Non State Armed Groups

Because of its extensive Mediterranean history, France had a particular responsibility when the Arab revolutions broke out in 2011. The strategies defined by Paris in Libya and Syria, implemented through foreign policy, have proved to be less effective than expected. Although distinct, both were pursuing the same aim: the expansion of friendly democratic regimes in the Southern European neighborhood bloc.

This is a year-long research project aiming to understand to what extent armed groups can participate (sustain or undermine) in endogenous state-building projects. Case studies : Somaliland (successful integration and state-making) and South Sudan (failure of state-making, failed state, proliferation of armed groups).

This chapter offers a critical perspective on contemporary security in the Middle East, by exploring the ways in which state and non-state armed groups have sought to reorder the regional balance of power, especially after the 2003 American-led in- vasion of Iraq. It reveals the strategic processes of politicization and depoliticization of violence that key regional and foreign actors employ in order to delegitimize or legitimize the use of violence in pursuit of rival political agendas. These dynamics are central in understanding the conflict and the scramble for control over resources and political developments in key countries across the Middle East.

Uluslararası ilişkilerin temel aktörü olan devletler günümüze kadar silahlı çatışmaların da temel aktörü olmuştur. Devlet dışında pek çok aktörün ortaya çıkması ve etkinlik kazanmasıyla bu durum değişmeye başlamıştır. Devlet dışı aktörlerin silahlı çatışmalara doğrudan veya dolaylı etkisi artmaktadır. Devleti temel aktör olarak kabul eden uluslararası hukuk, devlet dışı aktörlerin silahlı çatışmalarda oynadıkları rolü yeterince kapsamamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı devlet dışı aktörlerin yetki ve sorumluluklarını incelemektir.

В этом очерке не раскрывается весь многогранный и динамичный феномен новых добровольческих частей 2014 года. Вместо этого, я сфокусируюсь лишь на предыстории и некоторых аспектах возникновения одного особого и несколько девиантного примера общего феномена добровольцев6, а именно на раннюю историю одного из самых знаменитых из этих подразделений – полка «Азов». Более того, история этой структуры здесь рассматривается лишь с точки зрения политических, а не военных наук, т.е. как разновидность негражданского общества, а не вооруженных сил Украины. Иными словами, я сконцентрируюсь здесь на определенных особенностях создания «Азова», а не на боевых действиях, заслугах или возможных промахах этого подразделения. Последние представляют собой ещё более трудно исследуемые сюжеты, которые я не в состоянии обоснованно и компетентно оценить. Не столько сама известность, сколько причина западного медийного внимания к «Азову» – а именно, эксцентричные политические взгляды создателей подразделения – стали и для меня поводом для краткого рассмотрения специфики его предыстории, идеологии, руководства и создания. Неонацистские, как будет показано ниже, тенденции в этой теперь уже сравнительно большой военной части представляют собой проблему сразу в нескольких отношениях. Некогда явно фашистские взгляды главных командиров полка ставят под вопрос как его сегодняшнюю, в других отношениях, возможно, заслуживающую уважение боевую деятельность, так и послевоенное будущее «Азова».

Since 2012, Mali has seen many armed groups operate on its territory. International interventions, as well as national reconciliation and stabilization efforts, have led to a categorization of these groups along lines of conflict relevant to the national and international levels. Groups can be classified according to their opposition to or alliance with the Malian Government and the official forces; their ideological agenda; or their association with criminal activities. However, these categories do not necessarily reflect the internal identity of these groups and the many facets of their interactions with the communities with which they coexist.

This study attempts to describe these interactions and to explain the positioning of communities in the presence of these groups. The coexistence of communities and armed groups on the same territory generates renegotiations of the security, economic or social relations between the actors involved. These social changes must be taken into account in the responses adopted by the Malian Government and its partners to the presence of armed groups on the territory of Mali

El artículo discute la aparición de respuestas comunitarias frente a la violencia, caracterizadas por la apropiación de la seguridad y la justicia; propone entender estas respuestas, como parte de un continuum en la gestión de riesgos, que adopta múltiples formas, desde la justicia vigilante hasta la autodefensa armada; para ello analizará los casos de linchamientos y el movimiento de autodefensas en México; propone que en el actual escenario de inseguridad, colectivos y comunidades reaccionan defensivamente, pasando de reacciones espontáneas hacia una mayor organización. Esta participación discurre en escenarios ambiguos entre lo legal e ilegal, y producen imaginarios de orden que confrontan estas zonas de indistinción. El artículo discute la pertinencia de la categoría Margen del Estado, para dar cuenta de las negociaciones que las comunidades realizan con el Estado, en el establecimiento de controles comunitarios de regulación de la seguridad.

Most of the present rules of international law regulate the behavior of States. Within States, however, there are other entities such as corporations, non–governmental organizations, individuals, international governmental organizations and armed opposition groups that are regulated by different national and international regimes. In this regard, non–State armed opposition groups present particular challenges to international law due to their dominant presence and participation in armed conflicts. Armed opposition groups are one of the most important actors in international humanitarian law today. Yet, taking into consideration that they a priori have certain international humanitarian obligations to fulfill, it remains unclear what the implications are when they, as a group, commit violations. Among these uncertainties, is that there is no formally recognized mechanism to attribute such breaches to the relevant non – state armed opposition group as such. In fact, unlike States, they have no organs. Similarly, there is also no consensus on circumstance that could preclude the wrongfulness of these breaches for armed opposition groups. By challenging the State–centric system of public international law, this article analyses the possible application of certain rules contained in the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) to violations of international humanitarian law by armed opposition groups.

This thesis examines the paucity of international legal and theoretical frameworks that are applicable to the governance and overall status of the territorial enclaves of non-state armed groups (NSAGs), and the territorial fragmentation of Yemen and Libya by and through such actors in the years immediately following the Arab Uprisings (2011-2015). In addition to increasing our knowledge about the complex interplay between ‘sovereignty,’ ‘territoriality,’ and ‘self-determination’ on the one hand, and the state-centric nature of such prominent conceptual frameworks on the other, the thesis puts the fate of populations living within the territorial enclaves of NSAGs centre stage. This thesis thus seeks to offer an alternative to the heavily securitised lenses of studying NSAGs and their territorial enclaves in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and beyond, underscoring instead the devastating humanitarian outcomes.

Beyond any ethnic claims to ‘self-determination,’ the thesis highlights that the historical subdivisions of already established states such as Yemen and Libya are often exploited by external players in a manner that evidences the continuation of colonialism by other means. Informed by the Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) and ‘postcolonial’ IR theory, the thesis therefore proposes the utilisation of the conceptual framework of ‘terra nullius’ in our study of the territorial enclaves of NSAGs to 1) overcome deficiencies arising from readily available frameworks such as ‘self-determination,’ 2) accentuate the prominence of Great Power politics in all such situations of civil war and the continued existence of divisive colonial politics such as ‘terra nullius’ in our contemporary international affairs, and 3) address their largely unaccounted for humanitarian outcome. The thesis further responds to the call to ‘decolonise’ the curriculum, and by implication the generation of knowledge itself, pioneering in its methodological approach the qualitative analysis of 43,492 news reports from Yemen and Libya (18,759 reports from Yemen and 24,733 reports from Libya) using ‘NVIVO.’

More non-state armed groups have emerged in the last eight years than in the previous eight decades. During this period the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, has a racted inordinate global concern, diverting a ention from a trend that will define conflict in the coming decade: the proliferation of armed groups.

In today’s international law context, the majority of armed conflicts include at least one non-state armed group (NSAG). For a long time, however, these actors and their acts were considered to be regulated only by the internal laws of the relevant state(s), thereby escaping from any form of international regime. This scenario has since changed and nowadays reality continuously challenges the state-centric nature of international law, giving rise to many discussions and complex debates. Although it is recognized that NSAGs have international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations during armed conflicts, one of the primary concerns has been whether they are also bound by international human rights law (IHRL). In The Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law, Katharine Fortin meticulously addresses the much contested matter of when armed groups can be held to account under this legal framework. Due to its original approach, the book’s arrival should be welcome and, to her credit, Katharine Fortin has done a commendable job.

The dynamics of conflict (de)escalation by social movements or political opposition groups have attracted crossdisciplinary
interest among social scientists, but there remain several knowledge gaps to be filled. On the one hand,
there is already extensive research on the shifts from unarmed expressions of collective grievances to the adoption of
violent strategies by oppressed constituencies or ‘minorities at risk’, as well as on the transition from armed insurgency
to negotiations, demobilization, reintegration and conventional politics. However, there is scarce scholarship on the
phenomenon of armed groups shifting their conflict-waging strategies from violent to nonviolent means, especially
in contexts which cannot be resolved by force but are also ‘unripe’ for conventional de-escalation methods through
negotiation and political integration. This article offers a first attempt to fill this conceptual and empirical gap, by investigating
the nature and the drivers of transitions from armed strategies to nonviolent methods of contentious collective
action on the part of non-state conflict actors. It focuses in particular on the internal and relational/environmental factors
which underpin their decisionmaking process, from a change of leadership and a pragmatic re-evaluation of the
goals and means of insurgency, to the search for new local or international allies and the cross-border emulation or diffusion
of new repertoires of action. This multilevel analysis draws from past research on various self-determination or
revolutionary movements which fit the scope of analysis (i.e. Nepal, Egypt, Palestine, West Papua, East Timor, Mexico
and Western Sahara). The article also points to the need for more systematic enquiry on these cases through in-depth
comparative empirical analysis.

Despite a proliferation of scholarship on armed conflict and violence, Colombia and Mexico have been underexplored in studies of mass atrocities. However, systemic and grave violence in both contexts suggests a need to correct this empirical blind spot. This chapter contributes to the field by focusing on those individuals who have previously associated with the groups that commit these atrocities. Public, private, and third-sector actors posit a “lack of values” and “dysfunctional families” as the root cause for men’s involvement in non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Colombia and Mexico. Leveraging an abductive study design, we took these emic claims seriously and investigated gendered understandings of family roles among former members of NSAGs and their family members, as well as explored the relationship of these understandings to decisions to participate in these groups. We draw from a combined 39 months of ethnographic fieldwork, social census activities, formal and informal interviews in Mexico and Colombia, as well as feminist and anthropological theory on masculinity and violence to develop the concept of moral sonhood through the presentation of our tripartite findings. First, participants do not lack “values” (and those of their families, specifically, their mothers). Second, the shared understandings of what it takes to fulfill filial obligations and duties in these contexts at least partially explain decisions to participate in NSAGs. Third, these reciprocal relations of care can transform to relations of harm when the son is effectively bound to dangerous activities and places.

Economic and armed non-state actors increasingly operate through their transnational activities. International public law excludes them from any international regulation or accountability process. International humanitarian law (IHL, the law of war) as a branch of international public law is an exception to this because it also regulates the behavior of non-state actors. Recent developments pertaining to the potential liability of business entities for involvement in international crimes, particularly when related to the activities of ANSGs challenge the traditional doctrine of international law and demonstrate the need for its norms to adapt to an evolving reality.

The reconstruction of stable political order after violent conflict is a central concern of peacebuilding theory and practice. While much of the literature on this subject is based on cases where there has been state collapse or international intervention, this paper draws on a case study from India's northeast , where a long-standing separatist insurgency has given way to a stable and protracted ceasefire. Drawing on fieldwork from Ukhrul district in the India-Myanmar border, the paper studies the parallel military structures and civilian governance institutions and the nature of their interaction. In doing so, it evaluates the consequences of the ceasefire political equilibrium in terms of the larger project of conflict resolution and a permanent political resolution. 1. Introduction At first glance, Ukhrul appears to be just another one of the 707 administrative districts in India. With a population of 184,000 (2011 census) and territory of 4,544 sq km 1 , it is governed under the modular structure of India's district level administration. But when talking of the government in Ukhrul, there is often confusion about who is being referred to. Alongside the formal institutions of the Indian government, is the 'people's government', who, in the words of one respondent 'run everything here'. In the heart of Ukhrul town, not far from the administrative offices of the Indian central government and the state government of Manipur is the regional office of the Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland/Nagalim (GPRN), run by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah), which also contains a prison cell where offenders can be detained. As one of the GPRN's Kilonsers (ministers) described it, 'We collect the taxes to feed armed cadres and run the administration. We run the people's government'. 2 The reconstruction of stable political order in divided societies in the aftermath of violent conflict is a central concern for peacebuilding theory and practice. It is a particularly challenging problem in cases where there is no clear monopoly of violence, and where there are a multiplicity of contending sources of authority. Much of the relevant recent literature that addresses this issue is based on case studies where formal governance mechanisms collapsed, and where there was a heavy international presence. In contrast, the numerous conflicts that take place outside this limelight, such as those in the northeast of India have much to contribute to the understanding of this topic, but remain under-studied. Although they bear a different set of axioms, policy parameters and historical baggage, the problems that they set out to explain are mutually recognisable: the chronic dysfunctionalities of the post-colonial state, the challenges in establishing functional and legitimate governance institutions, and the relationship between the formal and informal sources of authority. The 1997 ceasefire between the Indian government and Naga separatist insurgents of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) [NSCN-IM] brought a prolonged pause to a four decade long violent conflict (Kolås 2011). Although the ceasefire has endured and has proven to be effective in bringing down levels of violence, it has not as of yet translated into a final political resolution of the conflict. In these circumstances of indefinitely extended ambiguity, both sides have established competing civilian governance mechanisms, which has as a result created a duplicate set of state institutions in the same territory. Alongside two sets of militaries, both sides aspire to provide a range of welfare, security, and representation mechanisms, and people can to some extent choose which authority to approach for functions such as dispute resolution or criminal justice.

The short-lived Ukrainian armed volunteer movement and its interaction with electoral politics, in some regards did, and in other regards, did not fit patterns observed in research into irregular armed groups (IAGs). The brief life span of most Ukrainian IAGs as more or less independent actors, and their swift integration into Ukraine’s regular forces during the years 2014–2015, were both unusual. They were also one of the reasons for the relatively low political impact of the IAGs as such - a repercussion that is in contrast to the partly impressive individual political careers of some IAG commanders in 2014–2019. There were various forms of interpenetration of parties with IAGs in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Certain parties, political activists, and MPs took part in the creation and development of IAGs in 2014. Some – to that point, mostly minor - politicians became soldiers or commanders of IAGs. Subsequently, a number of IAG members transited into the party-political realm, either ...

Les groupes armés non étatiques se sont développés de façon très importante lors des années 2010, particulièrement en Syrie et en Iraq, allant de milices locales d’autodéfense à des groupes atteignant les fonctions régaliennes. Ce processus n’est pas la conséquence d’une érosion progressive des Etats, mais la résultante de situations complexes où Etats et groupes armés cohabitent historiquement sous différentes formes. Chaque acteur, souvent au sein de larges réseaux d’alliances transétatiques, tente d’imposer son agenda stratégique, mais le nombre d’acteurs antagoniques, l’immiscibilité des projets et la dilution des pouvoirs induisent un processus cyclique de gouvernance destructeur pour les sociétés.