Retributive Justice

Perverse complicity in Christian celebration of pain?
Futility of highlighting denial of Christian complicity in torture
Promotion of enhanced torture on behalf of the American people
Crowdsourcing appropriate punishment for enemies of the American people
WikiJustice, WikiRetribution, WikiPunition, or WikiSalvation -- for Assange?
Types of torture variously used by Christians and applicable to Assange
Hanging, drawing and quartering as symbolic of Christian retribution?
Christian complicity in distortion of the truth symbolized by Cross
Religious enactment of the suffering and torture of Assange
Whistleblowing as a "crime of passion" -- for the truth?

Two experiments using Asian American university student participants examined the distinctive characteristics of responses to racist hate speech relative to responses to other forms of offense. The studies varied the target of insulting speech (Asian, African, and Overweight person) or the nature of offence (petty theft vs. insulting speech). Participant variables included collective self-esteem and social identification. Results indicate that hate speech directed at ethnic targets deserves more severe punishment than other forms of offensive speech and petty theft. Hate speech also results in more extreme emotional responses and, in the case of an Asian target, has a depressing influence on collective self-esteem. Ethnic identification moderated punishment responses in study 1 only. The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.

This is the Introduction to my book Justice in Young Adult Speculative Fiction (Routledge 2015). The book offers an evolutionary history of the concept of justice as represented in speculative literature for the young reader. The study brings together reflection on speculative fiction, moral imagination, cognitive science, global citizenship, environmental awareness, and justice literacy. The 20th-century expansion of Young Adult speculative fiction is linked with the emergence of human and civil rights movements and with the communitarian revolution in conceptualizations of justice. The book contends that complex ideas such as justice are processed by the human mind as cognitive scripts; that scripts, when narrated, take the form of script-rich stories; and that YA speculative fiction is currently the largest conceptual testing ground in the forging of justice consciousness for the 21st-century world. The argument draws on recent research in the cognitive and evolutionary sciences, suggesting that we are getting better at identifying different types of injustice and better at imagining alternatives to injustice. Overall, the book demonstrates that any progressive change must first be imagined and that the stories offered by speculative fiction are especially suited to create emotionally-relevant models for attitudes and behaviors in a world of global diversity.

is where I became an artist,' Alfredo Santos says now, more than half a century after he painted the mural at top and five others in the dining hall while an inmate there." Preamble "When we return to the search for a more humane and rational response to crime, we must keep in mind that the prison is tied to other social and political arrangements that limit what changes are possible. The criminal justice system in general is at least partially involved, directly and indirectly, advertently and inadvertently, in repressing groups and classes of people and in maintaining unfair social, political, and economic relationships. Fundamental changes in its operation are impossible unless some higher degree of social justice has been achieved and the criminal justice system is relieved of these tasks. [….] One of the important obstacles that must be removed is the public conception of the prisoner. Presently, this conception is formed from the rare, but celebrated and horrendous crimes, such as mass murders by the Manson cult, Juan Carona, or the 'Hillside Strangler.' Whereas prisoners like George Jackson, viewed as a heroic revolutionary fighting back from years of excessive punishment for a minor crime (an eighty dollar robbery), shaped the conception of the prisoner in the early 1970s, persons like 'Son of Sam' do so today. These extraordinary cases distort the reality. Most prisoners are still in prison for relatively petty crimes, and even those convicted of the 2 more serious crimes must be understood in the context of society in the United States. What we need is a new theory of crime and penology, one that is quite simple. It is based on the assumption that prisoners are human beings and not a different species from free citizens. Prisoners are special only because they have been convicted of a serious crime. But they did so in a society that produces a lot of crime, a society, in fact, in which a high percentage of the population commits serious crime. Those convicted of serious crimes must be punished and imprisoned, because it is the only option that satisfies the retributive need and is sufficiently humane. Knowing that imprisonment itself if very punitive, we need not punish above and beyond imprisonment. This means that we need not and must not degrade, provoke, nor excessively deprive the human beings we have placed in prison. It also means that we must not operate discriminatory systems that select which individuals should be sent to prison and, once incarcerated, who should be given different levels of punishment. Since we assume that convicts are humans like us and are capable of myriad courses of action, honorable and dishonorable, we also assume that they will act honorably, given a real choice. This means that we provide them with the resources to achieve self-determination, dignity, and selfrespect. This theory continues to be rejected not because it is invalid, but because it challenges beliefs and values to which large segments of the population comfortably cling. [….] In pushing this theory, I admit that many prisoners, like many free citizens, act like monsters. But they are not monsters and often choose to act like monsters when their only other real option is to be totally disrespected or completely ignored, while being deprived, degraded, abused, or harassed." [emphasis added]-John Irwin, Prisons in Turmoil (1980)

O artigo diferencia os elementos da teoria da pena, com especial destaque ao fundamento e às finalidades da pena criminal. Analisa as doutrinas absolutas e relativas e as suas respectivas capacidades de oferecer tratamento específico aos problemas do fundamento e das finalidades da pena criminal. Pretende demonstrar a imprecisão da classificação dicotômica que confunde o fundamento da pena com as suas diversas finalidades. A conclusão é que o fundamento da pena é a retribuição da culpa do autor da ofensa, independentemente de quais sejam as finalidades primordiais de cada espécie de pena.

In an important 1984 paper, “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment,” Jean Hampton justifies the practice of inflicting painful criminal punishments if and only if punishment is morally educative. Hampton’s suggestion forms the point of departure for this paper on Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. Below, I show that Dostoevsky agrees with Hampton that punishment should aim at moral reform; however, Dostoevsky presents no evidence that self-punishment or legal punishment reliably cultivates respect for law, legal authority, oneself, or for others as moral agents. Instead, Dostoevsky’s post-Siberian writings are highly critical of Russian criminal justice, and emphasize that moral education comes through dialogue, reflection, and criticism. This highly individualized treatment may be experienced as painful, but it does not have to result from, and it may even be impeded by, legal “hard treatment.”
Keywords: moral education; punishment; Dostoevsky; rehabilitation; crime

The story of Zanzanù is symbolically the history of the birth of  outlaw imagine in early modern age. Zanzanù firstly became a 'bandit' because he received a banishment penalty owing to the killing of a member of a rival family. But then, unable to establish a peace with his enemies, he couldn't return to his village and he followed a vengeance for his father killing. Survived to several ambushes of his enemies and of bounty killers who chased him, he soon entered the  dimension of myth until he died the 17th of august 1617 in a bloody battle which lasted a full day.

Dumas' work is often misunderstood as a story of portentous revenge of the main character Edmond Dantès. However, the Dumas' book seems to hide a philosophical structure that offers points of political and juridical reflection. Montecristo is able to integrate into a doctrinal context (also of a metaphysical and theological nature), that is typical of the european philosophical heritage, as the most paradigmatic proponent of a certain construction about the classical concept of a justice interpreted in the sense of a symmetry amongst the citizens.

L’opera di Dumas è spesso fraintesa come la storia di una portentosa vendetta del protagonista Edmond Dantès. Tuttavia, il libro di Dumas sembra nascondere una struttura filosofica che offre spunti di riflessione politica e giuridica. Montecristo può essere inserito in un contesto dottrinale (anche di natura metafisica e teologica), che è tipico del patrimonio filosofico europeo, quale più paradigmatico rappresentante di una precisa ricostruzione sul concetto classico di giustizia interpretato nel senso di una simmetria tra i cittadini.

In this paper, I do not discuss the contemporary problems of penal law nor advocate for punishment reform, but rather, I engage with the theory of legal punishment as introduced by Jeremy Bentham  and Immanuel Kant, each representing the fundamental position of two famous streams of ethics, utilitarianism and deontology. Bentham's core concern is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" of people, with each individual of equal worth, while Kant's is the categorical imperative, where one acts according to what one would accept as a universal law. What I set to do is a comparative analysis on Bentham and Kant's theories relative to key aspects of punishment: (i) the understanding of punishment in relation to the conception of the state; (ii) which effect of a crime is privileged, and how persons involved are perceived; and (iii) the proportionality of punishment. In my conclusion, I bridge Bentham and Kant's theories to suggest an enlightened and progressive stance on punishment, which also seems to reflect contemporary understandings on punishment.

The paper deals with the relationships between judicial practices and the feud, which acquires interesting relevance both in customary systems and in systems governed by the legal process. First is described the crucial transition from customary practices mainly handled by the community (prevailing in the early medieval age) to practices managed by professionals (lawyers) and the procedures successively worked out by them. Feuding is examined along with the researches conducted on single European areas and for different historical periods, especially for the early Middle Ages, the Middle Ages, the Modern Age, considering the various disciplines used. In reality, while focusing on the relationship between the spread of violence and the need for peace, the discussion on the subject of feud in Europe paid little attention to the role played by the spread of Roman canonical procedures and the mediation carried out by lawyers, both in their tracts and their judiciary practice, in order to introduce a new social order. In the early modern period,  the intense dynamics of social violence and the decisive interventions of state powers increased along with the use of new trial procedures. These transformations were relevant and even decisive, especially after the introduction of strict inquisitorial rites, which subtracted from the privileged classes the independent resolution of conflicts and the traditional management of procedural practices.

Although, there is a considerable literature which analyzes the UN Mission in Kosovo from different perspectives, limited attention has been given to the mission " s contribution in confronting with war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo committed by the Milosevic regime against Kosovo Albanians during the 1998-1999. This article intends to provide a comprehensive analysis of international justice mechanisms – UNMIK and the ICTY – in dealing with the past injustices in Kosovo by identifying their flaws and shortcomings, as well as exploring factors that impacted their performance and effectiveness. By using the existing literature, international organizations " reports, governmental documents, and media articles, the article argues that international community failed to deal with transitional justice issues in Kosovo – fighting impunity and delivering justice to victims as well as strengthening the rule of law and achieving reconciliation between the communities. In its endeavors to documenting the past crimes, international mechanisms relied mainly on retributive justice whilst ignoring restorative and reparation measures under justifications to preserving peace and stability in Kosovo. Regretfully, seventeen years after the war, justice in Kosovo remains an " unfinished business, " with a potential of negative implications to peace and reconciliation amongst the ethnic groups.

Published in the Springer Journal Neuroethics
Available here: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12152-015-9243-6?wt_mc=internal.event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst

Neil Levy argues that the degree to which psychopaths ought to be held blameworthy for their actions depends on the extent to which they are capable of mental time travel--episodic memory and episodic foresight.  Levy claims that deficits in mental time travel prevent psychopaths from fully appreciating what it is to be a person, and, without this understanding, we can at best hold psychopaths blameworthy for harming non-persons.  In this paper, I build upon and clarify various aspects of Levy’s view.  Specifically, I begin by outlining the neurobiological data on mental time travel, and I argue that psychopaths, or at least some psychopaths, indeed appear to have the deficits Levy ascribes to them.  I then expand upon the legal implications of his argument.  I use an analogy between juveniles and psychopaths to argue that the penological justification for retributive punishment against psychopaths ought to be substantially diminished.

Executioners and others who come into close proximity with the condemned often come to reject the death penalty. They reject it not only in individual cases, and not only on the ground that the death penalty is poorly implemented. They conclude that capital punishment is wrong. I argue that the perspective of the executioner helps illuminate the debate about whether to abolish capital punishment, and raises the troubling possibility that support for the death penalty can survive only at a great remove. The essay responds to a recent article by Jeffrie Murphy focusing on the question of whether executioners can take pride in their work. I contend that Murphy asks the wrong question, and that the better question is whether anyone ought to be asked to do such work. On this latter question, the perspective of the executioner sheds important light. Like Murphy, I draw on works by and about Albert Pierrepoint, the " last hangman " of Britain. I also draw on the perspectives of numerous executioners, wardens, chaplains and other death row personnel. I argue that their perspectives offer a powerful argument against the main rationale for the death penalty: retribution. If retribution is keyed to the offender's character as well as his wrongful act, then post-conviction character ought to matter. The executioners' accounts share a common theme: that death row inmates change over time and hold the potential for redemption. If a trial for murder lasts too long, more than the murder will out. The man in the murderer will out; it becomes horrible to think of destroying him. Rebecca West, in A Train of Powder 1 (reporting on the Nuremberg Trials) Deciding that a man must have the definitive punishment imposed on him is tantamount to deciding that the man has no chance of making amends. This is the point…where the arguments clash blindly and crystallize in a sterile opposition. But it so happens that none among us can settle the question, for we are all both judges and interested parties. Albert Camus, in Reflections on the Guillotine 2 I have come to the conclusion that executions solve nothing, and are only an antiquated relic of a primitive desire for revenge which takes the easy way and hands over the responsibility for revenge to other people. Albert Pierrepoint, in Executioner:

The paper deals with the story of Marcantonio Trissino, the grandson of Giangiorgio Trissino, the famous man of letters and humanist. In the year 1583 Marcantonio, abruptily and amazingly, killed Giulio Cesare Trissino outside Vicenza's dome while he was surrounded and protected by numerous friends and followers. Giulio Cesare Trissino was suspected by the public opinion being the mandant of Ciro Trissino's murder, the father of Marcantonio, killed in february 1576 in his palladian villa located in Cornedo, a Vicentine village, by a group of goons, masked and dressed in black suits. During the trial instructed in Padua by appointment of the Counsel of ten, Marcantonio Trissino defended his violent behavior advocating that his mind was run over by anger and furor. The trial rhetoric vehicles the great themes of vendetta and honor and introduce to the tensions between retributive and restorative justice.

Until recently, the International Criminal Court (ICC) described that its legal practices offered a balance between retributive and restorative justice. It was held that restorative justice was progressed through its framework of victim participation in legal proceedings. However, there is little research into how, or whether, the Court metes out restorative justice. This article first considers the key pillars of restorative justice as 'encounter', 'amends' and 'reintegration', and the form of victim participation within these practices. It then examines how the ICC aligns to the direct participation of victims prioritised by restorative justice, and shows that victims do not hold such participatory possibilities. Instead, legal professionals take on direct participation in dialogue and decision-making processes. Using Bourdieu's framing of the juridical field, the article identifies key reasons for the absence of direct victim participation and argues that the ICC primarily functions as a retributive approach to the resolution of conflict.

This article analyzes the Amorite view of history as found in the 18th century BCE Mari text (ARM I 3), a letter sent by Yasmaḫ-Addu to the god Nergal, reflecting the power-struggle between two Amorite clans, the Benjaminite Addu clan pitted against the Bensimʾalite Līm clan. In this text, the ruler of Mari, Yasmaḫ-Addu, recapitulates the historical events related to the protracted conflict between two reigning dynasties: the members of the Līm clan (Yagid-Līm, Yaḫdun-Līm, Sūmū-Yamam) against the Addu clan (Ilā-Kabkabū, Šamšī-Addu, Yasmaḫ-Addu). The former were the ancient rulers of Mari and belonged to the Bensimʾalite or northern Amorite tribes. The latter were part of the Benjaminite or southern tribes. The end of the power struggle between these two clans is reflected in the prophetic letter relating the message of the god Adad from Aleppo to the last ruler of Mari, Zimrī-Līm (A. 1968). The god Adad’s influence stretches beyond the city of Aleppo in northern Syria since he claims to have given the rule over Mari to the warlord who reveres him. These Mari documents represent a veritable philosophy of history with an ideology based on the operation of divine retribution. The view of history as the outworking of a retributive principle is common to all the major cultures of the Mediterranean seashore. It is found in Mesopotamia in several epochs (from the Legend of Narām Sîn to the the Poem of Erra), in the Hurrian-Hittite text concerning the fall of Ebla, in Egypt, in Greece, and in the Hebrew historiographic tradition. The Mari evidence coming from the Northwest Semitic domain to which the Hebrews also belonged could, therefore, be considered as one of the precursors of the theologico-historiographic genre, reflecting an ideology anticipating the one attributed to the redactor of the Deuteronomistic historiography (HDtr). This hermeneutical principle is a common ancient Near Eastern way of interpreting history which the Hebrew tradition shares.

This article gives a short survey of concepts of “sin and sanction,” the “crisis of Wisdom,” and divine justice in ancient Mesopotamian texts and in the Old Testament. A concluding summary provides a comparison of these two ancient Near Eastern cultures’ understandings of the ethics of divine justice.

Half of the drug offenders incarcerated in the United States are black, even though whites and blacks use and sell drugs at the same rate, and blacks make up only 13 percent of the population. Noncomparativists about retributive justice see nothing wrong with this picture; for them, an offender’s desert is insensitive to facts about other offenders. By contrast, comparativists about retributive justice assert that facts about others can partially determine an offender’s desert. Not surprisingly, comparativists, especially comparative egalitarians, contend that differential punishment is retributively unjust. I agree with this assessment, but take issue with the reasons egalitarians cite in its favor. In this paper, I argue that differential punishment violates retributive justice because it contributes to structural racial oppression. Over the course of developing and defending this claim, I identify the shortcomings of both comparative egalitarianism and respectarianism, which is the most popular and plausible brand of noncomparativism.

Plato warned that "Famine shall put an end to he who famishes the people." The fruition of this prophecy may fulfil the people's desire for vengeance, but it neglects to remedy their hunger. The trope "eat the rich" fulfills both of these carnal desires. It aphoristically satiates the pivotal longings for both revenge and sustenance--- festering  inside the hearts of the disparate masses. "Eat the rich" was the rallying cry of the French Revolution. Centuries later, it has been resurrected by a new generation of working-class  activists. Why has the palate of American laborers cultivated this same class-contingent longing for human flesh? Might this be an indication that they will also soon acquire a taste for class-contingent revolution?
    Through the lens of critical theory, the author invokes ideology to provide a rhetorical analysis of the trope "eat the rich." Her inquiry examines how the phrase has historically evolved to challenge the hegemonic structures of American plutocracy. Drawing upon the theories of Slavoj Zizek, Jean Baudrillard, Valentin Volosinov, Antonio Gramsci and others, the author examines the impact "eat the rich" has upon the élite discourse of power. She explores the success of the phrase as a rallying cry and questions if it is able to defy that same hegemonic production that unwittingly constructed it. With a focus on the massive protest movements of 2020, the author suggests that the reemergence of the trope functions to subvert the capitalist imperatives of retributive justice and artificial scarcity.

This article explores the relationship between the concepts of restorative
justice, racial reconciliation and Afro-communitarianism, and how these
concepts apply to the South African situation. A version of restorative justice which is necessary for the Afro-communitarian conception of reconciliation will be defended. The understanding of restorative justice defended includes aspects of both distributive and procedural justice.

El presente artículo discute cómo los fines y las funciones sociales de la prisión se ven reflejados en su diseño arquitectónico, el cual no constituye simplemente una organización económica del espacio
y las actividades que pueden ocurrir dentro de este, sino que además comunica importantes significados, políticos, sociales y culturales sobre el crimen y el castigo. También se analiza el papel que la prisión juega, y puede jugar, en la construcción de significados y espacios que puedan propiciar u obstaculizar la reconciliación social que, se supone, debe llegar con el postconflicto.

*This article discusses how the aims and the social functions of prisons are reflected in their architectural designs. These are not simply economic organizations of space that host relevant activities; they also communicate important political, social, and cultural meanings about crime and punishment. The article also analyzes the roles that prison plays and can play in terms of the constructions of meaning and spaces that can promote or obstruct the social reconciliation that should supposedly be part of post-conflict.

What factors determine the willingness to inflict collective punishment upon a group for a misdeed committed by individual group members? This research investigates the effect of collective responsibility shared among group members and the moderating effect of the group’s political organization (democratic vs. nondemocratic). Hypothesizing that moral accountability should be greater for democratic offender groups compared to nondemocratic groups, five experiments showed that the positive effect of collective responsibility on support for collective punishment (experiment 1) was stronger for democratic groups than for nondemocratic groups (experiment 2-5). A sixth experiment revealed that the moral and social value ascribed to democracy led to higher expectations towards democratic groups, resulting in negative perceptions of the democratic offender group and ultimately in increased collective punishment. The results are discussed in terms of defense strategies of democratic values.

This paper criticizes four major approaches to criminal law – consequentialism, retributivism, abolitionism, and “mixed” pluralism – each of which, in its own fashion, affirms the celebrated emblem of the “scales of justice.” The argument is that there is a better way of dealing with the tensions that often arise between the various legal purposes than by balancing them against each other. For we should aim to genuinely reconcile them instead.

Some moral philosophers believe that people getting what they deserve has intrinsic positive value. Some of these philosophers are axiological retributivists. They believe that some evil people deserve what is bad for them, and that some such person getting what he deserves, even though this is bad for him, has intrinsic positive value. In this paper, I raise a problem for axiological retributivism. The problem arises when we ask what this view implies about pairs of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents. Attempting to answer this question leads to a paradox that mirrors a familiar paradox in population axiology. The latter, which I call the neutrality paradox, arises when one tries to formulate a plausible population axiology that accommodates what John Broome calls the intuition of neutrality: there is a range of positive wellbeing levels such that if a new person comes into existence at any one of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither better nor worse, other things being equal. As Broome demonstrates, it seems impossible to accommodate the intuition of neutrality without rejecting some seemingly obvious axiological claim. I argue that axiological retributivists will be pressed to acknowledge a range of wellbeing levels such that if a new deserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither better nor worse with respect to desert, other things being equal. This claim, like the intuition of neutrality, seems impossible to accept without rejecting some seemingly obvious axiological claim. But the desert-neutrality paradox poses a bigger problem for axiological retributivism than the neutrality paradox poses for population axiology. While it would be unreasonable to respond to the neutrality paradox by rejecting population axiology altogether, it would not be unreasonable to respond to the desert-neutrality paradox by rejecting axiological retributivism.

Retributivism can be orated as the method of balancing and restoring the position of the law abiders and voiders to maintain societal peace. retributivism hold both positive and negative desert claim. Where the positive desert claim maintain those wrongdoers morally deserve punishment for their wrongful acts and the negative desert claim stimuli the positive desert claim maintaining that individuals, who have done no wrong should not be punished and the wrongdoers should not be punished disproportionately.

A critical evaluation of the statement: “Penal incarceration appears so deeply entrenched in our cultural sensibilities that prison and punishment have become almost synonymous…it has long been recognised that punishment may be intended as a moral message to denounce ‘crime’ with its severity reflecting collective indignation and revulsion”

A partir de una sentencia de la Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago, el artículo examina la tensión en que se encuentran nuestros tribunales de justicia, al indemnizar el daño moral en el ámbito de la responsabilidad extracontractual. Si bien rechazan que la indemnización decretada cumpla objetivos retributivos o disuasivos, ajustándose al principio de reparación integral del daño, en ciertos supuestos acuden a componentes punitivos en sus fallos, elevando el monto indemnizatorio. Se revisa esta tensión judicial, proponiendo su disolución a la luz de la pertinencia de consideraciones punitivas en el derecho privado.

From a decision of the Court of Appeals of Santiago, the article examines the tension found in our courts of justice when they seek to compensate moral damages in the context of tort law. While they deny that these awards are aimed at retributive or deterrent objectives, sticking to the principle of full compensation for damage, in some cases they take into account punitive components in their judgments, raising the amount of the award. This legal tension is reviewed, proposing its dissolution by endorsing the appropriateness of punitive considerations in private law.

One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per se face significant independent moral objections (Pereboom 2014, 153). Yet despite these concerns, I maintain that free will skepticism leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal behavior—in particular preventive detention, rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for good social policy. The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s (2001, 2013, 2014), taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop the quarantine model within a broader justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics. The resulting model—which I call the public health-quarantine model—provides a framework for justifying quarantine and criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and preferable to other non-retributive alternatives. It also provides a broader approach to criminal behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own.

This essay will explore and attempt to assess theologically the retribution relationship between God and Job (as well as all of humanity)—namely, in reference to the accuser’s question: “Does Job fear God for nothing?” (Job 1:9, NRSV). That God places “a fence around him and his house and all that he has, on every side” (1:10a), the accuser’s claim gains support by God blessing the “works of his hands,” increasing Job’s possessions in the land (1:10b). The accuser seeks to prove that Job (and essentially mankind) only serves God through a well-proven “doctrine of retribution” (or “law of causality”; cf. 4:7-11). The accuser’s challenge (1:9) essentially brings out the dynamic connection between the “doctrine of retribution” and Job’s “disinterested”  faith as the thematic element of the prose (1:1-2:13; 42:7-17) and poetry section (3:1-42:6) of the Book of Job.  Thus, the accuser’s wager questions Job’s ability to have a disinterested faith or servitude to God. It proposes that Job is only retributively faithful to God: “stretch out your hand now, and touch all that he has, and he will curse you to your face” (1:10).

Inevitably, the entire Book of Job seems to hinge upon the idea that Job (and all of mankind) should seek God’s Person disinterestedly—to relationally encounter with- and communicate to the God of the Bible without the influence of retributive rewards or punishments. God accepted the wager because He believed that Job is capable of a disinterested faith (which proved to be right in the end). Even though Job innocently suffered, in catastrophic proportions, God believed that Job disinterestedly pursued His Person. Job did not curse God to His face (1:11); instead, he worshiped God amid traumatic tragedies (1:20–21). The Book of Job, thus, proves that Job (and all of mankind) is capable of having a disinterested  faith, especially through extreme sufferings.

However, the doctrine of retribution is traditionally prevalent in most human civilizations—particularly in Israel’s use of “collective retribution,” which served as “the cornerstone of philosophy of the biblical historians, the authors of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings.”  Be it from secular society (such as the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have others do unto you” ) or from biblical reference (“…A man reaps what he sows,” Gal. 6:7–8; cf. “Blessings” and “Curses” in Deut. 28), the doctrine/philosophy of retribution seems ubiquitous. This is especially evident in the increasingly influential pop-culture media. Therefore, this essay will (1) research the basis of biblical and secular retribution, (2) provide a theological assessment on the dynamics between a retributive versus a disinterested faith, and (3) describe a case study on retributive- and disinterested theodicy depicted in popular media.