Phenomenology of Temporality

This article presents a brief report of a first-person investigation through drawing, discussing how serially developed drawing can be understood to express the becoming of 'now' – the present moment in time. By employing a phenomenological approach, the notion that drawing expresses this idea is treated as an assumption, meaning a hypothesis to be tested through practice and theory combined. This occurs as part of my developing research practice, where I look to ‘perform philosophy in a non-philosophical way’ (Emoe 2014). Rather than treat art as an object for philosophy, I use philosophy to question a thought that I, as a practitioner, believe is immanent to drawing as form of art – that drawing itself is a form of becoming, based on the intentionality underpinning the temporal experience of drawing.

Here are the preliminary materials and first two chapters from my most recent book: Grief Worlds: A Study of Emotional Experience.

All chapters of the final published manuscript are freely available via MIT Press Direct:

https://direct.mit.edu/books/oa-monograph/5524/Grief-WorldsA-Study-of-Emotional-Experience

As you will see from other entries in this section, Oxford University Press and Palgrave/Springer now charge extortionate prices for books that I have published with them. (In all instances, I am happy to send you a PDF if you want to read them.)

In contrast, MIT Press made *Grief Worlds* freely available to all as a single PDF, without charging an open access fee. Hence, I am delighted to have published this book with them and would encourage others to consider doing the same.

Spanish American countries exhibited during the nineteenth century many of the features Koselleck associated with the Sattelzeit, the transitioning period into our contemporaneity. However, the region's history was marked by social instability and political upheaval, and contemporaries referred to such experiences of time as precarious. In this article I explore the connection between this precarious time and the emergence of the sociopolitical concept of morality in New Granada (present-day Colombia) during the fi rst thirty -fi ve years of the republic (1818–1853). I focus on two conceptual moments as exemplifi ed by the refl ections put forth by Simón Bolívar (1783–1830), military and political leader of the independence period, and José Eusebio Caro (1817–1853), publicist, poet, and political ideologue of the Conservative Party.

“Arquivar a própria vida é se pôr no espelho, é contrapor à imagem social a imagem íntima de si próprio, e nesse sentido o arquivamento do eu é uma prática de construção de si mesmo e de resistência” (ARTIÈRES, 1998, p. 11). Com esta frase, o historiador francês Philippe Artières define uma das grandes problemáticas do estudo de narrativas biográficas. O estudo dos diários, mais especificamente, carrega em si a questão de um arquivamento compulsivo, que escapa aos refinamentos das autobiografias e à própria limitação do tempo. No diário, sucedem-se imagens de situações ditas banais e desimportantes para o desenrolar de um grande enredo, que Roland Barthes chama “biografemas extraordinários”. Por outro lado, autobiografias categorizam e ordenam “biografemas fatais”, responsáveis pela construção de uma imagem linear e ascendente de uma grande figura. Em ambos os casos, trabalha-se com uma acumulação constante de momentos, que diferem no fim a que se pretendem, e encontram-se na circunscrição que o tempo de uma vida lhes impõe. O objetivo deste capítulo será, então, a partir de exemplos de narrativas biográficas – principalmente diários – analisar esse desejo de acumular memórias, de arquivar vidas, que permeia não só a construção dessas narrativas, mas de todo o conhecimento Ocidental. Norteado por ideias como a de Arquivo de Jacques Derrida, e de tempo, de Phillipe Lejeune, buscaremos compreender o diário e a autobiografia como partes de um mesmo sistema de arquivamento obsessivo, com suas devidas particularidades quanto ao que é selecionado. O ponto de partida é de que não há narrativa que seja completamente exaustiva (ARTIÈRES, 1998, p. 10), e mesmo diários imensos, como os de Claude Mauriac e Henri-Frédéric Amiel, contém em si uma seleção – subjetiva – e um patente desejo de arquivamento compulsivo, que reflete um ethos próprio da tradição judaico-cristã.

This essay aims to examine the essence of drunkenness in its temporal and spatial dimensions. Despite the interest shown by phenomenological literature in the study of psychopathological consequences of acute and chronic drunkenness, the essential characteristics of drunkenness have not yet been addressed in depth. This essay claims that the temporal essence of drunkenness is the overwhelming, disintegrator of temporality's condition, which converges to its own extinction in a temporality, thus encompassing a distinct ability of assimilatory magnetization of the temporal dimensions. From the spatial standpoint, the essential manifestation of the condition of drunkenness is increased materiality, expressed by means of compression and exclusivity. At last, we show how the essence of drunkenness gradually leads to instability and decrease in the consciousness' ability of temporalization, which are both typical of a general condition of addiction.

Where does the self stop and the rest of the world begin? Clark and Chalmers already paved the way for an application of the extended mind theory to the problem of selfhood and identity, when in their seminal paper they asked ‘What, finally, of the self? Does the extended mind imply an extended self? It seems so’ (2010: 39). However, how can the self persist in time if it is chiefly constituted by a series of constantly renewed couplings, enactions, and extensions? If the self does persist, what are the processes responsible for the temporal unification and synthesis of what enactivists call different ‘sensorimotor contingencies’ (O’Regan and Noë 2001)? If the self does not persist, what kind of phenomenology and new ontology underlies, or results from, this shift? This essay focuses on these questions as they relate to an extended and enactive view of the self in the space-time trajectory explored in Marcel Proust’s Swann’s Way (2005) – the first volume of In Search of Lost Time. Proust’s work is regarded as the monumental literary research on temporality, self and memory. I will argue, however, that extended and enactive frameworks can provide important new insights on the key claims and findings of Proust’s literary endeavour.

Najważniejsze rozważania Husserla, poświęcone próbie odpowiedzi na pytanie "czym jest czas?", zebrano w tomiku Wykłady z fenomenologii wewnętrznej świadomości czasu. Już sam tytuł tego dzieła sugeruje, z jakim typem badań będziemy mieli do czynienia. Punktem wyjścia dla Husserla nie jest jakiś czas obiektywny, czas kosmiczny (Weltzeit) -zgodnie z jego metodą musi on, jako transcendentny, zostać zredukowany. Nie chodzi tu oczywiście o zanegowanie, czy choćby wątpienie w istnienie takiego czasu, ale o oparcie się wyłącznie na pewnych (fenomenologicznie) przesłankach; czyli na tym, co (nieco upraszczając sprawę na potrzeby tekstu) w sposób jasny, wyraźny i niepowątpiewalny -zgodnie z Kartezjańskim rozstrzygnięciem -jawi się w świadomości. Jak pisze sam filozof: tym, co tu przyjmujemy, nie jest istnienie czasu kosmicznego, istnienie trwania rzeczy itp., lecz czas pojawiający się, trwanie pojawiające się jako takie. To zaś są dane absolutne i powątpiewanie o nich byłoby bezsensowne. Wprawdzie następnie przyjmujemy również pewien czas istniejący (seiende), ale nie jest to czas świata doświadczenia, lecz immanentny czas upływu świadomości. (E. Husserl, Wykłady z fenomenologii wewnętrznej świadomości czasu, s. 9) Nie jest to czas "zewnętrzny", lecz "wewnętrzny" -co jednak nie oznacza jakiegoś czasu psychicznego -Husserla będą interesowały przede wszystkim przeżycia czasu, czyli data (Datum) fenomenologiczne. Aby uniknąć nieporozumień można by powiedzieć, że tym, co interesuje Husserla nie jest czas "subiektywny", tzn. subiektywne, jednostkowe przeżywanie czasu i wyobrażenie o tym, czym on jest, lecz raczej swego rodzaju obiektywne formy owych subiektywnych sposobów przeżywania go. Nakierowanie na świadomość -zamiast na rzeczywistość zewnętrzną -nie oznacza porzucenia rygoru, ścisłości i obiektywności.

Causa e effetto invertiti, entropia e sintropia, ordine e disordine, origine e scopo. Agli occhi della scienza il Tempo rimane ancora un enigma. Dall’America alla Russia passando per l’Europa, i misteri più affascinanti della quarta dimensione.

The paper analyzes the correlation of time and creation in St. Augustine. Building upon researches of recent decades, it subdivides the issue into three topics, which facilitates the treatment of memory as a philosophical and theological problem, and thus enables to deal with the problem of time. First, it is the question about the content of memory, or rather, of its ability to keep some content, which may be called synthetic ability. This question not only clarifies psychological objectives of memory — the possibility to keep impressions, feelings, and images, to bring together and hold whatever experience of thinking — but also exposes any synthesis whatsoever as dependent on the ability of memory to constitute the duration. The second question fo-cuses on the analysis of memory as a guarantee of self-identity of the subject. The human being, taken in her spiritual existence, is viewed by St. Augustine through the Trinitarian schema of «memoria-intelligentia-voluntas», expounded in his treatise On the Trinity. Hypostatized memory is a representation of God the Father who embodies the principle of being within the Trinity. Besides the obvious influence on the further elaboration of the Trinitarian dogma and the doctrine of filioque, this idea of St. Au-gustine reveals an additional anthropological dimension, since the Trinitarian unity implicates the unity of soul, perception and thought. The third aspect conveys the ontological significance of memory, which explicates the nature of creation and its associate mutability. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of memory contains a Platonism, which is inherent in all  Augustinian epistemology. Attempting to clarify the effect of this combination of Platonism and Christianity on the dealing with the problem of time, the author also probes a modern phenomenological interpretation of the doctrine of memoryformulated by J.-L. Marion.

The nature of temporal experience is typically explained in one of a small number of ways, most are versions of either retentionalism or extensionalism. After describing these, I make a distinction between two kinds of temporal character that could structure temporal experience: A-ish contents are those that present events as structured in past/present/future terms, and B-ish contents are those that present events as structured in earlier-than/later-than/simultaneous-with relations. There are a few exceptions, but most of the literature ignores this distinction, and silently assumes temporal experience is A-ish. I then argue that temporal character is not scale invariant, but rather that temporal experience is A-ish at larger scales (a few hundred milliseconds and above), and B-ish at smaller scales. I then point out that this scale non-invariance opens the possibility of hybrid views. I clarify (or modify, depending on how you want to frame it) my own view (Grush 2005, 2007) as a hybrid view, according to which temporal experience is B-ish at small scales – and at this scale my trajectory estimation model (TEM, a version of retentionalism) applies – but A-ish at larger scales, and at the larger scale my TEM does not apply.  I then motivate this hybrid position by first defending it against arguments that have tried to show that the TEM is untenable. Since the hybrid view has TEM as its small-scale component, it must address this objection. I then put pressure on the main alternative account, extentionalism, by showing that its proponents have not adequately dealt with the problem of temporal illusions. The result is a new theory (perhaps characterizable as a refined version of my prior theory) motivated by i) explaining its virtues, ii) showing that objections to it can be met, and iii) showing that objections to its main competitors have not been met.

This thesis investigates the relation between promiscuous pleasure and queer temporalities in the work of Guillaume Dustan, analyzing three affective relations to time: melancholia, ecstasy, and hope. I use the AIDS-crisis as the focal point of my thesis, exploring how it delimits an affective shift in gay men’s attitude toward sexual promiscuity as an important component of queer world-making, marking sexual promiscuity as a thing of the past. In Dans ma chambre, sexual promiscuity makes Guillaume feel melancholic, as though “being stuck” in his sexual activities is literally killing him. Thus, promiscuity exerts a kind of backward pull on the present, similar to what Elizabeth Freeman describes as temporal drag. Promiscuity, I argue, troubles a sense of temporal progression in Guillaume’s representation of Marais. This temporal conflict is also evident in Dustan’s public conflict with prominent French AIDS activists regarding bareback sex. I read Dustan’s claim that “the con-dom has never existed” as an anachronism that makes his views on condomless promiscuity both untimely and morally disturbing. As an anachronism, however, it offers an opportunity to read barebacking as a sexual practice structured around temporal drag.
In Je sors ce soir, I examine ecstasy as a narrative situation. As a first-person narrator Guillaume ecstatically steps out of himself by way of the narrative device metalepsis, paradoxically creating an effect of proximity. His ecstasy explodes the linearity of temporal progression the narrative strives for. Instead of pushing forward, ecstasy seems to make time coagulate in a perpetual present. In this way, ecstatic time brings about a powerful waste of time, halting its progression into the future.
Lastly, I ask what hope Dustan’s work holds for a queer future. Here I consider ecstasy, not only as a way of stopping time, but also as an important temporal figure when conceptualizing a queer utopia. Furthermore, I consider how Dustan’s novel Plus fort que moi traces a utopian impulse as an education of desire. The novel stresses the importance, not of what Guillaume enjoys or how he specifically enjoys it, but rather of his attitude toward sexual desire as a pleasurable pedagogic. I argue, then, that in his literary work Dustan practices an erotics of art, that is, an erotics of literary writing itself.

La critica condivisa da Paci e Sini alla concezione scientifico-matematica di spazio e tempo che sorregge la concezione tradizionale di storia e la concezione razionalistica dell’architettura si sostanzia dell’appello al mondo della vita, alla spazialità e temporalità della vita vissuta, della durata e della relazione.
Nell'indagare il rapporto tra memoria e progetto tutto ciò ha un ruolo essenziale, così come l'apertura d'orizzonte offerto dalla genealogia e dalla sua costitutiva capacità di farsi carico di
quella circolarità delle estasi temporali per cui il passato necessita del futuro per acquistare il suo senso compiuto.

Recensione a Hartmut Rosa, Accelerazione e alienazione. Per una teoria critica del tempo nella tarda modernità, Politica&Società, 2016, n. 1, pp. 131-136.

Book review: Hartmut Rosa, Accelerazione e alienazione. Per una teoria critica del tempo nella tarda modernità, Politica&Società, 2016, n. 1, pp. 131-136.

Prezentowany poniżej tekst jest wersją roboczą artykułu opublikowanego w tomie "Historia filozofii. Meandry kultury" pod redakcją M. Karasa, Wydawnictwo Nomos, Kraków 2014. Poniższy tekst nie stanowi wersji referencyjnej artykułu. Pomiędzy wersją roboczą a opublikowanym tekstem mogą występować nieznaczne różnice w treści.

Nothing is more obvious than the fact that we are able to experience, via perception, events in the world such a ball deflecting from the cross- bar of a goal. But what is the temporal relation between these two things, the event, and our perceptual experience of the event? One possibility is that the world progresses temporally through a sequence of instantaneous states—the striker’s foot in contact with the ball, then the ball between the striker and the goal, then the ball in contact with the cross-bar, and so forth—, while the perceiver’s experience is like- wise a sequence of perceptual experience states, each one of which corresponds to, or is a perception of, a corresponding state of the world— for example, a perception of the foot in contact with the ball, followed by a perception of the ball in the air, followed by a perception of the ball in contact with the cross-bar. This way of understanding the rela- tionship between experience and the world is very natural, and nearly universal. However, it rests on two assumptions that can be brought into question.
First, it assumes that at any time, the content of what is experienced is a temporally punctate state of the world. Second and relatedly, it assumes that the sequence of experience states temporally tracks the sequence of states of the world. The fact that we can perceive motion provides some reason to question the first assumption. Motion can only manifest over a temporal interval of non-punctate magnitude, so if we can perceive motion, then the temporal content of an experience cannot be limited to a temporally punctate instant. The existence of temporal illusions—cases where it seems as though A followed B even though in fact B followed A—provides some reason to question the second assumption. If the sequence of experience states just tracked the corresponding states of the world, then such illusions would not be possible.
In this article, I will discuss both of these issues—the perception of motion and temporal illusions—in more detail. I will then outline an alternative way to understand the temporality of experience that de- nies both of the assumptions. That is, on this alternative proposal, the content of experience at any instant is not temporally punctate, but includes a temporal interval; and second, the details of what is experienced within this interval is not a mere passive reflection of the world’s temporality, but is the result of active interpretation. This alternative picture I call the trajectory estimation model.

The digial spaces created through shift in online contact among physically distant contexts have been the focus of many studies in recent years. At this point, it seems that the mobility perception has been dramatically changed because the mobile systems have seemingly manipulated space perception through constructed instant virtual environments; that is, transtiveness across places and times has become natural outcome of digital spaces by affording the transcendence of space (Katz, 2008:442). Still, in the literature, there are two parties discussing this issue from two different points: on the one hand, there are those who suggest that digital spaces actually results in a sort of ‘absent presence’ or ‘ de-spatializing’ (e.g. Gergen, 2004; Katriel, 1999); on the other hand, other scholars emphasizes mobile revolution contributes significantly to the attendance of task-based, temporal, and spatial items and dimensions in instant digital environment ( Cohen, 2015). Driven from the second perspective, the current study aims to extend the previous research by focusing on “#tb” discourse in order to explore how digital spaces are used not just for spatializing bur also for de- temporalizing. Thus, the data source of the study is the randomly collected pieces of insta posts among the ones posted under “#tb” taggings. Following narrative analysis approach, supposing that insta posts are a sort of narrative genres where individuals share their personal experience, used within discourse analysis, the data were descriptively analyzed through frequency counting of linguistic items referring to temporal and spatializing lexemes. The findings relevant to “#tb” taggings show that digital spaces seem to functionally support users to spatialize and de-temporalize immediate context by referring to any places beyond the immediate conetxt and time beyond the present.
Key Words: Spatializing, De-temporalizing, Digital Space, “#tb” Discourse, Narrative Analysis

In recent years, the West has increasingly experienced the sense that the political aspects of its social life have undergone a profound alteration. There is a sense of blockage, of non-responsiveness, a feeling that the political class no longer represents the interests of the broader society. Underlying all of this is a loss of legitimacy. What exactly is legitimacy? How does it function? How is it lost? These are the questions that I address in this paper. While I refer to Max Weber’s remarks on legitimacy, my thesis is my own. My claim is that legitimacy involves temporal identity. It depends upon the ability of both individuals and peoples to identify themselves as the same over time. Legitimacy’s breakdown is the breakdown of this identity.

For centuries, Christian theology has understood the Eucharist in terms of metaphysics or in protest against it. Today an opening has been made to imagine the sacrament through the method of phenomenology, bringing about new theological life and meaning. In Dialectical Anatomy of the Eucharist, Donald Wallenfang conducts a sustained analysis of the Eucharist through the aperture of phenomenology, yet concludes the study with poetic and metaphysical twists. Engaging the work of Jean-Luc Marion, Paul Ricoeur, and Emmanuel Levinas, Wallenfang proposes pioneering ideas for contemporary sacramental theology that have vast implications for interfaith and interreligious dialogue. By tapping into the various currents within the Judeo-Christian tradition--Jewish, Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant--a radical argument is developed that leverages the tension among them all. Several new frontiers are explored: dialectical theology, a fourth phenomenological reduction, the phenomenology of human personhood, the poetics of the Eucharist, and a reinterpretation of the concept of gift as conversation. On the whole, Wallenfang advances recent debates surrounding the relationship between phenomenology and theology by claiming an uncanny way out of emerging dead ends in philosophical theology: return to the fray.

The physical sciences have always had a significant impact on philosophical thinking about time; I argue that the experiential aspects of time are also very relevant in this regard.  An examination of Zeno’s arrow paradox reveals the need to distinguish between the experiential and non-experiential aspects of motion.  Generalizing from this, I argue that we can usefully distinguish between the experiential and non-experiential (or purely metaphysical) aspects of temporal passage.  So doing has implications for the reality of temporal passage: those who adopt a sufficiently robust realism with regard to experience can acknowledge the full reality of one important aspect of passage.  However, for this option to be available to those who deny the existence of metaphysical passage—e.g. Block theorists (or eternalists)—the experiential and metaphysical modes of passage must be independent of one another.  I argue that there are good reasons for supposing that these are in fact independent.  I conclude with a review of as-yet unresolved problems regarding temporal experience, and suggest some topics which are likely to prove fruitful areas for future research.

In the paper, the eschatological perspective of Paul’s First Epistle to the Thessalonians is considered. As the problems are considered the following aspects: firstly, the question of the resurrection (4: 13-18), where the theological doctrine of Parousia and of the resurrection includes mainly a continuation of the Old Testament eschatological tradition, both in stylistic devices (4: 13-15) and in the knowledge of the resurrection. Second, stylistic analysis is carried out in the description of waiting of the second coming (5: 1-11), where as in the fourth chapter, it is not a story about the events of the future, but the admonition about present, about the spiritual readiness for the coming in any moment. We also consider the grammar and style of the various temporary forms of translation of eschatological ideas. The third aspect - the possible interpretation of the term “Kairos” (5: 1), how it differs from “Chronos”. Kairos - time is a question of the living experience of the experience of every Christian “here and now”, the essence of this experience. In particular, Paul Tillich, analyzing the idea of “Kairos” in Christianity, defined it as a special kind of Christian awareness and historicity in existence. The article also focuses on the phenomenological interpretation of the concept of Parousia in this Epistle, in particular, it is the opinion of Martin Heidegger, whose idea is:  Parousia is part of the Christian identity of the Christian as a person. The hypothesis of our analysis is that the doctrine of Parousia can be considered as an idea of special experience of the presence of God as the co-present, which does not contradict to the idea of waiting of his future coming event.
Статья посвящена эсхатологической проблематики Павла в Первом Послании к Фессалоникийцам.  В качестве задач рассмотрены следующие аспекты: во-первых, вопрос о воскресении (4:13-18), где богословское учение о парусии и воскресении включает в себя преимущественно продолжение ветхозаветной эсхатологической традиции, как в стилистических приемах (4:13–15), так и в знаниях о воскресении. Во-вторых, проводится стилистический анализ в описании ожидания второго пришествия (5:1-11), где как и в четвертой главе речь идет не о рассказе о событиях будущего, а о назиданиях в настоящем, о духовной готовности к пришествию в любой момент. Также рассматривается грамматика и стилистика различных временных форм в передаче эсхатологических идей.  Третий аспект – возможная интерпретация термина «кайрос» (5:1), его отличие от «хронос». Кайрологическое время – это вопрос о живом переживании опыта каждого христианина «здесь и сейчас», о сути это опыта. В частности, П. Тиллих, анализируя идею кайроса в христианстве, определял его как особый род христианской осознанности и историчности в существовании. Также в статье уделяется внимание феноменологической интерпретации понятия парусии в этом Послании, в частности, приводится мнение М. Хайдеггера, у которого представление о парусии – это часть христианской идентичности, христианина как личности. Гипотеза нашего рассмотрения заключается в том, что учение о парусии может рассматриваться как идея особого опыта со-присутствия Бога в настоящем, что не противоречит идеи ожидания события его будущего пришествия.

This study discloses existential temporality as the core to understand the lived experience of sexually abused girls with broken family relationship. Through a phenomenological analysis of 8 participants' interview data, the result indicates that, for the girls who had been sexually abused, as their primary parent-child relationship were destroyed, they lost the connections with the adult world and fell out into the "wild world." The "wild world," in contrast with the "mainstream world" which is ruled by and composed of social orders, is full of spontaneous actions and events without plan and order. The modes of time lived are the keys to understand the differences between these two worlds. The time lived in the wild world can be called as flowing temporality, in which spontaneous actions are most obvious. While in the mainstream world, social orders and values are founded on the temporality of linear causality. To the girls lived in the wild world, all the desired goals in the mainstream world were set in accordance with the linear temporality and thus with no significance. Living in the wild world, peer relationships on the street appeared to be the pathway for the girls to earn their own linear-causal temporality, which would develop into a "new world" for the girls to live in. This study indicates the importance of peer relationships for the girls to rebuild the linear-causal temporality in their lives. The significance of existential temporality as a research framework to understand the experiences of girls with childhood sexual abuse is thus demonstrated.

In the article the description of secondary memory in Husserl's phenomenology is given. The difference between the reproductive memory and the primary memory is shown. The author analyses  the meaning of secondary memory for the process of consciousness, the role of  uncondiciousness in the process of organization the memory, modes of the memory, theirs role and effect for present. The structures of secondary memory are shown in the relation with now-point.

Prophecy becomes interpreted as a revelation from a deity to a prophet. The nature of Martin Heidegger's work deals with Being and one major component in his book Being and Time is about the freedom that Dasein holds. From this freedom, Dasein could live an authentic life. This clashes with the idea of prophecy. In this essay, I will examine the primary and secondary literature to determine if there is enough adequate information to determine if Dasein remains authentic to himself in fulfilling prophecy. For the sake of simplicity, I will be referring to Abrahamic prophets in this essay. Heidegger does establish his various secular projects as atheist testaments, but there is a whole section where Azadpur writes how Dasein is a religious and existential hero because Dasein's potential is ownmost and always discloses possibilities. In Being and Time's division II temporality becomes a focal point for Heidegger that completes his project for Dasein that he set out in the division I. Death also comes into focus for Heidegger as an important structure for his argument, and it does lend itself for my topic.

Short abstracts in English and German of my doctoral dissertation exploring the time of waiting to discuss the relationship between power and temporality in aesthetics through the performative practices of Jack Smith, Lorraine O’Grady and Ana Mendieta.

The author wants to show that homesickness is not brought about by the intrinsic appeal of one’s home-ground. Rather wistfulness for bereavement makes home a precious good. From this it becomes understandable why returning home arouses more often disappointment than it relieves one’s sick feelings. Whereas homesickness has mainly a spatial connotation, nostalgia actually concerns the uniqueness of past experience as well as time’s transience. In both cases a further distinction has to be made between brokenhearted aching and mourning renunciation. Remembrance always is a work of mourning too, and therefore pathological forms of homesickness and nostalgia are equally characterized by their inaptitude to remember as well as to live mournfully with a loss. The homesick deprives himself from any bond to a real place. For the disconsolate nostalgic the invocation of “the good old days” has to substitute the lost present and future. Only the one who bade farewell, delights in remembrance. As in a dream the longing for something lost comes there to fruition.

Résumé L’objectif de cette revue de la littérature est de créer un pont entre philosophie et neuroscience de l’éducation. Comprendre le phénomène conatif dans son ensemble ainsi que son implication dans les processus cognitifs et cérébrales qui le contiennent est le socle de ce pont. La conation est l’ensemble des processus psychiques permettant d'aboutir à l'action. Il est inscrit dans l'humain l'envie de savoir en tant qu'émotion vitale de poussée. Elle est portée par le goût de l'évidence et de sens. Or, dans le processus conatif d'un apprenant, avoir envie de savoir doit être immanquablement suivi d'un vouloir apprendre, déployant en cascade un dispositif volitionnel qui produira l’action. Force est de constater qu’avoir envie n’est pas vouloir, et que vouloir n’est immanquablement suivi d’un faire…  Questionnements : Ce fait maintes fois avéré chez l’humain nous a poussé à questionner didactiquement le processus conatif dans son ensemble. Comment...

took his position in the Methodenstreit of his day largely in a polemic against what he regarded as invalid methodologies of psychological reductionism, social organizism, evolutionism, and both idealist and materialist teleologies. Because he was far more interested in empirical studies, Weber never developed his own position in any comprehensive and formal treatment. It was Alfred Schutz who sought to provide this "underlaborer" philosophy for verstehende Soziologie, grounding an examination of subjective meaning in the lifeworld?the world of everyday activity?and in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Yet Schutz never really used his methodological critique as a basis of substantive investigation. Thus, there has been a hiatus between the interpretive sociology of Weber and the sociological implications of the analysis of the lifeworld developed by Schutz.

In this chapter, I will focus on Ricoeur views on the intersection between the implicit poetic discourse in which the living metaphor emerges and the explicit philosophical discourse in which it is conceptually clarified. In this introductory section, I will zoom in on Ricoeur’s views on the transition from a living metaphor (poetic discourse) to a concept (philosophical discourse). This transition is needed because the semantic and the ontological gain of the living metaphor are brought to light by the living metaphor without being explicated in a concept yet.
In the other sections of this chapter, I will illustrate the intersection of discourses with the help of Augustine’s discussion of time in the eleventh book of his Confessions. This approach has a double advantage. On the one hand, Augustine’s search for a temporal vocabulary provides a perfect illustration of how the poetic discourse in which the living metaphor emerges can be taken up by a philosophical discourse that tries to derive a concept from this metaphor. On the other hand, this search also provides the foundation for an interpretative framework that underlies many of Ricoeur’s later works and that can be used to give some kind of unity to them. This framework will be explored in the next chapter as a more complex variation of the model of productive tensions in which many of the other variations can be included.

Cogitation described as calculation, the living being described as a machine, cognitive functions considered as algorithmic sequences and the 'mechanization' of the subjective were the theoretical elements that late heideggerian anti–humanism, especially in France was able to utilize 1 , even more so, after the second cybernetics or post-cybernetics movement of the late '60s introduced the concepts of the autopoietic and the allopoietic automata 2. Recently, neurologists pose claims on the traditional epistemological field of philosophy, proceeding from this ontological decision, the equation of human cognition to cybernetic systems. The emergence of the worldwide web in the 1990s and the global expansion of the internet during the first decades of the 21st century indicate the fallacies of the cybernetics programme to mechanize the mind. We stand witnesses to a semantic colonization of the cybernetic system, a social imaginary creation and expansion within the digital ensemblistic – identitarian organization that cannot be described by mechanical or cybernetic terms. Paradoxically, cyberspace, as a new being, a form of alterity, seems to both exacerbate and capsize the polarization between the operational and the symbolic. The creation of the internet might be more than an epistemological revolution, to use the terminology of Thomas Kuhn. It might be an ontological revolution. I will try to demonstrate that the emergence of the Internet refutes any such claims, since its context and utility can only be described by means of a social epistemology based on the understanding of social significances as continuous creations of an anonymous social imaginary proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997). I will try to explore some social-semantic aspects of the cyberspace as a nexus of social representations of the individual identity that forms a new sphere of being, where the subjective and the objective merge in a virtual subjective objectivity with unique epistemological attributes and possibilities. Abstract Cogitation described as calculation, the living being described as a machine, cognitive functions considered as algorithmic sequences and the 'mechanization' of the subjective were the theoretical elements that late heideggerian anti–humanism, especially in France was able to utilize 1 , even more so, after the second cybernetics or post-cybernetics movement of the late '60s introduced the concepts of the autopoietic and the allopoietic automata 2. Recently, neurologists pose claims on the traditional epistemological field of philosophy, proceeding from this ontological decision, the equation of human cognition to cybernetic systems. The emergence of the worldwide web in the 1990s and the global expansion of the internet during the first decades of the 21st century indicate the fallacies of the cybernetics programme to mechanize the mind. We stand witnesses to a semantic colonization of the cybernetic system, a social imaginary creation and expansion within the digital ensemblistic – identitarian organization that cannot be described by mechanical or cybernetic terms. Paradoxically, cyberspace, as a new being, a form of alterity, seems to both exacerbate and capsize the polarization between the operational and the symbolic. The creation of the internet might be more than an epistemological revolution, to use the terminology of Thomas Kuhn. It might be an ontological revolution. I will try to demonstrate that the emergence of the Internet refutes any such claims, since its context and utility can only be described by means of a social epistemology based on the understanding of social significances as continuous creations of an anonymous social imaginary proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997). I will try to explore some social-semantic aspects of the cyberspace as a nexus of social representations of the individual identity that forms a new sphere of being, where the subjective and the objective merge in a virtual subjective objectivity with unique epistemological attributes and possibilities.

Cover: Arrival. Die Hölle ist die Abwesenheit Gottes von Ted Chiang Quelle: Golkonda Den US-amerikanischen Autor Ted Chiang umgibt seit Jahren ein Mythos des Genialen. Sein Werk umfasst seit 1991 gerade einmal fünfzehn Erzählungen, die allerdings fast allesamt mit dem Nebula oder dem Hugo Award, teilweise sogar beiden, ausgezeichnet wurden, zweien der wichtigsten Science-Fiction-Preise des angloamerikanischen Raums. Chiangs Erzählung "Geschichte deines Lebens" bildete die Grundlage für Denis Villeneuves erfolgreichen Film "Arrival" aus dem Jahr 2016, in dessen Folge schließlich auch das Interesse der internationalen Feuilletons auf den Autor gelenkt wurde. Als neue Hoffnung der Science-Fiction wurde er vielerorts gepriesen, als Meister der minimalen Form und als Ideen-Virtuoso in der Tradition von Erzählern wie Jorge Luis Borges. Denis Scheck brachte diese Tendenzen auf einen Punkt, indem er konstatierte, dass "seit Borges niemand den Bereich des Sagbaren so eindrücklich erweitert" habe wie Ted Chiang. In der Tat lesen sich Chiangs Texte, wie jene von Borges, oft weniger als klassisch erzählte Geschichten denn als fiktive Berichte eines uns gleichermaßen vertrauten wie fremden Universums. Chiangs Geschichten liegen raffiniert erdachte Gedankenexperimente zugrunde, die stets um zwei zentrale Themen kreisen: um eine Reflexion über die Möglichkeiten individuellen Handelns inmitten logischer Unmöglichkeiten sowie -in Borges' Worten -um eine "neue Widerlegung der Zeit". Der Vergleich mit dem argentinischen Autor wird auch von Chiangs Texten selbst nahegelegt: Seine erste publizierte Erzählung "Der Turmbau zu Babel" verortet sich sowohl durch die Babel-Motivik als auch durch die mystischpseudohistoriographische-theologische Sprache im Fahrwasser von Borges; und die Protagonistin von "Geschichte deines Lebens" verweist sogar namentlich auf ihn, indem sie sich eine Fabel ausdenkt, von der sie behauptet, sie könne von Borges stammen. Die vorliegende Rezension nimmt diese textextern wie -intern postulierte Verwandtschaft zum Anlass, Chiangs Erzählungen unter dem Nagy Rezension: Arrival. Die Hölle ist die Abwesenheit Gottesvon Ted Chiangy medienimpulse, Jg. 56, Nr. 4, 2018

Umbrüche paradigmatischer Zeitperspektiven in Künsten und Wissenschaften Dieser Beitrag widmet sich der Verwendung von Perspektiven in »Denkstilen«. 1 Jedoch geht es weniger um räumliche denn vielmehr um temporale Blickwinkel, sprich: Zeitperspektiven. Es erhebt sich die Frage, ob in wissenschaftlichen Denkstilen und künstlerischen Darstellungsstilen je temporale Schemata konstruiert werden, die im Anschluss an Ernst Cassirer und Erwin Panofsky (korrespondierend zur Perspektive) als »symbolische Formen« zu gelten haben. Dabei soll insbesondere beobachtet werden, wie ein mutualer Austausch zwischen wissenschaftlichen Theorien, Methoden und Modellen und künstlerischen Wahrnehmungs-, Darstellungsund Handlungsweisen 2 hinsichtlich der dort wirkenden zeitperspektivischen Paradigmen 3 verfasst ist -und v. a. welche gemeinsamen konzeptionellen Muster Künste und Wissenschaften in Komplizenschaft bringen.

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This chapter studies the relationship between dark humor, addiction, and abjection. As a case study, it examines a stand-up routine by comic Craig Ferguson in which the comedian touches on such varied topics as peeing his pants, vulnerable populations, and alcoholic amnesia, noting how each relates to abjection. Since drunkenness frequently leads to vomiting and accidental urination, those examples provide the clearest cases of how alcoholism connects gross-out humor to bodily abjection. Ferguson also discusses how addicts form vulnerable populations, which demonstrates a social understanding of abjection as people left behind by society. Finally, Scepanski investigates drunken blackouts as temporal abjection. Since memory is so fundamental to understanding oneself, blackouts create an alienating disconnect between present and past.

Einleitung Saturn und Melancholie -seit der Antike wurde die Depression als eine Erkrankung angesehen, die unter der Herrschaft des Chronos oder Saturn stand und somit auch eine Störung der Zeitlichkeit war . Dies stimmt überein mit dem klinischen Bild: Depressive Menschen leiden unter einer Verlangsamung und Entfremdung der subjektiv erlebten Zeit. Die Antriebskräfte erlahmen, und die Lebensbewegung kommt ins Stocken, in der schweren Depression bis hin zu einem Stillstand der Zeit. Die Möglichkeiten der Zukunft erscheinen verschlossen, und an ihre Stelle tritt ein stets drohendes, ja unausweichliches Verhängnis. Auf der anderen Seite drängen sich alle erinnerten Versäumnisse und Fehler in den Vordergrund und scheinen nicht wiedergutzumachen; Schuld und Last der Vergangenheit drücken den Depressiven buchstäblich nieder. Kurz, in der Depression errichtet die Zeit eine grausame und unerbittliche Herrschaft, die sich nicht mehr abschütteln lässt.