Republic (Plato)

This dissertation frames Plato's Republic as an attempt to reform the state of discourse in a politico-discursive crisis that occurred toward the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth century BCE in Athens, by focusing on the previously unexplored role that proverbs and gnômai play in Plato's creation of the ideal polis. Plato uses such commonplaces not solely for the purpose of lending his dialogue a more authentic character. Rather, they both elucidate the dynamics of power that inhere in the prevailing modes of Athenian discourse and provide a locus for Plato's critique of the improper use of language. Plato reveals how discursive reform is inseparable from social and political reform. Proverbs, gnômai, and other rhetorical topoi serve collectively as one of the building blocks of a just society. Put simply, wordcraft is statecraft. Plato's effort at discursive reform in the context of proverbial expressions that are themselves part of the larger Greek wisdom tradition parallels, in turn, the critique against poetry The dissertation of John Roger Tennant Jr. is approved.

This dissertation frames Plato's Republic as an attempt to reform the state of discourse in a politico-discursive crisis that occurred toward the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth century BCE in Athens, by focusing on the previously unexplored role that proverbs and gnômai play in Plato's creation of the ideal polis. Plato uses such commonplaces not solely for the purpose of lending his dialogue a more authentic character. Rather, they both elucidate the dynamics of power that inhere in the prevailing modes of Athenian discourse and provide a locus for Plato's critique of the improper use of language. Plato reveals how discursive reform is inseparable from social and political reform. Proverbs, gnômai, and other rhetorical topoi serve collectively as one of the building blocks of a just society. Put simply, wordcraft is statecraft. Plato's effort at discursive reform in the context of proverbial expressions that are themselves part of the larger Greek wisdom tradition parallels, in turn, the critique against poetry The dissertation of John Roger Tennant Jr. is approved.

!is paper explores the role of external factors in the constitution of
the Stoic mind. It will show how the external infuences the Stoic mind
in several crucial ways: 1) Constitutive Role: the external world acts
as a constitutive factor for the soul (the third level of the scala naturae),
shaping its development. At the fourth level, the logos (rational principle)
interacts with qualified external objects. These objects form the
basis of abstract reasoning and teachings derived from external sources;
2) Truth-Making Function: the external world serves as a truth-maker
for phantasiai and the axiomata associated with them, providing validation
and substance to internal representations and core beliefs; 3) Opposition
to External Goods: For the Stoic soul dedicated to virtue, external
goods are elements to be opposed or transcended. The Stoic perspective
emphasizes the pursuit of virtue as independent of external goods,
which are considered indifferent or secondary to moral development;
4) Condition of Possibility: the external void or incorporeal space is
a necessary condition for the growth of the cosmos, including its periodic
conflagration (destruction) and subsequent reconstitution.

Aristotle offers us no sustained account of civic friendship (πολιτική φιλία), only remarks scattered throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics.1 In this paper I hope to make clear what his views on civic friendship are. Before I get to his remarks on civic friendship themselves, I want to look briefly at two discussions in Aristotle that I believe contribute to uncovering his views on civic friendship, and I want to indicate briefly those interpretations of Aristotle's civic friendship that I reject. I First, let us take a quick look at two related issues: (1) Aristotle's criticism of the communism of women and children in Plato's Republic, and (2) Aristotle's claim that one cannot properly be a friend-i.e. a character friend-to many people.2 According to Plato, nearly every citizen in the best city of the Republic will actually feel close familial friendship or affection towards one another: A citizen will regard all younger citizens as children, and all older ones as parents and grandparents, and all those of the same age as siblings. And they will really feel this; these are not simply words (Rep. 463c-d). This, it was claimed, will result in the highest unity possible. (See Rep. 462b-464d.)3 Aristotle levels several criticisms against this 'communism of women and children,' as it is sometimes called. (See Pol. II 3-4.) For example: What is common to the most people gets the least care, since they are concerned (φροντίζουσιV) most of all with their own things, but less with the common things, or [only with] as much as falls to each [individually] (1261b33-35). And: There comes to be a thousand sons to each of the citizens, and these not as [sons] of each [individually], but any chance man is equally the son of any chance man [given that they are in the proper age groups], such that all [the "fathers"] will eaually neglect them [i.e. the "sons"] (1261b38-1262al). The main thrust of Aristotle's complaint is that where women and children are held in common (or more accurately, where all regard themselves as part of one common family) , people will not be able 1

Razmišljajući duže vrijeme o jednom od najpoznatijih i najveličanstvenijih filozofskih odlomaka – “mitu/alegoriji o pećini”, iz Platonovog djela ‘Država’, koji predstavlja osnovu za različita tumačenja, imali smo potrebu skrenuti pažnju na određene usporedbe. Nakon skraćenog navođenja spomenutog ulomka slijedi brzopotezni komentar.

There are numerous interpretations of Plato's theory of justice as it relates to the ideal state, deeply intertwined with his political philosophy. This complexity makes understanding his interlocking ideas challenging, as he seeks to construct a theory of the ideal state. Plato's philosophy of justice, particularly in its political dimension, emphasizes integration as a fundamental factor in grasping his theory. This paper aims to elucidate the original concept of justice in Plato's state by delving into the roots of the Republic, analyzing its historical context. Plato's predictions reflect values and truths connected to politics and philosophy, emphasizing integration as essential to understanding his theory of justice, which lies at the core of his philosophy. This essay compares the relationship between the functions and class structure of the state. Plato classifies human nature into three components: reason, courage, and appetite, which correspond to three major classes in the state. The ruling class, educated in philosophy, governs the state. The military class, characterized by courage and strength, defends the state, while the professional class manages the everyday affairs of governance. Plato's theory posits functional specialization across all classes as fundamental to his ideal state. In essence, while Plato's imagined city may lack historical existence, it holds significant relevance in the realm of speculative human thought.
Keywords: Justice. State. Function. Class. Rulers. Guardians. Producers.

The purpose of this study is to find out the effect of PjBL with WBL media as an instructional strategy and direct instructional (DI) strategy on the understanding (intercept) and the concept application of science-integrated learning media. The method of this research is Quasi-Experimental with 2x2 factorial design. The number of respondents is 110 pre-service teachers consisting of 68 respondents for the experimental class and 42 respondents for the control class. The sampling technique is purposive sampling with a class as an experimental class and another class as a control class. MANOVA is used to analyze the data. The result of the test shows that: (1) there is a difference in the average score of learning outcomes in understanding and science-integrated conceptual application among pre-service teachers who are taught with Web-based PjBL and DI strategies. The average score of understanding the concept of developing science-integrated learning media with a Web-based PjBL strat...

Εὐδαίμων ὁ Κόρινθοσ' ἔγωγε δ' εἴην Τενεάτης. ΄΄Κόρινθοσ' ἔγωγε΄΄. Η βεβαιότητα που προκύπτει ότι μεταξύ της Τεγέας και της γειτονικής Τενέας ή κατά τον Στέφανο γραμματ. <Γενέα> κερδίζει η <ΤΕΝΕΑ> και είναι σωστό να γράφεται <ΤΕΝΕΑΤΗΣ>. Αφου κατα τον κώδικα Q, ισχύει το Τενέα , μια κώμη της Κορίνθου όπου υπήρχε ο ναός του Απόλλωνος.

The concept of the idea of the Good is one of the key aspects of Platonic ontology and ethics. Plato introduces the Good in Book VI of the Republic, defining it as the “the highest form of knowledge”. The function of the Good in Plato turns out to be twofold: on the one hand, it assumes a practical-normative role in relation to the other ideas; on the other hand, the function of the Good is purely ontological, in that it serves as the ontological foundation of the entire intelligible reality. The function of the idea of the Good played a central role in the so-called Middle Platonism, in which interpreters have sought to interpret the doctrines of the dialogues according to a systematic unity. In this view, the Good always assumes the role of the apex of the real, but it loses its normative character in favour of an ontological and theological perspective. The most significant example is that of Numenius of Apamea, who makes the Good (also called “first God”) the absolute apex of the real. The Good, in Numenius’ perspective, represents the being, transcendent with respect to the intelligible plane, but still ontologically determined as it is the highest intellect. The next step comes with Plotinus, who identifies the Good with the One of the Parmenides, from which he de- rives a series of aporias regarding its knowability and ontological determination. For Ploti- nus, the One-Good is defined as beyond being and thought, being transcendent even with respect to the sphere of the ideas-Nous. I have tried to show very briefly how the meaning of Good evolves in metaphysical-theological terms throughout the Platonic tradition, being profoundly different from how it was conceived by Plato in the Republic.

In this essay, I shall argue that, contrary to common assumptions, Plato's so-called "City of Pigs" (Pl. rep. 372a3–373b1) is by no means an anti-philosophical state. Refuting this assumption, I aim to show that the dialogical context accounts for the interlocutors' rejection of this state: it is, I ar-gue, an economic system that stands at the outset of the ideal state's foundation as its basis. This system illustrates metaphorically, represented by population groups and concrete lifestyles, a hierarchy according to which necessary and non-necessary human needs ought to be satisfied. However, Socrates' idea of what necessary needs are (depicted in the "City of Pigs") seems all too meagre to Glauco personally, highlighted by his coinage "City of Pigs". Precisely this makes Socra-tes realize that the moderation he has in mind - rendering the system "healthy, true" (and by the way vegetarian) - would demand too much from average people. Thus, despite his explicit prefer-ence for that City he makes no attempt at rejecting Glauco's prototypical wish. Instead, he modi-fies this system of needs accordingly, thus turning it "luxurious, inflamed", even if its very abun-dance will lead to resource scarcity (and eventually war). Only at this stage does the dialogue face problems for which there has been no room in the preceding economic discourse: a splitting of society into specialised classes, the education of the guardian class, political power, etc. that gradually establish the ideal state. At its beginning, however, we encounter - in the form of the "City of Pigs" - an often-misjudged plea for moderation (and vegetarianism) that - as Socrates rec-ognizes melancholically - is not (yet) suitbale to the people (of his time).

At Republic 414b, Socrates asks “Could we... contrive ... one noble lie ...?” Most plausibly, these words imply that there is one noble lie. Following these words, the Autochthony Claim asserts the Best City’s citizens are equally brothers, and the Myth of Metals asserts that brother justifiably rules over brother. The article argues that the Autochthony Claim is the “one” noble lie. This conclusion derives from showing that the two assertions are not only a normative exercise about what the Best City should do but are also descriptive insofar as they describe the behaviour of worldly polities in Plato’s day and ours.

The Allegory of the Cave (514a-520a of Plato’s Republic) describes how people may come to know the form of the good, or, the good itself. It depicts a prisoner who with great difficulty leaves the cave in which he was bound and enters the external realm. There, under compulsion, he gazes at the light, responsible for all things, including the shadows which he had mistakenly thought represented truth. My project is to consider why one leaves the cave. Thus, I am interested in the mechanisms by which the philosopher is externally compelled to leave the cave, but I am perhaps more interested in his internal compulsion – his internal desire, and striving, to leave the cave – and how external compulsions may help bring out and in concert satisfy it. Accordingly, I will suggest that while external compulsions are necessary (to varying degrees) for a person’s rise from the cave, they are only successful because there lies in each person (again, to varying degrees) the ability to recognize the good, and the eros-driven desire to do so. It is thus my view that the external compulsions represented in the cave are auxiliary catalysts — they aid people in coming to know the form of good by focusing their natural eros on attaining knowledge. In making this argument, I will consider the Allegory of the Cave and other more focused passages in the Republic which deal with eros and the soul. I will also enter into some conversation with Rachel Barney’s “Eros and Necessity in the Ascent from the Cave,” which deals specifically with this issue and whose reading — that the more conventional external motivations (per her curricular and Socratic readings) and eros can each or even together compel one’s ‘ascent’ from the cave — I will accept in part but attempt to strengthen and specify in my own.

En el presente artículo se sostiene que la violencia es inevitable en cualquier organización humana, pero que debe ser ejercida a modo de justicia. Según Platón el ser humano debe ser conducido, mediante la motivación y/o coacción, a preferir el bien de la comunidad sobre el propio. La violencia al ser un elemento negativo del poder político, ha de ser racionalizado de tal modo que logre reducirse a sus mínimos; pues sólo así se dirige al bien común y puede ser parte de la justicia, pues es el modo en que ésta combate la injusticia. En consecuencia, la racionalización de la violencia es posible en la medida en que ésta es útil y conveniente para la comunidad.

The utopian character of Plato's city in The Republic has been a main subject of discussion, centred especially on the characteristics of the proposed community and its incoherencies when assumed as a concrete political project. The aim of this paper is to analyse which parameters are used by Plato in his view of the best constitution and how these parameters became the criteria assumed by Aristotle in his general classification of political thought. Through Plato's representation of Socrates' activity when describing the city of the Republic it is possible to trace a genealogy of the modern concept of utopia.

Pensar qué es la justicia, qué es lo justo y que no, es como dice Sócrates, de mayor valor que el oro (336e). Y si el oro es difícil de hallar mucho más difícil será la búsqueda de lo que verdaderamente es la justicia. Tal es el panorama en la búsqueda de la justicia, que si bien, no interesa a algunos como Céfalo, e indigna a otros como Trasímaco, Sócrates emprende a partir del primer libro.

Certificate of my participation in the 31st International Conference “The Universe of Platonic Thought”, organised by the Plato Philosophical Society at the Russian Christian Academy for the Humanities, Saint Petersburg, Russia, 22-23 June 2023.

The title of the lecture was: “Individuals, Ideas and Dialectic”.

In my study, I shall investigate the features of ideas, the role of dialectic, and the effects which the acquaintance with ideas brings about in the individual. I shall mainly resort to passages taken from Plato’s Phaedo and Republic.
I shall first expose some differences between the entities of the average life dimension and the ideas. Entities of the sensible dimension are relative entities: they exist in a dimension of relativity. On the contrary, ideas are not relative: they never appear as different from what they are (for example, the idea of equality never appears unequal).
Ideas are absolute: they are not affected by the dimension of relativity. Sensible concretisations of a property are relative since they are always relative to the context in which they are: for instance, sensible equals can appear as equal to something and not equal to something else. The idea of equal is absolute since it cannot appear as different from that which it is. The sensible concretisations of an idea, in general, and of the equal, in particular, are not the property as such, whereas any idea is the property as such – i.e., it is the property itself – and it is nothing else than the property – the idea of equal, for instance, is equal and nothing else –. Sensible concretisations are affected by the relativity of the sensible dimension; ideas, on the contrary, are free from this relativity.
These differences have precise effects on the individual: the individual who is aware of the existence of ideas is, at least as regards his being connected to the ideas, absolute. Through the awareness of the existence of ideas and through the knowledge of ideas, the individual acquires an outlook on reality which is not dependent on the relativity of the sensible dimension. Therefore, the individual who becomes aware of the existence of ideas will have a relation with the world which is different from the relation that an individual who is not aware of the existence of ideas has: the individual who knows ideas is not dependent on the dimension of sensibility (at least not entirely dependent). He is not imprisoned in the dimension of the sense data. Thus, the condition of the individual completely changes after the individual has become aware of the existence of ideas.
The acquaintance with ideas brings about the development of the rational part of the soul. An education process is presupposed in order that the individual can know ideas. The rational part of the soul needs to be appropriately developed in order that it can reach a condition in which it can successfully lead the whole soul. This development is achieved through the programme of education exposed in books VI and VII of the Republic. The individual should be shifted away from the dimension of Becoming and ought to be brought towards the dimension of Being: the preparatory mathematical disciplines, first, and the dialectic, then, should shift the individual from the dimension of Becoming to the dimension of Being.
The education programme should lead the individual to the acquisition of a condition of stability for his rational part and to the acquisition of the correct perspective as regards the whole reality. Only after reaching the correct perspective on the whole reality is the individual able to give any component of reality the value which it deserves.
Through the programme of studies, the individual meets a dimension of reality which he cannot know before. The dimension of Being is initially unknown to him. In Republic VII, 533 we can observe the role of dialectic as the discipline which finally liberates the individual from his condition of ignorance. Knowledge represents the individual’s liberation from the original condition. The soul needs to be liberated: the condition of being free from the initial bog, as Plato describes the original condition of the individual, is not given and is not present initially.

This is the PDF-PowerPoint which I used for my talk at the 31st International Conference “The Universe of Platonic Thought”, Russian Christian Academy for the Humanities, St Petersburg, Russia. The title of my talk was: "Individuals, Ideas and Dialectic". In my study, I shall investigate the features of ideas, the role of dialectic, and the effects which the acquaintance with ideas brings about in the individual. I shall mainly resort to passages taken from Plato’s Phaedo and Republic. I shall first expose some differences between the entities of the average life dimension and the ideas. Entities of the sensible dimension are relative entities: they exist in a dimension of relativity. On the contrary, ideas are not relative: they never appear as different from what they are (for example, the idea of equality never appears unequal). Ideas are absolute: they are not affected by the dimension of relativity. Sensible concretisations of a property are relative since they are always relative to the context in which they are: for instance, sensible equals can appear as equal to something and not equal to something else. The idea of equal is absolute since it cannot appear as different from that which it is. The sensible concretisations of an idea, in general, and of the equal, in particular, are not the property as such, whereas any idea is the property as such – i.e., it is the property itself – and it is nothing else than the property – the idea of equal, for instance, is equal and nothing else –. Sensible concretisations are affected by the relativity of the sensible dimension; ideas, on the contrary, are free from this relativity. These differences have precise effects on the individual: the individual who is aware of the existence of ideas is, at least as regards his being connected to the ideas, absolute. Through the awareness of the existence of ideas and through the knowledge of ideas, the individual acquires an outlook on reality which is not dependent on the relativity of the sensible dimension. Therefore, the individual who becomes aware of the existence of ideas will have a relation with the world which is different from the relation that an individual who is not aware of the existence of ideas has: the individual who knows ideas is not dependent on the dimension of sensibility (at least not entirely dependent). He is not imprisoned in the dimension of the sense data. Thus, the condition of the individual completely changes after the individual has become aware of the existence of ideas. The acquaintance with ideas brings about the development of the rational part of the soul. An education process is presupposed in order that the individual can know ideas. The rational part of the soul needs to be appropriately developed in order that it can reach a condition in which it can successfully lead the whole soul. This development is achieved through the programme of education exposed in books VI and VII of the Republic. The individual should be shifted away from the dimension of Becoming and ought to be brought towards the dimension of Being: the preparatory mathematical disciplines, first, and the dialectic, then, should shift the individual from the dimension of Becoming to the dimension of Being. The education programme should lead the individual to the acquisition of a condition of stability for his rational part and to the acquisition of the correct perspective as regards the whole reality. Only after reaching the correct perspective on the whole reality is the individual able to give any component of reality the value which it deserves. Through the programme of studies, the individual meets a dimension of reality which he cannot know before. The dimension of Being is initially unknown to him. In Republic VII, 533 we can observe the role of dialectic as the discipline which finally liberates the individual from his condition of ignorance. Knowledge represents the individual’s liberation from the original condition. The soul needs to be liberated: the condition of being free from the initial bog, as Plato describes the original condition of the individual, is not given and is not present initially.

I am going to speak on 22 June at the Conference The Universe of Platonic Thought - 31st International Conference, 22–23 June 2023 St Petersburg, Russia. The title of my talk will be: Individuals, Ideas and Dialectic. In my study, I shall investigate the features of ideas, the role of dialectic, and the effects which the acquaintance with ideas brings about in the individual. I shall mainly resort to passages taken from Plato's Phaedo and Republic. I shall first expose some differences between the entities of the average life dimension and the ideas. Entities of the sensible dimension are relative entities: they exist in a dimension of relativity. On the contrary, ideas are not relative: they never appear as different from what they are (for example, the idea of equality never appears unequal). Ideas are absolute: they are not affected by the dimension of relativity. Sensible concretisations of a property are relative since they are always relative to the context in which they are: for instance, sensible equals can appear as equal to something and not equal to something else. The idea of equal is absolute since it cannot appear as different from that which it is. The sensible concretisations of an idea, in general, and of the equal, in particular, are not the property as such, whereas any idea is the property as such-i.e., it is the property itself-and it is nothing else than the property-the idea of equal, for instance, is equal and nothing else-. Sensible concretisations are affected by the relativity of the sensible dimension; ideas, on the contrary, are free from this relativity. These differences have precise effects on the individual: the individual who is aware of the existence of ideas is, at least as regards his being connected to the ideas, absolute. Through the awareness of the existence of ideas and through the knowledge of ideas, the individual acquires an outlook on reality which is not dependent on the relativity of the sensible dimension. Therefore, the individual who becomes aware of the existence of ideas will have a relation with the world which is different from the relation that an individual who is not aware of the existence of ideas has: the individual who knows ideas is not dependent on the dimension of sensibility (at least not entirely dependent). He is not imprisoned in the dimension of the sense data. Thus, the condition of the individual completely changes after the individual has become aware of the existence of ideas. The acquaintance with ideas brings about the development of the rational part of the soul. An education process is presupposed in order that the individual can know ideas. The rational part of the soul needs to be appropriately developed in order that it can reach a condition in which it can successfully lead the whole soul. This development is achieved through the programme of education exposed in books VI and VII of the Republic. The individual should be shifted away from the dimension of Becoming and ought to be brought towards the dimension of Being: the preparatory mathematical disciplines, first, and the dialectic, then, should shift the individual from the dimension of Becoming to the dimension of Being. The education programme should lead the individual to the acquisition of a condition of stability for his rational part and to the acquisition of the correct perspective as regards the whole reality. Only after reaching the correct perspective on the whole reality is the individual able to give any component of reality the value which it deserves. Through the programme of studies, the individual meets a dimension of reality which he cannot know before. The dimension of Being is initially unknown to him. In Republic VII, 533 we can observe the role of dialectic as the discipline which finally liberates the individual from his condition of ignorance. Knowledge represents the individual's liberation from the original condition. The soul needs to be liberated: the condition of being free from the initial bog, as Plato describes the original condition of the individual, is not given and is not present initially.

Levels of Argument is a comparison of the Republic and Nicomachean Ethics, focusing on the methods and structures of the texts' arguments. In his analysis, Scott's chief point is that in both texts, Plato and Aristotle recognize two separate "routes" or arguments that are both capable of leading one to an understanding of why justice is beneficial (in the case of Plato) or the human good (in the case of Aristotle). In both texts, the shorter route is seen as a less rigorous but adequate method of arguing for the authors' respective conclusions. It is also the route that both authors actually traverse in the texts. The longer route, in contrast, is taken to be more rigorous: its arguments are more precise and detailed but as a consequence are far more difficult to follow. However, Scott argues that the authors differ in their attitude to this longer route. Plato sees it as an ideal, one that he would like to follow but cannot due to its difficulty. In contrast, Scott argues that Aristotle sees the longer route as superfluous given that political science is a practical discipline. In addition to articulating and comparing these two routes, Scott also discusses key methodological passages, contrasting Plato's journey out of and then back into the cave with Aristotle's comments about whether he is working to or from first principles. In what follows, I will focus on how Scott distinguishes the two routes, elaborating on those parts of his argument that I take to be the most crucial in drawing this distinction. I will then briefly look at what we learn from this comparison and mount a worry about his reading of Aristotle. Scott begins by discussing the short route that Plato takes in the Republic. Scott's primary challenge in distinguishing this route, which he identifies as being contained in books II-IV and then elaborated on in IX and X, is showing that it can be understood without reference to Plato's theory of the forms, which occupies Plato in the central books of the Republic and which Scott identifies as unique to Plato's longer route. To this end, Scott enumerates various methodologies that are at work in II-IV, showing how they fit together to form a coherent argument that does not rely on the theory of forms but rather on hypothesis, political analysis, and moral psychology. Scott identifies three primary methods. First, Socrates begins with a hypothetical method in his parallel between the city and soul. In short, Scott argues that Socrates explicitly isolates as a hypothesis the contention that justice found in the state will be the same as that found in the soul. This allows him to proceed to analyze justice in the state and then apply it to the soul, since the state is larger than the soul and, Socrates reasons, justice will be easier to see in it. In Socrates' analysis of the state, Scott maintains (following Santas)1 that justice is identified in

The following is a draft of an essay currently under review.  The essay examines a crucial passage in Book II of Plato’s Republic (376c7-383c7).  In this passage, Socrates asks Adeimantus whether he knows that all gods and human beings hate the so-called “true falsehood” [τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος] (382a4).  Adeimantus does not understand what Socrates means, and so Socrates explains further, distinguishing the “true falsehood” from the “falsehood in speeches” [τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος] (382c6).  There is widespread disagreement among interpreters regarding the meaning of this distinction.  This disagreement grounds more general disagreements about Socrates’ assessment of lying, giving rise to misinterpretations of related passages, most notably Socrates’ account of the noble lie (414b8-415d6).  In this essay, I argue that the prevailing interpretations in contemporary Platonic scholarship all overcomplicate and thereby misunderstand this passage.  I aim to settle the debate about the true falsehood and the falsehood in speeches, by presenting a simpler interpretation and critiquing the prevailing interpretations.  It seems to me that this passage has been misunderstood due to the misinterpretation of a few key phrases, above all “the things that are” [τὰ ὄντα], which is central to Socrates’ account of the true falsehood.  Ultimately, I argue that, by the true falsehood, Socrates simply means the false opinion in the soul of the man who is mistaken and deceived, about anything at all; and, by the falsehood in speeches, Socrates simply means the representation of a false opinion in words.  In the conclusion, I briefly indicate how this interpretation helps clarify a potential point of confusion about Socrates’ noble lie. 

*I have made an effort to engage with the most relevant secondary literature, in order to refute the prevailing interpretations of this passage.  If there is any secondary literature presenting compelling counterarguments that I have overlooked, which I would need to refute to defend my interpretation, please let me know.

6/27/24:  This is a slightly revised version of this essay.  Most notably, I revised my explanation of how "the things that are" are the "the most authoritative things" (pages 10-12).  This new explanation seems far stronger to me.

9/12/24:  Revised again, to add an explanation of the implied contrast between "the things that are" and "the things that seem to be."

The ‘Scala Amoris’ (210a-212b), or ‘Ladder of Love’, constitutes the philosophical and aesthetic centrepiece of Socrates’ encomium of Eros in Plato’s Symposium. Here Diotima describes how a lover ascending up the Ladder directs his erotic attention to a number of difference kinds of beautiful objects, first bodies, then souls, just institutions and knowledge, until he catches a glimpse of Beauty itself. In this paper I advance an ‘inclusive’ reading of the lover’s ascent – to use Price’s 1991 terminology – with a particular emphasis on justifying such a reading concerning the final step. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_15_6

No te preguntas cuántos perros forman una jauría. Cómo recuperan su condición puramente animal. Cómo se rebelan a ser domesticados, se entregan a provocar dolor y a dolerse. Una jauría mató a una madre y a su hijo en el Cerro de la Estrella Recuerdas el rostro tranquilo de esa criatura. Se te insertó en el corazón. Dibujas una jauría desaforada, el gesto deforme, algo parecido al latido de Dios: la mirada perdida de uno de los perros, sin propósi to, tampoco esperanzada. ¿En qué formas dices que experimentas lo divino? ¿No somos todos su experimento? Confía en cosas calladas. El momento en que hincan los dientes. La carne tiene sus límites, no aguanta la desgarradura. ¿Te tomarás el tiempo para dibujar cada cabeza desenfrenada? ¿Los ojos desorbitados? ¿Cada mordida? Mordida: presión, deslizamiento y perforación, como en la escritura. Mira bien qué hay debajo de la carne. (Del diario Poemas incómodos) ©ITAM Derechos Reservados. La reproducción total o parcial de este artículo se podrá hacer si el ITAM otorga la autorización previamente por escrito.

Resumo: A literatura é uma prática artística que procura capturar a contingência, a diversidade, o movimento da realidade. A arte literária, de fato, se constitui através de ensaios aproximativos. É arte ensaística. A filosofia, ao longo de sua história, mostrou quase sempre uma tendência contrária: reduzir a riqueza da diversidade a unidades conceituais, buscar essências, construir ideias sistêmicas. Entretanto, no presente artigo, queremos analisar um texto filosófico que desmente essa tendência. Trata-se do Mênon, diálogo escrito por Platão.Pretendemos mostrar que os procedimentos dialéticos desenvolvidos por este filósofo constroem um ensaio sobrea virtude, tema que motiva os aspectos dialógicos nesta obra. Os conceitos platônicos que ajudarão a esclarecer isto serão doxa (opinião), alethésdoxa (opinião verdadeira) e eudoxía (opinião harmoniosa). Se o filosofar se torna ensaístico, então ele entra em sintonia com a arte literária.

The utopian character of Plato's city in The Republic has been a main subject of discussion, centred especially on the characteristics of the proposed community and its incoherencies when assumed as a concrete political project. The aim of this paper is to analyse which parameters are used by Plato in his view of the best constitution and how these parameters became the criteria assumed by Aristotle in his general classification of political thought. Through Plato's representation of Socrates' activity when describing the city of the Republic it is possible to trace a genealogy of the modern concept of utopia.

I presented this paper at the 2023 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.  The paper begins from the observation that, in Books II-VII of Plato’s Republic, Socrates founds three different cities-in-speech.  This fact raises a number of questions, which this paper seeks to (very briefly) answer.  First, what are the essential characteristics of each of the three cities, and how should one understand the relation between them?  That is to say, what is the logic of the progression from one city to the next?  Second, given that the city-in-speech is introduced as a likeness of the soul, should the three different cities be understood to represent three different souls?  If so, what is the logic of the progression from one soul to the next?  Third, and most importantly, how does this progression of cities and souls bear on the overall question of Plato’s Republic, whether or not justice is good-in-itself for the just individual?

The utopian character of Plato's city in The Republic has been a main subject of discussion, centred especially on the characteristics of the proposed community and its incoherencies when assumed as a concrete political project. The aim of this paper is to analyse which parameters are used by Plato in his view of the best constitution and how these parameters became the criteria assumed by Aristotle in his general classification of political thought. Through Plato's representation of Socrates' activity when describing the city of the Republic it is possible to trace a genealogy of the modern concept of utopia.

It seems necessary and above all logical to demand from researchers in the realm of the Classical Tradition the provision of conclusive proofs of the dependence of literary or artistic works on Greek or Latin models that, after having been adapted-lato sensu-, have reached our times. The preservation of Classical Wisdom offers in its turn a wide range of possibilities among which there would be, for instance, not only replicas ad litteram but adaptations, mere allusions and, why not?, all sorts of rules and commonplaces, thus becoming sometimes a burden rather than a source of inspiration. Whatever the case may be, it is essential to provide the proof and demonstrate that there has been both awareness and deliberate use of the ancient model-and perhaps of its tradition all through the centuries-, so that we can draw a line that associates-since Cinema is now our subject-the ancient world with the contemporary one. In other words, those who do research into the Classical Tradition and Cinema may and must write, for instance, on Pier Paolo Pasolini's Edipo Re or Medea, Jules Dassin's Phaedra or the Victorian experience of Platonic love in James Ivory's Maurice, etcetera, but they should neither analyse a film simply to establish certain parallelisms with Classical models, nor pay attention to significant coincidences if finally they cannot confirm any Classical authorship or inspiration. Following this professional code, they will exhibit an irreproachable behaviour, but they will not take good opportunities to lead con-1. Translations into Catalan

Il libro di Claudia Maggi si apre con una citazione di Pierre Hadot che, assegnato a unafabbrica addetta alla riparazione di locomotive durante la seconda guerra mondiale, ebbea dichiarare di essersi occupato, fino ad allora, di aggiustare idee non metalli e le idee, si sa, sono malleabili. Avendo per la prima volta avuto a che fare con i metalli, Hadot aveva allora compreso che ciò che offre davvero resistenza a ogni tentativo di aggiustamento è la materia.
La nozione di materia è assunta nel libro come emblema di tutto ciò la cui definizione eccede le possibilità del pensiero pensante, come la "chora"
del "Timeo", ricettacolo privo di caratteristiche; come l’individuo, che non ha qualità universali; come la morte, nihil absolutum.

Mixture of philosophy and religion defines Plato&#39;s tradition of spirituality known as Platonism. The view of God as a First Principle or Supreme Good rather than a person is based on platonistic doctrine that anything that have personality is changeable and belongs to Lower Realm, while God is an eternal principle who emanates unchangeable untelligible Forms in the Upper Realm. According to Plato, ascent to heaven from the„cave“ or world of shadows could happen only after the conversion of inverted soul through &quot;intellectual vision&quot; or &quot;ascetic paradigm&quot;. The very concept of spirituality in the West as we know it today comes from Plato and it is still an integral part of all three monotheistic religions today. In the „Republic“ we learn about Allegory of the Cave; in „Meno“ Theory of the Recollection; in „Phaedo“ Theory of the Immortality of the Soul; in „Phaedrus“ Theory of Division and the Fall of the Soul; and finally in „Symposium“ we learn about doctrine...

In the traditional interpretation, The Republic is a continuation of the discussions in Gorgias, according to which virtue and polis laws are tricks invented by a mass of weak people to capture the lust for power of the best individuals, few in number but naturally inclined to leads. The theses of Calicles of Gorgias resemble the ideas set forth by Trasymachus in Book I of The Republic.
The central political theses expressed by Socrates in The Republic are: the best rulers are wise, the best rulers rule for the benefit of those led and not for their sake, it is very unlikely that a city will have the best rulers because there is a chasm between the values ​​of most people and the values ​​of the wise, the greatest harm to a city is civil strife for who should rule, harmony between citizens as to who should rule, and harmony requires the city to cultivate virtue and the rule of law.

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27958.57922

The Hipparchus features a conversation between Socrates and an un-named companion, at an unknown time and place, about gain (or profit) and whether we should in any way limit our pursuit of gain. Socrates argues intransigently that we should not place any limits on our pursuit of gain, while the companion, despite being unable to counter his arguments, is equally firm in his rejection of Socrates’ moral position. The dialogue thus shows the strength of the conviction, in the souls of decent people, that unrestrained pursuit of the good things is not good for you. This conviction exists prior to calculation, and the action of the dialogue thereby testifies to the existence of man’s natural conscience.

do conhecimento como cognições essencialmente distintas e mutuamente irredutíveis. Ademais, uma vez que Sócrates estava preocupado principalmente com a noção de conhecimento como saber o que (é), o que requer uma apreensão de essências ou Formas, ele não prestou particular atenção ao saber que. Como consequência, Sócrates não argumentou para estabelecer as condições de justificação a ser dada proposicionalmente para que uma crença se torne conhecimento.

The aspect of Plato’s theory of the soul: on soul’s constitution, education and developments - PDF-Powerpoint for the NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE, DEDICATED TO WORLD PHILOSOPHY DAY - Philosophical Sciences Department at the Union of Scientists in Bulgaria, Sofia, 17th November 2022.

In my inquiry, I shall analyse some aspects of the association among being, knowledge and soul in Plato. For my investigation, I shall consider passages from Republic, Phaedrus, Phaedo, Timaeus and Laws.
My attention will be directed to the education and transformation of the soul. Through the process of learning, the individual becomes acquainted with the entities belonging to the dimension of being: this acquaintance brings about a complete transformation of the individual. The presence or absence of knowledge determines the moral ascent or the moral descent of the individual.
Basing on the education programme of Republic book vii, I shall expose Plato’s aims, which consist in bringing the soul from the dimension of becoming to the dimension of being. The educational thread of the Republic proves to be, among other things, a progressive diminution of the influence of the senses and a corresponding growth of the rational part within the individual soul. The knowledge of the dimension of being leads the soul to the development of the rational part, to the acquisition of internal stability, to the harmony between the different components and to the correct composition of the elements of the soul. The education programme turns out to be a road of liberation from the bonds of the sense dimension. Correspondingly, the absence of knowledge is the cause of the individual’s liability to instability and moral degeneration: the effects of the absence of knowledge are described by Plato throughout his exposition of the degeneration of the forms of individuals and the forms of constitutions in Republic books viii and ix.

This is the PDF-PowerPoint which Professor Elena Nikolaevna Sobolnikova and I used for your exposition at the Moscow X Plato Conference, RSSU, 3rd November 2022. The title of our paper was: 'The idea of the soul in Plato's philosophy: education as a path to wisdom'.

The object of my presentation is Plato’s Phaedrus, and, particularly, the interrelation between the metaphysics of the Forms from the Palinode (243e9 – 257b6), and the normative account of rhetoric as soul-leading (ψυχαγωγία) by means of speeches that comes up in the second part of the dialogue at 261a7-b3; 271c10-272b4. I will seek to demonstrate that whereas the reconceptualized art of rhetoric commits itself to the goal of gratifying gods instead of human beings (273e5-8-274a2), the Palinode substantiates this normative claim with a mythical narrative that elucidates why philosophers should strive to honor the gods above all else and to pursue truth.

Harari's study is the latest book-length investigation of the Aristotle's <i>Posterior Analytic</i> (<i>APo</i>). But where many recent predecessors-Goldin's <i>Explaining an Eclipse</i> (Michigan, 1996), Ferejohn's <i>Origins of Aristotelian Science</i> (Yale, 1991), and Kal's <i>On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle</i> (Brill, 1988) come to mind-focus on a more or less limited set of issues (indicated by their titles), Harari (H) offers a comprehensive interpretation of the theory of demonstration-resembling in its ambition McKirahan's <i>Principles and Proofs</i> (Princeton, 1992).

In the Republic, action is grounded on a true, objective knowledge due to the causal function of the intelligible Forms, which accounts for the possibility that political ruling aims at a true good. How to understand this articulation, which goes from an objective knowledge to a norm of practical action? This research investigates how the intelligible model is given a practical scope by means of a comparative reading of the Timaeus' divine demiurgy, in order to understand how the dialectical nature of philosophical activity is articulated with the concrete ruling of the city in the Republic. The assimilation of political action to a demiurgy clarifies the intrinsic normativity of any political action, which really produces the good of its object: the ontological difference between the intelligible model and the sensible copy and thus the recognition of the deficiency of the latter is precisely what endows the Forms with a normative function. It is this normative function that sheds light on the practical causality that the eternal objects of the true knowledge exercise and the interiority of the practical orientation of the knowledge. From there, the relation to the sensible consists in the realization of an objectively good finality provided by such an epistemic norm to which the material constraints are subordinated. The practical causality with which the intelligible Forms are endowed through the action of the philosopher-rulers thus acknowledges the irreducibly unintelligible character of the sensible world that surrounds us while maintaining the objectivity of the norm that guides its transformation.

In my inquiry, I shall analyse some aspects of the association among being, knowledge and soul in Plato. For my investigation, I shall consider passages from Republic, Phaedrus, Phaedo, Timaeus and Laws. My attention will be directed to the education and transformation of the soul. Through the process of learning, the individual becomes acquainted with the entities belonging to the dimension of being: this acquaintance brings about a complete transformation of the individual. The presence or absence of knowledge determines the moral ascent or the moral descent of the individual. Basing on the education programme of Republic book vii, I shall expose Plato’s aims, which consist in bringing the soul from the dimension of becoming to the dimension of being. The educational thread of the Republic proves to be, among other things, a progressive diminution of the influence of the senses and a corresponding growth of the rational part within the individual soul. The knowledge of the dimension of being leads the soul to the development of the rational part, to the acquisition of internal stability, to the harmony between the different components and to the correct composition of the elements of the soul. The education programme turns out to be a road of liberation from the bonds of the sense dimension. Correspondingly, the absence of knowledge is the cause of the individual’s liability to instability and moral degeneration: the effects of the absence of knowledge are described by Plato throughout his exposition of the degeneration of the forms of individuals and the forms of constitutions in Republic books viii and ix.

This paper examines Socrates’ problematic analogy of reading big and little letters in Book II of Plato’s Republic.  The examination highlights a significant grammatical detail, which has been almost entirely overlooked in contemporary Platonic scholarship: Socrates refers to the justice of the city as “doing one’s own thing” [τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττων], in the singular, but the justice of the individual as “doing one’s own things” [τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων], in the plural.  In terms of Socrates’ analogy, the big and little letters of justice are not, in fact, the same.  Ultimately, the paper argues that Socrates’ analogy of reading big and little letters is intentionally problematic, intended to draw attention this literal difference between the justice of the city and the justice of the individual.  The paper concludes with a discussion of a few immediate implications of this grammatical detail for interpreting the argument of Plato’s Republic.