Phenomenal Concepts

▪ О новом философском методе и новой реалистической философии Жослина Бенуаста ▪ Человек и реальность в польской философии УДК: 111.1 О новом философском методе и новой реалистической философии Жослина Бенуаста И. Е. Прись И. Е. Прись, , кандидат философских и физико-математических наук* В статье предлагается синтетический обзор контекстуалистского виттгенштайновского метода и контекстуалистской виттгенштайновской реалистической философии Жослина Бенуаста. В отличие от традиционных последователей Виттгенштайна Бенуаст не отвергает феноменологию и метафизику, а пытается скорректировать их. В частности, его работы содержат решения проблемы бытия, «трудной проблемы» (проблемы объяснительного провала) философии сознания и проблемы феноменальных концептов. Бенуаст идентифицирует философские «ментальные судороги», иллюзии, «фантазмы», мифы, ошибки и путаницы и исправляет их, применяя виттгенштайновский по духу терапевтический метод. В то же время он закладывает фундамент для построения позитивных контекстуалистских философии сознания, феноменологии и метафизики.

Nagel's characterisation of consciousness as being someone in What is it like to be a bat?  is shown to be an insight with enduring importance. But Nagel should opt for antirealism about consciousness and not the radical realism of neutral monism.  Antirealism is not a denial that I am conscious.  Solipsism is avoided by adopting a modal theory.

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are ways of being. In this paper, we build a new case for ontological pluralism in the form of three contributions: (1) We offer a theoretically useful definition of ‘way of being’ as a positive principle of similarity and difference that is distinct from—and a prior condition for—having properties. (2) We develop a test for distinguishing ways of being from properties: features of entities that are conceptually redundant when represented as predicates in standard predicate logic are ways of being. Finally, (3) we argue that there are ways of being, i.e., there are features of entities that satisfy the definition in (1), and pass the test outlined in (2). Along the way, we reply to objections against pluralism raised by Peter van Inwagen and Wouter Cohen, in an attempt to show that pluralism is well-motivated.

This is an End Note to 'Deconstructing the Physical World: The Substructure of Language' (DPWSL) that validates key concepts introduced in DPWSL by demostrating how they can be used to build a model able to describe, explain and predict the Stroop effect, the reverse Stroop effect and other Stroop-related effects, which are an array of empirically reproducible effects widely studied in cognitive psychology.

In this article I criticize the explanatory reductionism underlying the zombie argument from the point of view of the philosophy of science. I argue that it is a thesis that finds no support in the available models of reduction, a thesis that is based on an unfounded idealization of the natural sciences and that depends on an uncertain appeal to the possibility in principle of a future unified physics. I conclude that the uncertain character of these assumptions calls for a reassessment, not only of the implications of this type of argument for methodological naturalism but also of the role such arguments play in the study of consciousness.

I challenge the increasingly popular view that mental states are both causally inert and non-existent. Firstly, I consider Frankish’s illusionism which claims that mental states are merely introspective illusions that do not exist. Secondly, I raise two objections against Frankish, the first being that public corroboration of introspective testimony suggests that mental states are veridical rather than illusory, and the second that Jackson’s epiphenomenalist ‘Mary’s Room’ example potentially discredits illusionism.

In Part Three, I consider Kim’s Argument From Causal Determination which I generalize as follows:

(1) Stimuli induce (C1) physical neural responses and (C2) mental experiences, which both cause (E1) behavioral reactions.

(2) Mental phenomena thus have effects on the physical world.

(3) But the physical world is a causally closed system insulated from the mental.

(4) Therefore, mental phenomena are physical phenomena.

(5) E1 appears causally overdetermined.

(6) To avoid causal overdetermination, one can accept that C1 causes C2 and E1 but deny C2 causes E1

(7) Therefore, C2 is causally inert.

I argue (6) is mistaken because individuals do not always react to the same stimuli identically.  Most people recoil (E1) in pain (C2) if spanked (C1), but sadomasochists experience arousal compared to non-sadomasochists. The same C-fibers in their brains (C1) cause them to enter identical mental states (C2), but non-sadomasochists experience them as pain (E1), and sadomasochists as pleasure (E2). Because the difference cannot be explained in terms of physical events, it must arise from the quality of mental states. This is the fallacy of causal overdetermination: it equivocates between the causal influence that neural events exert on behavioral reactions and that which mental events do. To resist Kim’s argument, I distinguish between “triggering causes” like C1 which activate mental states that may otherwise not materialize, and “phenomenal causes” like C2 whose qualitative properties yield various reactions.

On the nature of concept and thought, language and mind. Positing thought is as inherently meta-propositional independent of language. Describing how meaning transcends the limits of language and resides in a realm that is comprehensible to the mind but often incommunicable in language. Highlighting the dual aspect of mind, which can grasp the communicable and the incommunicable, and underscores the significance of introspective reflection in understanding the essence of concept and mind.

Pain is often used as the paradigmatic example of a phenomenal kind with a phenomenal quality common and unique to its instantiations. Philosophers have intensely discussed the relation between the subjective feeling, which unites pains and distinguishes them from other experiences, and the phenomenal properties of sensory, affective, and evaluative character along which pains typically vary. At the center of this discussion is the question whether the phenomenal properties prove necessary and/or sufficient for pain. In the empirical literature, sensory, affective, and evaluative properties have played a decisive role in the investigation of psychophysical correspondence and clinical diagnostics. This paper addresses the outlined philosophical and empirical issues from a new perspective by constructing amultidimensional phenomenal spacefor pain. First, the paper will construe the phenomenal properties of pains in terms of a property space whosestructurereflects phenomenal similariti...

Upon her release, Mary gains new knowledge aligned with B-type materialism and property dualism, even though she already possesses knowledge of all the facts and truths related to color and color vision during her time in captivity. I argue that this "cognitive progress" can only be accounted for by the acquisition of a new nonconceptual representation of the color red upon her release. Independently of any concepts, this acquisition already enables her to discriminate all sorts of shades of color within her environment. However, the existence of nonconceptual representations, by itself, is not enough to specify the type of knowledge Mary acquired, obviously. We must add two additional conditions. Firstly, the acquisition of these nonconceptual representations must enrich Mary's preexisting physical concept of red. Assuming that concepts are mental files, the enrichment takes the form of housing information in analog format, like pictures of the color red. Secondly, by utilizing these enhanced concepts by analog information, Mary can achieve an introspective propositional knowledge. She learns the truth of the crucial proposition: she learns what it is like to experience red.

In this paper, I present a novel objection to Chalmers's "master argument" against the privileged strategy of 'type B' physicalists to account for the explanatory gap (the "phenomenal concepts strategy"). Specifically, I argue that the second horn of the master argument gets wrong why zombies cannot have our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness. Zombies cannot have a kind of mental state that we have. If something must have all of our psychological attributes to share our epistemic situation, then zombies cannot serve the purpose of the second horn of the dilemma. By way of background, I begin by briefly outlining a related argument against physicalism, also advanced by D. Chalmers-the "conceivability argument." I highlight some of the primary challenges with this argument and present additional criticisms. Finally, through a brief examination of panprotopsychism, I consider what lies ahead if Chalmers's arguments are conceded. I conclude that the phenomenal concept strategy is a sound explanation for why the conceivability of zombies likely does not imply their metaphysical possibility.

RESUMEN El objetivo del trabajo es analizar la relación entre la experiencia fenoménica y nuestra conceptualización folk de ella. Me concentraré en la estrategia de los conceptos fenoménicos como respuesta al rompecabezas de María. En la primera parte presento el argumento de María y la estrategia de los conceptos fenoménicos. En la segunda parte explico cuáles serían los requisitos que los conceptos fenoménicos deben satisfacer para responder al problema de María. En la tercera parte presento varias teorías acerca de los conceptos fenoménicos y muestro las dificultades que presentan. Finalmente, desarrollo mi propia teoría de los conceptos fenoménicos. Mi tesis es que los conceptos fenoménicos son complejos, ya que sus condiciones de posesión dependen de la maestría de otros conceptos, algunos muy sofisticados como la distinción apariencia-realidad (que pertenece a nuestra teoría de la mente), y los conceptos de color (al menos en el caso de los conceptos necesarios para dar cuenta del caso de María). Y estos últimos conceptos tienen peculiares condiciones de posesión: incluyen el uso de capacidades recognoscitivas no conceptuales. PALABRAS CLAVE: argumento del conocimiento; conceptos fenoménicos; conceptos de color; teoría de la mente.

The most influential media is the video media, which is a blend of visual and auditory.Films, though silent in the early days, have made their own impact on society.Even though the original purpose of entertainment was cinema, we see films acting as a carrier of culture.With a huge audience, the cinema media has been experimenting with new dimensions and experiments to entertain its audience.At this point, we see that many cinema directors have borrowed their cinema stories from the fiction or literary field.Attempts have been made in the cinema to give the story of the novel which are there in the form of a letter on a white paper.Emphasis on good storytelling and audience entertainment, many directors and filmmakers around the world have concentrating on a novel based film production.We can say that Kannada cinema industry has inspired many film makers nationally and internationally to produce novel based films.The 1960s-1980s saw the emergence of Kannada film industry with the novel-based filmmaking.Research is trying to understand the impact of Kannada cinema based on fiction.The study aims to understand the development of Kannada cinema through novel films.This study is based on the historical-analysis method. Secondary source of information like, the book reviews articles on Kannada films, interviews and interviews with Kannada artists, directors and producers are collected and analyzed in the study.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

Illusionism is the view that conscious experience is some sort of introspective illusion. According to illusionism, there is no conscious experience, but it merely seems like there is conscious experience. This would suggest that much phenomenological enquiry, including work on phenomenological psychopathology, rests on a mistake. Some philosophers have argued that illusionism is obviously false, because seeming is itself an experiential state, and so necessarily presupposes the reality of conscious experience. In response, the illusionist could suggest that the relevant sort of seeming here is not an experiential state, but is a cognitive state, such as a judgement or a belief, which is fully amenable to a physical or functionalist analysis. Herein, I argue that this response is unsuccessful and fails to undermine the reality of conscious experience. Nonetheless, the response does raise the problem of how a judgement or belief about the character of a conscious experience, even if it is true, can be justified if the conscious experience has no causal role in the formation of the judgement or belief. This is not a new problem, but is a reiteration of an old problem that is known in the philosophy of mind literature as the paradox of phenomenal judgement. I consider how the paradox of phenomenal judgement can be resolved and how the judgement or belief about conscious experience can be justified with appeal to the notion of acquaintance.

The impetus of this research paper is to identify constituent products and challenges of Bollywood tourism in India. The Bollywood and tourism industry in India rapidly growing and increasing highest revenue to contribute an Indian economy. Indian tourism industry render various forms of tourism like cultural, Eco, Agricultural, Heritage, business, Educational tourism where as film tourism is currently trending by the impact and enlarging the level of bollywood movies. The research methodology of current paper is based on published research articles and concluding the data from inbound and outbound tourist. The role of Indian film industry is continuously growing and putting a global influence with highest earning which indirectly supporting a tourism industry by which bollywood destinations attracting tremendous amount of tourist. This research study majorly focuses on various producing factors and constituent products of bollywood tourism with their numerous challenges.

To consider the existence of mental facts is essential to the practice of philosophy of the mind. A theory by the name of dualism makes the case for non-mental facts. Some dualists explain mental facts by way of physical facts and others interpret the mental as an autonomous entity. In order to examine the case

A popular defense of physicalist theories of consciousness against antiphysicalist arguments invokes the existence of 'phenomenal concepts'. These are concepts that designate conscious experiences from a first person perspective, and hence differ from physicalistic concepts; but not in a way that precludes co-referentiality with them. On one version of this strategy phenomenal concepts are seen as (1) type demonstratives that have (2) no mode of presentation. However, 2 is possible without 1-call this the 'bare recognitional concept' view-and I will argue that this avoids certain recent criticisms while retaining the virtue of finessing the 'mode of presentation' problem for phenomenal concepts. But construing phenomenal concepts this way seems to not do justice to the phenomenology of conscious experience. In this paper I examine whether or not this impression can be borne out by a good argument. As it turns out, it is harder to do so than one might think. It can be done, but it involves somewhat more convoluted reasoning than one might have supposed necessary. Having shown that, I will end with a few brief remarks on what my argument means for attempts to preserve a physicalist account of consciousness. Keywords Phenomenal concepts Á Type demonstrative concepts Á Recognitional concepts Á Type B physicalism Á Theories of consciousness I realize this subtitle presumes to speak for other people. Perhaps 'Harder to Debunk than I Thought' would have been better. At any rate, this paper descends from an earlier one in which I thought I had a fairly quick and easy refutation of the view that phenomenal concepts can be bare recognitional concepts. Credit for getting me to see that things are not so simple goes to Gene Witmer.

Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately ''secondary quality eliminativism''-the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated. In addition to being of interest in its own right, this new argument provides a perspective to better see that certain popular would-be refutations of the knowledge argument do not work (against either version). But it also introduces some complications that will force us to take an unexpected detour through the pros and cons of naturalizing intentionality before (tentatively) embracing Jackson's dualist conclusion.

In this work, we introduce what we believe to be a more sensitive variation of the Metaproblem of consciousness, structured by philosopher Keith Frankish (2017): the Illusion Problem. To do so, we explore the process that leads us to treat each and every quale as an illusion, in addition to showing how qualia are present in most supposedly physicalist theories, which we will later call “Closeted Dualism”. We also emphasize that the illusionist theory is already widely used or considered by philosophers who seek a scientifically plausible way out of the problems of consciousness. Once done, the reader will be ready for the more “technical” part of this article, in which we explore and defend the main concepts and mechanisms of Illusionism.

The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this essay, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly in keeping with embodied cognition, focuses on features of physical concepts, and succeeds in explaining the appearance of contingency.

Materialism/physicalism that generally dominates in the contemporary analytic philosophy is challenged by fairly powerful anti-materialist arguments, notably the zombie argument (most influentially defended by David Chalmers) and the knowledge argument (the most widely discussed version of which was advanced and defended by Frank Jackson). These arguments highlight the explanatory gap from the physical (which, if materialism is true, should constitute everything that exists, including consciousness) to phenomenal mental states, the principal impossibility to explain the latter by the former, and from this conclude that phenomenal consciousness is not physical, and so materialism is false. Materialist philosophers attempt to neutralize these arguments in several ways, the most influential of which is the strategy of phenomenal concepts. This article analyzes the main points of this debate with a focus on the knowledge argument, examines and responds to the main objections to the knowledge argument-that it should be mistaken because the alternative is epiphenomenalism, which is unacceptable; that no new knowledge but only new capacities and/or acquaintance are involved; that the knowledge is the same but in different forms; that the knowledge argument affects only type physicalism but not token physicalism. The case is made that psychophysical identities assumed by a posteriori physicalism are unexplainable in principle, and the postulation of brute unexplainable psychophysical identities glossed over by the strategy of phenomenal concepts amounts to dogmatic commitment (motivated by scientism) to a view despite its apparent falsity and its unintelligibility (the impossibility to explain how it can be true), made less unpalatable by offering an ad hoc theory about the mindbrain arrangement that makes us unable to see how the view can be true. As opposed to this, the position of the supporters of the knowledge argument and the zombie argument can be seen as guided by the principle of rational trust in obviousness and our capacities of judgement.

This thesis makes the case for a Wittgensteinian account of phenomenal concepts, both in exegetical and justificatory terms. In terms of exegesis, I respond to critics who argue that Wittgenstein's so-called Private Language Argument (hereafter 'PLA') is incompatible with the existence of phenomenal concepts. In terms of justification, I offer a proposal for how to positively characterise phenomenal concepts in a way in which Wittgenstein might have endorsed. My proposal contrasts with other recent attempts to do so. My argument is in four parts: Part I introduces phenomenal concepts by way of their development out of materialist responses to Jackson's (1982) version of the Knowledge Argument. I provide my own attempted definition for how to understand the term 'phenomenal concept'. Part II discusses Balog's (2009) and Papineau's (2002, 2011) criticism that the PLA is incompatible with phenomenal concepts. I reject this criticism on four grounds, arguing that it fails both as a criticism in itself, and as truly representing a proto-Wittgensteinian account of phenomenal concepts. 2 Crane (2000) has persuasively argued that the term 'qualia' (essentially what I term as 'phenomenal character') lacks a uniform meaning. Sometimes, it refers to supposed properties of the objects of experience (i.e. sense-data), sometimes to supposed properties of experiences themselves, and often the use equivocates between the two. Unfortunately, I cannot go into this argument in more detail. 3 Although see Dennett (2007) who presents an interesting argument to suggest that if Mary has all physical knowledge, then she will already know all there is to know prior to exiting. 4 Although see Nemirow (2006) for continuing disagreement. 8 Hereafter, I use 'PI' when referring to sections in Philosophical Investigations. I use similar acronyms for references to Wittgenstein's work, as set out in the bibliography. 9 From these sections, it should come as no surprise to learn that Wittgenstein enjoyed reading Lewis Carroll (see Pitcher (1965).

My argument is that Chalmers' Zombie fiction and his rigid-designator-argument going back on Kripke comes down to a petitio principii. Rather, at the core it appears to be more related to the essential 'privacy' of the phenomenal internal perspective. In return for Chalmers I argue that the 'principle self-preservation' of living organisms necessarily implies subjectivity and the emergence of sense. The comparison with a robot proves instructive. The mode of 'mere physical' being is transcended if, in the form of phenomenal perception, sense appears on the stage of higher animals-a transition explained here as an emergence phenomenon based on the systemic cooperation of perception, evaluation and action ('perc-val-act system'). Some fundamental considerations are added: Those consequences implied by the principle self-preservation reveal the natural-biological origin of the organism-primarily seeming a more insignificant circumstance-as a momentous fundamental difference (end-in-itself-character, subjectivity, constitution of sense) compared to technical artefacts (robot). And the emergentist approach indicates the-maybe paradoxical-possibility of a dualism of physical and psychical phenomena in an overall physical system, that is not dualistic at the same time.

Actually Papineau discusses several different uses of phenomenal concepts, distinguishing in particular between introspective uses, where the blank in the experience operator is filled by a state of perceptual classification, and imaginative uses, where the blank in the experience operator is filled by a state of perceptual "re-creation". For simplicity, I will discuss only the introspective use of phenomenal concepts.

Alter (2016) elaborates and defends an ambitious argument advanced by Chalmers (2002) against physicalism. As Alter notes, the argument is valid. But I will argue that not all its premises are true. In particular, it is false that all physical truths are purely structural. In denying this, I focus not on the objects of pure physical theory but on the homely, macroscopic objects of our daily lives.

Es ist nicht bloß für die Wissenschaft, sondern auch für das alltägliche Denken und die zwischenmenschliche Kommunikation von entscheidender Wichtigkeit, dass unser Denken sich nicht mit irgend welchem Pseudowissen, mit unbewiesenen oder ideologisch begründeten Annahmen und ungesicherten Fakten zufrieden gibt, sondern sich auf vernünftige Argumente und gut gesicherte Sachverhalte einlässt. Das ist meist gemeint, wenn man von rationalem Wissen und Denken spricht. Normalerweise wird das Prädikat, rational zu sein, nur Wissen zugeteilt, das begrifflicher Natur ist, d.h. das sich auf Begriffe stützt und in begrifflicher Form daherkommt und folglich auch verbalisiert und kommuniziert werden kann. Der vorliegende Text soll zeigen, wie der Mensch sich dazu befähigt, sich mit der Welt, in der er lebt, und mit den Bedingungen, die sein Leben in dieser Welt ermöglichen, rational erfolgreich auseinanderzusetzen. Daher ist sein Anliegen doppelt: An erster Stelle steht die Frage, was ausmacht, dass man begriffliches Wissen als rational im Sinne von gesichert, objektiv und wahr anzuerkennen bereit ist, und welche Eigenschaften, Prozesse und Bedingungen dafür als verantwortlich gelten. Das Anliegen des vorliegenden Textes ist es aber nicht, bloß die theoretischen Grundlagen, Voraussetzungen und Bedingungen solchen Wissens und Denkens offen zu legen, er nimmt ebenso die Entstehung und Entwicklung dieser Denkformen und Denkinhalte im menschlichen Individuum und, damit unauflöslich verbunden, in der Gesellschaft und in der Wissenschaft in den Blick. Dieser doppelten Zielsetzung entsprechend, wird vorab geklärt, was man unter begrifflichem Wissen zu verstehen hat, warum Wissen, dem wir die Qualifikation, rational zu sein, zubilligen, unvermeidlicherweise begrifflicher Art ist. Wenn dem so ist, wird folgerichtig gefragt, wie die Begriffe, mit denen Menschen im Alltag ihre Erfahrungen beschreiben und festhalten und auf die Wissenschaftler ihre Erklärungen und Theorien gründen, entstanden sind, was Begriffe mit Sprache und ihrer Bedeutung verbindet und unter welchen Bedingungen es berechtigt ist, begriffliches Wissen als rationales Wissen zu bezeichnen und ihm einen rationalen Anspruch zuzubilligen? Als Grundlage für all diese Errungenschaften und Leistungen wird eine allgemeine Erkenntnisfähigkeit 1 postuliert, die der Mensch mit allen Lebewesen teilt, die aber zugleich das Produkt vielfältiger evolutionärer Veränderungen über die Arten hinweg ist und daher bei jeder Art eigene Formen annimmt. Überdies wird angenommen, dass jedes Individuum einer Art eine artspezifische Entwicklung aufs Neue und auf eigene Weise zu durchlaufen hat. Dies gilt auch für den Menschen, der nur dank einer vielfältigen biologischen Evolution und einer ontogenetischen Entwicklung im Verlaufe seines Lebens die Fähigkeit

My argument is that Chalmers' Zombie fiction and his rigid-designator-argument going back on Kripke comes down to a petitio principii. Rather, at the core it appears to be more related to the essential 'privacy' of the phenomenal internal perspective. In return for Chalmers I argue that the 'principle self-preservation' of living organisms necessarily implies subjectivity and the emergence of sense. The comparison with a robot proves instructive. The mode of 'mere physical' being is transcended if, in the form of phenomenal perception, sense appears on the stage of higher animals-a transition explained here as an emergence phenomenon based on the systemic cooperation of perception, evaluation and action ('perc-val-act system'). Some fundamental considerations are added: Those consequences implied by the principle self-preservation reveal the natural-biological origin of the organism-primarily seeming a more insignificant circumstance-as a momentous fundamental difference (end-in-itself-character, subjectivity, constitution of sense) compared to technical artefacts (robot). And the emergentist approach indicates the-maybe paradoxical-possibility of a dualism of physical and psychical phenomena in an overall physical system, that is not dualistic at the same time.

David Chalmers advocates the view that the phenomenon of consciousness is fundamentally different from all other phenomena studied in the life sciences, positing a uniquely hard problem that precludes the possibility of a mechanistic explanation. In this paper, I evaluate three demarcation criteria for dividing phenomena into hard and easy problems: functional definability, the puzzle of the accompanying phenomenon, and the first-person data of subjective experience. I argue that none of the proposed criteria can accurately discriminate between the phenomenon of consciousness and mechanistically explainable phenomena.

As posições teóricas do artista plástico Hélio Oiticica, e a sua atuação cultural na segunda metade da década de 60, aparecem, na maioria das vezes, como oposição àquelas defendidas pelo poeta e crítico de arte Ferreira Gullar, “revelando” um embate, discutido pela historiografia desse período, entre uma vanguarda artística modernizante e uma arte engajada de esquerda. Entretanto, no que diz respeito à formulação de uma vanguarda brasileira, e em muitos aspectos relativos ao envolvimento do artista em questões sociais e políticas, podemos encontrar muitos pontos em comum nas idéias defendidas pelos dois artistas. No texto que segue, indicaremos algumas convergências no modo como Hélio Oiticica e Ferreira Gullar teorizaram a vanguarda brasileira, a partir de transformações no sistema da arte – especialmente no objeto artístico (obra aberta) e na recepção do espectador (participação) –, envolvendo também o tema do engajamento do artista em questões sociais e políticas do país. Defende...

Лоар был одним из первых, кто вве� л понятие феноменального концепта-концепта, непосредственно отсылающего к феноменальному свои� ству (опыту) и имеющему субстанциональное феноменальное содержание-и попытался применить его для решения проблемы объяснительного провала 1. Его подход основывается на обыденнои� интуиции феноменальности, а также на фундаментальном различии между свои� ствами и концептами. Одно и то же феноменальное свои� ство может быть представлено при помощи концептов различных типовфеноменальных и теоретических. Объяснитель-ныи� провал суть концептуальныи� провал между феноменальным и теоретическим представлени-1

Despite experience-based expertise being increasingly common in health care, what experiential knowledge consists of remains a topic for debate. Here I propose a philosophical approach to clarify experiential knowledge, drawing on an analogous debate in philosophy of mind, which similarly targets the intuition that experience may generate unique knowledge. I outline the philosophical debate and explicate some relevant ideas for health care, so as to (a) evaluate whether and to what extent this analogous debate is helpful, and (b) supplement existing ideas on experiential knowledge with a philosophical analysis.

The thesis of experiential revelation-Rev for brevity-in the philosophy of mind claims that to have an experience-i.e., to be acquainted with it-is to know its nature. It is widely agreed that although at least moderate versions of Rev might strike one as plausible and perhaps even appealing, at least up to a certain extent, most of them are nonetheless inconsistent with almost any coherent form of physicalism about the mind. Thus far, the issue of the alleged tension between Rev and physicalism has mostly been put in the relevant literature in terms of phenomenal concepts-those concepts which refer to phenomenal properties, or qualia, and characterize them in terms of the peculiar quality(ies) they exhibit-and some kind of "special feature" those concepts allegedly possess. I call this version of Rev C-Rev. This paper aims to suggest that while it is true that phenomenal concepts reveal the nature of their referent(s)-i.e., it is a priori, for a subject possessing the concept and just in virtue of possessing it, what it is for the referent(s) of the concept to be part of reality-this feature of them, in turn, rests on a nonconceptual non-propositional kind of knowledge, namely, sui generis introspective knowledge by acquaintance of one's own phenomenally conscious states. I call this version of Rev A-Rev. §1 provides some introductory material. In §2 I discuss two arguments that have recently been put forth to undermine the cogency of C-Rev against physicalism. §3 elaborates on the historical roots of C-Rev. §4 presents some of the major arguments which have been offered for A-Rev. A few concluding remarks close the paper.

Miranda Fricker’s insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice— testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience, and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical
injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel, public concept. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament.

Many of the leading theories in the philosophy of mind either implicitly or explicitly admit that the creation of artificial consciousness is possible. This constitutes an important explanation of the existing enthusiasm at the interstice of consciousness studies and artificial intelligence research, and of the current optimism surrounding the emergence of artificial consciousness. In this paper, I seek to articulate and evaluate some of these leading theories in order to show that this optimism rests on some philosophically unfounded assumptions, and that the emergence of artificial consciousness is implausible and worthy of skepticism.

Лоар был одним из первых, кто вве� л понятие феноменального концепта-концепта, непосредственно отсылающего к феноменальному свои� ству (опыту) и имеющему субстанциональное феноменальное содержание-и попытался применить его для решения проблемы объяснительного провала 1. Его подход основывается на обыденнои� интуиции феноменальности, а также на фундаментальном различии между свои� ствами и концептами. Одно и то же феноменальное свои� ство может быть представлено при помощи концептов различных типовфеноменальных и теоретических. Объяснитель-ныи� провал суть концептуальныи� провал между феноменальным и теоретическим представлени-1

In "Epiphenomenal Qualia" Frank Jackson argues against Physicalism (the thesis that all correct information is physical information) and for the existence of qualia on the grounds that all of the physical information possible cannot explain the qualitative feel of experience (qualia). In "The Knowledge Argument for Qualia" Jackson partakes in a thought experiment using the examples of "Fred" and "Mary" to show that having all of the physical information about color; including all of the information about physical history, physiology, behavior, light waves, and the physical sciences fails to provide the information of what it is like for Fred and Mary to experience (see) color. Given that all of the physical information cannot provide all of the information available, Jackson concludes that Physicalism is false and that qualia exist, for some information is not physical. I argue against Jackson on the grounds that he assumes that physical information must be publicly accessible and that the experience of color (privately accessible information) cannot be physical information. Moreover, I argue that all information is contextually dependent upon one's physical environment and physiological functions, thus it is possible that conscious experience is a kind of physical information and that Physicalism is true.

One compelling argument challenging the tenability of physicalism, which sees reality as fundamentally comprised of physical facts, is Jackson's knowledge argument. Through a powerful thought experiment involving the case of Mary, the super neuroscientist, the argument demonstrates how knowledge of phenomenal facts cannot be deduced from knowledge of physical facts. For allegedly leaving out phenomenal facts in its account of reality, physicalism is shown to be incomplete and hence mistaken. Physicalists respond to this argument in a variety of ways, challenging, in turn, some aspects of the knowledge argument. This paper focuses on the replies of the ability hypothesis and the phenomenal concept strategy, which respectively try to block the two crucial moves in the knowledge argument: the establishment of an epistemic gap and the inference from the occurrence of this gap to the existence of an ontological gap. The paper critically examines how proponents of these two replies to the knowledge argument respond to some objections to maintain the viability of physicalism.

My dissertation proposes a new model of introspection by examining those aspects of the nature of introspection that have been neglected in the contemporary literature, such as the ones determining variables or mental phenomena in accordance with specific cases of introspection. I assert that these neglected aspects are the very ones which provide a precise account of the way we are aware of our mental life and help us arrive at self-attributions. I begin by raising issues already extant in the epistemology of introspection, and not only argue against skeptical doubts about the reliability of introspection but also provide empirical evidence for its accuracy. I then discuss leading models of introspection, such as the inner-sense view and the acquaintance view, and show that both of these views fail to provide an explanation of the exact nature of introspection and to distinguish between different modes of introspective awareness. I finally offer a new model according to which introspection operates as what I call a cognitive superposition of mental phenomena-namely, a particular function of combining and integrating variables. It is by introspection that we become aware of the character and contents of our mental states as well as the changes, transitions, and boundaries among them. Yet while my own model of introspection builds on specific pluralist approaches which contend that introspection involves several cognitive processes, my model also shows that the operation of introspection remains distinct from the operation of other cognitive processes such as perception, attention, or inference, and thus cannot be reducible to them. v Acknowledgments Among many debts I wish to acknowledge, let me begin with those to the Mexican National Council for Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, CONACYT) for their three-year fellowship in support of my Ph.D. studies at The Graduate Center, City University of New York, and to The Graduate Center for its one-year Dissertation Fellowship. It is a special pleasure to thank my principal advisor, Jesse Prinz, for his support, guidance, and encouragement at all stages of my research. From his initial belief in my project to the commitment and attention he devoted to its many stages, I greatly appreciate his patience, respect, and responsiveness, unfailingly reflected in challenges and comments of the highest caliber. He has helped me to develop my own ideas and immeasurably improved my work, teaching me along the way to be a better philosopher and better person. I am particularly grateful for the support of my professors and dissertation committee Saul Kripke, Eric Mandelbaum, Susanna Siegel, and Iakovos Vasiliou, as well as for their insightful feedback and constructive questions. The guidance that Susanna Siegel and Iakovos Vasiliou have provided during my Ph.D. studies has inspired me to pay attention to what is important, and they have been ideal interlocutors. As my project has drawn to a close, their support has been essential as well.

Some philosophers consider that some of their colleagues deny that consciousness exists. We shall call the latter 'deniers', adopting a term that was initially meant pejoratively. What do the deniers deny? In order to answer this question, we shall examine arguments, both of some deniers and of their critics, and present denialism as a systematic highly non-trivial position that has had some interesting achievements. We will show that the denialist project concerns the epistemology of the mind and specifically of consciousness: what can be known about it, and how it can be known. The main argument of denialism is that first-person reports about the mental realm are not always the best source of information about that realm, and are certainly not reliable. This leads the deniers to realize that the reference and meaning of mental terms as used in standard philosophical literature are vague and call for clarification, and that what many take to be empirical data in the study of the mind are actually heavily laden with theory. Denialism thus makes scientific and philosophical research clearer and more fruitful. Preface Mark Steiner was an anti-naturalist; he believed that human beings have a special place and role in the cosmos. The important conclusion he drew from studying The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem

In this paper I discuss a variant of the knowledge argument which is based upon Frank Jackson's Mary thought experiment. Using this argument, Jackson tries to support the thesis that a purely physical – or, put generally: an objectively scientific – perspective upon the world excludes the important domain of `phenomenal' facts, which are only accessible introspectively. Martine Nida-Rümelinhas formulated