Myth of Er

Tomando por base principalmente o passo 17 do livro II das Meditações (Tá eis heautón), buscaremos analisar a relação que se institui entre filosofia (philosophia) e vida (bíos) nas reflexões desenvolvidas pelo imperador filósofo Marco Aurélio. Diante da constatação da precariedade da vida humana, tão somente a filosofia – enquanto exercício cotidiano seja de notar, atentar e observar; seja de cuidar, velar e proteger o deus interior (terein ton endon daimona) – desponta como guia para a travessia da existência. Consistindo num método capaz de explicitar o vínculo entre partes e todo, a filosofia termina por nos convocar a uma disposição amorosa em que se torna a entrelaçar psykhé e cosmos, sem a qual não parece possível adotar um modo de vida conforme a natureza (kata physin).

From the addressees of the questions within the dialogues one could infer the addressees of the dialogues themselves; in that case, the dialogues would have been written primarily for students of the Academy as exercise-textbooks or as the basis of their discussions. Because of their training in Platonic philosophy the students were certainly in a position to solve the text's puzzles and aporias and to supplement the missing proofs. The dialogues' references beyond themselves would in this way be brought into line with an assumed procedure in the Academy's teaching of philosophy, or even be explained by it. There is no room for doubt that on this assumption we would have a meaningful reading of at least the very aporetic dialogues.

In this paper, I examine Aristotle’s position on the theory of the soul as a self-moving entity in the light of a less nega-tive conception of his discussion with his predecessors. For this purpose, I discuss the hypothesis according to which Aristotle is producing the concepts necessary for his own research through a critique of Plato’s claims. I show that, more than a criticism, what we are witnessing is a process of conceptual appropriation where Aristotle filters an opinion to make a better use of it. I sup-port my argument by showing how Aristotle’s exegetical device works and how it could be connected to his own definitional procedures in De Anima’s book II.

Tzetz. Ex. II. p. 27, 11 Hermann φυσικών φημί καΐ αστρονομικών, μαγικών τ€ και τών τοιούτων, έπεί και ολίγοις τα τοιαύτα έπιτερπή, άλλως 1 τε δέ και Όρφεύς και έτεροι περί τοιούτων συγγεγραφήκεσαν. 720 Τ (ρ. 267 Κ.) SCHOL. Lycophr. Alex. p. 3, 29 Scheer γράφει δε ό Όρφευς χωρίς τών αστρολογικών και έπωιδικών καΐ μαγικών κτλ. 721 Τ (Τ 225 Κ.) CONST. LASCARIS Προλεγόμενα τού σοφού Όρφέως 77 (35 Martinez Manzano), plura invenies in fr. 1018 VI κατέλιπε (sc. Όρφεύς)... αστρολογικά κτλ. 722 Τ (Τ 236 Κ.) ΙΟΑΝΝ. MALAL. Chronograph. 13,36 (265 Thum) έπί δέ της-βασιλείας αύτού (Γρατιανού a. 367-383) θέων ό σοφώτατος φιλόσοφος (fr. 1136) έδίδασκε καΙ έρμήνευεν τά αστρονομικά και τά 'Ερμού τού Τρισμεγίστου συγγράμματα και τά Όρφέως.

It is well known that Aristotle tries to make room for self-motion-an idea he inherits to some extent from Plato-within his other commitments, such as the principle that every effect has a causal antecedent, while at the same time modifying the concept of a self-mover. However, one argument in Physics vii 1 seems to pose a problem for the bare possibility of self-motion; in it he seems to argue that everything in motion must be moved by something else. If this were true, then it would seem to pose a problem for the possibility of something self-moving at all. For what is self-motion but being in motion without being moved by anything else? The text in which this argument appears is itself vexed on a number of fronts, because it is not clear how Physics vii fits with the rest of the Physics, and also because there are two distinct manuscript traditions for Physics vii. For this reason, the argument in Physics vii 1 has not been adequately taken into account in discussions of self-motion. 1 A preliminary note about the text: there are two extant versions of Physics vii 1-3 (though not for chapters 4-5). This creates special interpretive difficulties for us, which I will briefly describe here. The two versions are referred to as α and β. These versions were known to Simplicius in late antiquity and left their traces in the MSS tradition of the Physics: some MSS have one version, others the other, and yet others have combined or contaminated versions. In Ross's OCT, the two versions are kept apart and have been printed separately. The Greek I use here is from the OCT. Ross treats the α as the main text, relegating the β to an appendix. Most English translations of the Physics include a translation of only the α, entirely excluding the β. Like Lang, but contra Wardy and Olshewsky, 2 I think 1 Bostock 1996, lxix-lxx writes: 'I believe that, if Aristotle had himself prepared his Physics for publication, he would have omitted VII altogether. …Aristotle intended the whole of Book vii to be superseded by the whole of Book viii.' Simplicius 1.1036.11-12 and his predecessors seem to concur Phys. vii's five chapters just seem to be various points about motion and change: on self-motion and infinite chains of movers (vii 1); contiguity between mover and moved (vii 2); alteration takes place only in sensible qualities (vii 3); what makes changes incomparable (vii 4); and the exceptions to the principle that power acting is to weight moved as distance covered is to time taken (vii 5). Moreover, Phys. viii draws on many theses and theorems established in previous sections of the Physics. It refers back to Phys. ii at viii 1.251a8-10; to Phys. iii at viii 3.253b7-9 and at viii 5.257a34; to Phys. v at viii 8.262a1-2; and to Phys. vi at viii 8.263a11-12 and viii 10.267b21. But viii does not once refer to vii. 2 Wardy 1990, 243: 'α and β do not draw the same conclusion from VII's unsatisfactory opening argument: according to α, "this moves itself" entails "this is moved by something" (e.g. 242a47); according to β, 'this moves itself' entails 'this is moved by something else' (e.g. 242a12-13).'

If the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost to us at birth, and afterwards by the use of the senses we recover that which we previously knew, will not that which we call learning be a process of recovering our knowledge, and may not this be rightly termed recollection by us? .. (Therefore) our souls must have existed before they were in the form of man-without bodies, and must have had intelligence." Socrates (as reported in Phaedo 72c-82e "On the Soul" written by Plato) Plato by Conego 1783 In Plato's REPUBLIC the last chapter is about the "Myth of Er"-myth being a term for "story of" rather than "Made up story about." Either way, if what Er had to say about the flipside is accurate, then some of his story, or all of his story should follow the same architecture that others have said about the afterlife.

JOSÉ MANUEL CURADO (Universidade do Minho) «If there is such a thing as 'otherworld journey studies', it is thus a field whose materiais are almost endlessly varied and whose contributors, approaching from their separate disciplines, rarely see eye to eye.» (Carol G. Zaleski, Otherwold Journeys, 1987). «The study of death is of crucial importance for the understanding of mental processes.» (Stanislav Grof e Joan Halifax, The Human Encounter With Death, 1977). No momento em que formula a inolvidável questão «Porque são preciosas as pedras preciosas?», Aldous Huxley recolhe, em Heaven and Hell', um dos mais belos ensaios do século XX, a passagem HOc-lllc do Fédon de Platão. «(.. .) the words of Socrates, in the Phaedo, take on a new significance. There exists, he tells us, an ideal world above and beyond the world of matter. 'In this other earth the colors are much purer and much more brilliant than they are down here.. . The very mountains, the very stones have a richer gloss, a lovelier transparency and intensity of hue. The precious stones of this : 1

My talk today is mostly a philosophical look at some issues in the history of observation, but I will look at some biographical issues as well. I shall be arguing for some sceptical theses, to mark off what we do not know and to emphasize what is likely. Many discussions in the history of astronomy in the 4th century, I fear, have taken on a theological tone. If such and such is possible, it must be so, especially if it is consistent with our prior ideology. In this, as in so many other academic fields, we have the grand pendulum. One hundred years ago, the boys from Cyzicus were doing careful observations to build astronomical theories. Today, in the words of one, dare I say, theologian, they made no observations at all and took what pittance they had of data from Babylon. As with music, between the heavy romantics of a hundred years ago and the minimalists of the present, I tend to prefer something in between, although I can still admire both. I shall also be concerned with eviden...

This note contains the text and translation of imperial edicts that chart the progress of Christianity from an illegal faith to a legal faith to the dominant faith of the Empire. The edicts in question were issued by Galerius (311), Constantine/Licinius (315) and Theodosius (380). The sources of these documents are: Lactantius de mortibus persecutorum for the texts of Galerius (§34) and Constantine/Licinius (§48) and the codex theodosianus xvi 1, 2 for that of Theodosius. Greek versions of the Galerius and Constantine/Licinius Edicts can also be found in Eusebius historia ecclesiastica 8 ch. 17 § § 3-and Bk 10 ch. 5 § §2-14 respectively. I have not translated the Greek text, but have added notes to the parallel Greek and Latin texts that follow.

Bu calismada, Phaidon diyalogunda one suruldugu haliyle anamnesis kuramini noetik ve dianoetik anamnesis arasinda yapilan kavramsal ayrimdan hareketle ele almak uzere, diyalogda ifade edilen anamnesis kurami kanitlamasini analiz edecek ve kanitlamanin nasil kurulabilecegi konusunda bir oneride bulunacagiz. Buradan hareketle, Phaidon diyalogunda soz konusu olan anamnesis turunun, noetik anamnesis oldugunu; bu anamnesis turunun eidoslarin episteme duzeyindeki bilgisini acikladigini; noetik anamnesis edimini ise ancak bir sophos olan Sokrates’in gerceklestirebildigini savunacagiz.

Let us first begin by defining ἀρετή in its classical usage before it is shown how Plato redefines it. In the time of ancient Greece, a history which is safeguarded by the Homeric poems, there was one perfect ἀγαθός; he was Achilles. Not only was he the bravest soldier, but he was also the best at maintaining the οἶκος. The former, ᾰ̓ νδρείᾱ, is necessary for one to maintain their οἶκος, which is to be translated as household. This condition-bravery as necessary for maintaining the οἶκος-expresses what is essential for the fundamental socioeconomic unit of antiquity, that is, the essence of ἀρετή and ἀγαθός, for the two cannot be separated, is one's ability in battle. In other words, for Achilles to be the perfect ἀγαθός, i.e., the archetypical good person, he must have the most physical courage coupled with the greatest ability in battle, which thereby secures his household. Ἀρετή, generally translated as virtues, are the properties of ἀγαθός, i.e., the good person is only good insofar as he possesses certain virtuous qualities. However, the common people, the δῆμος, are naturally excluded from possessing these qualities. They are considered to be κᾰκόςi, that is, common people are bad in the sense that they are immoral with respect to their intrinsic worth. Now, The Iliad and The Odyssey not only reflected the values of society, but Homer also identified and exemplified the values of a small number of individuals who possessed political power. Those who possessed the latter were, at the time, called aristocrats, heroes, or kings. Achilles was such a hero; for Achilles was able to maintain his οἶκος, by virtue of his bravery, through constant combat. Furthermore, he was the male head of this social unit where only his ἀρετή is of importance. Other members of the household, however, did have ἀρετή specific to their function, e.g., the ἀρετή of the women in the household, the wife, was anything done in accordance with their function

Zoilus of Amphipolis, known as the Homeromastix, the scourge of Homer, was a fourth-century rhetorician and critic renowned for his treatise Against Homer’s Poetry, a fragmentary collection of criticisms of Homer. Modern scholars consistently take his critiques of Homer at face value. They explain them either as a polemical exercise conducted in a sophistic fashion (BUFFIÈRE), or as an attempt at alerting Homer’s readers against the moral and technical shortcomings of his poetry (BISHOP). I argue, instead, that Zoilus’ “attacks” are best understood as a hermeneutical fiction characteristic of zetematic literature.
Originally sympotic pastimes (SLATER; JACOB), zetemata were literary investigations framed as questions and answers. Heraclides of Pontus and Aristotle, each of whom compiled a collection of zetemata on Homer, provide guides for understanding the genre. Particular to the zetematic “genre”, I demonstrate, is its agonistic framework. Interlocutor A plays the part of the prosecution and accuses the poet of a series of poetical flaws. Interlocutor B plays the part of the defense, and tries to invalidate the arguments of the prosecution. Ultimately, this framework, I contend, is a fiction: there are neither actual “detractors” nor “defenders” of poetry, prompted by consistently different agendas. The roles are part of the genre, they are interchangeable, and zetematic critics typically plays them both. Even Heraclides and Aristotle, who are consistently considered as defenders of Homer, often lend their voices to the prosecution (see F 99; 100; 101 SCHÜTRUMPF and F 384; 390; 391; 394; 395 GIGON).
Zoilus’ attacks of Homer, I argue, should be approached in a similar way. First, I note that the sources (especially the scholia to Homer) present Zoilus’ attacks as part of a zetematic framework. They match Zoilus’ criticisms with corresponding solutions, and introduce them with the same expressions with which they stage the voice of the prosecution in other known zetematic works (see e.g. γελοῖος, it is ludicrous, at F 26; 28; 35; 38 FRIEDLAENDER, αἰτιάομαι, to accuse, at F 32 FRIED., or ἄτοπον, it is awkward, at F 31; 38; 39 FRIED.). Moreover, the sheer length of Zoilus’ work, a collection in 9 books, suggests that he was animated by a genuine exegetical effort rather than polemical intent. Finally, although scholars unanimously agree that Zoilus only devised critiques of Homer, I discuss fragments such as F 33 FRIEDLAENDER, where Zoilus suggests an emendation to a problematic passage of Homer, proving that his work also contributed to the “defense” of the poet.
Often seen as an anti-Homer manifesto, Zoilus’ treatise, I conclude was, instead, an exegetical guide to Homeric poetry, and played a significant role in shaping ancient discussions of the epics. With it, Zoilus entered the zetematic arena. Soon after the publication of his treatise, critics, including Megaclides (see F11 JANKO) and Aristotle (Ar. Poet. 1461a9 and 1461a15), rose to the challenges he posed: they acknowledged the critiques devised by the famous Homeromastix and advanced their own solutions to them.

We analyze the process of metamorphosis in Greek 'mythographers' as the 'decisive moment' when a person is transformed. We begin with examples drawn from Antoninus Liberalis for showing the role of verbal aspect in the narrative, then some devices of metamorphosis, such as the wand and the touch by a god. Disappearing appears as a form of metamorphosis. The study of the 'instant before' shows the importance of pursuit and impossible flight. Incestuous loves appear in Antoninus Liberalis, but with more frequency in Parthenius of Nicaea, which allows to imagine that Freud could have found benefit studying these texts for his theory, especially with the narrative of Periandros' mother and the expression of pleasure felt by the son in the relation with his mother (he does not know then who she is). We analyze the kinship between metamorphosis and metaphor, important for poetry and visual arts. We conclude with the link between metamorphosis and the notion of rites of passage, and for love stories being told for the pleasure of both author and audience. Pursuit and impossible flight eventually appear as a means for the pursued girl of escaping and yielding, for the pursuer as a means of giving up sexual possession and keeping forever a substitute as the syrinx or the laurel.

Aristotle is still credited in several studies dealing mostly with medieval science with the so-called theory of antiperistasis, by which he allegedly explained the motion of the projectiles. 1 Nonetheless, antiperistasis is the first of two theories to which Aristotle refers with regard to the motion of the projectiles, passingly in Physics iv 8 and more amply in Physics viii 10, where it is actually rejected in favour of the second theory. Several commentators fail to notice the strict analogy between the two passages and wrongly take Aristotle as expounding and endorsing just one theory in Physics viii 10, which would be (a refined version of) the theory of antiperistasis. As a result, Aristotle's account of forced motion has been repeatedly misunderstood. 2 As is well known, according to the Stagirite, the natural elements that constitute the universe are either heavy or light or weightless; the heavy elements, i.e., earth and water, naturally move towards the centre, the light elements, i.e., air and fire, naturally move away from the centre, and the weightless element, i.e., the ether that occupies the supralunary region of the universe, naturally moves around the centre. 3 The problem with the projectiles, which are heavy by nature (φύσει), was not that they do not immediately move downwards, since this was explained as the result of a forced, unnatural (βίαιος or παρὰ φύσιν) motion provided by the thrower's hand. The real problem was that the projectile continued to move for some time, while there was no mover to move it. Here is how a historian of science presents the difficulty that Aristotle had to face: Projectile motion posed a…problem for Aristotle. In the case of a thrown object, the force was provided by the hand of the thrower as long as the object was in contact with the hand. But one needed an explanation of why the object continued to move once it had left the thrower's hand. Aristotle concluded that the medium through which the projectile moved provided the force that kept it moving. This occurred either by antiperistasis (replacement), in which the medium rushes around the 1 See, for instance, Gabrovsky 2015, 40: 'There were many problems with Aristotle's theory of antiperistasis: in Aristotle's argument a stone that is thrown moves the air, and the air propels the stone as it fills in the vacuum left behind.' 2 Various accounts of medieval science treat the theory of antiperistasis as a standard part of a general Aristotelian theory of motion; see, e.g., Grant 1974, 275-280. Nevertheless, medieval thinkers themselves, such as Thomas Aquinas and Jean Buridan, clearly distinguished between the two theories in both passages; cf.

Abstract: Great Lakes Philosophy Conference 2018
“Not her fault: The Ethical Implications of Gender and Uterine Diseases in Hippocrates’ On the Nature of Women.”

The Hippocratic treatise On the Nature of Women is largely devoted to describing women’s diseases and their possible treatments.  Modern readers might expect a text by this title to describe the “essence” of women.  Instead, however, the treatise reads like a list of illnesses that are primarily caused by a uterus and facilitated by the moist and loose flesh of a woman’s body.  Why does a treatise that claims to describe the “nature” of women spend so much time talking about genitalia? This paper will answer this question and in doing so explore how ancient Greek medical writers imagined the female person:  What is the “nature” of a woman?  Is it determined purely by her anatomy? If so, can a woman be held responsible for her suffering?  In order to answer these questions, this paper takes up a systematic analysis of uterine diseases and their treatments in Hippocrates’ On the Nature of Women.

On May 2017-05-25 at Kalamazoo I proposed to survey the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and τὸ τί ἐστι texts in Aristotle’s Metaphysics identified by Albert Schwegler in “Τὸ τί ἐστι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι und der Gebrauch des Dativs in der Formel τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι” (Excurs I from his edition of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Tübingen 1847-48, vol. IV, 369-379). I have drafted a translation of that study and am supplementing it with selected English versions of the passages in question. For my spring 2018 seminar I have prepared a matrix in which to tabulate the 41 relevant Aristotelian passages from the Metaphysics with the various English versions published since the first one published in 1801. The participants in this seminar will be undergraduate philosophy majors innocent of Greek; the task will be for each participant to advance the notions of “essence” in a few of the forty available English versions with a view to comparing their philosophical significance. I hope to bring the results of this study to bear upon Averroes’s Tafsīr mā bacd aṭ-ṭabīcat and its Latin translation, and in St. Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

δρ Ιωάννης Γ. Νεραντζής,
Αιτωλών, βίος, πολιτεία, κοινωνία, ιστορία - Αναφορές εις την αρχαία Ελληνική Γραμματεία - T.L.G. -  Λεξικογραφικός Πανδέκτης αρχαίων ελλήνων συγγραφέων με αποσπάσματα έργου αυτών με αναφορές εις την Αιτωλία και τους Αιτωλούς ως την ύστερη αρχαιότητα (5ος μ.Χ. αιώνας). Λεξικογράφηση - T.L.G. -  και για την αποδελτίωση δρ. Ιωάννης Γ. Νεραντζής

The concept of the highest good is an important but hardly uncontroversial piece of Kant’s moral philosophy. In the considerable literature on the topic, challenges are raised concerning its apparently heteronomous role in moral motivation, whether there is a distinct duty to promote it, and more broadly whether it is ultimately to be construed as a theological or merely secular ideal.  Yet comparatively little attention has been paid to the context of a doctrine that had enjoyed a place of prominence in the ethical systems of the ancients, where these systems provided a key critical foil for the development of Kant’s own conception of the highest good in terms of “happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality” (cf. 5:110).  Indeed, these ethical systems prove important for Kant not only in his initial presentation of his account in the Canon of Pure Reason in the first Critique, where he sought to redress the errors of the Epicurean and Stoic conception in particular, but also and importantly in the course of his development towards the second Critique. As I argue in this paper, Christian Garve’s defense of a revised but recognizably Stoic conception of the highest good in his translation of and commentary on Cicero’s De officiis (On Duties), helps to account for Kant’s renewed attention to that doctrine, and specifically to the errors attending the Stoic version, in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.

"a new awareness of time and history" en E.J. Jurji, Religious pluralism and world community. Interfaith and international communication (studies in the history of religions [supplements to Numen XV]), Leiden, E. summary This paper explores the ways in which the Greek mind derived a notion of time's cyclical nature from the sleep/wakefulness alternation, as well as the influence of sleep/death dichotomies on Greek views of eternity. Particular attention is paid to figures in myth and history, such as the Sleeping Cronos, Endymion, Cleobis and Biton, the Cretan Epimenides and the Sardinian heroes. Hace unos años s. G. Brandon 1 tuvo el acierto de poner en la conciencia del tiempo un posible origen de la religión. El hombre es el único entre los seres vivos capaz de percibir el tiempo en sus tres categorías: pasado, presente, futuro, y si esto le hace superior a todos ellos por haberle conferido la capacidad de planificar, le quita la de gozar en plenitud el presente, por el convencimiento mismo de no poder instalarse en él indefinidamente, no sólo porque las cosas cambian, sino porque él también está en continuo cambio. El hom-bre sabe que le espera la decadencia y al final la muerte y, enfrenta-do a esta perspectiva, busca cómo zafarse de ella. y del deseo de

Il saggio di Fulvia de Luise – L’involontarietà socratica del male e il macigno della responsabilità platonica. Tra il Protagora e il mito di Er – costituisce un tentativo di ricostruzione della posizione platonica sulla questione della libertà morale, attraverso i movimenti di vera e propria metamorfosi che investono la figura di Socrate nei Dialoghi. Senza proporsi di distinguere ciò che appartenne realmente a Socrate da ciò che Platone gli attribuisce, l’autrice intende porre a confronto due luoghi della rappresentazione platonica in cui il personaggio Socrate prende posizione in merito alla responsabilità individuale, con esiti apparentemente divergenti: il noto passaggio del Protagora in cui Socrate afferma che chi fa il male lo fa involontariamente, a causa dell’ignoranza; la perentoria asserzione contenuta nel mito di Er (Repubblica X), che attribuisce al soggetto umano una responsabilità assoluta nella gestione delle proprie scelte morali. Un’analisi mirata delle strategie rappresentative seguite da Platone nei due dialoghi, dove è sempre presente il filo conduttore del confronto tra Socrate e i poeti, conduce a un’ipotesi di sostanziale continuità e di perdurante socratismo tra i due contesti, in cui la validità della scelta morale resta vincolata al primato del sapere.

Bu çalışmada ruh ve onun yapmış olduğu diyalektik yolculuk, Er Mitos'u ile ele alınmıştır. Ruh, idealar dünyasından yeryüzüne inmiş ve tanrısal bir kaynaktan meydana gelmiştir. Duyumlanabilir olan bu alemde beden ile mündemiç olan ruh, çevresindeki tikellerden hareketle, anımsama tekniği ile tümelin bilgisine ulaşma çabasındadır. Bu nedenle bilgi bir anımsama'dan ibarettir. Platon'un doğuştan gelen bilgi (a priori) konusu, "ruhun önceden başka bir yaşama sahip olduğu" konusuyla yakından ilgilidir.

Resumo: A transformação mágica de humanos em animais é tema recorrente na literatura antiga. O artigo propõe investigar a singularidade dessa metamorfose em Lúcio ou o asno-narrativa ficcional em prosa-, a partir da compreensão de elementos políticos específicos ao século II, a saber, a valorização da tradição e cultura helênicas sob o patrocínio dos imperadores antoninos. Para tanto, o ideal platônico de filósofo rei será cotejado com o conceito de cidade interior proposto por Marco Aurélio. A conclusão é de que a ficcionalidade da narrativa em prosa, invenção própria do período pesquisado, foi capaz de expressar um comportamento político que evidencia os silêncios e o não dito oriundos de uma nova consciência do tempo histórico. Palavras-chave: Lúcio ou o asno; romance grego; helenismo; Império Romano. Abstract: The magical transformation of humans into animals is a recurring theme in ancient literature. The article proposes to investigate the singularity of this metamorphosis in The Ass-a fictional narrative in prose-from the understanding of specific political elements to the second century, namely, the valorization of Hellenic tradition and culture under the patronage of the Antonine emperors. For this, the Platonic ideal of philosopher king will be compared with the concept of Marcus Aurelius' inner city. The conclusion is that the fictional narrative in prose, a peculiar invention of this period, was able to express a political behavior that shows the silences and the unspoken coming from a new awareness of historical time.

Resumo: O presente texto consiste numa proposta de tradução para a língua portuguesa do chamado Mito de Er, com o qual Platão conclui a República. A edição utilizada foi a estabelecida por Siem Slings na coleção Oxford Classical Texts (Platonis Respublica, Oxford University Press, 2003). O objetivo das notas é apenas esclarecer as opções de tradução mais discutíveis. Palavras-chave: Platão; República; Mito de Er.

This paper focuses on Plato's compressed theodicy in the Republic's Myth of Er, which stems from the famous αιτία λομένου· θεος αναίτιος verdict, found at 617e4–5. Its direct implication is the understanding that the souls of the Myth are autonomous in making their choices, and therefore morally responsible for their decisions and actions. God is thus exonerated of all blame for the disappointments and sufferings they are going through, and his beneficent nature is defended, at least within the confines of the Myth's rudimentary theodicy. It is my opinion that Plato is indeed justified in upholding such views. In order to demonstrate that, I shall try to argue that the claim of individual responsibility – upon which Plato's theodicy in the Myth of Er is exclusively founded – withstands the charges of determinism and infinite regress of accountability, leveled against it by Annas, Halliwell, et al., and McPherran, Inwood, et al., respectively. I shall also try to make a case against Annas' and Thayer's allegations that the memory loss, which is one of the consequences of the reincarnation process, absolves the agent from culpability for the mistakes committed in his/her previous lives, because such loss implicates discontinuity of personal identity. Before engaging with this issues, however, I shall attempt to provide a possible Platonic account of the concept of freedom of choice – the basic precondition for moral responsibility – as employed in the Myth of Er.

Resumen
Presentamos los términos, y sus distintos matices, con los que Aristóteles designa el universo: κόσμος, τὸ ὅλον, τὸ πᾶν, τὰ πάντα, τὰ πράγματα, τὰ ὄντα y φύσις. El caso de ‘cielo’ (οὐρανός) es singular, dado que puede sonar extraño llamar con este nombre a toda la realidad. En consecuencia, mostramos las habilidades filológicas que exhibe Aristóteles para determinar tres sentidos del término. Estos se entienden mejor en el contexto de la doctrina filosófica del lugar (τόπος), a la luz de la cual el ‘cielo’ es entendido como el lugar de todas las cosas o el universo mismo.
Palabras clave: Aristóteles – nombres – mundo – κόσμος – τὸ ὅλον – τὸ πᾶν – τὰ πάντα – τὰ πράγματα – τὰ ὄντα – φύσις – οὐρανός

Abstract
We present the subtle distinctions of the terms with which Aristotle names the universe: κόσμος, τὸ ὅλον, τὸ πᾶν, τὰ πάντα, τὰ πράγματα, τὰ ὄντα and φύσις. The case of ‘heaven’ (οὐρανός) is special, given that it might sound strange to call with this name all of reality. In consequence, we show the philological abilities that Aristotle exhibit to determine three senses of this term. These senses are better explained in the context of the philosophical doctrine of place (τόπος), in the light of which ‘heaven’ is understood as the place of all things, or the universe itself.
Key words: Aristotle – names – world – κόσμος – τὸ ὅλον – τὸ πᾶν – τὰ πάντα – τὰ πράγματα – τὰ ὄντα – φύσις – οὐρανός

The paper discusses the sections of the Republic in which Socrates does not undertake a discussion of the "longer way" (6.504a-7e) and instead substitutes an account of the sun (507e-9c), the line (509c-11e), and the cave (7.514a ff). It analyzes these passages not as metaphysical and political doctrine, but rather as part of a conversation between Socrates and Glaucon presented in literary form. More specifically, it analyzes the passages in relation to the sourcetexts Plato uses for their composition. The main source-text he rewrites is the Thrinakian episode of the Odyssey 12.260 ff. The paper concentrates on showing the direct importance of Homer's text for a reading of Socrates' description of the sun and the line. The ascent from the cave is a more complex literary composition and only a summary of its structure is presented.

The aim of this paper is to throw some additional light on the lot-casting episode of the Republic’s Myth of Er. It is largely a reaction to McPherran’s views presented in his 2010 chapter entitled “Virtue, Luck and Choice at the End of the Republic.” I agree with his statement that the purpose of the lottery is to somehow absolve the gods from responsibility for each soul’s choice of life and the subsequent happiness and badness attached to it. Unlike McPherran, however, I argue that this strategy is a successful one, and discloses no traces of divine interference, which would endanger its credibility. Nevertheless, although the lot-casting process effectively diverts the responsibility for its outcome from the gods onto tychē, the scope of this strategy is very narrow, and actually limited to the placement of the souls in the choice-queue. By the end of the paper I touch upon the concept of tychē as employed in the Myth, and conclude that it is equivalent to the folk concept of chance.

Fifth section of the first chapter of our online book "Winged Mythical Singers of Cosmic Music" (http://eprints.sim.ucm.es/23744/), where we deal with the hypothetical connections of the myth of Er with a Pythagorean exegesis of the "Odyssey" as an allegory of the heavenly journey of souls.

Continuation of the third section of the first chapter of our online book "Winged Mythical Singers of Cosmic Music" (http://eprints.ucm.es/23744/), where we deal with the iconography of the soul as a winged being, and with its similarities to the iconography of the sirens.