Philosophy and Literature

In this article, I outline a logic of design of a system as a specific kind of conceptual logic of the design of the model of a system, that is, the blueprint that provides information about the system to be created. In section two, I introduce the method of levels of abstraction as a modelling tool borrowed from computer science. In section three, I use this method to clarify two main conceptual logics of information (i.e., modelling systems) inherited from modernity: Kant's transcen-dental logic of conditions of possibility of a system, and Hegel's dialectical logic of conditions of in/stability of a system. Both conceptual logics of information analyse structural properties of given systems. Strictly speaking, neither is a conceptual logic of information about (or modelling) the conditions of feasibility of a system, that is, neither is a logic of information as a logic of design. So, in section four, I outline this third conceptual logic of information and then interpret the conceptual logic of design as a logic of requirements, by introducing the relation of " suffici-entisation ". In the conclusion, I argue that the logic of requirements is exactly what we need in order to make sense of, and buttress, a constructionist (poietic) approach to knowledge.

There are many ways of understanding the nature of philosophical questions. One may consider their morphology, semantics, relevance, or scope. This article introduces a different approach, based on the kind of informational resources required to answer them. The result is a definition of philosophical questions as questions whose answers are in principle open to informed, rational, and honest disagreement, ultimate but not absolute, closed under further questioning, possibly constrained by empirical and logico-mathematical resources, but requiring noetic resources to be answered. The article concludes with a discussion of some of the consequences of this definition for a conception of philosophy as the study (or “science”) of open questions, which uses conceptual design to analyse and answer them.

Contemporary science seems to be caught in a strange predicament. On the one hand, it holds a firm and reasonable commitment to a healthy naturalistic methodology, according to which explanations of natural phenomena should never overstep the limits of the natural itself. On the other hand, contemporary science is also inextricably and now inevitably dependent on ever more complex technologies, especially Information and Communication Technologies, which it exploits as well as fosters. Yet such technologies are increasingly " artificialising " or " denaturalis-ing " the world, human experiences and interactions, as well as what qualifies as real. So the search for the ultimate explanation of the natural seems to rely upon, and promote, the development of the artificial, seen here as an instantiation of the non-natural. In this article, I would like to try and find a way out of this apparently strange predicament. I shall argue that the naturalisation of our knowledge of the world is either philosophically trivial (naturalism as anti-supernaturalism and anti-preternaturalism), or mistaken (naturalism as anti-constructionism). First, I shall distinguish between different kinds of naturalism. Second, I shall remind the reader that the kinds of naturalism that are justified today need to be protected and supported pragmatically, but they are no longer very interesting conceptually. We know how to win the argument. We just have to keep winning it. Whereas the kind of naturalism that is still interesting today is now in need of revision in order to remain acceptable. Such a kind of naturalism may be revised on the basis of a realistic philosophy of information, according to which knowing is a constructive activity, through which we do not merely represent the phenomena we investigate passively, but create more or less correct informational models (semantic artefacts) of them, proactively and interactively. I shall conclude that the natural is in itself artefactual (a semantic construction), and that the information revolution is disclosing a tension not between the natural and the non-natural, but a deeper one between a user's and a producer's interpretation of knowledge. The outcome is a philosophical view of knowledge and science in the information age that may be called constructionist and a revival of philosophy as a classic, foundationalist enterprise.

Keywords Constructionism · Closure · Level of abstraction · Naturalism · Naturalisation · Open question argument · Reasonably reiterable query test

This is a comparison of Agathon’s role in Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazusae and Plato’s Symposium. Firstly, I examine the Platonic version, and the unique, idiosyncratic part Plato gives Agathon to play, as a host to all, and a hostage to Socrates. Secondly, I discuss his interaction with Inlaw, the ordinary Athenian, in Aristophanes’ play. Such parallel reading allows us not only to refine our outlook on the dramatic construction both of the “talking party” and of the comic performance, but also to capture how really poikilos, for better or worse, that urban love could be. Finally, I analyze the significance of this juxtaposition, as an intertext. Plato, I argue, produces a proper palinode of Agathon, as an erotikos and a mimetic poet. By taking seriously the face-to-face between Agathon and Agathon, two dissonant and yet compatible variations on one man, our picture of Athenian erotic culture emerges sharper, and in greater detail. 
Key words:
Eros, sensuality, praise, blame, softness, manliness, effeminacy, body, language.

Abstract: The article examines Polish translations of the Derridian term différance. Polish philosophical discourse uses the following renditions of différance: róż (ni (c) oś) ć by Bogdan Banasiak, różNICa by Tadeusz Sławek, gra-na-zwłokę-o-różnicę by Stanisław Cichowicz and the most popular: różnia by Joanna Skoczylas. Should a mistake be deliberately committed in Polish, as it was done in the original? Or should it be corrected, and if so–how to explain the correction?

Not only in his infamous speeches as NSDAP-approved Führer-Rektor of Freiburg University, Heidegger advocated what can seem like an 'activist' understanding of human existence. To exist, according to this approach, means to be called upon to take charge of one's life – actively, responsibly, authentically – whether mandated by 'Volk' and 'Führer' or not. Heideggerian resoluteness amounts to being active in a deep sense, a view articulated during the Rektoratszeit in the form of an outright equation of dasein and work. I will revisit Heidegger's phenomenology of boredom in Basic Concepts of Metaphysics, and contrast it with passages from Fernando Pessoa's Book of Disquiet. Pessoa presents a radical counterpoint to Heidegger, utterly at odds with the latter's intellectual and political persona. Insofar as the early Heidegger represents the sinister forces ruling on the Death Star of western metaphysics, Pessoa carries the light that can show us a path toward very different horizons for thinking being.

Diese Masterarbeit befasst sich hauptsächlich mit der Analyse des Kapitels "Die Lust und die Notwendigkeit" aus G.W.F Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes". Das Kapitel wurde insbesondere im Hinblick auf das "Faust"-"Zitat" beleuchtet: Damit die Beziehung von Philosophie und Literatur herausgestellt werden konnte.

Erstgutachter/in: Prof. Dr. Michael N. Forster
Zweitgutachter/in: Dr. Lina Steiner

The biographical novel has supplanted the classical historical novel. What has caused this is a shift in our contemporary theories of consciousness, which radically impact the way we understand and do history. Traditional historical novelists have a positivist approach to history, so they picture the external factors that objectively shape and determine consciousness and thereby make historical collisions possible. Biographical novelists believe that there is a surreal dimension to consciousness, so they shift the focus from the objective external world to the subjective internal world in order to picture the forces that have given birth to major historical collisions.  To make my case, I analyze two biographical novels, one about Friedrich Nietzsche, and the other about Walter Benjamin.  For a fuller development of this idea, see chapter three of my book The American Biographical Novel.

The aim of this paper is to explore the limits of moral permissibility in both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. To this aim, the author will consider a comparison often made in the studies dedicated to Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, namely that between Nietzsche’s overman and Dostoevsky’s nihilistic anti-heroes: Ivan Karamazov (and his idea that, if there is no God and no immortality of the soul, everything is permitted), Raskolnikov (and his “extraordinary men”), and Kirilov (and his man-god). This comparison will serve the purpose of distinguishing Nietzsche’s immoralism from a mere amoralism à la Karamazov. Finally, the author will tackle the following question: if there is no God, is everything permitted?

J. L. Austin's claim that language ‘used not seriously’ is ‘parasitic’ upon ‘normal use’ has proved a puzzle to literary scholars, who have often taken this to mean that they are not allowed to apply the insights of speech-act theory to their own object of research. This article explores how, when read together, Michel Serres’ definition of the parasite as a ‘thermal exciter’ and Deleuze's concept of ‘minor literature’ bring out the hidden potential inherent in Austin's claim. More specifically, the article argues that Austin's reference to literature as a parasitic entity might become a promising conceptual gift, allowing us to generate a new model for approaching the world-shaping potential of literary texts.

The aim of this paper is to show that " traditional " and " resolute " interpretations have not freed the Tractatus from the apparent paradoxical self-defeat. I argue that these readings only give it new clothing. Hacker's " traditional " reading ends up ascribing a metaphysical conspiracy to the “Tractatus”, which is incompatible with the aims of the book. The “resolute” reading of Diamond and Conant ascribes an authorial conspiracy to Wittgenstein, which contradicts his views on authorship and method. Grounded in the difficulties found in both sides of the current debate, I conclude this paper by proposing several requirements that the correct interpretation of the Tractatus should fulfill.

This chapter reviews the two primary ways in which moral issues pertaining to literature are discussed in Anglophone philosophy of art. The first half of this essay looks at the morally relevant influences that literature is thought to have on its audiences, while the second half considers various positions on the question of whether a literary work's moral character affects its artistic value. Since several extensive and incisive surveys of this terrain are already available (Carroll 2000; Gaut 2009, chapter 7), this chapter focuses on points of contention and subsequent developments. Part One: Literature's Morally Relevant Influences Moral judgment is a common feature of interpreting, appreciating, and evaluating literary works. For example, we often attribute virtues or vices to characters and praise or condemn their actions on explicitly moral grounds. Moral judgment is even written into many of the concepts we use to understand literary works: just think, for instance, of the very notion of villain. A skeptic about the moral criticism of literature might point out that the moral judgments just mentioned pertain to diegetic elements of literary works-that is, to things within the world that a literary work describes-and that these judgments may diverge starkly from moral judgments we might make about the work itself. While a literary work might, for instance, tell the story of a mean and nasty person who deliberately hurts others, this does not make the work itself mean and nasty; the moral valence of diegetic elements, our skeptic is quick to point out, is conceptually distinct from the moral valence of the work itself. Further, our skeptic persists, while it is not difficult to acknowledge the moral valence of diegetic elements-after all, persons and their conduct are paradigmatic objects of moral assessment-it is far from obvious how a literary work itself-which is inanimate-can be the proper object of moral judgment.1 By what right, if any, do we make moral judgments about literary works themselves? Although few Anglophone philosophers of art directly attend to this question, the tradition does implicitly offer a compelling answer: namely that a literary work's moral valence lies in its influence on its audience. To be more specific, most philosophers working in this tradition appear to implicitly hold that a literary work is mmally meritorious or mmally flawed insofar as it has, or aims to have, a morally salutary or mmally deleterious influence,

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks on William Shakespeare, though small in number, have
raised a considerable amount of interest and bewilderment among scholars. The few
observations, all of which are contained in posthumously published Notebooks, express a distanced attitude not only towards the Bard but also towards the culture to which the
latter belongs. Wittgenstein does not, however, embed Shakespeare’s work in a larger
context, nor does he make any effort to explain or justify his judgment, which might be
due to the diaristic character of the notebooks in which they are contained. It should,
therefore, not come as a surprise that they have been interpreted in very different
and mutually incompatible ways. Some interpreters have suggested that they display a
misreading of Shakespeare’s work; others have argued that they reveal more about
Wittgenstein, his aesthetic judgement, or his philosophical agenda than the significance or the literary quality of Shakespeare’s work. In this article,  I first expose Wittgenstein’s remarks and then focus on the ambivalent reactions they have evoked among scholars.

In this paper I explore the complex relation to philosophy of the Russian formalists by discussing their radical attempt to redefine the categories of literature and philosophy in the Russian cultural sphere. My thesis is that instead of being mostly ad hoc and incoherent, as it is often thought to be, their effort to analytically isolate poetic language and establish a discipline specifically dedicated to its study was in fact underpinned and powered by a strong methodological framework, that of Neo-kantian epistemology and its drive towards the specification of individual human sciences.

This paper examines Borges’ view of time—the most important metaphysical problem in his opinion. Regarding it as indecipherable and indefinable like all the major metaphysical questions, it is governed in his works by Heraclitus’ metaphor of the flowing river or enigmatic dictum that “we cannot enter the same river twice.” Heraclitus’ fundamental philosophical principles of constant flux and the identity of opposites illuminate the way in which Borges perceives time as both the perpetual tide on which human existence is carried and the ontological inconceivable “mysterious material” of all reality. In order to fully illuminate the aesthetical, existential and philosophical aspects of Borges' reaction to Heraclitus' view of time, special attention is given here to three Borgesian stories: "Funes the Memorious" (1942), "The Immortal" (1947), and "the Aleph" (1945).

Paladino Patrizia 3^A Paladino Patrizia 3^A SCHEDA LIBRO Autore: Umberto Galimberti, nato a Monza nel 1942, è stato dal 1976 professore incaricato di Antropologia Culturale e dal 1983 professore associato di Filosofia della Storia. Dal 1999 è professore ordinario all'università Ca' Foscari di Venezia, titolare della cattedra di Filosofia della Storia. Titolo opera: Le cose dell'amore. Il libro è di: saggistica, cioè appartiene al genere letterario dei saggi. Sommario: A) Riassunto per capitoli: I CAPITOLO "Amore e trascendenza": La metafora di Dio è sempre stata collegata alla metafora dell'amore, nel senso che senza la presenza della trascendenza, cioè che è al di là dei limiti di ogni conoscenza possibile e quindi superiore alla ragione umana, l'amore perde la sua forza e la sua capacità di leggere il mondo. Rimane un enigma dove l'amore vede in Dio la sua trascendenza, e Dio vede nell'amore la sua natura,e questo intreccio non presenta sentimentalismi ma solo il nesso tra amore e trascendenza. II CAPITOLO "Amore e sacralità": La sacralità è dovuta dal desiderio dell'uomo di immortalità e quindi dal desiderio di conservare la sopravvivenza dell'individuo e della totalità dell'essere. Oltre al sacrificio, un altro modo di sperimentare la morte della propria individualità è l'orgasmo, l'apice della vita sessuale, durante il quale l'Io e il Tu si dissolvono, e ciò è reso possibile dalla fiducia reciproca. III CAPITOLO "Amore e sessualità": Il sesso non è qualcosa di cui l'Io dispone, ma è qualcosa che dispone l'Io, aprendolo così alla crisi. Nella sessualità, la meta non è il godimento dell'Io, ma il suo perdersi negli abissi dell'anima, i quali si pensa siano rimasti disabitati, e che invece possono riapparire durante quel rinnovamento della vita a cui l'Io cede ogni volta che ha un rapporto sessuale e quindi nesso con l'altra parte di sé. IV CAPITOLO "Amore e perversione": La perversione è sempre stata giudicata negativamente, perché concepita come sinonimo di devianza, degrado, ribrezzo e ripugnanza. Il perverso non cerca la trasgressione, ma la sua aspirazione è di raggiungere uno stato dove è soppressa ogni nozione di organizzazione, struttura, separazione e dl'universo di differenze da cui prende avvio ogni principio d'ordine. Il godimento del perverso non deriva dalla sessualità, ma dalla sessualità portata a quel limite oltre il quale c'è l'incontro con la morte. V CAPITOLO "Amore e solitudine": La mitologia greca aveva divinizzato la masturbazione, perché era espressione di autosufficienza e indipendenza dagli altri. Ma questo atto venne condannato, nell'età dei Lumi, dalla scienza medica e dall'economia: la prima sosteneva che essa provocava malattie, mentre la seconda affermava che era uno spreco. Osservando invece il fenomeno della masturbazione da un'ottica diversa da queste due discipline, questo "vizio dell'adolescente" non appare come un qualcosa da combattere, ma un qualcosa su cui fare leva per integrare gradualmente la sessualità. VI CAPITOLO "Amore e denaro": La prostituzione è uno scambio di sesso e denaro che caratterizza il regime sessuale della nostra società, e che viene alimentato da un desiderio di rapido miglioramento delle proprie condizioni economiche. Infatti, di fronte al denaro tutto diventa merce: quando un uomo paga una donna, non le riconosce alcuna interiorità sua propria, arrivando a considerarla più come un "genere" che come "individuo". VII CAPITOLO "Amore e desiderio": L'amore è un'illusione di stabilità emotiva. Questo sentimento necessita novità, mistero e pericolo, ma deve saper combattere il tempo, la quotidianità e la familiarità. infatti, la ricerca della

It should come as a surprise that the notion of style is elusive: after all, style is often taken to pertain to the surface (rather than the substance) of a (literary) work of art. The elements of style should, thus, lie open before our eyes and be easy to discern. Moreover, we all seem to have a clear intuitive understanding of style: we know that it is essential to the aesthetic dimension of a work and makes it accessible for aesthetic appreciation, we are familiar with the idea that it allows us to attribute a work to an author, a genre, a school, or a period, and might even think that it reveals the artistic personality of the author. Yet we find that there is no universally accepted definition of "style." Moreover, the numerous definitions that have been proposed in the past highlight very different aspects that often stand in contrast to one another, which shows that style has many faces, is rich of different dimensions and performs a great variety of functions: it has been characterized as a "dress of thought" that adorns a pre-existing content; as a choice between alternative expressions; as a set of recurrent, individual or collective characteristics; as signature;

Desde sus mismos orígenes, la narrativa policial acepta ser leída como símbolo o alegoría filosófica (en general, preferimos el término “alegoría filosófica”, porque, a diferencia del término “símbolo”, sugiere una cierta trabazón narrativa). No hace falta esperar a Chesterton, Borges, Eco o Savater para leer prácticas o interpretaciones filosóficas de la narrativa policial. En efecto, ya el primer cuento policial, en el que se establecen las líneas formales y temáticas del género, “Los crímenes de la calle Morgue” (1841), de Edgar Allan Poe, se nos aparece como una reflexión narrativa acerca de los diferentes modos del conocimiento humano. Tal y como afirmará Borges un siglo después, en su conferencia “El cuento policial”, las características esenciales del género son: que haya un misterio “descubierto por obra de la inteligencia” (1999: IV, 193); que el detective y su obligado amigo estén siempre “hablando de filosofía” (IV, 194); y que el cuento esté sembrado de disquisiciones sobre las capacidades cognoscitivas del ser humano (IV, 195).

This paper, which the author delivered as his inaugural lecture as the Chair of Philosophy at Maynooth University, explores the relationship between philosophy, poetry, and religion. Through a line-by-line interpretation of Leonard Cohen's song "Steer Your Way," it discovers the poet in a space between postmodern disillusionment and a desire for faith. What opens Cohen to the latter is specifically the experience of pain and brokenness, which lead him to the figure of Jesus. The paper concludes with a reflection on Richard Kearney's notion of "anatheism," the return to a "God after God."

Note: The text posted here is not the final published version. Please cite the published version.

The article focuses on Leopardi’s renowned poem "La ginestra, o il fiore del deserto" (1836) and on the scholars who have firstly explored the ‘political’ ideas proposed by this text: C. Luporini in his "Leopardi progressivo" and W. Binni in "La nuova poetica leopardiana", both published in 1947. This particular field of the Leopardi scholarship – which originated in the postwar years – tries to bring the ideological ‘content’ of the text to the fore. After a quick look at Luporini’s and Binni’s readings, the inquiry focuses instead on the ‘form’ of the text, and more specifically on the practice of lyric discourse, in order to outline the general ethical dynamics which underlie the lyric use of language in "La ginestra": the relationship between the 'I' and the flower of the desert, the potential dialogism of the lyric voice, the context of production of the text, the posture assumed by the 'I' and the historical position of the critics, the truth telling as an ethical act of individual and collective resistance to crisis. By looking at these dynamics, it is possible to reconsider the political ‘ideal’ proposed by the text – in particular the "social catena" ("social chain") mentioned at line 149 – in the light of its discursive practices. The article, finally, emphasizes the similarities between this interpretative possibility and the philosophical interpretation proposed by Antonio Negri in his essay "Lenta ginestra. Saggio sull’ontologia di Giacomo Leopardi" (1987) in a cultural context very different from Binni and Luporini’s postwar Italy.

Working from newly available texts in Heidegger’s Complete Works, Krzysztof Ziarek presents Heidegger at his most radical and demonstrates how the thinker’s daring use of language is an integral part of his philosophical expression. Ziarek emphasizes the liberating potential of language as an event that discloses being and amplifies Heidegger’s call for a transformative approach to poetry, power, and ultimately, philosophy.

Readers of Nietzsche became more and more aware of the fact that proper understandings of his philosophy must take his variety of literary forms into account. Some argue that he does not propose philosophical positions but rather explores self-referential modes of thought and speech to undermine the very idea of doctrines. This paper argues that the apparent tension between Nietzsche’s literary forms and his supposed philosophical positions could be resolved, if we acknowledge how he put his criticism of traditional notions of true teachings into practice. He ‘teaches’ the Death of God as a plausible and intellectually honest assumption, and he tries to convince his readers of its far-reaching implications. Without such guarantor of certainty, the justification and expression of philosophical views must not cease but change. Nietzsche’s literature experimentally explores new modes of philosophical expression.

Herein I argue that we can learn from literary texts, but not in the same manner by which we learn from philosophical texts. I consider whether literary texts are successful in imparting empirical knowledge, knowledge of what it is like to undergo particular experiences, knowledge of how to reconceptualize situations or knowledge of how to empathize; I conclude that literary texts teach us how we may reconceptualize situations and how to better empathize with others.
I begin by considering what we may learn from fictional philosophical thought experiments and reasons why these may succeed and fail to convince the reader, concluding that they successfully challenge intuitions but often fail to establish that the conclusions drawn hold true as generalizations. Next I compare philosophical thought experiments with literary texts, concluding that literary texts can act as thought experiments but, contrary to philosophical thought experiments, will often abstain from prescribing a particular conclusion to the reader. I evaluate New and Stolnitz’s arguments that we cannot learn from literary texts and conclude that they only succeed in establishing that literary texts cannot impart empirical knowledge. Finally I consider the extent to which Nussbaum is successful in arguing that experience of literary reading teaches us how to empathize and to be more compassionate.

In the last years of his life, the American poet Wallace Stevens expressed interest in the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Stevens was led to Heidegger by his prior interest in Friedrich Hölderlin, the poet who preoccu- pied Heidegger after the book Being and Time (1927). Although Stevens’s pursuit of Heidegger went nowhere, I like to think that he was right to wonder whether Heidegger might have something to offer him. Metaphysically speaking, both men belonged to the same epoch. Stevens, like Heidegger, was haunted by the question of how to respond to the moral and spiritual disorders of a world from which the gods had fled (or worse). Heidegger worried about technological “enframing,” in which beings appear as resources continually in the process of being optimised, enhanced and rendered ever more accessible to manipulation – an approach that is also applied to human beings and which obscures our true vocation as “shepherds of Being.” Stevens characterises the modern world in rather different terms – “the great things have been denied and we live in an intricacy of new and local mythologies, political, economic and poetic, which are asserted with an ever-enlarging incoherence” – but he was at one with Heidegger when it came to the “pressure on the consciousness” of a disenchanted technological society that weakens the “power of contemplation.”

Der Artikel stellt verschiedene Verbindungen zwischen Wittgenstein und der Literatur bzw. der Philosophie der Literatur dar und gibt im zweiten Teil eine Einleitung zu den Artikeln des Sammelbandes "Wittgenstein und die Literatur" (hrsg. von John Gibson und Wolfgang Huemer, Suhrkamp 2006)

Resumo

O artigo visa investigar o fundamento e a pertinência das proximidades apontadas entre a poesia de Alberto Caeiro e o budismo Zen por vários intérpretes pessoanos, particularmente a respeito da questão de śūnyatā, a " vacuidade " , não-existência intrínseca dos fenómenos ou interdependência universal, cujo reconhecimento na tradição budista se traduz no dinamismo sabedoria-compaixão. Perante a tese caeiriana da existência substancial das " coisas " e a ausência de uma ética da compaixão, cremos haver uma divergência fundamental entre a sua poesia e qualquer forma de visão-experiência budista do mundo, incluindo a Zen. Isto não obsta a que, a um nível formal e mais exterior, sejam compreensíveis várias das afinidades entre Caeiro, o budismo e o Zen apontadas pelos referidos intérpretes.

Abstract

The article aims at investigating the foundation and the relevancy of the closeness pointed out by several interpreters of Fernando Pessoa between Alberto Caeiro's poetry and Zen Buddhism, particularly on what concerns śūnyatā, the " emptiness " , the non-intrinsic existence of the phenomena or the universal interdependency, which are recognised by the Buddhist tradition as the wisdom-compassion dynamism. In view of the thesis of Caeiro about the substantial existence of " things " and the absence of an ethics of compassion, we believe that there is a fundamental divergence between his poetry and any form of Buddhist vision or experience of the world, including Zen. This doesn't imply that, at a more formal and outer level, aren't understandable some of the affinities between Caeiro, Buddhism and Zen pointed out by the same interpreters.

I published a review of Davies's The Artful Species in the Italian journal Aisthesis. Davies wrote a response. The editor invited me to write a rejoinder to Davies's response. I did, but when Davies declined to answer my rejoinder, the editor declined to publish my rejoinder. Evidently, the editor wished Davies to have the last word. I am here attaching my original critique, Davies's response, and my rejoinder to Davies's response.

In her readings of the Greek tragedies, Luce Irigaray demonstrates that the power relations between women and men permeate tragedy to its core. According to Irigaray, the source of the ancient tragedy —Antigone’s death is a clear example—lies in these systems of power that are bound to eradicate the heroine. In her reading, tragedy represents the fate of women, whose death and demise attest to the inability to represent themselves as women in the phallocentric culture, which, as Ibsen notes, does not allow women to be themselves.
I develop in this paper a reading of Hedda Gabler which draws on Irigaray’s reading of the Greek tragedies, such as Aeschylus’ Oresteia, Sophocles’ Antigone, Oedipus the King, and Oedipus at Colonus, and Euripides’ Electra. These provide a broad comparative framework for interpreting the play, the only one of Ibsen’s works named, like the ancient tragedies, after its female protagonist. Building on her work, I set out to show how by probing the trope of the riddle and problematizing it, Hedda Gabler also positions women’s destiny at the intersection of gender and genre, engendering the tragedy of femininity. At the same time, the play offers the possibility of envisioning what Irigaray’s calls “…another dramatic play through which we can relate to each other as different.” (2010, 199). Thinking of the relationship between tragedy and gender from an Irigaraian perspective, we can see how Hedda Gabler, which genders tragedy through the story of a specific woman, engenders in the spectators the realization for the need for projecting new images and modes of feminine existence.

Almost all readings of E.M. Forster’s Howards End note the famous epigraph – “Only connect…” – but it is not at all obvious how we are supposed to understand it. Connect what, exactly? Here, I propose a new interpretation: that to connect is to come to terms with one’s own embodiment. This notion ought to be of interest to moral philosophers for two reasons: first, because the failure to connect represents a significant form of moral confusion, and second, because this form of confusion is one to which moral philosophers are particularly likely to be subject.

"The article seeks to study Beckett’s (in)famous abstractionism in the light of his engagement with the discursive borderline of philosophy and literature with recourse to Alain Badiou’s texts on Beckett and his meditations on the philosophy-literature interface. Through a close textual reading of a series of Beckett’s late prose-texts, I argue that Beckett as a creative writer appropriates the reflexive locus of subjective thought which philosophy tries to claim as its exclusive belonging. This goes contra to Badiou’s idea of philosophy being  sutured to literature. In this problematic dialogue of the two discourses, Beckett’s obsessive abstractification renders the concrete as a remainder in the rigorous process of subtracting all particularities to arrive at a generic locus of thought. Beckett’s abstractionism is processual and non-absolute. It consists in the appropriation of the philosophical thought which thinks itself
without an object and as its own subject."