Non State Armed Actors

ارتبط الاهتمام بدراسة الفاعلين العنيفين من غير الدول Violent Non State Actors (VNSAs بالتحولات التي شهدتها الدولة منذ نهاية الحرب الباردة، سواء من حيث طبيعة دورها، أو من حيث بنيتها، وعجزها عن ممارسة وظائفها التقليدية، علي النحو الذي صورها به هوبز حين رآها الليفياثان العظيم الذي سينهي حالة حرب الكل ضد الكل، كما لم تعد الدول كما رأي كينيث والتز "المحتكر الوحيد للقوة". ويعد الاهتمام بدراسة VNSAs، بصفة خاصة، والفاعلين من غير الدول بصفة عامة، في مجال العلاقات الدولية حديثا نسبيا، مقارنة بدراسة الدولة، كما أنه تال علي وجود هذا النمط من الفاعلين. ففي عهد الإمبراطورية الرومانية مثلا، انتشرت عصابات الجريمة، التي هي صورة من صور VNSAs، ودخلت مع الدولة في حروب. ومع القرن العشرين، انتشرت حركات التحرر الوطني، التي هي صورة أخري للفاعلين العنيفين، والتي نجحت في التأثير في سياسات الدول الاستعمارية الكبري حينها: فرنسا، وبريطانيا، وألمانيا.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

CAN ACUN, BÜNYAMIN KESKIN, BILAL SALAYMEH

EL-KAIDE’DEN HTŞ’YE: NUSRA CEPHESI
Suriye’de devlet otoritesinin aşınmasından dolayı ortaya çıkan boşluk devlet dışı silahlı aktörler tarafından doldurulmaya başlanmıştır. Bu gelişmeler yaşanırken kriz ve çatışma bölgelerinde söz konusu aktörler egemen devlet düzenini sarsarak alışılmış olan uluslararası sistemi tehdit etmeye devam etmiştir. Önce El-Kaide daha sonra DEAŞ gibi örgütler bu meydan okumanın baş aktörleri haline gelmiştir. Suriye’de yaşanan krizlerle birlikte “cihadi” ideolojiyi benimseyen bu örgütlerin bir uzantısı olarak Nusra Cephesi ortaya çıkmıştır. 2011 yılı itibarıyla Arap Baharı’nın bölgede yayılmasıyla birlikte cihadi örgütler kendilerine hakimiyet alanı arayışına girmişlerdir.
El-Kaide’nin Irak’taki kolu Irak İslam Devleti (IİD) örgütü 2007 yılından itibaren aldığı ağır darbelerden yeni toparlanmaya çalıştığı bir dönemde ABD Irak’tan çekilmiş ve bünyesinde Suriyelilerin de bulunduğu IİD lider kadrosu Suriye’de ortaya çıkan krizle yeni bir genişleme alanı oluşturacağını düşünmeye başlamıştır. IİD örgütünün o dönemler Musul bölgesinde komutanı olan Suriyeli Ahmed Hüseyin Şara (Ebu Muhammed Culani) IİD’nin yeni lideri Ebubekir Bağdadi’ye Suriye’de örgütlenilmesi teklifinde bulunmuştur.
Sonuç itibarıyla El-Kaide merkezinin onayıyla Suriye’ye yedi kişilik
bir ekiple 2011 yaz aylarında geçiş yapılmıştır. Bu çekirdek kadro Suriye’deki iç savaşı derinden etkilemiştir. Nusra Cephesi’nin kuruluşu ise 2012’nin Ocak ayında Culani tarafından yapılan bir açıklamayla duyurulmuştur. O günden bu yana farklı süreçlerden geçmek suretiyle evrimleşerek muhalifler arasında en güçlü gruplardan biri olan Heyet-i Tahriru’ş-Şam’a dönüşen yapıyı beraberinde getirmiştir.
Bu rapor Suriye sahasında etkin aktörlerden biri olan Nusra Cephesi’ni ele almaktadır. Raporun hazırlık aşamasında Nusra’nın güçlü olduğu çatışma bölgeleri başta olmak üzere Suriye’de saha çalışması gerçekleştirilmiş ve buralarda bazı isimlerle mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Grubun ideolojik gelişimi ve bunun ardında yatan sebepler de raporun konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Aynı zamanda raporda örgütün yönetim modeli ve örgütlenme biçimine dair bilgiler de yer almaktadır. Ayrıca çalışmanın sonunda Nusra’nın liderleri ve örgütte ön plana çıkan isimlerin profil bilgileri de sunulmuştur.

On 20th January 2018, the Turkish military started to attack the Kurdish-populated region of Afrin in Syria (“Operation Olive Branch“). With its letter to the Security Council of 22nd January 2018, Turkey justified this action as self-defence in terms of Art. 51 UN Charter. The relevant passage of the letter is: “[T]he threat of terrorism from Syria targeting our borders has not ended. The recent increase in rocket attacks and harassment fire directed at Hatay and Kilis provinces of Turkey from the Afrin region of Syria, which is under the control of the PKK/KCK/PYD/YPG terrorist organization, has resulted in the deaths of many civilians and soldiers and has left many more wounded.” (UN Doc. S/2018/53; emphasis added). Two elements are troublesome in this official Turkish justification.

(max 150 words) Purpose of this article is to analyse the role of civilians within the "Boko Haram" terrorism and counter-terrorism dynamics, with special focus on the strategies individually and collectively pursued to navigate between opportunities and constraints of a conflict scenario. Here we will focus on the faction linked to both the Islamic State and to the original founder of the core "Boko Haram" group. The article will discuss the socioeconomic landscape of Lake Chad in the years immediately preceding the conflict's outbreak, providing insights on the precarious governance balance regulating access to lands, fishing areas, farming and cattle driving. The analysis will outline the relational dynamic of mobilization among local youth, bringing to light the economic and political rationality of joining an armed insurrection; a special focus will be dedicated to the importance of ideological commitment and pan-Islamic solidarity in driving individuals towards collective violent actions.

Why insurgent organizations stay together over time and why they maintain the fight under stress are questions of major concern for our understanding of war duration, conduct, and outcome. Structural integrity is the property of an organization remaining as a single intact entity, while cohesion refers to the creation and maintenance of cooperative effort toward the attainment of the organization’s goals. Although closely related, the conflation of structural integrity and cohesion is problematic. The body of the paper is a structured comparative analysis of two cases, the Irish Republican Army and the Karen National Union. First, this analysis demonstrates that cohesion and structural integrity are discrete concepts that each helps us to understand part of why, and how, insurgent organizations keep up the fight. Thus, despite much recent emphasis on “spoilers” in the conflict literature, understanding why armed organizations stay together or fragment is not enough. We also need to understand what makes insurgents perform effectively in the organization’s interest. Second, it points to some limitations of existing theories of structural integrity and cohesion in insurgent organizations and allows the author to conclude by suggesting some fruitful avenues for future research on these dynamics.

Although the nature, organization and structure of non-State armed groups (NSAGs) are issues of increasing concern, in particular due to the participation of these entities in the majority of armed conflicts,  their place and regulation in international law seem to remain unclear or insufficiently explored. Two explanations can be identified in order to justify this scenario.  First, the law applicable upon NSAGs is part of public international law, which has always remained State-centric in nature.  Secondly, from a methodological perspective, this category encompasses a variety of entities with different features, goals and even international obligations.  Identifying and categorizing their common constitutive elements has proven to be a rather difficult task, in particular for international lawyers.

In Organizing Rebellion. Non-State Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law, Rodenhäuser offers a meticulous analysis of some of these issues through the lens of an international law practitioner.  The book aims at clarifying what degree of organization armed groups should have to fall under international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL) and international criminal law (ICL).

We invite paper proposals for our upcoming Workshop “Perspectives on Governance by Non-State Armed Actors”, which will be held online on May 24, 2021. It is the first event of the Workshop Series "Debating Transnational Governance", organized by Scuola Normale Superiore and Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna.

The study of governance by non-state armed actors, including rebel groups, is an emerging field of research that has experienced greater scrutiny over recent years. Phenomena such as civil wars, in which insurgent groups or other armed groups might take control over swaths of territory and administer public life, have shown the limits of state-centered paradigms, thus stimulating the emergence of new approaches.

Literature on rebel governance, and on governance by armed groups broadly speaking, has been enriched by comparative analyses encompassing a number of case studies both in the same geographical area and in different regions. In particular, scholarship has highlighted the diversity underlying the concept of governance by non-state armed actors, as a variety of governance styles, patterns, and characteristics have been observed, shaped by pre-conflict as well as wartime factors. For instance, a number of works have scrutinized the relationship between rebel groups and the local civilians, focusing not only on the strategies employed by such groups to engage the populations, but also on how civilians’ response might affect rebels’ behavior and choices in governance; and on the experiences, perceptions, and agency of local actors.

This workshop aims to foster and expand current debates in the field of rebel governance and governance by armed groups. The event is open to both theoretical and empirical contributions, and it especially welcomes interdisciplinary contributions combining insights from different fields of research, as well as those connecting different levels of analysis. We welcome proposals addressing a range of aspects including, but not limited to: inter-group dynamics and governance by armed groups; relations between armed groups and civilians; women's roles and participation in rebel governance; the contested role of political ideologies; “hybrid actors” and external sponsors; consequences of rebel governance in the post-war context.

Proposals can be submitted online here until April 26, 2021: https://forms.gle/FNEks63UYcFK9isF8

Contacts: silvia[dot]carenzi[at]sns[dot]it | lydia[dot]letsch[at]sns[dot]it

In 2004, an unlikely combination of rural insurgent groups and urban gangs fought over the fate of President Aristide and brought Haiti to the brink of civil war. Ten years on, the country is still plagued by instances of armed violence. While most policy experts and practitioners seem to agree that over the last decade, violence transformed from a political into a criminal phenomenon, scholars remain divided over the question of whether Haiti's urban armed groups should be framed as a political movement or as hardened criminals. Drawing on semi-structured interviews and overt observation conducted during six months of fieldwork in Haiti in 2013, this article argues that it is crucial to refocus the analysis on the functions gangs fulfil on behalf of their politico-criminal sponsors. In contrast to the proclaimed internal shift from political to criminal motivation, this approach suggests that the constantly changing priorities of political entrepreneurs and organised crime groups shape the nature of the violent service offered by urban armed groups. The findings of this article mirror comparable dynamics in other countries in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa and have crucial implications for international agencies working in the urban environment and dealing with urban armed groups.

After nearly a hundred years of debate and analysis, the gang concept remains hotly contested within the social sciences. Once thought to be an exclusively American phenomenon, the study of gangs has become increasingly global over the last several decades. Countries from every world region have observed the emergence of gangs and gang-like groups. In some of these places, gangs resemble their American counterparts while in others they not only engage in  petty crime and drug trafficking but targeted assassinations, corruption of public officials, and racketeering as well. These activities make them less like the delinquent youth groups they were once conceived as and more akin to organized crime. In less stable and violent contexts still, gangs have even been incorporated into ethnic militias, rebel groups, and paramilitaries or have taken on a more vigilante ethos by combating violence and providing some semblance of order. The remarkable proliferation of the gang form over the last several decades and the incredible variation in the phenomenon across the globe requires a reassessment of the gang concept.
In the limited literature which focuses on the study of gangs cross-nationally, there have been several conceptualizations proposed. Some scholars have attempted to separate smaller street gangs from a variety of other related phenomena: prison gangs, drug gangs, and organized crime. They have done so by crafting a more restrictive concept. However, while separating street gangs from other criminal groups may make sense in the American or European context, it applies less well to other parts of the globe where such organizational forms have become thoroughly integrated thus blurring these traditional conceptual boundaries. On the other hand, some scholars have advocated for a conceptual framework which captures the transformative nature of gangs and encompasses any and all types of gangs and gang-like groups. Such an evolutionary framework fails, however, to distinguish between gangs and a huge variety of criminal and political non-state armed groups which share little in terms of their origins, motivations, or activities. The best conceptualization, this author argues, is a minimal one that incorporates gangs and many gang-like groups but avoids conceptual stretching to include virtually all non-state armed groups. Ultimately, contemporary scholars of gangs within any national context must be increasingly attentive to the global dimensions of the gang organizational form and the various overlapping and multi-faceted relationships they maintain with a variety of other  non-state armed groups.

This report examines the Aquino administration’s efforts to end hostilities and negotiate a long-term peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippine (GRP), on the one hand, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and CPP-NPA-NDF (CNN), on the other. The report has two central arguments. Firstly, the Aquino administration has been more invested (and successful) in pursuing peace negotiations with the MILF than the CNN. This can largely be explained by the greater compatibility of the strategic and ideological goals of the GRP and the MILF’s top leadership. Secondly, the administration has struggled to insulate the peace negotiations with the MILF from external interference/disruptions. The ongoing peace negotiations, however, have been vulnerable to sabotage by hardline elements, whether within the ranks of the negotiating parties or among other non-state actors and rebel groups opposed to peace negotiations. Meanwhile, long-running GRP-CNN negotiations...

The Ruzizi Plain in South Kivu Province has been the theatre of ongoing
conflicts and violence for over two decades. Patterns and dynamics of conflicts and violence have significantly evolved over time. Historically, conflict dynamics have largely centred on disputed customary authority – often framed in terms of intercommunity conflict. Violence was connected to these conflicts, which generated local security dilemmas. Consequently, armed groups mobilized to defend their community, albeit often at the behest of political and military entrepreneurs with more self-interested motives. At present, however, violence is mostly related to armed groups’ revenue-generation strategies, which involve armed burglary, robbery, assassinations, kidnappings for ransom and cattle-looting. Violence is also significantly nourished by interpersonal conflicts involving debt, family matters, and rivalries. In recent years, regional tensions and the activities of foreign armed groups and forces have become an additional factor of instability. Unfortunately, stabilization interventions have largely overlooked or been unable to address these changing drivers of violence. They have mostly focused on local conflict resolution, with less effort directed at addressing supra-local factors, such as the behaviour of political elites and the national army, and geopolitical tensions between countries in the Great Lakes Region. Future stabilization efforts will need to take these dimensions better into account.

This curated collection "Criminal Drone Evolution: Cartel Weaponization of Aerial IEDs" documents the evolution of drone usage by criminal cartels, gangs, and criminal armed groups (CAGs) in Mexico and beyond. Cartel Drone Evolution demonstrates the development spread of drone technology and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) among criminal actors while also pointing toward future potentials.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes form part of standard post-conflict peacebuilding tools regularly applied in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. Yet, the limitations of such templates become evident when peacebuilders are confronted with unconventional settings, such as the urban environment. So far, there is a scarcity of research on UN-led DDR efforts in cities, even though the proliferation of urban armed groups is projected to pose an intractable challenge for decades to come. Based on six months of fieldwork in Port-au-Prince, this article presents new empirical evidence on innovative DDR programming in Haiti, the only country where a United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) tried to implement a traditional DDR programme for gang members. As this attempt proved to be a failure, the mission subsequently changed its approach to a more community-focused armed violence reduction and prevention programme which aims to disincentivize at-risk sections of the population from joining gangs. Even though the current community violence reduction approach is better adapted to the unconventional conflict environment in Haiti and is seen by many practitioners today as a role model, it shares a number of limitations with traditional DDR programmes and is not a panacea for urban peacebuilding.

De term “Mai Mai” wordt gebruikt als etiket voor een bonte verzameling van kleinschalige, vaak langs etnische lijnen gevormde gewapende groepen in oost Congo. Doorgaans roept de naam associaties op met hekserij, barbarij en irrationaliteit. Mai Mai groepen staan immers bekend om het gebruik van amuletten, tatoeages en spirituele rituelen met water die hen immuun zouden maken tegen kogels. Zulke simplistische voorstellingen vertroebelen ons begrip van Mai Mai milities. Want als de Mai Mai inderdaad zo’n beestachtig en bloeddorstig zooitje zijn, hoe verklaren we dan dat deze groepen op grote schaal in hedendaags oost Congo voorkomen? Hoe komt het dan dat delen van de bevolking toch enige sympathie voor hen hebben? Deze bijdrage poogt Mai Mai milities te demystificeren door middel van een historische en sociologische benadering. Ze legt uit wat Mai Mai groepen eigenlijk precies zijn en geeft een overzicht van hun historische wortels en ontwikkeling. Ook verklaart zij waarom er van de dag nog steeds Mai Mai milities actief zijn. Daar blijkt geen eenduidig antwoord op te zijn, gezien een veelvoud aan historische, sociale en economische factoren een rol spelen.

This study examines how terrorist organizations use UAV technology by learning from each other and analyzes their adaptation processes.

Technological developments in both civilian and military fields have had a significant impact on the operational capabilities of terrorist organizations and on the increase of terrorist attacks. Many technologies that facilitate and improve the quality of life have security vulnerabilities. Following the introduction of commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), terrorist organizations have identified the security deficits of this new technology. Due to the increasing popularity of commercial UAVs, easy accessibility, and low cost, the use of UAVs by many organizations has become increasingly widespread. Drones have emerged as a new intelligence tool to improve the capabilities of terrorist organizations. Today, they are used by many non-state armed actors and terrorist organizations, from the Americas to Asia, to collect intelligence. However, the use of drones is not limited to reconnaissance and surveillance. Some of the aforementioned actors have started to employ drones in a more sophisticated way, namely for attacking purposes. This study examines how terrorist organizations use UAV technology by learning from each other and analyzes their adaptation processes.

El año 2013 marca la visibilidad de los grupos de defensa comunitaria  en México, mediante una variedad de formas organizativas, como las rondas comunitarias, los grupos de autodefensa y las policías comunitarias, así como grupos vigilantes de menor organización. Si bien la aparición de grupos defensivos contra la inseguridad, en la historia reciente, data de los años noventa del siglo pasado en Guerrero, es a inicios de la segunda década del siglo XXI  que esta emergencia se incrementó a nivel regional abarcando también el estado de Michoacán y otros puntos del país. En 2014, se calculaba que en México había alrededor de 106 grupos defensivos armados, distribuidos en 17 estados. La emergencia de nuevas organizaciones tiene que entenderse en el complejo entrecruzamiento de los procesos estructurales de las reformas neoliberales y la coyuntura de la política de seguridad de la «Guerra contra el narcotráfico» iniciada a finales de 2006.
En este libro nos proponemos estudiar la formación de estos grupos defensivos, a través de elucidar diversas experiencias en Guerrero y Michoacán,  donde el fenómeno de la defensa comunitaria adquirió un carácter masivo. Los capítulos de este libro presentan un panorama de los diversos grupos defensivos, permitiendo el entendimiento de sus especificidades y su heterogeneidad. El fenómeno de la defensa comunitaria en México se nos presenta como un área conceptual para observar dinámicas contemporáneas que subvierten nuestras tradicionales conceptualizaciones sobre el poder, el Estado, el capitalismo y las resistencias a la dominación.

This dissertation is part of a larger effort to understand rebel political orders and provides both a conceptual framework for analysing local jihadist governance and an in-depth analysis of the governance functions performed by the Islamic State in Libya (ISL). ISL ruled through a combination of coercion and patronage, but was not able to sustain its Libyan provinces due to shortcomings in all three governance realms: its inability to co-opt or outfight all rival factions, an alienation of the population induced by the group’s brutality, and a failure to provide necessary services to residents. Most of all, it was ISL’s parasitic mode of governance embedded in a foreign ideology that was the decisive blow to the group’s performance. Nevertheless, ISL demonstrated its ability to reshuffle the jihadist milieu and to set up a limited, yet functioning, authority in a theatre outside of Syria and Iraq, which carried the possibility for permanence.

As violence has continued to rise in Mexico year after year, criminal groups have adopted an increasingly militarized approach to their tactics, weaponry and training.

InSight Crime sat down with Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, founders of Small Wars Journal-El Centro and editors of a new book, "Illicit Tactical Progress: Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes 2013-2020," which dives deep into how this evolution has taken place.

After conquering large swaths of Syria and Iraq, the IS undertook an aggressive sectarian campaign in which they not only enacted horrific violence against the Shia people, but also damaged or destroyed several key Shia mosques and shrines. Drawing on Social Movement Theory (SMT), this article analyzes the response by various Shia nonstate actors—militia leaders, religious clergymen, populist preachers, and seminal poets. It argues that they used the IS threat to Shia holy sites to develop and deploy a mobilization frame that has come to be referred to as the “shrine protection narrative.” The article also documents the manifold consequences of the shrine protection narrative: it underpinned a mass recruitment drive that saw tens of thousands enlist; it legitimized foreign Shia militias to enter the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq; it justified the formation of entirely new militias who declared the centrality of shrine protection to their mandate; and it mobilized them to enact political violence. In doing so, this article extends existing studies of SMT to demonstrate that “sacred spaces”—and particularly the need to protect religious sites from specific threats—can serve as a powerful mobilization frame towards political violence.

This article aims to analyze the evolution of Brazilian criminal organization Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC—First Command of the Capital), especially its transformation from a group advocating human rights to a transnational violent non-state actor. Created in the late 1990s by inmates at Taubate Prison, PCC is currently a key trigger of violence in South America. Since a massive attack performed in 2006 against security forces, the group continues to be highly operative, also coordinating drugs and arms smuggling in Brazil and abroad. A combination of sources supported this analysis of PCC’s evolution, mainly Brazilian official judicial minutes, NGOs reports, and news released from reputable sources. The article shows that PCC has gained strength in the 2010s, expanding illicit business operations in cooperation with other criminal groups. The results suggest that PCC's expansion has changed significantly since their beginnings, into an actor that poses a challenge for the building of peaceful society in all of South America.

Transnational gangs challenge states in a variety of way. First, they transcend geographical and jurisdictional boundaries. Second, when left unchecked, they can erode the legitimacy of state institutions, co-opt state officials, and exceed state capacity to control their actions. A combination of crime, corruption, and impunity can empower criminal enterprises—gangs and criminal cartels—at the expense of the state. Finally, transnational crime blurs the distinctions between crime and war, local and global, and state and non-state violence. This essay examines these challenges and the evolution of gangs and criminal cartel conflict.

This chapter offers a critical perspective on contemporary security in the Middle East, by exploring the ways in which state and non-state armed groups have sought to reorder the regional balance of power, especially after the 2003 American-led in- vasion of Iraq. It reveals the strategic processes of politicization and depoliticization of violence that key regional and foreign actors employ in order to delegitimize or legitimize the use of violence in pursuit of rival political agendas. These dynamics are central in understanding the conflict and the scramble for control over resources and political developments in key countries across the Middle East.

Uluslararası ilişkilerin temel aktörü olan devletler günümüze kadar silahlı çatışmaların da temel aktörü olmuştur. Devlet dışında pek çok aktörün ortaya çıkması ve etkinlik kazanmasıyla bu durum değişmeye başlamıştır. Devlet dışı aktörlerin silahlı çatışmalara doğrudan veya dolaylı etkisi artmaktadır. Devleti temel aktör olarak kabul eden uluslararası hukuk, devlet dışı aktörlerin silahlı çatışmalarda oynadıkları rolü yeterince kapsamamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı devlet dışı aktörlerin yetki ve sorumluluklarını incelemektir.

The War Report 2017 identifies, describes and discusses the situations of armed violence that amounted in 2017 to armed conflicts, in accordance with the definitions under IHL and ICL.

In 2017, 55 armed conflicts occurred in 29 states and territories: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Western Sahara and Yemen.

As an annual publication, The War Report provides an overview of contemporary trends in current armed conflicts, including key international humanitarian law (IHL) and policy issues that have arisen and require attention. Aimed at students, academics, experts, journalists and diplomats as well as NGOs and international organizations, The War Report also lists current armed conflicts where IHL applies and focuses on selected situations.

Resumen: Desde 1955 hasta la última dictadura militar, Argentina atravesó un período de creciente conflictividad social y política. Las organizaciones armadas fueron actores destacados en ese proceso. Entre ellas, las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) condensan dos problemáticas claves del período: la identificación con el peronismo de vastos sectores de izquierda y la reivindicación de la violencia como forma de intervención política.
Este artículo reconstruye los orígenes y la historia de las FAR entre 1960 y 1973 considerando dos ejes analíticos: 1) el proceso de identificación de las FAR con el peronismo desde una perspectiva marxista y un proyecto socialista y 2) su dinámica de funcionamiento como organización político-militar. En relación con ellos, se fundamentan tres hipótesis. 1) Que los fundadores de las FAR atravesaron un proceso de doble ruptura (política e ideológica) respecto de sus partidos políticos de origen. 2) Que, sin embargo, las nuevas posturas conservaron ciertas huellas de origen que le imprimieron a las FAR su perfil distintivo. Y 3) que hacia 1972 tal perfil experimentó sustantivas variaciones que explican su acercamiento a Montoneros.
El trabajo está basado en una estrategia metodológica cualitativa y se sustenta en fuentes documentales escritas y en entrevistas a ex-miembros de la organización.

From 1955 until the last military dictatorship, Argentina went through a period of growing social and political conflictivity. Armed organizations were prominent actors in this process. Among them, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) summarize two key issues of the time: identification with Peronism of vast sectors of the left and the legitimization of violence as form of political intervention.
This article reconstructs the origins and history of the FAR between 1960 and 1973 considering two analytical axes: 1) the process of identification the FAR with Peronism from a Marxist perspective and a socialist project and 2) its dynamics of functioning as a political-military organization. In relation to them, three hypotheses are proposed. 1) That the founders of the FAR went through a process of double rupture (political and ideological) with respect to their political parties of origin. 2) That, however, the new positions maintained certain traces of origin that gave the FAR its distinctive profile. And 3) that by 1972 this profile experienced substantive variations that explain its approach to Montoneros.
The work is based on a qualitative methodological strategy and is supported by written documentary sources and interviews with former members of the organization.

Explora los distintos componentes y dinámicas de la economía política de la extracción de riquezas  naturales, específicamente en los territorios periféricos de los Llanos Orientales que durante la segunda mitad del siglo xx se convirtieron en zonas de interés prioritario para dicha extracción. Pretende dar cuenta de la amplia gama de arreglos políticos que se han establecido tácita e informalmente en esa región con el fin de garantizar condiciones para su gobernabilidad, así como para la viabilidad del desarrollo rentable de actividades extractivas durante las últimas tres décadas.Se ilustran los mecanismos específicos que han sido aplicados en la región para ese fin, entre ellos, la subordinación del interés público al particular de grupos criminales a través de la competencia política y las alianzas electorales, la conformación de densas redes políticas e institucionales para garantizar la impunidad, la utilización del control político territorial para capturar la contratación pública y, por último, un caso que ilustra cómo acaece la disolución de un “arreglo de extracción” cuando se exacerba la competencia entre facciones político-criminales por las rentas de actividades extractivas.

The most active and vocal non-State actors in the cultural heritage domain are non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private companies, and non-State armed groups. It is beyond doubt that these actors have an ambivalent role. On the one hand, NGOs, private companies and, arguably, non-State armed groups, contribute to the protection of cultural assets and the development of law and policy. On the other hand, these entities may have a deleterious impact on the integrity of cultural treasures. UNESCO – in cooperation with other bodies – is currently developing a top-down strategy to engage these non-State actors to respect the key obligations set forth in cultural heritage treaties. The international community’s aspiration to protect cultural treasures for the sake of present and future generations will be compromised if UNESCO and the other authorities overseeing the implementation of the existing legal regime fail to devise effective arrangements to reduce non-compliance and violations.

Önsöz
Eldeki çalışmada konu olarak Devletin Uluslararası Terörizme Karşı Uluslararası Hukuk Dâiresinde Meşrû Müdâfaa Hakkı incelenmektedir. Konu, çalışmanın başlığında öz olarak Uluslararası Terörizme Karşı Meşrû Müdâfaa şeklinde ifâde edilmiştir. Kitap, Milletlerarası Kamu Hukuku Doçentlik Bilim Alanı için yapılmış bir akademik çalışmanın ürünü olarak yayımlanmıştır. Kitapta işlenen başlıca konular Uluslararası Hukukta Klasik Saldırı; Uluslararası Terör Saldırısı; Uluslararası Hukukta Klasik Meşrû Müdâfaa; Uluslararası Terörizme Karşı Meşrû Müdâfaa başlıkları altında sıralanmaktadır. Çalışmada yanıtı aranan esas soru bir konak devletteki konuk teröristlerin diğer bir hedef devlete düzenledikleri uluslararası terör saldırısına cevâben hedef devletin uluslararası hukuka göre ve uluslararası hukuka uygun olarak kendisini kendi ülkesi dışında kuvvet kullanarak savunup savunamayacağıdır. Konak devlet, konuk teröristler, hedef devlet, uluslararası terör saldırısı, ülke dışında kuvvet kullanımı, meşrû müdâfaa gibi başlıca kavramlar devletlerarası ilişkiler çerçevesinde ve uluslararası hukuk bağlamında, eldeki çalışmada yapılmaya gayret edilen akademik inceleme boyunca açıklanması amaçlanmış başlıca kavramlardan olmuşlardır…
İstanbul, Haziran 2020

Resumen: El trabajo analiza los posicionamientos de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias en el marco de las OAP (Organizaciones Armadas Peronistas), una instancia de coordinación entre FAR, Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP), Montoneros y Descamisados que existió entre 1971 y 1972. El trabajo organiza las discusiones de las OAP considerando dos ejes centrales: las visiones sobre el movimiento peronista y el rol
de su líder, y los modos de pensar las relaciones entre las
organizaciones armadas y el movimiento de protesta social más amplio. Cuestiones que, a su vez, estaban estrechamente vinculadas con una tercera: la necesidad de fijar una postura frente al desafío del “Gran Acuerdo Nacional” planteado por Lanusse a principios de 1971. A partir de dicho análisis el artículo se propone, por un lado, mostrar de modo comparativo el perfil distintivo de las FAR en el marco de las OAP y, por el otro, los cambios que la organización atravesó en ese período, prefigurando su posterior convergencia con Montoneros.

In recent years, some of the most lethal episodes of violence have taken place in countries vastly a ected by organized crime, such as Mexico and Honduras. Criminal groups2 are primarily economical actors: they do not aim at constituting a parallel power system. However, they bene t from a weak State, unable to  rmly control its territory, in order to create areas of impunity where they can operate undisturbed.
is chapter analyses the speci c challenges of dealing with criminal organizations from an international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights perspective.
First, I discuss how the criteria to determine the existence of a non-international armed con ict (NIAC) apply to organized crime. Broadly speaking, criminal groups are not considered party to a con ict, despite the fact that they might engage in acts of vio- lence against the government. Nonetheless, situations such as the one in Colombia, and arguably the violence in Mexico, would suggest that criminal groups operating in these countries could be considered party to a NIAC.  ese organizations do not limit them- selves to take advantage of the instability and weakness of the government, but directly challenge its authority, seeking to create zones of impunity where they can pursue their criminal activities. Hence, they constitute an actual and serious threat to the State.
Second, the chapter focuses on the speci c challenges of dealing with organized crime. Heinous crimes against civilians demonstrate that criminal groups are unlikely to respect domestic and international law.  e responses adopted so far at national and international level have proved utterly un t to face the challenges posed by criminal organizations. However, given organized crime’s devastating impact on civilians, it is desirable to at least  nd ways to engage with these groups.  e greatest di culty lies in their economical nature and motivation: unlike opposition groups, they do not aim at overthrowing the government.  erefore, they do not seek for international legiti- macy and have thus fewer incentives to respect international legal obligations.  e  nal part of the chapter thus suggests strategies to engage with criminal groups in order to improve the protection of civilians.

Armed violence in Nigeria keep occurring sporadically and studies have revealed that in most crimes and conflicts in Nigeria, small arms and light weapons (hereafter called small arms) are the predominant weapons of choice and aggression. In his famous year 2000 Millennium Report to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, the Secretary General, Kofi Annan brought the phenomenon to the fore front of the UN agenda by noting that the death toll from small arms supersedes that of all other weapons and that in terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed could be called “weapons of mass destruction” (Annan, 2000). The pernicious and multidimensional effects of the availability, proliferation and misuse of small arms have also been felt through the prevalence of organised armed violence and criminality. This has become the order of the day in Nigeria, especially since 1999‟s transition to democratic governance. This paper therefore attempts to provide an analysis of armed violence and create a link between the availability/proliferation of small arms and armed violence in Nigeria. It will examine the causes and impact of small arms proliferation and it will also explore the attempts and challenges of regulating small arms proliferation in Nigeria

Recent experience around the world has demonstrated that resistance and liberation movements have become a defining feature of contemporary political conflicts, and that in the end, reaching political settlements needs their active involvement and cooperative engagement. The purpose of this report is to understand more fully how choices between violent and non-violent strategies are made to achieve certain political ends, which factors impact on these decisions, and conversely, how these choices affect conflict transformation and post-war reconstruction.

Hem sivil hem de askeri alandaki teknolojik gelişmelerin terör örgütlerinin ope-rasyon kabiliyetlerinde ve terör saldırılarının artışında önemli etkisi olmuştur. Hayat kalitesini artıran ve kolaylaştıran birçok teknolojinin bir de güvenlik açığı bulunmaktadır. Ticari insansız hava araçlarının (İHA) hayatımıza girmesiyle bir-likte bu yeni teknolojinin terör örgütleri tarafından güvenlik açıkları da tespit edilmeye başlamıştır. Ticari İHA'ların giderek yaygınlaşması, kolayca ulaşılabil-mesi ve maliyetinin az olması nedeniyle birçok örgüt tarafından kullanılması gi-derek yaygınlaşmıştır. Amerika kıtasından Asya'ya kadar birçok devlet dışı silah-lı aktör ve terör örgütünün günümüzde İHA'ları en azından hedefleri hakkında istihbarat toplamak için kullanmasıyla İHA'lar söz konusu örgütlerin kabiliyet-lerini geliştirmek için yeni bir istihbarat aracı olarak karşımıza çıkmıştır. Ancak İHA kullanımı sadece hedefin keşfi ve gözetlenmesi ile sınırlı kalmamıştır. Söz konusu aktörlerin bazıları daha karmaşık bir kullanım şekli olan saldırı amacıy-la da İHA'ları kullanmaya başlamıştır. Bu çalışma terör örgütlerinin birbirinden öğrenerek İHA teknolojisini nasıl kullandığını ve İHA teknolojisine adaptasyon süreçlerini incelemektedir.

Resumen: El artículo reconstruye las prácticas y discursos políticos de las Fueras Armadas Revolucionarias durante la coyuntura electoral de 1972-1973 en Argentina. Se analizan los sentidos que le atribuyeron a su participación en la compaña electoral del peronismo, la estrategia política en que ese compromiso tuvo lugar y los cambios que dicha estrategia implicaba en relación con las posturas previas de la organización. El trabajo apela a una estrategia metodológica cualitativa sustentada en fuentes escritas y orales.

Abstract: The article reconstructs the political practices and speeches of the Revolutionary Armed Forces during the electoral conjuncture of 1972-1973 in Argentina. It analyzes the meanings attributed to its participation in the electoral campaign of Peronism, the political strategy in which this commitment took place and the changes that the strategy implied in relation to the previous positions of the organization. The work appeals to a qualitative methodological strategy based on written and oral sources.

As the violence in northeast Nigeria continues into its tenth year, communities have been mobilizing to augment Nigerian state responses. These groups, known as the yan gora (Civilian Joint Task Force – CJTF), yan banga (vigilantes) and kungiyar maharba (hunters) have played important roles in protecting communities and pushing back against opposition groups. In the course of these activities, these groups have also caused civilian harm. This study aims to better understand civilian perspectives around the dynamics associated with the yan gora in Maiduguri and explore potential areas to mitigate civilian harm and advance civilian protection. Civilians credit the CJTF for bringing back some stability and safety to Borno. They believe the group is proactive in investigating reports received from community members, sharing information with civilians, and serving as a bridge between communities and security forces. The CJTF also patrol communities, conduct joint patrols alongside the military, perform security scans and body searches, and run checkpoints. They have assisted civilians to safety, enabling them to securely pursue livelihoods such as farming, and played a key role in resolving disputes. However, all civilian interviewees also pointed to concrete ways some members harm civilians. Members have been involved in assaulting and killing those thought to be associated with armed groups. They restrict movement outside IDP camps and use their positions of power for sexual exploitation and abuse. They intimidate civilians, employ punitive justice measures to settle personal scores, trade drugs, and have been implicated in the commission of extortion and theft, including the diversion of humanitarian aid. Civilians felt that opportunities for redress for harm do not exist. Every civilian interviewed was concerned for the future. In particular, civilians shared concerns over: 1) the increased politicization and mobilization of the group associated with the 2019 elections; 2) that the group’s involvement with politicians was diluting their focus on protection; 3) the group would become increasingly involved in criminality and gangs; and 4) the group derailing processes of disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, and rehabilitation; 5) tensions within the CJTF, or between CJTF and vigilante and/ or hunters, would develop into a new phase of the conflict.

El artículo discute la aparición de respuestas comunitarias frente a la violencia, caracterizadas por la apropiación de la seguridad y la justicia; propone entender estas respuestas, como parte de un continuum en la gestión de riesgos, que adopta múltiples formas, desde la justicia vigilante hasta la autodefensa armada; para ello analizará los casos de linchamientos y el movimiento de autodefensas en México; propone que en el actual escenario de inseguridad, colectivos y comunidades reaccionan defensivamente, pasando de reacciones espontáneas hacia una mayor organización. Esta participación discurre en escenarios ambiguos entre lo legal e ilegal, y producen imaginarios de orden que confrontan estas zonas de indistinción. El artículo discute la pertinencia de la categoría Margen del Estado, para dar cuenta de las negociaciones que las comunidades realizan con el Estado, en el establecimiento de controles comunitarios de regulación de la seguridad.