Philosophy of First Principles

At the foundation of every scientific study must lie a clear definition of what is being studied. Such a definition of key concepts is reached through the process of conceptualization, to which there exist two main approaches: the classical (or first principles thinking) approach and the prototype (or analogical thinking) approach. Through the example of finding an adequate definition for the concept of 'democracy', both approaches to conceptualization are demonstrated in practice. This article compares the effectiveness of both approaches before proposing a model for the more rigorous and reliable first principles thinking approach.

The aim of this article is to examine how first principles are developed into general theories by reviewing the roles that abduction, deduction, and induction play in the three primary steps of the scientific method: hypothesis generation, hypothesis testing, and theory generation. Kant's democratic peace theory is first used to illustrate this process, and the example is subsequently extended to show the secondary level of scrutiny that theories must undergo before they can be applied to the empirical world. The article concludes by considering the strengths and weaknesses of scientific theories, particularly in the field of social sciences.

This is just a one page argument explaining why the real cannot change and what changes is not real.

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Jungians and Christians use the word evil in different and contradictory senses. The moral aim of the Jungian is the "integration of evil", whereas for the Christian it is "the overcoming of evil by good". This paper guides the reader through White"s thinking on evil-understood in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas as parasitic on good-malum est privatio boni, and concludes by considering the clinical significance of the relationship between moral evil-malum culpae-and guilt. Although Jung and White never resolved their differences on evil, they agreed that the subject demands concentration and careful reflection. The hypothesis here is that, although the literature on the Jung-White dialogue offers extensive analysis on evil, it does not go far enough. There is little evidence of dynamic engagement with the underlying ethical issues that White"s clarity of thought challenges one to consider.

The world of today is more interconnected and dynamic than ever before. Although this fact has come with many benefits, it has also resulted in an ever-growing number of societal challenges around the globe. The lack of existing solutions to these challenges calls for new methods of developing innovative and practical ideas. First principles thinking is a technique that guides you to systematically come up with new solutions by way of reverse-engineering societal challenges. It encourages you to critically question the assumptions of the challenge and break it down into basic components, after which you ask more critical questions that will surely inspire new ideas in a way that reassembles the components from the ground up. The methodology itself dates back to classical antiquity, when it was first introduced by Aristotle and later applied by Euclid in his geometrical proofs. It was then further developed during the Renaissance by Descartes’ foundationalism as well as in the age of Enlightenment through Kant’s writings on reason. At the onset of modernity, Marx experimented with pairing first principles with ideology. However, contemporary works on the method have not gone much further than simply listing the action steps, which leaves much open to the intuition and interpretation of the applicant. Some aspiring first principles thinkers appreciate this more than others. For those who would like some more guidance, we have outlined additional procedures and insights. We furthermore elaborate on two additional steps that we find are particularly relevant in the context of societal problem-solving. In doing so, we also apply each step to the challenge of ensuring sufficient access to fresh water for residents of Cape Town, after which we invite you to do the same for your challenge. Though this manual addresses the steps of first principles thinking in depth, we go on to demonstrate how it compares to other societal problem-solving methods. In stark contrast to first principles thinking, analogical thinking seeks to duplicate solutions that have worked in similar contexts to a given challenge rather than develop unique and original ideas. More in line with first principles thinking, however, analytical thinking focuses on the root causes of a particular challenge to develop solutions for it. Design thinking is the most people-centred approach, as it concentrates primarily on the stakeholders in any particular challenge, while lateral thinking looks beyond the challenge in question to draw inspiration from other areas to produce creative solutions. Finally, computational thinking aims to deconstruct challenges into individual variables in order to create solutions based on the results of carefully formulated algorithms. Finally, we look at the scientific method to demonstrate the role that first principles play in hypothesis creation through the process of abductive, deductive and inductive reasoning.

Design thinking is not thinking about design, but rather a re-focus on the way we think, about the world in general, and in this cybernetic process the real self can be brought into being. Gramma/topology is the social structuration of a theory-as-ontology framework with the ability to function as a design educational model that could enrich the teaching and learning of design in all its diverse applications. To paraphrase and deconstruct Derrida, I shall call this model gramma/topology; since such a peculiar field-of-knowing does not exist, in any particular form, before the model is used, no one can say with certainty what the outcome would be, but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance for both designer-Dasein and design-Dasein.

The present study overhauls Hans Kelsen’s thesis of the traditional normative pyramid, in order to accommodate the most outstanding doctrinal contributions of the last century to it. For the purpose, the Essay proceeds as follows: (i) the shortcomings of the first version of the pyramid, found in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law and on Adolf Merkl’s contributions, are detected; (ii) new key concepts of the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics are introduced, this will allow us to upgrade the theory of the staggered legal system; (iii) unity and order of the legal system are briefly analyzed; (iv) a staggered legal pyramid is redesigned, with a gradual reduction of the juridical space; and finally, (v) the theories of Kelsen, Merkl, and several of the most influential doctrinarians of law (e.g., Jhering, Radbruch, Rorty, Ross, Kelsen, Holmes, Hägerström, Olivecrona, Hart, MacCormick, Dworkin, among others) are tested, to see if their ideas fit in the new theory.
This upgrade of the traditional theory arises from a significant shift in the philosophical basis. The first pyramid was elaborated by Kelsen and Merkl under the tenets of neo-Kantian metaphysics. On the other hand, the methodology and the basic ideas behind this study are those of the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. It moves from an idealistic metaphysics to a traditional realistic metaphysics, so neglected in recent centuries. The inverted pyramid theory, formulated here, is the product of many previous works. Many of them have been published in different international journals.

What is first principles thinking? When did it originate? Who can use it? And why is it such a big deal? Ever since Elon Musk, founder and chief executive of a number of highly innovative companies like Tesla and SpaceX, attributed first principles thinking to part of his entrepreneurial success, the problem-solving method has begun to experience a comeback. Nonetheless, despite its relative simplicity and versatile applicability, first principles thinking remains a concept merely skimmed over in philosophy classes or only briefly mentioned in business courses. In order to clarify some of the confusion surrounding the concept, this article outlines the history and development of first principles thinking from its philosophical foundations to its place at the forefront of modern problem-solving and innovation.

Reproduced with kind permission from 'Theofilus' Vol. 8, n 1, 2016

The theological sensibility of Radical Orthodoxy in its quest to return to traditional sources of orthodoxy for a ‘radical’ critique of secular thought has particularly privileged the thought of Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) as the pinnacle of the ‘ancient way’ prior to the nominalistic ‘fall’ which entered with Duns Scotus. This paper however questions whether Radical Orthodoxy has been radically Thomistic enough in its metaphysics and particularly highlights the importance of first principles of knowledge such as the law of non-contradiction to Thomas Aquinas. Whereas Aquinas insisted that God cannot break the law of non-contradiction, key RO writers have argued that this law is somehow suspended in God. This paper argues that compromising the law of non-contradiction weakens RO’s critique of secularism and opens up the possibility of nihilism.

Alan Darley has implored Radical Orthodoxy to become " more radically Thomistic " by recovering the law of non-contradiction that has lately been lost by Milbank, Pickstock, and Hoff in a " Cusanian tributary from the Neoplatonic river ". He contends that this prohibition on all contradictions can be explained through Aristotle's indirect demonstration against any possibility of denying it. But he fails to recognize how this very indirect demonstration already operates as a viciously circular formalized dialectic. Plato developed this dialectic into the self-determination of Intellect; Plotinus suspended it from the divine hypostases; and Proclus systematized it as the creative hypercontrariety that imparts every determination. Thomas Aquinas inherited Proclus' creative hypercontrariety from Pseudo-Dionysius of Areopagite, Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction from Avicenna, and sublated all contrariety into the divine impartation of individuated acts of existence. This impartation of existence into entities may have produced an aporia of existence: if existence is multiple then it is contrary to the individuality of every entity; but if existence is unitary then it may conceal the creative contrariety of participation. The indiscriminate application of the Principle of Non-Contradiction threatens to break the bonds of being and dissolve the Thomistic metaphysics of participation into post-Ockhamist nihilism. The further radicalization of Thomism may thus require the aporia of existence to be resolved through a Neoplatonic dialectic.

The overall objective of this article is to explore the psychological theories of ‘thinking’ and the efficacy and efficiency of each of these theories for the purpose of innovation and creativity.
We know for sure that some people, companies and businesses are better at problem solving, decision making and innovation than others and we also know (with sufficient data proofs) that most of these ‘some’ entities have been doing so consistently.
Therefore, one must ask himself/herself the question as to how these entities are consistently able to adopt themselves better than others. And given the fact, that adaptation is the primary characteristic of intelligence, one has to ask himself/herself as to, where does this intelligence comes from? Is this form and degree of cognitive intelligence inherent with certain people? Can it be learned and acquired? What is the reason behind this dissimilar ability for adaptability and innovation?
I argue that the answers to these questions, exists in-parts in different researches and literature. The objective for this article is to explore some of the theories that are associated with the notion of ‘cognitive thinking’.

This paper intends to trace the influence of the Platonic tradition “On first principles”, considering its different versions, on the philosophy of Origen of Alexandria. Origen’s knowledge of the Platonists and his affinity with them are confirmed by the historical sources. The Alexandrian adopts and assimilates many aspects of the doctrine and terminology of Plato’s followers. However, he also departs from them regarding some of the essential elements in his conception of the Divine and of the world’s creation. Particularly, the paper focuses on the roles played in Origen’s theory by the Academic categories of Absolute and Relative, the Middle-platonic and Philonian notion of the demiurgic agent and an original reframing of the Neopythagorean derivative system of causes.

Teori Ketumpatan Berfungsi (TKB) adalah kaedah pemodelan mekanik kuantum yang digunakan dalam bidang fizik dan kimia. Asas pada teori pemodelan ini adalah pengiraan tenaga ke atas sistem yang kompleks. Sifat suatu sistem tersebut dapat ditentukan dengan menggunakan fungsian elektron. Teori ini dibangunkan sebagai kaedah memudahkan dan menambah baik daripada teori-teori yang pernah diusulkan pada masa lepas. Antara pembaharuan ketara yang dilakukan adalah TKB tidak mengabaikan bentuk-bentuk tenaga yang dikatakan tidak signifikan oleh kaedah-kaedah sebelumnya. Kemudahan menggunakan teori ini adalah dengan mencari ketumpatan elektron sudah cukup untuk menentukan pelbagai bentuk tenaga yang berlaku dalam sistem tersebut. Dalam makalah ini, penulisan ini akan menghuraikan perkembangan mekanik kuantum daripada aspek pengiraan tenaga bermula dari Model Bohr, Kaedah Hatree-Fock hinggalah Teori Ketumpatan Berfungsi. Dalam berkongsi perkembangan tersebut, penulisan ini memberikan tumpuan bagaimana TKB mampu menjadi teori yang kukuh dalam pemodelan menyanggah teori-teori dan kaedah sebelumnya. Akhir sekali, falsafah disebalik teori ini akan turut dihuraikan. Kata kunci: teori ketumpatan berfungsi, tenaga, fungsian, prinsip-pertama

Considerar que hay ideas claras y distintas e ideas confusas, o sea, transferir la evidencia y la certeza del juicio a la idea, como hace la filosofía moderna siguiendo a Escoto, lleva necesariamente a plantear el problema crítico –al criticismo– y, en último término, al escepticismo.

With the explosive growth of biology, biological data accumulate in an increasing rate. At present, it seems that theoretical biology does not have its fundamental principles that could offer biological insight. In this situation, it is advisable for biology to learn from its older brother, physics. The most powerful tool of physics is the action principle, from which all the fundamental laws of physics can be derived in their most elegant form. We show that today’s physics is far from utilizing the full potential of the action principle. This circumstance is almost inevitable, since it belongs to the nature of the physical problems that the endpoint of the action principle is fixed already by the initial conditions, and that physical behavior in most cases corresponds to the minimal form of the action principle. Actually, the mathematical form of the action principle allows also endpoints corresponding to the maximum of the action. We show that when we endow the action principle with this overlooked possibility, it gains an enormous additional power, which, perhaps surprisingly, directly corresponds to biological behavior. The biological version of the least action principle is the most action principle. It is characteristically biological to strive to the most action, instead of manifesting inert behavior corresponding to the least action. A fallen body in classical physics cannot select its endpoint. How is it possible that a fallen bird can select the endpoint of its trajectory? We consider how the photon “selects” its endpoint in the classical and the extended double-slit experiments, and propose a new causal interpretation of quantum physics. We show that “spontaneous targeting” observed in living organisms is a direct manifestation of the causally determined quantum processes. For the first time, we formulate here the first principle of biology in a mathematical form and present some of its applications of primary importance. We indicate that the general phenomenon of biological homing relies on long-range cooperative forces between biomolecules, including mechanical, electromagnetic and osmotic forces. We show how theoretical biology beyond the quantum level can shed light to the properties of elementary consciousness.

Dans ce chapitre, nous aimerions formuler quelques brèves remarques (qui resteront incomplètes) sur le rôle joué par la dimension esthétique chez quelques- unes des figures principales de l’idéalisme allemand dans le cadre de la question de la foundation (comprise au sens large). Nous envisagerons d’abord brièvement la position de Kant dans la Critique de la faculté de juger (§ I), puis nous montrerons comment les penseurs du premier romantisme et Schelling (§ II), ainsi que les auteurs du texte intitulé Le plus ancien programme systématique de l’idéalisme allemande (Hölderlin, Schelling et Hegel) (§ III) et le Hegel « de la maturité » (§ IV) ont introduit l’esthétique, voire la philosophie de l’art, dans le cadre de la question de la fondation (ultime). Enfin, dans le § V, nous nous intéresserons à Fichte. Bien que l’expérience des arts au sens strict ne joue qu’un rôle très réduit dans la philosophie de Fichte et que l’esthétique en tant que discipline particulière du savoir ne receive pas davantage de statut clair et significatif dans son système, il apparaît qu’une certaine conception plutôt « productiviste » de la dimension esthétique de la vie exerce une fonction importante dans sa pensée transcendantale, en particulier concernant l’imagination et la théorie de l’image. C’est en raison de la portée théorétique qu’a l’approche transcendantale de Fichte pour notre questionnement que nous nous étendrons un peu plus longuement sur sa pensée, qui demeure bien moins connue encore que ne le sont les positions de Kant, des romantiques et de Hegel.

This is a Post inviting to an excellent conference in Spanish on the Principle of No-Contradiction and the inconsistencies of the Relativism and the Skepticism, by Dr. Enrique Alarcón professor of metaphysics at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Navarra, and Director of the Corpus Thomisticum enterprise. The conference is scheduled for tomorrow Friday September 24 at 11:00 am, time of Quito and 18:00 pm time of Spain.

“The mathematical sciences vs. De nominum analogia”

We examine Cajetan’s De nominum analogia (On the Analogy of Names) under the light of ancient mathematics to determine whether it adheres to the scientific criteria and discoveries set by the authorities upon which it claims to rest. We conclude it contains three fundamental errors: an incorrect distinction between predicable genus and subject genus; disdain for virtual quantity; and the reduction of analogy to a mere form of denomination, uprooting it from demonstrative reasoning, which is its original and proper place in science.

Examinamos el De nominum analogia (De la analogía de los nombres), de Tomás de Vio Cayetano, para determinar, a la luz de las matemáticas antiguas, hasta qué punto se ciña a los criterios y descubrimientos científicos de las mismas autoridades en quienes dice apoyarse. Concluimos que contiene tres errores fundamentales: no distinguir correctamente entre género predicable y género sujeto; desdeñar la cantidad virtual; y reducir la analogía a una mera forma de nombrar, desarraigándola del razonamiento demostrativo, que es su lugar original y propio en la ciencia.

Faculty, staff, and administrators each play a key role in university cultures, but these groups are not coequal in status or authority when compared to one another or within each subgroup, which complicates matters of collegiality and authority for academic administrators.

The topic of the present paper is the principle of contradiction and its initial status in Aristotle’s philosophy, where it functions as one of the “common principles” of all sciences.In course of the paper I try to answer the question of how exactly those common principles are supposed to function within the model of demonstrative science of Aristotle. After analyzing the doctrines of Posterior Analytics  and
Metaphysic  I come to conclusion, that there is a contradiction in the theory that describes functioning of the common principles. This contradiction, I believe,
cannot be resolved within the doctrine of Aristotle’s demonstrative science, but its’ originscan be explained historically, if we accept the hypothesis of the certain way in which the “first principles” of Aristotle’s philosophy originate from the axiomatic principles of the Ancient Greek mathematics.


В статье рассматривается принцип противоречия в его изначальном статусе в контексте философии Аристотеля – в качестве одного из “общих начал” всех наук – и ставится вопрос о способе функционирования общих начал в рамках модели “доказательной науки” Аристотеля. На основе анализа учения “Второй Аналитики” и “Метафизики” делается вывод о том, что учение Аристотеля о применении общих начал содержит в себе противоречие, и предлагается историческое объяснение причин этого противоречия на основе гипотезы о происхождении “первых начал” философии Аристотеля из аксиоматических начал античной математики

The article researches the question of whether the definitions, used in demonstrative syllogisms of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics as premises, are definitions of major or minor terms of the syllogism. First I show that in all cases, contrary to the traditional understanding of this problem, it is the definition of major term that concerns Aristotle: all the relevant textual evidence speak in favor of that interpretation while there is no explicit evidence against it. Then, I reveal the fallacies upon which the widely held assumption that demonstration uses definitions of the minor term is based. One of those fallacies is an attempt to conceive the process of demonstration described in Posterior Analytics as analogous to (and perhaps based on) the process of Platonic diaeresis, which leads commentators to focus on examples of demonstration, that are inadequate to the point and at best accessory for Aristotle himself. The other main mistake is an implicit assumption that the process of demonstration of essential attribute has to reflect directly one of the types of essential connection between a subject of demonstration and an essential attribute that is being demonstrated of it, described in Posterior Analytics  I.4. I show that the rejection of these two fallacious interpretational moves is not only justified, but also gives us an overall more coherent picture of the doctrine of Posterior Analytics.

В статье рассматривается вопрос, являются ли определения, используемые в доказательных силлогизмах “Второй аналитики” Аристотеля в качестве посылок, определениями больших или меньших терминов силлогизма. Во-первых, я показываю, что,
вопреки традиционному понимаю этого вопроса, во “Второй аналитике” во всех случаях речь идет об определениях больших терминов: в пользу этого говорят все релевантные свидетельства текста, тогда как об обратном текст прямо не свидетельствует
ни разу. Во-вторых, я демонстрирую, на каких ошибках покоится традиционное предположение о том, что доказательство происходит через определение меньшего термина. Одной из этих ошибок является попытка представить себе процесс доказательства, описываемый во “Второй аналитике”, по аналогии с платоническим диайресисом, что приводит исследователей к ориентации на неадекватные и второстепенные для самого
Аристотеля примеры доказательства. Другой главной ошибкой является имплицитное предположение о том, что процесс доказательства субстанциального свойства должен
прямо отражать в себе один из конкретных видов субстанциальной связи между до казываемым свойством и субъектом доказательства, описанных в I.4 “Второй аналитики”. Я показываю, что отказ от этих двух ошибочных интерпретационных ходов не только абсолютно оправдан, но и дает нам намного более связную картину “Второй аналитики”.

The Metaphysical Art is a series of short works illustrating the concept of the art of metaphysics. This is the 6th contribution to the series. Metaphysical Arts (I - V) may be found in SPIRITUAL WRITINGS by Nathan Coppedge, and are well worth a look. The book will soon be updated with the 6th segment of Metaphysical Art, but also already contains many other original spiritual writings.

O artigo compreende a discussão de três aspectos do pensamento político de Thomas Reid. Inicialmente, apresenta-se e discute-se a compreensão reidiana de ciência política. Na sequência, argumenta-se que, diferentemente dos princípios primeiros de outros campos do saber, como, por exemplo, a matemática, a filosofia da mente e a moral, os princípios primeiros da ciência política não são princípios primeiros do senso comum. A política é fundada sobre uma forma de conhecimento empírico que não pode ser identificada com o senso comum, com os julgamentos e crenças devidos à constituição original da mente que são compartilhadas pela maior parte dos seres humanos. Por fim, argumenta-se, a partir de um paralelo com a filosofia da natureza, que o senso comum possui apenas um papel metodológico no âmbito da ciência política.

The present paper investigates the question of whether Posterior Analytics’ “principles” of demonstration that Aristotle calls “hypotheses” are to be understood as existential or as predicative (veridical) propositions. I propose two arguments for the latter understanding. The first argument shows that demonstration (given that we understand this notion as Aristotle does) of existence is impossible, so that introducing existential principle would be pointless. The second argument shows that the demonstration of Posterior Analytics needs unmediated predicative premises distinct from definitions in order to function and that nothing apart from hypotheses can be those premises.

В статье рассматривается вопрос о том, являются ли такие «начала» доказательного знания «Второй аналитики», как «гипотезы», экзистенциальными или же предикативными пропозициями. С помощью двух доводов я показываю, что верным является последний способ понимания гипотез. Первый довод демонстрирует, что доказательство (если мы пониманием это слово в аристотелевском смысле) существования невозможно, что лишает постулирование экзистенциальных начал смысла. Второй довод показывает, что доказательству «Второй аналитики» необходимы неопосредованные предикативные посылки, которые не являлись бы определениями, и ничто, кроме гипотез, не может выполнять эту роль.