentialism”. Avicenna’s position partially follows the Aristotelian tradition yet also departs from it, especially when Avicenna argues against the Baghdad Peripatetic School.

The logician Lewis Carroll (1832–1898) invented a diagrammatic scheme for syllogisms and described how it could be used for logic problems involving more than 3 terms. Curiously, he never provided in print any diagrammatic solution for such a complex problem. The aim of this paper is to make sense of a manuscript where Carroll attempts to solve a sorite using his quadriliteral diagram. In this problem, three propositions are offered as premises. The purpose is to look for what information can be gathered as to the relation between two given terms involved in the argument. This case study provides some insights about the use of diagrams to solve elimination problems that were highly considered by early symbolist logicians.

The effects of the initial preheating perturbation on the dynamical behaviors of FGC wave propagation instability for low-velocity FGC in packed bed are studied numerically. The behaviors of the flame front inclination, break, and shrinking instabilities are always observed in experiments. Based on the experimental phenomena, an initial thermal perturbation model is numerically proposed as to predict the deformation behaviors of the flame front instabilities. The typical flame shapes are obtained depending on filtration velocity, equivalence ratio, and initial preheating temperature difference. It is demonstrated that the development of flame front inclination instability is proportional to the magnitude of initial preheating perturbation. At a lower equivalence ratio, the initial thermal perturbation of 300 K leads to the evolution of flame front break. Increasing filtration velocity leads to the appearance of flame front break, due to the intensification of the hydrodynamic instability. In addition, a perculiar instability of flame front shifting is also confirmed with the initial thermal perturbation of 400 K, which results in a fuel leakage of incomplete combustion.

Logical reasoning in any form is an important aspect of life; it is persuading or convincing others with logic through writing or speech, for example, scientists, politicians, businessmen, financiers, solicitors and many others do this. This paper points out the frequent inefficacy of logical presentations, arguments and debates per se in bringing about the correct and wonted outcomes. It describes the scenario of people frequently involved in fruitless arguments and debates, and shows why the application of logic, for example, in logical argument or debate, could not often achieve the desired outcomes, much of the time ending up with frustration, unhappiness, bad feelings and poor relationships. Scenarios from mathematics, which probably represents the most rigorous form of logical reasoning, and science are described as well. The paper also delves into the problems encountered in logical reasoning as well as some modes of reasoning. It would be difficult and might be impossible to reason with and convince someone with a closed mind-set, someone who has made up the mind not to be convinced, or even someone who is not intelligent enough to be convinced. The paper, which is published in an international mathematics journal, presents a resolution to this serious problem, which is important, as that would be conducive to peace and harmony.

By Scholasticism, we understand the application of Aristotle to theology, or the expression of the facts and realities of revelation in the mindlanguage of the peripatetics." (Tyrell, The Faith of the Millions, 1901: 224) • unique blend of pagan wisdom (the philosophy of Aristotle) and revealed wisdom (the Scriptures and teachings of the Church) • Aquinas: Aristotle = "the Philosopher"