Philsophy of Law

Abstract: What is the function of the category utilitas publica in the writings of the classical jurists? It serves to legitimate leges publicae, as in the case of Augustus’ lex Iulia et Papia. Secondly utilitas publica is cited as the rationale of a given lex publica for the purpose of its interpretation, and in the third instance it is a guideline for the creation of new law by the jurists themselves. The part of Roman law, which is derived from utilitas publica, is called ius publicum. In this sense it has an assortative function. – Keywords: utilitas publica, ius publicum, lex publica, res publica, lex Iulia et Papia, Cicero

Hasta el momento en que nació Cris- to, De iure personarum era un dispositivo del derecho romano para la descripción y la ejecución de la precedencia del pater familias sobre el resto de la sociedad romana: esclavos, libertos, extranjeros, cónyuges e hijos. La traducción correcta sería, por tanto, “Derecho de los estatus sociales”. Gracias a la influencia del derecho natural, la idea de libertad e igualdad ganó terreno que está basada en un concepto unitario de hombre. Para expresar esta idea los juristas romanos recurrieron al término persona en lugar de homo porque este último era una expresión técnica para mentar al esclavo y el primero ya tenía una amplia varie- dad de signi cados. Persona que, hasta ahora ha descrito cadenas del hombre, ahora se convirtió en un término para sus derechos adquiridos de la igualdad y la libertad. Este es el signi cado de la palabra latina persona que entró en la teología y la  losofía y llegó a ser uno de los conceptos jurídicos e ideas  losó cas más importantes de Occidente.

A symposium with Prof. Leonard Harris and Prof. Rozena Maart offering accounts of some of the foundational events, and their related conceptual underpinnings, that inform the emergence of Philosophy Born of Struggle and Philosophy Born of Massacres.

This course is designed for those students, philosophy majors and non-majors alike, interested in the intersection between the law and ethical issues. This semester the course will focus on the intersection between women and the law, and will include units on moral philosophy and development, the idea of a female ethics, the relation of feminism to pragmatism, feminist jurisprudence, and the relation among women, race, and the law. We will begin by reading an excerpt from Immanuel Kant, who advocates universality and necessity as the ideal conditions for prescribing moral imperatives. Next we will read Lawrence Kohlberg, who, building on Kant's ideals, develops a theory of moral development based on the application of autonomously generated universal rules. This Kant-Kohlberg foundation will serve as the background for our inquiry into the idea of a feminist ethics. Next we will read Carol Gilligan, a student of Kohlberg's, who gives a critique of Kohlberg's ideas about moral-development, including a critique of his ontology of the self. We will also read a summary article about the very idea of a female ethic by Jeam Grimshaw. Our second unit will focus on the intersections between feminism and pragmatism. We will begin by reading a proto-pragmatist account of the experience and capabilities of men and women by Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Next we will read Charlene Haddock Seigfried, who calls into question the relationship between theory and practice and attempts to recover methods of inquiry from the American Pragmatists in order to rethink feminist methodology. Our third unit will turn its focus towards jurisprudence, the philosophy of law, and its relationship to women's experiences and legal rights. We will read several essays from Catherine MacKinnon on the legal concept of equality as it relates to women's experiences and legal rights. Last, we will read Angela Harris and Angela Davis on the ways that legal discourse about women and the law has dealt with non-white women, the experiences of Black women in the American legal setting, and the issue of violence against women and the legal recourses of women, who are victims of gendered violence.

Artykuł podejmuje problematykę metody stosowania prawa w kontekście bezpieczeństwa, jakie wynikać ma z pewności prawa Unii Europejskiej. W tym też celu autor poddaje logiczno-psychologicznej analizie dwie takie metody: a) wynoszoną na piedestał w common law, prawniczą analogię oraz b) wiązaną ściśle z systemami prawnymi typu civil law, prawniczą dedukcję (przybierającą też postać sylogizmu prawniczego). Przy tym rezultat rozumowania według obu tych metod uznany został za zależny, nie tylko od operacji myślowych przebiegających na poziomie racjonalnego systemu rozumowania, ale również, i to w stopniu znacznym, od wyniku rozumowania intuicyjnego, bazującego na zgromadzonych w pamięci długoterminowej doświadczeniach/informacjach. Ponadto możliwość zwiększania pewności prawa w stosunku do prawniczej dedukcji została tu skorelowana z podnoszeniem progu, do wysokości którego mają być podejmowane decyzje absurdalne (niesprawiedliwe) mające uzasadnienie w językowej analizie tekstu aktu prawnego; podczas gdy intersubiektywność otrzymywanych za pośrednictwem prawniczej analogii konkluzji, ilekroć nie ma się to odbywać poprzez wpływanie na zasoby, z których korzysta rozumowanie intuicyjne, uznana została za ustawioną na względnie stałym poziomie: tzw. oczywistych (bardzo bliskich) analogii.

The article pertains to the issue of decentralisation (and democratisation) of sources of law and reconstruction of the concept of sources of law. Models of thinking or categories adopted in jurisprudence oftentimes constitute a manifestation of a repression that is stronger than the classic legal sanction. This is because they necessitate flattening of the social reality image, which tends to be richer than the corresponding law. The aim of this article is to indicate that the scarcity of law stems solely from thinking habits and solutions adopted unquestionably by jurisprudence. This is also the case for the concept of sources of law. The positivist idea that law is created and imposed on citizens by the centre in power (the state, the court) remains relevant, even if there are more than just one centre. At the same time, the concept of sources of law, defended by jurisprudence, excludes any actual displays of pluralism, thus preventing bottom-up law-making processes (perhaps except for soft law of unclear legal status) and recognising their role in the legal system or the legal order of a given state. Pluralism of sources of law is one of the elements of theory of law formulated by Leon Petrażycki. If we assume that the standard positivist model of sources of law is the currently binding one, Petrażycki's concept provides an alternative that allows us to indeed recognise and include into the notion of law all these rules that are in fact something more than morality, habit or custom in view of addressees, while maintaining the integrity and efficiency of law and traditional ways of understanding law in countries of the Enlightenment tradition.