Philosophy of Science

Während auf Deutsch mit „Implizites Wissen“ ein einziges Werk Polanyis vollständig erschienen ist, und Polanyi daran anschließend hauptsächlich lerntheoretisch rezipiert wurde, haben seine Arbeiten in Originalsprache von Anfang an reiche Wirkung in dem Gespräch zwischen Naturwissenschaft und Theologie entfaltet. Um das deutsche Rezeptionsdefizit zu kompensieren, wird in dem Artikel zunächst eine biographische Skizze geboten, bevor eine Erläuterung seiner wissenschaftsphilosophischen Kerngedanken im Kontext seines Gesamtwerkes erfolgt.

Estre corto documento recoge algunas ideas muy interesantes de varios estudiosos como Antonio Cruz, John Lennox, William Lane Craig y otros.
Para explicar el concepto de la palabra evolución , su significado en el contexto y como la evolución presenta conflictos con algunas leyes universales.

Nancy Cartwright’s most recent monograph: Nature, the Artful Modeler: Lectures on Laws, Science, How Nature Arranges the World and How We Can Arrange It Better presents the state of the art in the philosophy of science literature. Here, we are presented with the most coherent form of Cartwright’s views to date, combining building blocks she and other Cartwrightians have meticulously crafted throughout the last decades. We are thus presented with a book containing not only incredibly rich work on a diversity of topics spanning several decades, but also a number of novel ideas that will leave an impact on the philosophy of science in the decades to come.

In the dispute between presentism and eternalism, the affective dimensions of the debate have been somewhat neglected. Contemporary philosophers of time have not tried to relate these ontological positions with two of the most discussed maxims in the history of ethics – “live in the present” vs. “look at your life under the aspect of the eternity” (sub specie aeternitatis)”– that since the Hellenistic times have been regarded as strictly connected with them. Consequently, I raise the question whether the endorsement of one of these two ontological views can make a practical difference in the way we should live.

Analyzing the position of two philosophers whose views are recognizably divergent, W. O. Quine and M. Dummett, we intend to support a striking point of agreement between them: the idea that our logical principles constitute our principles about what there is, and therefore, that logic is metaphysics.

This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will.  Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain.  I consider alternative interpretations of how “conscious free will” might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law.

This presentation is part of the Social Values in Medical Research track. Due to higher than national average breast cancer rates and deaths on Long Island the U.S. Congress in 1993 ordered a study of breast cancer on the island. The Long Island Breast Cancer Study Project (LIBCSP), federally funded under Public Law 103-43, conducted by the National Cancer Institute

We have reached the peculiar situation where the advance of mainstream science has required us to dismiss as unreal our own existence as free, creative agents, the very condition of there being science at all. Efforts to free science from this dead-end and to give a place to creative becoming in the world have been hampered by unexamined assumptions about what science should be, assumptions which presuppose that if creative becoming is
explained, it will be explained away as an illusion. In this paper it is shown that this problem has permeated the whole of European civilization from the Ancient Greeks onwards, leading to a radical disjunction between cosmology which aims at a grasp of the universe through mathematics and history which aims to comprehend human action through stories. By going back to the Ancient Greeks and tracing the evolution of the denial of creative becoming, I trace the layers of assumptions that must in some way be transcended if we are to develop a truly post-Egyptian science consistent with the forms of understanding and explanation that have evolved within history.

This paper provides an initial, multidimensional map of the complex relationships among consciousness, mind, brain and the external world in a way that follows both the contours of everyday experience and the findings of science. It then demonstrates how this reflexive monist map can be used to evaluate the utility and resolve some of the oppositions of the many other “isms” that currently populate consciousness studies. While no conventional, one-dimensional “ism” such as physicalism can do justice to this web of relationships, physicalism, functionalism, dualism, neutral monism, and dual-aspect monism can all be seen to provide useful ways of understanding different aspects of the relationships among consciousness, mind, brain and the external world when these are viewed in either a first- or a third-person way from within this web of relationships by sentient creatures such as ourselves. For example, physicalism and functionalism provide a useful understanding of consciousness, mind, brain and external world when viewed from a third-person perspective, while neutral monism provides a useful way of understanding first- versus third-person views of external phenomena. On the other hand, dual-aspect monism provides a useful way of understanding first- versus third-person views of mind, including Eastern versus Western views of mind.  Dual-aspect monism also provides a useful understanding of the “unconscious ground of being” that gives rise to, supports and embeds all these observable phenomena. For an integrated understanding one needs to understand how these phenomena and relationships combine into an integrated whole.

In this book, I examine the principles that philosopher and historian of ideas, Arthur Lovejoy, considers founders of the interpretation of the world as a great hierarchical chain of being. That is to say, the “principle of plenitude”, that of ‘continuity’ and that of ‘qualitative grading’, all related to that of ‘sufficient reason’. But we deal particularly with the Middle Ages interpretation.
After considering how the ‘principle of plenitude’ arises in Platonic philosophy, then that of ‘continuity’ in the Aristotelian and also the mode of application of these principles in the Plotinian system; we select two Medieval philosophers among all those mentioned by Lovejoy: St. Augustine and St. Thomas. The first, because of its clear tendency towards Neoplatonic thinking, it is possible, indeed, to find a Christian version of the principle of plenitude, where Incoate variations of that reflection are the seed that will bear fruit in much more elaborate systems such as the Thomist. St. Augustine takes the Neoplatonic ideas of the self-diffusing high Good and the ‘principle of plenitude’ and leads them towards the constitution of a full but contingent universe. On the other hand, the second author, Thomas Aquinas, separates himself from the Platonic conception to think of a much more contingent universe, founded on the free divine gift of the esse. He elaborates a very complete and sophisticated theory about the divine Will and concludes conceiving a universe where necessity is nuanced.
There isn´t just an absolute necessity but also a hypothetical, which guarantees that the Necessary Being himself has the freedom to choose the creation of a merely contigent world. In the end we found very suggestive the theory created by Lovejoy, but irrelevant, rigorously speaking, to the philosophy of the Aquinate.

The hacker mentality in reality is independent therefrom what one hacking. The main point is that someone need to do such an achievement wich seams even for the same professionals almost impossible or something completely different and this achievement throwing new light upon the field of investigation or it's broader environment too. In such a meaning the top scientists can be called hackers too as they gaining new knowledge from the Nature, from our closed environment, or in other words from the holographic virtual reality around us, from the Matrix. Deeper knowledge from our environment and from ourself has every time influenced our thinking and in broader sense our ideology and philosophy too. From the beginnings for us human beeings the most important questions are: Who are we really, where are we coming from, how does our mind and body work, how our physical world works and why are we here? To these questions one can find the answers only in case when one gaining knowledge not just from one field of life or science but from so much field of investigation as it is possible. Because of his accomplishment and work in that sense the greatest researcher in our history was Nikola Tesla, who from his very childhood made groundbreaking observations and discoveries first in his closer environment and later all around our planet Earth and in the whole Universe too. He discovered, invented and built such methodes, principles, parts, instruments and machines from conventional materials wich opened our closed reality and unraveled the hidden working of ourself and our physical world too. In that sense he really hacked the world around us perceptible only to our senses and instruments and gained such new informations and knowledge wich revolutionized our world view making it possible to reach undreamed goals. In the following notes we can read about those most outstanding discoveries of Nikola Tesla wich make him call " the greatest hacker ever " in our history.

The feeling of clarity can be dangerously seductive. It is the feeling associated with understanding things. And we use that feeling, in the rough-and-tumble of daily life, as a signal that we have investigated a matter sufficiently. The sense of clarity functions as a thought-terminating heuristic. In that case, our use of clarity creates significant cognitive vulnerability, which hostile forces can try to exploit. If an epistemic manipulator can imbue a belief system with an exaggerated sense of clarity, then they can induce us to terminate our inquiries too early-before we spot the flaws in the system. How might the sense of clarity be faked? Let's first consider the object of imitation: genuine understanding. Genuine understanding grants cognitive facility. When we understand something, we categorize its aspects more easily; we see more connections between its dis-parate elements; we can generate new explanations; and we can communicate our understanding. In order to encourage us to accept a system of thought, then, an epistemic manipulator will want the system to provide its users with an exaggerated sensation of cognitive facility. The system should provide its users with the feeling that they can easily and powerfully create categorizations, generate explanations, and communicate their understanding. And manipulators have a significant advantage in imbuing their systems with a pleasurable sense of clarity, since they are freed from the burdens of accuracy and reliability. I offer two case studies of seductively clear systems: conspiracy theories; and the standardized, quantified value systems of bureaucracies.

Alchemy Rudolf II Prague Manuscript circulation a b s t r a c t This paper investigates John Dee's relationship with two kinds of alchemist: the authorities whose works he read, and the contemporary practitioners with whom he exchanged texts and ideas. Both strands coincide in the reception of works attributed to the famous English alchemist, George Ripley (d. c. 1490). Dee's keen interest in Ripley appears from the number of transcriptions he made of 'Ripleian' writings, including the Bosome book, a manuscript discovered in 1574 and believed to have been written in Ripley's own hand. In 1583, Dee and his associate Edward Kelley left England for East Central Europe, taking with them a proportion of Dee's vast library, including alchemical books-the contents of which would soon pique the interest of continental practitioners. Kelley used Ripley's works, including the Bosome book, not only as sources of practical information, but as a means of furthering his own relationships with colleagues and patrons: transactions that in turn influenced Ripley's posthumous continental reception. The resulting circulation of texts allows us to trace, with unusual precision, the spread of English alchemical ideas in the Holy Roman Empire from the late sixteenth century.

There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural entities.

The Soviet historian and philosopher of science Boris Hessen (English spelling also Gessen) is well known for the paper “On the Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia” he gave in 1931 to the Second International Congress of the History of Science in London. Its focus on the socio-economic aspects of the development of science – later called “externalism”– was regarded as groundbreaking. We present here an English translation of a lecture he gave in Moscow in April 1936, recently discovered in Russian archives, and believed to be one of his last works. He was arrested in August that year, admitting to “participation in counter-revolutionary Trotskyist activity” and “animosity toward Comrade Stalin”.  He was subject to torture and eventually executed in December, after denying “creating a terrorist cell at Moscow State University”. The lecture shows that despite being under enormous psychological pressure he coninued working on the history of physics but also returned to the philosophical questions of his earlier writings. We give a brief introduction to the lecture, attempting to place it in its context, and linking to his earlier work on the philosophy of physics from a Marxist standpoint which we have previously translated into English.

Book (in French) published in 2003 at the occasion of the first exhibition staging exclusively biomedia art works at the national art center Le Lieu Unique in Nantes/France. Hauser Jens (ed.): L'Art Biotech. Nantes/Trézélan, 2003.

The publication has not been available anymore since 2008; this PDF is made accessible with the agreement and the kind support of the Filigranes publishing house, until an augmented new edition will be be available. Great thanks to Filigranes and Patrick Le Bescont! https://www.filigranes.com

Understanding Consciousness, second edition provides a unique survey and evaluation of consciousness studies, along with an original analysis of consciousness that combines scientific findings, philosophy and common sense.

Building on the widely praised first edition of the book, this new edition adds fresh research, and deepens the original analysis in a way that reflects some of the fundamental changes in the understanding of consciousness that have taken place over the last ten years.

The book is divided into three parts; Part I surveys current theories of consciousness, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Part II reconstructs an understanding of consciousness from first principles, starting with its phenomenology, and leading to a closer examination of how conscious experience relates to the world described by physics and information processing in the brain. Finally, Part III deals with fundamental issues such as what consciousness is and does, and how it fits into the evolving universe. As the structure of the book moves from a basic overview of the field to a successively deeper analysis, it can be used both for those new to the subject and for more established researchers.

Understanding Consciousness tells a story with a beginning, middle and end in a way that integrates the philosophy of consciousness with the science. Overall, the book provides a unique perspective on how to address the problems of consciousness and as such will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who are interested in this subject.

Parmenides is probably the most influential of all Presocratics on the subsequent history of philosophy, yet he has been poorly served by his English translators. They persistently turn his poem into awkward and deadening prose, as if he had written an obscure treatise on logic. By rendering Parmenides’ poetry as poetry, in an English equivalent of its meter, this translation aims to show that his medium is essential to his message — that he is not a would-be analytic logician but a mystical visionary.striving to convey a revelation of ultimate reality.

Nossa proposta é investigar como ocorrem as metamorfoses da noção de substância simples no sistema leibniziano, entre Discurso de metafísica, Sistema novo da natureza e a comunicação das substâncias e Monadologia. Trata-se da mesma substância ou são noções diferentes?
Partimos de aporias de sua época e a polêmica entre os métodos modernos e escolásticos. Apontamos as críticas de Leibniz a ambos, partindo das insuficiências modernas aos excessos escolásticos, passando, assim, do campo da física ao campo lógico, em vista das questões metafísicas. Apoiando-se na exposição lógica, acabamos tentando reconstruir, involuntariamente, todo o sistema a partir do princípio de identidade, para conseguir apontar com mais clareza as inovações de Leibniz que reconciliam os dois partidos em sua síntese original.
Ao final, fazemos breves apontamentos particulares sobre cada um dos três textos e tiramos nossas conclusões, se as diferentes expressões da substância simples, nossa questão motriz.

Quatrième de couverture:
Réfléchir à la réflexion, penser la pensée et philosopher sur la philosophie, voilà ce que l’on propose de faire ici. Cette démarche est moins formelle qu’il n’y paraît, car interroger la nature et les exigences de la pensée philosophique engage toute une philosophie. Une philosophie qui n’est pas dupe d’elle-même et qui commence par examiner sa propre finitude. « La dernière démarche de la raison, c’est de connaître qu’il y a une infinité de choses qui la surpassent. Elle est bien faible si elle ne va jusque là », disait Pascal. Nous montrons dans un esprit proche que la réflexion est d’autant plus puissante qu’elle reconnaît son impuissance, comme la philosophie authentique doit se savoir doublement bornée, par la pensée scientifique d’une part, et par la pensée mystique d’autre part. Il ne s’agit pas de rabaisser la philosophie, mais au contraire de lui permettre de comprendre ce qui la comprend et de trouver sa juste place dans le champ intellectuel.

Table des matières

Partie I – Enjeux ontologiques, gnoséologiques et axiologiques de la réflexion

1- Fécondité de la réflexion, primat phénoménologique de l’irréfléchi, et horizon métaphysique de la réflexivité philosophique

2- Les insuffisances gnoséologiques de la réflexion et l’horizon scientifique de la philosophie

3- La réflexion sur les valeurs et les valeurs immanentes à la réflexion

Partie II – La religion, la philosophie, la science et la mystique : progrès et bornes de la réflexion théorique

1- Les progrès de la réflexion théorique : la religion, la philosophie et la science

2- Les bornes de la réflexion théorique : la science, la philosophie et la mystique

Partie III – Nature et exigences de la pensée philosophique (étude sur la philosophie et philosophie de la philosophie)

1- Remarques introductives sur le projet de définir la philosophie et d’évaluer les philosophies

2- Les exigences théoriques de la philosophie

3- Les exigences pratiques de la philosophie

4- Bilan sur les questions de définition et d’évaluation

Partie IV – De la réflexivité intradisciplinaire à l’objectivation extradisciplinaire (histoire philosophique et savante de la philosophie)

1- Remarques générales sur les rapports d’une discipline à son historiographie

2- De la sociologie de la philosophie à l’histoire scientifique de la philosophie

Data mining of Indus Script Corpora reveal the purpose of ceramic (stoneware) bangles (22), seals, fillets as dharma saṁjñā, 'badges of responsibility'.They are Corporate badges, with deciphered Indus Script inscriptions. Socio-cultural framework of a workshop (smithy-forge as a temple) for a cluster of Vedic villages unravels organization of artisanal-seafaring merchant society as a Corporation with ancient guilds.

The reference to an archaeological settlement of Sarasvati civilization is based on the finds of fire-altars in many sites (80% or over 2000 sites out of 2600 sites of the Indus valley civilization are on the banks of Vedic River Sarasvati), exemplified by the octagonal brick found in Binjor fire-altar (close to Anupgarh and Ganweriwala). At Anupgarh, the river forks into two channels: one flowing southwards towards Jaisalmer and another westwards towards Ganweriwala.


Binjor Indus Script seal PLUS fire-altar with octagonal brick (a signature tune of Vedic culture). See: http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.in/2015/12/binjor-seal-with-indus-script.html 
Binjor seal with Indus Script deciphered. Binjor attests Vedic River Sarasvati as a Himalayan navigable channel en route to Persian Gulf
Locus of Binjor, near Anupgarh on Vedic River Sarasvati

There are clear intimations of precursors to corporate life in ancient Bharatam with the social organization of the samajam governed by the weltanchauung of dharma. By unambiguous allocation of socio-cultural responsibilities governing the economic activity and businesses (production and marketing) of Bharatam Janam in clusters of villages, dharma was enshrined as the inviolate principle of all cosmic phenomena manifested in material aspects of living.

There are clear indications that cororate form (sreni) was used for the business of people. One one ceramic (stoneware) bangle (m1639) such a sreni is clearly identified headed by a sreshthin, guild-master. Thus, millennia before the Roman proto-corporations, Bharatam Janam, 'metalcaster folk' had evolved a system of socio-cultural organization of commonwealths (janapadas) for conducting businesses. Assets of the sreni were deposited into the treasury of the commonwealth and were distinct from the assets of the individual members of the sreni, many of whom were artisans and seafaring merchants.
Location of Balakot, a site of Saraswvati civilization where a ceramic (stoneware) bangle with inscription was found. (Balakot 06)
See: http://www.penn.museum/sites/expedition/shell-working-at-ancient-balakot-pakistan/ Shell working at Ancient Balakot, Pakistan (Expedition, UPenn., Vol. 19, Issue 2, January, 1977)
  Balakot 06 Ceramic (stoneware) bangle with inscription

Intimations of such janapadas are seen in the way distinct badges (as corporate badges) evolved for specific functionaries. Roots of the corporate form detailed in Kautilya's Arthas'astra are to be found in the corporate identities indicated by distinct structural elements in Indus Script corpora such as ceramic (stoneware) bangles, fillets, seals -- all with inscriptions -- as Dharma saṁjñā Corporate badges. For an Economic History of Corporate form in Ancient India, see a paper by Vikramaditya S. Khanna (2005): http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=796464

It is possible to read the sã̄gāḍā°ḍī 'lathe, portable furnace' hieroglyph-multiplex as rebus: sanghar 'fortification'; jangada 'consignments on approval' The pronunciation in Gujarati is jangaḍ relatable to jangāḍiyo ‘a military guard who accompanies treasure into the treasury’ (of the commonwealth or guild)(Gujarati). Such a dharma saṁjñā 'corporate badge' may be the gold fillet with 'lathe' hieroglyph.

Gold paṭa, 'fillet'. Punctuated design on both ends. Mohenjodaro.


Executive summary: Socio-cultural framework of Vedic village clusters of Bronze Age

The workshops evidenced by circular platforms are Corporations of the Bronze Age, with the emergence of guilds of artisans with specific functions and responsibilities to promote the Corporation as a commonwealth. It was a smiths' guild at work on circular platforms of Harappa using tablets as category 'tallies' for the final shipment of package with a seal impression. each functionary in the guild had a recognizable paṭa 'badge' (Corporate badge of dharma, of responsibility assigned in a socio-cultural organization of the samajam). A Bronze Age village of Bharatam Janam or a cluster of such villages was a janapada, a Corporation of artisan guilds.

Three paṭa 'badges' are shown on the stone statue of the so-called 'priest-king' who wears a fillet on his forehead and also on hi right shoulder. A third badge is signified on his uttariyam (shawl) which is embellished with the hieroglyphs of 'trefoils' signifying tri-dhAtu 'three mineral' strands of dhā̆vaḍ 'smelter', with assigned functional responsibility.of a Potr 'purifier'.

It is suggested that many such badges were worn by artisans of a Vedic village of the Bronze Age; such badges were ceramic (stoneware) bangles.
  An "eye bead" made of gold with steatite inlay, Harappa. Fired steatite beads appear to have been extremely important to the Indus people because they were incorporated into exquisite ornaments, such as this "eye bead" made of gold with steatite inlay found in 1995 at Harappa [Harappa Phase]. https://www.harappa.com/slide/gold-disc
The central ornament worn on the forehead of the famous "priest-king" sculpture from Mohenjo-daro appears to represent an eye bead, possibly made of gold with steatite inlay in the center. https://www.harappa.com/slide/priest-king-forehead

 
The weltanchauung, 'world perception' of artisans in a Vedic village was governed by 1. dharma, assigned responsibilities and 2. the metaphor of a kole.l 'smithy-forge' as a kole.l 'temple'.
Male head probably broken from a seated sculpture. Finely braided or wavy combed hair tied into a double bun on the back of the head and a plain fillet or headband with hanging ribbons falling down the back. The upper lip is shaved and a closely cropped and combed beard lines the pronounced lower jaw.
  Male head shows the typical arrangement of the hair in a double bun, held in place by a thin fillet (badge) tied on the forehead.

Functions assigned were recognized by distribution of ceramic (stoneware) bangles worn as paṭa, 'socio-cultural honour-badges'. Such a paṭa m. ʻ slab, tablet, metal plate ʼ,was distinct from the seals and tablets.

Such a paṭa was a gold fillet with the inscribed sã̄gāḍā°ḍī 'lathe, portable furnace' hieroglyph-multiplex .

Hieroglyph: सांगड [ sāṅgaḍa ]  That member of a turner's apparatus by which the piece to be turned is confined and steadied. सांगडीस धरणें To take into linkedness or close connection with, lit. fig.Rebus 1: Sangara [fr. saŋ+gṛ1 to sing, proclaim, cp. gāyati & gīta] 1. a promise, agreement J iv.105, 111, 473; v.25, 479; sangaraŋ karoti to make a compact Vin i.247; J (Pali) Rebus 2: śã̄gaḍa 'catamaran'. Such a सांगड [ sāṅgaḍa ] is alsoa hieroglyph-multiplex, f A body formed of two or more (fruits, animals, men) linked or joined together.

Such a paṭa were two anthropomorphs of copper/bronze with spread legs of a human body. The rebus reading of the hieroglyph-multiplex (hypertext) on the badges: 1. helmsman, merchantman, (metal) suercargo, engraver, merchant, worker in wood and iron; 2. helmsman, (metal) supercargo, iron worker

Spread legs on both anthropomorphs signify कर्णक 'spread legs' rebus: 'helmsman'

Sharply defined inscriptions on each of the 22 ceramic (stoneware) bangles indicate 21 sharply assigned responsibilities within the guild for metalwork, for e.g. 21 functional allocations of responsibilitie of artisans delineated in a Vedic village:
1. iron smelting, furnace work (m1659)
2. metal casting, engraving, documenting supercargo (m1647)
3. bronze (casting)(m1646)
4. gota (laterite) (m1641)
5. Seafaring merchant, magnetite ingot workshop (m1643)
6. Smithy, forge (m1641)
7. Moltencast copper, brass (m1640)
8. Alloy metal mint, weapons, implements workshop, guild master workshop (m1639)
9. Bronze ingots, implements, magnetite ingots (m1638)
10. Metalcasting workshop (cire perdue?)(m1637)
11. Metal implements, weapons, smithy, forge (m1636)
12. Blacksmith, seafaring merchant (m1634)
13. Helman for supercargo boat, iron furnace work, metals workshop (m1633)
14. Metal casting, alloy mixing workshop (m1632)
15. dhā̆vaḍ 'smelter', supercargo of implements (m1631)
16. Magnetite ingots, furnace work, supercargo engraver (m1630)
17. Iron furnace work, metal casting of tin, helmsman supercargo of metals, bharat ‘mixed alloys’  metalworker (m1629)
18. Minerals workshop guild (h2576)
19. Magnetite ingots, smelter (h1010)
20. dhā̆vaḍ 'smelter' tri-dhAtu, '‘three minerals (H98-3516/8667-01)
21. Seafaring merchant, supercargo engraver(Blkt-6)

Faire reculer la mort, agir sur ces causes, en modifier les frontières, contrôler l’ensemble de ses paramètres, comprendre son processus afin de prolonger le plus longtemps possible la vie, voire dépasser les limites temporelles assignées à l’existence humaine, tels sont les objectifs poursuivis sans relâche par les autorités scientifiques et politiques, au point que la santé est devenue l’une des préoccupations majeures de nos sociétés. Repoussée dans la sphère intime, la mort se désocialise, entraînant de ce fait un effritement du lien social. La notion de « postmortalité » renvoie à ce nouveau rapport à la mort qui s’affirme aujourd’hui par la volonté affichée de vaincre techniquement celle-ci et, en quelque sorte, de « vivre sans vieillir ». C’est la description minutieuse de ce courant de pensée que propose le livre de Céline Lafontaine, dérangeant à bien des égards.

Poursuivant la réflexion amorcée dans L’Empire cybernétique, l’auteur élabore ici une synthèse critique des représentations et des pratiques liées à la postmortalité visant à ouvrir un champ de réflexion et de débat sur le statut de la mortalité dans notre société et ses conséquences pour l’avenir

Plantinga famously argues against the evidentialist that belief in God can be properly basic.  Consideration of the epistemology of cognitive faculties (like perception and memory) that produce psychologically non-inferential belief helps us understand how various inferentially-justified theoretical beliefs are epistemically prior to our memory and perceptual beliefs, preventing such beliefs from being epistemically basic.  Taking seriously Plantinga’s analogy between the sensus divinitatis and cognitive faculties like memory and perception, I argue that such considerations give us good reason to think that the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis cannot be properly basic, either.  We close by considering a number of objections to our argument by and on behalf of Plantinga.

Terrence Deacon's Incomplete Nature defies easy review. This is a long, wide-ranging, and carefully argued book. The ideas are also highly networked so it is difficult to convey them in a brief, linear order. Despite these obstacles, I will summarize and evaluate a few of the ideas most significant for the field of science and theology.

Early in the twentieth century, Kant’s epistemology was accused of having become irrelevant in view of the relativistic and the quantum revolutions. Relativity seemed to discard the transcendental aesthetic (the doctrine of space as intuitive a priori), and quantum mechanics the transcendental analytic (the doctrine of causality as conceptual  a priori). But some neo-Kantian philosophers (especially E. Cassirer, the young H. Reichenbach, G. Hermann, P. Mittelstaedt etc.) convincingly argued that these problems could be solved.  Three strategies of adaptation of transcendental epistemology to the challenge of modern physics will then be discussed : 1) restriction of Kant’s a priori principles to the domain of ordinary cognition ; 2) research of even more general a priori principles able to cover the domains of modern physics as well ; 3) relativization and historicisation of the a priori. It will then be shown that the basic strategy of transcendental epistemology, to wit the ‘copernican revolution’, or the reflective attitude, has never been as indispensible to the intelligibility of physics. This strategy will be briefly applied to the justification of the structure of quantum mechanics, to understanding non-separability, and to re-interpreting decoherence.

"In recent years new applications emerged on the Web which received the labels Web2.0 or social software. In many of these applications people are engaged in epistemic activities, such as the dissemination, organization or creation of knowledge. The goal of this thesis is to analyze the epistemological relevance of such epistemic social software. Because communication and interaction between multiple agents seems to be the key to understand the epistemic processes within such systems, social epistemology, the philosophical discipline exploring the ways and the extent to which knowledge is social, was chosen as a theoretical framework. However, none of the existing comprehensive social epistemologies delivers a sufficient framework to analyze epistemic social software. Therefore, I have developed a new socio-epistemological framework to analyze epistemic social software which is rooted in socio-epistemological discourse, but amends it with insights from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS).

My framework is founded on a tripartite classification of socio-technical epistemic system based on the mechanisms they employ to close socio-epistemic processes. These three mechanisms are integration, aggregation and selection. With this classification I do not aim at reducing the differences between systems to their mechanisms of closure. However, I argue that the classification based on this indicator is heuristically fruitful. Systems employing different mechanisms of closure depend on different social, technical and epistemic prerequisites, have different strengths and weaknesses and are optimal for different epistemic tasks. My model puts a fact into the focus that has been neglected so far in social epistemology: the technical and its relationship to the social and the epistemic. Since most epistemic practices are nowadays pervaded by technologies, such a consideration of the role of technologies in these practices seems to be indispensable for any social epistemology that aims at being not only normatively appropriate, but also empirically adequate."

Sometimes we need to look backwards in order to look forward. Th at is to say, in order to understand the world of science today and where it may be heading tomorrow, it helps to know where it has been in the past. How did we come to our present understanding of atoms, energy, gravity and light? What are the fundamental principles through which we investigate the world around us? Who are the great scientifi c fi gures who helped us to fi nd our place in the universe? Th is book aims to answer these questions, guiding students from the past to the present and from the present to the future.

This paper examines the history and philosophy of a little-known psychological experience: depersonalization. It explores it as a phenomenal experience and as a disorder. It examines nosological debates over the condition, both past and present. It presents speculative hypotheses about phenomenal consciousness, the self and sensation.

Fifty years ago, Thomas Kuhn wrote a thin volume entitled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn challenged the traditional view of science as an accumulation of objective knowledge toward an ever more ‘truthful’ understanding of nature. Instead, he argued, that there is no ‘Truth’, what scientists discover depends to a large extent on the sorts of questions they ask, which in turn depend in part on scientists’ philosophical commitments. Sometimes, the dominant scientific way of looking at the world becomes obviously replete with problems; this can give birth to radical and irreversible scientific revolutions that Kuhn described as “paradigm shifts”.

While the question of survival of bodily death is usually approached by focusing on the mind/body relation (and often with the idea of the soul as a special kind of substance), this paper explores the issue in the context of our understanding of time. The argument of the paper is woven around the central intuition of time as an "everliving present." The development of this intuition allows for a more integral or "complexholistic" theory of time, the soul, and the question of survival. Following the introductory matter, the first section proposes a re-interpretation of Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence in terms of moments and lives as "eternally occurring." The next section is a treatment of Julian Barbour's neo-Machian model of instants of time as configurations in the n-dimensional phase-space he calls "Platonia." While rejecting his claim to have done away with time, I do find his model suggestive of the idea of moments and lives as eternally occurring. The following section begins with Fechner's visionary ideas of the nature of the soul and its survival of bodily death, with particular attention to the notion of holonic inclusion and the central analogy of the transition from perception to memory. I turn next to Whitehead's equally holonic notions of prehension and the concrescence of actual occasions. From his epochal theory of time and certain ambiguities in his reflections on the "divine antinomies," we are brought to the threshold of a potentially more integral or "complex-holistic" theory of time and survival, which is treated in the last section. This section draws from my earlier work on Hegel, Jung, and Edgar Morin, as well as from key insights of Jean Gebser, for an interpretation of Sri Aurobindo's inspired but cryptic description of the "Supramental Time Vision." This interpretation leads to an alternative understanding of reincarnation-and to the possibility of its reconciliation with the once-only view of life and its corresponding version of immortality-along with the idea of a holonic scale of selves leading from individual personality as we normally experience it, through a kind of angelic self (a reinterpreted "Jivatma"), and ultimately to the Godhead as the Absolute Self. Of greater moment than such a speculative ontology, however, is the integral or complex-holistic way of thinking and imagining that is called for by this kind of inquiry.

Depuis 1633, date à laquelle Descartes range son Monde dans un tiroir pour éviter d’avoir les mêmes ennuis que Galilée, aucun éditeur n’a jamais publié ce livre comme tel, et dans l’ordre où le souhaitait Descartes.
Cependant, pour Descartes lui-même, c’est un traité à part, même s’il est resté inachevé. L’homme est en effet le chapitre XVIII du Monde. Leur dissociation est dommageable car elle masque le projet même de Descartes, qui est d’articuler la révolution de Copernic à celle de Vésale, et de proposer ainsi une relation nouvelle de l’homme et  du monde, où la médecine joue un rôle éminent.
Cette édition intégrale du Monde est donc un événement - en ce qu’elle procure un  texte complet, scrupuleusement établi (modernisé dans son orthographe et sa ponctuation), introduit par Annie Bitbol-Hespériès et annoté par Annie Bitbol-Hespériès et Jean-Pierre Verdet.

Citar aqui todos os meus incentivadores seria uma tarefa enfadonha, pois foram muitos. Mas certamente alguns deles devem ser nominados, pela participação e importância decisivas que tiveram para a consecução deste trabalho. Aos meus professores, principalmente meu orientador, Professor Pablo Rubén Mariconda, por sua incessante disponibilidade em orientar meus estudos, por sua perspicácia e notável experiência na pesquisa voltada à filosofia da ciência. Ao Professor Oscar João Abdounur, cujas contribuições foram preciosas para o resultado final da presente tese. Ao professor Gerhard Heinzmann, que desde nosso primeiro contato, ainda por correio eletrônico, concordou em colaborar incondicionalmente com o projeto, demonstrando em todos os momentos disponibilidade, gentileza e comprometimento, sobretudo durante minha estadia em Nancy. Aos professores Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos, João Virgílio Gallerani Cuter, Roger Pouivet, Manuel Rebuschi e Scott Walter, pelos debates proveitosos e indicações valiosas para a pesquisa. Ao meu ex-comandante, Coronel PM Walter Gomes Mota, grande incentivador e amigo, por sua colaboração no sentido de viabilizar meu estágio no exterior. Ao pessoal do Departamento de Filosofia da Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da USP, pela competência acima de qualquer prova, aos membros do Laboratoire d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences -Archives Henri Poincaré, pela oportunidade do convívio em Nancy, e à Capes, pela concessão da bolsa PDEE. Aos meus amigos e parentes, em especial à minha mãe, Edna, meus irmãos, Edson e Bianca, e sogros, Othoni e Olindina, pelo apoio prestado a mim, minha esposa e filhas, mormente durante minha permanência no exterior. E, naturalmente, o justo agradecimento a estas últimas, Rita, Beatriz e Luíza, pela paciência e tolerância durante quatro longos meses de ausência, bem como pelas incontáveis horas de estudo e pesquisa que foram necessárias para a concretização deste trabalho.

This last chapter is intended to clarify some central methodological aspects of morphodynamical abduction as regards dynamical systems and the catastrophe theory. Some problems arise in the classical computational approach to cognition in describing the most interesting abductive issues. A cognitive process (and thus abduction) is described by the manipulation of internal semiotic representations of external world. This view assumes a discrete set of representations fixed in discrete time jumps and, because of its functionalist character, cannot render the embodied dimension of cognition and the issue of anticipation and causation of a new hypothesis adequately. An integration of the traditional computational view with some ideas developed within the so-called dynamical approach and catastrophe theory can lead to important insights. What is the role of abduction in the dynamical system approach?What is the role of the “salient/pregnant” dichotomy with respect to abduction?What is embodied cognition from the point of view of its “physics”?

We live in an age of movement. More than at any other time in history , people and things move longer distances, more frequently, and faster than ever before. All that was solid melted into air long ago and is now in full circulation around the world like dandelion seeds adrift on turbulent winds. We find ourselves, in the early twenty-first century, in a world where every major domain of human activity has become increasingly defined by motion. 1 We have entered a new historical era defined in large part by movement and mobility and are now in need of a new historical on-tology appropriate to our time. The observation that the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first was marked by an increasingly " liquid " and " mobile modernity " is now something widely recognized in the scholarly literature at the turn of the century. 2 Today, however, our orientation to this event is quite different. Almost twenty years into the twenty-first century we now find ourselves situated on the other side of this heralded transition. The question that confronts us today is thus a new one: how to fold all that has melted back up into new solids. 3

[1] What does the word ‘physical’ mean in its most general theoretical philosophical use? It’s used in many different ways, and it’s hard to imagine that philosophers could reach agreement on a best use. [2] Should we tie the meaning of ‘physical’ closely to physics? To do so (in a non-circular way) is to run the risk of ruling out the possibility that there might be two different universes that were ‘formally’ or structurally identical or homomorphic although substantially different—made of different stuff. [3] Perhaps that is not in the end a real possibility. Even so, it seems that we shouldn’t define ‘physical’ in a way that rules it out a priori. [4] If so, it may be that the word ‘physical’ is best used to denote a certain fundamental structure-transcendent stuff-nature—call it P—that allows the possibility that a universe with stuff nature Q structurally identical to a physical universe isn’t physical. [5] Can we suppose ourselves to know something about the ultimate intrinsic nature of P, if physicalism is true? I argue that we can. [6] Can we draw any further metaphysical conclusions from this knowledge? I argue that we can. We can show that panpsychism in some form constitutes the most plausible theory of the ultimate nature of P.

This is a short poem by Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Ṣabbān (d. 1206/1791) translated from the original Arabic into English verse. The poem is a concise, technical list of the ten essentials aspects of any science. It is intended to help students memorize the outline of the topic, while a teacher's additional commentary would be needed to really understand the content and meaning of the ten essentials.

The paper examines ontological presuppositions and epistemological branches of Peace and Conflict Studies. It describes the narrower use of the concepts ‗ontology‘ and ‗epistemology‘ as sub-branch and branch of philosophy respectively and later focus on their meanings in the context of particular areas of inquiry. It highlights the most basic of the core field definition and distinction issues in Peace and Conflict Studies—what peace is; the nature, causes, outbreak, and dynamics of conflict; and the means for resolving conflict and building sustainable peace. It presents and offers answers to key ontological questions: what exist, in what form do they exist, what are the conditions under which they exist, what is their relationships with other things that are said to exist regarding the field of Peace and Conflict Studies. Furthermore, the paper reviews ways of knowing, understanding, explaining and justifying the ontological presuppositions. Thus it discusses the three epistemological branches of Peace and Conflict Studies proposed by Johan Galtung—empirical peace studies, critical peace studies, and constructive peace studies—and their implications for values, empirical data and theory. In light of this epistemology, the author posits that values, followed by data, take preeminence in the applied Social Sciences field of Peace and Conflict Studies.