Paul Ricoeur (in ) Philosophy

† PROPOSITIONS 1. Paul Ricoeur and Gilles Deleuze both develop a specific conception of novelty that goes against existing theories of metaphor. Ricoeur's strategy is to criticize these theories from within and to draw a theory of the living metaphor from them. Deleuze, in contrast, rejects thinking in terms of metaphors altogether. His view can best be understood in terms of a process of metamorphosis. (Chapter 1) 2. The notion living metaphor, understood as 'seeing the similar within the dissimilar,' lays the foundation for what I have called Ricoeur's model of productive tensions. (Part 1) 3. Ricoeur's response to the problem of novelty can best be modeled on his theory of the living metaphor. A living metaphor does not rely on an already existing resemblance, but creates a similarity that was not perceived before. It exceeds the boundaries of ordinary language and intimates a new connection between distant categories. As such it enables a stereoscopic vision. (Chapter 2) 4. Augustine's definition 'time is a distention of the mind [distentio animi]' provides an excellent illustration of a living metaphor in Ricoeur's sense. In Augustine's Confessions, a first attempt is made to draw a philosophical concept of time from this living metaphor by finding the similar (the temporal vocabulary that is sought) within the dissimilar (the psychological and spatial vocabulary that is given). As seen from Ricoeur's perspective, Augustine's attempt goes a long way, but does not fully succeed to explicate the implicit novelty of the living metaphor. (Chapter 3) 5. Deleuze's conception of novelty can best be understood as a process of metamorphosis that has two moments: a mutual metamorphosis that sets the process in motion and a continuous metamorphosis of proliferating series that keeps it alive. This defines the underlying dynamic of what I have called the model of organizing encounters. (Part 2) 6. Deleuze's oeuvre can roughly be divided in three kinds of works: single-signature, doublesignature, and multi-signature works. The single-signature works try to set a process of metamorphosis in motion but often fail to bring it to an end. The double-signature works effectuate mutual metamorphoses in which something starts to pass between Deleuze and the philosopher he is discussing, creating a creative coupling that results in interesting new ideas. The multi-signature works, finally, attempt to move beyond the mutual metamorphosis by creating a continuous metamorphosis of proliferating series that never stops charging itself. (Part 2) 7. Following Deleuze's essays, in literature the mutual metamorphoses emerge through the employment of specific writing procedures in which the author injects the ordinary language with a strange undertone so that it starts to tremble and is pushed to the limit. Such a creative coupling of a decomposed and an ordinary language results in a poetic language. (Chapter 5)

Il tema della libertà costituisce nel pensiero ricoeuriano un elemento sorgivo della sua riflessione, che progressivamente diventa un fiume carsico: un che di sommerso che tuttavia riemerge di tanto in tanto nella sua scrittura. Alla luce di questa idea il presente saggio intende sondare la presenza di un pensiero della libertà nell’ampio orizzonte dell’opera ricoeuriana, al fine di evidenziare alcune dinamiche proprie del pensatore francese nell’orizzonte di una riflessione sempre unitaria, anche se mai totalizzante. Il tema della libertà nella sua realizzazione personale diviene così il centro dell’argomentazione a partire dal quale si irradiano le tematiche più care a Ricoeur: dal tema del linguaggio e della metafora, a quello del tempo e della narrazione, fino a giungere alla dimensione etica, legata al tema della volontà e del male e da ultimo sfociante nella questione del riconoscimento, tra giustizia e amore. Il tentativo di questo lavoro è propriamente quello di ricercare nella dimensione della libertà quella tessitura profonda e costante che tiene insieme il vasto orizzonte delle ricerche ricoeuriane.

This work is concerned with some basic problems which historical criticism poses to biblical interpretation. The first chapter deals with historical criticism in relation to problems of the text’s historical distance and contemporary significance. Certain key figures from the field of philosophical hermeneutics are briefly introduced (Schleiermacher, Gadamer, Hirsch, Ricoeur), but attention is also paid to the ways how historical criticism was actually practiced (Wellhausen, Mowinckel). It is maintained that historical criticism is a tool in interpretation and does not impede possible appropriation of the text by those who read it with deep affection.

The second chapter faces historical criticism as a theological problem, which has become most apparent in the inerrantist milieu and which was more or less successfully answered by canonical approaches. A special attention is given to the canonical approach of Brevard Childs, which is understood against the backdrop of Barth’s doctrine of the Word of God and Frei’s view of biblical narratives. A special attention is given to distinction between approaches of Brevard Childs and James Sanders. It is maintained that Sanders’ canonical criticism provides better interpretive platform, because it wants to address the needs of contemporary interpretive communities through a self-aware historical critical enterprise.

The third chapter takes up the problem of violence in the book of Joshua and the problem of theological meaning of the exodus story. Biblical theological insights of James Sanders, James Barr, and Walter Brueggemann are applied. An eye is kept also on Pixley-Levenson debate and it is maintained that traditions of the exodus and conquest must be understood together as literary devices which invite communities of faith to freedom. As a result of the present research, historical criticism is presented as a hermeneutical tool which can help to rescue text’s significance for the contemporary communities of believers.

O homem ricoeuriano vive com e para os outros, constitui a sua subjetividade no encontro necessário com a alteridade. Nas obras, nas instituições, nos monumentos da cultura está o plural como fundamento da existência individual, constituída num infindável processo de interpretações.
Minha história está emaranhada com as histórias do outro, mas as histórias estão também tecidas e juntas fazem uma teia cujo desenho é possível ver com o distanciamento adequado. Essa maranha de histórias, esse tecido, é o que chamamos “nós”. Nós brasileiros, nós ricoeurianos, nós democratas, nós humanos. Nós que falamos, agimos e somos responsáveis. Nenhuma história é sozinha: cada um dos fios de cada uma das histórias está composto por fios comuns, de maneira que a história do outro também faz a minha história, e ambos compartilhamos de outras histórias comuns.
Mas, apesar da proximidade, da junção necessária do outro com o si, da presença da alteridade na constituição da consciência, Ricoeur não faz uma “filosofia do nós”. Não vemos em Ricoeur a primeira pessoa dar o salto do singular para o plural, e talvez existam motivos fortes para que o filósofo se abstenha de dar esse salto. Não são esses motivos que iremos explorar nesse estudo de vocação preliminar e exploratória.
Nosso interesse pela noção de “nós” na filosofia ricoeuriana se insere no marco mais amplo de um estudo sobre a comunicação. Entendemos que não há comunicação possível sem o estabelecimento prévio de um nós, mas que o nós se constitui, junto com a consciência individual, no jogo da comunicação. A comunicação tem uma função central no estabelecimento desse sujeito plural, solidário da consciência individual, sua contraparte necessária.
Começamos nossa análise pelo diálogo, mas é na dança que encontramos um horizonte novo para pensar neste sujeito coletivo numa pesquisa que, em fase incipiente, se mostra tanto prenhe de potencialidades quanto de desafios e dificuldades.

Religion was a constant theme throughout Paul Ricoeur’s long career, and yet he never wrote a full-length treatment of the topic. In this important new book, Brian Gregor draws on the full scope of Ricoeur’s writings to lay out the essential features of his philosophical interpretation of religion, from his earliest to his last work.

Ricoeur’s central claim is that religion aims at the regeneration of human capability—in his words, “the rebirth of the capable self.” This book provides a rich thematic account of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of religion, showing how the theme of capability informs his changing interpretations of religion, from his early work on French reflexive philosophy and the philosophy of the will to his late work on forgiveness, mourning, and living up to death. Gregor exhibits Ricoeur’s original contribution to philosophical reflection on such themes as evil, suffering, and violence, as well as imagination, embodiment, and spiritual exercise. He also presents a critical reconsideration of Ricoeur’s separation of philosophy from theology, and his philosophical interpretation of Christian theological ideas of revelation, divine transcendence and personhood, atonement, and eschatology.

Additionally, Gregor provides an expansive look at Ricoeur’s interlocutors, including Marcel, Jaspers, Kant, Hegel, Levinas, and Girard. Theologically-inclined readers will be particularly interested in the book’s treatment of Karl Barth and the Protestant theology of the Word, which was a vital influence on Ricoeur.

The result is a study of Ricoeur that is both sympathetic and critical, provocative and original, inviting the reader into a deeper engagement with Ricoeur’s philosophical interpretation of religion.

Para salir del bucle de la identidad que idea fronteras personales y políticas, construye un 'otro' extraño, exótico y peligroso, es necesario deconstruir ese fantasma para encontrar la persona que se encuentra detrás con la que poder dialogar e intercambiar, con la que subsumirse en una nueva personalidad mestiza que supere el miedo mediante la empatía.

In this chapter, I will focus on Ricoeur views on the intersection between the implicit poetic discourse in which the living metaphor emerges and the explicit philosophical discourse in which it is conceptually clarified. In this introductory section, I will zoom in on Ricoeur’s views on the transition from a living metaphor (poetic discourse) to a concept (philosophical discourse). This transition is needed because the semantic and the ontological gain of the living metaphor are brought to light by the living metaphor without being explicated in a concept yet.
In the other sections of this chapter, I will illustrate the intersection of discourses with the help of Augustine’s discussion of time in the eleventh book of his Confessions. This approach has a double advantage. On the one hand, Augustine’s search for a temporal vocabulary provides a perfect illustration of how the poetic discourse in which the living metaphor emerges can be taken up by a philosophical discourse that tries to derive a concept from this metaphor. On the other hand, this search also provides the foundation for an interpretative framework that underlies many of Ricoeur’s later works and that can be used to give some kind of unity to them. This framework will be explored in the next chapter as a more complex variation of the model of productive tensions in which many of the other variations can be included.

Paul RICOEUR: La metaphore vive, Paris: Editions Du Seuil 1975. Cito la traduccion de Agustin Neira: La metafora viva, Madrid: Ediciones Trotta-Cristiandad 2001 (la ed. Madrid, 1980). Tengo en cuenta, como podra notarse, las variaciones entre una y otra edicion.

Abstract: One of the key concepts of Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutics is the notion of distanciation. In this article we show that Ricoeur introduces this notion as a correction of Heidegger's focus on being-in and Gadamer's emphasis on belonging (Zugehörigkeit) and Derrida's notion of discplacement.

This paper theorizes that the success of the People Power Revolution of 1986 to end a dictatorship is a concrete exercise of how would a democracy work. In a democracy, the people elect among themselves those who will be charged of forming the government and who will have power over them in order to assure their living of a life of justice and opportunity where they enjoy fully the exercise of their civil liberties anchored on a tradition of utmost respect for the rule of law. Therefore, at any moment that the governing authority subverts the will of the people, the latter has to reassert its power through civil disobedience or revolution on the institution that has already become violent. This will, however, turn into a vicious cycle unless the essential dissymmetry embedded in any political community which usually ends in the violence perpetrated by the more powerful agent, be it the government or the people, will be corrected. The strength of a democracy lies always on the collaborative and cooperative efforts between the governing authority lording over the people and the governed legitimating the former's authority. But the perception of politics as only a matter of strategic alliances, expediency, favoritism, and political realism will more likely lead to an unacceptable state violence. Thus, a vision of an ethics in politics must be instituted. Since ethics can provide rational order and so, curbs the violence that politics engenders, the ethical character of the state which is a matter of both the prudence exercised by the government and the participation of the citizens in democratic processes geared to negotiating conflicts and distributing power must be enshrined on institutions that assures the maximum participation of its citizens; such institutions as the political parties which consolidates people's interests and the judiciary whose fifth pillar of its criminal justice system is the community.

¿Cómo se desarrolló la guitarra académica en Rosario? ¿Son los momentos o etapas históricas la ciudad las mismas que las de Buenos Aires? ¿Quiénes fueron los guitarristas que iniciaron los procesos de profesionalización en la ciudad? ¿En qué lugares se realizaban las actividades artísticas, de difusión y que hoy consideraríamos pedagógicas? ¿Hay identificaciones discursivas típicas de Rosario? Con este trabajo se quiere hacer una aproximación a la guitarra académica en Rosario y proponer o sugerir etapas en el desarrollo de la guitarra académica rosarina, destacar sus actores, ubicar los acontecimientos y los centros guitarrísticos de la ciudad como también recuperar discursos/imaginarios y climas en los diferentes momentos.
Se encuentran correspondencias entre la guitarra académica en Rosario y la entrada “Guitarra: Argentina” del diccionario antes mencionado, como el corte sugerido en 1950. El mismo que plantea que al promediar la segunda mitad del siglo hay una superposición compleja de enfoques: “En primer lugar se evidencia la continuidad de la Escuela de Tárrega , mantenida a través de los discípulos de Prat y Anido” (PLESCH, GOYENA, & ZAVADIVKER, Guitarra II: Argentina, 1999-2002, pág. 113). Estos discípulos, afianzadores del proceso de profesionalización de la enseñanza y ejecución del instrumento en la primera mitad del siglo,  imponían la aplicación a ultranza de principios supuestamente inmutables. Pero por otro lado “…tendencias renovadoras, sustentadas por guitarristas que, partiendo de las premisas vigentes durante la primera mitad de siglo, las modificaron y elaboraron…” (PLESCH, GOYENA, & ZAVADIVKER, 1999-2002, pág. 114) y propugnaron, por ejemplo en el caso de Martínez Zárate, “…la predominancia de lógica musical sobre la guitarrística” (PLESCH, GOYENA, & ZAVADIVKER, 1999-2002, pág. 114). Y que a su vez Irma Costanzo se orientaba hacia las sonoridades potentes por influencias de Narciso Yepes y Carlevaro. En Rosario, esas tendencias renovadoras tuvieron una influencia relativa, y la continuidad de la Escuela de Tárrega mantuvo una influencia relevante hasta pasada la década del 50. Pero existen otros factores predominantemente rosarinos que inciden en la elección de la segunda mitad del siglo:
1) La fundación de la Asociación Guitarrística de Rosario en diciembre de 1949, entidad que aún hoy sigue organizando actividades, propulsada por más de una decena de guitarristas de diferentes vertientes.
2) La radicación del matrimonio de los guitarristas Jorge Martínez Zárate y Chelita Pomponio en la ciudad de Rosario en 1949. Por esos años Ernesto Bitetti comienza sus clases con Jorge, a los 5 años.
3) En 1949 el Profesorado de Música del Normal N°2 fue trasladado por el Ministerio de cultura de la Nación a la universidad Nacional del Litoral, pasando a depender de la Escuela Superior de Música de Santa fe. (LUTGES, 1972, pág. 346) (COZZI, La creación musical en Rosario, 2007, pág. 38)
4) Se sancionan los Decreto 33711/49 y 13921/52, que obligaba “…a la interpretación y difusión de música argentina en todos los conciertos públicos”  dentro de un nuevo modelo de acumulación que contiene un pacto social sustentado políticamente desde un discurso nacionalista.

La poca cantidad de trabajos realizados en la ciudad, la escasez de datos, la falta de relevamiento riguroso y la poca sistematización de información, no nos permite abordar las particularidades del desarrollo de la guitarra en Rosario de manera científica en el sentido de la resolución definitiva del problema (BORSOTTI, 2007, pág. 42). Pero aportar nombres, lugares y fechas, continuidades/rupturas, construcciones discursivas y elementos para un criterio de periodización, permitirá tener mayores recursos para futuros trabajos; sobre todo para definir objetos de estudio o encontrar fuentes pertinentes.

"ABSTRACT:
    This study assumes the subject's pursuit of meaning is generally incapacitating and should be suspended. It aims to demonstrate how such a suspension is theoretically accomplished by utilizing Lacan's formulae of sexuation integrated with his work in discourse theory and topology.
    Part I places this study into context by examining scholarship from the established fields of hermeneutics, phenomenology, (post)structuralism, aesthetic theory and psychoanalysis in order to extract out their respective theory of meaning. These theories reveal that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation and reaches near crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand this crisis is mollified by the rise of Heideggerian-Gadamerian hermeneutical phenomenology which questions traditional epistemological approaches to the text using a new ontological conceptualization of meaning and a conscious rejection of methodology. On the other hand this crisis is exacerbated when the ubiquitous nature of meaning is itself challenged by (post)structuralism's discovery of the signifier which inscribes a limit to meaning, and by the domains of sense and nonsense newly opened up by aesthetic theory. These historical developments culminate in the field of psychoanalysis which most consequentially delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity.
    Part II extends these findings by rigorously constructing out of the Lacanian sexuated formulae a decidedly non-hermeneutical phenomenological approach useful in demonstrating the sexual nature of meaning. Explicated in their static state by way of an account of their original derivation from the Aristotelian logical square, it is argued that these four formulae are relevant to basic concerns of textual theory inclusive of the hermeneutical circle of meaning. These formulae are then set into motion by integrating them with Lacan's four discourses to demonstrate the breakdown of meaning. Finally, the cuts and sutures of two-dimensional space that is topology as set down in L'étourdit are performed to confirm how the very field of meaning is ultimately suspended from a nonsensical singular point known in Lacanian psychoanalysis as objet a. The contention is that by occupying this point the subject frees himself from the debilitating grip of meaning."

This book investigates the importance of Ricoeur's hermeneutics and poetics in rethinking humanities. In particular, Ricoeur's insights on reference as refiguration and his idea of interpretation as a triadic process (which consists of mimesis 1-prefiguration, mimesis 2-configuration, and mimesis 3-refiguration) will be applied to philosophy of science and to literary and historical texts. It will be shown that Ricoeur's idea of emplotment can be extended and applied to scientific, literary and historical texts. This multidisciplinary research will include philosophy of science, metaphysics, hermeneutics, and literary theory.

Le référent de la parabole, pourrions-nous dire […], est l'expérience humaine, conçue comme l'expérience de tout l'homme et de tous les hommes, en tant qu'elle est interprétée à la lumière des ressources mimétiques de quelques fictions réalistes et extravagantes, elles-mêmes encastrées dans des structures narratives spécifiques 1 .

In speech, the function of reference is connected with the role of the discursive situation within, in the exchange of language itself: exchanging speech, the speakers are present, on both sides, and the circumstances of the discourse are also present, not only with their noticeable environment, but also with their cultural background which is familiar to the speakers. It is precisely in relation to this situation that the discourse gains full meaning: the reference to reality in the final analysis is a reference to that reality to which we can point "around here" -it can be said -determined by the moment of the discourse itself… In live speech, the ideal meaning of what is being said, strives towards a reality reference, or rather towards that "of which" it is spoken. However, that is not the case when the text takes the place of speech. The text… is not without reference. The task of reading as interpretation will be deduced precisely to actualizing the reference.

Les études sept à neuf de Soi-même comme un autre, dans lesquelles Paul Ricœur développe sa "petite éthique" souvent qualifiée d’éthique de la sollicitude, s’achèvent sur une suggestion d’après laquelle la "catégorie de la reconnaissance" exprime adéquatement la "dialectique du même et de l’autre" au cœur de cette éthique. Jean Greisch y a vu "la cellule germinale du Parcours de la reconnaissance" et a qualifié ce bloc d’études de "premier “travail de reconnaissance”". Radicalisant ces remarques, nous soutenons que la petite éthique peut être qualifiée d’éthique de la reconnaissance. Nous fournissons à cette thèse une première assise en clarifiant le rapport qu’entretient la notion d’estime de soi – fondamentale dans la petite éthique, où elle est définie comme la capacité d’une personne à évaluer la cohérence de ses actions avec sa conception de la vie bonne, – avec celle de reconnaissance (de soi). // His seven to nine studies from Oneself as Another, in which Paul Ricoeur develops his “little ethics” often discussed as a care ethics, end while suggesting that the “category of recognition” is rightfully characterizing the “dialectic of the same and the other”, central to his ethics. Jean Greisch, who alleged this interpretation as “the germ cell of The Course of Recognition”, termed these studies as a “first ‘work on recognition’”. Developing further these reflections, we will argue that the little ethics shall be portrayed as an ethics of recognition. We provide a first building block to this thesis by disentangling the connection between recognition and the self-esteem, fundamental in his little ethics wherein it is defined as the capacity to evaluate one’s actions coherence with their understanding of the good life.

The present article is a discussion of the philosophical-theological mode in which Christian orthodoxy could critically engage with non-Christian modes of thought in a manner intentionally consistent with native metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions and commitments. Hermeneutics will be more or less the platform on which the notion of “Tradition,” informed by Gadamer and Florovsky, is raised so as to articulate how Christian tradition - for the present study largely derived from the philosophical work of John of Damascus -  informs a hermeneutic mode of discourse, analysis, and worldview, what elsewhere has been called a hermeneutic of tradition. In short, this hermeneutic of tradition relative to historic orthodoxy refers in the first place to the intentional act of understanding according to the Scriptural, Apostolic, Patristic, and Conciliar norms as embodied and expressed by the particular Fathers and Ecumenical Councils of the historic, undivided Church, and the application of these norms, the regula fidei, or, perhaps yet more boldly, the “hermeneutic canons,” to contemporary problematics. The argument, then, seeks to show in light of Ricoeur’s interpretation theory how John of Damascus' Dialectica fittingly provides a foundation for Christian discourse, which is to say a foundational conceptual apparatus integrating Christian epistemology and metaphysics into a coherent system of thought which provides tools for engaging contemporary philosophical discourse from within a consistently orthodox perspective.

In this paper I trace Ricoeur’s reflections on ideology and utopia from his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, first delivered in 1975, to his later writings on selfhood and the just from the 1990s. The thread that I follow begins from the closing lines of Ricoeur’s Lectures, wherein he suggests that “practical wisdom” (or phronesis) may provide an answer to the paradox of ideology. Taking this suggestion as my point of departure, I reread Ricoeur’s earlier solution to this problem back from the vantage point of his later writings, where his conception of phronesis is further developed. Although these later writings are not immediately concerned with ideology, Ricoeur’s idea of “phronetic judgment” can still be understood within the earlier problematic. As I argue, Ricoeur’s concept of phronetic judgment helps to consolidate his earlier solution to the problem of ideology within his later, more systematic reflections on ethics, politics, and practical philosophy. Although Ricoeur’s reflections on ideology and utopia have been subject to considerable scrutiny, commentators typically discuss them within the context of his writings from the same period. The longer view that I adopt here therefore not only sheds light on questions of continuity in Ricoeur’s political thought, but may also stimulate further interest in his contribution to ideology critique and contemporary critical theory more broadly.

The purpose of this study is to propose the structural outline and conceptual framework of a Ricoeurian translation theory. Following a discussion on the ambiguities around situating Ricoeur in translation theory, three major interlinked components of the theory are explored. First, the metaphysics of meaning and translation is established based on Ricoeur's hermeneutics of infinitude. Then, the language---processing component is constructed through an incorporation of Ricoeur's narrative theory. Finally, the ethics and politics of translation, particularly in globalization, are founded based on Ricoeur's "age of hermeneutics theory."

The authenticity if the modalities of the imagery mediation of reality transferred into fiction -is read through their function in the refigurative process of fiction and in the interweaving of fiction and history or the refiguration of time. We shall go back to the thesis to represent to himself that…

This paper explores the post-metaphysical theology of Richard Kearney (1954–) from
a Jewish theological perspective. It seeks to provide an original analysis of his project
“anatheism,” considering the prominence of Jewish texts in the development of the
concept of anatheism. Rooted in deconstructionist and Continental philosophical discourses, Jewish hermeneutics also plays a central role in anatheism. This discursive
intersection has received scarce scholarly attention to date. Biblical and other texts
which he interprets, include the rabbinic exegesis of Rashi and of modern Jewish
hermeneutical philosophy notably of Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, and Emmanuel
Levinas. I analyse elements of Kearney’s interpretation primarily of the “Burning Bush”
biblical narrative as a test case for anatheistic reading of Jewish texts as they appear in
one particular text “I Am Who May Be” in The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion (2001). Kearney’s textual reading of the Burning Bush offers an unusual example
of a Christian engagement with Jewish interpretations of the biblical parable as well
as of Levinas, Derrida, and others. Kearney’s effort highlights an approach of a mutual
search for ways of interpreting texts not “of” the other, but “with” the other, in a mutual
engagement of post-metaphysical theology. More broadly, this examination offers an
important contribution to the developing field of post-metaphysical theology in the
Jewish and Christian traditions, ultimately posing questions as to how and whether
elements of Jewish scriptural interpretative techniques might or can imbue contemporary Christian post-metaphysical theologies. Conversely, the question can be asked as
to what a Jewish version of anatheism might look like. This examination presents a test
case for possibilities of reading and learning from discourses across different religions.

Il culmine della tradizione patristica greca e latina, rappresentato da Gregorio di Nissa e Agostino, può essere restituito come riflessione divergente sulla metafora, cioè sul potere ana-logico o carismatico di traslazione del desiderio. Al suo stesso interno la teologia matura di Agostino approda al riconoscimento dello scarto teologico tra due livelli di rivelazione e di senso. Alla platonizzante metafora ontoteologica (lex di translatio dai signa sensibili alla Res trascendente di Dio), ereditata dalla riflessione teolo-gica origeniana nella sua reinterpretazione cappadoce, Agostino sovrappone una metafora dif-ferente, "apocalittica": l'evento indisponibile dello Spiritus, il Dono indebito di grazia, pensato come Metafora carismatica, Transfert della santa concupiscenza, che elegge la peccaminosa libertà dell'uomo, muovendola irresistibilmente alla salvezza. Pensatore di Dio come Essere immutabile e confessore dell'evento della grazia, iniziatore della storia occidentale della memoria abitata da Altro come scaturigine delle ermeneutiche della storicità, Agostino continua ad essere privilegiato oggetto di interpretazione di due impor-tanti e divergenti teorie contemporanee della metafora: l'ermeneutica dell'incondizionato e l'on-tologia dell'inesauribile di Ricoeur e la decostruzione aperta all'evento del "Vieni!" di Derrida. Ma mentre la decostruzione del cristianesimo di Derrida privilegia l'interpretazione del dono e della decisione passiva dell'antiumanistico Agostino, la prospettiva di Ricoeur converge con quella umanistico-cristiana di Origene e ancor più con quella di Gregorio di Nissa. Il più speculativo dei Padri cappadoci "inventa" il pensiero dell'infinità incomprensibile di Dio, dell'intelligenza come sapere congetturale dell'inesauribile, del desiderio spirituale come protensione infinita nell'interpretazione allegorica delle metafore analogiche, attraverso le quali il Logos chiama la libertà della creatura alla responsabilità di una testimonianza fedele, quindi a un'impossibile, eppure estatica unione mistica. Se Agostino e Gregorio propongono due diverse intelligenze dell'intimo differire del pensie-ro teologico, quindi due diverse interpretazioni del transfert del desiderio cristiano e del suo paradossale godimento, essi continuano a differire nella ricerca rigorosamente filosofica, non dogmatica e laicamente decostruttiva di due dei massimi pensatori contemporanei.

Since the publication of "Oneself as Another", many sociologists have referred to the work of Paul Ricœur, some of them considering his notion of narrative identity to be a useful means of analyzing some aspects individual identity left unresolved by Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Bourdieu had, however, already discredited the sociological relevance of the notion of narrative in his 1986 article “The Biographical Illusion.” Through a careful re-reading of both texts, this article will determine to what extent the sociological use of Ricœur’s notions can escape the confines of Bourdieu’s analysis and, moreover, the different conceptions of the human being and of ethics underlying the two distinct frameworks of analysis.

In interviews with Charles Reagan, in his book Paul Ricoeur: His Life and His Work (pp. 122 -125), Paul Ricoeur reflects on the unwritten Poetics of the Will, the ambitiously projected third volume of his early Philosophy of the Will. The Poetics of the Will was intended to reconcile the voluntary and involuntary structures of the will and lead to an ultimate restoration of the innocence of creation through transcendence of bound, ciphered existence. Erazim Kohak gives the examples of “the graceful, effortless movements of the dancer,” and the “unity of understanding and will surpassed in moments of love” as glimpses of poetics. Although Ricoeur said he accomplished a poetics of the will in other modalities, he admits that the recourse to transcendence originally inspired by his reading of Karl Jaspersʼ “Transcendence and Metaphysics” with Mikel Dufrenne during their five years of captivity was never written. Ricoeur admits also that the author is not the best interpreter of his own work, and assigns to the interested reader the continuation of the project. This task is as much for the philosopher of the reflective tradition as it is for the poet who is irrepressible enough to act despite the futility of a finite freedom and who may consent to the speculation inspired by the soul of the existential enigma. The poet must transcend the limit imposed by fault by reading it as a cracking of the enigma of the ground and meaning of being through creation. The philosopher must elaborate existential and anthropological concepts reconciled through critique and interpretation which work with an axiological phenomenology and hermeneutic ontology. But Ricoeurʼs grandest aspiration was to provoke a “second Copernical revolution,” a “second naivete,” whose power is revealed in an eschatological figure that incorporates such a philosopher with such a poet. Like Jaspersʼ secular theology, and Richard Kearneyʼs ʻanatheism,ʼ Ricoeurʼs Poetics of the Will embraces the Nietzschean death of God while affirming the hope and promise of salvation. The Philosophy and the Poetics of the Will both come from an understanding of primary affirmation as the surplus of meaning, and  develop through existential difference as finitude, but while the poetics can give closure to the adventure, philosophy can teach and expand the human world and ready it for transfiguration.

Nosso texto propõe uma leitura da Confissões de Agostinho de Hipona com elementos da hermenêutica filosofia de Paul Ricoeur, especialmente a noção da identidade narrativa. O si, a memória e a identidade são pontos de encontro onde as filosofias de ambos os autores dialogam e se iluminam reciprocamente.

Our aim is to see how melancholia is a remarkable disorder of narrative identity: the patient can still tell her or his life story, or even write it, but she or he cannot construct a narrative in the Ricœurian sense, nor can she or he understand herself or himself according to a dynamic identity. With the help of Freudian literature and three selected melancholic narratives, we will be able to put the Ricœurian theory of narrative identity into a problematic perspective.

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Philosophy – whether traditional or contemporary – has nothing to say about the human metaphysical predicament, and cannot even offer a basic phenomenology of the human condition. Part of the problem is the ongoing confusion as to what philosophy actually amounts to, and what it can achieve. It is necessary to demystify philosophy, and have it restricted to the discipline of critical thinking, and it should not be thought of as possessing any substantial theoretical content of its own. It is a method, a skillset, a series of techniques, not a repository of various highbrow theories, whether about mind, epistemology, ontology, cosmology, science, or anything else. Metaphysics is an entirely distinct and separate field of inquiry, and concerns the human predicament, and ultimate human fulfilment, and it is to this end that critical thinking skills can usefully be applied. The purpose of this short study is to give some help to those hoping to gain an insight into the metaphysical realms of their being, and who would like some guidance with regard to those formal and academic disciplines supposedly geared to dealing with that very subject.

Paul Ricœur and Jan Patočka are considered among the most important phenomenologists of the 20th century. As with Ricœur, Patočka’s philosophy is shaped by an enduring critical confrontation with Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses of Dasein. The present paper aims at analyzing Ricœur’s and Patočka’s convergences and mutual inspirations in their perspectives on the topic of history. More precisely, I will take up the question of the meaning of history in Ricœur and Patočka as profoundly influenced by their readings of Husserl’s Krisis. Then, the attention will be turned to Ricœur’s concept of historicity and Patočka’s notion of care of the soul as concerns involved in the search for meaning in history as an open-ended mediation. In this context, I will discuss Ricœur’s and Patočka’s critical examination of Heidegger’s conception of thrownness (Geworfenheit) and projection (Entwerfen), that is, Dasein’s already-being-in-the-world and its disclosedness, as necessary concepts for understanding their own philosophical approaches to history.

Rastrear por la abundante obra de Paul Ricoeur todo lo referido a su lectura post-hegeliana de Kant se nos fue convirtiendo en un complejo recorrido. En parte, esto se debe a lo extenso de la obra. Pero también a la diversidad de planos que, aunque al final confluentes, se van abriendo a partir de la utilización que Ricoeur hace de las filosofías de Hegel y de Kant, como dos expresiones cumbres del pensamiento de occidente, tanto si nos referimos al campo de lo ético (y lo político, estrechamente ligados por el autor), como si lo hacemos al de la hermenéutica, en especial de los símbolos. Kant y Hegel abren campos de reflexión y especulación, e incluso reabren mutuamente los que fueron cerrados en forma individual por cada uno de ellos. Como veremos, Hegel corrige (al parecer de Ricoeur) algunos puntos erróneos de la reflexión kantiana, mientras que Kant supera con sus Dialécticas algunos límites del pensamiento hegeliano. Así, se completan y complementan mutuamente.

La traduzione, ogni traduzione, nasce quando la comunicazione è possibile ma non è immediata. Nei contesti in cui la comunicazione non è possibile, neppure la traduzione è possibile, mentre se ci fosse perfetta comunicazione, la traduzione non sarebbe necessaria. Di qui il paradosso dell’impossibilità di una traduzione perfetta, dovuto al semplice fatto che se fosse perfetta non sarebbe traduzione. Questo vale per ogni genere di traduzione. In questo testo mi concentrerò sulla comunicazione verbale tra uomo e animale o, per utilizzare un’espressione tecnica, della comunicazione verbale interspecifica. Farò riferimento a ricerche portate avanti dagli scienziati che lavorano nell’ambito delle scienze cognitive, in particolare della cognizione animale e della zoosemiotica, e successivamente presenterò alcune riflessioni filosofiche.

This paper reconstructs and presents the efforts of French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) to understand reconciliation. It deals with three central issues in reconciliatory processes, including memory, identity, and forgiveness. They are presented as actual forces, working through two interconnected and inseparable movements: an archaeological movement directed towards the past, and a teleological one aiming towards the future. I show their intertwined action to be a constitutive dimension of reconciliation.
The paper shows how a merely archaeological dimension of memory necessarily faces a host of contradictions and how this may even lead to an intolerant identity. From the other side, itshows how a teleological dimension of memory can establish a juste mémoire [just memory], that configures our identity as an identité narrative [narrative identity], which can lead towards reconciliation with oneself and with the Other. Finally, the paper culminates by examining Ricoeur’s reflection on forgiveness. Although directed to the past, forgiveness is as an act occurring in a real, present moment, with consequences capable of shaping the future, potentially moving on a path toward reconciliation.
In: Polylog, XXXIV, p. 151-167.

Cet article envisage deux postures sociologiques au regard de l’anthropologie de l’homme capable de Paul Ricœur. Une première sociologie travaille en approfondissant la notion de capacité humaine sous le signe de l’herméneutique de Ricœur. Une seconde, dont le projet sera ici explicité, reprend l’ambition d’étudier les phénomènes fondamentaux de la sphère pratique exposée dans la Philosophie de la volonté. La question des capacités y est prise très amont, au niveau où s’exercent des expériences sensibles primitives, et où l’humain est encore considéré dans la dépendance au vital. Une réflexion y sera conduite sur l’assurance intime de pouvoir se rendre capable et la fondation consubstantielle d’un espace pratique intégré par familiarité au schéma corporel. Ce développement permettra pour finir un éclairage critique sur les politiques sociales actuellement centrées sur l’activation des capacités des individus.

This article considers two sociological postures in relation to Paul Ricœur’s anthropology of capable man. The first sociological approach scrutinizes the concept of human capacity from the perspective of Ricœur’s hermeneutics. The second approach elaborated here aims to study the fundamental phenomena of the practical sphere exposed in Philosophie de la volonté. The question of capacities is raised to the upper level, where primitive sensitive experiences are carried out and human beings are still considered to be dependent on vital functions. A reflection will be carried out on the inner certainty of being able to be capable and consubstantial foundation of a practical space integrated by familiarity with the body schema. This study will allow for a critical illumination of social policies currently focused on the activation of individual capacities.

El artículo se ocupa de dos categorías clave en Ricoeur, poética y atestación, que transforman el dualismo entre objeto y sujeto en una dialéctica fina. El tránsito en su itinerario desde una hermenéutica en torno a los textos a una en torno a la acción humana facilita esta puesta en relación entre poética y atestación. Se analizan los frutos de cada categoría en el ámbito filosófico y luego en el religioso. En el caso de la poética, luego de apreciar los desplazamientos de la noción a lo largo de su itinerario, indagamos en los aportes tanto de la poética del lenguaje como de la poética teológica a la poética de la acción. Preside el análisis el paso del texto a la acción que permite sostener sucesivamente que no hay acción sin imaginación y que tampoco la hay sin llamado. En el caso de la atestación partimos del ser humano capaz y vulnerable y del rol clave que la atestación juega en la mediación de las tres dialécticas de su antropología, en particular en la relación entre alteridad e ipseidad. Esta relación entre conminación de Otro y atestación de sí, se transforma en el ámbito religioso en la relación entre llamado y respuesta. La religión frente al mal pretende restaurar en el ser humano su capacidad de actuar según el bien: este auxilio que regenera su capacidad, que obviamente no puede ser probado, tampoco puede ser atestado sino solo esperado. Es el relevo que la esperanza hace de la atestación.

Commenting on Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of imagination, Paul Ricoeur argues that Sartre fails to address the productive nature of imaginative acts. According to Ricoeur, Sartre’s examples show that he thinks of imagination in mimetic terms, neglecting its innovative and creative dimensions. Imagination, Ricoeur continues, manifests itself most clearly in fiction, wherein new meaning is created. By using fiction as the paradigm of imaginative activity, Ricoeur is able to argue against Sartre that the essence of imagination lies not in its ability to reproduce absent objects, but rather in the ability to transform reality through creative acts. Motivated by the intuition that Sartre the writer could not have forgotten to address such crucial dimensions of imagination,
I examine Sartre’s philosophical and literary work, showing that not only does he develop a notion of productive imagination, he also puts this notion to work by articulating the relationship between imagination, narrative, and identity formation,
well before Ricoeur advanced his narrative-identity theory. I argue that Sartre, like Ricoeur and MacIntyre, another representative of narrative-theory whose criticism of Sartre I address in this essay, views imagination and narrativity as necessary conditions for the formation of a coherent and meaningful sense of self

In contemporary political theory, democracy embodies the ideals of the Aristotelian state, the one that is most able to realize the ideal life of the political community. Nevertheless, fledgling democracies are confronted with economic and political problems which Paul Ricoeur thinks are due to the essential dissymmetry between the governing authority and the governed, culminating in the violence of the powerful agent. The enjoyment of the good life in a democracy presupposes what Ricoeur calls an ethics of politics, which consists in nothing other than the creation of spaces of freedom which confer on the governed a structure that enables its members to pursue the aim of enduring indefinitely in the future. When the governing authority buries into oblivion the desire of the historical community to live well with and for others in just institutions, the governed are expected to act in concert in order to ascertain their enjoyment of the good life because they feel particularly responsible for the horizontal bond that is constitutive of their will to live together. Thus, Paul Ricoeur explains that the balancing of power in common and domination is an endless task of democracy that seeks to place domination under the control of power-in-common.

Selon Fabienne Brugère, un point de rencontre existe entre l'éthique spinoziste et les éthiques du care, le care pouvant être envisagé comme une réactualisation du conatusspinoziste. Cet article vise à démontrer que cette convergence peut s'éta-blir à partir d'une éthique narrative inspirée de la pensée de Paul Ricoeur. Cela concerne principalement la perception que l'on peut avoir de soi en tant que corps et esprit, dans la mesure où l'esprit est défini par Baruch Spinoza comme « idée du corps ». L'éthique spinoziste invite à se rendre utile aux autres pour augmenter notre puissance d'être et nous libérer d'une servitude qui n'est pas sans rapport avec la vulnérabilité telle que définie dans les éthiques du care. L'humain.e vulnérable a besoin pour se sentir exister d'avoir une idée cohérente de son corps, et le récit est l'une des voies lui permettant de progresser dans cette direction. Encore faut-il, pour y parvenir, trouver des pourvoyeuses et pourvoyeurs de caredisposé.e.s à écou-ter, aptes à susciter en soi le désir de se raconter.

According to Fabienne Brugère, there is common ground between Spinoza's ethics and the ethics of care, which can be regarded as a renewal of the Spinozan concept of 'conatus.' This article aims to demonstrate that this form of convergence can be based upon a narrative ethic as inspired by Paul Ricoeur's thought. It is mainly about how people can perceive themselves both as mind and body, insofar as " mind " is defined by Spinoza as the " idea of the body. " The Spinozan ethic leads us to make ourselves useful to other people in order to expand our capacity to be and to free ourselves from a form of servitude that is somewhat linked to vulnerability as it is defined in the ethics of care. Therefore, vulnerable people each need to develop consistent ideas of their bodies if they wish to feel that they do exist. Narrative is one of the many ways of advancing in that direction. However, vulnerable people should not be alone ; they must be accompanied by care providers who have a sympathetic ear and who can arouse in them the desire to tell and share their stories.

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Ricœur fait la distinction entre deux conceptions de la métaphore : la théorie de la tension, créatrice de sens, et la théorie de la substitution, où la métaphore n’est qu’un équivalent imaginatif d’un concept et est donc aisément traduisible. Les récits poétiques d’Avicenne semblent clairement se situer dans cette catégorie, étant donné qu’ils sont tissés d’allégories reprenant rigoureusement l’épistémologie rationnelle du philosophe. Pourtant, la conception avicennienne de la métaphore offre un double rapport à la théorie de la substitution, en sa faveur ou en sa défaveur selon que la métaphore imite une vérité ou une chose. Ainsi, malgré la correspondance au premier abord entre métaphore et concept, les récits préservent un intraduisible renvoyant au plaisir ultime – et au désir qui lui est associé – procuré par la connaissance idéale, plaisir que le syllogisme démonstratif ne peut donner et qui demeure donc rationnellement inconcevable. La métaphore correspond certes à un concept mais elle n’est pas parfaitement traduisible car elle renvoie à une praxis qui n’aurait pu être dite à travers un langage conceptuel et qui vise la saveur expérientielle de la vérité, afin d’inciter à la goûter personnellement.

La presente comunicación busca mostrar que el concepto de identidad narrativa de Paul Ricœur articula dimensiones que se entrelazan y condicionan recíprocamente: 1) un trasfondo preestético, por el cual se concede una preeminencia ontológico-existencial a la acción; 2) una función estética, que deriva de la relevancia hermenéutica acordada a la teoría de la narración ; y 3) una orientación metaestética, que se pone al descubierto a través de la ética teleológica inherente a la imaginación narrativa.

In this article, I try to reconstruct the critical reception of the notion of "flesh" (Leib) in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, and Jacques Derrida. I argue that this concept plays a key role in the transformation set forth by those two authors regarding phenomenological heritage. On the one hand, the tension between the voluntary and the involuntary within Ricoeurian analytics of human action produces the substitution of Husserlian dualism of perspectivesbody-object (Körper) versus lived-body (Leib)-in favor of the mystery of incarnation; on the other hand, Derridian analysis of the sign and of the mechanism of signification brings upon a reversal of the balance of power between orality and writing, following the lead of material traces in expression. Both philosophers signal towards the insufficiency of the phenomenological descriptive method to deal with incarnation and the lived, making a move towards ontological understanding of existential anchorage.