Nuclear energy in India

Safe operation of nuclear power facilities requires a culture of learning, but Indian nuclear authorities appear to continuously fail to learn the lessons of accidents including at facilities they operate. This paper examines how nuclear authorities in India responded to the Fukushima accidents and a previous accident at one of India’s nuclear power plants, and infers what they seem to have learned from them. By evaluating this experience in light of a wide body of research on factors promoting reliability and safety in organizations managing complex and hazardous systems, it seeks to draw lessons about the prospects for nuclear safety in India.

This article contributes a case study of regulation of the design of India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR). This reactor is the first of its kind in India, and perceived by the nuclear establishment as critical to its future ambitions. Because fast breeder reactors can experience explosive accidents called core disruptive accidents whose maximum severity is difficult to contain, it is difficult to assure the safety of the reactor’s design. Despite the regulatory agency’s apparent misgivings about the adequacy of the PFBR’s design, it eventually came to approve construction of the reactor. We argue that the approval process should be considered a case of regulatory failure, and examine three potential factors that contributed to this failure: institutional negligence, regulatory capture, and dependence on developers and proponents for esoteric knowledge. This case holds lessons for nuclear safety regulation and more generally in situations where specialized, highly technical, knowledge essential for ensuring safety is narrowly held.

The November 2009 exposure of employees at the Kaiga nuclear power plant to tritiated water is not the first instance of high radiation exposures to workers. Over the years, many nuclear reactors and other facilities associated with the nuclear fuel cycle operated by the Department of Atomic Energy have had accidents of varying severity. Many of these are a result of repeated inattention to good safety practices, often due to lapses by management. Therefore, the fact that catastrophic radioactive releases have not occurred is not by itself a source of comfort. To understand whether the DAE's facilities are safe, it is therefore necessary to take a closer look at their operations. The description and discussion in this paper of some accidents and organisational practices offer a glimpse of the lack of priority given to nuclear safety by the DAE. The evidence presented here suggests that the organisation does not yet have the capacity to safely manage India’s nuclear facilities.

This article explores the safety capabilities of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor that is under construction in India, and which is to be the first of several similar reactors that are proposed to be built over the next few decades, to withstand severe accidents. Such accidents could potentially breach the reactor containment and disperse radioactivity to the environment. The potential for such accidents results from the reactor core not being in its most reactive configuration; further, when there is a loss of the coolant, the reactivity increases rather then decreasing as in the case of water-cooled reactors. The analysis demonstrates that the official safety assessments are based on assumptions about the course of accidents that are not justifiable empirically and the safety features incorporated in the current design are not adequate to deal with the range of accidents that are possible.

This article explores the safety capabilities of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor that is under construction in India, and which is to be the first of several similar reactors that are proposed to be built over the next few decades, to withstand severe accidents. Such accidents could potentially breach the reactor containment and disperse radioactivity to the environment. The potential for such accidents results from the reactor core not being in its most reactive configuration; further, when there is a loss of the coolant, the reactivity increases rather then decreasing as in the case of water-cooled reactors. The analysis demonstrates that the official safety assessments are based on assumptions about the course of accidents that are not justifiable empirically and the safety features incorporated in the current design are not adequate to deal with the range of accidents that are possible.

This article explores the safety capabilities of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor that is under construction in India, and which is to be the first of several similar reactors that are proposed to be built over the next few decades, to withstand severe accidents. Such accidents could potentially breach the reactor containment and disperse radioactivity to the environment. The potential for such accidents results from the reactor core not being in its most reactive configuration; further, when there is a loss of the coolant, the reactivity increases rather then decreasing as in the case of water-cooled reactors. The analysis demonstrates that the official safety assessments are based on assumptions about the course of accidents that are not justifiable empirically and the safety features incorporated in the current design are not adequate to deal with the range of accidents that are possible.

This article explores the safety capabilities of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor that is under construction in India, and which is to be the first of several similar reactors that are proposed to be built over the next few decades, to withstand severe accidents. Such accidents could potentially breach the reactor containment and disperse radioactivity to the environment. The potential for such accidents results from the reactor core not being in its most reactive configuration; further, when there is a loss of the coolant, the reactivity increases rather then decreasing as in the case of water-cooled reactors. The analysis demonstrates that the official safety assessments are based on assumptions about the course of accidents that are not justifiable empirically and the safety features incorporated in the current design are not adequate to deal with the range of accidents that are possible.

This article explores the safety capabilities of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor that is under construction in India, and which is to be the first of several similar reactors that are proposed to be built over the next few decades, to withstand severe accidents. Such accidents could potentially breach the reactor containment and disperse radioactivity to the environment. The potential for such accidents results from the reactor core not being in its most reactive configuration; further, when there is a loss of the coolant, the reactivity increases rather then decreasing as in the case of water-cooled reactors. The analysis demonstrates that the official safety assessments are based on assumptions about the course of accidents that are not justifiable empirically and the safety features incorporated in the current design are not adequate to deal with the range of accidents that are possible.

This article explores the safety capabilities of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor that is under construction in India, and which is to be the first of several similar reactors that are proposed to be built over the next few decades, to withstand severe accidents. Such accidents could potentially breach the reactor containment and disperse radioactivity to the environment. The potential for such accidents results from the reactor core not being in its most reactive configuration; further, when there is a loss of the coolant, the reactivity increases rather then decreasing as in the case of water-cooled reactors. The analysis demonstrates that the official safety assessments are based on assumptions about the course of accidents that are not justifiable empirically and the safety features incorporated in the current design are not adequate to deal with the range of accidents that are possible.

We welcome the response from Baldev Raj to our article. 1 However, it does not satisfactorily address the issues raised therein. To begin with, it does not explain how 100 MJ is an upper bound on mechanical energy that could be released in a core disruptive accident (CDA). Raj states that safety studies have shown that mechanical energy release from loss of coolant flow together with failure of safety systems is less than 1 MJ. This contradicts DAE's published studies of the PFBR, 2 cited in our article, which show that energies on the order of 1000 MJ are possible. A key assumption in this calculation is the reactivity " insertion " rate (which depends on how much of the core collapses, in what configuration and how fast); the 100 MJ limit is based on assuming that only a part of the core participates in the accident. As we show in our article, the DAE's analysis that calculates the effect of the initiating events on the extent of core melting is limited by omissions (ignoring of cladding failure modes and the effects of burnup on fast reactivity feedbacks as well as fuel thermophysical properties) and therefore is unduly optimistic. Regarding the small CDA mechanical energy to thermal power ratio estimated for the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) as compared to previous fast reactors, Raj points to other recent designs with even smaller figures. The problem is that the reactors he offers as counterexamples have not yet been cleared for construction by the appropriate safety regulators in those countries, let alone constructed. We see no reason to expect that French regulators , for example, would be satisfied with a reactor design that offers less containment strength than the Superphénix, after the series of accidents that the Superphénix experienced. The only reactor under construction in the list Raj offers is the Russian BN-800. However, this reactor has been designed to have a very small or negative sodium void coefficient and therefore is not the most relevant benchmark for the PFBR which has a large positive value. 3 The BN-800's containment design must also be seen in the background of the safety performance of Russia's breeder program. The largest reactor constructed so far, the BN-600, experienced 27 sodium leaks between 1980 and 1997, 14 of which resulted in sodium fires. 4 In most, if not all, cases, it appears that the reactor was not even shut down and continued operating as the fires were raging, indicating that inadequate priority is given to safety.

This article explores the safety capabilities of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor that is under construction in India, and which is to be the first of several similar reactors that are proposed to be built over the next few decades, to withstand severe accidents. Such accidents could potentially breach the reactor containment and disperse radioactivity to the environment. The potential for such accidents results from the reactor core not being in its most reactive configuration; further, when there is a loss of the coolant, the reactivity increases rather then decreasing as in the case of water-cooled reactors. The analysis demonstrates that the official safety assessments are based on assumptions about the course of accidents that are not justifiable empirically and the safety features incorporated in the current design are not adequate to deal with the range of accidents that are possible.

This article explores the safety capabilities of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor that is under construction in India, and which is to be the first of several similar reactors that are proposed to be built over the next few decades, to withstand severe accidents. Such accidents could potentially breach the reactor containment and disperse radioactivity to the environment. The potential for such accidents results from the reactor core not being in its most reactive configuration; further, when there is a loss of the coolant, the reactivity increases rather then decreasing as in the case of water-cooled reactors. The analysis demonstrates that the official safety assessments are based on assumptions about the course of accidents that are not justifiable empirically and the safety features incorporated in the current design are not adequate to deal with the range of accidents that are possible.

This article explores the safety capabilities of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor that is under construction in India, and which is to be the first of several similar reactors that are proposed to be built over the next few decades, to withstand severe accidents. Such accidents could potentially breach the reactor containment and disperse radioactivity to the environment. The potential for such accidents results from the reactor core not being in its most reactive configuration; further, when there is a loss of the coolant, the reactivity increases rather then decreasing as in the case of water-cooled reactors. The analysis demonstrates that the official safety assessments are based on assumptions about the course of accidents that are not justifiable empirically and the safety features incorporated in the current design are not adequate to deal with the range of accidents that are possible.