Neural correlates of consciousness

Understanding Consciousness, second edition provides a unique survey and evaluation of consciousness studies, along with an original analysis of consciousness that combines scientific findings, philosophy and common sense.

Building on the widely praised first edition of the book, this new edition adds fresh research, and deepens the original analysis in a way that reflects some of the fundamental changes in the understanding of consciousness that have taken place over the last ten years.

The book is divided into three parts; Part I surveys current theories of consciousness, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Part II reconstructs an understanding of consciousness from first principles, starting with its phenomenology, and leading to a closer examination of how conscious experience relates to the world described by physics and information processing in the brain. Finally, Part III deals with fundamental issues such as what consciousness is and does, and how it fits into the evolving universe. As the structure of the book moves from a basic overview of the field to a successively deeper analysis, it can be used both for those new to the subject and for more established researchers.

Understanding Consciousness tells a story with a beginning, middle and end in a way that integrates the philosophy of consciousness with the science. Overall, the book provides a unique perspective on how to address the problems of consciousness and as such will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who are interested in this subject.

Cieľom príspevku je poukázať na problémy spojené s rozlišovaním medzi fenomenálnym a prístupovým vedomím. Zástancovia disociácie sa opierajú o výsledky upravenej verzie Sperlingovho experimentu a tvrdia, že vedomie môžeme skúmať nezávisle od kognitívnych funkcií. Argumentujem, že presvedčivejšia je konkurenčná interpretácia, ktorej proponenti poukazujú na problém s falzifikovateľnosťou každej hypotézy, podľa ktorej je vedomie nezávislé od iných kognitívnych funkcií.

The goal of this work is to compile the basic components for the construction of an electromagnetic field theory of consciousness that meets the standards of a fundamental theory. An essential cornerstone of the conceptual framework is the vacuum state of quantum electrodynamics which, contrary to the classical notion of the vacuum, can be viewed as a vibrant ocean of energy, termed zero-point field (ZPF). Being the fundamental substrate mediating the electromagnetic force, the ubiquitous ZPF constitutes the ultimate bedrock of all electromagnetic phenomena. In particular, resonant interaction with the ZPF is critical for understanding rapidly forming, long-range coherent activity patterns that are characteristic of brain dynamics. Assuming that the entire phenomenal color palette is rooted in the vibrational spectrum of the ZPF and that each normal mode of the ZPF is associated with an elementary shade of consciousness, it stands to reason that conscious states are caused by the coupling of the brain to a particular set of normal modes selectively filtered from the full frequency spectrum of the ZPF. From this perspective, the brain is postulated to function as a resonant oscillator that couples to a specific range of ZPF modes, using these modes as a keyboard for the composition of an enormous variety of phenomenal states. Theoretical considerations suggest that the brain-ZPF interface is controlled by altering the concentrations of neurotransmitters, placing the detailed study of the neurotransmitter-ZPF interaction at the center of future research activities.

The main goal of this dissertation is to show the results of Michael Persingers research on the mystic states of consciousness from the third person perspective. In this paper also my own studies based on TMS rule will be shown. The research did in the 1973 by Andrew Greeley et al. clearly show that a 87 million (37%) people who live in the US had at least one experience of sensed presence. How-ever there was many studies on the mystic states of consciousness, many of them was rather phenomenological analysis than a science. This study shows that third person approach to the mystic has real explanatory power.
The second goal of this dissertation is to show the importance of the third person approach in the philosophical disciplines connected to anthropology. Using the third person methods in the research on traditional subjects is not the depreciation of these subjects. Just in opposite – using the scientific methods in the right way, we can save the traditional subjects from the devaluation.

Philosophy and anaesthesiology are disciplines that are rarely associated despite their respective interests in human consciousness. In this paper, we consider the advantages of integrating anaesthesiology and philosophy in the endeavour of discovering the neural correlates of state consciousness. We venture the following two-part argument. First, we argue that philosophical debates about the correlation conditions for state consciousness can be improved by focusing on how anaesthesiologists actually measure and study consciousness in practice. To this end, we argue that Integrated Information Theory provides a promising framework for discriminating features hitherto considered relevant to the identification of the neural correlates of state consciousness. Second, we argue that an improved philosophical understanding of what comprises the correlation conditions for state consciousness can, in turn, advance anaesthesiological methodologies; not only can it improve how potential evidence is gathered and assessed, but it can aid in the prevention of intraoperative awareness, increasing patient safety and well-being.

The main goal of this article consists in addressing two fundamental issues of consciousness research and cognitive science, namely, the question of why declarative memory functions are inextricably linked with phenomenal awareness and the question of the physical basis of memory traces. The presented approach proposes that high-level cognitive processes involving consciousness employ a universal mechanism by means of which they access and modulate an omnipresent background field that is identified with the zero-point field (ZPF) specified by stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a branch of physics that deals with the universal principles underlying quantum systems. In addition to its known physical properties and memory capacities, the ZPF is hypothesized to be an immanently sentient medium. It is propounded that linking up to a particular field mode of the ZPF activates a particular phenomenal nuance, implying that the phase-locked coupling of a set of field modes, i.e., the formation of a so-called ZPF information state, constitutes an appropriate mechanism for the amalgamation of elementary shades of consciousness into a complex state of consciousness. Since quantum systems rest exactly on this mechanism, conscious memory processes in the brain are expected to differ from unconscious processes by the presence of the typical features of many-body quantum systems, particularly long-range coherence and attractor formation, which is supported by a huge body of empirical evidence. On this basis, the conceptual framework set out in this article paves the way for a new understanding of the brain as a write-read head interacting with the ZPF, leading to self-consistent interpretations of the neural correlates of memory formation and memory retrieval and explaining why these memory processes are closely intertwined with phenomenal awareness. In particular, the neural correlates suggest that the brain produces consciously perceived memory traces by writing sequences of information states into the ZPF and retrieves consciously experienced memory traces by reading sequences of information states from the ZPF. Using these theoretical foundations, altered states of consciousness and memory disorders can be traced back to impairments of the ZPF write-read mechanism. The mechanism should reveal itself through characteristic photon emissions, resulting in testable predictions.

This online version of my review of Stanislas Dehaene’s (2014) book on Consciousness and the Brain adds a descriptive title, but is otherwise as it appears in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. In it, I conclude that the book offers an excellent introduction to the neuropsychology of consciousness that focuses largely on developments that have taken place over the last 15 years or so. The book ranges widely, starting with an account of how the processes that support consciousness in the brain have become increasingly open to experimental study, giving a fresh analysis of the extent of preconscious/unconscious processing, moving on to suggest what consciousness is good for when it appears, how to detect its presence by use of third-person observable neurophysiological signatures, incorporating these signatures into a version of the currently popular “global workspace model” of consciousness—and finally, suggesting some clinical application of the emerging research and some speculations about new frontiers, for example how the emerging science might be applied to the assessment of consciousness in babies and non-human animals. Dehaene also does not shy away from fundamental philosophical questions, adopting an unashamedly materialist-reductionist view of the nature of consciousness and mind, which, he believes, follows naturally from the advances in research that he surveys. In my review I accordingly address the book’s three central themes: (a) the advances in neuropsychological understanding of the conditions for consciousness in the human brain, (b) whether the emerging research leads naturally to a materialist-reductionist view of the nature of consciousness and mind, and (c) the scope and possible limits of the global workspace model of consciousness. Overall, I applaud the science that the book describes, but unravel the problems associated with Dehaene’s materialist reductionism.

This paper aims to show that the thought of Aristotle can shed much light on the irksomeproblems that lurk around the philosophical foundations of neuroscience. First, we will explorethe ramifications of Aristotle’s mereological principle, namely, that it is not the eye that sees, butthe human person that sees by the eye. Next, we shall draw upon the riches of Maxwell Bennett’sand Peter Hacker’s Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (=PFN) in order to elucidate howAristotle’s mereological principle can be of service to contemporary neuroscientists, psychologists,and philosophers. In the third and fourth parts we aim to complement the project of PFN byshowing how Aristotle’s philosophical anthropology and doctrine of pros hen equivocation canstrengthen PFN’s response to eliminativists, reductionists, and other critics of “folk psychology.”Finally, our last section will investigate the kinds of correlations involved in brain scanningtechniques, such as fMRI, so as to determine whether the most recent empirical discoveries do infact support various critics’ rejection of “folk psychology.” We will show that the empiricalevidence does not in fact favor eliminativist or reductionist views, and that we would do well toturn to the more Aristotelian approaches to neuroscience adopted by PFN and ourselves.

Herein, you will find a list of published articles and papers by Dr. Mohsen Paul Sarfarazi. As this list is constantly evolving and expanding, please use frequent visits to see the latest published papers on consciousness by the author. Happy Reading and self-discovering!

There have been various attempts to apply Darwinian evolutionary theory to an understanding of the human condition within psychology and the social sciences. This paper evaluates whether Darwinian Theory can explain human consciousness. Starting with a brief definition of phenomenal consciousness and the central features of evolutionary theory, the paper examines whether random variations in the genome that confer a selective, reproductive advantage can explain both the emergence of consciousness and its varied forms. To inform the discussion, the paper reviews what is known about the conditions for consciousness within the human mind/brain, understood in both structural (neural) terms and functional terms (in terms of human information processing), and concludes that “random variations in the genome” provide no explanatory mechanism for why some neural activities (but not others) are accompanied by consciousness. The paper then evaluates the many functional advantages that have been proposed for various forms of phenomenal consciousness once they emerge, and concludes that, on close examination, phenomenal experiences themselves do not carry out the information processing functions attributed to them, which challenges the Darwinian requirement that they could only have persisted (once emergent) it they enhanced reproductive fitness. The paper turns finally to what can be said about wider distribution of consciousness in non-humans, contrasting discontinuity theories with continuity theories. Discontinuity theories argue for a critical functional transition that “switches on consciousness” while continuity theories argue for a gradual transition in consciousness from unrecognisable to recognisable. All theories accept that there is an intimate, natural relationship of conscious experiences with their associated material forms. Consequently, as the material forms evolve, their associated experiences co-evolve—suggesting an indirect mechanism by which the emergence of species-specific forms of consciousness can be influenced by Darwinian evolution. It also allows a non-reductive understanding of human consciousness within the social sciences.

5846 ve 2936 sa yı lı Fi kir ve Sa nat Eser le ri ya sa sı hükümleri ge re ğince her han gi bir bö lü mü, res mi ve ya ya zı sı, ya zar la rın ve ya yın la yı cı sı nın ya zı lı iz ni alın ma dan tek rar la na maz, ba sı la maz, kop ya sı çı ka rı la maz, fo to ko pi si alı na maz ve ya kop ya an la mı ta şı ya bi le cek hiç bir iş lem ya pı la maz.

Objective: Reports have indicated possible uses of ayahuasca for the treatment of conditions including depression, addictions, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and specific psychoneuroendocrine immune system pathologies. The article assesses potential ayahuasca and N,N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT) integration with contemporary healthcare. The review also seeks to provide a summary of selected literature regarding the mechanisms of action of DMT and ayahuasca; and assess to what extent the state of research can explain reports of unusual phenomenology. Design: A narrative review. Results: Compounds in ayahuasca have been found to bind to serotonergic receptors, glutaminergic receptors, sigma-1 receptors, trace amine-associated receptors, and modulate BDNF expression and the dopaminergic system. Subjective effects are associated with increased delta and theta oscillations in amygdala and hippocampal regions, decreased alpha wave activity in the default mode network, and stimulations of vision-related brain regions particularly in the visual association cortex. Both biological processes and field of consciousness models have been proposed to explain subjective effects of DMT and ayahuasca, however, the evidence supporting the proposed models is not sufficient to make confident conclusions. Ayahuasca plant medicine and DMT represent potentially novel treatment modalities. Conclusions: Further research is required to clarify the mechanisms of action and develop treatments which can be made available to the general public. Integration between healthcare research institutions and reputable practitioners in the Amazon is recommended.

Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called " meta-consciousness " in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an " unconscious. " The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for gauging awareness. After re-interpreting the empirical data according to a philosophically rigorous definition of consciousness, I show that two well-known phenomena corroborate this hypothesis: (a) experiences that, despite being conscious, aren't re-represented during introspection; and (b) dissociated experiences inaccessible to the executive ego. If consciousness is inherent to all mentation, it may be fundamental in nature, as opposed to a product of particular types of brain function.

This article presents a new interpretation of the consciousness-related neuroscientific findings using the framework of stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a branch of physics that sheds light on the basic principles underlying quantum systems. It is propounded that SED supplemented by two well-founded hypotheses leads to a satisfying explanation of the neural correlates of consciousness. The theoretical framework thus defined is based on the notion that all conceivable shades of phenomenal awareness are woven into the frequency spectrum of a universal background field, called zero-point field (ZPF), implying that the fundamental mechanism underlying conscious systems rests upon the access to information available in the ZPF. The body of evidence can be interpreted such that in the extroverted, stimulus-oriented operating mode the brain produces streams of consciousness by periodically writing persistent information states into the ZPF (theta cycle). In the introspective operating mode, which goes along with activations of the default mode network, the brain is receptive to the flow of ZPF information states that constitutes the record of conscious experiences, suggesting that the sense of self and the retrieval of memories is accomplished by periodically reading (filtering) persistent information states from the ZPF (alpha cycle). Moreover, the data support the conclusion that meditative practices and psychedelics detune the filter, thus preventing the instantiation of self-referential conscious states, which leads to the dissolution of the ego. Instead, the brain taps into a wider spectrum of ZPF modes and, hence, gains access to an extended phenomenal color palette, resulting in expanded consciousness.

Are there scientifically-reliable experiments about conscious experience? It *seems* obvious we can reliably report e.g. our visual experience. But standard physics says that brain-dynamics, not experience itself, drives report. After discussing numerous attempts to make this observation consistent with reliable collection of data about experience, I argue that what's really needed for reliability is for our Universe to be consistent with a certain kind of non-standard physics. An experiment to identify the science-of-consciousness-relevant physical-basis-of-reality is identified.

It is often thought that contemporary neuroscience provides strong evidence for physicalism that nullifies dualism. The principal data is neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC). In this chapter I argue that NCC are neutral vis-à-vis physicalist and dualist views of the mind. First I clarify what NCC are and how neuroscientists identify them. Subsequently I discuss what NCC entail and highlight the need for philosophical argumentation in order to conclude that physicalism is true by appealing to NCC. Lastly, the simplicity argument for physicalism that appeals to NCC is presented, analyzed, and found wanting.

In the first instance, IIT is formulated as a theory of the physical basis of the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness in a system. In addition, integrated information theorists have tried to provide a systematic theory of how physical states determine the specific qualitative contents of episodes of consciousness: for instance, an experience as of a red and round thing rather than a green and square thing. I will raise a series of questions about the central explanatory target, the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness. I suggest it is not at all clear what scientists and philosophers are talking about when they talk about consciousness as gradable. I also raise some questions about the explanation of qualitative content.

This paper presents a new hypothesis as to the function of the claustrum. Our basic premise is that the claustrum functions as a detector and integrator of synchrony in the axonal trains in its afferent inputs. In the first place, an unexpected stimulus sets up a processed signal to the sensory cortex that initiates a focus of synchronized gamma oscillations therein. This focus may then interact with a general alerting signal conveyed from the reticular formation via cholinergic mechanisms, and with other salient activations setup by the stimulus in other sensory pathways that are relayed to the cortex. This activity is relayed from the cortex to the claustrum, which then processes these several inputs by means of multiple competitive intraclaustral synchronized oscillations at different frequencies. Finally, it modulates the synchronized outputs that the claustrum distributes to most cortical and many subcortical structures, including the motor cortex. In this way, during multicenter perceptual and cognitive operations, reverberating claustro-cortical loops potentiate weak intracortical synchronizations by means of connected strong intraclaustral synchronizations. These may also occur without a salient stimulus. By this mechanism, the claustrum may play a strong role in the control of interactive processes in different parts of the brain, and in the control of voluntary behavior. These may include the neural correlates of consciousness. We also consider the role of GABAergic mechanisms and deafferentation plasticity.

La questione se sia possibile o meno naturalizzare la mente e, in particolare, la coscienza è senz'altro una delle più dibattute nel panorama filosofico contemporaneo. Che cosa si intende più precisamente con naturalizzazione? Come è ovvio, è assai difficile, se non forse impossibile, trovare una definizione univoca del termine "naturalismo", anche perché molti filosofi che si riconoscono e auto-proclamano come "naturalisti" lo utilizzano in accezioni piuttosto diverse le une dalle altre (cfr., per esempio, Agazzi e ). In termini generali, e come tali non particolarmente controversi, una posizione filosofica che si proponga come naturalista dovrebbe perlomeno sostenere la tesi ontologica secondo cui la realtà sia esaurita dalla natura, non contenga cioè entità od oggetti "soprannaturali" ma solo quelle entità e quegli oggetti che, almeno in linea di principio, possano essere indagati dalle scienze empiriche (tra cui la biologia, l'intelligenza artificiale, la neurofisiologia, le neuroscienze, la psicologia cognitiva eccetera), ma anche la tesi metodologica secondo cui i metodi scientifici debbano essere gli unici utilizzati per indagare in modo legittimo qualsiasi aspetto della realtà.

Previous studies have observed different onset times for the neural markers of conscious perception. This variability could be attributed to procedural differences between studies. Here we show that the onset times for the markers of conscious visual perception can strongly vary even within a single study. A heterogeneous stimulus set was presented at threshold contrast. Trials with and without conscious perception were contrasted on 100 balanced subsets of the data. Importantly, the 100 subsets with heterogeneous stimuli did not differ in stimulus content, but only with regard to specific trials used. This approach enabled us to study general markers of conscious visual perception independent of stimulus content, characterize their onset and its variability within one study. N200 and P300 were the two reliable markers of conscious visual perception common to all perceived stimuli and absent for all non-perceived stimuli. The estimated mean onset latency for both markers was shortly after 200 ms. However, the onset latency of these markers was associated with considerable variability depending on which subsets of the data were considered. We show that it is first and foremost the amplitude fluctuation in the condition without conscious perception that explains the observed variability in onset latencies of the markers of conscious visual perception.

Despite the progress made in studying the observable exteriors of conscious processes, which are reflected in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), there are still no satisfactory answers to two closely related core questions. These are the question of the origin of the subjective, phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and the question of the causal mechanisms underlying the generation of specific phenomenal states. In this article, we address these questions using a novel variant of cosmopsychism, a holistic form of panpsychism relying on the central idea that the universe is imbued with a ubiquitous field of consciousness (UFC). This field is understood as a foundational dual-aspect component of the cosmos, the extrinsic appearance of which is physical in nature and the intrinsic manifestation of which is phenomenological in nature. We argue that this approach brings a new perspective into play, according to which the organizational characteristics of the NCC are indicative of the brain's interaction with and modulation of the UFC. Key insights from modern physics suggest that the modulation mechanism is identical with the fundamental mechanism underlying quantum systems, resulting in the conclusion that a coherently oscillating neural cell assembly acquires phenomenal properties by tapping into the universal pool of phenomenal nuances predetermined by the UFC, or more specifically, by entering into a temporary liaison with the UFC and extracting a subset of phenomenal tones from the phenomenal color palette inherent in the basic structure of the UFC. This hypothesis is supported by a substantial body of empirical evidence. Keywords: neural correlates of consciousness, hard problem of consciousness, explanatory gap, ubiquitous field of consciousness, zero-point field, modulation mechanism, quantum systems, long-range coherence CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE NCC Neuroscientific approaches to the study of consciousness assign pride of place to the task of progressively charting and analyzing the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), i.e., the neural mechanisms jointly sufficient for eliciting specific types of conscious experiences (Crick and Koch, 2003; Tononi and Koch, 2008). The search for the NCC is motivated, in large part, by the belief that they are more than mere correlates, namely, that such neural mechanisms provide the causal-material basis for consciousness. Significantly, many neuroscientists also hold (or have

[AMAZON LINK BELOW TO BOOK ITSELF -- TOC and book intro in downloadable .pdf]  Encyclopedia of Sleep and Dreams: The Evolution, Function, Nature, and Mysteries of Slumber explores the evolution, nature, and functions of sleep and dreams. The encyclopedia is divided into two volumes and is arranged alphabetically by entry. Topics include nightmares and their treatment, how sleep and dreams change across the lifetime, and the new field of evolution of sleep and dream. While this book includes ample material on the science of sleep and dreams, content is drawn from a broad range of disciplinary contexts, including history and anthropology.

Research on neural correlates of consciousness has been conducted and carried out mostly from within two relatively autonomous paradigmatic traditions -studying the specific contents of conscious experience and their brain-process correlates and studying the level of consciousness. In the present paper we offer a theoretical integration suggesting that an emphasis has to be put on understanding the mechanisms of consciousness (and not a mere correlates) and in doing this, the two paradigmatic traditions must be combined. We argue that consciousness emerges as a result of interaction of brain mechanisms specialized for representing the specific contents of perception/cognitionthe data -and mechanisms specialized for regulating the level of activity of whatever data the content-carrying specific mechanisms happen to represent. Each of these mechanisms are necessary because without the contents there is no conscious experience and without the required level of activity the processed contents remain unconscious.Together the two mechanisms, when activated up to a necessary degree each, provide conditions sufficient for conscious experience to emerge. This proposal is related to pertinent experimental evidence.

Equivalence of attention and consciousness is disputed and necessity of attentional effects for conscious experience has become questioned. However, the conceptual landscape and interpretations of empirical evidence as related to this issue have remained controversial. Here I present some conceptual distinctions and research strategies potentially useful for moving forward when tackling this issue. Specifically, it is argued that we should carefully differentiate between pre-conscious processes and the processes resulting in phenomenal experience, move the emphasis from studying the effects of attention on the modality-specific and feature-specific perception to studying attentional effects on panmodal universal attributes of whatever conscious experience may be the case, and acknowledge that there is a specialized mechanism for leading to conscious experience of the pre-consciously represented contents autonomous from the mechanisms of perception, attention, memory, and cognitive control.

Crick and Koch suggested in 2005 that the claustrum
might be engaged in sensory binding operations
related to consciousness. This might involve, they
suggested, widespread waves of information traveling
within the claustrum that might depend on networks of
gap-junction linked neurons, which were especially
sensitive to the timing of inputs. But they did not
suggest any specific system to do this. The purpose of
this present paper is to suggest what this mechanism
might be. The basic thesis is that the claustrum is a
spike coincidence–detecting device, constructed of
large number of small simple identical nerve nets.
These function as GABA-modulated ‘AND gates’ that
convert the separate packets of unbound information
in its inputs into an efferent signal that carries the
binding information essential for consciousness and
other brain functions. This function may also be
relevant to processing of synchronized oscillation by
the claustrum. Different anatomical regions of the
claustrum may exert this function for sensory binding,
computation of the significance of reinforcement in a
complex environment, and other higher brain functions.
We also suggest the outlines of a mechanism by
which the cortex may process this input from the
claustrum. We review the manner in which this
hypothesis explains the present data. There is at
present no other detailed hypothesis in this field.
Key words: Claustrum, consciousness, binding,
coincidence detection, AND gate, GABAergic
interneurons, gap-junction linked networks, salvinorin
A.

A novel approach to the scientific understanding of phenomenal awareness is presented that accepts consciousness as ontologically fundamental and is based on the hypothesis that the whole range of phenomenal nuances is inherent in the frequency spectrum of a ubiquitous field of consciousness. Pursuing this idea, it is postulated that the brain employs a universal interaction mechanism through which it taps into this field, thereby acquiring phenomenal qualities. I argue that the edifice of modern physics can not only offer a promising candidate for the field of consciousness, consisting in the zero-point field (ZPF), but also an appropriate interaction mechanism. What is more, the empirical body of evidence supports the conclusion that conscious processes make use of exactly this mechanism. More specifically, the neural correlates of consciousness suggest that in the stimulus-oriented operating mode the brain produces streams of consciousness by periodically writing information states into the ZPF, while in the stimulus-independent operating mode the brain is receptive to previously generated ZPF information states that constitute the repository of conscious experiences, implying that self-referential conscious states are retrieved by periodically reading information states from the ZPF. Beyond its explanatory power the presented approach opens up new horizons for the future research strategy.

Mathematical physics relies foundationally on symbols, for expressing e.g. hypothetical relationships between various natural phenomena. Curiously, to date, both mathematical physics and science more generally have lacked an explicit symbolism for conscious experience. Consequently, physical theory has simply overlooked a number of acute problems with standard theories of the brain-experience relationship – as well as overlooking a number of problems and opportunities for physics itself, and for science-as-a-whole!
This paper remedies the notational gap in current physical theory, by defining a new symbol class for conscious experience. Of course, it could be that new symbols are trivial. But this paper refutes that possibility directly, uncovering new and fundamentally-interesting content in six experience-related topic-areas (emergence, experiments, evolution, spatiotemporal relationships, theories-of-everything, and the foundations of science). Ten specific puzzles are identified as future research directions.

In this article, I present a novel approach to the scientific understanding of consciousness. It is based on the hypothesis that the full range of phenomenal qualities is built into the frequency spectrum of a ubiquitous background field and proceeds on the assumption that conscious systems employ a universal mechanism by means of which they are able to extract phenomenal nuances selectively from this field. I set forth that in the form of the zero-point field (ZPF) physics can offer a promising candidate that is qualified for playing the dual role as both the carrier of energy and consciousness. The appropriate mechanism, which rests upon the principle of dy-namical coupling of ZPF modes, is a unique feature of quantum systems, suggesting that the dividing line between conscious and non-conscious systems is defined by the differentiation between quantum systems and classical systems. The presence of this mechanism in the brain is supported by the neurophysiological body of evidence, leading to a consistent explanation of the dynamical properties of the neural correlates of consciousness. Building on these findings, I lay the foundations for the conceptually coherent integration of consciousness into the physical worldview, derive an indicator for the quantity of consciousness of a given system, and outline the further steps toward a theory of consciousness.

One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.

Every living organism is characterized by two different classes of complex physical field patterns. These constitute (1) the ‘life force’ or biofield and (2) the mind-consciousness complex. The biofield deals with the normal biological functions of anatomy and physiology, which can be represented by a complex three-dimensional matter/energy field pattern within the overall quantized space-time continuum. But the particles, atoms and molecules that comprise that material body can also be associated with a pattern of changing electrical charges and associated fields that generate an even more complex pattern of magnetic field variations (constituting magnetic domains in various groupings) around them. Together these complex field patterns of electric scalar and magnetic vector potential constitute the mind and consciousness that are characteristic of all living organisms.This physical model has grave consequences because it directly implies the survival of consciousness/mind beyond material body, a new form of non-traditional top-down evolution from consciousness to the organism and DNA and the necessity of new as yet unrealized higher senses that are a result of directly realizing and experiencing the higher embedding fifth space-like dimension that is required by the physics of our commonly experienced four-dimensional space-time continuum. The awareness of ‘self’ that normally characterizes the present level of human consciousness is a product of the normal three-dimensional world of experience and evolved according to the physics of the four-dimensional space-time continuum some forty to one-hundred thousand years ago, therefore the existence of a higher embedding physical (though non-material) dimension implies that we either have evolved or are presently evolving a second higher self that can take advantage of the embedding space just as our material awareness utilizes the four-dimensional space-time continuum and that we are still evolving an even higher level of consciousness. The human species is not just still evolving, but the rate of evolution is accelerating which strongly implies that we are on the threshold of a new evolutionary leap forced on us by a newly emerging higher level complexity of consciousness.

The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) along with Daniel Dennett's (1991) Multiple Drafts Model (MDM) of consciousness are renowned cognitive theories of consciousness bearing similarities and differences. Although Dennett displays sympathy for GWT, his own MDM does not seem to be fully compatible with it. This work discusses this compatibility, by asking if GWT suffers from Daniel Dennett's criticism of what he calls a "Cartesian Theater". We identified in Dennett 10 requirements for avoiding the Cartesian Theater. We believe that some of these requirements are violated by GWT, but not all, hence there is partial incompatibility with MDM, and it is nonsense to answer if GWT is or is not a Cartesian Theater. However, by asking such question we conclude that the issues around this discussion involve fuzzy claims about degrees of consciousness and we show how the Neuro-Astroglial Interaction Model (NAIM) is fit for solving such conceptual issues.

Abstract Ita
La recensione presenta la prospettiva enattivista difesa da Alva Noë, e ne discute alcuni aspetti specifici. Il pensiero, la coscienza e la cognizione non sono pienamente comprensibili, secondo l’enattivismo di Noë, senza un’adeguata considerazione del ruolo ricoperto dal corpo e dall’ambiente. Sarebbe quindi sbagliato continuare a pensare che il cervello da solo sia responsabile dei processi cognitivi umani: il programma che ricerca i correlati neurali della coscienza sarebbe quindi destinato al fallimento dal principio, perché tralascia in partenza corpo e ambiente; i programmi di ricerca nel campo dell’intelligenza artificiale sarebbero ugualmente compromessi, non solo con una concezione computazionalista della cognizione, ma anche con la vecchia idea che un cervello artificiale sia sufficiente alla cognizione quanto un cervello naturale. Di seguito si prendono in esame due prospettive sperimentali su cui Noë fa grande affidamento: gli studi sulla plasticità neurale dei furetti svolti da Mriganka Sur e altri (ad alcuni furetti neonati viene ricablata la connessione nervosa, permettendo la visione grazie al sistema costituito da occhi e corteccia uditiva), e la realizzazione di un sistema di sostituzione visuo-tattile da parte di Paul Bach-Y-Rita (un sistema che permette di vedere mediante la connessione tra una fotocamera e la corteccia somatosensoriale). Per Noë si tratta di elementi cruciali in supporto alla propria prospettiva: in realtà, come emerge dalla breve analisi, l’attribuire loro un significato così chiaro e univoco pro-enattivismo è qualcosa di molto meno scontato. Infine, segue un breve bilancio del libro di Noë, dove gli elementi d’interesse del volume sono presentati insieme all’individuazione di alcuni punti deboli, che il testo condivide con la gran parte degli studi che in vario modo fanno leva sull’intuizione legata all’embodiement: da un lato una difficoltà strutturale riguarda la possibilità di identificare con chiarezza gli elementi costitutivi del mentale; dall’altro lato, il riferimento a forme di esternalismo radicale sembra ugualmente comportare diversi problemi.
Abstract Eng
The review presents Alva Noë’s enactivist view, and aims at discussing some of its ideas. Thought, consciousness, and cognition are not understandable, Noë claims, without taking into proper consideration the role played by the body and the environment. It would be wrong indeed to go on thinking that our brain alone is responsible for human cognitive processes: the program searching for the neural correlates of consciousness is hopeless in principle, because it neglects from the beginning the body and the environment; research programs in artificial intelligence are as well compromised, not only with a computationalist view of cognition, but also with the old idea that an artificial brain will suffice for cognition just like a natural one. Thereafter, two experimental perspectives, that Noë uses to support his view, are examined: Mriganka Sur’s studies on neural plasticity of ferrets (certain newborn ferrets have undergone a rewiring of their nervous connection, permitting vision thanks to the system constituted by their eyes and auditory cortex), and Paul Bach-Y-Rita’s tactile-visual substitution system (it connects a camera to somatosensory cortex allowing a kind of vision). Noë argues that these results are crucial in supporting his view, but, as the discussion highlights, their pro-enactivism meaning is not so clear and unambiguous. Finally, a balance of the book follows, where the many elements of interest are presented together with the acknowledgment of some weak points, that the book shares with the majority of the proposals that deal with the embodiment’s insight: on the one hand, a structural difficulty concerns the possibility to identify clearly the constitutive elements of the mental; on the other hand, the reference to radical versions of externalism seems to entail many difficulties as well.

The question of whether conscious experience is restricted by cognitive access and exhausted by report, or whether it overflows it—comprising more information than can be reported—is hotly debated. Recently, we provided evidence in favor of Overflow, showing that observers discriminated the color-diversity (CD) of letters in an array, while their working-memory and attention were dedicated to encoding and reporting a set of cued letters. An alternative interpretation is that CD-discriminations do not entail conscious experience of the underlying colors. Here we argue, based on conceptual considerations and consistency with neuroscience and phenomenology, in favor of the Overflow interpretation.

Perceptual phenomena such as spatio-temporal illusions and masking are typically explained by psychological (cognitive) processing theories or large-scale neural theories involving inter-areal connectivity and neural circuits comprising of hundreds or more interconnected single cells. Subcellular mechanisms are hardly used for such purpose. Here, a mechanistic theoretical view is presented on how a subcellular brain mechanism of integration of presynaptic signals that arrive at different compartments of layer-5 pyramidal neurons could explain a couple of spatiotemporal visual-phenomenal effects unfolding along very brief time intervals within the range of the sub-second temporal scale.

Solving the problem of consciousness remains one of the biggest challenges in modern science. One key step towards understanding consciousness is to empirically narrow down neural processes associated with the subjective experience of a particular content. To unravel these neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) a common scientific strategy is to compare perceptual conditions in which consciousness of a particular content is present with those in which it is absent, and to determine differences in measures of brain activity (the so called "contrastive analysis"). However, this comparison appears not to reveal exclusively the NCC, as the NCC proper can be confounded with prerequisites for and consequences of conscious processing of the particular content. This implies that previous results cannot be unequivocally interpreted as reflecting the neural correlates of conscious experience. Here we review evidence supporting this conjecture and suggest experimental strategies to untangle the NCC from the prerequisites and consequences of conscious experience in order to further develop the otherwise valid and valuable contrastive methodology.

The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The main theoretical idea that emerges as a consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate of a perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between content-processing and consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper elaborates this distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of consciousness.