Pragmatic encroachment

Root, branch, and blossom, attention is intertwined with epistemology. It is essential to our capacity to learn and decisive of the evidence we obtain, it influences the intellectual connections we forge and those we remember, and it is the cognitive tool whereby we enact decisions about inquiry. Moreover, because it is both an epistemic practice and a site of agency, attention is a natural locus for questions about epistemic morality. This article surveys the emerging epistemology of attention, reviewing the existing literature and sketching avenues for future investigation. It also argues for a reorientation of epistemology itself. This argument is the focus of Section 1. Section 2 briefly reviews philosophical accounts of attention, Section 3 focuses on issues in traditional, individualistic epistemology, and Section 4 turns to social epistemology.

Moral encroachment is the thesis that morality has an effect-unrecognized by traditional epistemology-on which doxastic states are epistemically appropriate. The thesis is increasingly popular among those who, in opposition to Gendler (2011), desire harmony between epistemic and moral demands on belief. This paper has three main goals. First, drawing on attractive structural principles concerning belief and justification, it is shown that a thoroughgoing harmony between moral and epistemic demands is implausible. This weakens the motivation for positing moral encroachment, but a proponent might still hope that moral encroachment can have a significant effect, so that many of the central cases of apparent disharmony can be avoided. The next goal of the paper is to argue that any significant effect of moral encroachment would manifest itself in the credences which are most epistemically appropriate. Finally, it is shown that even a small effect of moral encroachment on credence is in tension with widely accepted basic constraints on epistemically appropriate credence.

We constantly assess each other's epistemic positions. We attempt to distinguish valuable from worthless information, reliable from unreliable informants, etc. Without established social practices of epistemic evaluations we could not navigate the flood of information we are exposed to every day in order to perform essential selections of valiable information. Yet the way we epistemically evaluate each other, ascribe or deny knowledge, who we deem knowledgeable or ignorant, and whom we refer to as an expert or a layman also crucially shape our epistemic milieu and the structure of our society. Epistemic asymmetry often results in and reflects social asymmetry; higher epistemic appraisal often increases social standing. Also, epistemic evaluations such as knowledge ascriptions are commonly performed against the background of certain epistemic and non-epistemic (e.g., practical) concerns and interests. Consequently, epistemic and non-epistemic factors interact in guiding our epistemic practice. To advance our understanding of how they do so is not only a worthwhile project from an epistemological point of view but can be expected to have repercussions on decision making, in debates within political and social theory as well as within ethics, and help us understand and evaluate how we act and even how to act. Moreover, it might shed light on the perennial question of how theoretical and practical rationality relate to one another. A much-discussed question in recent debates on knowledge ascriptions is the question of whether-and if so, how-epistemic standards (standards of how much it takes to count as knowing or as a knower) are influenced by, and/or contextually vary with, non-epistemic factors such as stakes, interests, aims, etc., and whether this in turn affects the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions or only their assertibility (or sayability) conditions. This has been a main point of contention between contextualists, invariantists and relativists (of various brands) concerning knowledge acsriptions (cf.,

Abstract
    This paper outlines the fundamental of a new Pragmatics, formulated in a new conceptual framework, including a new normative system - Conversational Etiquette. It's claimed that it does better than the Gricean system or its offshoots, and covers a much broader domain. It's main new concepts are: Steering-Thrust; Posting; and Pragmatic Stances. Its main applications are:
1. Assertion is a Pragmatic construction, which invokes a raise in the degree of Steering Thrust.
2. 'presupposition' as used in Logic/Linguistics (or what's in the 'Common Ground') is analyzed in terms of the new Pragmatics: The main phenomenon involves is: Posting-without Steering.
3. There is no Pragmatic Encroachment (into the semantics of 'know'). Fluctuations in knowledge-ascriptions in High/Low Stakes convey a DIFFERENT dominant Pragmatic content that drives our intuitions, which track so-called 'Sayability' rather than Truth-Values.
4. Pragmatic Inconsistencies amount to Steering-Thrusts in opposite directions (polarity). Moorean sentences invoke Pragmatic Inconsistencies.
5. Misleading is a Pragmatic phenomenon.

Abstract            Posted in PhilPapers on 12-30-2018: PERMANENT Posting
Igal Kvart: A Coding Conception in Action-Directed-Pragmatics.
    I present formal Pragmatics for a domain in Pragmatics that I call Action-Directed Pragmatics, which focuses on the Pragmatic riddle of how implicit contents are conveyed and understood, by adopting a coding model, in which the speaker and addressee simulate each other iteratively in a deliberative context (an ‘action-pregnant’ one). The implicit content, conveyed by a speaker and decoded by her addressee, in such cases, consists in the specified steered-to action, plus modulations on the action-polarity (pro or con) and the degree of the so-called Steering Thrust that accompanies such assertions and is conveyed by verbal locutions, intonation, and/or bodily and facial gestures. There are two main tasks to model (in a given setup and conversational context): First, how is the speaker, with a steered-to action in mind (and Steering Thrust), to select an assertion so as to (say) optimize the successful transmission and decoding of its implicit pragmatic content by her and her addressee? Second, how does the addressee, given an assertion by the speaker, decipher the implicit pragmatic content conveyed via it? Both will invoke pertinent information they have about each other and the setup/context in order to best encode and best decode the implicit pragmatic content. (This coding mechanism proposed here is not offered for the ubiquitous ‘frozen’, ‘trivial’ or ‘routinized’ pragmatic messages.) A prelude to this formal Pragmatics is a general formal Pragmatic account of Assertibility in contexts that are multi-normative (which is the common case). I focus here only on Epistemic/Semantic and Instrumental Norms. A linear representation of degrees of Overall Assertibility (i.e., taking into account various operative norms) will be an n-dimensional qualitative vector space with a function that computes them given different degrees of sub-normative Assertibility on each axis.

The assumption that the justifiability of scientific belief depends exclusively on the relevant facts is a widely accepted orthodoxy both inside and outside of the scientific establishment. Drawing on the pragmatic and moral encroachment thesis in epistemology, this paper challenges that assumption by showing that practical and moral considerations affect the justifiability of our beliefs regarding the safety of COVID-19 vaccines. In particular, I show that a proper consideration of the practical and moral costs of committing to the belief that COVID-19 vaccines are safe enough for a general vaccine mandate requires COVID-19 vaccines to meet a higher-than-current evidentiary standard of safety. Furthermore, I show that a reassessment of existing COVID-19 vaccines against a higher evidentiary standard of safety would entail a wider scope of medical exemptions and remedial duties. Beyond the case of COVID-19 vaccines, this argument has important general implications for how scientific beliefs should be assessed.

Over the last hundred years, competing and incompatible positions in relation to basic problems of knowledge and the use of the verb ‘to know’ have multiplied; and the prospect of a consensus solution emerging with respect to any of the problems has not seemed particularly good. We have a Gordian knot. Even so, I suggest that we also have a way to cut it. This will involve identifying why the cognitive mechanism that produces our intuitions of knowing evolved and was maintained (by natural selection), i.e., identifying the ‘teleonomic function’ of that cognitive mechanism. Also, it will involve predicting, on the basis of this teleonomic function, the triggering-conditions of these natural knowledge intuitions. In this thesis, I develop a general theory of the origin, function and triggering-conditions of knowledge intuitions that will allow us to cut that knot. That theory follows basic biological theory (including that which pertains to natural altruism) and also signal detection theory.

My theory identifies a number of different circumstances under which the triggering-conditions of knowledge intuitions are different. Strikingly, these different circumstances (and their associated triggering-conditions) map onto the different competing and incompatible epistemological positions to which I referred. This suggests that these positions are all correct within the boundaries of one of the circumstances that my theory identifies; and that the Gordian knot is largely the result of epistemologists claiming universal applicability of a theory that in fact only applies under particular circumstances. We cut the knot by specifying the different circumstances under which each of the different epistemological positions will hold, and the reason we should expect it to hold in just these circumstances, in light of the teleonomic function of knowledge intuitions.

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Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can explain the intuitions that underlie pragmatic encroachment. My basic proposal is that in high-stake cases, it is not that one cannot rationally believe that p; instead, one ought not to rely on one's belief that p. One should rather rely on one's credence in p. I conclude that we need not commit ourselves to pragmatic encroachment in order to explain the intuitiveness of the cases that motivate it.

By responding tentatively to Quanbeck and others, this paper hopes to sketch an essentially plausible and defensible account of belief that is recognizably Kierkegaardian by having a basis in Kierkegaard's work and recent interpretations of it. Here I will contrast cognition (Erkjendelse) with knowledge, introduce Kierkegaard's Leibnizian approach to modality, and the focus on epistemic undecidability and how practical considerations affect epistemic ones. In this connection, I will also introduce belief-credences dualism and epistemic permissivism against a broadly Kantian background. I end by discussing religious belief, aiming to shed new light on the elusive God-postulate in Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

Call these requirements the traditional epistemic requirements, and call the features which satisfy these requirements the traditional epistemic features. Pragmatic Encroachment is the view that, in addition to these traditional epistemic requirements, knowledge ascriptions are true only if they meet some pragmatic requirement. More perspicuously, Pragmatic Encroachment is the view that two subjects, S a and S b , can, if their practical situations are sufficiently different, differ with respect to knowing p, even though they are just alike with respect to the traditional epistemic features. Two comments. First, I'm not attempting to give, or for that matter even concern myself with, an analysis of knowledge here. Second, I've chosen to describe the traditional epistemic requirements as requirements on the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions rather than requirements on knowledge. Doing this has a cost and a benefit. The cost is that it's either confusing or cumbersome. It's initially confusing because it makes epistemology appear to be a study of knowledge ascriptions, which it is not. It is a study of knowledge. However, if the disquotational schema ["S knows that p," iff S knows that p] is true, then any knowledge ascription claim can be converted into a knowledge claim, and this would remove the confusion. But, constantly using the disquotational schema is cumbersome. The benefit of describing the traditional epistemic requirements in terms of knowledge ascriptions is that it makes contrasting Pragmatic Encroachment with nearby views, Contextualism in particular, much easier. This is because Contextualism is a semantic thesis that can only be expressed by talking about knowledge ascriptions-it doesn't make sense to talk about Contextualism's requirements on knowledge. But, Pragmatic Encroachment and Strict Invariantism can be characterized in terms of knowledge ascriptions, albeit awkwardly, with the help of the

Credences are similar to levels of confidence, represented as a value on the [0,1] interval. This chapter sheds light on questions about credence, including its relationship to full belief, with an eye toward the empirical relevance of credence. First, I'll provide a brief epistemological history of credence and lay out some of the main theories of the nature of credence. Then, I'll provide an overview of the main views on how credences relate to full beliefs. Finally, I'll turn to the empirical, and suggest some ways that cognitive science does and could answer questions about credence, such as what credences one has, how credences relate to beliefs, and the extent to which we can control our credences.

A scenario exists that is almost exclusively specific to university life. We are driven by the supposition that our work is focused on the most elevated epistemic goals— pursued not only by each of us individually, but also by society—and that our task is a cognitively collective enterprise that involves the mind and an infinite number of performances by other people. Further, we accept from the outset that the people with whom we live are, at least in principle, as epistemically competent as we are, capable of observing, thinking, and achieving epistemic performances with us. In most cases, we secure our jobs because of our skills and achievements. When we start working at university, our goals are public, and we have access to the same techniques and instruments, methodological resources, and sources of information. In other words, it is a necessary condition for us to live in the midst of epistemic peers. But the fact is that these people are not always in agreement with us, and we frequently find ourselves in situations in which somebody demands explanations from us, better reasons and justifications, proof, and arguments.

For this reason, our life at the university is marked by epistemic disagreements in practically all subjects. And the absence of such disagreements should cause us a certain amount of discomfort because it may mean that academic power is excessively concentrated in the hands of someone arrogant and oppressive.

The public intellectual shaped by a university is somebody prepared to converse, to dialogue. They are trained to recognize that there are disagreements, and that this recognition is not trivial. Recognizing that the person we disagree with is an epistemic peer (is, at least ideally, as able and competent as we are in producing good epistemic achievements) is the central pillar of epistemic cooperation and one of the principles of democracy. In daily life, this type of recognition is rarer: in day-to-day situations when we enter into a disagreement, we almost always assume that our divergence is only a matter of viewpoint and taste; at other times we assume that our interlocutor is an opponent and must be less capable and rational than we are. In these cases, we doubt the competence, taste, honesty, and reasonableness of our opponent. But in epistemic disagreements between virtuous epistemic agents, our challenger must be someone who has good reason to believe things that are different from the things we believe.

Interpersonalist theories of testimony have the theoretical virtue of giving room to the characteristic interpersonal features of testimonial exchange among persons. Nonetheless, it has been argued that they are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to accounting for the way in which testimonial beliefs may be epistemically justified. In this paper, we defend the epistemological credentials of interpersonalism, emphasizing that it is inseparable from the acceptance of non-evidential epistemic reasons to believe, which demands proper conceptual elaborations on the notions of epistemic reasons and of epistemic justification. We offer a proper reading of epistemic reason, and we defend non-purism on justification as the adequate way to conceive the epistemic proposal of interpersonalism on testimony, realizing that only this combination is capable of apprehending certain cases in which there seems to be no way to rule out the idea that the assurance offered by the testifier offers an epistemic reason to believe that it is not evidential.

Folk epistemology refers to a range of cognitive skills that involve epistemic concepts such as knowledge and truth. As human beings we are able to assess the truth of an utterance by another agent or whether an inference someone makes is valid. We can evaluate to what extent sources we acquire information from are reliable and whether new information we acquire should lead to belief revision. We consistently produce, in particular, epistemic evaluations. We can judge, for instance, that: "p is true", "it is probable that p", "A is justified in thinking that p", "B is trustworthy when she says that p", or "C is lying". Epistemology is the normative study of how such epistemic evaluations should be made. By contrast, the study of folk epistemology focuses on epistemic evaluations that people actually make and on the processes that produce them. It is a descriptive research project on the beliefs and intuitions people have about knowledge, truth, reasons and other epistemic notions, as well as a research project on the psychological and cognitive processes that sustain them. We use the term "folk epistemology" to specify that the scope of this notion is not just epistemology as traditionally understood by philosophers, but the epistemology that reflects how people make epistemic evaluations; the term "folk" also refers to an established tradition in psychology that investigates "naive" or "folk" theories that ground the cognition of specific domains: folk physics, for instance, as the cognition of physical objects, or folk psychology, as the cognitive ability to ascribe intentions, beliefs and desires to others. Research on folk epistemology, or folk epistemologies, spans the study of the form and content of epistemic evaluations, as well as their cognitive underpinnings.

To be a critical thinker is to base one's beliefs and actions on reasons. But the notions of 'reason' and 'rationality' are philosophically problematic. What is a reason? How do we tell that some consideration constitutes a reason for doing or believing something? By what criteria do we evaluate reasons? How are those criteria themselves evaluated? What is it for a belief or action to be justified? What is the relationship between justification and truth? These questions are epistemological questions; they are also relevant to critical thinking and its pedagogy. In this paper I argue (1) that critical thinking presupposes particular answers to contentious epistemological questions, i.e. that there is an epistemology underlying critical thinking; and (2) that these epistemological considerations are fundamental to an adequate understanding of critical thinking and should be explicitly treated in basic critical thinking courses. Epistemology is basic both to critical thinking and to its pedagogy.

Havstad (2022) argues that the argument from inductive risk for the claim that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in the internal stages of science is deductively valid. She also defends its premises and thus soundness. This is, as far as we are aware, the best reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk in the existing literature. However, there is a small flaw in this reconstruction of the argument from inductive risk which appears to render the argument invalid. This flaw is superficial, and a small amendment to it rescues the claim of validity.

The aim of the present contribution is to defend a specific version of moderate skeptical invariantism, which I call Practical Skeptical Invariantism (PSI). The view is a form of skepticism to the extent that it denies knowledge of many facts that we ordinarily think or claim to know. It is moderate to the extent that it is supposed to be compatible with a quite weak, nonradical form of skepticism. According to this view, the threshold on evidential support required for knowledge should be partially fixed by the practical circumstances of the subject: someone is in a position to know a proposition p only if she would be rational to act as if p even if the practical stakes on p were maximally high. I consider and address what I take to be the most pressing problem for the view, namely, that the view can’t avoid a collapse into a radical form of skepticism. Moreover, I propose a positive argument for this view. The argument relies on the claim that judgments in high stakes are generally more reliable than in low stakes.

The value-free ideal for science holds that values should not influence the core features of scientific reasoning. We defend the difference-to-inference model of value permeation, which holds that value-permeation in science is problematic when values make a difference to the inferences made about a hypothesis. This view of value permeation is superior to existing views, and suggests a corresponding maxim, namely that scientists should strive to eliminate differences to inference. This maxim is the basis of a novel value-free ideal for science.

I have argued for a kind of 'counterfactual scepticism': most counterfactuals ever uttered or thought in human history are false. I briefly rehearse my main arguments. Yet common sense recoils. Ordinary speakers judge most counterfactuals that they utter and think to be true. A common defence of such judgments regards counterfactuals as context-dependent: the proposition expressed by a given counterfactual can vary according to the context in which it is uttered. In normal contexts, the counterfactuals that we utter are typically true, the defence insists, while granting that there may be more rarefied contexts in which they are false. I give a taxonomy of such contextualist replies. One could be a contextualist about the counterfactual connective, about its antecedent, or about its consequent. I offer some general concerns about all these varieties of contextualism. I then focus especially on antecedent-contextualism, as I call it. I firstly raise some high-level objections to it. Then, I look at such a contextualist account due to Sandgren and Steele. I think it has many virtues, but also some problems. I conclude with some avenues for future research.

We constantly assess each other's epistemic positions. We attempt to distinguish valuable from worthless information, reliable from unreliable informants, etc. Without established social practices of epistemic evaluations we could not navigate the flood of information we are exposed to every day in order to perform essential selections of valiable information. Yet the way we epistemically evaluate each other, ascribe or deny knowledge, who we deem knowledgeable or ignorant, and whom we refer to as an expert or a layman also crucially shape our epistemic milieu and the structure of our society. Epistemic asymmetry often results in and reflects social asymmetry; higher epistemic appraisal often increases social standing. Also, epistemic evaluations such as knowledge ascriptions are commonly performed against the background of certain epistemic and non-epistemic (e.g., practical) concerns and interests. Consequently, epistemic and non-epistemic factors interact in guiding our epistemic practice. To advance our understanding of how they do so is not only a worthwhile project from an epistemological point of view but can be expected to have repercussions on decision making, in debates within political and social theory as well as within ethics, and help us understand and evaluate how we act and even how to act. Moreover, it might shed light on the perennial question of how theoretical and practical rationality relate to one another. A much-discussed question in recent debates on knowledge ascriptions is the question of whether-and if so, how-epistemic standards (standards of how much it takes to count as knowing or as a knower) are influenced by, and/or contextually vary with, non-epistemic factors such as stakes, interests, aims, etc., and whether this in turn affects the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions or only their assertibility (or sayability) conditions. This has been a main point of contention between contextualists, invariantists and relativists (of various brands) concerning knowledge acsriptions (cf.,

And finally to see if responses to Knowledge Attribution are due to protagonist projection, we asked: Strict Knowledge Attribution: In your personal opinion, which of the following sentences better describes Bob's situation? [Bob knows the bank will be open on Saturday./Bob thinks he knows the bank will be open on Saturday, but he doesn't actually know it will be open.] 1

Philosophers have recently argued, against a prevailing orthodoxy, that standards of knowledge partly depend on a subject's interests; the more is at stake for the subject, the less she is in a position to know. This view, which is dubbed "Pragmatic Encroachment" has historical and conceptual connections to arguments in philosophy of science against the received model of science as value free. I bring the two debates together. I argue that Pragmatic Encroachment and the model of value-laden science reinforce each other. Drawing on Douglas' argument about the indispensability of value judgments in science, and psychological evidence about people's inability to objectively reason about what they care about, I introduce a novel argument for Pragmatic Encroachment.

And finally to see if responses to Knowledge Attribution are due to protagonist projection, we asked: Strict Knowledge Attribution: In your personal opinion, which of the following sentences better describes Bob's situation? [Bob knows the bank will be open on Saturday./Bob thinks he knows the bank will be open on Saturday, but he doesn't actually know it will be open.] 1

According to intellectualism, what a person knows is solely a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Anti-intellectualism is the view that what a person knows is more than simply a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Jason Stanley (2005) argues that, in addition to "traditional factors," our ordinary practice of knowledge ascription is sensitive to the practical facts of a subject's situation. In this paper, we investigate this question empirically. Our results indicate that Stanley's assumptions about knowledge ascriptions do not reflect our ordinary practices in some paradigmatic cases. If our data generalize, then arguments for anti-intellectualism that rely on ordinary knowledge ascriptions fail: the case for anti-intellectualism cannot depend on our ordinary practices of knowledge ascription. Imagine that you and your friend Bill are hiking in the woods. You come across a rickety old bridge over a shallow, five-foot ravine. Bill ventures safely across. Do you know that the bridge is safe for you to cross given that it is safe to cross? Imagine that the bridge spans a one hundred-foot drop. Now do you know? Intellectualism implies that the answer to both questions must be the same. According to intellectualism, what a person knows is solely a function of the truth-conducive features of the person's situation. Anti-intellectualist views claim that what a person knows is more than simply a function of these truth-conducive features of her situation. Anti-intellectualism allows for the possibility that you know the bridge is safe when it spans a five-foot drop but not when it spans a one hundred-foot drop. Some anti-intellectualists have claimed that anti-intellectualism captures part of our ordinary practices of knowledge ascription. Recently, similar untested empirical claims made by * Authorship is equal. We would like to thank [OMITTED FOR BLIND REVIEW] for helpful comments on this paper.

In this paper I discuss three important, distinct phenomena. In my terminology, one is common knowledge of co-presence. Another is mutual recognition. I shall spend the most time on that. The third phenomenon is joint attention. As we shall see, common knowledge of co-presence is essential to mutual recognition; this, in turn, is essential to joint attention. 1

* I want to thank everyone who had faith in me and supported me during the process of writing this thesis-most importantly my family and people from the Department of Philosophy of the University of Tartu. I would also like to express my gratitude to people from the Department of Philosophy of the University of Konstanz, above all prof. Wolfgang Spohn whose supervision and guidance helped me make a significant leap forward.

©  Matt Weiner M    investigates knowledge through the semantics of the word ‘know’. Contextualists, relativists, and various kinds of invariantist posit dierent kinds of rules for the truth of sentences containing the word ‘know’; and much of the dispute among these three parties concerns which rules best capture our actual use of the word ‘know’. These parties share the presupposition that our use of the word ‘know’ will be best captured by some consistent semantics. I will argue that this presupposition is false. Our use of the word ‘know’ is best captured by a set of inference rules that I will call collectively the Knowledge Principles, and the Knowledge Principles are inconsistent. This is a radical thesis; it will require an elaborate argument to show that it is better to admit that ‘know’ lacks consistent semantics than to reject one of the Knowledge Principles. However, the thesis is radical only at the theoretical level; it does not call for a ra...

According to conciliatory views about the epistemology of disagreement, when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a proposition and fully disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes toward that proposition (and neither has independent reason to believe the other to be mistaken), each peer should always change his attitude toward that proposition to one that is closer to the attitudes of those peers with which there is disagreement. According to pure higher-order evidence views, higher-order evidence for a proposition always suffices to determine the proper rational response to disagreement about that proposition within a group of epistemic peers. Using an analogue of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, I shall argue that no conciliatory and pure higher-order evidence view about the epistemology of disagreement can provide a true and general answer to the question of what disagreeing epistemic peers should do after fully disclosing to each other the (first-order) reasons for their conflicting doxastic attitudes.

Collocations are recurrent combinations of words where one lexical item occurs near another lexical item with a frequency far greater than chance. Collocations can be used to study meaning. I argue that the collocational phrase 'really know,' in conjunction with some reasonable interpretive conclusions, provides us with evidence that the verb 'know' has an infallibilist sense. I make my case, first, by arguing that 'really' when part of the phrase 'really know' is best understood as synonymous with 'truly.' I then argue that there are two plausible interpretations of the function that 'really' plays in the phrase 'really know.' On the first interpretation, 'really' helps distinguish claims about genuine infallibilist knowing from loose talk about 'knowing.' On the second interpretation, 'really' is often used to disambiguate an infallibilist sense of 'know' from a fallibilist sense of 'know.' On either interpretation, there is an infallibilist sense of 'know.'

And finally to see if responses to Knowledge Attribution are due to protagonist projection, we asked: Strict Knowledge Attribution: In your personal opinion, which of the following sentences better describes Bob's situation? [Bob knows the bank will be open on Saturday./Bob thinks he knows the bank will be open on Saturday, but he doesn't actually know it will be open.] 1

The truth of skepticism would be depressing and impractical. Our beliefs would be groundless, we would know nothing (or almost nothing) about the world around us, and epistemic success would likely be impossible. But do these negative consequences have any bearing on the truth of skepticism? According to many scholars, they do not. The impractical consequences of skepticism are typically regarded as orthogonal to its truth. For this reason, pragmatic resolutions to skepticism are regularly dismissed. I will argue, however, that skepticism is implausible because it is impractical. In particular, skepticism is implausible because it goes against the point of epistemic evaluation.

Encroachment of bio-physical space
-- Territorial encroachment
-- Environmental encroachment
Encroachment of socio-political space
-- Group encroachment
-- Political encroachment
-- Legal and government encroachment
Encroachment of economic space
-- Encroachment of commercial space
-- Encroachment of profit-making
Military-industrial encroachment
-- Industrial encroachment
-- Military encroachment
-- Encroachment of technology
Encroachment of psycho-cultural space
-- Communication encroachment
-- Encroachment of knowledge space
-- Ideological encroachment
-- Encroachment of symbolic space
Encroachment of inter-personal space
-- Encroachment of behavioural space
-- Encroachment of personal space
-- Sexual encroachment
Temporal encroachment
Structural encroachment
-- Conceptual violence
-- Spiritual violence

This paper presents a new argument for the Principle of Indifference. This argument can be thought of in two ways: as a pragmatic argument, justifying the principle as needing to hold if one is to minimise worst-case expected loss, or as an epistemic argument, justifying the principle as needing to hold in order to minimise worst-case expected inaccuracy. The question arises as to which interpretation is preferable. I show that the epistemic argument contradicts Evidentialism and suggest that the relative plausibility of Evidentialism provides grounds to prefer the pragmatic interpretation. If this is right, it extends to a general preference for pragmatic arguments for the Principle of Indifference, and also to a general preference for pragmatic arguments for other norms of Bayesian epistemology. Keywords Principle of indifference • Bayesianism • Epistemic consequentialism • Accuracy Many Bayesians are committed to some version or other of the Principle of Indifference, which holds that in certain situations one's degrees of belief should be equivocal. Section 1 introduces three such versions in order of increasing strength. In Section 2, I develop a consequentialist argument for the strongest version. This can be thought of as motivating the principle in terms of its pragmatic consequences: if one is to minimise worst-case expected loss, then one should satisfy the Principle of Indifference. As I explain in Section 3, an analogous argument can be constructed

I present a straightforward objection to the view that what we know has epistemic probability 1: when combined with Bayesian decision theory, the view seems to entail implausible conclusions concerning rational choice. I consider and reject three responses. The first holds that the fault is with decision theory, rather than the view that knowledge has probability 1. The second two try to reconcile the claim that knowledge has probability 1 with decision theory by appealing to contextualism and sensitive invariantism, respectively. I argue that each response fails, and that we can hold on to much of what was attractive in the responses while denying that what we know has probability 1. For helpful comments and discussion, thanks to Alan Hájek, Agustin Rayo, Robert Stalnaker, Roger White, two anonymous referees for Oxford Studies in Epistemology as well as the editors thereof, and audiences at MIT and the ANU.

Recent literature features an increased interest in the sufficiency claim involved in the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-Suff). This paper looks at two prominent objections to KNA-Suff, due to Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, and argues that they miss their target due to value-theoretic inaccuracies. It is argued that (i) the intuitive need for more than knowledge in Brown's high-stakes contexts does not come from the epistemic norm governing assertion, but from further norms stepping in and raising the bar, and (ii) Lackey's purported qualitydriven case against KNA-Suff boils down to a quantitative objection. If that is the case, Lackey's argument will be vulnerable to the same objections as Brown's.

One of the most salient objections against paternalism is that it is motivated by a negative judgment about other people's capacity to advance their own goals and interests. Such a negative judgment, according to this objection, is morally wrong because it denies others the status of moral equals who can rationally set and pursue their own conception of the good. Despite the popularity of this objection, I argue that it misfires because rendering a negative judgment about others' capacities does not deny them equal moral status when there is sufficient evidence for that judgment. However, I argue that in order to determine if there is sufficient evidence of the agent's incapacity, we must understand the agent's reasons for action through a rational discursive exchange with them, instead of taking perceived facts about their behavior as sufficient grounds for a negative (or positive) judgment of their capacities. In fact, I argue that if the outcome of the discursive exchange supports a negative judgment of the agent's capacities, there is a pro tanto case in favor of paternalistic interference.

Pragmatic encroachment offers a picture of knowledge whereby knowledge is unstable. This paper argues that pragmatic encroachment is committed to more instability than has been hitherto noted. One surprising result of the arguments in this paper is that pragmatic encroachment is not merely about changes in stakes. All sorts of practical factors can make for the presence or absence of knowledge on this picture – stakes are just one factor among many that are knowledge-depriving. In this way, the focus in the literature on ‘stakes-sensitivity’ is misleading. Furthermore, insufficient attention has been paid to the variety of ways in which on this view pragmatic factors affect knowledge: pragmatic factors are not merely knowledge-depriving but are also knowledge-inducing.

On the Bayesian view, belief is not just a binary, on-off matter. Bayesians model agents not as simply categorically believing or disbelieving propositions, but rather as having degrees of confidence, or degrees of belief, or credences in those propositions. Rather than flat out believing that your Kimchi Jjigae will turn out splendidly, you might, for example, be 0.7 confident that it will turn out splendidly. Or you might have less precise opinions on the matter. You might be more confident than not that it will turn out splendidly. You might be at least 0.6 confident and at most 0.9 confident that it will turn out splendidly. You might have any number of more or less informative opinions, but nevertheless fall short of having a precise credence on the matter. In that case, we say that your credences are imprecise. Credences, whether precise or imprecise, play a number of important theoretical roles according to Bayesians. For example, a rational agent's credences determine expectations of measurable quantities-quantities like the size of the deficit 10 years hence, or the utility of an outcome-which capture her best estimates of those quantities. Those best estimates, in turn, typically rationalise or make sense of her evaluative attitudes and choice behaviour. Suppose that you are considering donating to charity. You have credences regarding the cost of bulk food, shipping, and other matters relevant for estimating how good different donation options are. Your credences, let's imagine, determine a higher expected utility for giving cash directly to the poor than for investing in infrastructure development. These expected utilities, on the Bayesian view, capture your best estimates of how much good each option would produce. And these best estimates, in turn, rationalise or make sense of your evaluative attitudes-your opinion that direct-giving is the better action, perhaps. Evaluative attitudes, in turn, rationalise choice behaviour. In the case at hand, your evaluative attitudes rationalise your choice to give cash directly to the poor rather than invest in infrastructure development. According to many Bayesians, e.g., Koopman (1940a, 1940b), Good (1950), de Finetti (1951), Savage (1954), and Joyce (2010), certain types of doxastic attitudes-opinions of the form "X is at least as likely as Y," known as comparative beliefs-play an especially important role in explicating the concept of credence. These explications typically involve an important bit of mathematics known as a representation theorem. The aim of this 267 brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

Impurism says that practical factors encroach on knowledge. An important version of impurism is called 'Threshold-Impurism,' which says that practical factors encroach on the threshold that rational credence must pass in order for one to have knowledge. A prominent kind of argument for Threshold-Impurism is the so-called 'principle-based argument,' which relies on a principle of fallibilism and a knowledge-action principle. This paper offers a new challenge against Threshold-Impurism. I attempt to show that the two principles Threshold-Impurists are committed to-KJ and Fallibilism-are jointly in tension with a widely-held principle of credence that's called 'Truth-Directedness,' in the sense that the former two principles cannot both apply to those who know the third. This tension constitutes a serious challenge to Threshold-Impurists, because it leaves them two options, both of which are undesirable: denying Truth-Directedness, or accepting Truth-Directedness and accepting that whether KJ and Fallibilism apply to a person depends on whether she knows Truth-Directedness.

And finally to see if responses to Knowledge Attribution are due to protagonist projection, we asked: Strict Knowledge Attribution: In your personal opinion, which of the following sentences better describes Bob's situation? [Bob knows the bank will be open on Saturday./Bob thinks he knows the bank will be open on Saturday, but he doesn't actually know it will be open.] 1

My aim in this paper is to give a philosophical analysis of the relationship between contingently available technology and the knowledge that it makes possible. My concern is with what specific subjects can know in practice, given their particular conditions, especially available technology, rather than what can be known "in principle" by a hypothetical entity like Laplace's Demon. The argument has two parts. In the first, I'll construct a novel account of epistemic possibility that incorporates two pragmatic conditions: responsibility and practicability. For example, whether subjects can gain knowledge depends in some circumstances on whether they have the capability of gathering relevant evidence. In turn, the possibility of undertaking such investigative activities depends in part on factors like ethical constraints, economical realities, and available technology. In the second part of the paper, I'll introduce "technological possibility" to analyze the set of actions made possible by available technology. To help motivate the problem and later test my proposal, I'll focus on a specific historical case, one of the earliest uses of digital electronic computers in a scientific investigation. I conclude that the epistemic possibility of gaining access to scientific knowledge about certain subjects depends (in some cases) on the technological possibility for making responsible investigations.

The present paper argues that there is a knowledge norm for conversational implicature: one may conversationally implicate p only if one knows p. Linguistic data about the cancellation behavior of implicatures and the ways they are challenged and criticized by speakers is presented to support the thesis. The knowledge norm for implicature is then used to present a new consideration in favor of the KK thesis. It is argued that if implicature and assertion have knowledge norms, then assertion requires not only knowledge but iterated knowledge: knowing that you know that you know that . . . you know. Such a condition on permissible assertion is argued to be plausible only if the KK thesis is true.

Draft-feel free to quote but please check to see if there are changes in a (hopefully) published version.] You've been battling a drinking problem, and-in the last few months-successfully. At a departmental reception, you show strength of will and again drink nothing, but a colleague accidentally spills some wine on your sleeve. When you're back home, your partner-smelling the alcohol-believes you're drinking again. Naturally, you are offended: Not necessarily by something your partner does or says, or will do, or is even disposed to do, but by their belief about you, it's their belief that hurts you, that you may resent, that you may be expecting an apology for .

A common objection to both contextualism and relativism about knowledge ascriptions is that they threaten knowledge norms of assertion and action. Consequently, if there is good reason to accept knowledge norms of assertion or action, there is good reason to reject both contextualism and relativism. In this paper we argue that neither contextualism nor relativism threaten knowledge norms of assertion or action.

Can you rationally double-check what you already know? In this paper, I argue that you can. Agents can know that something is true and rationally double-check it at the very same time. I defend my position by considering a wide variety of cases where agents double-check their beliefs to gain epistemic improvements beyond knowledge. These include certainty, epistemic resilience, and sensitivity to error. Although this phenomenon is widespread, my proposal faces two types of challenges. First, some have defended ignorance norms, on which agents are only allowed to inquire about things they don't already know. Second – motivated by strong conceptions of belief or pragmatic encroachment – some have argued that double-checking destroys knowledge. I argue that these competing views fail to capture both the epistemic value of double-checking and the many reasons why agents might double-check. Moreover, they rely on overly strong assumptions about what inquiry, knowledge, or belief requ...