Plato's Republic

Contrairement aux interprétations coutumières il y a un dialogue permanent entre la République, le Politique et les Lois et non une rupture ou un changement substantiel de la pensée politique de Platon. Une analyse minutieuse de Leg. V 739a1-740a2 montre clairement cette cohérence, en particulière la tournure "dieux ou fils des dieux" qu'y apparaît se rattache à l'état ordonné de l'âme et plus spécifiquement à la connaissance philosophique et n'indique pas l'abandonnement des positions de la République. De cette façon sont réfutées les thèses soutenues par A. Laks depuis quelques années sur le rapport entre la République et les Lois.
In spite of the usual interpretations there is a continuous dialogue between the Republic, the Statesman, and the Laws and not a break or a substantial change in Plato's political thought. A detailed analysis of Laws V 739a1-740a2 shows beyond all doubt this strict coherence, especially the expression "gods or children of gods" that appears in this passage is related to the ordered state of the soul and more specifically to the philosophical knowledge and does not point to a revision of the doctrines defended in the Republic, so that the interpretation of the relationship between the Republic and the Laws defended since the beginning of the 90'ties by A. Laks can be considered as definitively refuted.

El tema de esta tesis es la educación musical en la filosofía de Platón. En la República de Platón, la etapa educativa más importante es la niñez; los vehículos de esta educación son la mousiké para el alma (o mente) y la gimnasia para el cuerpo. La palabra griega mousiké describe un conjunto de artes compuesto por la música, la poesía, el canto y el baile. Así mismo, una educación musical para Platón describe una educación cultural. Además, Platón entiende que la conservación política de la ciudad ideal depende de una adecuada práctica musical, y de proteger los modos musicales. Por ende, la educación musical es un tema meridiano en la pedagogía si concedemos que la República es más bien un libro cuyo tema es la educación. Que el elemento fundamental del tema educativo (la mousiké) provoque sorpresa, sea en el lector antiguo o moderno, problematiza el significado del concepto humano de la educación. Que provoque sorpresa puede dejar entrever que una pedagogía que no otorga a las artes (y notablemente, a los modos musicales) importancia suprema, está condenada al fracaso. Igual destino puede esperar a una filosofía o práctica política que ignore su importancia. Es en el contexto de estas inquietudes que surge la pregunta que esta tesis intenta contestar: ¿Por qué considera Platón que la mousiké es central en la polis? La tesis que se defiende es la siguiente: Platón postula que la mousiké es aquello que educa la sociedad porque tiene el efecto de moldear el alma (o la mente). Esto tiene consecuencias políticas, pues la legislación y la justicia, que son las dos artes de la política, dependen del carácter de los individuos que componen la polis.

El hombre justo controla sus apetitos por medio de una alianza entre sus partes racional y colérica: mientras la primera determina el objeto de la acción, la segunda da estabilidad y fuerza a la prescripción de la razón. Este trabajo intenta mostrar que la parte colérica puede dar fuerza a las órdenes de la razón, solo si, al mismo tiempo, recibe ella también valor (i.e. la restauración de su imagen dañada). A partir de esto, defenderé que la parte colérica (i) siempre toma partido por la razón en la confrontación con los apetitos (en cuanto enemigos de la libertad del sujeto) y, sin embargo, (ii) puede entrar en conflicto con la razón cuando la parte apetitiva no está en juego (y la pretensión de restauración, i.e. venganza, es reprimida por la razón).

Despite the frequent pairing of and contrast between persuasion and force, Plato’s Republic undermines any coherent distinction between these two modes of handling others. The dialogue creates a puzzle with respect to this division, demanding of political philosophy a fuller investigation into the way speech and deed may rule. Peithô is not simply the gentler democratic cousin of authoritarian bia; but neither is the former simply the latter veiled in sweet speech. Indeed, I take Glaucon and Adeimantus’ frequent use and easy assent to the pairing to show their confusion about political and human autonomy, a matter displayed in detail in Book II. To the extent that Socrates’ obedience to Glaucon’s request for a defense of justice is simultaneously a testing of Glaucon and his brother, and to the extent that Plato’s brothers stand in for some aristocratic Athenians, Plato is performing here a sharp political diagnosis—or, should he be pessimistic, a prognosis. That the ideal city the interlocutors want to hear about requires totalitarian and illiberal mechanisms of control—one of speech, one of motion—implicates not Plato but the interlocutors who accept and speak of this traditional set of techniques of mastery. This paper provides two major pieces of evidence to support my primary claim. (Supporting evidence is Plato’s tendency to subvert this same sophistically popular binary elsewhere, especially in Statesman, Sophist and Laws.) (i) Book I dramatizes the weakness of the distinction between persuasion and coercion, especially in Polemarchus’ apparent bullying of Socrates, Socrates’ and Thrasymachus’ debate about the shepherd, and Thrasymachus’ struggle with the norms of polite conversation. (ii) The arguments that the best rulers will rule only under coercion (in Books I, V, VII, and IX) make the distinction into an obvious conundrum. Ultimately resolving this conundrum—if even possible—would depend on first clarifying in what ways— physical, moral, epistemic, (etc.)—coercion differs from persuasion. And so the more important task will precede what may be an impossible one (viz., figuring out how this city-in-speech could work). Arendt and Strauss, as well as others, write that the coupling of force and persuasion simply indicates the political necessity for both. Though this paper does not tell the story of these various scholars’ positions, it shows these positions to take inadequately seriously the sensitivity with which Plato—just as any other critic of Athenian political rhetoric—would value various modes of influence.

Is the just man happier than the unjust man? The answer to this question motivates Plato’s writing on justice in both the Gorgias and the Republic and this is the broad claim I argue Socrates is challenged to prove. In this dissertation I will argue 4 things. First, Socrates fails to prove the just man is happier than the unjust man in response to Callicles in the Gorgias. Second, Callicles’ challenge is fundamentally similar to Thrasymachus’ challenge in Book I of the Republic, which Socrates also fails to respond to, leading to Glaucon and Adeimantus reformulating the challenge in Book II of the Republic. Third, Socrates successfully proves the just man is happier than the unjust man in response to Glaucon and Adeimantus. Fourth, Socrates’ arguments in theRepublicwould constitute an effective response to Callicles in the Gorgias. Chapter One will focus on Callicles’ challenge and Socrates’ failed response. Chapter Two will examine the similarities and differences between Callicles’ challenge in theGorgias andThrasymachus’ challenge inBook Iof the Republic; Socrates’ failure to respond to Thrasymachus in Book I and Glaucon and Adeimantus’ reformulation inBook II. Chapter Three will examine Socrates’ response to this reformulation. Chapter Four will examine whether Socrates’ response to Glaucon and Adeimantus would successfully respond to Callicles. In this dissertation, I will refer throughout to ‘Socrates’ despite the difficulty in attributing everything Plato puts into Socrates’ mouth to the historical Socrates.

Materiales de estudio para revisar y aprender con Paideia de Werner W. Jaeger 11 La Sócrates y la ruta hacia el centro divino. Figura, problema y herencia de Sócrates. 1 Al llegar a la tercera parte de la obra Jaeger nos introduce en la dimensión hard core del texto que, como él mismo lo anticipa en el capítulo IX de la primera parte 2 , constituye el núcleo del desarrollo espiritual de aquella tendencia de la cultura griega, orientada a la formación de un tipo de hombre capaz de asumir y reproducir su imagen ideal y normativa, en un constante proceso de autoafirmación social e intelectual.

I argue for a view that departs radically from the long-held assumption that "to know the good is to do the good". On the view I shall defend, the role of the Form of the Good in the 'Republic' is greatly demoted; I argue that Plato thinks that knowledge of the Form of the Good is in fact 'insufficient' for the philosopher-king to rule. Instead, I argue that Plato thinks that knowledge of the Forms must be complemented with a type of "practical wisdom". I define "practical wisdom" as the ability to discern information about a 'particular' circumstance and the capacity to choose the best 'actions' that will bring about ideal ends for that circumstance.

"One, two, three, but where is the fourth?" I was reminded of this question while reading Prof. Brian Becker's paper "Flight from the Flesh" as he attempts to translate Freud's topological tripartion of the soul into Marion's phenomenology. Becker's paper establishes an analogy of sorts between the id and the flesh, the body as idol and the ego, while, in conclusion, speculates that the third saturated phenomenon, the icon, could correspond to the super ego. Yet, the fourth saturated phenomenon, the event, remains unaccounted in this conceptual correspondence.

In this paper, I use comparisons of Freud, Loewald, and Plato to explore what it means to individuate and to desire in a world of frustration, pain, and loss. The metaphors of the "wheel" versus the "ladder" present basic images for Freud's tragic conception of a person's emerging into a world of pain, transience and loss, in contrast to Loewald's sense of individuation as an increasing attainment of individual ego and world enrichment, constructed from metabolized grieved objects. I then argue that Plato's Symposium offers comparable visions of the possibilities of love, and that the juxtaposition of Freud and Loewald can be connected to ancient philosophical considerations. The paper begins by examining the implications of the two thinkers' treatments of the "oceanic state" (primary narcissism), then compares these to the speeches of Aristophanes and Socrates/Diotima. The conclusion touches on the relevance of the juxtaposition to the Platonic distinction between philosophy and poetry.

Despite initiating the discussion and introducing the first definition examined in Plato’s Republic, Cephalus is quickly compelled to leave the discussion. Many scholars read the dramatic action of this opening exchange as a coup d’ tat in which Socrates overthrows Cephalus’ reign over the community and usurps his ancestral command over the conversation. In contrast, I contend that Cephalus presents a competing moral claim as a representative of the class of moneymakers.

Les Lois de Platon, fondement de l'économie du droit par Wolfgang Drechsler * * Wolfgang DRECHSLER est professeur d'administration publique et de gouvernement à l'Université de Tartu (Estonie). Texte original en anglais. Cependant, comme il s'agit d'un article interdisciplinaire, s'adressant d'abord aux spécialistes de Platon, l'Économie du droit doit d'abord être brièvement présentée.

Resumo: O presente texto consiste numa proposta de tradução para a língua portuguesa do chamado Mito de Er, com o qual Platão conclui a República. A edição utilizada foi a estabelecida por Siem Slings na coleção Oxford Classical Texts (Platonis Respublica, Oxford University Press, 2003). O objetivo das notas é apenas esclarecer as opções de tradução mais discutíveis. Palavras-chave: Platão; República; Mito de Er.

Resumo: Como se ensina filosofia? Pergunta preciosa que abre precedente para um longo e árduo caminho. Para isso não há resposta pronta, não está escrito e determinado, mas é preciso percorrer todo o caminho, pois a própria pergunta ‘pode a filosofia ser ensinada?’ já nos é uma pergunta filosófica e respondê-la significa entrar nos meandros da filosofia e em que consiste uma educação filosófica. A tentativa de responder a questão, nos deixa outra questão no ar: existe tal arte de ensinar? Se ela existe, então também existe seu artífice e seu objeto. Como nos diz Platão na República “cada arte foi feita para procurar e fornecer a cada um o que lhe convém por natureza” (341d). Se tomarmos o mestre como o artífice e o discípulo como objeto deste ensino, devemos ter em mente que a arte de ensinar é conveniente ao discípulo e não ao mestre. O mestre, portanto, é instrumento para que se possa ensinar tal arte ao discípulo. Se a filosofia é uma arte ensinável, então é preciso verificar a existência de tal mestre para ensiná-la. A dialética tem um papel de, através de seus cortes, encontrar a verdade a ser proferida no discurso da alma. O objetivo deste trabalho é refletir o ensino, seu instrumento e seu objeto a partir do pensamento da antiguidade grega, mais especificamente a obra de Platão e suas implicações sobre o ensino da filosofia.

Over the past few decades the Thai economy has been developing and gradually integrating with other economies in and beyond the ASEAN region. Due to the ASEAN countries' integration processes, the community is facing political, economic, social, educational and environmental challenges. In order to turn challenges into opportunities that serve Thailand and the ASEAN region in an inter-generational way, it is pertinent to draft, disseminate and discuss perspectives for sustainability and well-being. This anthology aims to extend and deepen our awareness of ecological, social and economic sustainability in Thailand and the ASEAN region and thus to intensify the discourse amongst decision makers, academics, students and the wider public. The objective of the papers in this volume is to give recommendations on how sustainability in economic, social and environmental sectors could be promoted.

Le rapport entre Platon et Rousseau est significatif en ce que ces deux philosophes présentent chacun un projet de refonte radicale de la société. L’un fondé sur l’égalité géométrique, telle qu’elle est précisée d’une manière fondamentale à la fin du Gorgias, et développée successivement dans la République et dans les Lois, l’autre fondé sur l’égalité arithmétique, dans le cadre d’un paradigme moderne promouvant l’idée de liberté, en ayant néanmoins perdu de vue le principe d’égalité géométrique. Cette différenciation doit néanmoins être nuancée par le fait que Rousseau, lecteur assidu de Platon, a retenu de son lointain devancier l’idée que la cité doit être un holon vivant (le corps politique). Se pose alors la question des modalités selon lesquelles doit s’établir l’intégration totale de l’individu dans le corps social, et le fait est que l’on s’est souvent demandé si les deux projets ne portaient pas en eux, par la représentation holistique de l'État, les germes théoriques du totalitarisme. Cette question, sitôt posée, se voit assez rapidement résolue par le fait que l’holisme chez ces deux penseurs ne peut aucunement être assimilé au processus de déshumanisation mis en œuvre par les totalitarismes récents de nature industrielle, dans lesquels l’homme a perdu sa dimension d’homo laborans, selon l’expression d’Hannah Arendt. S’il y a un totalitarisme chez Platon, il reste « artisanal » et n’a jamais pu voir le jour, alors que le totalitarisme industriel, lui, a pu malheureusement se concrétiser, comme s’il avait fallu compter sur la puissance des machines pour cela. Le totalitarisme de type artisanal poursuivait la mission d’harmoniser les classes et les individus, le totalitarisme industriel sera systématiquement uniformisateur. Les réflexions de Karl Popper et d’Hannah Arendt ont été sollicitées et discutées pour résoudre cette question récurrente.


The relationship between Plato and Rousseau is meaningful in that these two philosophers each present a plan to radically change society. One based on geometric equality, as it is specified in a fundamental manner at the end of the Gorgias, and developed successively in Republic and in the Laws, the other based on arithmetic equality, in the setting of a modern paradigm promoting the idea of liberty, having nevertheless lost from view the geometric equality principle. This differentiation calls for some nuance in the fact that Rousseau, a regular reader of Plato, kept from his distant predecessor the idea that the city must be a living holon (the political body). One of the issues that was raised is that of the modes according to which the individual's total integration in the social body could be achieved, and the fact is that it has often been wondered if the two plans didn't carry in them, by the holistic representation of the state, the theoretical seeds of totalitarianism. This question, as soon as posed, sees itself answered quickly enough by the fact that the holism in these two thinkers cannot be assimilated by any means to the process of dehumanization put in place by recent totalitarianisms of industrial nature, in which man lost his dimension of homo laborans, according to Hannah Arendt. If there is totalitarianism in Plato, it remains "artisanal" and could never actually have existed, whereas industrial totalitarianism, itself, could unfortunately be established, as if it had been necessary to count on the power of machinery to do it. The artisanal type of totalitarianism wanted to harmonize the classes and individuals, whereas the industrial totalitarianism would be systematically homogenizing. The arguments of Karl Popper and Hannah Arendt have been solicited and have been discussed to solve this recurrent question.

relembra a certa altura (p. 39) o conto de Borges sobre Averróis tentando adivinhar o que Aristóteles entendia por tragédia e comédia. Vez por outra os estudiosos do Comentador devem se sentir, como Averróis, como Borges, como este resenhista... Diante de uma obra que se deixa ler através de traduções e traduções de traduções não há como não concordar que se trata do "caso de um homem que se propõe um fim que não está vedado a outros, mas sim a ele". O livro de Rosalie Pereira contém duas partes: uma introdutória, falando de Averróis e seus escritos, e outra, indicada pelo subtítulo, a arte de governar. A primeira parte recolhe as informações sobre o que se conhece da pessoa de Averróis e seu contexto na corte almôada em Córdova. Retoma também as diferentes facetas daquele que ficou conhecido no Ocidente latino sobretudo como o comentador por excelência de Aristóteles: filósofo, jurista, médico e até mesmo teólogo. A segunda parte começa também por evocar o contexto da obra de que tratará especificamente, O Comentário da República, dentro da filosofia (falsafa)

In this paper, I interpret the Republic’s “parallel” imagery of a contest between the lives of the most just and most unjust men as indicating that book 9’s two pleasure arguments are the culmination of the dialogue’s refutation of Thrasymachus’ sophistry. I take this strategic function of the pleasure arguments as the primary explanation as to why Socrates designates the account of the just man’s pleasure the "most severe defeat of the unjust man." In exposing my thesis, I challenge Richard Kraut's claim that the pleasure arguments have little significance to the dialogue's argument, and I suggest that my argument strengthens Daniel Russell's thesis that book 9's pleasure arguments complete Socrates' notion of the just soul.

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

For the last 2,500 years literature has been attacked, booed, and condemned, often for the wrong reasons and occasionally for very good ones. ‘The Hatred of Literature’ examines the evolving idea of literature as seen through the eyes of its adversaries: philosophers, theologians, scientists, pedagogues, and even leaders of modern liberal democracies. From Plato to C. P. Snow to Nicolas Sarkozy, literature’s haters have questioned the value of literature―its truthfulness, virtue, and usefulness―and have attempted to demonstrate its harmfulness.

Literature does not start with Homer or Gilgamesh, William Marx says, but with Plato driving the poets out of the city, like God casting Adam and Eve out of Paradise. That is its genesis. From Plato the poets learned for the first time that they served not truth but merely the Muses. It is no mere coincidence that the love of wisdom (philosophia) coincided with the hatred of poetry. Literature was born of scandal, and scandal has defined it ever since.

In the long rhetorical war against literature, Marx identifies four indictments―in the name of authority, truth, morality, and society. This typology allows him to move in an associative way through the centuries. In describing the misplaced ambitions, corruptible powers, and abysmal failures of literature, anti-literary discourses make explicit what a given society came to expect from literature. In this way, anti-literature paradoxically asserts the validity of what it wishes to deny. The only threat to literature’s continued existence, Marx writes, is not hatred but indifference.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction
Words from Elsewhere
First Trial: Authority
Second Trial: Truth
Third Trial: Morality
Fourth Trial: Society
Conclusion
Notes
Acknowledgments
Index

Attempting to discuss bringing about a rebirth of ancient Greek artistic mathematical physics is practically impossible. We know that Plato’s ethical mathematics is relevant to evolving consciousness within the workings of David Bohm’s infinite universe. Scientists have pointed out that Plato was developing Anaxagoras’ infinite fractal geometrical mathematics from a biological perspective. However, prevailing science cannot tolerate such ideas. Einstein had a moral tribal obligation to develop his science in accordance to his mechanistic worldview. This was necessary to prevent the inhuman Nazi regime from being the first to build the atomic bomb. DNA now shows that all human tribes belong to a single species. A species dedicated to harming itself is obviously suffering from some form of mental disease. Plato’s human survival science, whilst providing the medical antidote shows we are living in a confused state of scientific schizophrenia.
The co-founder of the American National Cancer Research Foundation, the Nobel Laureate in Medicine, Albert Szent-Györgyi in his his book The Crazy Ape, points out that man “the more he progresses technologically, seems the more to regress psychologically and socially, until he resembles his [tribal] primate ancestors in a state of high schizophrenia” and “most of scientific research that is done to elevate human life serves in the end to destroy it”1. Obtaining the antidote to this medical problem is not difficult but the prevailing tribal science mentality simply means that the humanitarian academic will to obtain it does not exist.
As superstitious tribal science and human survival science are both integral aspects of human evolution, they can be entangled within a computer program governed by universal first- cause principle logic in order to generate sustainable human survival blueprint simulations. The survival blueprints will guarantee wealth and power beyond the limitations of primitive tribal science. Such a reality can be used to negotiate sharing armistice information between tribal nations preparing for military conflict. This crucial antidote science appears to belong to neurological medical scientists using Plato’s asymmetric mathematical information functioning under the auspices of an acceptable international medical agreement.

This reconstruction of Plato’s biography was researched and written when I was at the London School of Economics Department of Government in 2004-05. As an attempt to reconstruct Plato’s life with more detail than had been done before, I hope it may be of interest.

Although it’s not complete and hasn’t been used for a publication, I intend to use this material at some point in the future. I welcome any comments. Feel free to write me at [email protected].

In the following lecture I will not only consider Plato’s positive statements about philosophy. Instead I choose an indirect approach by analysing the critique of his philosophy and his answer to it. This detour could turn out fertile, especially in the context of this conference. First, it could give us a better understanding of the popular picture of philosophy in its early days. Secondly, it could show us, how Plato does not want to be understood and thus contribute to avoiding common misconceptions about Plato and philosophy in general. Lastly, a closer look at Platos refutations of the critics allows a better accentuation of his concept of philosophy.  I  will  try  to  show,  that  Plato’s  concept  of  philosophy  can  best  be  understood  as  a  certain perspective of thinking, opposed to everyday and sophistical thinking. This concept could be fundamental  not  only  for  the  understanding  of  Plato  but  also  for  a  systematic  concept  of philosophy  as  a  certain  way  of  thinking.  The  starting  point  of  my  lecture  ist  he  so-called philopher’s critique in Republic Book VI (474b-497a). The critique contains three different challenges against philosophy in general, which ultimately aim at the philosophy of Plato. I will show how these three critiques are systematically connected and are argumentatively supported by the sophists. Plato’s defences reveal a consistent and plausible understanding of philosophy. 

I.  Introduction p.1
    a.  Plato’s concept of philosophy in recent research
    b.  Intention of the lecture

II.  Plato’s definition of philosophy p.3
    a.  Context
    b.  Definition

III.  Cristiques of philosophy p.5
    a.  Epistemic critique p.5
          i.  Challenge
          ii.  Response
    b.  Practical critique  p.6
          i.  Challenge
          ii.  Response
    c.  Moral critique p.9
          i.  Challenge
          ii.  Response

IV.  Conclusion  p.11

Frihet er neppe det første man forbinder med den bystaten Sokrates og samtalepartnerne hans beskriver fra bok 2 til bok 7 i Platons Staten. Denne bystaten har snarere gitt Platon et rykte som fortaler for et autoritaert og totalitaert regime, hvor den styrende klasses kontroll ikke begrenser seg til å gjelde hva innbyggerne gjør, men også omfatter hva de tenker, føler og begjaerer, gjennom programmet for paideia, 1 oppdragelse og utdannelse, som skisseres i dialogen.

La réflexion politique de Platon quant à ce que devrait être une cité juste ne se limite pas à l'intégration des trois groupes fonctionnels-gardiens, auxiliaires et producteurs-à laquelle on la réduit souvent. Elle consiste aussi et avant tout en la délimitation du territoire physique et symbolique de la cité, soit dans le tracé de ses frontières, externes et internes, qui assignent leur lieu politique à des catégories de population distinctes. Celles-ci se constituent par cette opération même - c'est le cas, par exemple, des incurables - ou lui préexistent sur le plan empirique et historique, Platon examinant alors leur pertinence, soit à quels déplacements il faudrait les soumettre pour les intégrer dans l'espace politique juste. Tel est le cas de la frontière qui passe entre les hommes et les femmes, dont Platon examine le bien fondé politique.