Practical Wisdom

Medical ethics has recently seen a drive away from multiple prescriptive approaches, where physicians are inundated with guidelines and principles, towards alternative, less deontological perspectives. This represents a clear call for theory building that does not produce more guidelines. Phronesis (practical wisdom) offers an alternative approach for ethical decision-making based on an application of accumulated wisdom gained through previous practice dilemmas and decisions experienced by practitioners. Phronesis, sometimes referred to as the 'executive virtue', offers a way to navigate the practice virtues for any given case to reach a nal decision on the way forward. However, very limited empirical data exist to support the theory of phronesis -based medical decision-making, and what does exist tends to focus on individual practitioners rather than practice-based communities of physicians. The primary research question was: What does it mean to medical practitioners to make ethically wise decisions for patients and their communities? A three-year ethnographic study explored the practical wisdom of doctors (n=131) and used their narratives to develop theoretical understanding of the concepts of ethical decisionmaking. Data collection included narrative interviews and observations with hospital doctors and General Practitioners at all stages in career progression. The analysis draws on neo-Aristotelian and MacIntyrean concepts of practice-based virtue ethics and was supported by an arts-based lm production process. We found that individually doctors conveyed many different practice virtues and those were consolidated into fteen virtue continua that convey the participants' collective practical wisdom, including the phronesis virtue. This study advances the existing theory on phronesis as a decision-making approach because only now a theoretical 'collective practical wisdom' exists. Given the arguments that doctors feel professionally and personally vulnerable in the context of ethical decisionmaking, our contribution in the form of a moral debating resource can support before, during and after decisionmaking re ection. The potential implications are that these theoretical ndings can be used by educators and practitioners as a non-prescriptive alternative to improve ethical decision-making, thereby addressing the call in the literature, and bene t patients and their communities, as well.

It has been argued that phronesis (practical wisdom) has been reduced to following guidelines or a sequential algorithm and there is a call from medical practice to be provided with the means to apply phronesis to their decision-making without yet another set of guidelines. The concept of the phronesis virtue offers a way to navigate the complexity of any given situation through the 'rough ground' by drawing on acquired wisdom from self and a practice peer group to make good and wise decisions for the people served by the practice. Our research that informs the work to date involved collecting narratives of doctors' lived experiences that transmit their 'collective practical wisdom' of what it means to make ethical decisions. This second paper provides evidence that phronesis can be cultivated within medical practice by using that 'collective practical wisdom' in the form of a lm series and app as a unique contemporary moral debating resource. Here we summarise the outcomes and impact of a twelvemonth evaluation of the application of those resources to medical and other healthcare practices. Data collected answered two primary questions:

Phronesis (practical wisdom) as a concept is known as the executive virtuea crucial chair role type decision adjudication skill in medical practice, leadership and many other practice roles. Aristotle and MacIntyre, the two most quoted virtue ethicists, argued that developing phronesis as part of practical experience for an individual or peer practice group, can also be part of an educational programme. In fact MacIntyre suggests that we are living in a time after virtue (globally) and there is a need to bring virtuous practice (for all professions and governments) back from the abyssan abyss that is evidenced by the number of recent and historic practice scandals in e.g. acute care, maternity care, social care, banking, cricket. Given such scandals seem to have rocked arguably trustworthy practices as well as many others a question arises: What are we missing in the education of the professionals involved? MacIntyre's call was clear; he said what was lacking across the board are moral debating resources in professional education that allow virtuous practices to be debated and enacted in their decision making. So how do we create a moral debating resource for medical leadership and clinical practice that allows the cultivation of the phronesis virtue in particular? The call from the medical ethics literature is to carry out empirical research into medical practice and ethical decision making. Until now empirical work with clinicians or other professions for that matter has been very limited in this area. This three year Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) funded research project addresses this gap by asking the question 'What does phronesis mean to the medical community?' The research contribution includes a set of fifteen virtues including phronesis and a video series showing a Consultant and GP enacting the virtues gleaned from the participants' stories. The stories include what the participants consider to be both wise and unwise decisions and cover the full decision range for each virtue. So we argue that we have encapsulated the current practical wisdom of 131 participants from the medical community in our research findings. Thus we further argue this initial set of fifteen virtues offers a moral debating resource in the form of the video series and tutor notes for the professional education of doctors internationally and an approach that can also be used in other professions. This theoretical debating resource enables medical schools and CPD programmes to engage their participants in debate about ethical decision making and in a form that can be built on in the context of medical practice (and with other related professions for that matter e.g. nursing, social work and police) So this study is of international interest as it makes a contribution to global medical ethics and has the potential to support ethical decision making in all interrelated health care practices as well as practices outside the health care sector. searching (where available). We also identified and searched by key authors and carried out citation searches to track papers which have cited relevant references. We used an empirical , narrative approach to synthesise evidence of where phronesis can inform medicine and health care. Leading on from the philosophical discussion regarding how society in general and the medical profession in particular may, or may not, engage more fully with phronesis (see Kristjánsson 2015; see also Paton et al , 2107), we turn to consider one of the first requirements needed for this project: a review of the literature in the field. This was undertaken in order that the research team could gain an in-depth understanding of some of the key theoretical and current debates in the field of phronesis, as applied to medical education. Accordingly, an in-depth review of the research literature in this field relevant to the topic of phronesis was undertaken. We determined to carefully explore the main theoretical and current debates around phronesis in the medical profession. Although there is much discussion about the role of phronesis or practical wisdom in healthcare, and how it is considered to inform clinicians' duty of care, the exact nature of how phronesis supports this process is less clear. We found this somewhat surprising. With the focus on the field of medicine and healthcare, we were interested in learning how we might examine the ethical aspects of 'wise' or good decision-making in healthcare and medical leadership. Our main research question, therefore, was an exploration of what current research and philosophy might tell us about when, and how, phronesis might be incorporated into healthcare delivery if it was to have a more active role in influencing this area. For example, could phronesis offer something that might further inform and support development of a larger role for compassion -for instance, to improve patient care and experience Some of the philosophical context of phronesis is considered in relation to healthcare before moving on to discuss some of our findings. This is presented as a narrative synthesis of current research literature on the topic of phronesis.

BackgroundMedical ethics has recently seen a drive away from multiple prescriptive approaches, where physicians are inundated with guidelines and principles, towards alternative, less deontological perspectives. This represents a clear call for theory building that does not produce more guidelines.Phronesis(practical wisdom) offers an alternative approach for ethical decision-making based on an application of accumulated wisdom gained through previous practice dilemmas and decisions experienced by practitioners.Phronesis,as an ‘executive virtue’, offers a way to navigate the practice virtues for any given case to reach a final decision on the way forward. However, very limited empirical data exist to support the theory ofphronesis-based medical decision-making, and what does exist tends to focus on individual practitioners rather than practice-based communities of physicians.MethodsThe primary research question was: What does it mean to medical practitioners to make ethically wise d...

A educação ambiental é um processo que visa construir conhecimentos socioambientais por meio do diálogo de saberes o que permite a discussão e a reflexão para a busca de melhorias e prática cidadãs para a sustentabilidade. Assim, as redes oportunizam o intercâmbio de informações, participação interativa, intermediação, relacionamento entre os integrantes da rede. Esse artigo apresenta a dinâmica da Rede de Educação Ambiental do Paraná (REA-PR), como uma ação extensionista em desenvolvimento e tem como objetivo fortalecer a REA-PR para melhor articulação entre indivíduos e instituições, a fim de somar esforços para se construir elos representativos de todos segmentos da sociedade, criando sinergia e diálogo de saberes entre os atores envolvidos em ações, programas e projetos de Educação Ambiental. Com uma metodologia participativa, os resultados alcançados refletem o fortalecimento da rede por meio de ferramentas informacionais virtuais que contribuíram no mapeamento das atividades dos pólos regionais, incentivando a participação mais efetiva.

There has been much discussion about the overmedicalization of human experience and the problems incurred by overzealous action-oriented medical care. In this paper we describe the Aristotelean virtue of phronesis, or practical wisdom, and discuss how it can be developed by interested clinicians. We argue that becoming a phronimos requires conscious attention to one's practice by using feedback to continually improve. But there must also be judicious adherence to clinical practice guidelines and advocacy for people-as-patients at individual, community, and national levels. (

This article presents the results of a rigorous critical interpretive review that maps the current literature on phronesis in medicine. The literature in this area involves varied disciplines, centuries, and conceptions and is extensive, but through a focused review, this study seeks to clarify definitions and key distinctions. It thereby aims to elucidate a depth of meaning and understanding regarding phronesis in medicine to inform future work on the topic. Specifically, 12 themes are inductively identified and analyzed from the literature, and organized into three chronological categories of past, present, and future. A narrative summation of the literature to date is then offered, assessing the varied conceptual applications of phronesis to medical practice, the emerging literature on its applicability to organizations, prospects for empirical work on the concept, and its application in medical education.

Orientation: Success is a common goal in both personal and professional life, and wise leadership is key to achieving it. Effective leadership guides and motivates teams, driving them toward success and excellence. Research purpose: This study examines wise leadership in Oman's government sector, using Hassi and Storti's theoretical frameworks. It explores dimensions such as Intellectual Shrewdness, Spurring Action, Moral Conduct, and Cultivating Humility to improve employee awareness and perception. Motivation for the study: To assess wise leadership qualities across different dimensions and demographic groups to identify strengths and areas for improvement in leadership practices. Research approach/design and method: A descriptive method was employed, and a questionnaire was used as a data gathering tool. The data were analysed by several techniques including T-tests, ANOVA and descriptive statistics. Data were anonymously collected from 300 respondents across the Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Information and Taxation Authority, representing diverse demographic profiles and organisational ranks. Main findings: The findings highlight that practical wisdom is vital for organisational resilience, effective communication, and societal well-being in complex governance. While there is broad agreement on key leadership traits, minor discrepancies suggest challenges in applying theoretical ideals, especially concerning vulnerability and humility. Practical/managerial implications: Providing a detailed look at employees' views on wise leadership and the impact of personal characteristics on these perceptions. Contribution/value-add: Provides a comprehensive view of employees' perceptions of wise leadership and how personal characteristics influence these perceptions.

One of the scholars who studied Safavid pathology during the Safavid dynasty, while holding the highest religious position in the government, is Mullah Mohammad Baqir Sabzevari, well-known as Mohaqeq Sabzevari. In his book Rozatol-Alnwar Al-abbasi, written at the request of Shah Abbas II, in addition to providing guidelines for ruling the government and principles for statecraft, he tried to describe the harms that the Safavids suffered. This study seeks to answer this question: from the perspective of Sabzevari in the book Rozatol-Alnwar Al-abbasi, what social harms did Safavid suffer from? Therefore, using a descriptive-analytical method and collecting datasets by library searching, the following findings have been reached: Sabzevari's religious pathology of Safaviya, according to the type of damage mentioned by him, is classified in five fields: pathology of religion, religious knowledge, religious society, religiosity and religious institutions. Sabzevari has been working as a social reformer to improve the livelihood and resurrection of the people, the reformist idea in Rozatol-Alnwar Al-abbasi is based on the practical wisdom of Islam and It shows a justice-oriented and compassionate approach to the general public. Rozatol-Alnwar Al-abbasi should also be mentioned as a text in order to formulate and realize the model of faithful politics, which, based on Islamic beliefs, judgments and ethics, offers a method of ordering good and forbiding bad, at a time when social reform is possible only through accompanying kings. In this book, he has stated his meaning in many cases with ironic expression, and in some cases, he has directly described the harms Sabzevari considers three factors to be involved in order to fix the mentioned damages and preserve and survive the government, which arise from the specific foundations of his political thought: 1- Inner factor: improving the ruler's inner (spiritual) relationship with God 2- External factor: improving the relationship of the ruler with the people and Statesmen in observing the principles of statecraft 3- External and internal factors: justice and peace with the people and fight against oppression and oppressors.

Phronesis (practical wisdom) as a concept is known as the executive virtuea crucial chair role type decision adjudication skill in medical practice, leadership and many other practice roles. Aristotle and MacIntyre, the two most quoted virtue ethicists, argued that developing phronesis as part of practical experience for an individual or peer practice group, can also be part of an educational programme. In fact MacIntyre suggests that we are living in a time after virtue (globally) and there is a need to bring virtuous practice (for all professions and governments) back from the abyssan abyss that is evidenced by the number of recent and historic practice scandals in e.g. acute care, maternity care, social care, banking, cricket. Given such scandals seem to have rocked arguably trustworthy practices as well as many others a question arises: What are we missing in the education of the professionals involved? MacIntyre's call was clear; he said what was lacking across the board are moral debating resources in professional education that allow virtuous practices to be debated and enacted in their decision making. So how do we create a moral debating resource for medical leadership and clinical practice that allows the cultivation of the phronesis virtue in particular? The call from the medical ethics literature is to carry out empirical research into medical practice and ethical decision making. Until now empirical work with clinicians or other professions for that matter has been very limited in this area. This three year Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) funded research project addresses this gap by asking the question 'What does phronesis mean to the medical community?' The research contribution includes a set of fifteen virtues including phronesis and a video series showing a Consultant and GP enacting the virtues gleaned from the participants' stories. The stories include what the participants consider to be both wise and unwise decisions and cover the full decision range for each virtue. So we argue that we have encapsulated the current practical wisdom of 131 participants from the medical community in our research findings. Thus we further argue this initial set of fifteen virtues offers a moral debating resource in the form of the video series and tutor notes for the professional education of doctors internationally and an approach that can also be used in other professions. This theoretical debating resource enables medical schools and CPD programmes to engage their participants in debate about ethical decision making and in a form that can be built on in the context of medical practice (and with other related professions for that matter e.g. nursing, social work and police) So this study is of international interest as it makes a contribution to global medical ethics and has the potential to support ethical decision making in all interrelated health care practices as well as practices outside the health care sector. searching (where available). We also identified and searched by key authors and carried out citation searches to track papers which have cited relevant references. We used an empirical , narrative approach to synthesise evidence of where phronesis can inform medicine and health care. Leading on from the philosophical discussion regarding how society in general and the medical profession in particular may, or may not, engage more fully with phronesis (see Kristjánsson 2015; see also Paton et al , 2107), we turn to consider one of the first requirements needed for this project: a review of the literature in the field. This was undertaken in order that the research team could gain an in-depth understanding of some of the key theoretical and current debates in the field of phronesis, as applied to medical education. Accordingly, an in-depth review of the research literature in this field relevant to the topic of phronesis was undertaken. We determined to carefully explore the main theoretical and current debates around phronesis in the medical profession. Although there is much discussion about the role of phronesis or practical wisdom in healthcare, and how it is considered to inform clinicians' duty of care, the exact nature of how phronesis supports this process is less clear. We found this somewhat surprising. With the focus on the field of medicine and healthcare, we were interested in learning how we might examine the ethical aspects of 'wise' or good decision-making in healthcare and medical leadership. Our main research question, therefore, was an exploration of what current research and philosophy might tell us about when, and how, phronesis might be incorporated into healthcare delivery if it was to have a more active role in influencing this area. For example, could phronesis offer something that might further inform and support development of a larger role for compassion -for instance, to improve patient care and experience Some of the philosophical context of phronesis is considered in relation to healthcare before moving on to discuss some of our findings. This is presented as a narrative synthesis of current research literature on the topic of phronesis.

BackgroundMedical ethics has recently seen a drive away from multiple prescriptive approaches, where physicians are inundated with guidelines and principles, towards alternative, less deontological perspectives. This represents a clear call for theory building that does not produce more guidelines.Phronesis(practical wisdom) offers an alternative approach for ethical decision-making based on an application of accumulated wisdom gained through previous practice dilemmas and decisions experienced by practitioners.Phronesis,as an ‘executive virtue’, offers a way to navigate the practice virtues for any given case to reach a final decision on the way forward. However, very limited empirical data exist to support the theory ofphronesis-based medical decision-making, and what does exist tends to focus on individual practitioners rather than practice-based communities of physicians.MethodsThe primary research question was: What does it mean to medical practitioners to make ethically wise d...

Using big data in organizations has the potential to improve innovation, accuracy, and efficiency. Big data is also connected with risks for both the organization and society at large. It is therefore important to improve our understanding of potential consequences of implementing and using big data. We studied the Swedish Transport Administration to understand their attitude towards implementing big data for prediction of, for example, the need for road maintenance. The analysis identified four moral dilemmas that the organization deals with in connection to big data. We discuss these dilemmas from the perspective of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is manifested in contextdependent actions connected to open-mindedness, reflection and judgment. It can be summed up as "the reasonable thing to do" in a unique situation where "not-knowing" is a helpful resource when making wise decisions. This paper seeks to shed light on the importance of practical wisdom when implementing big data.

Using big data in organizations has the potential to improve innovation, accuracy, and efficiency. Big data is also connected with risks for both the organization and society at large. It is therefore important to improve our understanding of potential consequences of implementing and using big data. We studied the Swedish Transport Administration to understand their attitude towards implementing big data for prediction of, for example, the need for road maintenance. The analysis identified four moral dilemmas that the organization deals with in connection to big data. We discuss these dilemmas from the perspective of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is manifested in contextdependent actions connected to open-mindedness, reflection and judgment. It can be summed up as "the reasonable thing to do" in a unique situation where "not-knowing" is a helpful resource when making wise decisions. This paper seeks to shed light on the importance of practical wisdom when implementing big data.

Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the special issue on practical wisdom for management from the Islamic traditions. Design/methodology/approach -The guest editorial introduces the papers in this special issue, focusing on practical wisdom for management from the Islamic tradition. Findings -Using multiple levels of analysis as well as both academic and practitioner-oriented perspectives, this special issue demonstrates that the Islamic tradition offers valuable practical wisdom insights in multiple areas including leadership, human resource management, action learning, knowledge transfer and business ethics. Originality/value -This issue represents the first exploratory contribution to the research on practical wisdom from the Islamic tradition, opening a new focus of research and contributing to management development.

Controlled human infection studies (CHIs) involve the intentional infection of human subjects for a scientific aim. Though some past challenge trials have involved serious ethical abuses, in the last few decades, CHIs have had a strong track record of safety. Despite increased attention to the ethics of CHIs during the COVID-19 pandemic, CHIs remain controversial, and there has been no in-depth treatment of CHIs through the lens of virtue ethics. In this article, we argue that virtue theory can be helpful for addressing CHIs that present a constellation of controversial, unresolved, and/or under-regulated ethical issues. We begin with some brief background on virtue ethics. We then substantiate our claim that some CHIs raise a constellation of ethical issues that are unresolved in the ethics literature and/or lack adequate regulatory guidance by demonstrating that CHIs can present indeterminate social value, risks to third parties, limitations on the right to withdraw from research, and questions about the upper limit of allowable risk. We argue that the presence of a virtuous investigator, with virtues such as prudence, compassion, and integrity, is especially important when these unresolved research ethics issues arise, which is the case for certain types of controlled human infection studies. We use the historical example of Walter Reed and the Yellow Fever Commission to illustrate this claim, and we also highlight some contemporary examples. We end by sketching some practical implications of our view, such as ensuring that investigators with experience running CHIs are involved in novel CHI models.

The topic of humanity and human life has been a central concern in the philosophical thought of Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ (the Brethren of Purity). The question this article addresses is whether their anthropological teachings can be reformulated within the framework of modern strategy development, a contemporary practical science. If such a reformulation is possible, the philosophy and theology of Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ on the subject of anthropology could be transformed into practical wisdom and theology. This article seeks to resolve this issue by examining the works of this group of sages, as well as relevant secondary literature. The primary findings are as follows: the mission of humanity, according to Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, is to become an actual angel and attain the status of God’s vicegerent. They emphasize one of humanity’s key weaknesses—physicality. However, they also highlight significant strengths, such as the soul, and describe humanity as a microcosm. Accordingly, the opportunities and threats before humans range from ascending to the rank of angels to descending to the level of animals. The goal of human life is to attain happiness in both this world and the hereafter. They identify key strategies for pursuing happiness, including perseverance on the path, maintaining purity of the self, and seeking guidance from a teacher. Additionally, one of a person’s essential duties is to continually assess their own conditions and habits. Thus, it can be argued that Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ formulated a strategic plan for human life, even if they did not explicitly define the terminology and components of this new field of knowledge.

Three decades of neoliberal efficiency thinking about caring and care systems have resulted in a greater need for relationality in healthcare and social work than ever before. These support services extend beyond the giving of care and support to include the development of relationships between caregivers and their care recipients in their socio-institutional contexts. The culmination of over 30 years of research, this book provides an extensive and critical introduction to relational working in care, education and welfare. It explains what relational work is and proposes a new, human-orientated theory beyond the simple needs provision model. Demonstrating the kind of professionalism required for such work, it explores why it is as important to be present with and for people, especially those in precarious conditions, as it is to give care. This is essential reading for researchers, educators, quality officers, policy makers, students and practitioners interested in understanding the growing scholarship related to both care theory and presence theory.

O campo da educação ambiental percorreu, nas últimas décadas, diferentes caminhos, visualizou múltiplos cenários e consolidou um conjunto de ações e projetos educativos que evidenciam a complexidade presente em seu interior. No entanto, como todo espaço de saber e prática social, tem sido influenciado por uma diversidade de fatores, que em alguns casos o potencializaram e, em outros, lhe impuseram um prolongado estado de letargia. Hoje em dia, diante do reconhecimento quase unânime em nível mundial, regional e nacional de que os problemas ambientais seguem seu curso e, em alguns casos, muitos deles se agravaram, torna-se imprescindível voltar a questionar os fundamentos, leituras e visões sobre os quais a educação ambiental tem sido pensada e praticada nos diversos âmbitos e níveis em que se faz presente. Este trabalho pretende ser mais um ponto de resistência nessa persistente busca por novas abordagens, explicações e respostas para os problemas ambientais que enfrentamos, com o objetivo de construir outras possibilidades de futuro no contexto socioambiental. Ao longo do livro delineiam-se, por meio das palavras de educadores ambientais do México, Canadá e Espanha, um conjunto de análises, reflexões, olhares, perspectivas, dúvidas, nostalgias e alegrias sobre o que tem sido o processo de construção do campo da Educação Ambiental. Destacam-se alguns de seus aspectos mais relevantes, mas sem ocultar suas marcadas inconsistências, que têm dificultado sua consolidação como um campo de saber voltado à constituição de processos educativos críticos, participativos, democráticos e reflexivos.

Mulla Sadra considers the speaking soul to have perceptive and executive functions. The human soul can make the right choice in the path of thought to action with the presence of practical reason during conflicts that may arise between the speaking power and other powers of the soul. This research intends to explain the choice in Mulla Sadra's works with a descriptive and analytical method; a choice that is only sometimes rational. To explain the truth of rational choice, Sadra pays attention to the roles that practical reason can play in the process of optional action.

According to him, practical reason overcomes illusion and reflects on imaginary perceptions, sometimes it does not confirm them as useful; By standing against some animal passions (lust and anger), it prevents their aggravation; He carries out the minor matters that he himself has decreed to be permissible, good and beautiful, with resolute determination. All the way through an optional verb, the ego is continuously choosing. By fully fulfilling these roles, practical reason realizes a rational and good choice, and on the contrary, with the absence of practical reason, a bad and inhuman practical choice will definitely be formed. Human action is human only when the scientific part of the soul reaches a scientific and rational understanding and combines this understanding with a decisive determination that is achieved in the area of the practical part in the light of practical rationality.

The aim of Dimitris Vardoulakis’s paper, ‘Toward a Critique of the Ineffectual: Heidegger’s Reading of Aristotle and the Construction of an Action without Ends’, is to provide the foundation for a critique of aimless action by tracing its genesis to Heidegger’s putative misinterpretation of Aristotelian phronēsis (practical wisdom) in the 1920s. Inasmuch as ‘the ineffectual’—the name Vardoulakis gives to action devoid of ends—plays a crucial role in post-Heideggerian continental philosophy, he thereby seeks to diagnose and to provide an aetiology of an illness afflicting contemporary thought.1 In my response, I will first argue that, while Vardoulakis is right to identify an emphasis on the ineffectual in Heidegger, he is mistaken about its origin. Heidegger does not strip phronēsis of instrumentality, nor does he mistranslate Nichomachean Ethics 1139a31–32. Second, I trace an alternative source for the ineffectual, which is not simply a negative alternative to technological machination but stems from a positive experience of what Meister Eckhart, and Heidegger in his wake, called life without why. Finally, I look at a couple of texts, including one discussed by Vardoulakis, in which even the later Heidegger is not entirely dismissive of calculative instrumentality but instead assigns the latter to a secondary, restricted site of competence.

Future values and wisdom in a generational sense is a challenging topic to wrestle with at an international conference, especially one which focuses on action in the present. Session Two at the 2005 WFSF World Conference in Budapest was titled 'Counting on Each Other', represented through the papers presented here and the group's discussion related by the author. The papers were grouped into four areas-Futures Studies and Methods; Values; Sustainable Development; and Rights and Ethics. After reading the issues which were raised, and the conclusions that were reached, the reader should appreciate the complexity of the topic. In particular, the difficulties faced by a group of people who wished to explore this topic, its related images of the future and the actions generated for the present is a microcosm of the difficulties faced in the wider world when trying to deal with these issues for the future.

Future values and wisdom in a generational sense is a challenging topic to wrestle with at an international conference, especially one which focuses on action in the present. Session Two at the 2005 WFSF World Conference in Budapest was titled 'Counting on Each Other', represented through the papers presented here and the group's discussion related by the author. The papers were grouped into four areas-Futures Studies and Methods; Values; Sustainable Development; and Rights and Ethics. After reading the issues which were raised, and the conclusions that were reached, the reader should appreciate the complexity of the topic. In particular, the difficulties faced by a group of people who wished to explore this topic, its related images of the future and the actions generated for the present is a microcosm of the difficulties faced in the wider world when trying to deal with these issues for the future.

This paper argues for an explicit acknowledgement of the link between wisdom and learning in management education. Contending that an intellectual understanding of wisdom alone is inadequate, we adopt a phenomenological perspective and present reasons for the teaching of embodied wisdom in management education. In particular, we discuss the role of embodied, transformative learning with an emphasis on the critical role of habits for cultivating wisdom. Approaches to learning practical wisdom in management education are discussed with a focus on the role of improvisation.

1. پرسش سقراطی
سقراط در مقابل افلاطون. این عنوان جویای پرسش سقراطی است. بیشتر شناخت ما از سقراط ناشی از گفت‌وگوهای افلاطون است. با این حال افلاطون برای بیان نظرات خود از زبان سقراط بهره گرفته است. پس چگونه می‌توانیم سقراط تاریخی را از ملغمه‌ی سقراط و افلاطون بازشناسیم که در کتاب‌ها می‌یابیم؟
پاسخ‌های ارائه‌شده به این پرسش سقراطی طیف وسیعی را دربر می‌گیرد. در سر طیف، بازنمایی افلاطون از سقراط کم‌و‌بیش ارزش اسمی دارد: سقراط تا پایان زندگی‌اش اصول فلسفه افلاطونی را تکامل بخشید (شاید تحت تأثیر خود افلاطون) و افلاطون فقط فلسفه‌ی سقراطی/افلاطونی را در قالبی توسعه یافته‌‌تر و جزمی‌تر شکل داد. سوی دیگر طیف، سقراط همیشه پرسشگر شکاکی بود و تنها پس از مرگ سقراط بود که افلاطون یک نظام فلسفی کاملاً جدید را ایجاد کرد و آن را از روی تواضع از زبان سقراط بیان کرد.
با این حال، ما در اینجا به دکترین فلسفی نمی‌پردازیم، بلکه به روش می‌پردازیم. و تردیدی نیست که رویکرد سقراطی به کندوکاو فلسفی با رویکرد افلاطونی بسیار متفاوت بود. تقابل رایج بین «روش سقراطی» و رویکرد «آکادمیک» (با همین نام افلاطون آکادمی را تأسیس کرد) کاملاً مبتنی بر واقعیت تاریخی است. شرحی که از تفاوت‌های اصلی بین این دو رویکرد خواهم گفت، شامل مقداری اغراق و کاریکاتور خواهد بود؛ اما به روشن شدن تقابل بین دو موضع افراطی کمک خواهد کرد که هر دو در طول تاریخ آموزشی طرفداران خود را داشته اند. اما ابتدا پیشینه‌ای از سقراط و افلاطون ارائه می‌دهیم.

The approach of vocational Bildung didactics has been developed to investigate practical knowledge in matters of education for Bildung and phronesis (practical wisdom). Case narratives of unusual richness or success are at the core of the approach, each case representing an articulation of someone's practical knowledge. The concept of a practice as developed by MacIntyre is introduced here as a way of situating the practical knowledge of Bildung and phronesis gained from case narratives. A series of case studies are discussed to examine the practices that surfaced. The result is a differentiation of MacIntyre's concept in two directions: one more specific called vocational practice and one more general called a cultural practice. This differentiation is then applied to the case studies and it is argued that it helps illuminate aspects of them that previously were difficult to comprehend within the framework of vocational Bildung didactics. The conclusion is that biographical cases where cultural and vocational practices intersect are uniquely positioned to afford knowledge of how such intersections have been achieved through education and what they have meant for the person initiated into such matrixes. This, in turn, contributes to the insight with which we are able to design vocational education and training curricula that support initiation into dynamic vocational practices with a focus on the goods and virtues possible to develop through them.

This paper argues, from a critical realist perspective, that it would be beneficial to extend thinking on how personal and social education could become more central to students learning. We explore how constructive-informed arrangements which emphasise cognitive skills and affective qualities could be realised through experiential learning. Our theorizing is informed by neo-Aristotelian and Deweyian thinking on the importance of identifying mutually acceptable value commitments which can cultivate practical wisdom as well as generally benefit society. Thereafter, we outline how the recent writings of Tiberius could inform thinking on how, epistemologically and ethically, a first person perspective on learning and personal growth could connect with normative decision-making on how to make good life choices. We conclude by briefly highlighting the methodological potential of using outdoor learning environments to help students make informed and wise judgements which show evidence of discernment, deliberation and effective decision-making.

Département d'études cognitives, École normale supérieure Institut universitaire de France Conventional wisdom holds two seemingly opposed beliefs. One is that groups are often much better than individuals at dealing with certain situations or solving certain problems. The other is that groups are usually, and some say always, at best as intelligent as their average member and at worst even less than the least intelligent. Consistency would seem to be easily re--established by distinguishing between advanced, sophisticated social organizations which afford the supporting communities a high level of collective performance, and primitive, mob--like structures which pull the group towards the lower end of the achievement scale. But this reconciliation meets with some objections. The most familiar ones concern the mixed record of elaborate social systems, which are said to occasionally or even, according to some accounts, systematically produce wrong decisions, poor assessments, disastrous plans, counterproductive measures, etc. A more recent set of objections rests on cases where 'crowds', i.e. groups not organized in a sophisticated way, produce good results, in fact, results which better those of most, or even all, members of the group. Many such cases are collected in James Surowiecki's book The Wisdom of Crowds, which argues more generally in favor of an 'order out of chaos' view of collective thinking: whether sophisticated or simple, social organizations for the production of knowledge or problem--solving can benefit from the absence of certain individualistic constraints which are traditionally thought to foster excellence in cognitive tasks. This flavor of paradox is enhanced by Surowiecki's choice of phrase: at the surface level, 'wisdom of crowds' conflicts with the well--entrenched cliché of the folly 1 of crowds; but at a deeper level, Surowiecki seems to appeal to one frequent connotation of 'wisdom' which is precisely its paradoxical character. Whether Surowiecki actually intended to exploit this connotation is not entirely clear, as he uses 'wisdom', 'intelligence' or even sometimes 'knowledge'; and similarly, 'wise', 'intelligent', and even 'smart', interchangeably 2 . However, and despite the fact that a lot of attention is given throughout to 'group' (or 'collective') 'intelligence', the book, as I read it, also strongly suggests that the wisdom of crowds should be seen as more than mere collective intelligence, and be thought of instead as partaking of wisdom. Indeed, wisdom of crowds does seem to share with the ordinary concept of wisdom some important features, which in particular do not typically belong to intelligence. Thus as a concept, and as a project, wisdom of crowds invites us to take a closer look at wisdom, in particular in its relation to intelligence or rationality, quite in the way AI invited us decades ago 3 , and in a new guise today invites us again 4 , to take a closer look at (human, ordinary) intelligence, in particular in its relation to cognition or logic for example. The paper is organized as follows. It starts with a brief clarification of the target phenomenon: wisdom of crowds, in Surowiecki's book, covers a wide variety of phenomena which cannot be encompassed within a single approach, and I will spell out where my focus lies, viz. in the 'mindless' processes of aggregation of individual cognitive competences which tend to result in cognitive progress. I will then propose a contrastive characterization of rationality, intelligence and wisdom, as they apply to individuals. Next I will examine the possibility of extending these terms to collective entities or processes (leaving rationality to the side, for reasons which will become clear) and ask to what extent wisdom of crowds can be regarded as a form or

É notável que a preocupação com o meio ambiente tornou-se cada vez mais ampla e globalizada, sendo debatida em diversas conferências internacionais sobre meio ambiente. Um dos resultados de tais conferências pode ser encontrado no envolvimento direto do Estado para com a questão, manifesto por meio da formulação e implementação de leis e políticas públicas. Mas, para além das ações estatais, há uma dimensão micropolítica que se organiza e dissemina em grupos sociais menores, acionando o cidadão para o enfrentamento da problemática do meio ambiente de maneira local. Nesse viés, o presente estudo teórico teve por objetivo realizar um diálogo entre as teorias que analisam a temática da sustentabilidade na área de administração e as produções sociais que acontecem no cotidiano de indivíduos anônimos, buscando compreender como pessoas comuns tornaram-se mais atentas e preocupadas com o meio ambiente, desenvolvendo ações de proteção, sensibilização e militância em prol de uma vida sustentável.

For many years now the interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics has been beset with controversy concerning its penultimate chapters, where it clearly emerges that Aristotle endorses as the best life a career devoted as much as humanly possible to theoria or intellectual contemplation. When we reach the final act of this ethical drama, we have a veritable "divine intervention" in the form of an appeal to the energeia (activity) of divine theoria (contemplation), an activity analogized to that of our own nous (intellect, understanding, thinking faculty), whose proper employment will constitute complete, perfect (teleia) eudaimonia (happiness, well-being?) for us humans (1177b24-5). Furthermore, we are immediately informed, somewhat surprisingly, that such a life would be superior to the human level. For someone will live it not insofar as he is a human being, but insofar as he has some divine element in him (theion ti en hauto). And the activity of this divine element is as much superior to the activity in accord with the rest of virtue (ten allen areten) as this element is superior to the compound (tou sunthetou). Hence, if understanding (ho nous) is something divine in comparison with a human being, so also will life in accord with understanding be divine in comparison with human life. We ought not to follow the makers of proverbs and 'Think human, since you are human', or 'Think mortal, since you are mortal'. Rather, as far as we can (eph' hoson endechetai), we ought to be pro-immortal (athanatizein), and go to all lengths to live a life in accord with our supreme element (zen kata to kratiston ton en auto); for, however much this element may lack in bulk, by much more it surpasses everything in power and value (1177b26-1178a2, tr. Irwin). Now, if we have gotten this far, having begun with the first book's repeated emphasis on the search for the human good (to anthropinon agathon -most notably in the formal definition of eudaimonia offered as the conclusion of the celebrated function [ergon] argument at 1098a16; cf. 1094b7 and 1104a14-15), patiently pursuing the long discussion of the moral virtues, justice, scientific and practical reasoning, pleasure, friendship, etc., we might at least be brought up short by this peremptory appeal to rise above mere mortal concerns and to athanatizein -"to immortalize as much as possible". The problem posed by the apparently extreme version of "intellectualism" defended in Book 10.6-8, when compared with the earlier books of this work is, of course, hardly new, although it seems that of late there has been a gathering consensus that the so-called "dominant-end" reading of it is correct. 1 I can't go into all the difficulties brought up for this reading by the "inclusivists" who want to interpret the NE as a whole as providing for both intellectual and moral virtues in a comprehensive vision of a "mixed-life" that will feature proper pleasures as well as sufficient external goods (e.g. wealth, good looks, friends) to enable someone to flourish. Instead, I wish to highlight the deep connection urged at the end of the NE between the best sort of human activity, that of thinking or contemplating, and the only activity worthy of Aristotle's "philosopher-god", to borrow Richard Norman's useful label 2 , especially as that divine energeia is described in Metaphysics Lambda, cc. 7,9. Now, whatever the independent merits of its philosophical theology, it seems to me that any strong parallel between human and divine thinking drawn 1 The vocabulary of 'dominant-end' and 'inclusive' as applied to different interpretations of the final end in Aristotle's ethics was introduced by W.F.R. Hardie in 1965 in his article originally published in Philosophy, v. XL, pp. 277-295. It was reprinted in Julius Moravcsik's inaugural edition in the distinguished series published by Doubleday Anchor whose general editor is Amelie Rorty. See Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. J.M.E. Moravcsik (Anchor Books, 1967(pp. 297-322. This article is still very useful, as are the first and last chapters of his Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1968) and in a second edition (1980) with "appended notes". Subsequent discussion of the problem posed by Hardie has continued ever since and one continues to find partisans on all sides of the question. 2 "Aristotle's Philosopher-God", Phronesis 14 (1969), pp. 63-74; this essay was re-printed in Articles on Aristotle 4. Psychology & Aesthetics, ed. Barnes, Schofield and Sorabji (Duckworth, 1979), 93-102. Further references to this article will be incorporated into the text, with the first number indicating its page in the original and the second keyed to the reprinted version.

Following Ballantyne, we can distinguish between descriptive and regulative epistemology. Whereas descriptive epistemology analyzes epistemic categories such as knowledge, justified belief, or evidence, regulative epistemology attempts to guide our thinking. In this paper, we argue that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on what we call epistemic prudence. Our argument proceeds as follows: First, we lay out an objection to virtue-based regulative epistemology that is analogous to the no-guidance objection to virtue ethics. According to this objection, virtue-based regulative epistemology cannot offer us useful guidance in our deliberations, because an abstract knowledge of virtue does not tell us what we should do here and now, especially in hard cases. We respond to this objection by showing that our making good epistemic decisions cannot simply be a matter of our following the right epistemic rules. In order to reliably inquire and deliberate well, we need epi...

Lo scopo della critica della ragion pratica è mostrare come la ragion pura è in grado di determinare la volontà umana e quindi a nosotro agire, a priori e quindi di seguire la legge morale, un dovere che devo fare si o sì, propio perche se non lo faccio non succede niente, ma sono obbligato moralmente.

In his 2006 article “On Reason’s Control of the Passions in Aquinas’s Theory of Temperance” Giuseppe Butera argues that, according to Aquinas, the virtuous person feels no passions or emotions until he judges what is best to be done, at which point his passions follow the lead of his judgment. The idea is that passions get in the way of clearheaded thinking, so that any passions preceding the judgment of reason have the potential to cloud that judgment. Passions are useful only to help us execute the judgments we have already reached apart from passion. Virtuous passions are the obedient slaves of reason; in no way do they help reason to reach its judgment.

We might be averse to this interpretation on two counts. First, we might desire a less slavish role for the passions; they should not always have to be completely subservient to reason. Virtuous passions should sometimes be spontaneous emotions, moving of their own accord, even apart from a judgment of reason. Second, we might desire a less dry and cold deliberation. Our deliberations should sometimes be moved, it seems, by virtuous emotions. It seems that a person’s virtuous desires might help him or her to reach a judgment about what is to be done.

This paper criticizes Butera on the latter but not the former. Butera is correct in his main assertion: virtuous passions do indeed always follow upon the judgment of reason; they do not arise spontaneously, apart from reason. At the same time, virtuous deliberations are not always dry deliberations; sometimes our passions assist us in judging what is to be done. The paper argues that these two points be combined.

First, the paper defends Butera against those who would claim that virtuous passions are sometimes spontaneous. Second, it shows that Butera’s view can be developed to include passions within deliberation. Without contradicting Butera, we might discover emotions within virtuous deliberations.

Recent discussions of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of natural law have focused upon the “self-evident” character of the first principles, but few attempts have been made to determine in what manner they are self-evident. On some accounts, a self-evident precept must have, at most, a tenuous connection with speculative reason, especially our knowledge of God, and it must be untainted by the stain of “deriving” an ought from an is. Yet Aquinas himself had a robust account of the good, rooted in human nature. He saw no fundamental difference between is-statements and ought-statements, both of which he considered to be descriptive. Knowing the Natural Law traces the thought of Aquinas from an understanding of human nature to a knowledge of the human good, from there to an account of ought-statements, and finally to choice, which issues in human actions. The much discussed article on the precepts of the natural law (I-II, 94, 2) provides the framework for a natural law rooted in human nature and in speculative knowledge. Practical knowledge is itself threefold: potentially practical knowledge, virtually practical knowledge, and fully practical knowledge. This distinction within practical knowledge, typically overlooked or underutilized, reveals the steps by which the mind moves from speculative knowledge all the way to fully practical knowledge. The most significant sections of Knowing the Natural Law examine the nature of ought-statements, the imperative force of moral precepts, the special character of per se nota propositions as found within the natural law, and the final movement from knowledge to action.

The prospects for Aristotelian character education (ACE) is considered. Seven important claims that should win wide acceptance are reviewed; and also two challenges that are impediments. I argue many of the assumptions of ACE turn out not to be distinctive. The conflation of realism and naturalism is ill-considered, and the account of phronesis will need additional clarification to be helpful to educators, as will the specific recommendations on offer. I conclude with a suggestion that Dewey offers a powerful, empirically grounded, educationally accessible account of moral functioning that meets the desiderata of ACE; and that charting an integrative perspective is an exciting prospect for the future.

A renewed interest in the study of character and virtue has recently emerged in the fields of Education and Psychology. The latest research has confirmed the association between virtuous consistent behaviours and academic positive outcomes. However, the motivational dimension of character (the intentions underlying the patterns of observed behaviours) has received little attention. This research aims to extend the knowledge on this topic by examining the predictive relationships between the behavioural and motivational dimensions of character, with reference to academic engagement, career self-doubt and performance of Spanish university students. A total of 183 undergraduates aged 18–30 (142 of whom were women) from the north of Spain completed specific parts of self-report questionnaires, including the Values in Action VIA-72, a Spanish translated and validated version of the Moral Self-Relevance Measure MSR, and the Utrecht Work Engagement Student Scale UWES-S9. The collected data...

One of the most significant changes in Higher Education pedagogy that has occurred over the past fifty years is the idea that university students should not just be taught theoretical subject knowledge but should engage with practical aspects of their course so developing the skills and professional competences that will allow them to gain successful employment after graduation. In this paper, we relate this development to the Aristotelian notion of intellectual virtue and specifically the concept of phronesis. We discuss the way in which this idea has developed from classical beginnings to the modern educational setting, and argue that the notion of phronesis, that is, practical wisdom or prudential judgement, is crucial to a range of activities which are fundamental to science, engineering and computing education. These include an understanding of what it means to engage in authentic learning and the solution of open-ended or illstructured problems. We also discuss the role the concept plays in describing key features of work-based learning. Finally, we make some comments concerning the relative value the education system places on different types of knowledge, and why an appropriate understanding of phronesis allows for a proper appreciation of contingent knowledge within the curriculum.

While this is already part of our imaginary, as the "Hollywood kind of AI" (Broussard, 2018: 32), it is still well beyond the reach of current technology. Machine learning is seen as a necessary (but insufficient) element for attaining AGI. It is based on two operations (algorithms): a first which learns bottom-up from some training data (for instance records of decisions made by humans) and a second which uses the rules 'learnt' by the first system to classify new inputs. This process is opaque, in the sense that is not clear how a particular classification decision has been reached from inputs . In this AI machines learn and solve problems on their own, by mimicking human cognitive functions. Every encounter with new data enhances the breadth and depth of the machine's internal schema categories, providing reference points for processing new incoming data using neural reference simulations, probabilistic inferences and pattern analysis. By mid-2018 over a dozen countries had proposed new AI strategies (Dutton, 2018), while industry is developing AI principles and developing best practices. They are also involved in developing regulation for AI, whether through direct participation or lobbying efforts. As Cath (2018: 1) suggests, such industry efforts are laudable but imply important ethical questions: notably, who sets the agenda for AI governance; what cultural logic frames it, and who benefits? Artificial Intelligence must coexist with human intelligence, whose practical wisdom it may supplement, challenge or even contest. We explore the direction of these developments, the legitimacy of AI's involvement in managing organisations and the role of managers and leaders in this changing context. More specifically we ask: what does the growth of AI systems in business organisations imply for the way that managers will need to exercise human practical wisdom? By practical wisdom we refer to "the application to professional

Educational leaders are required to respond in real time to questions, quandaries, and cases that involve individuals in different contexts. They face an array of possible choices that exist in tension. Justice and fairness must coexist with mercy and compassion; in enforcing policy, compliance must make room for flexibility in special cases. School leaders are called to adjudicate competing goods and teach others to do the same. This article examines what practical wisdom is, why it matters, and introduces a theoretically grounded Practical Wisdom Framework (PWF) to help school leaders deliberate well to create and sustain formative institutions.

Character education is an increasingly discussed topic drawing upon virtue ethics as a moral theory. Scholars have predominantly understood educating character as a process that entails the formation of certain distinct character traits or functions through practice and habituation. However, these approaches present some problems. This paper explores the educational implications of various accounts focusing on the relationship between phronesis and other virtues. In particular, our focus will be on those that Miller (2023) has classified as Standard Model and Eliminativist Model of practical wisdom. Starting from these accounts, we will outline three specific problems that the latter models appear to generate at a theoretical level in character education. Finally, we will address the task of demonstrating why the monist account of moral virtue recently proposed by the Aretai group—which conceives being virtuous in possessing phronesis understood as ethical expertise—might offer a refined response to these challenges. In addition, we will illustrate three educational pathways that can emerge from the same model.

Oil transportation by rail is one of the most important, yet dangerous means of transportation. The analysis of transportation incidents is important to determine the faults in the system and the root causes in order to prevent these incidents from recurring. Bow tie analysis is one of the methods used to understand the events, consequences, barriers and mitigative controls of incidents, such as the Lac-Mégantic Rail catastrophe. This disastrous incident occurred on July 6, 2013, and it destroyed 50 vehicles, 40 buildings, the railway tracks at the west end of the Mégantic Yard and tragically caused the death of 47 people. There was damage to the environment, 2000 people were forced to evacuate, almost all 63 tank cars were destroyed and most of downtown Lac-Mégantic was ruined. By studying relevant case reports, a bow tie diagram was created analyzing the root causes of this incident. We believe that human factors, organizational safety culture, and engineering-related factors were key contributors to the incident. The sequence of events was used to determine underlying causes, possible preventative measures, and mitigative controls. The analysis of the root causes and sequence of events is important for determining the causes of the incident, understanding the underlying issues in the safety management system, and ensuring this type of catastrophe cannot happen in the future.

Practical wisdom (phronesis) is a key term in Aristotle’s ethics, especially when it comes to explain and to understand the right way to act. In this article, I aim at the character of practical wisdom (phronesis) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I try to point out that practical wisdom consists of few subordinate abilities. In my interpretation, I try to explain the relation between these abilities and their specific role inside the practical wisdom (phronesis). In this article, I present plausible interpretation of character of practical wisdom and subordinate abilities.

Alfred. If he tells us, 'No, no, I meant that it is just plain a good thing,' then we can at best suppose he is a philosopher making a joke. 11 Elsewhere, in Goodness and Advice, she claims, Moore said it is clear that some things are good, some are bad, and some are neither…This idea seems to issue from nothing better than an oversimplified conception of the way in which the adjective 'good' functions in English. When people say about a thing 'That's good,' what they mean is always that the thing is good in some way. 12 Thomson's general approach is the same as Geach's: she looks to English speakers to see how the word 'good' is employed, though she is a bit more liberal than Geach. The latter seems only to recognize goodness of a kind while the former thinks there are other ways in which something can be good, e.g. good to eat (look at, listen to), good for use in (for instance) building something, and good at some skill. 13 Here she seems to be echoing G.H. von Wright who, after sketching the many ways in which something can be good (good for, good at, good of a kind), says, 11 Thomson (1997), 133. 12 Thomson (2001), 17.